Australia’s National Defence Strategy and the Strengthening of Bilateral Ties with Japan

On 16 April 2026 the Australian government released the public version of its 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) in line with its commitment to update policy at two-year intervals. While the document contains no major “surprises”, it reflects a strengthening of resolve among defence planners and enduring commitment towards building Australian capabilities, both independently, and with key partners and allies such as Japan and US. This trajectory was mapped out in the earlier 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and proceeding National Defence Strategy (2024) but has taken on a new momentum in a worsening global and regional security environment.[1]

Less than a month later, Prime Ministers Albanese and Takaichi held their annual leadership summit, commemorating the 50-year anniversary of the NARA Treaty (the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation) by showcasing a range of new accords that would further elevate Australia-Japan ties and mutually support one another’s economic and security objectives.[2] As China’s power has risen, and uncertainties around the Trump Administration have grown, Canberra and Tokyo have increasingly looked toward one another as “like-minded” states with closely aligned interests and values and a shared stake in the preservation of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s National Defence: Strategy, Capabilities and Implementation

In terms of actual defence strategy, the NDS reiterates Australia’s investment in “deterrence by denial”. In essence, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) aims to acquire and deploy capabilities with the ability to hold an adversary at risk at greater range from Australian shores (discussed below). It identifies as the “primary area of military interest” the archipelagic belt of countries across lower South East Asia and the South Pacific that guard the country’s “northern approaches”. In addition to the relevant military capabilities acquisitions outlined below, Australia has sought to secure this region through a range of new security pacts including the Australia-Indonesia Treaty on Common Security (the “Jakarta Treaty”),[3] the Papua New Guinea–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (the “Pukpuk treaty”),[4] and the, now finalised, Australia-Vanuatu Bilateral Security Agreement (the “Nakamal” agreement).[5]

To establish the credibility of the above strategy, the NDS outlines the sustained build-up of military capabilities, encompassing major projects such as the acquisition of nuclear-power submarines under AUKUS, and Frigates sourced from the UK and Japan, as part of its overarching plan to boost the Royal Australian Navy’s power. Additionally, Australia (like Japan) is focused upon the acquisition of new long-range strike capabilities to be distributed across land (Precision Strike Missile), sea (Naval Tomahawk and SM-6 Missiles) and air (Joint Strike Missile) forces. The end game is to field a “Integrated, Focused Force” that will be more agile and lethal in effect. There has been a surprising surge in recruitment for the ADF, which bodes well for plans to increase personnel numbers from around 61,000 to 69,000 by the 2030s (including the eligibility of applicants from Five Eyes countries to serve in the ADF). This force restructuring is matched with continued improvement and hardening of northern base infrastructure as a platform from which to project force into the primary area of military interest, and which regularly host American and Japanese visiting forces. A separate document, the 2026 Integrated Investment Program, explains the budgetary and procurement process behind the military-build up, which will be of interest to defence economists.[6] Plans are in train to increase the defence budget from approximately 2% of GDP (currently: AUD$62.2bn) to 3% by 2033 (approximately AUD$100bn). This will be heavily allocated toward maritime force acquisitions (AUKUS and surface/amphibious fleets), strike-capabilities, air and missile defence, and cyber, space and advanced technologies.

These objectives are sited within a broader context of a national security posture in which Canberra seeks to deploy “all arms of national power” to practice “integrated statecraft”.[7] The NDS recognises that to realise the purpose of “National Defence” writ large, requires as “whole of government” and “whole of nation” approach.[8] Key to this is developing “greater self-reliance”, in part through a revitalisation of Australia’s sovereign defence industrial base, including munitions production and stockpiling fuel reserves. This is part of a broader effort to improve national resilience and national civil preparedness to better protect the country from global disruptions and economic coercion. Like Japan and the UK, Australia seeks to combine public-private partnerships to fuel Innovation, Science and Technology (IS&T) in a bid to reap a “defence divided” that will metastasise into wider economic benefits. More information will be forthcoming in a planned 2026 Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy, later this year.

Yet for a middle power country like Australia “allies and partners will remain irreplaceable force multipliers”.[9] The US-alliance is crucial to bolstering Australia’s own efforts, affording treaty protection and access to advanced military hardware. Alongside other military suppliers such as the UK and Japan (see below), and minilateral efforts such as AUKUS, Australia’s own Guide Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise is engaging external partners. In addition to major weapons platforms, it is through these venues that collaboration on Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDT), such as AI, Quantum computing, hypersonics and drone development occurs. Concurrent to such practical cooperation, is the desire to forge a more credible “collective deterrence” front with these allies and partners.[10]

Enhanced Economic, Security and Defence Cooperation with Japan

Australia’s defence policy matters more than ever to Japan (and vice-versa) at a time of international upheaval – a condition which has spurred further strengthening of the Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership itself. When Prime Minister’s Albanese and Takaichi met on 4 May for their annual leadership summit they unveiled a raft of new declarations, statements and other initiatives that would elevate the bilateral Strategic Partnership to “even greater heights”.[11] Crucial among these were a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation (JDESC) recognising the shared need to build economic resilience against supply chain disruptions and economic coercion.[12] To this purpose the JDESC was accompanied by Joint Statements agreeing to enhance collaboration on energy and critical minerals supply issues.[13] Since Japan was subjected to economic coercion following the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident (with a cut off of rare-earths supply), and Australia was hit with an array of export tariffs after its call for an international inquiry into COVID-19 in 2020, both states are alive to the possibility of repeat performances of this tactic.

The 2026 JDESC neatly compliments the founding Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) signed in 2007 (and updated in 2022), reflecting the prominence that economic security challenges have assumed on both partner’s policy agendas.[14] The latter was consolidated further in a new Statement on Enhanced Defence and Security Cooperation.[15] This reflected upon crucial milestones such as the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), and 2025 Framework for Strategic Defence Coordination, and points the way for increased military interoperability through joint exercises, intelligence and information sharing (including a Joint Statement on Strategic Cyber Partnership), weapons testing, and maritime security.[16]

Prior to this, the landmark agreement for Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to supply the Mogami-class Frigate to Australia is testament to the increasing defence integration between the two countries and helps overcome the unfortunate affair of Japan’s earlier failed bid to supply Australia’s future submarine flotilla in 2016 (since displaced by AUKUS). Ironically, given an identified “capability gap” if the acquisition of American Virgina-Class SSNs is delayed (through Life of Type Extension (LOTE) for the existing Collins-class boats) and the later arrival of AUKUS-class SSNs, commentators have proposed the procurement of Japanese boats to fill this gap.[17]

These broadened and deepened bilateral lines of effort are emblematic of the “unprecedented strategic alignment” between the partners.[18] And while such actions are looked upon favourably by their joint ally in Washington, they also afford some room for manoeuvre for (so-called) middle power states to do more together at a time where US reliability as a treaty ally is again in doubt under a second fractious Trump Administration. The notion that middle powers needed to collaborate in “concert” and step up to the plate in the absence of US commitment to the liberal international order was popularised by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos on January 20, 2026.[19] As the US appears (form its National Security Strategy 2025) to resile from direct confrontation with Beijing, prioritises the Western Hemisphere, and launched a military adventure in Iran, all the while berating its allies, such middle power states are increasingly being compelled to act as “custodians” of the rules-based order and the challenges to it by revisionist states.[20]

The Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership has become increasingly important to both parties across all dimensions of cooperation: diplomatic, economic, security, defence and people-to-people ties.[21] Yet, whilst Japan enjoys strong support among the Australian policy establishment (and public), critics have sounded the alarm that increasing alignment with Japan under its current PM risks antagonising Beijing, or worse, might entrap Australia in a Sino-Japanese conflict.[22] Nevertheless, this is simply “one of many” potentially thorny entrapment problems that Australia faces, more specially through its US-alliance relationship, and cannot be detached from the bigger regional picture.[23] As proverbial “quasi-allies” (in Japanese parlance) Australia and Japan are increasingly looking to each other to safeguard their interests and jointly do their part in upholding peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.[24]

(2026/07/21)