Introduction

The political and security dynamics in North Africa are deeply intertwined with global issues, including energy, immigration and refugee crises, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Russia’s geopolitical ambition. The participation of key North African leaders—Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, Tunisian President Kais Saied, and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani (in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union)—at the G7 Italy Summit in June 2024 underscored the region's growing importance in global strategic discussions. Across the two-day summit, North Africa's challenges and opportunities were prominently featured, reflecting its critical role in international security and political stability.[1]

This paper analyzes the political and security situations in North African countries and their response to the Israel-Palestine conflict. It argues that the domestic political dynamics and conflicts in these countries are deeply linked to regional and international politics. [2]

Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia: The consolidation of incumbent presidents' power and the centralization of government authority

The global trend of pivotal elections in 2023 and 2024 has extended to North Africa, where key political events underscore a consolidation of power by incumbent leaders and the entrenchment of centralized authority. In December 2023, a presidential election was held in Egypt (advanced from its original schedule in spring 2024[3]), and incumbent President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won a third term in office. His presidency, now extended to 2030, will mark a 16-year tenure since his ascension in 2014. The stability of his administration is underpinned by a deeply entrenched power structure that revolves around the military, supported by a coalition comprising the judiciary, religious institutions, security agencies, bureaucratic apparatus, political parties, media, and business elites. This intricate network ensures that challenges to his administration remain unlikely in the near term.[4]

Algeria followed a similar trajectory in its September 7, 2024 presidential election, where President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was reelected with 84.3% of the vote for a second five-year term. The longtime leader President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned in April 2019 in response to the intensifying protest movement, and Tebboune’s administration has been characterized by stability. However, this stability largely stems from the military's dominance over the political sphere, suppressing dissent during the COVID-19 pandemic, and leveraging increased oil and natural gas revenues spurred by the Ukraine war. These economic windfalls enabled the government to expand public services and create jobs, bolstering public support and mitigating unrest.[5]

Deepening centralization under President Kais Saied has raised concerns about democratic backsliding in Tunisia. In the presidential election on October 6, President Saied won reelection with over 90% of the votes. However, his mandate is overshadowed by low voter turnout (28.8%, compared to 49% in 2019’s first round), indicating a strong distrust of politics among the people. Since assuming office in 2019, Saied has systematically dismantled democratic institutions, dismissing the prime minister and suspending parliament in July 2021, and significantly expanding presidential powers through constitutional revisions in 2022. Furthermore, Saied has also targeted political opposition, exemplified by the April 2023 arrest of Islamist Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, a former Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, and the closure of the party's headquarters.

On the other hand, unlike resource-rich neighbors, Tunisia faces a structural economic crisis marked by deteriorating living conditions. Neither negotiations for a $1.9 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), nor approximately 1 billion Euros in support from the EU, which was signed in July 2023, have progressed. This is because President Saied has rejected calls for political and economic reforms, which are a prerequisite for these support measures, as interference in domestic affairs. This impasse risks exacerbating public discontent, potentially destabilizing the already fragile political landscape in Tunisia.

Libya and Sudan: Protracted conflicts and foreign interventions

In Libya, the anticipated presidential and parliamentary elections of December 2021 were postponed indefinitely, intensifying fears of political stagnation and escalating confrontations. Several systemic and structural factors underlie the failure to hold elections: (i) the interim government, parliament, and key institutions obstructed the electoral process in order to maintain vested interests; (ii) the legitimacy of national institutions including the government, parliament, and judiciary was ambiguous, hindering important political and judicial decisions; (iii) the inability to forge a political consensus on presidential candidacy requirements paralyzed progress; and (iv) military organizations and militias committed electoral violence and intervened in political and judicial decisions.[6]

Since its establishment, the interim Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, has clung to power by leveraging oil revenue distribution to secure popular and military support in western Libya. However, the House of Representatives' 2022 approval of a rival administration—the Government of National Stability (GNS)—has rekindled the pre-existing "dual government and prime ministers" crisis, with competing centers of power and authority. By December 2024, militia forces backing the GNU dominated the western coastal region, including Tripoli, while the Libyan National Army (LNA), under Commander Khalifa Haftar, maintained control of eastern and southern regions, operating in conjunction with the HOR and GNS. Even within the west, factional divisions among militias add further complexity to the conflict, moving beyond a simple east-west division.

In Sudan, the civil war that erupted on April 15, 2023, has shown no signs of abating after more than 20 months. Hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) persist across multiple fronts, including the outskirts of Khartoum and the volatile Darfur region. The toll has been catastrophic: over 15,000 fatalities, more than 13.2 million displaced individuals—2.3 million of whom have sought refuge in neighboring countries like Egypt, Chad, and South Sudan—and a collapsing social infrastructure, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations estimates that 27 million Sudanese, over half the population, now require humanitarian assistance[7][8]. Despite repeated ceasefire appeals and mediation efforts by actors such as the AU, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, a sustainable peace process remains elusive.

Downtown in Tripoli, Libya

Downtown in Tripoli, Libya
Photo by the author

A common feature of the crises in Libya and Sudan is the deep and persistent political and military intervention of foreign powers. Immediately after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya became a battleground for geopolitical competition among Middle Eastern countries, with Turkey and Russia now asserting significant influence. Furthermore, European countries have continued to compete for oil and natural gas resources[9]. Russia’s involvement, particularly through the Wagner Group, extends beyond Libya, using its bases as logistical hubs to expand operations across Africa. This has alarmed Western powers, who see Libya's proximity to Europe as a potential launchpad for broader Russian strategic ambitions [10].

In Sudan, Egypt and Iran support the SAF while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia back the RSF, deepening divisions among the regional powers. As Wagner supported the RSF and profited from the gold mine operations, the Ukrainian military dispatched special forces to Sudan in 2023 as part of a countermeasure to Russian influence, showcasing an intersection between African conflicts and global geopolitical dynamics.[11]Ukraine has reportedly supported local forces and, in some cases, extremist organizations in other African countries such as Mali.

Sudan, which borders the Red Sea, is of great geopolitical importance, and Russia has long been aiming to advance into the major port city of Port Sudan. In May 2024, the Sudanese military announced that it had agreed to establish a Russian “naval logistical support center” near the Red Sea coastal city of Port Sudan in return for Russian supplies of arms and ammunition. In addition, the two countries agreed to expand cooperation to include economic aspects like agricultural ventures, mining partnerships, and port development.[12][13] This agreement, secured through military and economic incentives, may shift Russia’s role in the Sudanese conflict, given its prior support for the RSF through Wagner. Any change in Moscow’s alignment could substantially alter the dynamics of the war, with implications for regional stability.

The links with the Israel-Palestine situation

The October 7, 2023 attack on Israel by militant groups such as Hamas, along with the subsequent Israeli military incursion into Gaza Strip, has deeply influenced North African countries.

In particular, Egypt, which shares a border with the Gaza Strip, is the home of the Arab League and a signatory of a peace treaty with Israel in March 1979. The situation in Gaza has also helped improve Egypt’s cooling relationship with Turkey. In February 2024, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Cairo for the first time in 12 years, and in September of the same year, President Sisi visited Ankara for the first time since taking office, with the Gaza war being one of the main topics on the agenda.

For the Sisi administration, the Gaza war is an extremely important political problem, but it is not currently conceived of as a direct threat to the regime. While maintaining its advocacy for Palestinian rights, Egypt also emphasizes the containment of the Gaza situation, explicitly opposing a mass influx of refugees, labeling it a "red line." However, the negative economic impact is already becoming apparent. Due to Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, which was a stable source of foreign currency revenue, is facing a decrease in both the number of ships navigating through it and income from transit fees. In February 2024, President Sisi stated that the Suez Canal revenue, estimated to be approximately 10 billion dollars per year, had decreased by approximately 40% to 50%. The tourism industry, another pillar of the country’s economy, saw a record high 14.9 million inbound tourists in 2023, but the outlook has become uncertain due to the destabilization of the regional situation.[14]

Algeria, in contrast, has amplified its longstanding support for Palestine, reinforcing its pro-Palestinian policies in the international arena, As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its aid to Gaza and frequent meetings with Palestinian representatives signal its unwavering solidarity. After the October 7th attacks, Algeria was one of the first countries to provide humanitarian aid supplies to the Gaza Strip. Domestically, Algeria’s approach aligns with its rivalry with Morocco. By equating Palestinian rights with the Western Sahara dispute, Algeria aims to exert pressure on Morocco, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords. The severing of diplomatic ties with Morocco in 2021 and the cessation of natural gas supplies reflect the tense geopolitical rivalry exacerbated by differing stances on Israel and Palestine. Due to the Western Sahara problem and the agreement between Morocco and Israel to normalize diplomatic relations (see below), the Algerian government decided to sever diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021, and in November of the same year, it also stopped supplying natural gas to Morocco.[15]

Morocco normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 as part of the Abraham Accords.[16] In response to this, the Trump administration of the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara, which was a strategic victory for Morocco. While maintaining its ties with Israel, Morocco faces growing anti-Israeli sentiment domestically. Its government adopts a dual strategy: publicly supporting Palestine to placate public opinion while safeguarding its strategic alliance with Israel.

For North African governments, the challenge lies in managing pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli domestic sentiments while ensuring stable relations with Western powers. The balancing act reflects the broader geopolitical pressures shaping their foreign policies amid the ongoing Gaza crisis.

Conclusion

This paper examines the evolving political dynamics and conflicts in North African countries, exploring their deep linkages with international politics. The re-election of incumbent presidents in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia consolidates their hold on power, yet these administrations face mounting challenges, including persistent economic recession and the geopolitical repercussions of the Israel-Palestine crisis. Meanwhile, Libya remains mired in political deadlock, and Sudan’s civil war shows no signs of resolution, further undermining regional stability. Additionally, political tensions between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara dispute continue to simmer, exacerbating regional rivalries.

North Africa’s significance in global energy geopolitics cannot be overstated, given its proximity to Europe and vast reserves of energy resources. Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves on the African continent, ranked ninth globally with 48.4 billion barrels, while Algeria ranks tenth worldwide in natural gas reserves (4,500 bcm) and fifteenth in oil reserves (12.2 billion barrels). Egypt’s discovery of large-scale natural gas fields in the Mediterranean has positioned the eastern Mediterranean as a focal point for energy development.[17] Since the onset of the Ukraine war in February 2022, the EU has intensified its focus on North African energy resources as part of its strategy to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Egypt and Morocco are advancing renewable energy initiatives, including large-scale solar and wind projects, and exploring hydrogen production as a future energy source. However, these opportunities are tempered by domestic demand pressures and uncertain political and security environments, which pose significant obstacles to further development.[18]

North Africa’s instability poses broader international implications. Issues such as terrorism, migration and refugee crises, and the expanding influence of Russia have heightened global concern. NATO’s recent moves to deepen its engagement in the Mediterranean's southern flank, encompassing North Africa and the Sahel, underscore its recognition of these strategic challenges. Stability and economic growth in North Africa could play a pivotal role in counteracting the destabilization of neighboring regions in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

With the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9) approaching in August 2025, the significance of Japan’s involvement in North Africa is increasing. Strengthening partnerships in this region could position Japan as a key contributor to fostering stability and sustainable development in North Africa, reinforcing its broader strategic and economic interests in Africa and beyond.

(2025/1/22)

Notes

  1. 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “G7 Apulia Summit (Overview),” June 17, 2024.
  2. 2 For a more detailed analysis of this matter, please refer to Amane Kobayashi, North Africa’s Political and Energy Situation: Expectations, Issues, and Links with International Politics, Chuto Dokobunseki Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 1-16, July 2024.
  3. 3 Egypt’s presidential election was originally expected to be held in the spring of 2024, when the previous presidential term was due to expire. However, it has been pointed out that the Sisi administration decided to bring forward the election due to concerns about the risk of growing public discontent and political turmoil caused by the worsening economic situation, including high prices, and a shortage of foreign currency, in addition to the intensification of the Gaza-Israel conflict from October 2023. It is also thought that the decision was a calculation made to avoid giving the opposition parties enough time to conduct their election campaigns. Yolande Knell, “Egypt’s Early Presidential Election Campaign Off to Eventful Start,” BBC, October 5, 2023.
  4. 4 Takayuki Yokota, Egypt: Reconsideration of the False Dreams Brought About by Two Revolutions, Hiroyuki Aoyama ed. What’s Happening in the ‘Arab Heart’, Iwanami Shoten, 2014, pp. 23-27.
  5. 5 Dalia Ghanem, What Algeria’s Upcoming Elections Mean for the Next Five Years, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 4, 2024.
  6. 6 Amane Kobayashi, The Libyan Situation after the Postponement of Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: Challenges for Escaping the ‘Libya Trap,’ Journal of Middle Eastern Studies No. 546, pp. 90-101, January 2023.
  7. 7 Koji Sakane, Sudan’s Most Serious Humanitarian Crisis in 40 Years: Is There a Way to a Ceasefire and Resumed Aid?, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), August 5, 2024.
  8. 8 Zeynep Conkar, “Sudan war has killed at least 20,000 people: UN”, TRT World, September 2024.
  9. 9 Amane Kobayashi, Rising Tensions in the Libyan Conflict Ⅰ: Military Intervention by Turkey and Russia, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), August 13, 2020. Amane Kobayashi, Rising Tensions in the Libyan Conflict Ⅱ: Stabilization Obstructed by Division in the West, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), November 30, 2020.
  10. 10 Amane Kobayashi, Trends in Africa Concerning Russia’s Wagner: What Changes Were Brought About by the Prigozhin Rebellion?, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), July 27, 2023.
  11. 11 Kateryna Zakharchenko and Alisa Orlova, “EXCLUSIVE: Ukrainian Special Forces Interrogate Wagner Mercenaries in Sudan,” Kyiv Post, February 5, 2024.
  12. 12 “Sudan to solidify military and economic ties with Russia, including Red Sea base,” Sudan Tribune, May 25, 2024.
  13. 13 “Russian Envoy Meets Sudan’s Army Commander in Show of Support,” Reuters, April 30, 2024.
  14. 14 Meanwhile, in the first half of 2024, the number of tourist arrivals reached a record high of 7.069 million and tourism revenue of 6.6 billion dollars (a 300 million dollar increase compared to the same period in the previous year) was recorded. “Egypt’s Tourism Revenue Hits 6.6 bln USD in H1: Ministry,” Xinhua, July 2, 2024.
  15. 15 Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, read out the declaration of independence of the Independent State of Palestine in Algiers, in November 1988.
  16. 16 Since August 2020, Arab countries such as the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco have agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel one after another through the brokerage of the Trump administration in the United States. Since the Abraham Accord, economic and technical cooperation between Arab countries and Israel has expanded. For example, the UAE agreed to a comprehensive economic partnership with Israel in April 2023.
  17. 17 Amane Kobayashi, Energy Development and Geopolitical Competition in the Eastern Mediterranean (1) Rapprochement of Egypt and Israel and Confrontation between Turkey and the Surrounding Countries, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), March 8, 2021.
  18. 18 Amane Kobayashi, North Africa’s Political and Energy Situation: Expectations, Issues, and Links with International Politics.
  19. 19 Jun Nagashima, Three Results from the Washington NATO Summit and Future Actions ―The Challenges Facing the NATO Value Community and Japan's Challenges in Evolving its Global Approach―, International Information Network Analysis (IINA), August 13, 2024.