Mr. Nishida: Dr. Comfort Ero, President of the International Crisis Group, thank you for coming to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
Dr. Ero: Thank you for inviting me as well.
Mr. Nishida: The International Crisis Group, or ICG, is very well known for its in-depth analysis of crises, but perhaps it is less widely known to Japanese audiences. Would you kindly tell us in a nutshell what ICG does, in what way, and how your organization operates? Also, it would be nice if you can describe how it differs from the work of journalists, academia, or think tanks.
Dr. Ero: Thank you. It's a good time to also answer that particular question, because next year the Crisis Group will mark its 30th anniversary.
We were founded back in 1995, in the middle of the horrors of the war in Bosnia. And the statesmen, diplomats, and officials at the time said that they wanted to create a new idea, an organization whose principal focus was prevention, to sound the alarm, to warn, and to be the eyes and ears especially of those caught in conflicts, and to be able to reach out to various policymakers, governments, conflict actors, to think through how to avert, de-escalate, and resolve conflicts, and then to find solutions to them.
We have no ideology. We have no political positioning. Our founders saw us as principally concerned with saving lives and finding a response to address those issues as well.
We differ from journalists or academics in that we are rooted in the field in the countries of concern. We don't fly in and out. Our analysts are experts from within the region. They've spent many years working on the ground in the country. We don't talk about countries where we don't work in. And what we do is not analysis for analysis’s sake, but analysis with a specific end goal, which is to find a pathway to peace.
Mr. Nishida: I understand the Crisis Group’s mission is prevention and to sound alarms. From that point of view how do you read the current state of international affairs, especially around the conflicts and abilities of the international community to respond to it? And relating to that, how do you see the relevance of conventional conflict management approaches through the United Nations? Do you see any issues?
Dr. Ero: Looking in the 30 years in Crisis Group, the three different moments that I think defined the global trends. The Iraq war is one moment in time in the early 2000s. Another moment in time was during the time of the Arab Springs. And now here.
I think what's worrying about today's moment is that one, you're seeing a rise in wars wherever we look, right across all the regions that I told you. I've never seen a moment more worrying, more precarious with wars rising everywhere.
I think what is also complicating that picture is not just that you're dealing with those wars and with it the humanitarian crisis and the human suffering that is taking place and the refugees and the displacement. That's one set of concerns. But the undercurrent of the global picture landscape that we're looking at today is one of major power competition.
At no time in Crisis Group’s 30 years have we seen this level of big power rivalry. I mean, I think from a Japanese perspective, the most worrying is the U.S.-China competition that is overshadowing a lot of crises that we're dealing with. One close to home is the South China Sea and Taiwan.
In fact, there are, I would say, three centers of insecurity today. I've just named one, which I think is of major significance. But the other center of crisis, of instability, is the Middle East, where since the 7th of October (2024 Hamas attack on Israel) and even before the 7th of October, the situation was pretty dire. But since the 7th of October, watching the horrible situation unfolding in Gaza as Israel responded to those heinous attacks that took place on the 7th of October. But as a result of that, the big issue has been trying to avert further escalation in the Middle East, trying to avert a regional war.
Now, to a certain extent, that type of regional war has been averted. But there is a sense in which we're seeing an escalation to the point where you might see miscalculation and a bigger war taking place that will draw in Iran further than that it is involved today and may also draw in other powers.
And then the third pole of insecurity, which goes to what I was saying about big power rivalry and wars rising, is the one that's taking place in Europe as a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. And now you're seeing a long-protracted conflict, vulnerability in Europe and as a result, European leaders having to also increase their own defense standing to protect Ukraine.
So, it's a very turbulent time, with crises in different places. But these three centers are also shaping what global security would look like in the future.
Mr. Nishida: As you just articulated, for us this great power rivalry between China and the United States is one of the most worrying issues, but also the U.S. as the superpower, it has been engaged in the many of the conflicts around the world over the years. How do you see the change of the U.S. government to the Trump 2.0 administration and its impact on global governance and also conflicts?
Dr. Ero: At one level, you'll see some continuity and I think the area of continuity and acceleration, but you may also see some sort of distancing. But I talk about acceleration and continuation at the same time because the one area where there's likely to be continuity but acceleration is in relation to Asia, and particularly how the U.S. views China as strategic competition.
Every single administration, regardless of the political inclination, from Obama right through to Trump and now Trump 2.0, has really had this effort to pivot towards Asia and particularly the Indo-Pacific, and really, it's about China. And the big question I think most people are grappling with, and surely also Japan, is the ability or the willingness, whether or not the U.S. is willing to accommodate China on the international stage, both economically but also in terms of its political and security weight as well. And I think that shapes the strategic competition between the two.
And there I see a continuation of that tension and an acceleration by Trump. And he hasn't shied away from that. To be frank with you, there's a sense in which Russia's war in Ukraine put a halt to what Biden was going to do because Washington, even under Biden, wanted to make that strategic shift towards China. You saw Biden not walking away from what Trump had put in place when he first came into office, but actually doubling down and even pushing harder than the Trump administration, and what you're going to see going forward from January the 20th is Trump just continuing on that path and maybe accelerating as well. So, in that sense, there's a predictability path there.
And then I think a number of the U.S. partners and allies, and Japan I put you squarely into that category, there's a sense of anxiety about what to expect particularly in the South China Sea and in this part of the world.
I think of the Philippines which has a mutual defense pact with the U.S. and is concerned about the viability of that and how China will react. I think of Taiwan and the mixed messaging that came from Trump during the election campaign, at one level oscillating between protecting Taiwan and that sort of deterrence and diplomacy, but then suggesting that it would leave Taiwan out in the cold to look after itself. Certainly, that's why Crisis Group said that Taiwan needed to build up its own defense structure for the sake of deterrence as well.
And then we see a country like Australia, where it's got the AUKUS alliance with the U.K. and the U.S., also, I think, worried about what will happen under Trump, partly because all of them have read into the America First narrative about less prioritization for them but more about American first interest as well.
It's very much burden sharing, lessening the responsibility on the U.S., and really thinking about U.S. first in terms of trade, in terms of immigration, and in terms of no misadventures overseas for the U.S. as well. I think that's what's driving the Trump foreign policy posture. And you just need to look at the choices he's made for foreign policy.
Mr. Nishida: You also touched on China. China appears to have more of a role in the space of international governance and also conflict management. China is one of the biggest financial contributors to the UN assessed contribution funding. They also have so much investment in foreign aid to countries in Africa and Asia. Also, they have their military base in Djibouti. How do you see the role of China in conflict management?
Dr. Ero: It's been interesting as the U.S. has maybe sort of taken on a different role. And now let me clarify, I would never argue, and I don't necessarily see the U.S. declining. I’m not a declinist. And I would be careful also, with any argument that suggests the U.S. is isolationist as well.
But in the last 5 to 10 years or so, in the more multipolar world where you see more and more actors coming out, China is certainly one of those key players that is wanting to project more presence, certainly in its own backyard. And I think in the last five years or certainly under Biden, as Biden has tried to build up alliances and realignments in the region and certainly tried to get the region to work together, China has also become more assertive, very concerned that the U.S. is shaping facts on the ground in the region, and then wanting to project its own sort of power, whether it's economic or military as well.
And question marks about certainly under Trump 1 when Trump was pulling away from multilateralism, when he was sort of putting in blocks in terms of the U.S. vis-a-vis the UN, you saw China wanting to assert itself as a good global player, as a champion of the United Nations. And then you also saw China “in solidarity,” and I put solidarity in quotes, "in solidarity" with the so-called Global South and Africa as well.
One can look quite dispassionately and say, well, actually, number one, China is not the Global South, even though it sees itself as in solidarity. Number two, the debt crisis, some of that is also linked to China's own loan standards. And number three, I think there are still question marks as to how far China is able to play or show that it’s a responsible actor because the other narrative is that China also is seeking to bend multilateralism and bend the UN in its favor and not necessarily that it does this from some altruistic standpoint, as well.
Mr. Nishida: The Global South is one of the biggest buzzwords these days. Of course, there are a lot of issues on this terminology-wise, but putting aside the definition, how do you see the roles of those so-called Global South countries, countries like India, Indonesia, the rising middle powers, and also the ones who are left out from those economic trends?
Dr. Ero: Well, you've already put a question mark on the terminology, just the way you broke them all up as well. I mean, in that broad camp or broad church, the reason why it's come up again as a terminology is because of the Ukraine war and then Israel-Palestine, that not everybody automatically jumped into agreement even if there was sympathy towards Ukraine. And then certainly I think there were question marks about the rules-based order, the so-called international rules. I think there are serious question marks about that in relation to certain conflicts as well.
It's in that sense that this idea of the Global South has gained more ascendancy. But it's also a mark of the shifting power balance as well. It's also a mark that we're in a world of disorder or a world in between orders as well.
And in that mix is a rise of assertive middle powers. You mentioned Indonesia and India. I would add Turkey and Brazil to that, I would also add the Gulf powers to that. And I would think Japan would also be in that camp, although, I would also argue that Japan is also seen with Australia as part of the Western Hemisphere. So it's interesting that you might consider yourself a Global South country at the same time as well.
Look, what is very clear, today also, is that in this very multipolar world, where the international peace and security landscape is still very fluid, and where there's a challenge to the rules-based order, the space has been opened up to other powers who are strong in their regions, but are also trying to project an international presence as well.
A good example of that would be Turkey. Turkey has played a useful role, for example, in helping to deliver the Black Sea grain deal, which helped to deal with the food insecurity concerns that were materializing from Ukraine.
Another interesting country has been India, which has played an interesting role in still having one foot in its security arrangements with the U.S., having to still maintain its relationship with Russia, but acting as a bulwark towards China. So it becomes a useful ally as well.
Another interesting player under President Lula is Brazil, who is seen as an international advocate for the Global South and inequality and in the more inclusive international governance system, a champion of environmental climate change – and you will see that next year at COP 30 – but also being a champion of the notion of de-dollarization and yet still very close to the West on certain issues as well.
And you quite rightly talked about the south of the Global South, and these are African countries as well who have a very different view of Trump. Not all of them are anxious. Some of them welcome the transactional nature of Trump's policy. Some of them see clarity in what Trump is saying and therefore may feel more comfortable in doing business with him because it doesn't come with all the types of principles or values that make some of them a little bit nervous. So let's see.
But certainly, when you break it all down, the middle powers themselves have a clear sense of self-confidence and are very assertive and are hedging. They don't want to be stuck in one camp or the other. It's not that we're with America or against China, but they also see themselves as having a chance to maneuver and assert their own independence.
Mr. Nishida: For the last question, do you have any message that you want to convey to the Japanese people or how you want to see Japan to play a role?
Dr. Ero: It's a good question, because the region in which it operates in, it's a pretty fluid one. You have China on one side, you’ve got North Korea, and in fact you are seeing an interesting axis building up now with Russia, the two Koreas having a stake in Europe's war in Ukraine now.
Japan, also seeing what happened in Ukraine, watching how China is positioning itself vis-a-vis Taiwan, rewriting its own national security structure. Number one is the lessons that you take away from Ukraine. Number two is how you balance being a very close ally over decades with the U.S. plus managing your relationships with China at a time of high stakes geopolitics as well.
And being caught in the middle, I would imagine that what keeps you awake at night is the idea of any of those countries or any country being one step away from miscalculation, and that itself causing a lot of turbulence as well.
I would say – and I don't believe that's what's happening – that this is not a time to retreat, but a time also to assess the options that are available, the most crucial, and I say to Japan but I say it to the region also, is that one of our concerns is diplomacy and diplomacy losing its currency as well, and the need for diplomacy, the need for dialogue, and how you balance that with deterrence and building up your defense apparatus is crucial.
Number two, as a wealthy nation, your role in helping to shape the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF and the World Bank. Certainly, when Japan hosted the G20 meeting last year, the message that we took away from that was that Japan was very concerned and wanted to protect the rules-based order. In protecting that you've got to also make sure it's inclusive and to make sure that the right actors, the appropriate actors in this multipolar world, are at the table and are part of that reform agenda.
And I would say that you can't afford to put walls up and to retreat, but to be a player in that international arena, to make sure that the outcome is one that's premised also on your values of diplomacy, prevention, and crisis management as well.
Mr. Nishida: Thank you very much for all those great comments and we are very much delighted to have you here at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Thank you very much.
Outro: That was our conversation with Dr. Comfort Ero, President of the International Crisis Group. Visit the show notes for a link to the video from the SPF event featuring remarks by Dr. Ero. Thanks for joining us, and we’ll see you next time.
