The Foundation for Confidence-Building in the Indo-Pacific Region ― Can the ARF Ease Tensions in the Region?

In the Indo-Pacific region the security environment is deteriorating due, for example, to China’s large-scale military exercises, North Korea’s missile launches, and Myanmar’s ongoing internal conflict. Just looking at the United States (U.S.)-China confrontation, one of the major factors behind this deterioration, there is still no prospect of easing tensions.[1] Given this situation, the foreign countries which have an interest in the region are showing a positive attitude toward multilateral security cooperation.[2] Since the 1990s, regional organizational frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and others have appeared, and subsequently “minilateral” frameworks,[3] namely the QUAD comprised of the four countries of Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India, and AUKUS comprised of the three countries of Australia, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S., have also emerged. In this paper, we focus on the ARF, which is responsible for easing military tensions and other issues using confidence-building measures (CBMs) as the only inclusive framework in the region. We give an overview of the present situation of the ARF and discuss its development and expected roles going forward.

What is the ARF?

Launched in July 1994, the ARF is the only inclusive multilateral security framework in the Indo-Pacific region, and it has the objective of enhancing the regional security environment through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues.[4] Its membership consists of 27 countries and organizations including Japan, the U.S., Russia, China, North Korea, the European Union (EU), led by an ASEAN member state which serves as the chair. The inclusiveness which can be said to be a characteristic of the ARF[5] is reflected in the number of member states it has and its objectives, which are based on cooperative security[6]. In other words, the ARF is aiming to prevent conflicts and take action on a range of security challenges through CBMs and other measures, using non-military means under a non-confrontational structure.[7]Because of these characteristics we can clearly distinguish the ARF from other multilateral security frameworks which have an exclusive nature.[8] Furthermore, another characteristic of the ARF is its three-stage approach to achieving the aforementioned objectives. This is a gradual evolutionary approach of going through the stages of promotion of confidence-building measures, development of preventive diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches to conflicts.[9]However, to state the conclusion first, the ARF remains stuck in the first stage of promotion of confidence-building measures.[10]

Examples of activities by the ARF

The main security dialogue in the ARF is the ARF Ministerial Meeting,[11] and in addition to that the ARF is continuously holding Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) in five areas, the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP) meetings which are related meetings on a different track, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and others.[12] Furthermore, the outcomes of these meetings are communicated internally and externally using the Annual Security Outlook and other reports.[13] Through these activities, ARF is working to achieve mutual understanding and confidence-building among the countries and organizations participating in the forum.[14] In addition, it is worth noting that the ARF is a framework created through an initiative of ASEAN. For example, the chairs and venues of the ARF are only ASEAN member states, and its resolutions adopt the consensus method (the ASEAN Way).[15]In the next section we will consider the factors which hinder the development of the ARF and its roles going forward, so here we focus on three of the main functions of the ARF.

The first function is the ARF Ministerial Meeting, which is a forum for Track 1 (intergovernmental meeting) dialogue in the region. It is a significant framework for the security of the region, under which foreign ministers from the region all meet together once a year to hold discussions on security issues.[16] The agenda for this meeting, which is held every summer, is discussed and organized at the preceding ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF SOM). To give some examples of the content discussed most recently at the ARF Ministerial Meeting, the invasion of Ukraine, the South China Sea problem, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other issues were discussed at the 31th ARF Ministerial Meeting held in Lao PDR in July last year and at other forums.[17] These discussions show that at a time when there is no prospect of easing tensions in the region the ARF is regularly providing forums for direct dialogue among major powers.[18] Furthermore, it has the characteristic that it is one of the few international frameworks in which North Korea, which is isolated in the international community, participates.[19] The second function is as a forum for the Track 1.5 (meetings of government officials and non-governmental experts) and Track 2 (non-intergovernmental meetings) dialogue which supports the above Track 1. The breakdown of this is comprised of ISMs for each security issue and the CSCAP,[20] organized and permanent track forums in which government officials, academics, and other private citizens participate. The ISMs are generally categorized as Track 1, but in some cases, their participants are both from the public and private sectors, so based on this point they can be regarded as Track 1.5. The ISMs cover diverse areas of cooperation such as disaster relief, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, and maritime security, and they deal with the method of development of the aforementioned three-stage approach and matters for cooperation. Meanwhile, CSCAP holds meetings on ad hoc themes and compiles some of the outcomes into security overviews and other reports to transmit information.[21] In this way, the ARF’s ISMs and CSCAP support Track 1 by bringing together the diverse security interests and opinions of the public and private sectors in each of the member states and promoting the sharing of security perspectives and related perceptions among the member states.

The third function is the drills specialized in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), called the Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx). Since these drills were held for the first time in 2009 they have been held every second year, for a total of four times by 2015. Many public and private sector people from ASEAN, the U.S., China, the Republic of Korea, and other member states have participated with personnel and equipment, and the Self-Defense Forces have also participated from Japan.[22] Their objectives include enhanced resilience through military and civilian capacity-building in the participating countries and confidence-building among the participating countries, based on the characteristic of the Indo-Pacific region that it is more prone to natural disasters than other regions. We can conclude that these drills are an effort utilizing the inclusive nature of the ARF.

Above, we have discussed the three functions to give an overview of the main activities of the ARF, but there are many other varied initiatives hosted by or related to the ARF, such as ad hoc meetings and seminars.[23] We can argue that these various activities are valuable initiatives utilizing a characteristic of the ARF, its inclusiveness, to contribute to confidence-building in the region by enhancing transparency and building networks, among others. On the other hand, taking the overview of the content of these initiatives, one can say that the development of preventive diplomacy is still insufficient.

Factors hindering the development of the ARF

The reasons for this have already been analyzed from a variety of perspectives in previous studies.[24] Mainly, there is ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states[25] and the ARF also firmly adheres to this principle.[26] Here, we put the focus on two points: the relationship between CBMs and interference in internal affairs, and changes in the security environment.

Regarding the first point, there is the constraint that CBMs have a nature which interferes with the sovereignty of each country, so they cannot be developed easily in ASEAN, which firmly adheres to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. For example, in the case of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), where the institutionalization of CBMs has made progress, the CBMs have been developed in the three stages of exchanges, verification, and regulation. However, when their development reaches the stage of regulation, CBMs have the nature of constraining the actions of the military, which essentially fall under matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state.[27] Put another way, OSCE-type CBMs demand the enhancement of exchanges and transparency and therefore attempt to infringe upon the area of state sovereignty, which is respected by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, so a tense relationship exists between CBMs and sovereignty. In some areas, such as HA/DR, the ARF has explored development in forms which do not infringe on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, such as CBM development based on specific contexts. On the other hand, concerning the internal conflict in Myanmar, specific initiatives were still not launched even after the “five-point consensus”[28] was agreed in April 2021. In other words, a basic principle that ASEAN has maintained to date is a hurdle to CBM development like that seen in the OSCE.

The second point is the constraint imposed by changes in the security environment due to ASEAN taking a neutral stance in the context of intensifying great power competition. After the establishment of the ARF, the functional development seen in DiREx and other initiatives peaked in the mid-2010s,[29] but the backdrop to this was that formerly the U.S. was in the superior position in the regional order and great power relations were comparatively stable.[30]

Subsequently, this situation did not last long, and as China’s economy grew it expanded its influence in the region by establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and militarizing the South China Sea, among other moves. Furthermore, Russia has also been approaching the region via China, North Korea, and other countries with which it already had deep relations, and the Ukraine war strengthened that trend.[31] The U.S. has been wary of these Chinese and Russian moves and has shown a stance of political and military opposition to China, including strengthening tariffs and increasing freedom of navigation operations, among other measures. As a result, great power competition is intensifying. Moreover, ASEAN has responded by not taking sides with either the U.S. or China,[32] but due to that neutral stance, the ARF, in which the U.S., China, and Russia all participate, has not been able to tackle head-on the key problems of the South China Sea, human rights, and Taiwan, failing to meet expectations to ease the tensions in the region.

The roles and functions required of the ARF going forward

The multilateral security initiatives by the ARF have yet to be equipped with effective conflict prevention functions and they are also facing many other issues. However, it is also true that the ARF bears an important role as a forum for dialogue which encourages confidence-building in the Indo-Pacific region, and that it has contributed to some extent to conflict prevention in the region to date. Furthermore, given the point that no alternative systems exist, expectations with regard to its role are likely to continue.

However, in light of the rapid changes in the international situation, the significance of the existence of a range of multilateral security frameworks will be called into question even more going forward. It is likely to be necessary for the ARF to utilize its inclusiveness to carry out initiatives in the common interest of the region.[33]

On the other hand, if we take into consideration the factors constraining the ARF discussed in this paper, the path of functional development based on Track 2 by a non-governmental entity is presumably the most realistic way to develop those CBM functions.[34]The development of CBMs through state-led institutionalization as seen in the OSCE is difficult in the current ARF, so perhaps those functions could be developed by establishing a functional platform such as a new ISM in Track 1.5 or Track 2 and considering an agenda such as responding to the easing of tensions in the region. When doing so, it would be possible to refer to the initiatives of Europe, which is a leader in multilateral security, and it would be easy to obtain cooperation.

This author participated in an international conference on confidence-building hosted by German think tank GIGA (German Institute for Global and Area Studies) in December 2023. European experts are closely monitoring the recent developments in the Indo-Pacific region, including the possibility of a Taiwan contingency, and had a strong interest in supporting security initiatives by Europe in the Indo-Pacific region [35]. The 31st ARF Ministerial Meeting was held in July this year too, and its value will continue to be useful going forward in combination with other minilateral and ad hoc frameworks, so Japan should also pay close attention to these developments.

(2024/09/20)