Everyone is a hero

　The extraordinary circumstances we have been experiencing have continued into the spring.

　Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, has postponed his planned visit to Japan in the spring, and the Tokyo Olympics/Paralympics scheduled to be held this summer have also been delayed.

　This author was forced to cancel a visit to China that had been scheduled for mid-February (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong) to conduct field research with seminar students. The graduation ceremony this year was also cancelled, and so I had to say goodbye to my students in our seminar room. The entrance ceremony for the 2020 school year has also been cancelled, and the start of classes has been delayed by a week (as of April 2). Looking at my schedule book, I see that the last time I was in Tokyo was February 13.

　The impact and sense of crisis that the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, which began in Wuhan, Hubei Province, has had on both Japanese society and societies throughout the world has exceeded all initial expectations. Seventeen years ago, in the spring of 2003, I was living in Beijing during the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak. Looking back on this experience, I recall that even then there was not as deep a sense of despair as exists now.

　2019 was a year marked by Sino–US trade friction and the protests in Hong Kong. Then, 2020 saw the COVID-19 outbreak. China is currently experiencing a period of upheaval. However, in the midst of this crisis, I have noticed two unchanging aspects in the circumstances currently enveloping Chinese politics. Perhaps these are the “two constants” the Chinese Communist Party often speaks of. Here, I will discuss these “two unchanging aspects.”

　According to the Chinese authorities, the outbreak in China has passed its peak. [1] Without a doubt, as publicized by the Chinese authorities, the Chinese people focused their “cohesive power and fighting strength on the eradication of the disease” [2] to shift circumstances in a positive direction. But there were those in China who were resistant to these propaganda efforts by the Chinese authorities, or who were silenced by the authorities who, by the subsequent actions, showed themselves to be the true “people of China.”

　Here, I would like to first discuss the response of the Chinese authorities to the death of a physician in Wuhan who was the first to report the “SARS outbreak” there as well as the response of intellectuals.

　Despite the wishes of many people in China that he recover from his illness, Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital, died on February 7 at the age of 34. The cause was a viral infection he had acquired from one of his patients.

　The event that directly led to Dr. Li gaining widespread attention was the following information posted to WeChat (a social networking service similar to LINE) on December 30, 2019, by a college classmate: “Seven people who have contracted SARS have been placed in quarantine at my hospital. Please tell your family and friends to take steps to prevent infection.”

　The Chinese authorities moved quickly after viewing this post. The following day, December 31, the Wuhan Health Committee released information regarding “a pneumonia infection,” stating that “Although there have been 27 confirmed cases of people being infected with viral pneumonia, we have not observed person-to-person infection. We are currently investigating the cause of the infection.”

　China has strict regulations on speech. Something that could never happen in Japan happened immediately after this in China. Several days later, on January 3, the local Security Police precinct that had jurisdiction over the area where Dr. Li’s hospital was located, called him in and demanded that he sign an admonition for “disrupting public order by releasing information without first checking the veracity of that information.” The admonition he was forced to sign stated the following: “We hope that you will calmly reflect on what you have done as we admonish you for the incident listed below. If you insist on your own way of thinking, fail to reflect upon your actions, and as a result engage in illegal activities, you will be subject to legal sanctions. Do you understand?” Dr. Li had no choice but to sign. [3]

　There was also a case involving the novel pneumonia in which “a certain physician indicated that, shortly after a different physician said in an interview with the media that he had begun informing other physicians about a type of pneumonia of unknown origin, but that he was silenced and told he ‘shouldn’t be talking to others or talking with the media.’” [4] Thus, the Chinese authorities revised their assessment of Dr. Li.

　On the day Dr. Li died, February 7, the National Supervision Commission of the People's Republic of China announced that it would “send a survey group to Wuhan, upon the approval of the Party central authority, to conduct a full survey of the situation.” [5] A spokesperson for the National Health Committee also held a press conference the same day and stated, “The Committee is deeply saddened by the death of Dr. Li, and we would like his family to know that our deepest sympathies are with them.” [6]

　Approximately one month after the start of the survey, Dr. Li’s “honor was restored.”

　First, on March 5, the National Health Committee, the Human Resources Social Security Department, and the National Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine announced the awards to be given to organizations and individuals who had made achievements in the effort to prevent infection. Dr. Li Wenliang’s name was among those who received awards. [7]

　Then, on March 19, Xinhua reported on the final conclusions reached by the National Supervision Commission. The details of their report were as follows: [8]

　1. “Dr. Li, who posted information to a WeChat group, did not have the personal intention to disrupt public order. However, since Dr. Li publicized information without first checking its veracity, some of the information he posted was not completely consistent with the actual circumstances.”

　2. “The Wuhan City Public Security Bureau (Wuchang Branch, Zhongnan Street Police Station) wrongfully issued a letter of admonition to Dr. Li, and the law enforcement process that was used to issue the letter deviated from norms. The Survey Group proposed to the Wuhan City Supervision Organization in Hubei Province that it would be proper to supervise the situation; that the Security Bureau withdraw the letter of admonition; that it investigate the type of responsibility that should be taken by the employees involved in this issue; and that the results of the their administrative measures be immediately released to the public.”

　3. “The forwarding and transmission of information about this issue by Dr. Li to his classmates and coworkers were for the personal intention of warning them to take proper measures to prevent infection. The fact that he forwarded large amounts of this information led to public interest in the situation. Objectively, he was encouraging a wide variety of people to take the infection seriously and increase their efforts to control and prevent it.”

　4. “Those who need to be cautioned are hostile forces who, to attack the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government, have called Dr. Li an ‘anti-establishment figure’ who resisted the established systems and an ‘awakened person.’ This is completely in opposition to the facts. Dr. Li was a Communist Party member and not an ‘anti-establishment figure’ or the like.”

　Although these findings were awkward in the sense that they attempted to assign blame to both sides, in light of these findings of the Survey Group, the Wuhan Security Bureau posted the following announcements on an SNS site that same day: (1) the Wuhan Security Bureau withdraws the letter of admonition and has decided to solemnly apologize to the family of the person in question for the mistake that was made, and (2) the deputy chief of police at the police station was subjected to “administrative penalties,” and the officer in charge was issued an “administrative warning.” [9]

　After hearing of the death of Dr. Li, some intellectuals believed the Chinese authorities should be criticized for their handling of Dr. Li. When the SARS epidemic occurred 13 years earlier, Dr. Jiang Yanyong publicized its cover-up by Chinese authorities and was critical of their handling of the issue, but this time around, criticism of the Chinese authorities has been more severe and varied.

　On February 8, a total of 28 lawyers and scholars who work in the field of human rights focused on “the suppression of freedom of speech” and released a position statement to the Chinese authorities. [10] The main points listed in this document were as follows: (1) The spread of COVID-19 throughout Hubei and the entire country was a “man-made tragedy” that was caused by the obliteration of freedom of speech. (2) We must forever remember the words that Dr. Li left with us: “In a healthy society, it is not possible for everyone to be of the same opinion.” [11] (3) We demand the following: (a) a generous funeral for Dr. Li and a stone monument erected in his honor; (b) the abolition of all regulations and systems that are in violation of Article 35 of the Constitution (author’s note: “The people of the People’s Republic of China have freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, demonstration, and protest”); and (c) the holding of a National Council that includes the participation of experts from a wide variety of fields for the purpose of a comprehensive examination of recent domestic policies.”

　Next, Yang Yao, director of the Institute of International Development at Peking University, posted critical views from within the system on the Institute’s website. According to Yang, “The countermeasures against the novel coronavirus pneumonia are a major test of the governing capacity of the government,” indicating that he believes there is a problem in that capacity. For example, he stressed that, although the government has demanded that production activities be resumed, since workplaces are subject to punishment if even a single worker were to be infected, management is not complying for fear of the consequences. As a result, he continued, there is a “need to preserve enthusiasm in the provinces,” and this requires that the “one strike and you’re out” policy (that a single failure leads to demotion and/or relocation) used to assess those in management positions be reassessed. He goes on to say that, “As was the case in the 1950s, we need to build a congenial relationship with those in Democratic Party factions.” This was a bold statement indeed, as it was critical of the current administration’s insistence that “the Party controls all.” [12]

　Author Yan Lianke made the following statement in an online lecture delivered to graduate students in Hong Kong: “If we are unable to be ‘whistleblowers’ like Dr. Li, then let us become the sort of people who can hear the call of the whistle.” He went on to say, “As masses of people raise their voices in a chorus, proclaiming, as they surely will soon, that we’ve ‘won the war’ against the spread of this novel pneumonia, there will be those standing silently apart from them who are holding tombstones. Let us become the sort of people who remember this indelible stigma. Let us become the kind of people who are able to someday relate to future generations this memory—our own memories.” [13]

　In addition to the people mentioned above, many other intellectuals—including Xu Zhangron, Xu Zhiyong, Fang Fang, and Ren Zhiqiang—have publicized their criticisms of the Chinese authorities. [14]

　Since the spread of the disease, the Party has mobilized the media to portray the strong leadership of Xi Jinping and his administration, and the contributions they have made. However, their delayed response to the crisis cannot be glossed over.

　As mentioned above, in an interview with a person in charge of the National Supervision Commission, it was emphasized that Dr. Li’s statements “led to public interest” in the infection. However, as we will see below, countermeasures were put into effect on the national level as of late January. Thus, there was a blank period of at least three weeks between Dr. Li’s showing concern and the implementation of countermeasures. [15]

　According to a Party publication, in a speech delivered on February 3 at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi stated, “When I presided over the Politburo Standing Committee meeting held on January 7, I made specific demands regarding measures to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus pneumonia infection.” [16] However, oddly, there is not a single mention of the word “infection” in the official reports of Xi’s statements at the January 7 meeting. [17] Perhaps the truth had somehow prematurely crept into the propaganda measures?

　What follows is an examination of Xi’s actions regarding the measures put into place as a result of COVID-19 infection and the media reporting on them.

　The start was delayed and action was sluggish.

　The January 21, 2020, edition of The People’s Daily newspaper ran two articles of great interest about measures against coronavirus disease.

　The first of these was a Xinhua report from Beijing dated January 20, which stated, “In Wuhan and another area, a type of pneumonia caused by the novel coronavirus has been confirmed.” [18] It further states, “Chinese authorities have stated that this is the first case in which infection has been confirmed outside of Wuhan.” [19] In fact, the National Health Committee, which has the greatest authority on these matters, first sent a notification regarding “a type of pneumonia caused by a novel coronavirus” to the regions on January 15 and 19. [20] It had taken an entire month for the infection to “make its appearance” since cases of “viral pneumonia of unknown origin” were first confirmed in December of the previous year. [21]

　A second article in The People’s Daily from Kunming in Yunnan Province was dated January 20. It reported that General Secretary Xi Jinping (who was on an inspection tour from January 19 to 21 prior to Chinese New Year) stated, “To gain control over the spread of the infection, it is extremely important to immediately set countermeasures in motion. […] Priority should be given to protecting the lives and the physical well-being of the masses.” [22]

　Then, on January 23, the day that Wuhan was locked down, a welcoming party for Chinese New Year was held by the Party Central Committee, where Xi Jinping delivered a speech. [23] In 2019, more than 3,100 people gathered for the spring celebration held in the Great Hall of the People. The “main guests” included retired senior Party and military officials, leaders of minor political parties, and leaders of the National Federation of Industry and Commerce. However, when one looks at the entire text of the speech given this year, not a single reference to the “novel pneumonia” or to Wuhan could be found. For what purpose had the lockdown of Wuhan been enacted?

　Two days later on January 25 (the first day of the new year in the Chinese calendar), a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee regarding measures for managing the spread of the novel coronavirus was held. Xi delivered a speech and emphasized his strong leadership by stating, “After the outbreak of the new coronavirus infection, the Party Central Committee took the matter very seriously. It has been a top-priority issue.” He also said, “I myself have been constantly following the progress of the spread of the infection and the development of efforts directed at managing that spread, and the Party Central Committee has made repeated investigations regarding these measures.” [24]

　Three days later on January 28, Xi held discussions with Tedros Adhanom, Director-General of the WHO, in the Great Hall of the People and demonstrated that he was holding his ground. He stated, “People’s lives and physical well-being always take top priority, and controlling the spread of the infection is the most important mission right now. I have personally directed and made all plans regarding countermeasures against the infection. I believe that if we build our self-confidence, stay together through these difficult times, implement scientifically sound measures, and focus on specific strategies, we will be able to win this war of resistance to control the spread of the infection.” [25]

　Beginning with the meeting on January 25 mentioned above, there was a series of “five meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee in three weeks’ time” in which it was stated that “all actions would comply with the commands, decisions, and strategies of the Party Central Committee.” In light of Xi’s statement to Adhanom that “I have personally directed and made all plans,” one might think there would be some results to show, but it was not until the Politburo Standing Committee meeting on February 26 that Xi indicated some tangible results of his direction. He stated that “there are now positive signs regarding efforts to contain the infection, and positive results regarding efforts to return the society and the economy to a normal pace of development.” [26]

　After this speech, there was a dramatic shift in direction.

　The February 29 edition of The People’s Daily published a commentary written under the pen name “Zhong Yin” (meaning “the voice of the Party Central Committee”). [27] It noted, “This war against the infection, which is of great scope and touches on so many lives, once again clearly demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party is a strong party that dares to engage in conflict and gain victory” and that “through this war to protect the country we have gained the clear awareness that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and our nation’s socialist system is the foundation that we rely upon as we face risk and trials.” The focus thus abruptly shifted to praising the system under the leadership of the Party.

　In March, Xi’s actions and the efforts of the media became much bolder. On March 2, Xi made an inspection tour in Beijing of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the School of Medicine at Tsinghua University. He emphasized that the situation required a “system that operates throughout the nation,” noting that “scientific and technical methods are the sharpest weapons for fighting illnesses.” [28] Following this on March 10, Xi visited Wuhan. He toured the Huoshenshan Hospital (built specifically for COVID-19 patients) and a neighborhood block, and then met with representatives to encourage them in their efforts. [29] However, during his visit with the local residents in Wuhan, there were no scenes of Xi interacting with the people; he only waved to them, appearing on the top floors of high-rise apartment buildings. It is widely known that on a prior visit to Wuhan in early March by Sun Chunlan, the vice premier of China, the residents cried out from the windows of their apartments, “These are all fake. Those aren’t volunteers. We can’t get the vegetables we buy!” The lack of “interaction” by Xi was surely due to the authorities taking strict precautions to ensure that nothing of the sort would be repeated while he visited. The media made no mention of the anger or dissatisfaction of the residents, praising only “General Secretary Xi Jinping, the focus of 1.4 billion sets of eyes, [who] arrived in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, where he engaged in a personal inspection of the people serving on the front lines in Wuhan.” [30]

　These media reports are completely consistent with previous reports on Xi Jinping (which some note resemble a “personality cult”). Through an examination of these events, from the outbreak in Wuhan to its spread across the nation, it seems that there has not been a single deviation from previous patterns.

　China may have survived this crisis by effectively mobilizing resources using its “national operation system,” an achievement to which the strict lockdown of the cities, including Wuhan, may have contributed in no small part. Indeed, this is something that a powerful, authoritarian government has the capacity to achieve. As it did 12 years ago during the Sichuan (Wenchuan) earthquake, the Party was able to put its power on display. And it is certainly true that not only those who worked on the front lines—which includes physicians and nurses, staff workers, officers assigned to neighborhood blocks, employees from outside the region, public safety officers and employees involved in public infrastructure, and volunteers—but those citizens who adhered strictly to the harsh regulations regarding self-isolation are heroes. Nevertheless, what cannot be excused is the “hiding of defects” in an attempt to protect the virtues and abilities of the leadership. The “hiding of defects” is a major, overarching problem related to how the nation should act as it moves forward. As noted by some, including Yan Lianke, there is a possibility that, when this crisis is passed, all negative aspects will be covered over by songs of triumph. However, as they say, a forthright and comprehensive investigation of the criticism that the “initial response was delayed” must be conducted. This is because pressure on those with divergent views to remain silent, which led to the delay of the initial response, and the enforced shutdown of the city that helped prevent the spread of the infection are characteristics of an authoritarian government. In the absence of dealing with this sort of process, it is impossible to foresee a better future.

　How should the global society—and, in particular, the US and Japan, whose responses China pays the most attention to—face China, which has now switched to the offensive?

　In this paper, I mentioned the arguments of some intellectuals, but what is of utmost interest to the general public in China is not freedom or democracy. The disaster that is the coronavirus is an extremely important and serious humanitarian problem that has a direct effect on the lifestyle and the very lives of the people. In this sense, people are inordinately focused on the issue of whether other countries are behaving in a friendly way toward China or not—and that will likely affect people’s perceptions of the rest of the world more than it normally does.

　However, the US and China are engaged in a fruitless war of words. The US leadership is needlessly irritating China with statements such as “the Chinese virus” and “the Wuhan virus,” while Chinese diplomatic spokesmen are making unfounded, emotional statements such as, “The virus may have been brought into China by the US military.” [31] If the US and Japan expect China to move in the direction they hope it will, then they need to focus on cooperating with a wide variety of the Chinese public, who love their country. Biased and emotional criticisms of the Party and the government are counterproductive.

　The Chinese Party and the government have refused to ascertain the overall situation in their country due to an overemphasis on their “virtues” and due to their hiding of defects. Some in the Japanese media and among Japanese intellectuals who refuse to see China in a comprehensive way have maximized its faults and ignored its merits. Should we not seize the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity provided by this health crisis to revise our perceptions of China? If the major power that is China can see itself objectively, surely it would naturally garner the respect of the global community without having to place special emphasis on the “excellent system” created by one-party rule! For China, this is a turning point that will determine whether their empty “creation of a common destiny” slogan reaches the level of a philosophy that is officially recognized by the global community.

　There is a final issue facing us. One result of people avoiding the use of public transportation during the SARS epidemic in China was the emergence of the popularity of owning one’s own automobile. Are the Chinese Communist Party and the major Chinese corporations focused on seizing the opportunities provided by the coronavirus outbreak to increasingly utilize “big data” and make innovations in AI technology? As China continues developing its “Belt and Road Initiative,” the Party is certainly promoting the international standardization of those technologies. In China, will this mean that the Party continues to develop its so-called “happy surveillance society”? [32] Although we have not yet returned to a social or psychological state in which we are able to engage in calm debate, we need to maintain a critical eye as we examine whether the Party’s policies are achieving universal happiness.

（Dated Apr 2, 2020）