Allies strengthen trilateral bonds in the face of strategic competition

While other strategically-oriented forms of minilateral cooperation, such as the US-Japan-Australia-India “Quad” and the Australia-UK-US “AUKUS”, have tended to capture the lion’s share of the attention among security analysts, there is a third strategic minilateral formation in the Indo-Pacific that demands greater scrutiny.[1] Trilateral cooperation between the Tokyo, Washington and Canberra was initiated as far back as 2001 with the inauguration of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD); a leaders-level forum to discuss common security assessments. “TSD” is widely used, including here, as an umbrella term for all trilateral cooperative activities, technically under its institutional auspices. The TSD is complemented by Trilateral Defense Ministers Meetings (TDMM) in which the countries coordinate their national defence postures more closely. As trilateral cooperation has crystalized, and assumed a more military-oriented disposition, this analysis looks at the current state of play and assesses the progress the trilateral partners have made towards building up their collective deterrence capability.

At the Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting (TDMM), held in Darwin on 17 November 2024, the parties revealed a raft of new initiatives aimed at closer integration of their defence postures in pursuit of collective deterrence.[2] This is the 14th time that the Defense Ministers have met trilaterally, and the second occasion in 2024 alone. The choice of location – Darwin – was also highly symbolic since the military installations and facilities in Australia’s Northern Territory are the “hub” of the Australia-US Force Posture Initiative,[3] whilst also being symbolic of the closure of historical reconciliation with Japan, when the late former Prime Minister Abe gave his speech there in 2018.[4] That Japan could now be considered an “ally” of Australia and the road clear for the training of Japanese military forces in a region heavily bombed by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War, is a highly significant development in itself.[5]

The reinvigoration of the TSD minilateral is first and foremost a response to deepening strategic competition with China and other challenger states.[6] Faced with growing challenges to its security interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, Washington is proactively strengthening its military alliances, forging new strategic partnerships with key states, and exploring small-group minilateral mechanisms for pursuing competitive advantage.[7] Though lacking the power and influence of the US, Canberra and Tokyo, are also actively engaging in such minilaterals as a means to secure their strategic interests.[8]

Before discussing the most important take aways of the most recent TDMM below, it is worth briefly back tracking to re-examine what US-Japan-Australia trilateral security cooperation looks like and what it entails.

US-Japan-Australia trilateralism as the “core” of collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

Despite its (strangely) low profile among regional security debates policymakers have frequently referred to trilateral cooperation as the “core” of collective deterrence strategy, usually employing “TSD” as shorthand to differentiate it from a plethora of other “trilaterals” in the region.[9] Begun in 2001, and formalized in successive stages in the mid-2000s, the TSD and its associated organs have progressively been consolidated and expanded, with a noticeable uptick in activity in recent years. Trilateral cooperation is politically steered by the meeting of government leaders in the TSD itself, (last convened in 2022). But the current locus of trilateral activity has apparently shifted to the TDMM. This development indicates a greater emphasis on concrete defence cooperation rather than broader security “dialogue”. Nevertheless, the TSD nominally remains the “institutional” minilateral format under which this is subordinated.[10] These meetings are supplemented by a Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), the details of which are sketchy, though evidently tasked with implementing the trilateral defense agenda.

Indeed, the amorphous institutional design around trilateral cooperation – TSD-TDMM-SDCF - presents an initial stumbling block for the would-be analyst in making sense of what is actually occurring between the allies. This is further exacerbated by the expansive underlying network of bilateral contacts between the partners, not only through the respective bilateral treaty alliances of Japan and Australia with the US, but also the Australia-Japan bilateral “Special Strategic Partnership”.[11] The breadth and deep of this multi-vectored alignment ensures ‘deep trust’ and the ability to cooperate trilaterally on the most sensitive issues.[12] Effectively, this adds up to extensive cooperation along multiple parallel and intersecting lines of effort that serve to reinforce the trilateral edifice as a whole.

Though initiated before the advent of overt strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific era, the TSD formation has been progressively attuned to new challenges across a number of competitive domains. With a formidable array of power resources to draw upon it can be considered one of the premier examples of “strategic minilateralism”.[13] That is, it is designed with strategic intent to shape the regional balance of power and has the capabilities to achieve such an effect.[14] United by ‘shared values’ – freedom, democracy, and human rights - it represents a ‘steadfast commitment to a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo Pacific region, where the rule of law is upheld, sovereignty is respected, and nations can make decisions free from coercion or threats of force.’[15] The TSD (or TDMM) serves as a combined platform to denounce threats to regional ‘peace and stability’, such are occurring in the South and East China Seas, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait.[16] The TSD partners have consistently emphasized its willingness to support and engage with other regional organizations, such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

But while the TSD partners recognize strategic messaging is important, they are also cognizant diplomacy must be backed by a credible capability to deter such threats to peace and stability.

Building up credible collective deterrence capacity and next steps

Track 1.5 dialogues have long advocated for translating shared strategic interests into a more coherent trilateral approach and creating the tools to implement this.[17] As the latest TDMM statement indicates, this is now actually happening in more concrete terms, expressed as an ‘unbreakable commitment to strengthening collective deterrence’.[18] To ensure that collective deterrence is credible a number of important initiatives are being undertaken.

First, dedicated “Trilateral Defense Consultations” have been initiated to collectively address regional security issues or contingencies. This will align the political and operational objectives between the armed forces of the US, Japan, and Australia ‘from peacetime to contingency’.[19]

Second, Japan will be increasingly integrated into the Australia-US Force Posture in the Northern Territories, including Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) participation in bilateral military exercises, plus the Australian Defense Forces’ reciprocal admission into various US-Japan joint exercises. Effectively, all these relevant exercises will be trilateralized.[20]

Third, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) will be likewise trilateralized through Australian participation in the US-Japan Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC). This permits the parties to jointly analyze information collected by their respective national assets (for example: unmanned aerial vehicles).[21]

Fourth, the TSD partners will improve operational coordination, planning and information sharing between respective command centers. Japan and Australia will appoint joint Staff Liaison Officers to one another’s Joint Operations Commands, whilst US Forces Japan will be reconstituted as a Joint Force Headquarters.[22]

As the necessary backdrop to pre-forming a coalition response capability, the TSD partners are committed to work more closely on collaborating in advanced capabilities to ensure both competitive advantage and a war-fighting edge. This concerns Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) – AI, autonomous systems, hypersonics etc. – that serve to enable their military forces in time of conflict.[23] The trilateral Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement will oversee such endeavors. First steps have already been taken in respect to creating a networked air and missile defense architecture between the three parties.[24] Key to trilateral cooperation on advanced capabilities is Japan’s interface with AUKUS Pillar II.[25] The TSD also plans to work to promote trilateral defense-industrial cooperation a within the partnership for Indo-pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), a multilateral forum designed to strengthen national industrial bases and supply-chains.[26]

Thus, with a determination towards integrating military capabilities and command and control (C2), backed with collaboration of EDT, the TSD powers will be better equipped to deter, and if necessary, respond to, a regional crisis. None of the initiatives above will be quick or easy, but they are necessary steps required to “operationalize” the TSD as a credible deterrent and combined response option. While the intent is sound, domestic issues, such as budgetary or institutional constraints, an unexpected crisis, or leadership fluctuations, may affect the pace and success of these ambitious plans.

The future of trilateralism under Trump

Speculation abounds over what the incoming second term of President Trump will mean for close US allies like Australia and Japan.[27] The President is nothing if not unpredictable, but so far analyses of the likely development of allied relations for Canberra and Tokyo are cautiously positive. In particular, both countries have greatly ramped up their defence spending – a persistent “bug bear” for Trump – and show greater willingness to bear allied defence burdens. The TSD is a reflection of this, whilst also serving to tether Washington to the strategic concerns of Canberra and Tokyo. For this reason, it would be valuable to reignite discussions under the TSD at the leader’s level, (as opposed to TDMM), to affirm common political and strategic objectives between the three partners. Yet, even if Trump has no appetite to convene the heads-of-government level TSD meeting itself, trilateral cooperation across a variety of vectors outside of this highest-level forum is so embedded that it has acquired a momentum of its own. Lastly, given the fairly pedestrian and bureaucratic profile of trilateral cooperation, the existence of the TSD-minilateral itself is unlikely to draw the ire of the incoming President, who no doubt, will have his own particular “fish to fry”.

(2025/01/21)

Notes

  1. 1 Collins Chong Yew Keat and Rahul Mishra, ‘The Quad is here to stay’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (12 Aug 2024); Thomas Wilkins, ‘Australia and AUKUS into the 2030s’ International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, (14 Sept 2023).
  2. 2 Australian Government: Defence, ‘Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting November 2024 Joint Statement’, Australian Government, Canberra (17 Nov 2024).
  3. 3 Australian Government: Defence, ‘United States Force Posture Initiatives’ Australian Government (no date).
  4. 4 Ryosuke Hanada, ‘Abe’s historic visit to Darwin a moment of truth for the rules-based order’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (16 Nov 2018).
  5. 5 Thomas Wilkins, ‘Australia-Japan relations 80 years after the bombing of Darwin: A case study of reconciliation and partnership’, JIIA Policy Brief, Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, (22 Mar 2022).
  6. 6 Thomas G. Mahnken and. Aidan Greer, ‘The 2023 U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on Great Power Competition’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC (May 2023).
  7. 7 Thomas Wilkins, ‘A Hub-and-Spokes “plus” model of US alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a new “networked” design’, Asian Affairs. (2022), pp. 1-24.
  8. 8 David Envall, Miwa Hirono, Kyoko Hatakeyama & Thomas Wilkins, ‘Indo-Pacific Minilateralism and Strategic Competition I: Australia/Japan and Chinese Approaches Compared’, EWC Occasional Paper #9. East West Center, Washington DC, (June 2024).
  9. 9 Thomas Wilkins, ‘US-Japan-Australia Trilateralism as the Inner “Core” of Regional Order-Building and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific’, Asia Policy Vol. 19, no. 2 (April 2024), pp. 159-185; ‘The “Core”: Operationalising the Australia-Japan-United States Defence Partnership’, Track 1.5 Dialogue. The United States Study Centre, Sydney, (10 Dec 2024).
  10. 10 MOFA, ‘Sixth Japan-United States-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’, MOFA, Tokyo, (26 Jul 2016).
  11. 11 Thomas Wilkins, ‘From “Strategic Partnership” to “Strategic ‘Alliance”? ‘Australia-Japan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific.’ Asia Policy No. 20, (July 2015), pp 81-111.
  12. 12 Australian Government: Defence, ‘Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting November 2024 Joint Statement’, Australian Government, Canberra, (17 Nov 2024).
  13. 13 Kei Koga, ‘A new strategic minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific’, Asia Policy Vol. 17, no. 4 (2022), pp. 27-34.
  14. 14 Thomas Wilkins, ‘What is the future of strategic minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific? The Quad, AUKUS and the US-Japan-Australia trilateral’ Australian Outlook, Australian Institute for International Affairs, (20 Dec 2024).
  15. 15 Australian Government: Defence, ‘Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting November 2024 Joint Statement’, Australian Government, Canberra, (17 Nov 2024).
  16. 16 Ibid.
  17. 17 Thomas G. Mahnken and. Aidan Greer, ‘The 2023 U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on Great Power Competition’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC (May 2023); ‘The “Core”: Operationalising the Australia-Japan-United States Defence Partnership’, Track 1.5 Dialogue. The United States Study Centre, Sydney, (10 Dec 2024).
  18. 18 Australian Government: Defence, ‘Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting November 2024 Joint Statement’, Australian Government, Canberra (17 Nov 2024).
  19. 19 Ibid.
  20. 20 The Associated Press, ‘Australia, Japan, U.S. to hold trilateral military training’, Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, (23 Nov 2024).
  21. 21 US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘U.S., Japan Hold Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell Opening Ceremony’, US Forces Japan, (2 Dec 2022).
  22. 22 US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘U.S. Intends to Reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan as Joint Forces Headquarters’, U.S. Department of Defense, (28 July 2024).
  23. 23 Aiden Warren, Adam Bartley, and Charles T. Hunt, ‘Bringing Strategic AI Collaboration to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’, The Diplomat, (19 Sept 2024).
  24. 24 Malcolm Davis, ‘Australia’s next step in integrated air and missile defence’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (16 Apr 2024).
  25. 25 Diego Castillo, ‘Bridging the gap: How innovation will see Japan become the first nation integrated into AUKUS Pillar II’, Policy Brief, UWA Defence & Security, (Nov 2024).
  26. 26 Connor Fiddler, ‘Pay the PIPIR: US and Indo-Pacific Defense Industrial Base Cooperation’, Hub-and-Spokes, (16 Oct 2024), unexpected crisis, or leadership fluctuations, may affect the pace and success of these ambitious plans.
  27. 27 Tomohiko Satake, ‘Trump’s Victory and Implications for Australia’s Foreign and Domestic Policy’, International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, (16 Dec 2024).