The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (APBI).

The world is changing faster than ever, so fast that the main actors and agents in the political field are struggling as they have little understanding of how to keep pace. Conventional strategies of exerting power, such as occupying a territory or initiating armed warfare, have become obsolete. Even the most powerful nations, such as the USA or China, no longer need to assert their domination by deploying armed troops on the ground. Claims like 'The USA will take over a country' or 'Sovereignty will be snatched' are no longer considered a threat. In the contemporary world, the more one controls a power wielded over artificial intelligence and information, the greater the political influence that is exercised. Nevertheless, in the future, interventions will increasingly rely on remote control, dominance over the cyber world, and influence over trade hubs, ports, and communications. Cyber warfare and the control of information will supplant traditional military operations. This shift in the nature of power also helps explain how global political structures themselves have evolved over time.

After World War II, the world order polarized into two distinct blocs—the capitalist one led by the USA, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan, and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and a few countries in Asia and Latin America. The period till the 1990s was sustained through the tension between these two blocs, as nearly every aspect of economic policies, diplomatic relations, and foreign affairs, as well as international strategy, was constrained by the ideological divide. For less powerful countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, it was almost impossible not to belong to one pole, not to deviate from the norms of their expectations. However, the global landscape dramatically transformed once this bipolar structure collapsed.

The collapse of the socialist bloc shattered this globalized world order. The fiasco of the Soviet system, along with Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘Glasnost’ (open window)’ paved the way for the capitalist bloc to consolidate its power monopolistically. Apparently, the world order transformed into a capitalist one. Especially with the adoption of neoliberal policies, capitalistic aspiration began to dominate as the major aspiration for most of the country, and the West emerged as the world’s singular hegemon. Nevertheless, this absolute dominance in a unipolar world came along with its own challenges. Military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the perceived aggression of NATO, and the failure to stabilize regions militarily or politically posed questions to the power of the ‘West’ and ‘neoliberalism.’. By 2001, initiatives to build alternative centers of power became visible. It is within this context of rising discontent and shifting alliances that new regional and global partnerships began to gain strength.

Two major alliances are noteworthy. The regional security alliance Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), created by China, Russia, and some Central Asian countries, is often described as ‘Asia’s NATO. The BRICS—an economic cooperation bloc formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—is perhaps one of the strongest alliances that aimed to reduce dependence on giant ‘Western’ financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank, offering alternative development banks and exploring independent currencies. The crisis of the unipolar system further deepened with the global recession and financial crisis in 2008. By the 2010s, it became evident that the world is no longer unipolar; instead, there exist multiple centers with different capacities that include China, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, and some Western European countries like Germany. This multipolarity faced a serious challenge with China’s perpetual rise as a global economic superpower that exceeded all other poles. Once again, the global order has been broadly moving towards a bipolar structure with the United States on one end and China on the other, although it is still uncertain if it will take the previous bipolar model or not. However, this cyclical sequence of polarity suggests the rapidly changing global order under new dynamics, where China’s ascension appears as the most decisive factor in shaping the contemporary geopolitical landscape.

Although China’s escalation appears to be strategically visible over last two decades, the groundwork has been steadily ongoing for a long time. In conjunction with huge investment in infrastructure, and careful strategy of foreign affairs, China has emerged not only as a major stakeholder in the global economy, but a lead actor for the geopolitical transformation. It adopted an approach of joining ancient history and a long-term vision of the future. The widely discussed mega project ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is one such example that has drawn inspiration from the thousand-year-old history of connectivity through the Silk Road and the apt execution of ambition into reality. Through the mammoth infrastructure of roads, railways, and ports, this project has connected many countries, regions, and cultures, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Maldives, Laos, and Hungary. Moreover, China is reducing its over-reliance on the Malacca Strait by developing alternative trade routes via Pakistan's Gwadar port and land corridors through Myanmar. Another example of China’s attempt to reduce transit time from 30-40 days by the sea route to the 12-15-day freight route is the China-Iran Link road. As part of the BRI, this 9000-kilometer-long rail link traverses Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and finally Iran. It offers a strategic land alternative to bypass US naval influence while ensuring the uninterrupted flow of goods and energy supplies. Such strategies inevitably prompted reactions from other global powers, particularly the United States.

With a careful calculation, China established a naval base in the African nation of Djibouti while it is focused on expanding rail connections in Europe, securing its strategic and commercial supply chain. For the world, China has made global life more affordable and convenient by supplying cheap goods while avoiding directly threatening the security of any other nation or any display of militaristic aggression. On the other hand, despite having a quite well-equipped and efficient military, China avoided direct conflict or occupying another country. Instead, it has prioritized the global circulation and trade of its products over confrontation. This stands in contrast to how the United States has responded to China’s expanding influence.

The United States, the leader of the global capitalist order, is on the way to accommodating a changing global system, compelled to reorient its economy and geopolitics to maintain influence in a world increasingly influenced by China’s strategic ascendancy.

In response to China’s strategic predominance, the United States is forced to reorient its economy and geopolitics. U.S. President Donald Trump’s initiative to bring production, investment, and industry back home, which apparently seems to be extreme, is a basically rational response to claim their stake in this changing world order. More importantly, the US is gradually reconsidering the need for a permanent physical presence in many countries. Traditional strategies of exerting global dominance appear to be costly and inefficient. and politically less acceptable both outside and inside the US. Therefore, the US is now more into remote control with the advantage of cutting-edge information dominance. Satellite networks, AI, drones, and vast data resources now allow the US to retain its influence remotely. However, it does not mean that the US has eliminated its interest in accessing other geo-economic assets, such as railways, ports, canals, and trade corridors.

In this new and fast-changing order, Asia, more specifically, South and Southeast Asia, appears as the battleground where Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar have become key pawns in the USA-China strategic tension. Calculative moves over the economic leverages, strategic corridors, and nuanced diplomacies that will shape the regional stability as well as the future form(s) of alliances. This section of the paper takes a close look at South and Southeast Asia’s stake in this shifting geopolitical order.

Geopolitical dynamics in South and Southeast Asia is so complex and multi-layered that requires constant focus. Like a board game, regional actors must constantly adjust their moves. The case of the Philippines might offer a useful insight of how shifting alliances reshape regional security strategy.

The Philippines, particularly its Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, has long been serving as a permanent strategic foothold of the United States in Southeast Asia. Despite the USA’s pervasive influence, the Philippines declined to renew the lease for the Subic naval base in 1991, for which the US eventually had to withdraw. One key factor behind this decision was the high cost of maintenance of the Clark Air Base, especially given its location in an earthquake-prone region.

In the absence of the US, China established dominance over nearly all of the South China Sea. China’s territorial claim under the ‘Nine-Dash Line’ includes the Spartly Islands and Scarborough Reef, are the areas claimed by the Philippines. However, an international tribunal rejected China’s claim to these lands. Despite the rule, China continued its dominance and increased its military presence even more strongly than before, even it has deployed military installations in the artificially-built islands. Tensions intensified as Chinese coast guards regularly confronted Filipino fishermen. Being heavily indebted to China for infrastructure, energy, and transportation projects, the Philippines found itself economically trapped and morally weaker. To some extent, they relate their vulnerability to US withdrawal and, therefore, are eager to rebuild strategic partnerships with Washington again, whose primary concern in this region largely remains countering China in the South China Sea. Still, broader regional dynamics—particularly ASEAN’s stance—further complicated the US ambitions.

ASEAN, the key regional bloc, largely resists American political and military influences, which makes US dominance in Southeast Asia almost impossible. The region’s cautious stance on foreign investment and the fraught memories of the US in Vietnam delimit Washington’s strategic ambitions.

In the shifting era of post-Soviet geopolitics, many other configurations of new alliances continued to appear. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), consisting of the US, Japan, India, and Australia, was formed in 2007 but remained mostly inactive for a decade. One major reason for this inactivity was that both Japan and India had to maintain prudently cautious relations with China. Outwardly, the US has focused its attention on the South China Sea rather than on the Indian Ocean. In 2017, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar created an opportunity for the US to reactivate the QUAD on the ground of promoting humanitarianism and democracy. However, India was hesitant after procuring S-400 missile deals from Russia, and trading oil and gas in rubles instead of US dollars. This eventually led to India’s reliability in implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) of Washington. Meanwhile, China’s steady but strong economic and military influence posed a serious challenge to the US. China continued to retain influence across the region through maintaining economic leverage and security ties.

Recently, China expressed a non-supportive and non-oppositional attitude on the proposed humanitarian corridor through Bangladesh to Rakhine State in Myanmar. Although being Myanmar’s long-term ally, Beijing emphasized that this would be essentially an internal decision for Bangladesh. China’s indifference contrasts with the volatile situation in Myanmar. The insurgency between Myanamr military and armed opposition has disrupted the Kyaukphu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project in Rakhine state. This project is a vital concern of China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean, aiming to reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the SEZ includes a deep-sea port on Maday Island and pipelines that would connect China’s Yunnan province. The ongoing conflict has interrupted port operations, electricity infrastructure, and the China-Myanmar rail corridor. China’s concerns are primarily financial and logistical, not political. As such, such interruptions or Myanmar’s failure to repay the debts or purchase weapons, actually compound these challenges.

Despite these challenges, China continues to find strategic opportunities even amidst the instability. A functional corridor would allow economic development in western Myanmar, stabilize Rakhine, complete the delayed projects, and ensure strategic connectivity. As such, it is evident that China will not allow any external force to dominate Myanmar, India, or Bangladesh’s borderlands. However, India still remains concerned about the possibility that an intensifying conflict might marginalize India’s influence in the regional politics. China’s influence also reached even to India’s northeastern frontier. In Arunachal Pradesh and other border villages, China invested in building modern roads and homes and even provided 5G connectivity. These initiatives strengthen China’s economic and strategic foothold while strengthening cross-border influence, despite Indian security oversight. China has also constructed helipads and logistics in the remote ‘second-fish-tail’ regions along the India-Myanmar-China border.

In today’s world, both the diplomatic and military spheres are evolving at lightning speed. Actual control over others would heavily depend on economic control combined with authority over advanced surveillance technologies, artificial intelligence, and access to vast data that would allow for monitoring others. Failing to adapt or accommodate these advancements means falling behind in geopolitics.