Ending the Iran War: The Case for a Multilateral Framework to Resolve the Hormuz Crisis

In Iran, the state funeral for former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—killed in late February during a joint US-Israeli military operation—were held from July 4 to 10, 2026. The following day, the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, vowed to avenge his father’s death.[1]

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump, the declared target of Iran’s promised retaliation, intensified military engagements with Iran over safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz following the 250th-anniversary celebrations of US independence.[2] On July 10, he announced on social media that the “Cease Fire is OVER.”[3] Three days later, he declared the resumption of a US naval blockade of the strait and stated that transiting vessels would be charged a 20% cargo fee[4]—only to retract the statement the next day.[5]

These rapid shifts surrounding the Strait of Hormuz appear to have reset bilateral negotiations that had been inching toward an end to hostilities, from the April 7 ceasefire agreement to the June 17 memorandum of understanding, despite intermittent clashes. This article summarizes key developments around the Strait of Hormuz—one of the central obstacles to ending the war—and considers how a multilateral cooperation framework may offer a pathway toward resolution.

Competing “Blockades” of the Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s “closure” of Hormuz has been threatened before—notably during the June 2025 US-Israeli strikes on Iran—but never implemented. The reasons were clear: shutting the strait would halt Iran’s own energy exports, inflicting severe economic damage, and would risk alienating China, the largest importer of Gulf energy.

This time, however, Iran framed the conflict as existential. It imposed a new navigation route through the strait and required vessels to obtain passage authorization; ships that failed to comply faced warning shots and other strict enforcement measures.[6] This allowed Iran to select which vessels could transit and to collect passage fees, creating a de facto closure of the strait. The result has been significant global economic disruption, including surging energy and petroleum product prices and sharply higher maritime insurance premiums.

The Trump administration reportedly underestimated the likelihood of such an outcome in the early stages of the military campaign.[7] Once Iran’s controls took effect, Trump began pressing forcefully for reopening the strait from late March onward,[8] and—after Iran refused—declared on April 12 that the United States would itself impose a blockade on vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports following failed ceasefire talks in Pakistan.[9] Iran responded on April 18 by announcing a “reclosure,” creating a dual blockade.[10]

This dual blockade ended on June 17 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran. Article 5 of the MoU states that Iran would “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa.”[11] Based on this provision, Iran continued its strict management of the strait. Trump’s July 12 declaration of a renewed US blockade (effective July 13) directly rejected Iran’s control.

Since the war began, Iran has sought to establish a superior position in the strait through its “closure,” while the United States has attempted to prevent such dominance. The underlying dispute reflects longstanding legal disagreements: Iran argues that coastal states may impose prior authorization requirements for security reasons under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),[12] while the United States maintains that transit through straits used for international navigation is a customary right and that such requirements are unlawful.[13]

Finding a Path Toward Resolution

The most contentious aspect of Iran’s Hormuz management is its collection of passage fees. The strait’s narrowest point is roughly 21 nautical miles (about 40 km). Under UNCLOS, states may claim territorial seas up to 12 nautical miles,[14] meaning the strait contains no high seas; vessels must transit either through Iranian or Omani territorial waters. A 1974 bilateral agreement established a median line, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) designated a traffic separation scheme (TSS) that directs inbound traffic through Iranian waters and outbound traffic through Omani waters.[15] Although both states claim that Hormuz is not an international strait but a territorial sea, they generally permit innocent passage.[16]

On May 12, amid ongoing hostilities, Iran and Oman held talks on exercising sovereign rights within their respective 12 nautical mile zones.[17] President Trump reacted sharply, warning on May 27 that the United States would “blow up” Oman if it tried to control the strait along with Iran.[18] Despite US objections, Iran continued consultations with Oman under the MoU,[19] and the two states have discussed collecting service fees as an exercise of territorial sovereignty. Iran favors mandatory fees, while Oman prefers voluntary contributions.[20]

Oman’s approach reportedly draws inspiration from the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,[21] a multilateral framework in which user and littoral states share the burden of ensuring navigational safety, environmental protection, and emergency response in a vital international waterway.[22] To advance this idea, Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr held calls with his Saudi and Egyptian counterparts on June 26,[23] and Sultan Haitham bin Tariq made an official visit to France on June 28, discussing strait navigation with President Emmanuel Macron.[24] On June 29, Oman and Iran convened the first meeting of their joint Strait of Hormuz Committee.[25] A cooperative framework acceptable to all relevant stakeholders—built through such diplomatic efforts—may offer a way to resolve the strait issue without being trapped in US-Iran rivalry.[26]

A Multilateral Framework to End the War

On July 10, President Trump formally notified Congress that US military operations against Iran had resumed on July 7, resetting the 60-day window for using force without congressional approval.[27] The administration has intensified strikes to prevent Iran from controlling the strait.[28] Iran, for its part, has launched retaliatory attacks on US military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.[29]

Amid these exchanges, two developments suggest potential avenues for de escalation. First, Qatar and other mediators have proposed a 10-day temporary ceasefire.[30] Second, on July 14, Omani Foreign Minister Badr published an op ed in Le Monde calling for a “new Gulf security policy,” urging regional security cooperation among the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states plus Iran and Iraq.[31] This proposal seeks to link multilateral efforts on the strait to broader, long term regional security. Significant obstacles remain, including intra-regional rivalries and interference by external powers.

Yet history offers precedent. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Conference established a multilateral framework that fostered confidence-building and regional cooperation, contributing to the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government for Palestine (the Oslo Accord) and the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. The conference adopted a two-track system: bilateral negotiations between parties, complemented by five multilateral working groups (arms control, economic development, water resources, the environment, and refugees).

Drawing on this experience, preventing renewed US-Israeli-Iranian conflict will require persistent mediation by states such as Qatar and Pakistan, combined with multilateral forums addressing the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf security, and related issues. If the warring parties can foresee tangible peace dividends from such cooperation, the path toward ending the war will become more durable.

(2026/08/28)