- 1 -Message from The SponsorJapan is the world's largest importer of crude oil and is a prodigious consumer of many petroleumproducts. In fact, without oil imports, the industrial revival of the post-war period could not havehappened, and Japan's ongoing economic prosperity is dependent on our consumption of petroleumproducts. However, there is another side to this story : the annual influx of billions of barrels ofpetroleum exposes this country to the potential danger of oil pollution.The Nippon Foundation is strongly committed to developing ever more effective environmentalprotection and disaster relief strategies. Supported by the Foundation, many organizations, includingJapan Maritime Disaster Prevention Center, Ship & Ocean Foundation and The Japan Associationof Marine Safety, are engaged in research into measures to combat oil spills and to develop theoptimum equipment to prevent or contain spills. The Nippon Foundation was quick to respondwhen the Russian tanker NAKHODKA sank in the Japan Sea off Shimane Prefecture, releasing alarge quantity of heavy fuel oil. The resulting oil slick spread across 800 km of coastline, andaffected the coastal areas of nine prefectures. The Foundation gave active support to the localcommunities, helping the residents and volunteers to remove the oil and clean up the pollutedshorelines.As many as 2,500 Iarge tankers transport oil across the world's oceans every day. TheNAKHODKA incident draws our attention to the fact that the possibility of a disastrous oil spill isalways there, whether as a result of bad weather or actions arising from political disturbances suchas the Gulf War. One of the vital missions of a non-government organization (NGO) such as thisFoundation is to accumulate information on oil spill incidents. This information can, in turn, bemade available to other countries that also face the threat of these incidents. We believe that this isthe kind of mission that NGOs like ours can well undertake.The tanker NAKHODKA left not only oil debris but also many other intractable problems for us toaddress. With this latest spill still so fresh in our minds, we think it is a most opportune time tohold a symposium to discuss such topics as effective response measures to oil spills in roughweather conditions. The Japanese and foreign experts invited to this symposium are the people withdirect experience in combating large-scale oil spills. We hope that this symposium will help todevelop increasingly effective oil spill response measures.Ayako SonoChairmanThe Nippon Foundation- 2 -- 3 -GreetingTranquillity of the new year holidays of 1997 was shattered abruptly by a disastrous marineincident the Russian tanker "NAKHODKA" ... broke apart in the Sea of Japan on January 2.Shaking off the festive mood, the Japanese mass media were busy reporting the spread of oil spilledfrom the superannuated tanker, the harsh weather conditions around the incident site, and devotedresponse activities of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency and a large number of volunteerworkers. The incident alerted many people afresh to the latent possibility of large-scale oil spillsnear the Japanese waters. Since 1991, the Ship & Ocean Foundation had been engaged inexhaustive researches into the fate of oil slicks by use of a special water tank at its researchinstitute ; and the researches were then coming into the final stage."The International Symposium on Marine Oil Spill Response" was projected against thesebackgrounds. Incidentally, the Petroleum Association of Japan was also working on preparation of aconference to discuss oil spill response. To avoid adding unnecessary things, we decided to makeour symposium topics more specific. Instead of theoretical studies or lab researches on responsemeasures, the more practical sides of response activities were highlighted. Thus, our symposiumfeatured response to intractable oil spills of the order of tens of thousands tons under severeweather conditions. We invited to the symposium Japanese experts who combated theNAKHODKA spill and as many as 10 experts from overseas : the experts from Norway have muchexperience in dealing with oil leakage from drilling rigs installed in the North Sea, whilst the USand UK experts combated the Exxon Valdez spill and the Sea Empress spill, respectively. We askedthe speakers to share with us their valuable experiences in combating large-scale oil spills. Thesymposium was not opened to the public, but to dozens of selected experts.Thanks to contributions by the eminent speakers, the symposium was a great success beyond allexpectations. Just a glance over the contents of this Proceedings would suffice to learn howinformative presentations were given there ; and transcribed discussions include penetrating remarksof the kind that only the people actually involved in response activities can address. Shortly afterthe NAKHODKA incident, the Japanese government and relevant organizations redoubled theirefforts to improve oil spill response strategies. We hope this publication of the symposium resultsmay help such efforts in some way or other.Lastly, allow us to express our sincere gratitude to Ms. Ayako Sono, Chairman of the NipponFoundation and Mr. Yohei Sasakawa, President of the Nippon Foundation, for their understandingand support to this symposium. Our gratitude is also due to Mrs. Setsuko Sengoku, Director of theGreat Britain Sasakawa Foundation for her amazingly dexterous management of the secretariat,without which this symposium would not have been organized so impeccably within a short time ofpreparation.KenSaku ImaichiChairmanShip & Ocean Foundation- 4 -The "NAKHODKA" IncidentThe Russian tanker NAKHODKA broke apart 106 km NNE of Oki Island of Shimane Prefecturearound 02:51, January 2, 1997. Transporting aboard 19,000kL of heavy fuel oil shipped at the portof Shanghai, China, the tanker was then en route to Petropavlovsk, Russia. The severed ship's bowdrifted on the raging sea, whilst the rest of the ship body sank to rest on the seabed. Some 6,200kLof heavy fuel oil were released from the ruptured cargo tanks. At the time of the incident, a NWwind was blowing at a velocity of 20 m/s or above ; and wave height and swell were estimated at 6m min. and 4 m min., respectively. At 13:00, January 2, thirty-one crew members, were rescued,except the ship's captain whose body was retrieved later.Both the sea current and the strong, northerly seasonal wind carried the ship's bow, together withthe spilled oil, away to the coastal regions of Japan. On January 7, the ship's bow ran aground nearthe seaside town of Mikuni, Fukui Prefecture, and the oil polluted the shoreline. The dispersing oilspill then moved north along the coast and contaminated the long shorelines of nine prefecturesfrom Shimane northward to Akita.Thanks to concerted efforts of the government and private sectors, recovery operations proceededsmoothly. On April 30, the Fukui prefectural authorities announced the termination of recoveryoperations in their jurisdiction. And recovery- 5 -Oil Spill from the "NAKHODKA"- 6 -Speakers / 講演者- 7 -Reception / 懇親会- 8 -Chairman / 議長 Vice-Chairman / 副議長- 9 -Session / 会議風景- 10 -At Mikuni-cho Site現場視察Photo by H. Oishi and M.Okawa- 11 -- 12 -- 13 -- 14 -Chairman's Profile /Seizo Motora, Dr.Position Director, Ship & Ocean Foundation,Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo, Naval ArchitectureEducation Doctor of Engineening. Graduated from Department of Naval Architecture, SecondFaculty of Engireering, University of TokyoLife honorary member of Society of Naval Architects of JapanLife honorary member of SNAMELife honorary member of Chinese Society of Navel ArchitectsProfessional Experiencel) Stability and safety of ships and offshore platformsHave been joining Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment and Subcommittee on Stabilityand Loadlines on Fishing Vessel of IMO for 25years.Joined MEPC (Marine Environment Protection Committee) of IMO in 1992 and 19932) Safety assessment of offshore oil storage systems (at Kamigoto site 4,500,000kL, Shirashimasite 6,400,000kL)3) Development of superconducting magnetohydrodynamic ship proplusion4) Feasibility study and trial design of floating airport in Osaka Bay5) Evaluation of the effect caused by large quantity of oil spill from tankers6) Read a key-note speech at Colloquim '94 of OPRC (Oil Spill Preparedness Response andCooperation) in Tokyo and Colloquim '95 in, Dalian, China7) Evaluation of oil outflow from mid-deck tankers- 15 -Vice-chairman's Profilelkuo MutohEducation1945 graduated from Department of Naval Architecture, Second Faculty of Engineering, Universityof TokyoMember : Member of Society of Naval Architects of Japan. Kansai Society of Naval Architects1975-78 Member of Committe for Oil Spill Prevention Technology. (Japan Ship ResearchAssociation)1983 Expert Member of National Council for Transport Technology (MOT)1970, 1989 Expert Member of National Council for Ocean Development. (Science & TechnologyAgency)1985 Member of Committee of Oil Pollution Control & Prevention in the lce SeaProfessional Experience1949 joined Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. and worked at the Tamano Shipyard asship designer1969 General Manager of Ship Design Dept.1970 Director and General Manager of Research & Development Dept. at Mitsui OceanDevelopment & Engineering Co. Ltd. (MODEC)1983 Executive Managing Director of MODEC1983 President of MOBAX Co. Ltd.1988-97 Director of MOBAX Co. Ltd.Development :1973 Developed Inclined Plane Oil Skimmer "MIPOS"1974 Invented a dual skirt oil boom "MOBAX", for high current1974 Developed a recovering & cleaning apparatus for oil boom.- 16 -Lecturer (Ocean Engineering & Special Ship) :1976-91 Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science1978-80 Osaka University1979-82 University of Tokyo (Postgraduate Course)1985-87 Yokohama National University1986-89 Japan Institute of Humanities & Sciences- 17 -International Symposium on Marine Oil Spill Response16-17 July 1997 TokyoPROCEEDINGSSession 1Summary and Precept of the NAKHODKA IncidentEisuke KudoPosition Director General, Equipment and Technology Department, The Maritime Safety Agency,Japan,(Fomer Commander, the 8th Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters)Education 1970 MA Department of Naval Architecture, Gradute School of Engineering of OsakaUniversityAt the time of the NAKHODKA incident, he took charge from the time of occurrence of theincident as commander of the agency having jurisdiction and undertook the resolution of variousproblems- 18 -IntroductionInternational rule-making and co-operation to prevent marine pollution have been positivelypromoted, learning lessons from many cases of tanker incidents including the TORREY CANYONand the EXXON VALDEZ.Relying almost entirely on crude oil imports from oil-supplying countries overseas, Japan has paidparticular attention to the prevention of marine pollution by vessel with great interest as a leadingshipbuilding nation of tankers and an island nation blessed with beautiful coast lines.Nevertheless, the NAKHODKA incident, which occurred at the beginning of this year, causedunprecedented oil pollution damage to the coasts of almost all the prefectures on the side of theJapan Sea.In this paper, probable future tasks for us all suggested by the present case of the NAKHODKA arediscussed as my opinion from the position of the commander of field oil control operations aftergiving a brief report on the incident.1. Summary of Measures to the Oil Spill Incident(1) Outline of the NAKHODKAParticulars of the NAKHODKA are shown in Fig. 1.(2) Narratives of the incident and the oil spill controlWhole process of the incident is outlined in Fig. 2. Detailed descriptions are given below inchronological order.① Occurrence of incident and initial responseThe incident is outlined in Fig. 3. The incident occurred enroute from Shanghai to Petropavlovsk.[Fig. 4]2Jan. ・02:51 Distress signals from the NAKHODKA (N) monitored. Instructions weregiven immediately to 2 patrol vessels navigating in the vicinity of the wreck to rescue the tanker. 4additional patrol vessels and 2 aircraft were arranged in succession.・08:20 The stern of the tanker sank.・About 10:00Confirmed the bow drifting in the sea.・About 13:00All 31 crew members but the Master rescued.[Weather/Sea conditions]Northwesterly 20 m/sWave height 6 m- 19 -Swell 4 m or more3Jan. ・Providing information to local governments started.・Assumed quantities of spilled oil identified [Fig. 5]4Jan. ･Disaster Countermeasure Task Force for NAKHODKA Oil Spills at 8th RMSHestablished.5Jan. ･Attempt to tow the bow failed due to bad weather.・Patrol vessels started spraying oil dispersants.・Oil cleanup operations were entrusted by the shipowner to the Maritime Disaster PreventionCenter.[Weather/Sea conditions]Northwesterly 8 m/sWave height 1 mSwell 3 m6Jan. ・Attempt to tow the bow failed because of bad weather.・Requested the Maritime Self Defense Force to dispatch troops for oil control.・Liaison conference among relevant ministries and agencies.(in Tokyo, 18 ministries and agencies participated)[Weather/Sea conditions]Westnorthwesterly 30 m/sWave height 6mSwell 4 m or more7Jan. To prevent the bow from drifting ashore, ropes were sent out from 2 patrol vessels, butresulted in parting due to heavy weather.・ 14:30 The bow drifted and ran aground at Mikunicho, Fukui Prefecture. Theoil reached the coast of Mikunicho as well.[Weather/Sea conditions] Northwesterly15 m/s Wave height6 m Swell6 mor more 8Jan. ・ Oil slicks drifted ashore in neighbouring Ishikawa Prefecture.・ Oil collecting operations by volunteers started.9Jan. ・ Large oil recovery vessel SEIRYU MARU (5th Ports and Harbours Bureau,Construction Division of the Ministry of Transport) began to collect drifting oil.10Jan. ・ Disaster Countermeasure Task Force Team for NAKHODKA Oil Spills establishedby relevant ministries and agencies.② Oil control operations for drifting oil slicks and oil dwelling ashore Minimizing the quantity ofdrifting oil to reach the coastal areas, the following measures, which included the investigation ofoil-drifting state by vessels and aircraft, as well as providing information to local governments,were taken.(a) Measures for removing drifting oil slicks at sea・ Oil dispersants were sprayed by helicopters and vessels.・ Collecting oil by oil recovery vessels and boats equipped with oil-collecting equipment.・ Collecting oil by patrol vessels, Self-Defense vessels and boats using dippers and nets, etc.[Fig.6](b) Measures to remove oil drifting in the coastal sea Arranging oil booms in waters near nuclearpower plants or other important facilities.- 20 -・ Collecting oil by vessels equipped with oil-collecting equipment.・ Collecting oil onshore, by vacuum cars and mobile concrete pumps, etc.・ Manual oil collecting operations using dippers and buckets, etc.(c) Public announcement of oil movements expected (for the first time in Japan) Oil slicks hadalmost disappeared around 10 February, about a month after the oil spill incident.On the other hand, oil began to drift ashore from 7 January, the day on which the bow of the tankerreached Mikunicho, Fukui Prefecture, and extended to the coasts of 9 prefectures facing the JapanSea as time went on.Before or after oil washed ashore, each local government set up a Countermeasure Task Force.Collecting operations for oil that had drifted ashore was led by local governments, collaboratingwith relevant agencies and volunteers, mainly by means of manual work.③ Removal of oil remaining in the bowOil spilled from the bow of the tanker blackened the coasts off Mikunicho. Coastal areas may havesuffer from more damage from oil contamination as the extent of structural damage to the hull ofthe tanker worsen due to heavy weather.Therefore, the pressing problem to be handled was to remove oil left in the tanker, so measures tobe taken began to be discussed among all those concerned to take a proper action as soon aspossible.As a result, it was decided on 14 January that, although oil was mainly collected using a crane anda barge (trimming), another measure was also to be taken whereby the remaining oil would becollected using a crane on the path constructed to access the bow of the tanker as an emergencymeasure, for fear that the previous measure might be hampered by heavy weather in the Japan Seain winter.Oil-collecting operations were carried out and developed to a certain stage, but as was expected,they were suspended for climatic reasons. Finally, on 25 February after completion of the path alloperations were finished. On 20 April, a day on which sea conditions were quiet and moderate, thewrecked bow section was lifted from the water, transferred to the Seto Inland Sea and broken upafter conducting an investigation for the causes of the incident.④ Oil spill control near nuclear power plants As many as one-third of the nuclear power plants inJapan (compared by output) are located concentrically in areas embracing Wakasa Bay, so theimminent task was to prevent spilled oil from seeping into the plants. Therefore;(a) Each plant was instructed to strengthen defences and remove oil around 8 January, when oildrifting in the sea began flowing into Wakasa Bay.(b) Oil booms near cooling water intakes were subjected to stricter quality requirements, thenumber of lines was multiplied, and in the meantime, cleaning up oil by local vessels, etc., was- 21 -started. Then, measures were taken by monitoring drifting oil at night, precisely observing driftingconditions using chartered aircraft and collecting oil slicks inside the oil booms on the shore. Theseactions fortunately resulted in maintaining power supplies without lowering output in all nuclearpower plants. [Fig. 7]⑤ Resources mobilized to collect oil and oil quantities collected An interim estimate made inearly March, when collecting operations in the sea were almost completed is shown below. Vesselsand Boats (Maritime Safety Agency, Self-Defense Force) about 4,700 vessels Quantity of oil/watermixtures collected in the sea (related to the nation) about 5,700 kL(3) Sunken tanker and monitoring spilled oil① It was not until 12 January, 10 days after the casualty occurred, that oil was confirmed to bedrifting near waters where the tanker had sunk. Therefore, in response to the oil spill, oildispersants were sprayed on one hand; and oil-contaminated waters were agitated by the sternvortex of vessels on the other hand; and the monitoring system in the sea area was tightened.② During the period from late January to late February, the detailed condition of the tanker,which sank in waters roughly 2,500 m deep, was detected by an unmanned underwater robot ofJapan Marine Science & Technology Center, followed by detection of the tanker's position. Inaddition, in the middle of February, an investigation was conducted by Dr.H.Rye (Norway) todetermine the rising of oil from the wreck in cooperation with Ship and Ocean Foundation.③ At the end of March, the Committee of the Ministry of Transport assessed the sunken tankerand leakage of remaining oil as shown below, on the basis of observations of spill conditions bypatrol vessels and aircraft and the investigation described above ②.(a) Remaining quantity of oil is 3,700 ～ 9,900 kL(b) Quantity of oil expected to leak per day is 3 ～ 14 kL, which is not likely to go ashore.(c) It cannot be expected that the hull of the tanker would suddenly break up causing a massiveoil spill, although oil leaks would continue for some time.④ Although the oil spill rate varies day by day, oil from the spring-head of the remaining hulllying on the sea bottom continued to float on the sea surface in the shape of a circle with adiameter of approximately 5 m within a circular water area with a diameter of approximately 100 meven in early June, 5 months after the incident. The oil then drifts on the sea, dividing into severallong slicks measuring 100 ～ 200 m wide and several km long, disappearing at the end of oil slicksdue to wind and waves. [Fig. 8]2. The Japan Sea and Marine Pollution(1) Firstly, the number of marine pollution incidents caused by vessels in the surrounding watersof Japan has declined sharply in recent years, as shown in Fig. 9. This is considered to beascribable to strict- 22 -observance of provisions for safety navigation by all concerned, strict management of cargooperations and down-to-earth countermeasures taken for marine pollution.Fig. 10 shows occurrences of marine pollution by area, suggesting that the coasts on the Japan Seaside are less likely to suffer from marine casualties than that on the side of Pacific Ocean, whichare heavily congested with shipping traffic.2 Subsequently, a rough ( ) calculation by The Japan Association of Marine Safety suggested thatthere are roughly 10,000 tankers operating throughout the Japan Sea yearly, and about half of themdo not call at ports in Japan. The tankers' trade routes are varied and complex as shown inFigs.11and 12. The noteworthy points featured by these trade routes are, firstly, that aged tankersare operated on these routes carrying low-priced crude oil from China and Korea to Russia.[Fig.13] Secondly, on the route to Korea, where the quantity of oil imports has rapidly increasedin proportion to increasing consumption, various tanker incidents have been reported lately aroundthat country. Moreover, it is expected that an increasing number of tankers will navigate in morecomplicated ways in the Japan Sea in association with oil exploitation projects in Sakhalin in thefuture.(3) If we look at the sea conditions in the Japan Sea, there appear to be unusually high waves inwinter, just as we experienced with the casualty of the NAKHODKA [Fig.14]. Also, both seacurrents and strong North westerly seasonal winds head toward Japan.(4) Although the current rate of marine pollution incidents in the Japan Sea is relatively low, ifwe take the above discussion into account and realize that unseaworthy tankers are increasinglynavigating under harsh climatic conditions, serious marine casualties and marine pollution caused bythem will be more likely to occur in the Japan Sea than today.3. Oil Spill Control System and Organization(1) In Japan, the Law relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disasterprescribes the requirements for overall measures to be taken to protect the marine environment.(2) To ensure the consolidation of the oil spill control system and organization, the Lawspecifically provides for;・ Stockpiling materials and equipment for control of oil spill to be arranged by Maritime SafetyAgency and Japan Maritime Disaster Prevention Center.・ To establish councils as regional organizations ensuring coordinated oil control activities bygovernmental and private sectors.・ Basic oil control measures to be taken by the party responsible for the cause under thecauser-to-blame principle.・ In case of exigent oil spills implementation of oil control measures by Maritime SafetyAgency, and Maritime Safety Agency's oil control instructions to Japan Maritime DisasterPrevention Center.- 23 -Measures to remove oil that ・ has washed ashore as an intrinsic task of local government.(3) As shown in Figs. 15 and 16, stockpiling of materials and equipment for oil control has,reflecting the aforementioned characteristic geographical distribution of oil pollution, a bias towardthe bay areas on the side of the Pacific Ocean and the Seto Inland Sea.4. My WishesListed below are the difficulties met in the process of commanding spilled oil control and cleanupoperations at sea, in other words, hints suggesting what should be done in the future.(1) Desseminating accurate and prompt information on the wrecked vessel and the cargo carried.It is indispensable to obtain relevant information to determine countermeasures as soon as possible,considering temporal changes of oil properties under rough weather in the open sea. In the presentcase, information on the tanker's loading condition when wrecked could be gathered throughinterviews with rescued crew members. Furthermore, vessel's drawings, etc., could be obtained at arather early stage from the charterer, thus it is desirable to establish an international system so thatinformation useful for drawing up an oil control plan at an early enough stage in countries whosecoastlines are expected to be damaged can be provided as duties of flag states, shipowners andoperators.(2) Establishment of procedures capable of tracking and predicting movements of spilled oilUpon the hull fracturing, spilled oil began to spread and drift over a large sea area, and it waspractically impossible to constantly monitor oil slicks, initiating immediately after the incident.The following are hoped in the future:・ Establish a system to collect information on drifting oil utilizing satellites・ Workout measures to predict oil movements with greater accuracy・ Build up an oil monitoring and predicting scheme on a non-profit basis to support countriessustaining oil spill damage.(3) Development of materials and equipment available in rough seasFig.17 shows the development status of oil recovery systems worldwide investigated by Ship andOcean Foundation. However, there are no oil recovery vessels or collecting equipment capable ofoperating in waters with significant wave heights of 2 m or more.As suggested by the case of the NAKHODKA, in which oil spread and drifted over a large areawithin several days after the incident, it is desired to develop several classes of shipborneoil-collecting systems that are internationally standardized so that they can be used not only bypatrol vessels but also by naval craft, Iarge fishing boats, ocean tugs, etc., in close co-operation.(4) Consolidation of information for environmental disaster prevention in coastal sea areas- 24 -The questions of how many oil recovery vessels should be mobilized and in what waters to dealwith spilled oil drifting over a large sea area are mainly governed by the natural and socialconditions of the coasts. Accordingly, it should be urged to prepare sensitivity maps in co-operationwith local governments and fishermen, in which information as to whether or not the use oftreatment agents is acceptable is included.Besides, it is desirable in the future to unify supporting information in the event of a disaster,including information on support available from voluntary groups and foreign countries. In thisconnection, NOWPAP now underway is considered to be promising. [Fig.18]- 25 -- 26 -- 27 -- 28 -DiscussionMearns What was the ： damage to marine life from the spill― birds, mammals, fish?Kudo： During one-and-a-half month period up to mid February, we had protected 1,269 birds.We don't know, of course, how many birds were killed in total.Schive： You said in your wish for the future that you want to establish a system to collectinformation on drifting oil utilizing satellites. How in fact was the drifting oil observed during theNAKHODKA incident?Kudo： Just for a short time in the initial stage of response activities,we observed the oil spill byuse of satellites. But for the most part of the response activities, we made daytime observations byusing helicopters of our own or P3C of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to gather necessaryinformation. Everyday we analyzed, the collected information by the evening of the sarne day, andbased on the analysis, we predicted where the spill would drift next day. Of course, we wereinformed that the Canadian Radarsat took Photographic images of the spill. Yet, since the spillspread over a vast surface of the sea, we did not use always satellite information, due to ourrestricted funds to obtain such information.Lessard： I noticed in your slide the difficulty in applying the dispersants in high wind from theships. Is there an aircraft capability, or are you thinking you might want to fortify your existingcapability with aircraft?Kudo： By using helicopters, we did apply dispersants in the waters not adjacent the coast, forseveral days, but because of the nature of the spilled oil, we estimated that it would not beeffective. And since the aerial application of dispersants from helicopters had various operationaldifficulties, we gave up the operation. Only when we confirmed much spill at the leakage point, weapplied some dispersants.Motora： In Japan, there is a discussion that we should also establish a preauthorization systemfor swift application of dispersants. I would like to ask aquestion to Mr. Kudo. During theNAKHODKA incident, you mentioned that dispersants were used at an early stage. How was itpossible for you to use it at a relatively early stage?Kudo： The hull was broken apart in the open sea; before the oil actually drifted ashore,there wasa lot of time ― I think more than five days. So on the second day after the incident occurred, thatwas January 3, through the responsible sections of the local government authorities, discussionswere held with the fisheries unions and associations to obtain approval for application ofdispersants. Therefore, in the NAKHODKA incident, we were able to use dispersants at an earlierstage of response.Motora： Likely in the DIAMOND GRACE incident which took place in Tokyo Bay, dispersantswere used at an early stage, thanks to which the damage was minimized. How was it possible?Kudo： I am not in a position to answer about this incident, because I was not involved in theresponse. But according to the information I have, the fishermen knew very well about theproperties of the oil; and they knew dispersants are very effective for crude oil at an early stage of- 29 -response. Therefore approval was obtained soon and it was possible to start dispersant operationwithin three days. But there was a request from the fishermen not to continue using the dispersantsafter the third or fourth day.Motora Listening to your report, it seems ： that in Japan alike, it is possible to establish thispreauthorization system. Is that correct?Kudo： On that particular question, I believe the situation is different for the DIAMONDGRACE incident and the NAKHODKA incident, and different local government authorities mayhave different views. So I can not give you a simple answer of yes.- 30 -Session 2Recovery of Oil Spilled from the NAKHODKA and Equipment UsedYoshio SuzukiPosition General Manager, Disaster Prevention Department, Japan Maritime Disaster PreventionCenterEducation 1959 graduated, Maritime Safety Academy (Engine Equipment) / Member of JapanInstitute of Navigation / Seaman's Competency Certificate, 3rd-Class Seaman (engineer)He was involved in control operations at the site of the oil spill at the time of NAKHODKAincident- 31 -1. Initial Responses to the incident of the NAKHODKAA massive oil spill, which was caused by the fracturing of the hull of the Russian tankerNAKHODKA gross tonnage: ( 13,175 t) occurred at about 0250 hours on 2 January, 1997, wasfirst identified together with the sheared-off bow section on the Japan Sea by an aircraft and apatrol boat of the Maritime Safety Agency on the following day, 3 January. A large amount of oilspilling from the sheared-off bow section of the wreck and oil slicks drifting in the vicinity wereverified during this first discovery.A salvage boat dispatched at the request of the shipowner for rescue operations arrived at the sceneof the incident at 2130 hours on 4 January, and tried to tow the bow section, which was thendrifting, with assistance provided by the patrol boat. The drifting bow in the bottom-up position,exposing only a small portion above the water, coupled with the heavy seas prevented them frombelaying towing hawsers.On the morning of 5 January, the head of the spilled oil drifting together with the bow had alreadyapproached a point 40 nautical miles off Mikunicho. The oil pushed by northerly winds was likelyto menace the coast of Japan.The patrol boat and other vessels began to remove drifting oil, while making an attempt to tow thebow. At the initial stages, recovery nets were used to recover the oil, oil dispersant were sprayedonto the sea, and on 5 January, a helicopter was tested for spraying oil dispersant.2. Off-shore Drifting and On-shore Conditions of OilIt was estimated that about 3,700 kL, contained in the bow section, of about 19,000 kL of C heavyoil that the NAHKODKA carried had instantaneously been discharged into the sea through fracturesfollowing the hull damage. (The investigation performed afterwards made us estimate the oil spillto be 6,240 kL.)The oil slick drifting on the sea surface were broken up in places by waves but thick layers of theprincipal part and the bow pushed by the currents and northern seasonal winds were approachingthe coast of Honshu, Japan.The drifting bow reached a point off Anto Misaki. Mikunicho. Fukui Prefecture at about 1100 hourson 7 January, while rough weather continued dominating the waters of the Japan Sea. Another oilspill from the bow was identified. All these oil slicks reached and landed on the neighbouringcoasts.On 8 January, diffusing layers of oil came ashore consecutively on the coasts of Fukui Prefectureand Ishikawa Prefecture.On 20 January, the oil layers drifting northwards along the Noto Peninsulafinally passed the northern coasts of the Peninsula and were driven to Sado Island, NiigataPrefecture, eventually reaching other coasts of Niigata Prefecture on the Honshu side. As a result,contamination of waters was found to be affecting 9 prefectures including Shimane and Akita.3. Oil Recovery Operations- 32 -All oil recovery operations included recovery of oil drifting on the sea, recovery of oil drifting nearthe coast and recovery of oil driven onshore and dwelling on sandy shoals and rocky beaches.(1) Recovery of oil drifting on the seaThe spilled oil was driven onto the long coastline from Shimane Prefecture to Akita Prefecture. Partof the oil took a northern course off from Wakasa Bay and along the coast of Fukui Prefecture andIshikawa Prefecture and reached the coast at the northern end of Noto Peninsula, Toyama Prefectureand Niigata Prefecture, widely diffusing on the sea.When more than one week had passed since 2 January, the date the incident occurred, the spilledoil which had been continuously stirred by waves since then became a emulsified oil containing alarge amount of water. According to data, the properties of the oil carried by the tanker, which wasloaded in Shanghai, are: kinetic viscosity: 137.46 cSt at 50 ℃ (about 6,000 cSt at 10 ℃) ; pourpoint: -17 ℃. The drifting oil sampled on 5 January presented a viscosity of 1,232,000 cSt at 12 ℃.a) Crane barges and grab dredgersIt was foreseen that such high-viscosity oil could be recovered more effectively by means of cranebarges and grab dredgers than by oil recovery systems. Such vessels were chartered and used for oilrecovery operations at sea.For the operations, a total of 5 crane barges or grab dredgers were chartered at ports on the coast ofthe Seto Inland Sea. This was because, as always, no vessels appropriate for oil recovery operationswere available in the Japan Sea during winter, which is characterized by rough weather ( most ofthe work boats had been transferred to the Pacific side.)The initially planned sweeping formation consisted of one vessel towing a guide boom and onecrane barges recovering oil collected by the boom. However, the actual operations were carried outby a single crane barges, because the planned operational co-ordination between the 2 vessels wasnot possible or was difficult under the prevailing bad weather. It is estimated that a total of about1,000kL of the mixture of spilled oil (85%) and sea water (15%) has been recovered.b) Oil recovery vessels and equipmentThe oil recovery vessel ASUWA of the Fukui Oil Storage Co., Ltd., registered in the Port of Fukui,was engaged in operations at sea from 9 January, 1997 when the rough weather temporarily ceasedto dominate the area.On 4 January, 1997, 5 days before these operations, the Maritime Safety Agency had alreadyrequested the dredger/oil recovery vessel SEIRYU MARU of the Ports and Harbours Bureau,Nagoya, Ministry of Transport, to proceed to the affected areas and commence oil recoveryoperations. The SEIRYU MARU actually commenced operations on 9 January.The other vessels chartered for oil recovery operations include the TAKAHOKOMARU NO. 3 ofMutsu-Ogawahara Oil Storage Co., Ltd. and the HAKURYU of Shirashima Oil Storage Co., Ltd.Vessels and equipment from overseas, which were dispatched in co-operation with the operations,included RO-SKIM system of EARL, Singapore, and oil recovery vessels from Russia carrying oil- 33 -booms, oil trawl nets, DESMI 250 and FOXTAILS.The oil recovery operations carried out by these vessels and equipment proved to be poor in termsof operational efficiency because of the high viscosity of the oil. They are assumed to havecollected oil/water mixtures of about 1,100 kL (oil: about 100 kL). The RO-SKIM system failed torecover oil. The amounts of the oil/water mixture recovered by the Russian systems and equipmentwere about 430 kL of which about 200 kL were oil.c) OthersGroups each comprising 2 small fishing vessels carrying recovery nets also participated in theoperations. These vessels towed oil recovery nets and used dippers.The oil recovery operations by these vessels covered large areas including Wakasa Bay, sea areasoff Mikunicho (Fukui Prefecture), Kaga City. Kanazawa City, Noto Peninsula (each IshikawaPrefecture), Toyama Prefecture and Niigata Prefecture, which were affected by the diffusing anddrifting oils. Special measures were taken to prevent the oil from approaching the cooling waterintakes of the nuclear power plants located on Wakasa Bay in Tsuruga City and in Shigacho,Ishikawa Prefecture.(2) Recovery of oil drifting near the coastThe oil spilling from the bow and drifting oil slicks were driven ashore on the coasts of Ojima,Mikunicho, on which the bow ran aground on 7 January, 1997. The layers of oil near the coastlines passed under the Ojima Bridge and continued drifting southward toward Tojimbo. Oil boomswere stretched along the bridge to prevent the oil from further diffusing and other items of oilrecovery equipment were used.a) Oil recovery equipment2 types of recovery equipment, wear and disk types, as well as beach cleaners owned by thePetroleum Association of Japan were used. These items of equipment were used as oil transferpumps between the beach and the drum cans/FASTANK, because oils subjected to cycled wavemotions on the shoals tended to become highly viscose oil mass.b) Vacuum cars and mobile concrete pumpsVacuum cars were used for drawing oil directly from the coast and indirectly drawing oil fromdrum cans.Despite their inferior suction ability to vacuum cars, mobile concrete pumps were used safelybecause of their advantageous features - long suction lines and availability of remote control evenunder unfavourable sea and weather conditions.(3) Recovery of oil washed ashore on the coastThe drifting oil that had reached ashore was removed manually from the coast by numerous people.Oil washed ashore on the sandy beaches was collected by heavy machines such as bulldozers andback hoes. The collected oil was separated from sand afterwards.- 34 -Oil solidified in the sand was first subjected to a water jet to drive it onto the water surface andthen the separated oil was recovered. Operations for recovering drifting oil and oil washed ashorewere performed both on the sea and on the coast. The operations involving vessels at sea werecompleted on 20 February, while those on the coast were finished at the end of April. After thesedates, operations related to oil recovery were continued -cleaning the coasts and removing oil onand between the tetrapods and in isolated places inaccessible either from sea or land until June.4. Materials and Equipment UsedThe materials and equipment used for recovering drifting oil and oil washed ashore include:Other vessels engaged in oil recovery operations include patrol boats, Self-Defense Force vessels,and fishing inspection boats.The total amount of oil/water mixtures recovered from the sea is about 8,700kL.b) Operation on the coastThe materials and equipment used for recovering oil on the sea near the coasts include:- 35 -FASTANK and drum cans were used as recipients for recovered oil.The total amount of oil/water mixtures recovered using these items of recovery equipment is about6,600 kL. To this number should be added the amount of the oil recovered by many volunteers'manual operations; the total amount of oil/water mixtures recovered and delivered to appropriatereception facilities is accordingly about 47,000 kL.c) Preparation of provisional storage pit for oil recoveredAs the amount of oil drifting and washed ashore increased, it was anticipated that the amount of oilrecovered also would increase to the extent that temporary storage in drum cans could not keep upwith such an increase. Therefore, provisional storage pits were installed in the Fukui, Tsuruga andSuzu areas where the amount of oil/water mixture recovered has already proved to be relativelylarge.5. Conclusion(1) Decontaminating capability in areas of the Japan SeaIn winter, it is practically impossible to perform maritime operations due to strong winds in theJapan Sea. For this reason, most of the work boats based on the Japan Sea side are moved to thePacific side, and there remain a limited number of such boats available for emergency use.The number of vessels calling at ports on the Japan Sea side is smaller than on the Pacific side andthe number of large vessels and tankers navigating under unfavourable sea and weather conditionsis also smaller.Thus, there are few work boats immediately available for decontamination for oil spills in areas onthe Japan Sea side in winter. The overall decontaminating capability on the sea is extremely limitedon the Japan Sea, compared to that on the Pacific side.- 36 -(2) Materials and equipment available for oil recovery in open seasIn Japan, most of the materials and the equipment available for oil recovery operations are locatedin waters accessed by tankers, which are characterized by heavy shipping traffic, such as TokyoBay, Ise Bay, Osaka Bay, Seto Inland Sea and in enclosed and calm areas of petrochemicalcomplexes that have a port. Hence, these materials and equipment are designed for use undersmooth sea and weather conditions.In the case of the NAKHODKA, all of the vessels except for the oil recovery vessels actuallymobilized are designed for use in harbours and are not serviceable under stringent conditions inopen seas.(3) Private decontamination organizationsDecontamination organizations include governmental (national and local) competent and obligatoryorganizations, Oil Spill Decontamination Conference ( legally formed semi-governmentalorganization), and private organizations - PAJ Oil Spill Cooperative Organization (organizationformed under the Petroleum Association of Japan composed of oil companies), and differentcontractual oil pollution prevention organizations composed of harbour-based shipping companiesand tugboat operators prepared for practical operations organized around the nucleus body of theMaritime Disaster Prevention Center. The private sector (except salvage companies) mainly coversharbour areas and has no capabilities for working in open seas. These conditions justifyreconstruction in terms of both material and management of these private organizations mainlycomposed of salvage companies to cope with similar accidents in open seas.(4) Limitations on oil removal operations under contract with shipownerThe Maritime Disaster Prevention Center may carry out oil removal operations at the request ofshipowners. In addition, the Center must follow instructions and obtain consent from the sameshipowner and the surveyor in charge of P & I insurance. For example, the Center must consult thesurveyor on operations in new areas if the contamination has expanded to such areas. Besides, theremay be differences of opinion. These conditions may cause time delay before taking necessary andtimely measures.In any cases, it is necessary to establish a unified control and operation system supported bycooperative work of the parties concerned in on-scene operations.(5) Disposal of recovered oilThe oil recovered as oily waste amounts to about 47,000 kL. The entire amount was disposed of asindustrial waste in appropriate reception facilities in accordance with the relevant domestic laws andregulations. However, the procedure for industrial wastes under normal and not emergencyconditions was followed, which prevented steady disposal of the recovered oily waste from beingexecuted.- 37 -1/ Geographical dispersion of drifting spilled oil2/ Location of shipwreck3/ Sakai4/ Maizuru5/ Tsuruga6/ Mikuni7/ Bow8/ Kanazawa9/ Nanao10/ Toyama11/ Naoetsu12/ Niigata13/ Hegura Jima14/ Sado- 38 -DiscussionGainsford： Could I ask about the purpose of the causeway?Suzuki： Initially it was estimated that there remained 2,800 kL in the bow. But while the bowwas drifting, some had leaked, so the estimate was revised to be 2,000 kL. After the bow wasgrounded, the salvage vessel continues, of course, off-loading the oil offshore, and the access waywas also created to off-load the oil from the shore. We used these approaches concurrently, and thereason for that is the sea conditions were severe, with very strong wind and waves. There are avery limited number of days at this time of the year in which the sea is mild, If there are two orthree consecutive days of mild weather, then offshore off-loading will become possible. But if themild weather lasts only one day, it will not be sufficient, because you need from a half day to a dayfor preparation. This means that we cannot depend on offshore off-loading alone. Therefore, wedecided to use both approaches ― that is, from offshore as well as from the shore, using the accessway to off-load the remaining oil from the bow section.Gainsford： Are there indications that the IOPC Fund are happy to pay for that? Are they happywith the causeway as well as the offshore off-loading of the oil?Suzuki： Unfortunately, I must say that the prospect is rather pessimistic, but we intend torequest compensation from the IOPC Fund for the overall cost. This matter would be decided at thegeneral meeting of the IOPC Fund or the board meeting.Davies： What is your estimate of the cost of the oil recovery and are you proceeding with yourclaim from the Fund ? If so, have you had any payment to date?Suzuki： The MSA, the Ministry of Transport and the SDF-these are the national entities thatwould be making the claim. In addition the prefectural governments, of which shores were subjectto pollution, and the local autonomies that have provided equipment and maneuvered people to dealwith the pollution, will be sending their claims. The private sectors will be using the MDPC as acontact point through which they will be filing their claims. As for the claims that will be made torecover the cost, we are calculating the total cost of the operations from January to March. There isan IOPC office for dealing with compensation matters related to the NAKHODKA incident inKobe, and the claims will be submitted to it. From the IOPC, we have so far received 540 millionyen which we needed immediately.Schive： I have a question which I think is equally important as the economical aspect. It relatesto the safety of the people involved. A lot of people were involved in the cleanup of the oil spill.What are your considerations relating to the safety of those people ? Do you have any particularexperience related to the safety of the workers?Suzuki： As for the safety of the operators, especially when it comes to the offshore operations,you have to think about the safety of the vessel as well. This will also have a bearing on theefficiency of the collection of the oil. Offshore, under rough sea conditions, we suspended theoperation and had them stand by. So we did not coerce the workers to carry out operations duringrough weather.- 39 -Regarding onshore operations, we took nesessary measures so that people would not be knockeddown by the waves. We had a system in place to keep close watch so that people would not beharmed by strong waves during onshore operations.Lunel ...How much oil was contained ： in 47,000 kL of oil and water that was recovered?Suzuki： We have not determined the exact amount yet. We collected 110,000 drums of oil. Theoil recovered offshore was stored in barges and then it was transported to the storage facilities. Weused flexible containers and drums for storage of recoverd oil. Of the 1,100 kL recovered byskimmer vessels, we estimate the actual oil at about 200 kL.Lunel： ...it sounds in total like about between 5 and 10 % was recovered at sea. Do you have anidea overall whether you're talking about 40 % or 80 % oil in the waste oil recovered, just as arough idea?Suzuki： The oil and water recovered offshore is estimated to contain 30 to 40 % of oil in total.As for the onshore beach operations, a lot of oil stuck on to the garbage, so an estimate is verydifficult.Davies： As to the solid waste material, such as oiled debris and garbage, what was your routefor disposal of that?Suzuki： All of the waste was sent to a processing plant to for disposal by incineration.- 40 -Session 3Partnerships, Planning and Preparedness for Public and Private Resourcesin a Major United States Oil Pollution ResponseRichard E.BennisPosition Chief, Response Office, United States Coast GuardEducation BSc Natural Resource Development, University of Rhode Island / Attended the CoastGuard Office Candidate School in Yorktown, Va / MA Energy and Environmental Policy, HarvardUniversityAssigned to Valdez Alaska during the EXXON VALDEZ pollution response.- 41 -Recent major oil pollution incidents in the United States have clearly demonstrated how far we, themarine oil pollution response community, have come since the EXXON VALDEZ spill in 1989.We previously had what appeared to be a somewhat divisive atmosphere in the response arenahighlighted by a perceived lack of cohesiveness and organization between the responders, theresponsible party and the impacted maritime community.The lessons of the EXXON VALDEZ incident have taught us well, we learned much and havefashioned an oil pollution response methodology which has proven to be a dynamic, flexible andextremely successful system.From a federal government regulatory standpoint, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, known as OPA90, provided the legal impetus to initiate many initiatives covering areas of oil pollution responseranging from financial liability, compensations for damages/loss, vessel and facility operatingrequirements, exercise requirements, equipment prestaging to planning and preparedness aspects ofpollution response.The basis for succes of the U.S. model of oil spill response is premised on the tenets that thepolluter, or responsible party, is responsible for cleanup. That response occurs at the direction of thefederal government. Further, while the federal government representative (the U.S. Coast Guard inmarine incidents and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for most inland spills) has theresponsibility to ensure cleanup is satisfactory, the inclusion of what we refer to as stakeholders isabsolutely essential to a successful response. These stakeholders include, but are not limited to,other government representatives from state and local municipalities; natural resource trustees;historic preservation representatives and environmental concerns. Their participation in responseplanning and execution ensures a more effective and efficient response than existed prior to theEXXON VALDEZ response.These relationships with the aforementioned stakeholders and all those who could possibly beimpacted by a pollution event are captured by the all encompassing U.S. National ContingencyPlan, created by OPA 90, which gives our current response the force of law. Our planning makesits way to all levels of government and community as, from the National Contingency Plan, wehave developed Regional Contingency Plans and, from these, finally Area Contingency Plans. It hasbeen clearly learned, through experience, that the Area, or local, contingency plan is of paramountimportance. It is here that cleanup priorities are pre-identified, based on environmental sensitivityanalyses. It is also the plan which identifies the response resources available within the area as wellas the cascading of resources from other locales as the situation mandates or escalates. The responseorganization is described here and includes all local representatives, contacts and positions/roleswithin the response.This plan is the product of an Area Committee where local stakeholders meet to discuss concernsand achieve consensus on what the most important local issues are in a pollution incident. Whilethe environment is always of paramount concern, issues which are also critical to the welfare of theimpacted community, like economic impact, are also extremely important. Local fishermen,shipping interests, recreational concerns, scientific interests and other members of the maritimecommunity are all part of the process which develops the Area Contingency Plan and are affordedthe opportunity to express their response priorities. One key factor to the planning process issimple... in the end, consensus must be reached. The common thread that runs throughout ourlessons learned is that extensive planning, partnering and networking with all who may be impactedby a pollution event goes a long way to removing controversy during the actual response, and- 42 -ameliorates a painful legacy from the EXXON VALDEZ spill.While the Area Contingency Plan planning process builds consensus amongst government agenciesduring the planning process, a key factor essential to the smooth implementation of the manymonths of planning is the designation of one person in charge. That individual, known as thefederal on-scene coordinator FOSC is ( ) charged, by law, with directing the response to any spillthat threatens public health or welfare.The far reachng interpretation of public welfare places the FOSC in the directing mode for themajority of all medium and larger spills. Other spills, which have a known responsible party who isresponding in a proper manner will be monitored by the FOSC as the cleanup progresses. TheFOSC always retains the ultimate responsibility to ensure cleanups are satisfactorilly conducted inaccordance with the applicable contingency plans. This designation of one person in charge hasproven to be exceptionally effective as it clarifies the question as to who the final arbiter is whencontentious issues arise.The natural outgrowth of the Contingency Planning process is the strategic implementation of thoseplans into a logical, universally known and accepted response organizational structure. Cleanupmanagement, under the FOSC direction, is done through the use of a unified command structurewhich includes the FOSC, the State (or States) OSC and the cleanup manager for the spiller, orresponsible party. This triad will determine the strategy for the response. In the unlikely event thatagreement is not reached, however, the FOSC has the legal mandate to resolve the issue incontention with his determination as to the best resolution of the probelm.This Incident Command System (ICS), under the triad described, is further broken down into 4main sections. These are Planning, Logistics, Operations and Finance. Staffing of these are jointlyshared and pre-determed in the response planning process. All potential response management areasof concern are coordinated through this system. Often neglected areas in previous planningmethodologies are now covered (I.E. Volunteer coordination and training, dignitary visits, protocol,media relations, etc.). It is extremely flexible internally, it can grow or shrink to meet the specificdemands and size requirement of an incident. We intend to implement it soon for use in ourresponses to what we currently refer to as incidents of national significance. This will expand theconcept beyond our traditional utilization in oil pollution response to other areas of incidentresponse.Concurrent with the aforementioned planning, preparedness and exercising process the FOSC issupported by all of the other government agencies. This is a requirement of the NCP and it allowsthe FOSC to enlist the aid and special capabilities of these agencies in battling a spill. Includedamong these agencies is the Department of Defense which opens up a vast array of manpower andlogistics support for a FOSC.The National Response Team (NRT) and the more geographically oriented Regional ResponseTeams (RRT) are comprised of day members of each these federal agencies and include staterepresentatives at the RRT level. These individuals are at the ready to assist the FOSC in expeditingthe resoltion of what might ordinarily be bureaucratic nightmares. These teams also are instrumentalin working towards the resolution of final pre-approval agreements for different responsemethodologies like dispersant application and in-situ burn.OPA 90 has required the potential spillers to be responsible and prepared to mount their ownresponse to a pollution incident. Should the spill source be a tank ship or tank barge, the operator- 43 -must have pre-existing contract with a designated oil spill removal organization (OSRO) tocleanup a "worst case discharge". Simply put, this would be a loss of the entire cargo under adverseweather conditions. Each of these vessels is now required to demonstrate financial responsibility torespond to a pollution incident. They must have approved vessel response plans which are, in effect,a vessel specific contingency plan for pollution response. The planning, coordination and conduct ofthe many and varied exercises required by OPA 90 have produced a response environment which isprepared for all contingencies. The combination of a joint public and private response effort, underthe direction of a single federal official, the Federal On Scene Coordinator, in accordance with anagreed upon contingency plan are the pillars of our extremely successful U.S. model.In addition to the advances made in planning, preparedness and spill management techniques weremain actively engaged in considering, evaluating and adding alternate spill response technology toour cleanup capabilities. While we insist on a privately funded and staffed response, it behooves usto remain current in our capability to provide the best response and, if necessary, best first responsecapability we can if private resources are either time or resource constrained in the early hours of aresponse.With the exceptional professional development and increased response capabilities of our OSROSWe find a diminishing need for traditional response capabilities (I.E. boom and skimmers) in theCoast Guard ready response arsenal. We are expanding our horizons to address the areas ofdispersant application and in-situ burn methodologies as areas of expertise and response that arerapidly developing but are not yet universally available.The mid 1990s have seen a tremendous increase in the number of memorandums of understandingfor the pre-approval of dispersant application. Had agreements such as these been in place duringprevious major responses it would have eliminated significant contentious discussions and allowedfor expeditious implementation of this time critical mitigation tool. We have worked aggressivelywith our Regional Response Teams and Area to obtain these pre-approvals and in the majority ofcases we have successfully obtained either pre-approval or accelerated approval procedures by theapplicable government authorities and/or resource trustees. This capability provides yet another toolfor FOSC to use in mounting the best response possible.Tranditional recovery and removal remains the response methodology of choice. Notwithstandingthis, there is a growing awareness among responders, stakeholders, trustees and involved agenciesthat utilization of other methods (I.E. chemicals and in-situ burning) may be necessary and, infact, preferable to prevent large quantities of product from coming ashore into inter-tidal regions.In summary, we have found that our post EXXON VALDEZ approach to oil pollution response is asystem wherein we, as a community partnership, plan together, exercise together, and respondtogether. Our successes are victories we share. Our failures are lessons we learn from together. Anoil spill response is no longer automatically seen as a divisive event but a challenge we facetogether.- 44 -- 45 -- 46 -DiscussionKudo The Federal ： On-Scene Coordinator ― does he need to have frequent contacts withWashington every time something happens? The reason I ask this is because there are, I believe,many decisions to be made, such as decisions on cost as well as the legal coordination andadjustments to be made between different organizations. Is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator giventhe authority and the power to make the decisions himself?Bennis： ...as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), I would have to use the phrase, "thebuck stops here". The Federal On-Scene Coordinator has the authority to make all the decisions. Ina huge pollution incident, as in the EXXON VALDEZ, we may bring in a more senior officer. Inthe EXXON VALDEZ the Commander was replaced by a more senior Vice Admiral, because ofthe intense public and political interest.But, until that three star Admiral was brought in and designated as the new FOSC, theresponsibility to authorize the money and determine what the response consists of remains with thepre-designated FOSC.Without that authority, we would not be successful. Military rank is not the issue for the FOSC. Hissupervisor, historically, is an Admiral but the FOSC need not go to his supervisor for approval,permission, or to discuss issues. The FOSC will have a lawyer on his/her staff to advise him. Hewill have members of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund Staff to advise on procedures, but, the finalauthority in a successful response has to lie with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and thatauthority.Gainsford： I have two questions. Do you split up the marine side of the operation from theshore side in the headquarters or do you try to combine the two headquarters to deal with at-searesponse and onshore response? And the second point is, do the local authorities or state authoritieshave a statutory duty to clean-up and also to contingency plan prior to the event, or is it a voluntaryeffort?Bennis： Offshore, near-shore, inland, river ― they are all planned as one. We do not separateoffshore incidents and near-shore incidents. The states ― it certainly behooves them to participatein their area contingency plan and in their regional response team meetings. Of all our states, wehave three states, which will go nameless, that are very aggressive in their response programs. Iwon't name them, but I think they are Texas, California and Florida. They, too, get very involved,but historically, in our responses, we have the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, the responsible partyand the state representative in that triad at the top of the response, the Unified Command. So thereis no competing between the federal government and the state governments. They are all part of theteam, and they work together. Those states that perhaps get a little more involved are those statesthat are fortunate enough to have more money and more manpower to participate a little moreaggressively, and we welcome any money and manpower that someone brings to the table.Gainsford： When you said near-shore, was that shoreline as well?Bennis： Yes.Gainsford： But doesn't the actual operation center become too large?Bennis： It could on a spill of national significance as in the EXXON VALDEZ. I think we- 47 -ended up having four centers. We had four primary centers. One center was basically the mothership, where the Federal On-Scene Coordinator was, and he sent three other representatives to theother centers to run those and brief him out on a regular basis. But certainly, in a geographic issue,we will have sub-units as far as responding, but they'll report back to the mother ship or the mainresponse organization.Gainsford One final question, if I may. Is there ： any transfer of funds from federal to state to dothe contingency planning prior to an event?Bennis： Under OPA-90, we have funds available for OPA-90 preparedness exercises, and eachregional response team, each region, is funded a certain amount for the prep exercises, areacontingency plan, planning, production, and that money comes from the Oil Spill Liability TrustFund. It's not tax dollars, it's Trust Fund dollars.Suzuki： The U.S. compensation system only applies domestically, in the United States, I believe.As to authority given to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, you mentioned that he is endowed withvery broad authority and power given, but when it comes to costs incurred for this response and fordamage compensation, is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator in a position to decide on these