China’s Resolve as Seen from Russia: “A New Great Wall”
— China’s Preparations for Large-Scale War

Introduction

Vasily B. Kashin, who is one of the most famous Russian scholars specializing in Chinese studies, and his team have conducted a comprehensive analysis of China’s security perceptions and preparedness. Their findings were presented in a study titled “The New Great Wall: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Behavior.”[1]

At a time when conducting field research in mainland China has become increasingly difficult for researchers in many countries, including Japan, they have continued to visit various regions of China and engage with experts from different sectors. Through this process, they have carefully examined nuances that cannot be discerned solely from the limited publicly available sources.

The picture of China that emerges from their analysis stands in stark contrast to the peaceful image promoted by the Xi Jinping administration to the international community—through narratives such as economic globalization and the “community of shared future for mankind.” Instead, they depict another face of China: a country preparing, through a whole-of-nation effort, for the possibility of isolation and even scenarios in which the Chinese mainland itself becomes a battlefield.

In their study, Kashin and his colleagues argue that Chinese policies are being advanced under the assumption that a large-scale war—potentially involving severe sanctions against China, maritime blockades, and even missile strikes on urban areas—could occur or may even be unavoidable in the late 2020s to early 2030s.[2] Furthermore, Kashin interprets the large-scale purges carried out within the military, diplomatic sectors, and state-owned enterprises as indicative of Xi Jinping’s determination to accelerate the consolidation of such a system.[3]

While not all aspects of Kashin and his colleagues’ analysis can be fully endorsed, this paper focuses on the perspective of Russian scholars of China, whose values and analytical frameworks differ from our own. By examining China through this lens, it seeks to identify key concerns that arise from their viewpoint and to consider the implications these may hold for Japanese society.

The “New Great Wall” Supporting Military Power as an Indicator of Security Perceptions

When discussing defense and military capabilities, attention tends to focus on the modernization of frontline equipment, such as weapons systems, and on operational concepts—what might be termed “weapons systems and military hardware.” However, what Kashin and his colleagues emphasize is the rear that underpins such frontline capabilities: namely, industry, civilian life, social infrastructure, and the relationship of trust between the state and its citizens.

In their study, Kashin and his colleagues refer to the systematic effort to organize and strengthen this entire rear domain as the “New Great Wall,” highlighting that since entering the 2020s, the Xi Jinping administration has been allocating resources to this area on an unprecedented scale. They position this endeavor as the most reliable indicator of the leadership’s sense of crisis and determination.[4]

The upgrading and expansion of operational equipment—through live-fire exercises, joint drills with foreign militaries, and overseas deployments of naval vessels and aircraft—can serve, even in peacetime, as instruments for projecting diplomatic influence and bolstering national prestige domestically. In contrast, investments in the rear domain generate little in terms of immediate political returns. Kashin and his colleagues thus focus on the fact that the Xi administration has deliberately begun to channel substantial resources into an area traditionally seen as offering limited political payoff. They interpret this shift as a sign that China has embarked on preparations for full-scale war, including scenarios in which its own mainland could become a battlefield.

Indicators Presented by Kashin et al.

In what follows, I will introduce the five points presented by Kashin and his colleagues at the beginning of their paper, drawing on publicly available materials and incorporating my own perspective.

Although the original paper presents five distinct points, for the purposes of this discussion, I combine two of them—namely, the strengthening of stockpiles of strategic materials and the establishment of comprehensive self-sufficiency systems—due to the nature of the analysis.

(1) Inland Relocation of Key Industrial Bases and the Concept of a “Strategic Hinterland”

To prepare for scenarios in which its coastal regions come under attack or are subjected to maritime blockades, China has begun dispersing and relocating key industries to inland areas. A central concept guiding this effort is the notion of a “strategic hinterland”,[5] first introduced at the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2023.

Centering on Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality, this initiative aims to relocate major industries—such as integrated circuits, medical equipment, industrial machinery and machine tools, and industrial software—to the region. At the same time, it seeks to enhance the ability to rapidly shift key production lines from peacetime to emergency operations, thereby ensuring robustness and resilience. In addition, by utilizing these production capacities in normal times, the initiative aims to increase reliance on the domestic market across production, distribution, and consumption, ultimately fostering a virtuous cycle within the national economy.[6]

The strategic hinterland also enjoys a geographical advantage, being located at a key junction linking eastern and western, as well as northern and southern China. It is thus positioned as a critical hub for building high-capacity, high-quality strategic transportation corridors across land, sea, and air. On this basis, China aims to integrate its inland regions into both national and trans-Eurasian transport networks, while developing strategic corridors that connect all cardinal directions. These corridors are intended to support the construction of civil-military emergency logistics support and information management systems that can function not only in peacetime but also in contingencies[7]

From this perspective, China’s high-speed railway projects—often criticized by Japanese media and others as economically unprofitable[8] —can be reinterpreted not primarily in terms of economic efficiency but as part of the development of strategically significant transportation corridors shaped by security considerations.

Kashin and his colleagues compare this “strategic hinterland” concept with the Third Front construction of the 1960s,[9] which ultimately proved unsuccessful. They argue that, unlike the purely defensive Third Front strategy, the current initiative represents a departure in that it is expected to drive growth and innovation even in peacetime, while integrating national security imperatives with high-quality development.[10] However, given China’s slowing economic growth and the persistent deficits of its high-speed rail projects, it is far from certain that such a strategy will necessarily yield a favorable outcome.

(2) Strengthening Strategic Stockpiles and Ensuring Self-Sufficiency

The stockpiling and domestic production of food, energy, and mineral resources constitute a lifeline for withstanding blockades and sanctions. One of the Chinese government’s highest priorities is therefore the restructuring and enhancement of the strategic reserve management system. To this end, since the early 2020s, China has successively established relevant legal frameworks and has been developing a multilayered reserve system involving the central and local governments as well as enterprises.

In January 2026, the National Development and Reform Commission released a draft of the National Reserve Security Law.[11] Until now, China has lacked a single, comprehensive basic law governing the management of all types of reserves. The primary objective of this new legislation is to strengthen reserve capacity from a national security perspective. It defines national reserves as resources stored in accordance with the needs of national development and security, including grain, major agricultural products, agricultural inputs, energy resources, minerals, critical equipment and components, and emergency supplies. Beyond the mere stockpiling of materials, the law seeks to enhance overall reserve capacity as a system—encompassing the ability to rapidly scale up production in times of emergency.

New legislation has also been introduced in recent years for individual categories of reserves. The National Food Security Law,[12] which came into force in 2024, is the first comprehensive regulatory framework covering the entire food security system, including farmland protection, stable grain production, and the management of national reserves. In parallel with the enactment of such laws, China has also promoted measures such as the domestic production of key components for agricultural machinery and the expansion of digitalization in agriculture.[13]

Some of these measures clearly contradict long-standing policy orientations, prioritizing “survival in times of emergency” over environmental considerations and market principles. This suggests that food security has become one of the top priorities of the Xi Jinping administration. Examples include the prohibition of converting farmland into forests—despite past state-led afforestation programs[14] —relaxation of greenhouse gas regulations for fertilizer manufacturers,[15]and the easing of restrictions on genetically modified crops.[16] As a result, grain storage infrastructure has steadily expanded and modernized, and China’s grain reserves are said to have reached record levels.[17]

Similar trends can be observed in the strategic stockpiling of other resources. The Energy Law [18] came into force in January 2025, followed by the revised Mineral Resources Law [19] in July of the same year. By 2024, China’s crude oil storage capacity had already exceeded 1.8 billion barrels, reportedly reaching approximately 130 percent of that of the United States. While China has decided to reduce coal consumption after 2026, it has also opted to maintain coal supply capacity through measures such as mandatory allocation of coal to power plants and the use of long-term contracts.[20] Strategic reserves of metals such as copper, aluminum, zinc, and cobalt are also being actively expanded,[21] alongside continued efforts to develop new mining projects.[22]

Kashin and his colleagues interpret this series of initiatives as preparations for major global disruptions that could emerge in the coming years, including the possibility of blockades against China.[23] Indeed, considering recent developments—such as the United States’ hardline approach toward Venezuela[24] in January of this year and rising tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz—China’s efforts can be seen as possessing a certain degree of strategic rationality.

(3) Dual-Use Transformation of Public Infrastructure

Efforts are also underway to redesign urban infrastructure itself as systems capable of functioning in both peacetime and wartime.

Transportation networks, communications systems, public facilities, and underground spaces are being designed on the premise that they can be immediately repurposed in emergencies such as medical facilities, evacuation sites, or command centers. This concept envisions “the city as a whole as a structure capable of withstanding war,” and its importance and urgency have been increasingly emphasized since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine[25] At its core lies the development of a flexible system in which civilian infrastructure can be rapidly converted to meet military or emergency needs—namely, a “people’s air defense” framework.[26] The details and assessment of this aspect have already been discussed in my previous work.[27]

However, in light of recent developments—such as the collapse of the real estate bubble, the proliferation of partially abandoned high-rise construction projects across China, and the slow progress of the Xiong’an New Area initiative championed by President Xi Jinping—it is difficult to avoid questioning the extent to which these plans are being implemented as intended. As with the “strategic hinterland” concept, there remain considerable uncertainties regarding their actual progress.

(4) Compensation and Commemoration Systems in Anticipation of Large Numbers of War Casualties

From 2024 to 2025, legal frameworks related to preparations for the occurrence of large numbers of war dead and wounded were rapidly developed.[28] These regulations aim to clarify and strengthen the criteria and procedures for recognizing “martyrs,” while also expanding economic support for bereaved families and enhancing the maintenance and protection of memorials. The term “martyrs” in this context refers to those killed or injured in activities such as national security operations, counterterrorism, disaster relief, and international peacekeeping. It is not limited to members of the People’s Liberation Army or the People’s Armed Police but also includes militia personnel and civilians engaged in related activities.

Kashin and his colleague argue that this series of measures reflects the Xi Jinping administration’s anticipation of a “high-casualty war,” potentially one in which the Chinese mainland itself becomes a battlefield, and represents an effort to institutionally manage its societal impact.[29]

Of course, it is also possible that the COVID-19 pandemic and the increasing frequency of large-scale natural disasters in recent years have produced substantial numbers of casualties—served as catalysts for these policies. However, given that these measures have been implemented alongside the three previously discussed policies, including that of the “strategic hinterland,” it is difficult to categorically dismiss the analysis advanced by Kashin and his colleagues.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, Kashin and his colleagues argue that China is “quietly but quickly turning it into an impregnable fortress, which, when completed, should have some resilience even to full-scale nuclear conflict. To achieve this goal, the Chinese government spares no expense.” They further contend that, if such objectives are achieved, China “will allow it to choose the time and scale of its participation in world affairs.”[30]

Of course, the fact that China is advancing preparations based on such an extremely pessimistic worldview does not in itself directly indicate Xi Jinping’s intent to initiate war. The decision to go to war is shaped by a different set of factors, including political judgment, the international environment, and diplomatic conditions. Moreover, just as the Third Front construction ultimately failed in the past, there is no guarantee that China’s current efforts will come to fruition as envisioned. Nevertheless, Kashin’s argument is persuasive in that such preparations could expand China’s strategic freedom of choice.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with the subsequent armed conflicts occurring in various parts of the world, has once again demonstrated that war can no longer be confined solely to the military sphere. At the same time, these developments have strongly underscored the ongoing transformation of international order and global society. In Ukraine in particular, not only the military but also employees of private-sector entities supporting daily life—such as those in electricity, energy, communications, and finance—continue to sustain the front lines, suffering casualties daily.[31]

It is evident that national defense cannot be sustained solely through the modernization of equipment or innovation in military operations. It also depends on the rear—namely, the industrial base, social infrastructure that underpins civilian life, and institutional systems capable of addressing wartime damage and casualties. While it remains highly uncertain whether China’s initiatives will progress as planned, it is nonetheless clear that the analysis presented by Kashin and his colleagues reflects China’s determination considering these realities.

At present, Russia and China maintain what is described as a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era,” regarded as the highest level in the history of their bilateral relations. Under these circumstances, the analysis and warning offered by Russian experts on China cannot be lightly dismissed.

(2026/06/22)