Nuclear Threats, the Risk of Use, and Stagnation in Arms Control: Now Is the Time for a Realistic Discussion

A new book titled Deterrence Being Shattered: The Reality of Nuclear Weapons Operations (available in Japanese as 壊れる核抑止　核兵器運用のリアル) was published at the end of September. This book is co-edited and co-authored by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Executive Director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), and Junichi Fukuda, Senior Research Fellow for SPF’s Japan-U.S. and Security Studies Unit. Both Mr. Kanehara and Mr. Fukuda gave an interview in which they discussed their views on operational policies for nuclear weapons referring to their new book. The main points of the conversation are as follows.

Mr. Fukuda: The international environment on nuclear weapons is drastically changing. Competition among major powers is intensifying, nuclear arms races are advancing, and Russia is engaging in nuclear intimidation in the context of the battlefield in Ukraine. The possibility of nuclear use has started to become a reality. For example, Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in its ally, Belarus, and is frequently conducting exercises in the surrounding area.
 
In addition, arms control mechanisms are failing. No successor treaty to the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty (Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) has been established, and efforts by the United States and other countries to involve China in such a successor treaty have also failed. There have also been three consecutive failures to adopt a final document at the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), and trends toward nuclear proliferation are evident, such as Iran’s nuclear development.
 
Against this backdrop, we have been forced to consider the real possibility that deterrence through nuclear weapons could collapse. Conventionally, the prevailing view was simply that nuclear weapons must never be used. However, I believe we are now in an era where there is a real concern that nuclear weapons might actually be used, and in order to deter such use, we must consider under what circumstances adversaries might use them and what operational policies we must prepare. Given the grim reality of stagnation in global arms control, it is fair to say that we are at the juncture where the premises of nuclear deterrence could be undermined.

Mr. Kanehara: During the Cold War, the related countries were acutely aware that a strategic nuclear exchange in Europe would result in catastrophe across the U.S., Russia, and throughout Europe. As a result, a “Cold Peace” was maintained based on the belief that a clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would lead directly to World War III.
 
On the other hand, as for what is happening now, Russia is invading Ukraine, but the situation has not escalated into a major war involving neighboring countries. This is because both Russia and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries understand that if they were to exchange strategic nuclear strikes, all related countries, including their own, would suffer enormous losses. As a result, we are seeing how Russian President Putin has come to believe that he can do whatever he wants as long as it doesn’t escalate to a full-scale strategic nuclear exchange, and he has resorted to threats involving tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kanehara: I think the lesson here is that the U.S. and China would never engage in a conflict over Taiwan that involves the use of strategic nuclear weapons. If a Taiwan contingency were to happen, Chinese President Xi Jinping might resort to nuclear intimidation, just as Putin has done.
 
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, naval and air combat are expected, and the U.S. military holds an overwhelming advantage in those areas. If China were to find itself on the verge of defeat in naval or air combat, it is possible that Xi could threaten the Japanese government with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Japan has never considered how it would respond to such a threat.
 
There has long been a deep-rooted tendency in Japan to shy away from discussions about nuclear issues, which can be traced back to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and an incident involving the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5), a Japanese fishing vessel in which people fell victim to radioactive fallout from the U.S. “Castle Bravo” hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954.
 
Now, more than half a century has passed and the international situation has changed dramatically. The cornerstone of deterrence lies in how military firepower is deployed. This firepower typically refers to conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons. However, in the debate in Japan, the issues of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons have been completely left out. This is an extremely rare situation by global standards. I believe we have entered an era where we can no longer avoid discussions grounded in reality on this issue.

Mr. Fukuda: I believe the simplest way to overcome traditional taboos is to get started with discussions at the grassroots level in so-called Track 2 discussions. Advanced insights, including those related to nuclear deterrence, have recently become the subject of international discussions even at the private-sector level. For example, discussions in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. are not limited to those based solely on classified information held exclusively by government officials, but also include in-depth debates grounded in publicly available information.
 
Even if our discussions and proposals are not accepted by the government at this stage, what we have seen before is that public awareness and perceptions of the international situation can continue to change, leading to a gradual shift in the government’s stance as well. This may also be true with regard to the nuclear issue. By raising these issues now, I believe there is a role that we as a private organization can play.