Contours of Influence: China’s Expanding Footprint in the Pacific Islands

Framing the China-Pacific Shift

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly intensified its political, economic, and strategic presence in the Pacific Islands region.[1] This expansion, situated within a broader context of strategic competition, particularly with the United States and its allies, is reshaping the geopolitical equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.[2] China's engagement encompasses an array of instruments—including diplomatic ties, development finance, security cooperation, and cultural outreach—which collectively have transformed the regional landscape and elicited parallel responses from traditional partners such as the United States, Australia, and Japan.[3]

While the Pacific Islands region was long considered a peripheral strategic theater, recent developments have repositioned it at the center of global geopolitical recalibration.[4] The renewed attention to this vast and diverse area, composed of mostly small island developing states (SIDS), stems not only from their geostrategic locations but also from the growing recognition of their relevance to global governance, maritime security, and climate resilience.[5] As China asserts its influence, it challenges established patterns of engagement, prompting regional and global stakeholders alike to reconsider their strategic approaches.[6] This paper examines the contours of China’s expanding footprint in the Pacific Islands region, with particular attention to four interconnected domains—namely, infrastructure and diplomatic engagement; security and strategic arrangements; digital technologies and governance; and deep-sea mining—and assesses their broader implications for regional order and global governance. By examining these four domains, the analysis explores how China’s presence is reshaping power dynamics in the region, influencing development trajectories, and generating systemic implications for both Pacific institutions and the broader framework of regional and global governance.

Figure 1: Political Map of Oceania

Infrastructure and Diplomatic Engagement

From the mid-2010s, China has leveraged a combination of bilateral agreements and large-scale infrastructure projects to bolster its ties with Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Notably, participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided a structural framework for these engagements.[7] Chinese assistance includes concessional loans, grants, and in-kind support in health, agriculture, and public works. While these efforts have generated tangible benefits in recipient states, they have also raised concerns about transparency, debt sustainability, and disproportionate influence, particularly given the opacity of certain agreements and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny.[8]

Chinese-funded infrastructure projects span roads, airports, hospitals, sports facilities, and government buildings, providing high-visibility outputs that strengthen bilateral relations.[9] For many PICs, Chinese development financing represents a much-needed alternative to conventional multilateral funding mechanisms, which are often perceived as slow-moving and encumbered by stringent conditions. However, critics—like Darshana M. Baruah, Satyendra Prasad and Denghua Zhang—argue that China's infrastructure diplomacy can exacerbate debt vulnerabilities, particularly where repayment terms are vague and collateral clauses remain undisclosed.[10] The case of Tonga, which has struggled with repayments on Chinese loans, underscores the risks of unsustainable debt exposure.[11]

Diplomatically, the PRC has made significant strides in expanding its presence across the Pacific. China has opened new embassies, upgraded existing diplomatic missions, and intensified political dialogue at various levels. In recent years, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, further consolidating China’s position in the region.[12] These diplomatic victories also reflect the appeal of Chinese aid and infrastructure investment, particularly as they are often presented without the governance or human rights conditions typically associated with Western assistance.[13] However, such support may still entail implicit expectations of political alignment or reciprocal backing on international issues.

Security and Strategic Engagements

One of the most consequential dimensions of China's Pacific strategy lies in its growing involvement in the security sector. In 2022, Beijing signed a highly controversial security agreement with the Solomon Islands, potentially allowing Chinese security personnel to operate in-country and, allegedly, providing for naval access—a claim officially denied but nonetheless worrisome for regional powers.[14] The agreement alarmed traditional security partners, including Australia and the United States, who feared the establishment of a permanent Chinese military presence in a region historically under Western strategic purview.[15]

Similar arrangements with Kiribati and Vanuatu—alongside a series of agreements signed under the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the Cook Islands in February 2025[16] —cover areas including maritime surveillance, police training, and cybersecurity cooperation.[17] Such initiatives reflect China’s expanding engagement in the security domain, extending beyond development assistance to include the securitization of infrastructure and digital assets.[18] Often formulated with limited public scrutiny and minimal stakeholder consultation, these pacts have raised concerns among civil society actors and opposition parties which, though relatively weak in many PICs, represent an important, if often underpowered, layer of domestic accountability.[19] In several cases, the absence of parliamentary oversight has triggered political backlash, highlighting both the sensitivity and the far-reaching strategic implications of China’s security footprint in the Pacific.[20]

Similarly, China’s attempt to promote a region-wide security pact during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 2022 Pacific tour illustrates Beijing’s ambition to institutionalize its role as a long-term security actor in the region, though the initiative encountered resistance from several PICs.[21] This episode revealed divergent views among Pacific leaders, with some welcoming deeper cooperation with China and others expressing concern about compromising sovereignty and exacerbating regional tensions.[22] Nonetheless, the proposal reflected a more proactive and structured approach by Beijing in framing its Pacific policy.[23]

Digital Governance and Strategic Technologies

China's digital presence in the Pacific is expanding rapidly. Through state-linked enterprises, Beijing has provided telecommunications infrastructure, digital governance platforms, and public service management systems.[24] Companies such as Huawei and ZTE have been instrumental in establishing backbone digital infrastructure, including undersea cable networks and national data centers.[25] While these technologies offer modernization benefits, they also raise critical issues related to data sovereignty, privacy, and potential dependence on foreign-controlled systems.[26]

The deployment of Chinese-made surveillance and urban security systems has drawn particular scrutiny. These technologies, often embedded within aid packages or concessional financing, introduce opaque mechanisms of data collection and storage, prompting concerns over their alignment with democratic norms and human rights protections.[27] The intersection of digital infrastructure and strategic surveillance capabilities is particularly significant in archipelagic states where maritime domain awareness is increasingly vital. The potential for dual-use technologies to facilitate both civilian and military applications underscores the strategic stakes of digital governance.[28]

Furthermore, as digital platforms become integral to public administration, education, and healthcare delivery, questions arise about who controls the software, manages the data, and oversees system integrity. In the absence of strong local regulatory frameworks, many PICs may find themselves reliant on external providers with limited recourse in cases of data misuse or cyber incidents.[29] This digital dependence could, over time, translate into strategic dependency, thereby amplifying the geopolitical implications of China’s digital footprint.[30]

New Frontiers: Deep-Sea Mining

The Pacific Ocean floor is rich in polymetallic nodules essential for green technologies. Beijing has partnered with two PICs—, Kiribati and the Cook Islands—to explore opportunities in deep-sea mining.[31] These efforts form part of China's broader resource diplomacy, aimed at securing long-term access to critical minerals essential for its energy transition and technological development. However, this emerging domain poses ecological risks and lacks a cohesive international regulatory framework.[32]

While proponents argue that deep-sea mining offers a pathway to economic diversification and fiscal revenue, environmental advocates and several Pacific leaders have raised alarms about the irreversible damage it could inflict on fragile marine ecosystems.[33] Some states, including Palau, Fiji, and Tuvalu, advocate for a moratorium until comprehensive environmental assessments are conducted, highlighting diverging regional perspectives on the issue. This divide within the Pacific complicates the formation of a unified position and may expose smaller states to bilateral pressures from external actors.[34]

Moreover, the convergence of deep-sea mining technologies with digital monitoring systems introduces new governance challenges. Effective oversight of underwater operations will require real-time data collection, satellite connectivity, and AI-based analytics—domains in which China is actively investing.[35] The integration of these systems further strengthens China's embeddedness in the operational infrastructure of PICs, reinforcing its role as a key stakeholder in the region's economic and environmental future.[36]

Implications for Regional Order and Global Governance

China’s growing presence in the Pacific is prompting recalibrated strategies from traditional partners.[37] The United States has reinvigorated its Free Association Compacts and reopened embassies,[38] while Australia has increased aid and security partnerships.[39] Japan and the European Union are also stepping up their regional engagement, emphasizing shared values and rule-based cooperation.[40] These efforts, while significant, often appear reactive and fragmented, lacking the long-term coherence of Beijing’s Pacific strategy.[41]

Western actors have begun to recognize the need for enhanced coordination and inclusivity in their Pacific policies. Initiatives such as the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), launched in 2022 by the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, aim to provide a transparent and values-based alternative to Chinese engagements.[42] Similarly, the European Union has committed increased resources to climate resilience, food security, and digital transformation in the region.[43]

Nonetheless, Beijing’s narrative of mutual respect, non-interference, and South-South cooperation continues to resonate with several Pacific leaders. This discursive advantage, combined with flexible and demand-driven aid delivery, positions China as an appealing partner for states seeking development without overt conditionalities.[44] For traditional partners, the challenge lies in offering meaningful alternatives that respect local agency, align with regional priorities, and deliver tangible outcomes.[45]

Summary assessment

China’s expanding presence in the Pacific Islands region is reshaping strategic, economic, and governance dynamics with growing intensity and complexity.[46] Through a multifaceted engagement strategy—encompassing development assistance, infrastructure projects, diplomatic outreach, security agreements, digital platforms, and access to seabed resources—Beijing has positioned itself as a central actor in the Pacific.[47] These engagements provide PICs with alternative development pathways and a broader set of external partnerships. At the same time, they raise significant concerns related to debt sustainability, political transparency, digital sovereignty, environmental risks, and long-term strategic dependence.[48]

A key takeaway from this analysis is that China’s model—marked by its responsiveness, limited conditionality, and willingness to act outside traditional donor frameworks— holds tangible appeal for many Pacific states.[49] However, such an approach often bypasses institutional checks and public scrutiny, potentially weakening domestic governance and regional solidarity. In the security and digital domains in particular, contractual murkiness and the dual-use nature of some technologies have heightened tensions and prompted pushback from civil society and opposition parties.[50]

While the paper has emphasized the growing agency of Pacific Island leaders in engaging external powers on their own terms, this optimism must be tempered by recognition of the structural constraints these nations face.[51] Their limited institutional capacity, economic vulnerability, and exposure to geopolitical pressure make them susceptible to asymmetric relationships.[52] China’s presence, though welcomed by some as a corrective to Western dominance, also presents new risks that could undermine the very autonomy and development it seeks to promote.[53]

Pacific Perspectives

Looking ahead, fostering sustainable and inclusive cooperation will require more than rhetorical commitments to partnership. It demands stronger regulatory and institutional frameworks within PICs, greater regional coordination, and consistent investment in local capacity building.[54] It also calls for external actors—including China, traditional partners, and multilateral institutions—to engage in ways that are transparent, predictable, and aligned with the long-term priorities of Pacific societies.[55]

For traditional partners, the challenge lies not only in countering China’s influence, but in presenting coherent, respectful, and effective alternatives that respond to Pacific concerns without instrumentalizing the region in broader strategic rivalries. The viability of such alternatives will depend on their ability to deliver results, foster trust, and reinforce the norms of mutual accountability and local ownership.[56]

In sum, the evolving strategic architecture of the Pacific is increasingly shaped by China’s expanding engagement, but also by the uneven and reactive responses of longstanding partners. While Pacific Island countries have sought to navigate this shifting landscape to secure development gains and diversify external ties, the structural asymmetries in their relationships with both Beijing and more established actors remain stark. China’s approach, marked by speed, flexibility, and limited conditionality, poses distinct governance and sovereignty risks. At the same time, traditional partners—often constrained by bureaucratic inertia and short-term agendas—have struggled to offer credible, coherent alternatives. Without stronger regional coordination, enhanced institutional safeguards, and consistent investment in local agency, there is a growing risk that continued involvement by outside powers—whether from China or from traditional external engagers—will entrench dependency rather than empower Pacific Island nations to shape their own futures.

(2025/07/10)