Biodefense in the Age of “Omni-Use”: Rethinking National Preparedness

In my previous article[1], I introduced the concept of the ‘Era of Omni-Use’, arguing that advances in the life sciences are no longer confined to laboratories or the healthcare sector but are reshaping virtually every aspect of society—from agriculture and environmental protection to industry and national security. Building on that argument, this article examines the institutional foundations required for states to navigate the Era of Omni-Use. It begins with one of the most fundamental elements of that foundation: biodefense.

Rethinking Biodefense

The defining challenge of modern biodefense is no longer defending against known biological threats but preparing for biological events whose origins are initially unknown. This represents a fundamental departure from the Cold War conception of biodefense, which focused primarily on deliberate biological attacks. During that time, biodefense centered on identifying specific threats, preventing their entry, and minimizing their consequences through pathogen surveillance, protective equipment, vaccine and therapeutic development, and strengthened containment.

The defining challenge of modern biodefense is that crisis response often begins before the origin of a biological event can be determined. An unexplained infectious disease may emerge in a major city, rapidly overwhelming healthcare systems. In the early stages, authorities may be unable to determine whether the event is the result of a naturally occurring outbreak, a laboratory accident, or a deliberate biological attack. Such uncertainty is no longer the exception—it has become an inherent feature of biological risk.

The 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the United States illustrate this challenge. Occurring just one week after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the mailing of anthrax-contaminated letters immediately raised fears that the United States was facing a second wave of international terrorism. Twenty-two people were infected and five died. Initial suspicion focused on foreign terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda. However, after years of investigation, the FBI concluded that the attacks had most likely been carried out by a lone scientist, Bruce Ivins, a microbiologist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). During the initial stages of the crisis, however, uncertainty over the origin of the attack fueled widespread public anxiety and disrupted postal services, public health operations, and other government activities. The incident demonstrated that effective crisis response must begin long before the source of a biological event can be established.

Contemporary biodefense therefore adopts a broader conception of biological threats—one that encompasses naturally occurring outbreaks, laboratory accidents, and the deliberate misuse of biological agents[2]. The central challenge is ensuring that society can respond effectively even when its origin remains uncertain. This requires sustained investment in early warning, biosurveillance, research and development, training and exercises, resilient supply chains, and close cooperation between the public and private sectors. Together, these capabilities enable societies to reduce risks, respond effectively to crises, and recover quickly post-disruption.

The ultimate objective is resilience — the capacity to sustain essential societal functions and recover quickly from biological emergencies. Resilience may also be understood as a form of deterrence by denial[3]: a society that can withstand and rapidly recover from biological incidents denies adversaries the ability to achieve their intended objectives.　This also explains why contemporary biodefense increasingly adopts a ‘Whole-of-Society’ approach. Building resilience is not the responsibility of governments alone; it requires the combined efforts of healthcare systems, research institutions, industry, local governments, and civil society.

The Five Pillars of Modern Biodefense

Translating this Whole-of-Society approach into practice requires the coordinated development of five mutually reinforcing pillars: (1) early warning and anomaly detection; (2) response capabilities; (3) supply chain resilience; (4) risk governance and regulation; and (5) scientific capacity and the competitiveness of the bioeconomy.

(1) Early Warning and Anomaly Detection

Early detection is the foundation of effective biodefense. Infectious disease surveillance, genomic sequencing, data analytics, and international information sharing make it possible to identify unusual biological events before they escalate into major crises.　Increasingly, this depends on treating society itself as an early warning network. Wastewater surveillance, real-time clinical data, pathogen analysis, and AI-enabled anomaly detection can reveal emerging risks by integrating information from human and animal health, genomic data, and patterns of mobility.

Detection alone, however, is insufficient. Information must be shared rapidly and translated into timely decision-making. This requires institutional mechanisms that enable local governments, healthcare providers, research institutions, national authorities, and international organizations to operate from a common operational picture. Modern biodefense is thus evolving toward a society-wide early warning system capable of identifying and responding to biological risks before they become national emergencies.

(2) Response Capabilities

Effective biodefense requires institutions that can operate as an integrated response system during a crisis. Biological incidents rarely fall within the responsibility of a single organization. An unusual outbreak may first be detected by local healthcare providers, while emergency services transport patients and manage the scene, police secure affected areas, local governments provide information and support to affected communities, and research institutions identify and characterize the pathogen. National authorities coordinate the broader response, with the Self-Defense Forces providing transport, medical, and other specialized support when necessary. Each actor has a different role, but these functions must come together quickly when a crisis occurs.

Japan has steadily strengthened its capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. Fire and rescue services, for example, have developed specialized hazardous materials (HAZMAT) units trained to operate in contaminated environments, including conducting decontamination and rescue operations. Police responsibilities range from securing incident sites and preserving evidence to investigating suspected deliberate attacks. The Self-Defense Forces maintain additional capabilities for large-scale transport, field medical support, and specialized CBRN protection.

Individual capabilities alone, however, are not enough. Effective response depends on clear roles and responsibilities, rapid information sharing, and decision-making procedures established before a crisis occurs. These arrangements allow different institutions to coordinate quickly and develop a common operational picture—a shared understanding of what is happening, where, and what actions are needed—even when the nature and origin of a biological incident remain uncertain.

(3) Supply Chain Resilience

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains. Shortages of masks, personal protective equipment (PPE), diagnostic supplies, vaccines, and other essential medical resources disrupted healthcare systems and economic and social activity around the world. Transportation bottlenecks, export restrictions, and manufacturing disruptions made it difficult for many countries to secure critical supplies when they were needed most.

Reliable access to essential goods during a biological crisis is therefore more than a healthcare issue. It is essential to keeping society functioning. Governments need to know where critical pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and key raw materials are produced, whether supply depends too heavily on particular countries or regions, and what alternatives are available if those supply chains are disrupted. Diversifying sources of supply and maintaining sufficient domestic production capacity for critical goods can reduce these vulnerabilities.

From a biodefense perspective, supply chain resilience is therefore part of preparedness itself. The ability to secure essential goods during a crisis depends largely on arrangements made in advance—before shortages occur and global competition for limited supplies intensifies. A resilient supply chain helps ensure that healthcare and other essential services can continue to function even during a major biological emergency.

(4) Risk Governance and Regulation

Advances in the life sciences bring enormous benefits to medicine, food production, and environmental sustainability, but many are also dual-use: the same knowledge and technologies can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. Research on infectious diseases, for example, is essential for developing vaccines and treatments, yet some of the knowledge and techniques it generates could also be misused to make pathogens more dangerous or easier to exploit.

Managing these risks requires several layers of governance. Biosafety aims to prevent accidental exposure to or release of biological agents, while biosecurity seeks to prevent their theft, misuse, or unauthorized access. Research ethics, information governance, and export controls provide additional safeguards as knowledge, data, technologies, and biological materials move across institutions and national borders. The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and the life sciences is making this challenge more complex. AI can accelerate biological research and broaden access to advanced capabilities, making it increasingly difficult for regulation alone to keep pace with technological change.

The objective is not to constrain scientific progress, but to manage its risks as innovation advances. This requires not only rules and regulations, but also a culture in which researchers, institutions, and industry consider both what a technology can do and how it should be used. In the Age of Omni-Use, governance must evolve alongside science and technology.

(5) Scientific Capacity and the Bioeconomy

Biotechnology is transforming not only healthcare, but also food and agriculture, advanced materials, chemicals, energy, and environmental management. This expanding role of the life sciences has given rise to the concept of the bioeconomy[4]—the use of biotechnology to generate economic value while addressing societal challenges. Some projections suggest that biotechnology could be involved in nearly 30 percent of global manufacturing by around 2030, making scientific and technological capacity an increasingly important source of national competitiveness.

That capacity also matters in a crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the importance of having strong research institutions, skilled scientists, vaccine development capabilities, and manufacturing infrastructure already in place. The rapid development and deployment of mRNA vaccines, for example, drew on decades of investment in basic research and biotechnology.

The same is true of genomic sequencing, pathogen analysis, advanced data analytics, and AI-enabled research. In normal times, these capabilities support scientific innovation and economic growth; in an emergency, they can be mobilized for surveillance, diagnostics, vaccine and therapeutic development, and other critical response needs.

In the Age of Omni-Use, a strong bioeconomy is therefore more than an engine of economic growth. The scientific, technological, and industrial capacity built in peacetime becomes part of a nation's capacity to respond in a crisis. This makes the bioeconomy an important foundation of modern biodefense.

A Whole-of-Society Approach

The five pillars outlined above share a common feature: none can be built or sustained by government alone. Early warning depends on healthcare providers, researchers, local authorities, and international information networks. Effective response requires coordination across multiple institutions. Supply chain resilience depends on industry and international partners, while risk governance requires the engagement of researchers and technology developers. Scientific and industrial capacity, in turn, rests on long-term investment in research, infrastructure, and human capital.

Modern biodefense therefore requires a Whole-of-Society approach, bringing together government, healthcare and public health, research institutions, industry, local authorities, and civil society. The institutions, investments, expertise, and partnerships built in peacetime become the foundation for resilience in a crisis.

Building such a system is not straightforward. How much should a country invest in this form of preparedness? How should it balance scientific and industrial development with safety and security? How can it encourage preparedness without placing excessive constraints on research, innovation, or economic activity? These are not simply questions of crisis management. They are questions of governance—of how societies manage both the benefits and the risks of rapidly advancing life sciences.

The goal is not to eliminate every biological risk. It is to ensure that when a crisis occurs, essential functions—healthcare, supply chains, government services, and other critical systems—continue to operate and society can recover quickly. In the Age of Omni-Use, the ability to remain resilient in a crisis is itself a core element of national preparedness.

The next article in this series will examine how governments can design the institutions, rules, and governance frameworks needed to build and sustain that resilience.

(2026/08/26)