The Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI-SPF) and the Suikoukai co-hosted the Sixth Maritime Security Symposium on July 23, 2019. With the backdrop of recent developments in international affairs, including the conflict between the United States and China as well as the presentation of the revised 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines (2018 NDPG), the symposium focused on the theme “Japan’s Maritime Security and the Future Role of Maritime Defense Power,” and featured frank discussions between active Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) officers, members of the Suikoukai, and experts with practical experience in the fields of maritime security.
Activities by the MSDF that contribute to maritime security—Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151) and the Indo-Pacific Deployment 2018
Following opening remarks by OPRI-SPF President Atsushi Sunami, a keynote lecture was presented by Rear Admiral (RADM) Tatsuya Fukuda, Deputy Director General of the Defense Plans and Policy Department (J-5) in the Joint Staff Office. He clearly laid out the role of maritime defense power and offered concrete examples of the activities of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151), a multinational unit responsible for the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the dispatch and training activities of the MSDF in the Indo-Pacific region. His detailed explanation was accompanied by videos and stories based on his own experiences as CTF and force commander.
According to RADM Fukuda, the policy guiding the activities of the MSDF, or in short the role of maritime defense power, is to defend Japan’s territory and its surrounding waters, secure the safety of maritime transport, and create a desirable and stable security environment. These three pillars embody the philosophy of “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation” set out in the National Security Strategy of Japan, and are the roles that should be fulfilled in order to establish maritime security in sea lanes from Japan’s coastal waters through the Strait of Malacca to the Persian Gulf. The fulfillment of these roles also contributes to the realization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision promoted by the government of Japan.
Tatsuya Fukuda, Deputy Director General of the Defense Plans and Policy Department in the Joint Staff Office
The CTF151 headquarters under the command of RADM Fukuda comprises 25 personnel in total from 11 countries around the world. From March 9 to June 28, 2017, CTF151 carried out surveillance and monitoring, information gathering, and various training activities. It also participated in international conferences, including visits by the unit commander with key persons of the relevant countries and international organizations to maintain key leadership engagement and push for the promotion of counter-piracy measures. Soon after RADM Fukuda’s appointment, a pirate hijacking of a merchant ship incident occurred for the first time in five years, and seven cases (four of which were successful hijackings) have been handled during his time in office.
With regard to Indo-Pacific Deployment 2018, a unit of three MSDF escort vessels and three embarked helicopters with about 800 crewmembers departed Japan on August 31, 2018, for visits to the ports of the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Singapore. During this time, the unit conducted joint exercises with the navies of each visiting country, the United States, and the United Kingdom, among others, returning to Japan on October 26, 2018. The exercises strengthened collaboration and interoperability among the naval forces of the respective countries while enhancing the tactical skills of the unit. RADM Fukuda reiterated the resolve of the MSDF to support the realization of FOIP and contribute to maritime security in the region through the promotion of similar activities going forward in order to fulfil the role of maritime defense power.
Next, the four panelists delivered their presentations.
Transition and progress of FOIP
Teruaki Aizawa, Senior Program Advisor of OPRI, presented a detailed interpretation of the government document outlining FOIP. He then described FOIP, a term that expresses the direct and straightforward image of the diplomatic strategy employed by the Abe administration, as a diplomatic strategy that links development cooperation with multilateral security cooperation. In addition, FOIP is what he termed a “present continuous” concept, as demonstrated by the change in its description from a “strategy” to a “vision,” the revisions to the contents of the three pillars, and its inclusion in the 2018 NDPG. Hence, he pointed out the need to continue paying close attention to the situation.
Furthermore, with regard to the difficulty of understanding FOIP in relation to China, Mr. Aizawa introduced research by Shinichi Kitaoka, President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entitled “Indo-Taiheiyo Kousou – Jiyuu to Hou no Shihai ga Honshitsu” [“The Indo-Pacific Vision - Freedom and the Rule of Law as the Essence Behind the Vision”].* This research argues that FOIP renders China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) “harmless,” so to speak. It is crucial to maintain a partial openness to cooperation while also attempting to block any harmful effects from Chinese diplomacy and waiting for changes in China.
Furthermore, with regard to the future of FOIP, Mr. Aizawa argued that the philosophy uses the universal concept of “freedom of the ocean” as its yardstick, which becomes an incentive for countries outside the region, such as the United Kingdom and France, to become involved in FOIP. In the future, he feels that FOIP should aim to become a vision for a “Free and Open Global Ocean” (FOGO). Finally, he introduced a new OPRI research project seeking to create a new international framework for protecting the seas, and asserted that FOIP will become a touchstone for the creation of a new doctrine under the “Blue Infinity Loop (BIL),” which links new sea lanes.
BRI from the perspectives of China and relevant countries
How does China view the world? Shin Kawashima, Professor at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo, explained it as follows.
According to Professor Kawashima, President Xi Jinping never talks about confronting the existing world order. He supports and complies with the United Nations and international law, but does not support a U.S.-centric security system or the values established by Western countries. However, he does support a global economic and trade order, and is aware of his own position as the representative of a developing country.
One of the images of the world order proposed by China, which takes a “revisionist” position toward the order created by developed countries, is the vision of a new type of international relations that is established based on economic prowess. This is a concept advocated by President Xi Jinping that seeks to form partnerships based on win-win economic relations and also create a “community of common destiny.” According to President Xi, establishing a “community with a shared future for mankind” will be possible by 2049. It is important to note that BRI is positioned to act as an experimental space for a new form of economic relations.
In short, BRI should be understood first as an economic activity. It meets the high demand for infrastructure in Eurasia and Africa with a focus on connectivity, including transportation. Professor Kawashima also explained that BRI involves the construction of a pipeline toward China from the Indian Ocean — a maritime defense and sea lane for China — in preparation for an emergency, the construction of a military base at a port in Djibouti, the securing of ports of coastal countries such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in the southern part of Sri Lanka, as well as the protection of sea lanes.
He also raised the point that Japan and China initiated 52 third-country cooperation projects in October 2018, and questioned if these would become a kind of “common ground” between BRI and FOIP. Japan perceives FOIP as being divided into two levels: one involving economic cooperation with China, and the other focused on confronting China. Here, Professor Kawashima pointed out the need to consider how to explain this to China.
A British Royal Navy that is active in Asia: Perspectives from countries outside the FOIP region
Captain (CAPT) Hiroyuki Terada, Dean of the Strategic Studies Department of the JMSDF Command and Staff College, reflected on the role of the British Royal Navy in international security during the post-Cold War era. He explained that while the role of the navy was limited in the first half of that period, beginning around 2008 the navy began to increase its presence and become more involved in incidents and disasters on the sea related to piracy and migrants.
At the same time, from around 2010, the UK was observed to be turning back toward Asia. On the economic front, the UK appeared to be approaching China while remaining wary. From a security standpoint, in anticipation of its departure from the European Union (“Brexit”), the UK had been attempting to find a new international role in Asia. It is important to note that in the joint declaration issued after the Japan-UK Summit Meeting in January 2019, emphasis was placed on the Indo-Pacific region and cooperation in the area of maritime security. In reality, the Royal Navy has been dispatching frigates in operations to counter illegal acts on the sea, including the illegal “ship-to-ship transfers” carried out by North Korea in 2018, and engaging in surveillance activities in the waters around Japan including the East China Sea. On the other hand, there are also restrictions and concerns regarding the Royal Navy’s involvement in Asia, such as the issue of resources and assets. CAPT Terada pointed out that the Royal Navy holds a total of only 19 vessels including destroyers and frigates, and deploying one of those to Asia would likely not be sustainable.
Given these circumstances, the UK does not talk about involvement in FOIP, but rather states that maritime security is also a major topic concerning its involvement in the Asia Pacific region. It is important to focus on the framing of FOIP's narrative in order to engage countries outside of the region. For example, the UK would be more likely to be involved if the narrative were one of universal values, such as rule of law or preventing a change in the status quo by force. On the other hand, CAPT Terada also expressed the view that the UK may back away from narratives such as acting as a counter against BRI or playing a part in the struggle for supremacy between the United States and China.
MSDF from the perspective of the 2018 NDPG and 2019 Mid-term Defense Program - Contributions to FOIP
According to Tokuhiro Ikeda, research committee member of Suikoukai, the organization of the surface warship units has undergone significant changes in the 2018 NDGP and 2019 Mid-term Defense Program formulated at the end of last year.
With regard to the intentions behind these changes, he explained that the 2018 NDPG seeks to strengthen Japan’s defense capability by building a multidimensional and integrated defense force that organically combines capabilities in conventional domains, including ground, maritime, and air forces, with new domains such as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic waves. The document also set out the primary roles for this defense force, such as contending with “grey zone” incidents during peace time, and responding to attacks on Japan, including its offshore islands. According to his analysis, the development of Japan’s defense force, which for a long time after the Cold War had focused on wartime response, has shifted toward also preparing for missions related to “grey zone” incidents in order to fulfil the aforementioned roles. This defense force will consist of new surface units including escort vessels (FFM) and welcome the addition of 12 patrol vessels.
With regard to the situation surrounding Japan and the activities of the MSDF in the East China Sea, after the Japanese government declared the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in October 2012, Chinese vessels were permanently deployed to the waters around the Senkaku Islands to confront the Japanese Coast Guard. This confrontation between Chinese naval vessels and MSDF escort vessels throughout the area is expected to continue, testing the resilience and capabilities of the MSDF. On the other hand, it was revealed that since 2001, Japan has continued to maintain a presence in the sea lanes of the Indo-Pacific region based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and has been dispatching escort vessels in counter-piracy operations since 2009.
In addition to such activities, Mr. Ikeda explained that the MSDF participates in regional frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises, engages in defense cooperation and exchange, and provides support for capacity building. He explained that such activities demonstrate the concept of a free and open order of the seas, and that the MSDF will continue to put its full effort into promoting these activities.
Panel Discussion: International Relations Concerning FOIP
The panel discussion in progress
Next, Hajime Kuramochi, Visiting Research Fellow at OPRI, joined in the panel discussion as the moderator.
According to Mr. Kuramochi, researchers from China have raised the question of why China has not been included in the FOIP initiative if its purpose is to create a free and open system. Furthermore, some have asserted that China has not been violating international law, but rather is interpreting international law in its own way. Accordingly, Mr. Kuramochi posed the question of whether China can be incorporated into FOIP given the current circumstances.
Mr. Aizawa argued that consideration should be given to incorporating China into FOIP due to its premise of supporting an inclusive international order. To that end, Japan should first clearly communicate what it is trying achieve and seek out possible areas for cooperation. Any differences in the understanding of principles such as the rule of law should be reconciled by the two countries. CAPT Terada was of the view that bringing the value of FOIP to the forefront and ultimately presenting a stance of incorporating China is not a bad idea in the sense that it would make it easy to gain international support.
On the other hand, Mr. Ikeda disagreed, arguing that the Reiwa era is one that raises the question of how those countries that support the current international order and those that want to change it will coexist. As FOIP is a concept in support of the current world order, arguably it would not be a priority to incorporate countries from the latter group.
Professor Kawashima pointed out that the problem lies with the United States. According to him, amidst the escalating conflict between the U.S. and China, would Japan and the U.S. be able to support the idea of incorporating China into the FOIP framework? There are also discussions in the U.S. about integrating Taiwan within FOIP. While Japan feels that China should be included, this may prove difficult. Hence, he emphasized again the possibility of creating common ground with China at least regarding economic issues.
In response to a question from Mr. Kuramochi about the extent to which the UK is committed to maritime security in East Asia against the background of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, CAPT Terada felt that one of the reasons behind the decision to dispatch Royal Navy vessel to the East China Sea was probably consideration of U.S.-UK relations. He felt that it is important for European countries to demonstrate their presence in the Asian region and that the UK probably recognizes the value of deploying a fleet to East Asia.
Furthermore, when questioned about the remaining issues in the current NDPG and Mid-term Defense Program, Mr. Ikeda pointed out that there is inadequate content about how the free and open order of the sea will be understood and established as a mission of the MSDF. What should the MSDF do amidst the reality of confrontations with Chinese vessels and various incidents that occur on a daily basis? It is important to clearly set out these aspects in the NDPG.
The discussion also covered a wide range of topics including the perspectives of India and Australia, the new relationship between China and India, issues of democracy and economic development, and possible areas for compromise in the conflict between the U.S. and China.
*Note: Published in the Yomiuri Shimbun on December 17, 2018.