1. Introduction

One of the disputed points in the Northern Territories issue involves the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In Article 2(c) of the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” (the San Francisco Peace Treaty) of September 8, 1951, Japan renounced the Chishima Islands (Kurile Islands in the official English-language text).[1] Because the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not stipulate the ceding of these islands to Russia (neither did it specify that Japan renounce them to Russia) nor was Russia a party to the treaty, it is not the case that these islands became Russian territory under the treaty. Since they were renounced, however, they are no longer Japanese territory. The question, then, becomes: are Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomai Islands and Shikotan (the so-called four Northern Islands), which Japan claims to be its inherent territory, included in the Chishima Islands (Kurile Islands) that Japan renounced, or not?

Russia contends that the Kurile Islands were handed over to Russia under the Yalta Agreement; that their renunciation by Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty has an absolute character (its effect extends to countries other than the treaty’s signatories); and that no precise demarcation of the four islands was made in either the Yalta Agreement or the San Francisco Peace Treaty. I have commented on these Russian claims previously in this journal.[2] On the other hand, the general rule of interpretation of treaties is that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and that “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty … in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31 … leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure …” (Article 32)

Was a specific meaning given to the term “Chishima Islands (Kurile Islands)” in the preparatory work for the treaty? With this point in mind, this paper will double check the provisions related to the four Northern Islands at every stage and in every draft of the process of drawing up the San Francisco Peace Treaty. [3]

2. Overview of the Japanese Peace Treaty Drafting Process

An early draft of the Peace Treaty with Japan among the records of the Department of State at the US National Archives is the March 1947 one by State Department officials that focuses on territorial provisions.[4] It is preserved in the form of an attachment to two memoranda, one dated March 19, 1947 (labeled tentative, not officially approved by the State Department) from Hugh Borton, chief of the State Department’s Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, addressed to George Atcheson, Jr., the political adviser in Japan, and the other from Atcheson to General MacArthur (“I understand that discussion is still continuing between JCS [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and SWNCC [the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee] in regard to the future of Okinawa and the most southern part of the Kuriles”)[5]. March 1947 corresponds to the period after the Treaty of Peace with Italy (February 1947). The drafting of a peace treaty with Japan within the State Department seems to have begun in earnest around this time.

Preparations for drafting the treaty by the staff of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs would continue until the spring of 1950 (hereinafter the drafts of this period will be referred to as the “State Department drafts”). These drafts were repeatedly revised in consultation with other State Department organizations such as the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) led by George F. Kennan, as well as with other government departments and military-related organizations.[6] Subsequent to the abovementioned March 1947 draft, the main State Department drafts are dated August 5, 1947, January 1948, September 7, 1949, October 13, 1949, November 2, 1949, December 15, 1949 and December 29, 1949.[7] The State Department drafts were tentative plans for internal review by the US government only, however, and were not shown to foreign governments (consultations with foreign countries began after the “seven principles” of September 1950 were drawn up). Furthermore, although they were sent to General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for comment (e.g., the abovementioned memorandum attached to the draft of March 1947 and the position paper on the November 2, 1949 draft by the acting political adviser in Japan, i.e., the head of the GHQ diplomatic section), the State Department drafts were never shown to the Japanese government.

Beginning in the spring of 1950, John Foster Dulles took part in putting together the peace treaty with Japan as a consultant to the Secretary of State. By August 7, 1950 he had prepared a short draft distinct from the State Department drafts. Dulles summed up the main points of the September 11, 1950 draft treaty, which was a revised version of the August 7 draft, in seven items (the “seven principles”) and began coordinating with the countries concerned. Subsequently, after the new Memorandum of January 12, 1951 (which Dulles showed to the British ambassador) and the Memorandum of the Dulles’ mission of February 3rd of that year (shown to Japan on February 5th and revised on March 12th), the US draft (Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty) was completed. Then, after consultations between the US State Department and the British Foreign Office held in Washington in April-May of that year, the US draft and the UK draft of April 7, 1951 (Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty [United Kingdom]) were brought into alignment, and the US-UK draft of May 3, 1951 (Joint United States-United Kingdom Draft of Peace Treaty) was ready. Talks during Dulles’ visit to London in June led to the completion of the revised US-UK draft on June 14, 1951 (Revised United States-United Kingdom Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty), and this became the direct basis for the Treaty of Peace with Japan of September 8th of that year.

3. Provisions in Each Draft Related to the Kurile Islands

[8] (1) March 1947 draft[9]
CHAPTER I - TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 1

[1.] The territorial limits of Japan shall be those existing on January 1, 1894, subject to modifications set forth in Articles 2, 3 .... As such these limits shall include the four principal islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all minor offshore islands, excluding the Kurile Islands, but including the Ryukyu Islands forming part of Kagoshima Prefecture, the Izu Islands southward to Sofu Gan, the islands of the Inland Sea, Rebun, Riishiri, Okujiri, Sado, Oki, Tsushima, Iki and the Goto Archipelago.
[2.] These territorial limits are traced on the maps attached to the present treaty.

Article 3

[1.] Japan hereby cedes to the Soviet Union in full sovereignty that portion of the Island of Saghalien [sic] (Karafuto) south of 50° N. Lat., and Kaiba Island. [2.] Japan hereby cedes to the Soviet Union in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands, lying between Kamchatka and Hokkaido.

(2) August 5, 1947 Draft [10]
CHAPTER I TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 1

1. The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands … and all minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Goto Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife). As such the territorial limits of Japan shall include … beginning at a point in 45° 45' N. latitude, 140° E. longitude; …
2. These territorial limits are indicated on Map No. 1 attached to the present Treaty.

Article 3

2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuril Islands, comprising the islands northeast of Etorofu Strait (Etorofu Kaikyo) from Urup (Uruppu) to Shumushu inclusive, which were ceded by Russia to Japan by the Treaty of 1875.

(3) January 1948 draft [11]
CHAPTER I TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 1

1. The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), Sado, Oki Retto, Tsushima, the Goto Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. Latitude, and the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife).

NOTE 1
The question whether provision should be made in the draft for the retention by Japan of all or some of the southernmost Kurils (Kunashiri and Etorofu), the Habomais and Shikotan is still being studied. It is believed that legally the case for the retention by Japan of the Habomais and Shikotan is stronger than the case for the southernmost Kurils.
NOTE 2 [on the Ryukyus]
NOTE 3
After decisions have been reached concerning the disposition of the islands mentioned in NOTES 1 and 2 above, there should be inserted in Article 1 provisions setting forth the territorial limits of Japan in terms of latitude and longitude.
2. These territorial limits are indicated on Map No. 1 attached to the present Treaty.

Article 3

2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuril Islands. (Note: This provision is subject to modification in accordance with the decision reached concerning the disposition of the southern Kurils. See Note 1 under Article 1 above.)

(4) September 7, 1949 Draft [12]
CHAPTER I TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 1

1. The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), Sado, Oki Retto, Etorofu, Kunashiri, the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Tsushima, the Goto Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. latitude, and the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife).

Article 3

2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuril Islands.

(5) October 13, 1949 Draft [13]
CHAPTER I TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 1

1. The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), Sado, Oki Retto, Etorofu, Kunashiri, the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Tsushima, the Goto Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. latitude, and the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife).

Article 3

2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuril Islands.

[Foot]Note 1

If the U.S.S.R. does not sign the treaty, it would be the U.S. position that the treaty should not contain a provision whereby Japan would cede the territories described in Article 3, but that it should provide that the status of these territories should be determined subsequently by the states concerned, including the parties to the present Treaty.

Comment on Article 1 of the Draft in “Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan (October 13, 1949)” [14]

Article 1 – It will be noted that the territorial limits of Japan include Etorofu, Kunashiri, the Habomai Islands and Shikotan. The question of whether these islands form part of the Kurile Islands promised to the USSR at Yalta is contentious. Even though there is little chance that the Soviets, now in occupation of these islands, will give them up, there are political, economic and strategic reasons why their retention by Japan would be desirable. It is believed that we should propose this disposition on the slight chance that the Soviets would give them up, and for the good will we would gain and the ill will that the Soviets would incur among the Japanese if they did not do so.

(6) November 2, 1949 Draft [15]
CHAPTER II TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 3

1. The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands … and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), Sado, Oki Retto, Tsushima, the Goto Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. latitude, and the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife) and all other islands … beginning at a point in 45° 45' N. latitude, 140° longitude east …

Article 5

2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuril Islands.

[Foot] Note I

[virtually identical to the note to Article 3 in the October 13, 1949 draft cited above, except here the reference is to Article 5]

[Foot] Note II

With reference to paragraph 2 of Article 5, decision whether the U.S. should propose the retention by Japan of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and the Lesser Kuriles (the Habomais and Shikotan) has not been finally made. Present thinking is that the U.S. should not raise the issue but if it is raised by Japan we might show a sympathetic attitude. Consideration should also be given to the question whether it might be advisable for the U.S. to propose that the USSR place the Kuriles under the trusteeship system.

Comment on Article 5, paragraph 2 and footnote to “Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan (November 2, 1949)”[16]

Article 5, paragraph 2 and footnote--The present view that the U.S. should not propose the retention of Japan of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and the Lesser Kuriles, notwithstanding the economic, political, and strategic reasons which make that disposition desirable, is based on two main considerations:
1.

Irrespective of the Japanese records which can be advanced to show that these islands are not part of “the Kurils,” it is believed that the U.S., in view of its commitments and actions to date, would expose itself to charges of bad faith by the Soviets which it would be difficult to refute if it were to claim that “the Kurils,” promised to the Soviets at Yalta, do not include these islands. In a communication of August 17, 1945, President Truman informed Premier Stalin that he agreed to his request “to modify General Order No. 1 to include all the Kuril Islands to the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.” All the Kuril Islands down to Hokkaido were subsequently occupied by Soviet forces, which have remained there during the past four years without challenge or objection by the U.S. There would seem to be no advantage to our advancing a proposal which is almost certain to be rejected.

2.

U.S. assumption of control over the Ryukyus places the U.S. in a poor position to suggest the renunciation by the Soviets of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and the Lesser Kuriles. We might, however, propose that these islands be placed under trusteeship in the manner of the Ryukyus.

(7) December 15, 1949 Draft [17]
Article 3

The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai); Tsushima, Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks) [18] , Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri and all other islands in the Japan Sea (Nippon Kai) within a line connecting the farther shores of Tsushima, Takeshima and Rebun; the Goto archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. latitude, and all other islands of the East China Sea east of longitude 127° east of Greenwich and north of 29° N. latitude; the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife) and all other islands of the Philippine Sea nearer to the home islands than the islands named; and the Hobomai [sic] group and Shikotan. All of the islands identified above, with a three-mile belt of territorial waters, shall belong to Japan.

Article 4

1. Japan hereby renounces on behalf of itself and its nationals all territorial and mandate rights, titles and claims outside the territorial area described in Article 3.
2. The Allied and Associated Powers retain their rights in respect to disposition of the territories referred to in the preceding paragraph which were under Japanese sovereignty, pending conclusion of an agreement or agreements among them providing for disposition of such territories.

AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE DISPOSITION OF FORMER JAPANESE TERRITORIES
The Allied and Associated Powers party to the treaty of peace concluded with Japan on [blank], 1950, dispose of the territories renounced by Japan in that Treaty in the following manner:
Article 2
The Allied and Associated Powers agree that the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) south of 50° N.latitude, and adjacent islands, including Totamoshiri (Kaiba To, or Moneron), and Robben Island (Tyuleniy Ostrov, or Kaihyo To) and the Kuril Islands [superscript insertion] shall be transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty.

(8) December 29, 1949 Draft [19]
CHAPTER II TERRITORIAL CLAUSES
Article 3

1. The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai); Tsushima, Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks), Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri and all other islands in the Japan Sea (Nippon Kai) within a line connecting the farther shores of Tsushima, Takeshima and Rebun; the Goto archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands north of 29° N. latitude, and all other islands of the East China Sea east of longitude 127° east of Greenwich and north of 29° N. latitude; the Izu Islands southward to and including Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife) and all other islands of the Philippine Sea nearer to the four principal islands than the islands named; and the Habomai group and Shikotan lying to the east and south of a line extending from a point in 43° 35' N. latitude, 145° 35' E. longitude to a point in 44° N. latitude, 146° 30' E. longitude, and to the south of a line drawn due east on the parallel in 44° N. latitude, and to the south of a line drawn due east on the parallel in 44°N. latitude. All of the islands identified above, with a three-mile belt of territorial waters, shall belong to Japan.
2. All of the islands mentioned above are shown on the map attached to the present Treaty.

Article 5

1. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty that portion of the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) south of 50° N. latitude, and adjacent islands, including Totamoshiri (Kaiba To, or Moneron), and Robben Island (Tyuleniy Ostrov, or Kaihyo To).
2. Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands.

[Foot] Note I

If China and the USSR do not attend the peace conference or sign the treaty, it would be the U.S. position that the treaty should not contain provisions whereby Japan would cede the territories described in Articles 4 and 5 to China and the USSR, respectively, but that it should provide that disposition of these territories should be determined subsequently by the states concerned, including the parties to the present Treaty.

Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan (December 29, 1949)
I. General

3. Territorial Dispositions [20]
The territorial dispositions in Chapter II follow the terms of the Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam Agreements and of previous U.S. Governmental studies relating to their implementation. The U.S. position with respect to the implementation of some of the terms of these Agreements is under recurrent review.

II. Comments on Particular Articles [21]

Article 3--It was stipulated in the Yalta Agreement that “The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union”. On Japan’s surrender Soviet forces occupied these islands, and also the Habomai Islands and Shikotan (or the “Shikotan Archipelago”) 35 to 40 miles southeast, sometimes known as the “Lesser Kuriles”. This action was not protested by any Allied Government or by SCAP and, indeed, has been specifically respected in the determination of the permitted Japanese fishing area. The Japanese, however, have exhibited considerable interest in the recovery of the two southernmost Kuriles (Etorofu and Kunashiri) and the Habomai Islands and Shikotan They argue that these islands are historically Japanese and that their loss has involved serious hardship for the fishing population of northern Hokkaido while significantly reducing Japan’s total fishing catch. From a political and strategic point of view it would be to U.S. advantage to have the Japanese rather than the Soviets control these islands, which extend to within a few miles of the Japanese mainland. Provision in Articles 3 and 5 of the treaty that Japan retain the Habomais and Shikotan but renounce “the Kurile Islands,” including Etorofu and Kunashiri, to the USSR is based on the following principal considerations:
1. There seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that Kunashiri and Etorofu are not part of the “Kurile Islands”, the term employed in the Yalta Agreement. Although there has been no Soviet claim to the two islands since the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Amity of 1855, both that treaty and the St. Petersberg [sic] Treaty of 1875 indicate that they were considered to be part of the Kurile Islands. The U.S. would, therefore, expose itself to charges of bad faith by the Soviets which it would be difficult to refute were it to claim that “the Kuriles” did not include these islands. Moreover, U.S. assumption of control over the Ryukyus will place the U.S. in a poor position to suggest to the Soviets that they renounce the two islands to the Japanese simply in response to Japanese interests and desires.
2. On the other hand, there is believed to be sound legal basis for claiming that the Shikotan Archipelago is not properly part of “the Kuriles”. While Russia has at one time or another claimed or possessed most of the Kuriles, including Etorofu, it has never before claimed any part of the Habomais and Shikotan. The Kuriles are a string of rugged and often precipitous volcanic islands while the Shikotan Archipelago constitutes an extension of the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido with low rolling hills similar to those on the peninsula. The Habomai Islands were not joined politically with the Kurile Islands before surrender, being administered as part of Nemuro District. Shikotan was included with the south Kuriles for the sake of convenience.
　　　Although the waters of the Shikotan Archipelago and the two southernmost Kuriles Islands constitute a unit for fishing operations, and although the southern Kuriles are the more important area, significant advantages would be derived by Japan from the retention of the Habomais and Shikotan even without the southern Kuriles. U.S. sponsorship of Japan’s claim to the Habomais and Shikotan would indicate to the Japanese our desire to support their claims in this area to the maximum feasible extent.

(9) August 7, 1950 Draft #2 [22]
CHAPTER IV TERRITORY

5. Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China with reference to the future status of Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin south of 50° north latitude and the Kurile Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one year, the parties of this treaty will accept the decision of the United Nations General Assembly.

(10) September 11, 1950 Draft [23]
CHAPTER IV TERRITORY

5. Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China with reference to the future status of Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin south of 50° north latitude and the Kurile Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one year from the effect date of this treaty, the parties to this Treaty will seek and accept the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

Seven Principles [24]

3. Territory. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R, China and U.S. with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the treaty came into effect, the U.N. General Assembly would decide. Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.

(11) January 12, 1951 Memorandum (presented by Dulles to Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador) [25]

4. As regards territory, the treaty would require Japan to renounce all interest in Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores and to accept a United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. Japan would accept the establishment of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(12) February 3, 1951 Memorandum Prepared by the Dulles Mission[26] (presented to Japan on February 5th, revised on March 12th[27])
TERRITORY

Japan would renounce all rights and titles to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, and accept a United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. The United States would retain control of these islands pending approval by the United Nations of the trusteeship agreement or agreements. Japan would further renounce all rights, titles and claims deriving from the mandate system and from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area.

[After revision]

2. 　Terr[itory] :Unless and until Soviets remove themselves from the treaty picture it appears preferable that the draft assume their participation. Accordingly it provides for the return by Japan of South Sakhalin and all islands adjacent thereto to the Soviet Union and handing over to the Soviets of the Kurile Islands as they may be defined by bilateral agreement or by judicial decision under treaty disputes procedure. Provision would be operative only if the Soviets sign and ratify the treaty.

(13) March 23, 1951 US-Japan Draft (Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty) [28]
CHAPTER III TERRITORY

5. Japan will return to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands.

CHAPTER VIII FINAL CLAUSES

19. Except for the provisions of Article 11, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits to or upon any State unless and until it signs and ratifies, or adheres to, this Treaty; nor, with that exception, shall any right, title and interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision hereof in favor of a State which does not sign and ratify, or adhere to, this Treaty.

(14) April 7, 1951 UK Draft (Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom)) [29]
Article 3

Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands, and that portion of South Sakhalin over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty.

(15) May 3, 1951 Joint US-UK Draft (Joint United States-United Kingdom Draft of Peace Treaty) [30]
CHAPTER II TERRITORY
Article 4

Japan cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Kurile Islands, and that portion of South Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty.

CHAPTER VII FINAL CLAUSES
Article 25

… the present Treaty, shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State unless and until it signs and ratifies or accedes to the Treaty; nor … shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the treaty in favour of a State which does not sign and ratify, or accede to it.

(16) June 14, 1951 Revised US-UK Draft (Revised United States–United Kingdom Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty) [31]
CHAPTER II TERRITORY
Article 2

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

CHAPTER VII FINAL CLAUSES
Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan which have signed and ratified it. … the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favour of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

4. Conclusion

In looking over the provisions of, and notes to, the drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty cited in section 3 above, it can be seen that the authors of the State Department drafts had knowledge of the history of the Habomais and Shikotan as well as of the Chishima Islands (Kurile Islands) as a whole. That is because during the war, in anticipation of the postwar disposition of territories, the State Department had prepared preliminary memos studying territorial issues around the world, the “T-documents” (1943, compiled by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy) and the “CAC-documents” (1944, compiled by the Interdivisional Country and Area Committee)[32]. This may also be related to the fact that, soon after the war ended, in preparation for the peacesettlement to come, the Japanese government began studying potential topics, such as territories, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and compiled explanatory materials on them in English, which theypassed on to the United States. [33]
　　In a context such as this, the draft provisions with respect to the four Northern Islands shifted back and forth, and various justifications were given in the notes and footnotes. The following is a summary of the main points of each draft, marking those which stipulate that Japan retain the four islands with a circle ○; those that stipulate their divestiture with a cross ×; and those that stipulate the retention of Habomai and Shikotan and divestiture of Kunashiri and Etorofu with a triangle △.

× ○ × ○ × △ △

　　　In the stages of the drafting process from the summer of 1950 on, when Dulles took part in planning and coordinating with the other Allies, the provisions were simplified, and descriptions of what constituted the “Kurile Islands” disappeared. Methods of listing the islands to be retained by Japan in the State Department drafts and illustrating Japan’s territorial limits by drawing lines on maps attached to the treaty also ceased. In a certain case (the March 12, 1951 Memorandum), it was stated that the Kurile Islands, “as they may be defined by bilateral agreement or by judicial decision under treaty disputes procedure,” would be handed over to the Soviet Union.
　　　In an article written for an earlier issue of this journal (see note 2 above), the author pointed out that the general rule of treaty interpretation provides that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose,” and argued that the term Chishima Islands (Kurile Islands) in the Peace Treaty can be interpreted as the islands north of Uruppu that were the subject of exchange under the 1875 treaty, for the context here is that the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia of 1855 confirmed the previously existing border between Japan and Russia in the Chishima area, in other words, the four Northern Islands have been Japanese territory from the beginning, and what’s more, the Allied Powers themselves had proclaimed the principle of non-territorial aggrandizement. By looking at the preparatory work to the Peace Treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation, we can confirm that there is no reason to reconsider this conclusion.