Framing the China-Pacific Shift

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly intensified its political, economic, and strategic presence in the Pacific Islands region.[1] This expansion, situated within a broader context of strategic competition, particularly with the United States and its allies, is reshaping the geopolitical equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.[2] China's engagement encompasses an array of instruments—including diplomatic ties, development finance, security cooperation, and cultural outreach—which collectively have transformed the regional landscape and elicited parallel responses from traditional partners such as the United States, Australia, and Japan.[3]

While the Pacific Islands region was long considered a peripheral strategic theater, recent developments have repositioned it at the center of global geopolitical recalibration.[4] The renewed attention to this vast and diverse area, composed of mostly small island developing states (SIDS), stems not only from their geostrategic locations but also from the growing recognition of their relevance to global governance, maritime security, and climate resilience.[5] As China asserts its influence, it challenges established patterns of engagement, prompting regional and global stakeholders alike to reconsider their strategic approaches.[6] This paper examines the contours of China’s expanding footprint in the Pacific Islands region, with particular attention to four interconnected domains—namely, infrastructure and diplomatic engagement; security and strategic arrangements; digital technologies and governance; and deep-sea mining—and assesses their broader implications for regional order and global governance. By examining these four domains, the analysis explores how China’s presence is reshaping power dynamics in the region, influencing development trajectories, and generating systemic implications for both Pacific institutions and the broader framework of regional and global governance.

Figure 1: Political Map of Oceania

Figure 1: Political Map of Oceania
Source: iStock

Infrastructure and Diplomatic Engagement

From the mid-2010s, China has leveraged a combination of bilateral agreements and large-scale infrastructure projects to bolster its ties with Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Notably, participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided a structural framework for these engagements.[7] Chinese assistance includes concessional loans, grants, and in-kind support in health, agriculture, and public works. While these efforts have generated tangible benefits in recipient states, they have also raised concerns about transparency, debt sustainability, and disproportionate influence, particularly given the opacity of certain agreements and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny.[8]

Chinese-funded infrastructure projects span roads, airports, hospitals, sports facilities, and government buildings, providing high-visibility outputs that strengthen bilateral relations.[9] For many PICs, Chinese development financing represents a much-needed alternative to conventional multilateral funding mechanisms, which are often perceived as slow-moving and encumbered by stringent conditions. However, critics—like Darshana M. Baruah, Satyendra Prasad and Denghua Zhang—argue that China's infrastructure diplomacy can exacerbate debt vulnerabilities, particularly where repayment terms are vague and collateral clauses remain undisclosed.[10] The case of Tonga, which has struggled with repayments on Chinese loans, underscores the risks of unsustainable debt exposure.[11]

Diplomatically, the PRC has made significant strides in expanding its presence across the Pacific. China has opened new embassies, upgraded existing diplomatic missions, and intensified political dialogue at various levels. In recent years, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, further consolidating China’s position in the region.[12] These diplomatic victories also reflect the appeal of Chinese aid and infrastructure investment, particularly as they are often presented without the governance or human rights conditions typically associated with Western assistance.[13] However, such support may still entail implicit expectations of political alignment or reciprocal backing on international issues.

Security and Strategic Engagements

One of the most consequential dimensions of China's Pacific strategy lies in its growing involvement in the security sector. In 2022, Beijing signed a highly controversial security agreement with the Solomon Islands, potentially allowing Chinese security personnel to operate in-country and, allegedly, providing for naval access—a claim officially denied but nonetheless worrisome for regional powers.[14] The agreement alarmed traditional security partners, including Australia and the United States, who feared the establishment of a permanent Chinese military presence in a region historically under Western strategic purview.[15]

Similar arrangements with Kiribati and Vanuatu—alongside a series of agreements signed under the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the Cook Islands in February 2025[16] —cover areas including maritime surveillance, police training, and cybersecurity cooperation.[17] Such initiatives reflect China’s expanding engagement in the security domain, extending beyond development assistance to include the securitization of infrastructure and digital assets.[18] Often formulated with limited public scrutiny and minimal stakeholder consultation, these pacts have raised concerns among civil society actors and opposition parties which, though relatively weak in many PICs, represent an important, if often underpowered, layer of domestic accountability.[19] In several cases, the absence of parliamentary oversight has triggered political backlash, highlighting both the sensitivity and the far-reaching strategic implications of China’s security footprint in the Pacific.[20]

Similarly, China’s attempt to promote a region-wide security pact during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 2022 Pacific tour illustrates Beijing’s ambition to institutionalize its role as a long-term security actor in the region, though the initiative encountered resistance from several PICs.[21] This episode revealed divergent views among Pacific leaders, with some welcoming deeper cooperation with China and others expressing concern about compromising sovereignty and exacerbating regional tensions.[22] Nonetheless, the proposal reflected a more proactive and structured approach by Beijing in framing its Pacific policy.[23]

Digital Governance and Strategic Technologies

China's digital presence in the Pacific is expanding rapidly. Through state-linked enterprises, Beijing has provided telecommunications infrastructure, digital governance platforms, and public service management systems.[24] Companies such as Huawei and ZTE have been instrumental in establishing backbone digital infrastructure, including undersea cable networks and national data centers.[25] While these technologies offer modernization benefits, they also raise critical issues related to data sovereignty, privacy, and potential dependence on foreign-controlled systems.[26]

The deployment of Chinese-made surveillance and urban security systems has drawn particular scrutiny. These technologies, often embedded within aid packages or concessional financing, introduce opaque mechanisms of data collection and storage, prompting concerns over their alignment with democratic norms and human rights protections.[27] The intersection of digital infrastructure and strategic surveillance capabilities is particularly significant in archipelagic states where maritime domain awareness is increasingly vital. The potential for dual-use technologies to facilitate both civilian and military applications underscores the strategic stakes of digital governance.[28]

Furthermore, as digital platforms become integral to public administration, education, and healthcare delivery, questions arise about who controls the software, manages the data, and oversees system integrity. In the absence of strong local regulatory frameworks, many PICs may find themselves reliant on external providers with limited recourse in cases of data misuse or cyber incidents.[29] This digital dependence could, over time, translate into strategic dependency, thereby amplifying the geopolitical implications of China’s digital footprint.[30]

New Frontiers: Deep-Sea Mining

The Pacific Ocean floor is rich in polymetallic nodules essential for green technologies. Beijing has partnered with two PICs—, Kiribati and the Cook Islands—to explore opportunities in deep-sea mining.[31] These efforts form part of China's broader resource diplomacy, aimed at securing long-term access to critical minerals essential for its energy transition and technological development. However, this emerging domain poses ecological risks and lacks a cohesive international regulatory framework.[32]

While proponents argue that deep-sea mining offers a pathway to economic diversification and fiscal revenue, environmental advocates and several Pacific leaders have raised alarms about the irreversible damage it could inflict on fragile marine ecosystems.[33] Some states, including Palau, Fiji, and Tuvalu, advocate for a moratorium until comprehensive environmental assessments are conducted, highlighting diverging regional perspectives on the issue. This divide within the Pacific complicates the formation of a unified position and may expose smaller states to bilateral pressures from external actors.[34]

Moreover, the convergence of deep-sea mining technologies with digital monitoring systems introduces new governance challenges. Effective oversight of underwater operations will require real-time data collection, satellite connectivity, and AI-based analytics—domains in which China is actively investing.[35] The integration of these systems further strengthens China's embeddedness in the operational infrastructure of PICs, reinforcing its role as a key stakeholder in the region's economic and environmental future.[36]

Implications for Regional Order and Global Governance

China’s growing presence in the Pacific is prompting recalibrated strategies from traditional partners.[37] The United States has reinvigorated its Free Association Compacts and reopened embassies,[38] while Australia has increased aid and security partnerships.[39] Japan and the European Union are also stepping up their regional engagement, emphasizing shared values and rule-based cooperation.[40] These efforts, while significant, often appear reactive and fragmented, lacking the long-term coherence of Beijing’s Pacific strategy.[41]

Western actors have begun to recognize the need for enhanced coordination and inclusivity in their Pacific policies. Initiatives such as the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), launched in 2022 by the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, aim to provide a transparent and values-based alternative to Chinese engagements.[42] Similarly, the European Union has committed increased resources to climate resilience, food security, and digital transformation in the region.[43]

Nonetheless, Beijing’s narrative of mutual respect, non-interference, and South-South cooperation continues to resonate with several Pacific leaders. This discursive advantage, combined with flexible and demand-driven aid delivery, positions China as an appealing partner for states seeking development without overt conditionalities.[44] For traditional partners, the challenge lies in offering meaningful alternatives that respect local agency, align with regional priorities, and deliver tangible outcomes.[45]

Summary assessment

China’s expanding presence in the Pacific Islands region is reshaping strategic, economic, and governance dynamics with growing intensity and complexity.[46] Through a multifaceted engagement strategy—encompassing development assistance, infrastructure projects, diplomatic outreach, security agreements, digital platforms, and access to seabed resources—Beijing has positioned itself as a central actor in the Pacific.[47] These engagements provide PICs with alternative development pathways and a broader set of external partnerships. At the same time, they raise significant concerns related to debt sustainability, political transparency, digital sovereignty, environmental risks, and long-term strategic dependence.[48]

A key takeaway from this analysis is that China’s model—marked by its responsiveness, limited conditionality, and willingness to act outside traditional donor frameworks— holds tangible appeal for many Pacific states.[49] However, such an approach often bypasses institutional checks and public scrutiny, potentially weakening domestic governance and regional solidarity. In the security and digital domains in particular, contractual murkiness and the dual-use nature of some technologies have heightened tensions and prompted pushback from civil society and opposition parties.[50]

While the paper has emphasized the growing agency of Pacific Island leaders in engaging external powers on their own terms, this optimism must be tempered by recognition of the structural constraints these nations face.[51] Their limited institutional capacity, economic vulnerability, and exposure to geopolitical pressure make them susceptible to asymmetric relationships.[52] China’s presence, though welcomed by some as a corrective to Western dominance, also presents new risks that could undermine the very autonomy and development it seeks to promote.[53]

Pacific Perspectives

Looking ahead, fostering sustainable and inclusive cooperation will require more than rhetorical commitments to partnership. It demands stronger regulatory and institutional frameworks within PICs, greater regional coordination, and consistent investment in local capacity building.[54] It also calls for external actors—including China, traditional partners, and multilateral institutions—to engage in ways that are transparent, predictable, and aligned with the long-term priorities of Pacific societies.[55]

For traditional partners, the challenge lies not only in countering China’s influence, but in presenting coherent, respectful, and effective alternatives that respond to Pacific concerns without instrumentalizing the region in broader strategic rivalries. The viability of such alternatives will depend on their ability to deliver results, foster trust, and reinforce the norms of mutual accountability and local ownership.[56]

In sum, the evolving strategic architecture of the Pacific is increasingly shaped by China’s expanding engagement, but also by the uneven and reactive responses of longstanding partners. While Pacific Island countries have sought to navigate this shifting landscape to secure development gains and diversify external ties, the structural asymmetries in their relationships with both Beijing and more established actors remain stark. China’s approach, marked by speed, flexibility, and limited conditionality, poses distinct governance and sovereignty risks. At the same time, traditional partners—often constrained by bureaucratic inertia and short-term agendas—have struggled to offer credible, coherent alternatives. Without stronger regional coordination, enhanced institutional safeguards, and consistent investment in local agency, there is a growing risk that continued involvement by outside powers—whether from China or from traditional external engagers—will entrench dependency rather than empower Pacific Island nations to shape their own futures.

(2025/07/10)

Notes

  1. 1 Peter Connolly, “China’s Quest for Strategic Space in the Pacific Islands”, Mapping China’s Strategic Space, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 16 January 2024.
  2. 2 Charles Edel and Kathryn Paik, “China’s Power Play Across the Pacific”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 8 April 2025.
  3. 3 Fabrizio Bozzato, “Gifts that Bind: China's Aid to the Pacific Island Nations”, Asian Journal of Japanese Studies, n. 12, 2017, pp. 17–35.
  4. 4 Christopher K. Colley, “The South Pacific Is the New Frontline in the Rivalry with China”, War on the Rocks, 26 March 2025.
  5. 5 Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell, “Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for Advantage”, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, 16 January 2024.
  6. 6 Graeme Dobell, “The permanent Australia-China contest in the South Pacific”, The Strategist — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog, 24 March 2025.
  7. 7 William Yang, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Sets Off Great Power Competition in the Pacific”, Voice of America, 13 October 2023.
  8. 8 William Piekos, “How Beijing uses inducements as a tool of economic statecraft”, Atlantic Council, 24 March 2025.
  9. 9 Riley Duke and Alexandre Dayant, “China’s Pacific Aid Is Rebounding and Recalibrated”, The Interpreter - Lowy Institute, 21 November 2024.
  10. 10 Darshana M. Baruah, Satyendra Prasad and Denghua Zhang, “How Chinese Financing Shapes the Pacific”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 February 2024.
  11. 11 Riley Duke, “Tonga walks a tightrope on its Chinese debts”, The Interpreter - Lowy Institute, 31 January 2024.
  12. 12 Alexandria Conn, “Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies in the Pacific: Navigating China’s Growing Influence”, Indo-Pacific Studies Center, 9 April 2025.
  13. 13 Dominic Giannini and Ben McKay, “China boosts Pacific ties, flags policing collaboration, nations say ‘no political strings attached’”, The Nightly, 29 May 2025.
  14. 14 Kylar Cade, “Understanding China–Solomon Islands Security Cooperation in Context”, Strategy International, December 28, 2023.
  15. 15 Andrew Harding, “Competition Returns to the Southwest Pacific”, The Heritage Foundation, 5 August 2024.
  16. 16 Lucy Craymer, “What Is the Cook Islands Deal with China and What Has Worried NZ?”, Reuters, 19 February 2025.
  17. 17 Prianka Srinivasan and Virginia Harrison, “Mapped: the vast network of security deals spanning the Pacific, and what it means”, The Guardian, 9 July 2024.
  18. 18 ANI, “China Competes for Influence in the South Pacific”, The Economic Times, 19 June 2024.
  19. 19 Meg Keen and Mihai Sora, “Looking through a Pacific Islands lens: Access, accountability, and alignment in global engagements”, The Interpreter – Lowy Institute, 12 December 2024.
  20. 20 Shubhamitra Das and Rahul Mishra, “Ramifications of the China–Cook Islands’ Partnership”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 4 June 2025.
  21. 21 Henry Ivarature, “The Rejection of China’s Deal Shows the Pacific Will Not Be a Geopolitical Pawn”, The Guardian, 2 June 2022.
  22. 22 Izumi Kobayashi, “State of Affairs in the Pacific Island Region: Reading China’s Engagement”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 18 September 2023.
  23. 23 Christian Shepherd, “China fails on Pacific pact, but still seeks to boost regional influence”, The Washington Post, 1 June 2022.
  24. 24 Kirsty Needham, “Vanuatu Prime Minister Visits Huawei, Views Policing Technology”, Reuters, 9 July 2024.
  25. 25 Alvin Camba, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”, 20 March 2025.
  26. 26 Edwin Liava'a, “Pacific Island States Call for Unified Cybersecurity Protocols and Digital Sovereignty”, Hackernoon, 4 June 2025.
  27. 27 Bulelani Jili, “A Technological Fix: The Adoption of Chinese Public Security Systems”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 20 January 2023.
  28. 28 Domingo I-Kwei Yang, “China’s Dual-Use Infrastructure in the Pacific”, Sinopsis, 14 April 2025.
  29. 29 UNCTAD, Gap Analysis of Cyberlaws in Pacific Small Island Developing States, UNCTAD/DTL/ECDE/2024/6, 22 April 2025.
  30. 30 Mihai Sora, “Beneath the Surface of Pacific Digital Infrastructure Investments”, Lowy Institute, 17 September 2024.
  31. 31 Stephen Wright, “Kiribati Explores Deep Sea Mining Deal with China”, RNZ News, 18 March 2025.
  32. 32 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Between Rocks and a Hard Place: Seabed Mining in the Pacific”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 May 2025.
  33. 33 Fabrizio Bozzato, “Seabed Mining in the Pacific Islands: New economic frontier or Pandora’s box?”, Ocean Policy Research Blog, 15 March 2021.
  34. 34 Shayal Devi, “Deep-sea mining — Its impact in the Pacific”, Island Times, 25 February 2025.
  35. 35 Rui Zhang, “CPPCC Member Seeks High-Tech Boost for China's Marine Economy”, China.org.cn, 10 March 2025.
  36. 36 Alex Gilbert and Morgan D. Bazilian, “The Seabed Is Now a Battlefield”, Foreign Policy, 4 June 2025.
  37. 37 William Yang, “China, Major Democracies Step Up Competition in Pacific”, Voice of America, 1 August 2024.
  38. 38 Karen Goldmeier Green, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Geoffrey K. Verhoff, and Jeffrey L. Farrow, “Compacts Renewal Ushers in New Era of Relations Between the U.S. and Freely Associated States”, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 21 March 2024.
  39. 39 Rod McGuirk, “Australia focuses foreign aid spending on Pacific region as US slashes aid programs”, Associated Press, 26 March 2025.
  40. 40 Simran Walia, “Japan’s Outreach to the Pacific Island Countries in the Indo-Pacific”, Centre for Air Power Studies, 1 May 2024.
  41. 41 Peter Connolly, “China’s Quest for Strategic Space in the Pacific Islands”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 16 January 2024.
  42. 42 Cherry Hitkari, “PacNet #13 – Revamping Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative”, Pacific Forum, 15 March 2024.
  43. 43 Enrico D'Ambrogio, The EU and the Pacific countries: Between climate change and geopolitical rivalries, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing PE 772.875, 20 May 2025.
  44. 44 Kathrin Hille and Nic Fildes, “China Vows to Open Markets to Pacific Island Nations as US Retreats”, Financial Times, 29 May 2025.
  45. 45 Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue, “Support Pacific Regionalism”, AsiaPacific4D, July 2024.
  46. 46 William Yang, “China, Major Democracies Step Up Competition in Pacific”, Voice of America, 1 August 2024.
  47. 47 Ahmed Al-Sayed Al-Helou, “Cementing Presence: China’s Strategies in the Pacific Islands”, Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS), 5 May 2025.
  48. 48 Emma Farge, “World Powers’ Strategic Rivalry ‘Threatens to Overwhelm’ Pacific Islands: Think Tank”, Reuters, 21 August 2024.
  49. 49 Digby James Wren, “China and the Pacific Island Countries: A Model of South–South Cooperation”, Small State Diplomacy (Substack), 27 May 2025.
  50. 50 Christine Chen, “New Zealand’s Top Spy Warns China’s Influence in Pacific Backs Five Eyes Collaboration”, Reuters, 7 March 2025,.
  51. 51 Tessa Newton Cain, “Pacific transactionalism: Art of the diplomatic deal”, The Jakarta Post, 3 March 2025.
  52. 52 Christine Chen, “World Powers’ Strategic Rivalry Threatens to Overwhelm Pacific Islands, Think Tank Warns”, Reuters, 21 August 2024.
  53. 53 Ivamere Nataro, “Fiji wrestles with need for outside help on security, at risk to https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/11/fiji-security-deals-pacific-china-us-australia its own sovereignty”, The Guardian, 11 luglio 2024.
  54. 54 Kathryn Paik, “Looking Ahead: Next Steps in the Pacific”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 27 January 2025.
  55. 55 Darshana M. Baruah and Nitya Labh, “Understanding the Indo-Pacific: The Island Way”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 March 2023.
  56. 56 Eleanor Shiori Hughes, “US and Australian Efforts to Bolster People to People Ties with the Pacific Islands”, United States Studies Centre Brief, 4 November 2024.