The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (APBI).

The Rohingya crisis, a complex humanitarian and political challenge for South is no longer limited to the region. Initially a humanitarian concern, this issue has gradually evolved into a significant regional and geopolitical concern. Because of the abundant natural resources of the Rakhine state, its proximity to the Bay of Bengal, and large-scale projects such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, strategic competitions involving China, India, Russia, the United States, and Japan have transformed the Rohingya issue from a human rights concern to shaping geopolitical order. This article intends to shed light on those complex dynamics.

Since August 25, 2017, as a aftermath of a brutal military crackdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, more than one million Rohingya fled across the border and took refuge in Bangladesh. They mostly settled in camps of the Cox’s Bazar area, making it the world’s largest refugee camp with dire conditions. Some of them also dispersed in parts of the nearby Bandarban district. Initially, it was thought to be a temporary crisis, and the population would return home once the situation calmed down. Unfortunately, eight years have passed, and no tangible solution has come out. Instead, the situation is becoming increasingly complicated with the increasing Rohingya influx, declining international aid, and intensifying security concerns, as well as tensions with the host population. Despite numerous international declarations, UN resolutions, and diplomatic efforts, a sustainable resolution remains elusive. Bangladesh, a low-income country with a huge population of its own, had to bear the immense economic, political, and humanitarian burden all the way.

At this moment, the Rohingya crisis is not only a humanitarian tragedy- it has become the epicenter of geopolitical tension in the broader South and Southeast Asia.

Ethnic tension and violence have long been a regular phenomenon in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Following the military crackdown and mass atrocities of August 2017, which is known as the Tatmadaw, nearly a million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Although this time the migration was massive and horrific, such an exodus is not new. In the past, Rohingya migration to Bangladesh took place several times, especially in 1978, 1991, and 2012, following the military coup, clashes between government forces and ethnic armed groups, with direct spillover effects on Bangladesh. Since 1978, to even September 2025, violent clashes in Maungdaw and its adjacent areas have escalated noticeably, and gunfire across the border is regularly audible from Bangladesh’s side, spreading fear among border residents. As such, the Rohingya influx did not stop, even though the borders became ‘strict’ and ‘tighter’. For instance, different reports suggest that roughly 700-800 crossed the border between 6 to 7 September, while around 8000 new Rohingyas entered the camps in August 2025. Thousands of stranded people are still waiting to cross the border. As one of the world’s most densely populated countries, Bangladesh is now sheltering around 1.4 million Rohingya refugees in 33 camps across Ukhiya and Teknaf.

Over time, donations and aid declined, as the World Food Programme (WFP) reduced monthly food aid from USD 12 to USD 10 per person in March 2023, and even to USD 8 by June. In addition, many US-funded projects shut down by 2025 because of the change of policy by the Trump government. All these triggered widespread frustration among humanitarian organizations and community leaders. On the other hand, hunger, frustration, and violence escalated -particularly among youths. Law and order have deteriorated – at least 48 people, including local leaders and camp residents, were killed in inside camp conflicts in just the first half of 2023. Allegedly, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had direct stakes in these violent actions. Reports also suggest that there is a considerable increase in drugs and human trafficking, extremism, and arms smuggling. Prolonged presence of the refugees is also affecting their relationship with the host communities. The resentment within the host community intensified over job competition, deforestation, environmental degradation, and the rising living costs. The cordial empathy of the host community that once warmly received the ‘Rohingya’ and sheltered them has turned into hostility and resentment. The ‘Rohingya’ is now a term of insult on social media and in public discourse. These overcrowded and resource-deficient camp situations of Cox’s Bazar symbolize both humanitarian tragedy and global neglect.

The UN recognized the 2017 atrocities as ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’. In 2018, the General Assembly called for investigations, and Gambia filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2019. On January 23, 2020, the Court issued a provisional order directing Myanmar to protect the Rohingya. The proceedings remain slow, and enforcement of the orders seems to be uncertain amid Myanmar’s volatile political situation.

The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants urged global responsibility sharing for refugee protection. As Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, it defines the Rohingya refugees as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs)- indicating their temporary stay and preserving the possibility of repatriation. Under the Declarations’ Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), refugees were to be assured voluntary repatriation and third-country resettlement. Yet in the Rohingya crisis, these commitments have largely failed. Meanwhile, donor funding declined, and over one million Rohingya, third-country options appear to be impractical, and repatriation seems impossible.

The main reason for this protracted crisis lies at the heart of the geopolitical dynamics of South and Southeast Asia. The Rohingya issue is no longer a Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral issue; instead, it involves more powerful actors like China, Russia, India, and Japan, and it poses a wider threat to regional stability.

China remains Myanmar’s key strategic ally, which sustained the junta by extending political and economic support. China refrained from UN resolutions on the Rohingya, blocked efforts at the ICJ to enforce the genocide ruling. On the contrary, it focused on strategic assets like ports, pipelines, and energy routes connecting Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal, in order to reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait China has invested more than 18 billion USD in Myanmar, including in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor(CMEC) and Kyaukphyu deep sea port as part of their Belt and Road Initiative mega project. Kyaukphyu remains a key knot in China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. China also controls more than 90 percent of the arms market in Myanmar, which eventually ensures the junta’s survival amidst sanctions. This poses a serious diplomatic dilemma for Bangladesh, as it has to maintain Chinese investment on the one hand, and seek China’s active support in repatriation, on the other.

Despite the military and political support, China’s attitude towards Myanmar’s junta is not unilinear. China seems to be a little unsatisfied, mainly due to the interruptions in its multi-billion-dollar Kyaukphu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine state. The ongoing insurgency has severely disrupted this flagship project, a major part of the BRI and a key element of China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy to establish influence in the Indian Ocean. Situated in on Ramree Island along the Bay of Bengal, the SEZ project is related with a deep-sea port on Maday Island, linking Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province by oil and gas pipelines. These pipeline projects, completed in 2013 and 2017, are to start serving China with an efficient alternative to the Malacca Strait route for Middle Eastern and African energy imports. Because of the civil war, much of this infrastructure remained dysfunctional. Some other plans are still incomplete, the powerplant construction is interrupted, and the port operation, which was to start this year, remains uncertain. China spent around 1.3 billion dollars on the first phase to implement jointly with the CITIC Group and the Myanmar government. But now the junta cannot access the area due to the dominance of the Arakan Army in Rakhine. Consequently, all industrial, residential, and port facilities along the SEZ area have become frozen. For China, this is a major setback, as the Kyaukphyu port plan was designed to reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints and anchor development in western Myanmar. This stalemate situation inside Myanmar affects China’s plan as well as regional stability, which is a precondition for full functional network of the BRI across South and Southeast Asia.

India, another regional actor, has been maintaining a cautious stance so far. Although showing humanitarian concern, it did not directly criticize the Myanmar military. In fact, it shocked many as India was considered to be the best ally for Bangladesh, particularly during the regime of the previous prime minister, Sheikh Hasina. Instead, India continues military cooperation with the junta. New Delhi also retains strategic projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the proposed India-Myanmar-Thailand highway. These high investment projects would connect India’s northeastern part to the Bay of Bengal through the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state. Therefore, India considers Myanmar as its key to the ‘Act East’ policy and essential for managing insurgency in many parts of the northeast.

Additionally, India also hosts around 40,000 Rohingya, and some of them face deportation. Although Delhi verbally supports repatriation to Bangladesh, it carefully bypasses antagonizing the junta. With the subtle intention of counteracting China’s regional influence in South Asia, India’s goal is to prevent Myanmar from being fully under China’s control.

Among other actors, Russia and Japan have been involved in different capacities. Russia has been selling arms to Myanmar worth roughly 400 million USD since the 1990s. Recently, it has been building two nuclear power plants in Myanmar. Since the Ukrainian war, Russia has to build new allies in Asia, and Myanmar is one of the potential allies for it. After the Western sanctions, Russia has deepened military cooperation and investment in the energy sector through Gazprom. As such, Moscow has never condemned the Rohingya genocide, maintains indifference, and reinforces the junta’s resilience.

Japan, being the fifth largest investor in Myanmar, previously funded major infrastructure projects like the Thilwa SEZ, under Aung San Suukyi’s government. After the coup, Japan reassessed its position but did not entirely cut the ties. Perhaps there was a dilemma on Japan’s side that full withdrawal might benefit China to have full control over Myanmar. Japan adopted a ‘dialogue and mediation’ diplomacy in order to offer limited support for Bangladesh’s repatriation efforts. As Japan continues its substantial development cooperation with Bangladesh, its Myanmar policy remains cautious and strategic rather than humanitarian.

Bangladesh’s humanitarian responsibility has had a heavy price. Despite repeated appeals, Myanmar has not shown any intention toward repatriation. Differing interests and complicated ties with China, Russia, and India have effectively guarded the junta and restrained the international rules from being executed. Along with being heavily burdened by the prolonged presence of the refugees, some other factors also threaten the security of the Bangladeshi people. The refugee camps are located near the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’- a hub for drug and arms trafficking. This geographic location and camp situation led to rampant kidnapping, extortion, violent conflicts, and organized crimes all along, posing risks to the internal stability of Bangladesh.

Recently, the US has displayed its interest in the Rohingya issue through renewed humanitarian and diplomatic moves. The USA pledged an additional 60-73 million USD aid for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, bringing its total contribution since 2017 to over 2 billion ISD. It is said that the funds aim to support food, healthcare, education, and protection for the Rohingya refugees living in camps in Bangladesh, while the USA also urged ‘meaningful policy changes’ to improve refugee livelihoods and reduce aid dependency. Expressing concern over global aid shortfall, the US warned that the funding gaps can lead to sever cuts in food and essential services, and therefore urges other countries to share the financial burden, emphasizing that no single nation can take the burden alone.

Amidst the crises, Bangladesh and the United States jointly conducted ‘Operation Pacific Angel 25-3’ in August 2025. The Bangladesh government describes this as a humanitarian exercise with a focus on medical services, disaster response, and defense cooperation. The opposition groups and analysts interpret it as an extension of Washington’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ with a goal to counter China. Nevertheless, this has placed Bangladesh at the crossroads of great power competition between China and the USA while further complicating the diplomatic solution of the Rohingya issue.

While praising Bangladesh’s generous role in hosting the refugees, the US also emphasized accountability in Myanmar, supporting international procedures to investigate atrocities against the Rohingya. There was also an urge for an immediate end to violence in Rakhine state. Washington and humanitarian groups agreed that the current situation in Myanmar is unsafe for return, and safe, voluntary, and dignified condition is required for the repatriation of refugees. During the recent bilateral talks, Bangladesh reminded the US that peace in Myanmar will remain fragile unless the Rohingya crisis is resolved.

The Rohingya crisis mirrors the region's shifting geopolitical order. As long as this resolution remains uncertain, a viable and permanent solution will come only when democracy, justice, and human rights are restored in Myanmar, supported by unified international cooperation. Until then , the Rohingya Crisis will remain at the very center of South and Southeast Asia’s geopolitics.