Differences in Maritime Traffic Protection Between the Navies of the United Kingdom and Japanese During World War II

It would be impossible for Taiwan to successfully fight a Taiwan contingency while maintaining its domestic systems and normal economic systems as they are in peacetime. In the post-Cold War world, the concept of a war of attrition, which had long dominated war planning, was considered outdated.[42] However, the outbreak of the Ukraine War and its subsequent course demonstrated that war involving the full strength of a nation (total war) can still occur in modern times. In particular, when a major power wages a war against a smaller nation, the smaller nation’s defensive war is forced to become a total war, and a Taiwan contingency would undoubtedly go the same way.

In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian government transitioned to a general mobilization system, increasing the strength of its defense forces (Ukrainian Army, National Guard, Border Guards, and Police) from approximately 250,000 to approximately 700,000 to one million active-duty soldiers. Military spending was increased to 34% of GDP, and all national tax revenue was allocated to the necessary expenditure of the military. This mobilization of human and material resources, despite the economic burden, has enabled Ukraine to maintain its defense capabilities over the long term. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government implemented swift emergency economic measures in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, with the objectives of maintaining national functions, stabilizing finances, and supporting the war effort. These policies put the priority on maintaining liquidity, securing foreign aid, simplifying the business environment, and reallocating resources to defense.[43]

Due to advances in science and technology, World War I transformed from a military-dominated form of warfare to one dominated by civilians and industry. Major post-war nations, recognizing that the wars expected to break out in the future would primarily involve civilians, aimed to build a system of national general mobilization (industrial mobilization) in which industry would play a leading role. According to Yasuo MORI of Doshisha University, national general mobilization did not mean totalitarianism; rather, it had the objective of balancing meeting military demand with securing civilian demand, so that democratic nations restrained military leadership and conducted military operations within the scope of meticulously calculated resource supplies.[44] Therefore, the national mobilization plan (industrial mobilization plan) was meant to prepare private businesses in advance to efficiently meet military demand during wartime while ensuring their continued profitability.

If the supply of energy and raw materials is delayed by war, government intervention in markets and industries, as well as control of critical resources, becomes necessary. There are various stages to this, from the minor measures taken by the Japanese government to adjust the energy market, such as drawing down oil reserves and providing subsidies for gasoline sales, in response to the disruption of energy transport and surge in crude oil prices triggered by the attack on Iran by the United States and Israel (February 2026), to measures like those implemented by the Ukrainian government, which involve direct government intervention, such as prioritized allocation of resources and electricity controls during times of tight supply.

Taiwan cannot receive support from friendly countries with shared land borders. If delays in overseas trade due to quarantines and blockades or commerce disruption similar to what Japan and the United Kingdom experienced in the last world war are anticipated, it would be desirable to mobilize industries from an early stage, including controlling electricity and raw materials, prioritizing allocation to the defense industry, and controlling the labor force. Rather than beginning intervention and control little by little as the situation worsens, preparing an industrial mobilization plan in advance with the participation of private businesses and institutionalizing the procedures would allow for efficient launching of the plan without disruptions, enabling Taiwan to fight for the long term.

The U.S. government’s Industrial Mobilization Plan (1939) included price controls, electricity and fuel, transportation, labor, wartime trade, facilities, and the mobilization of goods.[45] The scope of critical materials, assessments of substitution difficulty, supply structures, and supply chains change over time. Because Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is inextricably linked to the global economy, it is desirable that the plan also incorporate the import and distribution of materials supporting semiconductor manufacturing, as well as the export of finished products.

From the outset of the invasion, Russia repeatedly attacked critical infrastructure, and between 2022 and 2023, approximately half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity was either occupied by Russian forces or damaged by attacks. The energy sector holds vital strategic importance for Ukraine to continue its fight. [46] Although strict power rationing is in place, Ukraine is still forced to restrict the power supply through both planned and unplanned outages during heating seasons and nuclear power station maintenance periods.[47] Regarding food, it is estimated that by 2025, approximately five million people, or 15% of the population, faced food insecurity and were in need of food and livelihood assistance. Food insecurity remains most severe in ten of the most affected southern, eastern and northern oblasts, with a total of approximately 2.57 million people in need of assistance across these ten regions.[48] The Ukrainian government does not implement food rationing; instead, the United Nations World Food Programme and other organizations are providing assistance.

For Taiwan, which has difficulty receiving support from neighboring countries, a rationing system is surely of vital importance.

In the case of Japan and the United Kingdom, as the war clouds gathered, both governments strengthened their domestic stockpiles of military materials and, with the outbreak of war, initiated rationing of daily necessities. For both Japan and the United Kingdom, the top priority for military materials was fuel (for ships and aircraft). In the case of Japan, the navy, which accounted for 80% of the domestic stockpiles in peacetime, expanded its fuel reserves over many years, and by the outbreak of war (1941), it had established heavy oil tanks with a capacity of approximately 7.3 million kiloliters, and its stored oil amounted to 6.5 million kiloliters. Including the army and civilian stockpiles, the total reached 8.4 million kiloliters. However, this was only enough for one year and seven months of the final estimated annual consumption (5.2 million kiloliters).[49]

As summarized in Table 2, although there are differences in the social lives of Japan and the United Kingdom, in both countries the rationed daily necessities began with gasoline and expanded to food, fuel, and clothing as the war became more prolonged.

Learning from the above, the Taiwanese government should, in the lead up to a Taiwan contingency, first increase domestic stockpiles of energy resources such as oil and coal that can be stored for a long time and enhance its energy self-sufficiency ratio by restarting nuclear power plants. Secondly, it is desirable to prepare in advance a list of rationed commodities that are appropriate to Taiwan’s circumstances, and to activate phased rationing if a situation is expected where stable imports are disrupted. For example, with regard to energy resources, gradual restrictions and rationing should be strengthened from the stage before a crisis becomes apparent, such as administrative guidance to restrain consumption, restrictions on gasoline consumption, electricity controls, and planned outages.

For democratic countries, rationing cannot be implemented without the understanding and support of their citizens. To mitigate chaos during implementation, it is necessary to repeatedly conduct public awareness campaigns and exercises involving the public from the current stage onward.

Generally speaking, defense capabilities possessed during times of peace go no further than basic and core capabilities that can respond to all anticipated threats. After the Cold War, as the threat of large-scale, long-term war receded, Western countries always kept their defense budgets low, and it became common practice to expand armaments in anticipation of or in response to crises.

In anticipation of the outbreak of war against Germany, the Royal Navy halted the construction of capital ships and prioritized the construction of types of vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare. This was a result of assessing the geopolitical vulnerabilities of the United Kingdom as an island nation and the threat posed by the German Navy. In the case of the Imperial Japanese Navy, it continued to invest limited resources in the construction of capital ships, and only seriously focused on strengthening their anti-submarine vessels after the threat of unrestricted submarine warfare by the U.S. Navy became a reality. For that reason, when it expanded the operational area it had envisioned for many years southward to capture resources in the Dutch East Indies, it was unable to find an adequate approach to maritime traffic protection for the longer-distance sea lanes.

If Taiwan were to learn from the lessons of the navies of Japan and the United Kingdom regarding military preparedness, the lessons would be (1) accurate assessment of one’s own vulnerabilities and threats, and (2) a bold shift in resource allocation toward equipment that mitigates vulnerabilities if war is anticipated. Given the constraints on available resources and time, Taiwan should consider, like the Royal Navy, halting programs that are already under way and reallocating the freed-up resources to vital equipment.

Taiwan has built a strong multi-layered defense system to counter aggression from the mainland. On the other hand, judging from the force composition of the Taiwanese Navy, it has insufficient maritime traffic protection capabilities for mitigating the “twin vulnerabilities” concerning continuing warfare and maintaining social life. In the event of an imminent Taiwan contingency, the strengthening of the maritime traffic protection capability should be prioritized, particularly the ability to counter the submarines of China, which has 50 conventional submarines alone. For example, large-scale programs requiring long development periods, such as for new types of submarines, should be temporarily halted, and the freed-up resources should be used to build a large number of smaller anti-submarine vessels, such as corvettes. Following the example of the Royal Navy, it is worth considering requisitioning large fishing vessels, equipping them with anti-submarine equipment, and using them for harbor defense.

If even in the case of a quarantine imposed by law enforcement it would be difficult for Taiwan to stand up to China on its own for an extended period and the surrounding countries would not be able to avoid being impacted, Taiwan and the surrounding countries should cooperate from an early stage to protect maritime traffic.

There is no possibility that the United Nations would invoke collective security in the event of a Taiwan contingency. China would no doubt claim that the Taiwan contingency is a domestic issue, but Taiwan has met the qualification requirements to be treated as a state by the international community. Therefore, the state relations governing a Taiwan contingency would be relations between parties to the conflict and non-parties to the conflict, and as seen in the responses of various countries to the Ukraine War, the involvement of each of the surrounding countries in a Taiwan contingency would be left to their own judgment. In the past two world wars, Germany’s commerce raiding escalated into unrestricted submarine warfare in pursuit of high cost-effectiveness, leading neutral countries such as the United States to enter the war. If Taiwan’s resistance causes China to follow the same path as Germany, it would be desirable for Taiwan to cooperate closely with the surrounding countries that would be directly affected by a Taiwan contingency, and to also share the concept of joint escorts of important vessels.

In the lead-up to World War II, the United Kingdom quickly strengthened its maritime traffic protection system, but the issue of maritime transport continued to be a strategic Achilles’ heel for both the United Kingdom and the Allied powers. Even after the United States entered the war and began building transport ships, it was unable to transport the amount necessary for the war effort, the economy, and food supply, and it wasn’t until August 1942 that the tonnage built exceeded the tonnage of transport ships lost.[53] If the United Kingdom had neglected to prepare for commerce raiding as Japan did, its people may have fallen into poverty at an early stage, or it may have surrendered to Germany before the United States entered the war.

The Lai Ching-te administration in Taiwan is seriously working on a plan to strengthen the resilience of society as a whole. Taking it a step further, from the perspective that a Taiwan contingency would become a total war, it is necessary to learn from the lessons of Japan and the United Kingdom in the last world war and strive to strengthen the nation’s capacity to resist, for example, by expanding stockpiles of critical materials and formulating industrial mobilization plans.