What Membership for Finland and Sweden Would Mean for NATO’s Evolution

Because it is landlocked geographically, Russia has historically sought to expand externally in search of ice-free ports and to ensure access to the open sea—thought to be indispensable for its survival and growth[3]. For Russia, the Scandinavian Peninsula is a natural barrier to the open ocean, and the continued neutrality of Finland and Sweden was regarded as a geopolitical requirement for its survival (see Figure 1). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a downsized Russia lost its security buffer zone, while NATO began an eastward expansion under its Open Door Policy and extended the sphere of its influence. With the military invasion of Ukraine, Putin sought to stop NATO’s eastward expansion and regain the buffer zone Russia lost following the Cold War. But the move appears to have backfired, given the Finnish and Swedish decision to end its neutrality policy.

If Sweden and Finland were to join NATO, how would this impact on the security and military environment in Europe? For starters, the length of a direct land border between NATO and Russia would more than double from approximately 1,200 km at present to around 2,500 km.
Russia would have no choice but to beef up its military resources—at a significant economic cost—and enhance its surveillance posture for territorial security. Second, since almost all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea would become NATO members, Russia’s access to its enclave of Kaliningrad would become more difficult, and the activities of the Russian navy would be severely restricted (see Figure 2). In the skies over the Baltic states, NATO has been undertaking aerial security activities since March 2004. Its members regularly exchange fighters and other aircraft to guard against unidentified planes, including those from Russia. Should the Finnish and Swedish air force begin participating in these operations, NATO’s aerial security will become more diversified and have a significant impact on the operations of the Russian air force in the Baltic Sea.

NATO would be obliged to expand the scope of collective self-defense (as stipulated in Article 5) and deal with new threats in the Arctic region (including the High North) and the Baltic Sea. The Arctic Council has hitherto secured the environmental protection and sustainable development of the region, but with the rapid melting of the Arctic sea ice due to global warming, the Arctic is becoming the focus of international cooperation and conflict over natural resources and sea route development. Russia is increasing its military presence and activities in the region[8], and NATO sees the Arctic as an emerging warfighting domain along with outer space and cyberspace. It will thus no doubt further accelerate its involvement in the region through fuller cooperation with Finland and Sweden.

In the Baltic Sea, meanwhile, concerning is growing over the strategic stability of Finland’s Åland Islands and Sweden’s Gotland Island[9], which have been remained demilitarized zones for historical reasons[10]. Moscow will likely take increasing military interest in these islands, though, as a strategic way of dividing NATO. Should the islands be taken by Russia and rearmed with long-range weapons, such as Iskander-M intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO countries will be confronted with a direct military threat a few dozen kilometers away—just like the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

In addition, if Russia or ally Belarus moves to occupy a critical strategic corridor of NATO defense called the Suwałki Gap that runs for 104 km along the Polish-Lithuania border, a long forward line of defense linking Belarus, the Suwałki Gap, Kaliningrad, and the occupied islands of the Baltic Sea would emerge, putting the three Baltic NATO members in danger of being isolated (see Figure 3).

There are also growing concerns about the safety of undersea cables[11], which currently carry 99% of all digital data worldwide. Åland and Gotland are key cable relay stations in the Baltic Sea. Should Russia invade the islands and destroy the cable facilities, this could seriously impact on communication among NATO members, especially for the Baltic states. This is tantamount to a nonmilitary attack by Russia (see Figure 4) on the cyberspace of the Baltic states. This would not only physically disrupt operations, supplies, and communication within NATO but also lead to the loss of digital information sharing and command and control functions.

In July 2019, NATO established Joint Force Command - Norfolk (JFC Norfolk) to strengthen its operational posture across the Atlantic and to strengthen cross-Atlantic ties among allies and partners. The mission of JFC Norfolk includes the maintenance of submarine cables deployed at the bottom of the North Atlantic and other oceans[12].
Should the Finnish and Swedish navies come under the command of JFC Norfolk, this will further enhance interoperability in both real and virtual domains. And the evolution of these capabilities should create the foundation for deterring and defending against Russian military aggressions in the Arctic and Baltic Sea.