The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (APBI).

It will not be an exaggeration to state that, for the last 54 years, the political landscape of Bangladesh has revolved around the question of the existence and significance of the Jamaat-e-Islami (hereafter JI or Jamaat). Although JI not yet attained the hold of the state, two other major political parties, the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have always strategically used the Jamaat issue as their trump card in electoral politics. There exists a number of Islamist political groups in Bangladesh, yet JI remained the major but the most controversial Islamist force, not only because of the Islamist ideology they uphold, but also for their past involvement and present position regarding the Liberation War of Bangladesh. After the ousted of prime minister Sheikh Hasina through the July Uprising in 2024, Jamaat question once again pervaded the political scenario, and the supporters and observers started to think that this time JI is truly close to state power.

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh has had a long complex history of politics and religious movemnts in South Asia, traversing through British colonial period, the Partition of India, Pakistan period and the independence movement, and the Liberation War of Bangladesh. This article traces the historical trajectory of JI in Bangladesh. Founded by Abul A’la Maududi in 1941, JI emerged as a political force in British India. Hailing from Aurangabad, a district of the princely state of Hyderabad, Maududi endorsed Islam as a ‘total way of life’ and advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state through constitutional means. He not only opposed ‘western liberal’ ideologies, but also rejected all forms of ‘secular’ nationalism -widespread at that time. Maududi also rejected the idea of Partition on the ground that this very notion of division contradicts Islamic ideology. Arguing that the idea of Pakistan state violated the idea of an Islamic state, he predicted that it would result in incomplete or partial polity, instead he envisioned India as a unified Islamic state which was in ‘chaos’ because of the British withdrawal.

After the Partition of India in 1947, Jamaat-e-Islami split into two separate branches in two newly-emerged countries—India and Pakistan. During the early 1950s, based on Maududi’s vision of a forerunner role of an Islamic party, JI commenced its organizational activities in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Compared to other Islamist political parties of that time (such as the Muslim League), the extent and activities of JI were relatively small, but it operated a cadre-based politics strongly committed to ‘Islam’ with a critical stance against secularism and socialism. Since the 1950s, when the spirit of Bengali nationalism was beginning to take root, JI chose to stand for the unity of Pakistan as a Muslim state. In 1964, the military regime of Pakistan banned Jamaat-e-Islami and its leaders including Ghulam Azam, the Secretary General of the East Pakistan wing, and imprisoned them for eight months. After being released, Ghulam Azam became the chief (Ameer) of JI East Pakistan. Throughout the 60s, tension between repression of the West Pakistan rulers and the rising Bengali nationalistic sentiment intensified, which eventually led to the liberation war in 1971. Throughout this period of escalated tension, JI relentlessly extended its support to Pakistan’s military regime and took a stance for a unified Pakistan.

On 25 March 1971, the Pakistani army started the crackdown on the general people of East Pakistan. When the war broke out between the Pakistani army and the liberation forces of Bangladesh, JI clearly expressed its opposition against the Mukti Bahini (the liberation force). During the war, Jamaat leaders not only opposed secession and supported the unity of Pakistan but also collaborated with the Pakistan army. Excerpts from Ghulam Azam’s speech after 25 March 1971, used to be published in the mouthpiece of JI named The Daily Sangarm. On 20 June 1971, Azam reaffirmed his support for the Pakistani army by stating that ‘the army has eradicated nearly all criminals of East Pakistan.’ In order to strengthen their position for the unified Pakistan and against the liberation, the East Pakistan Central Peace Committee (Shanti Committee) was formed on April 11 with Ghulam Azam as one of the founding members. The Peace Committee served as an effective front for the Pakistani army, informing on civil administration as well as the general public. They were also in charge of confiscating and redistributing shops and lands from Hindu and pro-liberation-minded Bengali people, mainly relatives and friends of Mukti Bahini fighters who fled because of the war atrocities. It is also alleged that Ghulam Azam played a key role in designing the blueprint for the massacre of intellectuals during a meeting with Rao Forman Ali in September 1971. This made him a particularly controversial figure. Additionally, they allegedly organized paramilitary forces such as Razakar, Al-Badr, and Al-Shams, which had direct involvement in atrocities and war crimes, including the targeted killing of intellectuals and pro-liberation people. When the Mukti Bahini reached the outskirts of Dhaka, Ghulam Azam and his associate, Maulana Abdur Rahim, fled to West Pakistan under the pretense of attending a central meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami. Even from there, their anti-liberation activities continued, such as the organization of ‘East Pakistan Recovery Week.’ Ghulam Azam and Maulana Abdur Rahim were eventually sent to Saudi Arabia, where they mobilized funds under the banner of defending Islam in Bangladesh and portraying the Hindu minority as perpetrators of violence against Muslims.

JI’s role as the chief organizer of the intellectual killings has been identified as more horrific than that of any other group. The motivation behind this brutal activity was more ideological, as their rage was not only due to these intellectuals’ role in spreading the spirit of the Liberation War among the masses, but also because these progressive and left-leaning intellectuals were the main obstacles to JI’s vision to impart its Islamist ideology in society. As the evidence of JI’s involvement in atrocities against civilians and intellectuals surfaced, resentment grew against JI’s wartime leadership.

The 1972 Constitution of independent Bangladesh upheld secularism as one of the main principles, effectively banning religion-based parties. Consequently, the JI and other Islamist parties were banned. As many war criminals had affiliations with JI, many of its senior leaders fled or went underground. Ghulam Azam’s citizenship was revoked. It might be noted that a large segment of war criminals came from elite Muslim families and were politically affiliated with the Muslim League, who enjoyed state-sponsored privileges and positions during the Pakistan period. Despite the ideological and class differences between these two camps (JI and Muslim League), they were united in their efforts to protect Pakistan. Far from trial and punishment for their war crimes, post-1971 AL leadership somehow protected both groups—partly due to class proximity and partly because many Awami leaders had political legacies of the Muslim League. After the general amnesty declared in 1973, members of the Malek cabinet (an interim government in East Paksitan during 1971) were released, along with key JI leaders like Abbas Ali Khan and collaborator Shah Azizur Rahman. Maulana Abdur Rahim returned from Saudi Arabia soon after the general amnesty, but Ghulam Azam stayed back. Although the government was appeasing the collaborators (commonly referred to as Razakars), public hatred towards them was so intense that it was difficult to have public appearances. Still, they started secretly organizing JI across the country.

In August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, then Prime Minister and leader of the Awami League, was assassinated in a military coup. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was followed by a number of military coups, and finally, Major General Ziaur Rahman came into power in 1977. The new military government, as part of their legitimacy-seeking process from the Middle East, more specifically from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, allowed Jamaat-e-Islami to resume their political activities. Zia further enabled the rehabilitation of the Razakars, as he not only appointed Shah Azizur Rahman, a known collaborator, as a minister, but also gave ministerial positions to other controversial war criminals and Islamist leaders. The Collaborators Act was repealed, and war criminals waiting for their trials were released. Ghulam Azam was allowed to return and reassume leadership of the party. Sensing a favorable environment, Ghulam Azam applied for citizenship. Although his application was rejected in 1978, Ghulam Azam arrived at Dhaka with a three-month visa that same year, making the excuse of visiting his ailing mother. Henceforth, JI started to regain its full force as a political party around him.

Still, for both JI and Ghulam Azam, gaining a firm footing was not easy. In 1981, while attempting to join a funeral prayer at the Baitul Mukarram national mosque, a worshipper threw a shoe at him. Since then, he avoided public appearances. While public sentiment had prevented them from gaining widespread public support, it did not stop them from building significant financial, social, and political influence over the years. Between 1978 and 1990, Islami Chhatra Shibir (hereafter Shibir)—the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami—established a strong presence in many educational institutions, particularly at Rajshahi University, Chittagong University, and several medical colleges. Meanwhile, the nature of their organizational activities demonstrated that Jamaat-e-Islami adheres to a cadre-based model of Islamsit politics. Alongside expanding their membership, they gained a reputation as ‘rog kata shibir’ (ligament-cutting-Shibir) for their violent approaches against their opponents. Following a bloody clash at Jahangirnagar University, the activities of Islami Chhatra Shibir were banned in 1989. Despite repeated attempts, the organization failed to regain entry into Dhaka University and Jahangirnagar University in the face of strong resistance from other student groups and general students.

During the 1980s, JI envisioned itself as a precursor movement preparing itself for an Islamic revolution. However, in the following decade, the organization’s strategic orientation appeared to shift towards consolidating and expanding influence across different spheres of social and political life. One by one, Jamaat established strongholds in several areas, took control of some educational institutions, and began building banks and other establishments to strengthen their social institutional foundation. This transformation of goals reflected broader geopolitical undercurrents, as until the 1980s, JI’s ideological and organizational orientation remained closely aligned with US-Saudi political interests, particularly within the context of the global anti-Soviet campaign.

In 1986, both the Awami League and Jamaat-e-Islami participated in the national election under the military ruler Ershad, thereby not only legitimizing the military ruler but also establishing JI as a political party. During the anti-Ershad movement, one of the key demands of the democratic forces was to deny the political legitimacy to Jamaat. After the fall of the Ershad regime in 1990, a parliamentary election was held in 1991. When the Awami League sought JI’s support, JI chose to support its natural ally, the BNP, the party founded by Ziaur Rahman. Despite such deals at the top level of major parties, deep-rooted resistance among the public persisted. Although a court verdict later restored Ghulam Azam’s citizenship, the anti-war crimes movement led by Jahanara Imam, who had lost her son in the independence war, also escalated mass protests against Ghulam Azam, and JI in the early 1990s. Azam’s Bangladeshi citizenship was contested in the Supreme Court since he held only a Pakistani passport. Later, the court ruled that he should be granted Bangladeshi citizenship and continue political activities. However, JI quickly recovered by joining alliances with the Awami League on the issue of the caretaker government system. After jointly participating in the 1996 election, the Awami League offered them a place in the government, but Jamaat chose to keep a calculated distance.

In May 2008, while the army-backed caretaker government was in power, Jamaat chief and former minister Motiur Rahman Nizami was arrested, and other senior JI leaders including members of the BNP-Jamaat coalition government (2001-2006), were also imprisoned. In the 2008 parliamentary election, JI won 2 of 300 seats, weakening its position as the BNP’s key coalition partner. In January 2009, a petition filed by several Islamic organizations that challenged JI’s legality. The High Court cancelled the party’s registration in August 2013, ruling that its charter placed divine authority above democratic principles, making it ineligible to contest elections. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, rejecting Jamaat’s appeal.

Meanwhile, the International War Crimes Tribunal sentenced several Jamaat leaders for their role in the 1971 war. In 2013, the Shahbagh Movement, a mass uprising demanding the trial of war criminals, reflected the pro-Liberation aspirations, especially of the youth. Their desire for justice and historical accountability quickly spread all over the country. Like some other JI leaders, JI chief Motiur Rahman Nizami was charged with war crimes in 2009 and executed in May 2016. The death sentence of Delwar Hossain Sayidee, a Jamaat leader and popular Islamic speaker, sparked widespread violence, including attacks on the Hindu minority, resulting in dozens of deaths, the destruction of temples, burning of homes and businesses across multiple districts. By March 2013, law enforcement crackdowns on Jamaat protests had left nearly 90 people dead.

Despite its declining influence, Jamaat continued to be active in mobilizing dissent, including its support for the 2024 Quota Reform movement. In response, the government imposed a full ban on the party in August 2024, though the decision was reversed later that month. In August 2024, the Sheikh Hasina government fell following a mass student-led uprising, and Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus was appointed as the Chief Advisor of the interim government. Soon after the uprising, many reports suggested that some influential student leaders at the forefront of the movement were active members of the Shibir. Alongside the widespread debates, the very authenticity of the uprising came under question too.

On the one side, the ousted Awami League sought to portray the movement as a conspiracy orchestrated through collusion between JI and foreign powers. Interestingly, the BNP, long-standing ally of Jamaat and itself sidelined from power for many years, took an unexpectedly firm stance against Jamaat, publicly reiterating its commitment to the values of the Liberation War. This left Jamaat in a somewhat difficult position.

To everyone’s surprise, Shibir-nominated full panels won in the student union elections at Dhaka University, long regarded as the most influential institution in Bangladesh politics. They repeated this feat at other public universities, raising serious questions as to whether JI now had the capacity to secure a majority in the national parliamentary election on its own. Finally, on June 1, 2025, Jamaat-e-Islami regained its legal registration following an order by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

For years, many had believed that JI—or any Islamist party—could never become a dominant force in Bangladesh politics. But for the first time in its long history, JI has emerged in mainstream politics with full force and, so far, has seen success. Now it will be interesting to watch how they themselves appear in the bigger canvas of national election. Next part of the article deals with JI’s struggle with ideological ambiguity and strategic dilemmas.