Publication of Policy Papers for the SPF Project “Cooperation Between European and Indo-Pacific Powers in the U.S. Alliance System”
IINA (International Information Network Analysis) hosts a series of policy papers featuring analyses and insights from U.S., Japanese, South Korean, Australian and European experts, which discuss constructive cooperation among U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The series aims to provide readers with valuable perspectives on the future of NATO-IP4 (Indo-Pacific 4) cooperation for regional and global security.
With Japan’s National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program of December 2022, Tokyo’s defense policy has taken a practical step forward to secure the country’s territory and regional peace. Japan no longer enjoys a stable international environment. China’s extensive military buildup over the past two decades has allowed Beijing an advantageous posture vis-à-vis the US forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific, which are operating together with the military forces of three IP4 allies: Japan, South Korea, and Australia. China’s rise has forced Japan to respond to a more threatening Chinese military force posture and a greater potential for the outbreak of violent conflict.
The National Defense Strategy for 2022 states that the JSDF’s “current war fighting capability in terms of ammunition, fuel, and equipment availability is not necessarily sufficient” and that, in order to enhance its warfighting capability, the JSDF will improve its ammunition production capacity and build an explosives depot to match the production volume.
The strategy also states that Japan’s defense industry is positioned as an important partner in national defense with the Ministry of Defense and the JSDF. Japan will ensure quality management of capabilities production by strengthening the defense technological base and facilitating the production, maintenance, and repair of equipment.
Government policies to assist the national defense industry are long-standing concerns of the US and European governments. However, in Japan, policies to promote the national defense industry used to be taboo because pacifism dominated popular attitudes toward defense. Japan’s challenging security environment at present has changed the Japanese people’s awareness, and a majority of the public now support the contents of the three security documents from 2022.
In the October 2024 general election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kōmeitō coalition suffered a defeat in which it lost its majority. However, the defeat was due to dissatisfaction with the LDP’s opaque political funding and high inflation rates, not with its strengthening of Japan’s security and defense force posture. In fact, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which opposes the Japan-US alliance and a strong defense force posture, asked the largest opposition party that gained seats in the election, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), to cooperate in the election on the condition that they repeal the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, which enabled the seamless response to the regional contingency. However, the CDP refused to cooperate with the JCP to maintain its practical defense policy. It suggests Japanese voters still support the ruling coalition’s realistic defense policy.
To expand Japan’s national defense industrial base, the government signed the DICAS agreement at the Japan-US summit in April 2024. DICAS promotes joint development, production, and maintenance of defense equipment. Japanese and US officials have already held two rounds of consultation in June and October 2024.
According to Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, modernization of its defense capabilities includes the introduction of intermediate-range missiles that can reach military bases in countries such as China and North Korea. However, the possibility that Chinese actions engender a Taiwan contingency within 10 years makes it necessary to strengthen coordination of command and control between Japan and the United States. DICAS confirms mutual Japanese-US willingness to strengthen this aspect of defense cooperation.
Preparing for a Taiwan contingency presents Japan and the US with two major challenges: the tyranny of distance and the limitation of US defense industrial production capacity. During the first DICAS meeting in Tokyo in June 2024, then US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel told a reporter that “our national security strategy calls for us to be able to handle one and a half theatres, that’s a major war and a stand-off, and with challenges both in the Middle East, Ukraine, and with ensuring credible deterrence in this region (East Asia), you can already see that we are in two plus [contingencies].” He added that “China has a major capacity we already know that will surpass us on new shipbuilding.” Japan’s support is necessary, he said, to address strategic challenges in Europe and Asia, where defense industries cannot meet swiftly growing demands.[1]
From Japan’s perspective, a Taiwan contingency is a nightmare scenario if the United States decides to produce ammunition and weapons in Europe or the Middle East and not in Japan. In addition to Japan modernizing its production facilities, US allies South Korea and Australia are planning to improve their defense production capacity. This would relieve the demand on the national US defense industry, as Ambassador Emanuel indicated. It would also be good news for US allies in Europe and the Middle East if US allies in the Indo-Pacific would increase their own military production and make fewer demands on US production in contingencies. Similarly, if Europe increases its defense industrial capacity, it would help strengthen Europe’s defense force posture, preparing the continent for contingencies in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
The vast distance between IP4 nations and the US mainland is another concern. Delays in responding to contingencies resulting from the tyranny of distance could critically damage the defense of Taiwan and allied territory. For example, many military experts estimate that if US forces in the Indo-Pacific and allied forces in Japan and South Korea need to act to defend their countries in the event of a contingency in Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula, those countries would need at least a month to move sufficient troops to the Indo-Pacific region and prepare them for deployment. This requires Japan to establish sufficient domestic production of ammunition and weapons to sustain at least the defense of Japanese territory, including US military bases in Japan, for one month.
There is no guarantee that the war in Ukraine will end before a Taiwanese or Korean Peninsula contingency occurs. On the contrary, China’s technical and economic assistance to Russia has allowed Moscow to continue and expand its war in Ukraine, even if China has refrained from direct arms transfers to Russia. In addition, North Korean troops are currently participating in the war in Ukraine. Improving defense production capacities of European NATO members enables Europe to establish a strong defense force posture against Russia. It can also assist the US and its Indo-Pacific allies in being prepared for worst-case scenarios in East Asia because it will diversify and increase supplies of defense capacities.
President Donald Trump has demanded that allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe increase defense spending and their strategic autonomy. US demands for greater allied defense contributions took off during the Biden administration, and allies expect such demands to increase for the foreseeable future irrespective of who is in power in Washington, DC.
To improve the defense production capacity of Indo-Pacific and European allies, enhanced dialogue and cooperation between NATO and its IP4 partners is necessary. By sharing military production capabilities and strategic perspectives, they will be better able to adopt efficient defense policies that facilitate collaboration across theaters in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.
Japan has agreed to the Japan-NATO ITPP in effect from 2023 to 2026. The ITPP includes maritime security, science and technology, capacity-building for interoperability, and resilience and readiness. The participating countries in AUKUS announced in a joint statement that they expect Japan to join Pillar II in 2025 and cooperate to develop advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons. If the Japanese government officially accepts the invitation, it would be an important milestone for Japan to secure territorial defense and contribute to regional peace and stability.
Japan is pursuing defense industrial cooperation with the United States, NATO, and the IP4 partners due to the necessity of responding to a challenging security environment. Such efforts are likely to strengthen the US alliance network and increase its readiness to respond to future defense contingencies.
(2025/04/04)