The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (APBI).

After the July uprising, Jamaat-e-Islami (hereafter JI or Jamaat) has become the center of heated debate in Bangladesh’s political landscape- perhaps more than ever before. JI, the largest Islamist political party in Bangladesh, was virtually banned during the Awami League (AL)’s 17-year rule (2008-2024). As such, many assume that Jamaat lost its political influence and public support. Secondly, in its long tenure, the AL established much of its political legitimacy around the ‘spirit of the Liberation War’, promoting this narrative through public institutions, education systems, media, and social organizations. This strong narrative was so widely promoted that many observers thought that Jamaat-e-Islami, accused of genocide and intellectual killings during the Liberation War, had lost any viable political future. Later, the conviction and death sentences of several senior JI leaders by the International Crimes Tribunal further reinforced the perception that the party was in crisis, both in leadership and identity. Thirdly, JI’s performance in the parliamentary election has historically been modest. It won 18 seats each in 1991 and 2001 (in alliance with the BNP), and only 3 seats in 1996 and 2 in 2008. These performances led many to believe that the party could never win more than 20-30 seats on its own.

All these assumptions were shattered when Jamaat-backed student wings won nearly full panels in the student union elections in public universities, including Dhaka University. It is worth remembering that student politics at the Dhaka University often signals national political trends. Many major events that have shaped the country's history, from the Language Movement in 1952 to the latest Quota Reform Movement in 2024, began on this campus. Historically, the ruling party’s student wing had dominated campus politics, though the DU student politics has acted as the nation’s conscience during the difficult times. From barring military dictator Ershad’s entry in the 1980s, to resisting Ji’s student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir (student wing of JI, hereafter Shibir) in 1991, are examples of such historical role. During the long Awami rule, its student front, the Chhatra League, had almost silenced all other political currents on campuses. Yet the anti-Quota Movement of July 2024, which eventually turned out to be a nationwide anti-government uprising, also began at Dhaka University. In such a complex scenario, JI’s recent re-emergence and growing visibility in the political arena have raised many questions and debates. Analysts are asking what its new strategies might mean for Bangladesh’s politics, while JI itself seems somewhat confused, frequently shifting its positions.

Several factors may explain the success of Islami Chhatra Shibir in campus politics. Firstly, Shibir has been able to create an image of moral politics. For the last three decades, the student wings of two major parties - Chhatra League (of the Awami League) and Chhatra Dal (of the BNP) – have alternatively maintained control over the educational institutions. Their involvement in extortion, display of weapons, suppression of other political organizations, illegal occupation of dormitories, and harassment of general students has caused widespread disillusionment among the general students toward both organizations. On the contrary, Shibir (of the Jamaat) inculcated an image of being relatively clean, disciplined, and morally upright -representing itself as distinct from the violent, partisan politics practiced by the other two. Consequently, a large section of students began to view Shibir as a fresh alternative, even if only on an experimental basis. Secondly, activities of Shibir are meticulous with long-term impacts- such as assisting students with tutoring in coaching centres (which helped recruiting new members), assisting the students in need with financial support, installing water filters in dormitories, and providing other practical supports -have directly benefited many. This is how the organization built a reputation as a ‘student-friendly’ one. A similar dynamic is also apparent in its parent organization, Jamaat-e Islami. Among general voters, beyond the party loyalists, there is a sense of frustration and disillusionment toward both AL and BNP, particularly due to widespread corruption. In this context, JI has managed to project itself as a party of religious moral integrity, while some view it as a potential alternative deserving a chance. Over the past four decades, JI has also established a wide network of social service initiatives- such as educational coaching centers, healthcare centers, and service, banking, and finance sectors -that have produced two main outcomes: creating a welfare-oriented image of the party, and generating employment opportunities for many, particularly attracting the youth amid widespread unemployment. It might be worth noting that during the coalition government with the BNP (2001-2006), Jamaat’s minister Ali Ahsan Mujahid headed the ministry of Social Welfare, which strengthened JI's welfare network too. Thirdly, the ‘rog-kata’(ligament-cutting) image of Shibir in the 80s and 90s seems to be distant and unfamiliar to the present-day youth. Instead, having witnessed the dominance and violence of Chhatra League in the past seventeen years, many students now feel a degree of sympathy toward Shibir, who appears to be a victim rather than an aggressor. Finally, in Sheikh Hasina’s regime, the ‘Liberation War’ narrative has been so excessively used as a political tool to legitimize government actions that the emotional appeal of the Liberation War has somewhat faded for the younger generation. Given this backdrop, JI’s potential success in national politics cannot be ruled out.

Over the past two decades, Bangladesh has experienced a significant rise in Islamism across society as well as public institutions. From the declaration of Islam as the state religion to the construction of hundreds of model mosques, making Islamic Studies compulsory at schools, to increasing dominance of Islamic discourse on social media, all reflect the hype of Islamism in every sphere of life. Simultaneously, many Islamic political parties (except JI) have become more pro-active and visible. The spirit of secular Bengali nationalism that flourished during the 60s was largely rooted in language and culture – the opposite of Pakistan’s Muslim nationalism. Secularism and nationalism that were adopted as the main principles of the Constitution now had encounters with neo-Islamism.

Military ruler Ziaur Rahman founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which championed the notion of ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ and has traditionally been more inclined to Islamic parties, explaining its alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami. The Awami League (AL), the flag bearer of the Liberation spirit and ‘secularism’, has been the main opponent of JI. During its 2008-2024 rule, AL suppressed JI from politics. The War Crimes Trials of several Jamaat leaders for their involvement in the 1971 atrocities further deepened social polarization. Paradoxically, it was under the Awami League’s long tenure, Islamism has expanded in scale more than ever. Nevertheless, the AL covertly or overtly allowed this to happen. On the one hand, the AL made an effort to address its ‘anti-Islamic” image by letting the Islamic groups like Hefazat-e-Islami grow, while using the threat of extremism to justify AL leader Sheikh Hasina’s dictatorship. It was a common saying, “without Awami League, Bangladesh would fall to anti-Liberation Islamist radicals. So, there is an alternative to Sheikh Hasina”. While Islamic parties have performed poorly in national politics, public sentiment has become more religious, and their political influence has grown during Sheikh Hasina’s rule.

Religion, in particular Islam, is of profound social and emotional value in Bangladesh. Even if many do not strictly follow Islamic codes, faith still contributes to shaping public sentiment to a large extent. Today, Bangladesh’s society stands sharply divided than ever before: on one side, the secular-liberal-nationalist camp representing a small but powerful group of cultural elites and their adherents; on the other, the Islamist current, diverse in itself, representing large segments of the lower and lower middle classes , migrant workers, and some segment of traditional Muslim elites. However, public sentiment is also divided on religion-based politics, while many argue that there should be no objection to a political organization that promotes a religious ideology, and let the people decide who they would choose.Another section strongly opposes Islamist politics, particularly JI, arguing that JI never expressed remorse for opposing the Liberation War and their war crimes. A December 2024 issue of Chhatra Sangbad, run by Shibir, sparked controversy by describing the Liberation War as a result of the failure and shortsightedness of Muslims, and claiming that “Many Muslims of that time joined the Liberation War without understanding the situation. It was their failure and lack of foresight.” It also states that freedom fighters harmed Islam, showing hostility toward it”. The publication argued that Jamaat was banned for practicing Islamic politics rather than opposing the Liberation War. Such a stance highlights the party’s ongoing struggle with historical legitimacy.

The party’s name itself -linked to opposition during the country’s birth -remains contentious. It is also argued that sensible JI leaders should dissolve the party under its current name, a step some former leaders like Barrister Abdur Razzak recognized before their deaths. In Jamaat’s own website, its constitution begins by acknowledging the Liberation War. The freedom fighters, who were once addressed as ‘traitors’ by JI, are now regarded as ‘martyrs’ and the nation’s ‘greatest sons. Islami Chhatra Shibir has recently demonstrated remarkable political pragmatism. Its success in students' unions at public universities relied on a manifesto emphasizing academic improvement and student welfare, a departure from its constitution, which advocates Islamic social and political order. Candidate selection also reflected a form of ‘liberalization’: endorsing non-Muslim candidates and females without ‘hijab’ (head cover) and interacting freely with female students. While all these moves suggest a temporary distancing from strict Islamic goals, these also raise a number of questions: has JI changed its ideology? Or are these simply a strategic camouflage to attain power? In fact, pragmatism can be a political strength, but politics also needs consistency, where JI has shown its strength so far. As such, JI now faces the challenge of reconciling political expediency with its religious principles.

Despite JI’s apparent prospects, it might face more challenges. A large section of the electorates still serves as the support base for the AL. The direction in which these AL-leaning voters shift (as AL may not be allowed to take part in the election) will largely determine the poll results. It should also be considered that despite its flaws and misdeeds, the AL remains a highly strategic and resilient political force with a proven capacity to recover from political setbacks. In this scenario, some analysts argue that neither JI nor BNP is likely to secure an outright majority. Whichever party forms the government has to struggle to maintain stability-potentially paving the way for the AL’s eventual return to power.

However, JI’s primary and strong challenge may not come from the AL or BNP, nor even fron the left wings. Rather, it should be within the expanding sphere of Islamist politics itself. Many Islamist groups are now active, many of which never subscribe to JI’s ideological interpretation of Islam. After the fall of Sheikh Hasina, there was a prospect of renewed unity among the Islamist factions, but this has given way to fresh tension and division, particularly between Hefazat-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami. Hefazat, with its vast network of Qaumi madrasa (puritan Islamic educational institutions), rejects JI’s version of Islam. Recently, Hefazat Ameer(chief), Mahibullah Bbaunagari, even declared Jamaat as the greatest enemy of the Qaumi madrasa. In addition, the rising Salafist traditions have initiated further theological and political divide, as Salafists too view JI’s approach with skepticism. Although JI has been jointly participating with Islamist parties like Islami Andolon, Khilafat Majlish, the prospect of a durable and effective alliance among the Islamist factions is still slim. Therefore, a key question for the future remains how, before and after the election, successfully Jamaat can unify these numerous Islamist streams that are divided on fierce ideological differences?

Like other faiths, Islam has multiple schools of thought, and Islamic political parties in Bangladesh already differ widely in ideology. As a party claiming divine ideology, any deviation invites scrutiny. Yet its crisis does not imply that the religious culture they endorse will be disappearing. The moral crisis that capitalism creates within the middle class, resulting from the social fracture it brings, is precisely what reformist middle-class parties like JI represent. Most of these moral anxieties center around women’s empowerment. Beyond that, they seek a comfortable reconciliation between religion and capitalist finance, and a conservative -though unrealistic – solution to the instability that capitalism inevitably produces. JI’s ideology and strategy may become increasingly useful to attain state power, but predictably unresolved conflicts over the rights of workers, women, and other minority groups, and more specifically for a workable democracy, will intensify in future.