Publication of Policy Papers for the SPF Project “Cooperation Between European and Indo-Pacific Powers in the U.S. Alliance System”
IINA (International Information Network Analysis) hosts a series of policy papers featuring analyses and insights from U.S., Japanese, South Korean, Australian and European experts, which discuss constructive cooperation among U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The series aims to provide readers with valuable perspectives on the future of NATO-IP4 (Indo-Pacific 4) cooperation for regional and global security.
The rise of next-generation technologies—including dual-use civil-military innovations, increasing automation, and new cyber capabilities—has dramatically altered the way maritime forces operate. This paper addresses five key issues that these developments give rise to:
- 1. The opportunities for fleets to adapt to an unpredictable geopolitical environment
- 2. The costs and scalability of maritime platforms
- 3. The need for distributed forces and interoperability
- 4. The resilience of industrial production
- 5. The critical role of cybersecurity in enhancing communication and data-sharing
Adapting Fleets to a More Complex and Unpredictable Geopolitical Environment
Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, cyber threats to maritime infrastructure, and the proliferation of uncrewed systems, the traditional paradigms of fleet composition and deployment are no longer sufficient. On the one hand, building flexibility directly into individual ships and uncrewed vehicles offers significant advantages. It is possible to quickly reconfigure a versatile, multi-role vessel or system to meet a variety of threats, preparing it for tasks from intelligence gathering to anti-submarine warfare (ASW), strike missions, or humanitarian aid.
However, this approach also has limitations. The complexity and cost of designing vessels or systems with the adaptability to perform multiple missions may outweigh the benefits. Additionally, the rapid pace of technological change means that reconfiguring platforms to stay ahead of evolving threats could lead to delays and inefficiencies. Moreover, multi-role ships or systems may not be ideal for any one specific task, which could compromise their effectiveness in specialized missions.
An alternative approach is to focus on flexibility through the composition of fleets. Rather than individual reconfigurable ships, the fleet would consist of various specialized vessels and uncrewed vehicles that forces could rapidly combine or reallocate to meet specific operational needs. Flexibility and the growth potential of platforms would still be important but not all-determining. For example, the Dutch Navy is developing a smaller-scale uncrewed or minimally crewed multifunction support ship (MSS), which could navigate as a “loyal ship consort” to larger ships. As a missile carrier, it will provide extra containerized vertical launch tubes for air defense or land attack, or ASW support. As a radar picket, it will be available for uncrewed vehicle (UxV) control/relay ship support, electronic warfare support, or other supporting functions.
The main advantage of this strategy lies in its ability to deliver more focused and effective responses to specific challenges. The way ahead in accommodating a more complex and unpredictable geopolitical environment lies in finding the right balance between individual platform flexibility and fleet composition. The current approach is a layered defense with one or more high-value units in the center, protected by specialized, mainly anti-air warfare (AAW) and ASW units. In the future, US and allied navies will field a more layered defense with additional smaller, flexible vessels that can accompany escort vessels on solo missions.
The Cost of Maritime Platforms and Weapons Systems
Modern warships, such as aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships, are extremely costly to build, maintain, and operate. The increasing demand for sophisticated weaponry, which may outstrip available resources, compounds this issue. For smaller nations or those with limited defense budgets, these high costs present a critical barrier to acquisition of necessary maritime capabilities. In addition, the need for maintenance, training, and operational readiness further stretches already constrained resources. The sheer scale of maritime security needs exacerbates the financial pressure. Global trade routes, territorial waters, and regional flashpoints require constant surveillance and response capabilities.
There are several ways to mitigate these challenges. Pooling and sharing might look like a logical solution, but sovereignty over combat means shows that this is not always possible unless that sovereignty is over the supporting roles in the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, interoperability (DOTMLPFI) equation and over information systems and budgets. For example, in the Belgian and Dutch navies, these constituents of capabilities for frigates and mine warfare ships are under national sovereign control, but the DOTMLPFI platforms themselves are shared and integrated. This arrangement has led to two current programs for joint acquisition of new identical ASW frigates and mine countermeasure (MCM) ships.
Navies also need to increase the scale and adaptability of maritime platform production to reduce costs. Technological advancements, such as modular designs for ships and the increasing use of uncrewed systems, offer a way forward by allowing shipbuilders to cooperate across national boundaries in more areas. Modular shipbuilding techniques, which construct sections of a ship separately and then assemble them, can reduce both the cost and time of construction. Furthermore, producing smaller, more affordable ships, such as corvettes, along with cost-efficient uncrewed vehicles could provide a viable alternative to constructing large, expensive platforms such as aircraft carriers.
Capacities such as multimission bays and multiple UxVs have given rise to larger platforms, which may have weaknesses such as less maneuverability in coastal waters and vulnerability to asymmetric threats. Dual-use platforms and systems serving civilian and military purposes also reduce costs. Dual-use capabilities could be a win-win for navies and other security-related services, such as coast guards, maritime police, customs, fisheries inspection, and pollution control envisaging a tiered fleet composition. Smaller navies do not have the option of acquiring both large, high-end, expensive, multipurpose “Tier 1” ships and large quantities of simpler “Tier 2” ships.
Reducing Vulnerability Through Distribution and Interoperability
A critical question for modern navies is whether they can reduce vulnerability by dispersing naval assets while retaining the ability to coordinate and engender mass effects. Can distributed forces, working together in a highly interoperable manner, increase the time and resources an enemy requires to mount a successful attack? Historically, large, concentrated fleets have been the backbone of naval power projection. However, in the age of advanced missile systems, UxV swarming attacks, hypersonic weapons, and cyberattacks, large concentrations of assets are increasingly vulnerable to surprise attacks and saturation strikes. The challenge is finding ways to distribute forces that reduce vulnerability without compromising operational effectiveness.
One approach is to distribute forces across a wider geographic area, integrating various ship types and uncrewed vehicles. For instance, it may be effective to disperse a fleet across a vast maritime expanse, with smaller vessels, autonomous vehicles, and sensors working in concert to provide a comprehensive defense network. This distribution makes it harder for an adversary to target all assets at once, as the attacking force would have to identify and neutralize multiple well-coordinated targets.
Interoperability is crucial to this strategy’s success. Ships, aircraft, uncrewed systems, and other assets must be able to communicate seamlessly, share data in real time, and coordinate their efforts without delay. This requires advanced communications infrastructure, AI-driven decision support systems, and standardized platforms across nations and services. In practice, it means navies must work together to ensure compatible data-sharing protocols and real-time operational coordination. This has been a strong point in NATO naval operations, but a deeper and more basic level of data and information exchange is necessary to take advantage of technological developments.
Industrial Resilience and Supply Chain Diversification
To meet the demand for affordable and capable naval platforms, countries need to strengthen their industrial bases and diversify supply chains. By expanding and diversifying production across allied nations, militaries can tap into shared expertise, reduce dependence on any single supplier, and scale up production capacity. This approach would also help mitigate the risk of supply chain disruption, whether due to geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, or trade barriers. Additionally, a more resilient industrial base across the US alliance system would enable the production of advanced dual-use platforms, such as in navigation, propulsion, and communications. Governments could leverage dual-use technologies to create more cost-effective and technologically advanced naval platforms.
Strengthening Cybersecurity for Communication and Data-Sharing
As maritime security relies increasingly on AI, digital communication and data-sharing have become critical concerns. How can navies enhance communication and data-sharing while ensuring robust protection against cyber threats? Cyberattacks on maritime assets such as datalinks, navigation systems, port infrastructure, and military command centers pose significant risks. Hackers can disrupt shipping lanes, cripple naval operations, or even hijack vessels. Ensuring the security of communication systems and data-sharing networks is thus vital to maintaining operational effectiveness.
To safeguard communication and data-sharing, navies and maritime organizations need to invest in robust cybersecurity frameworks. This includes the development of encryption technologies, real-time threat monitoring, and secure communication protocols in both defensive and offensive capabilities. Additionally, international cooperation on cybersecurity standards and practices will be essential to protect the maritime domain from evolving cyber threats.
Conclusion
Flexibility, cost-efficiency, interoperability, industrial resilience, and cybersecurity are key components of a successful maritime security strategy. By investing in flexibly composed fleets, modular and distributed production in strong partnerships, dual-use technologies, and robust cybersecurity, NATO and its partners can prepare their maritime forces for an increasingly unpredictable and technology-driven geopolitical environment. As maritime threats evolve, so too should the strategies and technologies that ensure the security of global trade, defense, and national interests.
(2025/03/14)