Ocean Newsletter

No.26 September 5, 2001

  • Disaster Prevention from the Ocean Perspective Suminao MURAKAMI
    Honorary Director, Laboratory of Urban Safety Planning
    Selected Papers No.2
  • A Disaster Prevention Support System Using Rivers and the Ocean Kunihiko HIRAI
    Professor, Nagaoka Institute of Design
    Selected Papers No.2
  • Mutual Earthquake Support Agreements Linked By the Oceans Yoshinori YAMANE
    Mayor of Tamano City, Okayama Prefecture
    Selected Papers No.2
  • Searching for 'Hope' in Disaster Prevention Measures from the Ocean Mineo SUGIYAMA
    Chief of Disaster Countermeasures Office, Disaster Prevention Bureau, Shizuoka Prefecture

Disaster Prevention from the Ocean Perspective

When it comes to earthquakes, facilities positioned on the ocean surface are in a far superior location from the disaster prevention point of view. However, in order to make the most of these superior facilities at the time of an earthquake, consideration of systems that provide unspoiled links with facilities on land are very much required. For this purpose, we must review what happened when previous earthquakes struck, and carry out scenario investigations based on the information obtained.

On the day the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck, Japanese and American disaster-prevention researchers were gathering in Osaka.

 On the morning of January 17, 1995, when the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck Kansai area, I felt the shock in my hotel room in Osaka. I had arrived the previous day to attend a conference of Japanese and American researchers on urban disaster prevention in Kansai. Our American counterparts had strongly urged us to change the timing of the conference, as the Northridge Earthquake had occurred on this date exactly one year earlier.
 When we selected the date for the conference I reasoned, as chairman of the Regional Safety Council, that January 17 would be a good date, as it was the day after Japan´s university professors finished their center tests. Needless to say I could not possibly have foreseen the calamity that would occur on that date, any more than I could have had advance knowledge of the Northridge Earthquake. When I negotiated with the Americans on the date, I was aware that it was more convenient for us than for them, and the number of participants might be reduced by as much as half. Nonetheless some 37 participants arrived from the United States, no doubt because the Northridge Earthquake of a year earlier had provided numerous findings they wanted to announce.
 The earthquake struck at 5:46 AM. It was hard to discern from the morning news what was going on, so I went downstairs for an early breakfast in the restaurant, where the other attendees had already gathered. The room was abuzz with conversation about the disaster unfolding just a few dozen miles away. Some of the younger researchers and people not involved in running the conference, deciding to go immediately to the scene of the quake, hired taxis and headed for the Kobe/Awaji area. If I had not been responsible for running the conference, I would have joined them. As it happened, it was impossible to proceed, as soon as the conference began, TV and newspaper journalists were calling constantly. I was asked to appear on the 11 o´clock news at NHK. While I waited and watched the news feed from Kobe and Awaji, I realized that as many of us as possible should depart for the affec ed region the next day, so I asked NHK to transport 25 of us to the scene. NHK obliged with three minibuses carrying nine people each, and soon the other media joined in, so we were all able to make the journey. We finally managed to hold a general conference on the third day. As a result of this experience, the bonds of friendship and cooperation among disaster-prevention researchers on both sides of the ocean were strengthened considerably, and many fruitful Japan-US conferences on urban disaster prevention followed.

When disasters arise, support from the sea is important. To ensure this support is available, the necessary systems must be set up in advance.

The port of Kobe, 25 days after the earthquake (February 11, 1995). The pier in the background was available for use the next day; the one in the foreground was unserviceable. Even if relief supplies could reach the port, sea-based support systems could not function because vessels were unable to dock.

I visited more sites struck by the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake than I can count, but I only went there by car on January 17 and 18. At all other times, until the shinkansen was running again, I ventured out from Kansai International Airport by boat.
 When major earthquakes occur, access from the sea is of paramount importance. In 1923, when the Great Kanto Earthquake struck the Tokyo area, relief supplies were shipped in from around the world and unloaded on the wharf at Shibaura. Organization is important, however, as the following tale illustrates. According to Mr. Miyoshi who was present at the time, there were not enough dockworkers to handle the workload, so the people of the stricken city moved in to take the supplies themselves. Unsure how to handle the situation, local policemen asked for the opinion of the Superintendent General of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. The Superintendent General suggested that the people be allowed to carry on, with the police allocating tasks so that the work could proceed in an orderly fashion.
 Later a survey was conducted of the port facilities used during the quake disaster. The equipment used at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake was small, suited to offloading of cargo imported from China. Officials recognized that more modern ports used much larger facilities, and highly detailed plans would have to be considered to ensure the port´s usefulness in the event of another earthquake.
 In the case of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Kobe´s port had three berths specially designed to be earthquakeresistant, but none of them could be used because they were all in the same place and the bridge leading to them had collapsed. When the berths were built, it was deemed that putting them all in one location was most cost-effective; in fact, they were made useless. If each berth had been erected in a separate place, it would have been far more likely that at least one berth would be serviceable.
 More trouble arose when the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force brought in drinking water by ship, but not enough water trucks were available to distribute it. As these incidents reveal, facilities cannot be considered in isolation-planners must take into account the interplay of many different factors.
 Passenger ships were pressed into service as refuges and accommodations for relief teams. The dilemma in this case is that, if the ships are not docked, it may be difficult to get on and off the ships after the port is damaged, yet if the ships are docked when the earthquake strikes, they may be damaged along with the port. When an earthquake struck Italy in 1980, ships were used as refuges, but a lack of similar refuge facilities meant that the ships had to be used in this way far longer than intended, disrupting passenger services. For those taking refuge on the ships, however, there was no need to worry about aftershocks, nor was food supply an issue. On the morning of April 18, 1906, my grandfather was on a ship moored at the San Francisco harbor. When the earthquake struck that city, the ship was rocked by a powerful tremor but was left undamaged, in contrast to the devastation in the city center. He told me that he simply disembarked from the ship and walked around San Francisco to survey the wreckage.
 Maritime facilities have an outstanding role to play in disaster prevention, but to make proper use of them in the event of an earthquake systematic planning is needed to ensure that sea and land facilities are well coordinated. The lessons from past earthquake disasters must be carefully studied and scenarios developed on that basis. Clearly, the role of the sea in earthquake relief has not yet been adequately examined.

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