To begin, I wanted to get your thoughts about the outcomes of the bilateral summit itself, which kicked off this whole week of activities in D.C. What were your main takeaways from the summit?
Mr. Watanabe: I think it was very impressive for Prime Minister Kishida to choose the opportunity with President Biden to make the appeal that the U.S.-Japan alliance is very global in character, has a global role, and is a public good for everybody, not only in the Indo-Pacific, but in the world.
Especially at the congressional address, Kishida somehow encouraged the United States to engage in world affairs. This was very impressive, because in the past, Japan was very passive and the U.S. often encouraged Japan to participate in several international affairs, such as the Gulf War or Iraq War. But this time, Japan is now encouraging the U.S. to be more engaged in global affairs, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
This also came up in the joint statement that was issued after the summit, there was a list of some 70 deliverables about concrete outcomes to be followed up after this joint meeting, one of which very significantly and that shows this increased action on the Japanese side is the issue of the joint command and control. Could you talk about what exactly was presented?
Mr. Watanabe: One homework between the United States and Japan is close coordination of command and control, because without the close coordination of command and control, any kind of action or reaction would be very delayed. That delay is that sometimes very critical. For example, probably the previous plan was that the U.S. and Japan may make some command and control headquarter together in an emergency case.
But, the situation is very much fluid, from peacetime to gray zone and war time. Such control is very critical in order to prevent the gray zone from becoming a serious hot war. So, Japan and the U.S., especially the military and the Self-Defense Forces, really need this close coordination.
This is a significant move coming from the Japan side. In 2022, with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, the Japanese government decided to establish a permanent joint command for the Self-Defense Forces. I think that the Japan side is now trying to prepare a more effective joint command and control, and that requires the U.S. to have a good counterpart in Japan.
So far, Japan's counterpart is Indo-Pacific Command, but that is located in Hawaii, far away from Japan, and the time of difference is significant. Of course there are U.S. forces in Japan, but their commander is not given the authority for command and control in the case of a military operation.
This time, the U.S. and Japan Leaders’ Statement clearly stated to the agreement of closer coordination of joint command. I'm sure that now the U.S. and Japan, both sides in the military level, are closely working on what is the best way to coordinate, which means the coordination of alliance management mechanism, or the very rapid response to any case from peacetime and gray zone to war time.
I think that clearly shows the readiness of the U.S.-Japan alliance and that's clearly raising the hurdle for any other country to think about taking any military action to change the status quo in the region. I think that's very significant.
There was a huge list of deliverables from this joint statement not only focusing on this joint command and control, but also defense industry cooperation, economic cooperation, space development, A.I., all of these different thematic elements coming through. Was there anything else that struck you as particularly significant coming out of this statement?
Mr. Watanabe: One very impressive one is space cooperation. I think Japan and the United States already are developing space cooperation. At least, the U.S. side, the guarantee is that the first non-American astronaut to land on the moon would be Japanese.
It's significant how Japan is critical for space technology and the endeavor to space. That's probably a kind of political message, but at the same time based on the practical fact that Japan and the United States have worked closely in the space domain, and space is, of course, critical in military operations.
I talked about the permanent joint command and the closer coordination. In the U.S. case, it’s Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps. That's clearly covering air, maritime, and land. But now we have new areas, like cyber and space. I think space is one of the critical spheres of military operation.
At the same time, the space cooperation is targeting civilian space usage and commercial business, too. The scope is not only the securing of space, but also utilizing space for the future prosperity of all countries. It's very critical.
I would like at this point to turn our conversation to the trilateral summit, the meeting between heads of state from Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines. I think China was clearly front of mind in this conversation, even with the remarks that came before the meeting happened and Biden reiterated what he called the ironclad U.S. defense commitment to both Japan and the Philippines, coming in the context of various actions that are happening now in the South China Sea. I wanted to hear about what you saw as the significant outcomes.
Mr. Watanabe: I think Japan and the U.S. keep confirming the mutual defense agreement and the U.S. and the Philippines did the same thing, but this trilateral is the very first time.
This means that Japan didn’t have any obligation to defend the Philippines. Why would Japan join? The reason is clearly, again, the characteristic of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a public good for the stability in the region. The Philippines case, especially the trouble with China, was maritime security and also maritime order.
I think now China is expanding their argument to other country’s territorial sea or exclusive economic zone as their own influence. And that that's clearly against international law and the common sense of public goods or safety. The South China Sea is now a flashpoint between the U.S. and China.
Many Southeast Asian countries are heavily influenced by the Chinese economy, so it's very difficult for them to choose either the U.S. or China. But at the same time, several Southeast Asian countries which have a territorial conflict with China want the U.S. to engage. And the U.S. continues to have a presence in South China Sea, East China Sea, and also do FONOPs, freedom of navigation operations.
The step up from this trilateral agreement is that Japan is also somehow assisting in such kind of activity. Very recently, Japan, the United States, and the Philippine Navy had a joint exercise in the South China Sea. Again, this is not for just defending Philippines’ sovereignty, but the maritime order in the South China Sea.
Practically it is not so easy for Japan to expand too much the operation in the South China Sea. But at the same time, Japan can help the U.S. and also Japan can help the Philippines. I think that is one step, and a very good message to the countries surrounding the South China Sea and other Southeast Asian countries.
I wanted to hear if you had any thoughts about what significance that type of partnership would have or how that might build in the regional architecture writ large.
Mr. Watanabe: Regional cooperation is very critical. Now in the Indo-Pacific, I think has the so-called hub and spoke system of U.S. bilateral alliances, like U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, U.S.-Philippines, and U.S.-Australia.
For example, Japan and the Philippines will have an agreement, a so-called RAA: reciprocal access agreement. Japan already had RAAs with Australia and the U.K. That's clearly some agreement between U.S. allied partners. For example, Japan has agreement with the United States. The Self-Defense Forces work together with the United States military because of a treaty. But Japan doesn’t have any agreement with the Philippines or Australia.
So, with the RAA agreement, it would now be easier for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to work closely with the Philippines’ military, and that is a kind of a networking of hub and spoke that’s ongoing, and a very recent significant result is the agreement over the Japan-U.S.-Philippine trilateral summit.
The theme of global leadership and that Japan is standing alongside the U.S. in this global leadership role came up as a major theme in the remarks that Prime Minister Kishida gave to the joint session of congress earlier as well. What do you see as the takeaway from that idea that was presented in the remarks?
Mr. Watanabe: Prime Minister Kishida understands that U.S. leadership is still critical, but now inward looking. But, the U.S. may be coming back. Kishida is a kind of catalyst, the opportunity to accelerate the U.S. coming back to the global leadership.
Again, the U.S. is still a very critical, prominent leader, but the mindset is not there. Kishida really wanted to facilitate and encourage the U.S. to come back to leadership and actually, it would be too late if the U.S. is completely out of world affairs.
For example, if Russia controlled Ukraine and China controlled the Indo-Pacific and the U.S. then decided oh, we need to come back. That would have a huge cost and probably people would be suffering a lot. Before that, the U.S. really needs to act quickly. That is the core of Prime Minister Kishida’s address in Congress.
This comes at an interesting time both for Prime Minister Kishida and in the U.S because of the domestic political situation. I think it wasn’t lost on anyone that he was giving this address in congress where there is mixed support for this kind of global leadership. How did those comments sound to your ears as you were listening to them?
Mr. Watanabe: One thing that is very important that Kishida pointed out in the address in Congress was, I'm an idealist, but I’m a realist. Realist is clearly based on the calculation of international powers that all actors are working in the self-interest, but clearly if there is a common interest, they will work together. I think that's kind of a very important message, because no matter whether it’s Biden or Trump, Japan will continue to work together because our interests are the same, common interests.
I think that's probably one message. And I'm sure that some of the Republicans who are close to Trump understand. And the fact is that the Trump team is more hawkish and very cautious against China's influence. I think that's probably what Kishida and the Japanese Foreign Ministry are thinking about what kind of message is effective.
It's a rare opportunity for the Congress to get together and at least the U.S. Congress share the consensus of some threat conception of China. Kishida sent the message that Japan will continue to work with the United States to secure Indo-Pacific stability and counter against China's expansive attitude. So, it’s easier for all Congress members to the stand and give applause. So, Kishida could be a facilitator in some sense.
Of course, the division of Congress or politics in the U.S. is not so easy, I'm sure, and Kishida himself has that trouble in domestic issues. Kishida joked that in Japan I never get such good applause, and everybody laughed because they are politicians and they know.
I think one thing is the mutual interest of Japan and the United States is clear, and that is the status quo, or saving the regional or global order, because the result is clear: the number one GDP is the U.S., and the second one is China, and Japan is third.
Clearly, the U.S., China, and Japan somehow were benefited by the current global order and the economic system. Who created and who maintained such an order? The United States, that's clear. China may seem to be challenging to the U.S., but if China challenged, is China ready to create another system? I don't think so.
In the joint statement, clearly the U.S. and Japan confirmed the importance of continuing to communicate with China. That's very important.
I think the total U.S.-Japan statement and Kishida’s address was very well balanced and very political in some sense, but that's good rather than just theoretical or just ideas. It is a practical way we can defend our own interests.
I think the current situation is very, very difficult. In domestic politics, very difficult. Regional conflict, very serious. And the global order may be in jeopardy. However, the hope is that like-minded countries really, really try to maintain or fix. I think the current U.S.-Japan summit is like that, it’s not only one but a kind of good hope for the future.
Outro:
That was our conversation with Tsuneo “Nabe” Watanabe, senior fellow of the Security Studies Program at SPF. You can read more of his analysis on the SPF website and on SPF’s IINA website, International Information Network Analysis. You can find the links in the show notes. Thanks for joining us for this episode of SPF World Views, and we’ll see you next time.
