On May 23, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed four executive orders aimed at revitalizing the American nuclear industry¹. These orders include:
 

1. ORDERING THE REFORM OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION（NRC）
2. REFORMING NUCLEAR REACTOR TESTING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)
3. REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE
4. DEPLOYING ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The key components of these orders are as follows:
 

• Quadruple the nation’s nuclear power generation capacity by 2050
• Streamlining administrative review processes to achieve the above target
• Enhancing nuclear fuel self-sufficiency, including the extraction and reuse of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel through a reinforced nuclear fuel cycle
• Improving the output of existing reactors, leading global innovation through advanced reactors—particularly small modular reactors (SMRs)—and promoting their deployment at military bases

The executive orders assert that the implementation of these measures will contribute to the strengthening of national security².

In January of this year, the author published an article in this column entitled “Toward Self-Sufficiency in Uranium Fuel for Nuclear Power: Watching Trump 2.0”(in Jaoanese), analyzing the Biden administration’s initiatives such as the ban on imports of Russian low-enriched uranium. The article noted that “attention should be paid to whether a second Trump administration would continue these efforts.”³ The executive orders issued in May not only continue the previous administration’s trajectory of enhancing self-sufficiency in the nuclear sector but also reflect an aggressive posture by the Trump administration to reassert U.S. dominance in the global nuclear market. This unrestrained push for nuclear utilization suggests a strategic ambition that goes beyond domestic energy policy. Against the backdrop of efforts to achieve decarbonized societies, there is a movement around the world, including Japan, toward a return to nuclear energy, which does not emit CO₂ during electricity generation, and the impact of U.S. policy developments on the international community is by no means negligible.

At the same time, questions remain regarding the actual effectiveness of the executive orders. Even among the four major initiatives outlined above, achieving a fourfold increase in nuclear power generation capacity would require the construction of several hundred new reactors—an undertaking that demands enormous budgetary allocations. Moreover, the concept of integrating nuclear reactors into military bases, as will be discussed later, appears to contradict the principles of international humanitarian law. Whether these executive orders will gain congressional approval and be translated into actionable policy remains uncertain at this stage.

This article focuses on the following three points of analysis, concluding with a discussion on how Japan should engage with the evolving U.S. nuclear policy under these executive orders:
 

• The declaration to quadruple nuclear power generation capacity and its underlying domestic and international background
• The specific policy measures being deployed to achieve above goal and the strategic objectives of the United States
• The effectiveness and challenges of the executive orders, with particular attention to the four core initiatives

The push to expand nuclear power generation capacity is driven by both domestic and international factors. Domestically, the United States is at the forefront of global developments in energy-intensive technologies, particularly the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and the construction of data centers. In response to the projected surge in electricity demand, the Department of Energy (DOE) released an estimate in January of this year indicating that nuclear power supply capacity must be tripled by 2050⁴. In practice, major U.S. tech companies are increasingly turning to nuclear power to meet the energy needs of their data centers. For instance, in September 2024, Microsoft entered into an unprecedented agreement with the owner of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Pennsylvania—where Unit 2 experienced a meltdown and Unit 1 ceased operations in 2019—requesting its reactivation and committing to purchase the plant’s entire electricity output for a period of 20 years.⁵ The executive orders go beyond the DOE’s projections, calling for a fourfold increase in nuclear power capacity. This bold target underscores the Trump administration’s unequivocal commitment to advancing nuclear energy.

Another external factor is the growing dominance of Russia and China in the international nuclear market. The Executive Order on REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE explicitly articulates the United States’ sense of urgency regarding this trend.

Reference: Whitehouse “REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE” May 23, 2025.

According to the “2025 edition of Global Trends in Nuclear Power Development”, published annually by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF), a total of nine new nuclear reactors were launched worldwide in 2024 across four countries. Of these, seven were Chinese designs—six constructed domestically and one exported to Pakistan—while two were Russian designs, with one built in Russia and the other in Egypt.⁶ Looking back as far as 2017, France remains the only country outside of China and Russia to have initiated new reactor construction, and even then, only through an export project to the United Kingdom. The aforementioned executive order states that “87% of global reactor designs are based on two foreign models.” While the orders refrain from naming specific countries, it is evident that it refers to China and Russia. The order goes on to assert that such a trend is unacceptable, signaling a clear intent to challenge the current dominance of these two nations in the international nuclear market.

Reference: Whitehouse “ORDERING THE REFORM OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION” May 23, 2025.

President Trump attributes the decline of the nuclear industry in the United States, at least in part, to administrative failure. This attribution of blame to bureaucratic dysfunction is a recurring theme across other policy areas as well. Of the four executive orders, two directly address federal agencies, and the deliberate inclusion of the goal to quadruple nuclear power generation capacity within the executive order mandating reforms to the NRC serves as clear evidence of this perspective. The references to the NRC are notably critical.

Reference: Whitehouse “ORDERING THE REFORM OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION” May 23 2025.

The division between pre-1978 and post-1978 periods reflects the impact of the 1979 meltdown accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, which led to a prolonged freeze on the construction of new reactors in the United States.
Following this assessment, the executive order outlines specific regulatory reforms aimed at promoting nuclear energy, including:

• Applications for the construction and operation of new reactors must receive a final decision within 18 months of the initial regulatory step.
• Applications for continued operation of existing reactors must receive a final decision within one year of the initial regulatory step.
• Extensions beyond these deadlines are not permitted, except in cases of applicant fault.

In a swift follow-up move, the President also directed the DOE to expedite the review and testing of advanced reactor technologies.

Reference: Whitehouse “REFORMING NUCLEAR REACTOR TESTING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY” May 23 2025.

In the “REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE”, the administration outlines specific measures for the private sector to pursue, supported by federal initiatives. A notable feature of the order is its division between goals to be achieved during President Trump’s term and those requiring long-term commitment.

Goals to be achieved during the presidential term:

• Secure an additional 5 gigawatts of electricity through uprates of existing reactors.
• Commence construction of ten newly designed large-scale reactors by 2030.
  These directives reflect the President’s intent to lay a clear path toward expanding nuclear power generation capacity within his tenure.

Long-term initiatives:

• Expand the supply and production of nuclear fuel.
• Ensure the resilience of the private-sector nuclear supply chain.
• Streamline the licensing process for advanced reactors.
• Develop a skilled workforce to strengthen U.S. leadership in the energy sector

The first item—expanding the supply and production of nuclear fuel—signals a renewed emphasis on strengthening the nuclear fuel cycle, a domain that previous administrations had largely frozen. This shift has drawn considerable attention both domestically and internationally, as it suggests a potential move toward concrete implementation. President Trump himself instructed the Secretary of Energy to submit a report within 240 days of the executive order, outlining a strategy for advancing the nuclear fuel cycle.

Reference: Whitehouse “REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE” May 23, 2025.

As noted earlier in this paper, the third long-term initiative—advanced reactors—is addressed separately through the “DEPLOYING ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY”. This order outlines a series of policy measures and explicitly frames the United States’ decline in the global nuclear market as a serious national security concern. It further directs the early development and deployment of four specific types of advanced reactors.

Reference: Whitehouse “DEPLOYING ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY，”  May 23, 2025.

The executive order further establishes a section on the deployment and utilization of advanced reactor technologies at military facilities, thereby signaling a push toward the military application of nuclear power.

Reference: Same as above.

It is particularly noteworthy that the executive order sets a clear deadline—September 30, 2028—mandating that the outlined objectives be achieved within President Trump’s term.

Summarizing the measures specified across the four executive orders and the underlying sense of urgency, one can interpret the overarching goal as a restoration of American strength in nuclear energy to its pre-1979 status, prior to the Three Mile Island accident. This interpretation is supported by the executive order on NRC reform, which explicitly contrasts the trajectory of the U.S. nuclear industry before and after the accident.
The United States was a pioneer in uranium enrichment for military purposes, having developed the atomic bomb. After World War II, it also led the global effort to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The U.S. took charge of supplying low-enriched uranium (LEU) to nuclear power plants in Japan and other Western countries, effectively managing the global use of nuclear energy. In the 1970s, when West Germany attempted to export nuclear reactors to Brazil, the United States opposed the move on non-proliferation grounds and wielded its influence by threatening to suspend LEU supplies, ultimately forcing Germany to abandon the plan⁷.
However, following the Three Mile Island accident, the U.S. lost its competitive edge in the nuclear sector, and the international market came to be dominated by China and Russia. Even domestic reactors in the U.S. now rely on foreign sources of LEU, with a particularly high dependence on Russia (see Table 1). These domestic and international trends are reflected in the executive orders, which frame the situation as a national security crisis.

As outlined above, the four executive orders issued by President Trump aim to fundamentally transform the U.S. nuclear energy industry. At the same time, they include policy directions—such as the strengthening of the nuclear fuel cycle—that diverge significantly from those of previous administrations. This makes a detailed examination of their effectiveness essential. In particular, assessing the four key initiatives introduced at the outset is critical to evaluating the practical impact of these executive orders. The following sections will address each in turn.

(1) Expansion of Nuclear Power Generation Capacity

The stated goal of increasing nuclear power capacity from 100 GW to 400 GW may be difficult for the general public to visualize. One gigawatt (GW) equals 1,000 megawatts (MW), and most commercial reactors currently in operation worldwide have a capacity of approximately 1,000 MW—essentially 1 GW per unit. Therefore, adding 300 GW over the next 25 years, by 2050, would require the construction of 300 standard reactors, averaging 12 new reactor starts per year. If small modular reactors (SMRs) become the mainstream option, the number of units required would be two to three times higher.
The inclusion of specific targets to be achieved during his presidential term in the Executive Order on REINVIGORATING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE reflects President Trump’s seriousness about the initiative. However, considering that China and Russia—currently leading the global nuclear energy market—together initiate construction of only about 10 new reactors per year, and that the United States has built only two new reactors in the 47 years since 1978, with limited progress in workforce development for reactor manufacturing, the numerical targets set forth in the executive order appear overly ambitious—if not outright unrealistic.

Moreover, the development of nuclear power infrastructure—whether in the United States or elsewhere—cannot be achieved through private-sector efforts alone; substantial government financial support is indispensable. Without congressional approval of the necessary budget allocations, the feasibility of implementation remains uncertain. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has also warned that, without sustained federal funding over the long term, the executive orders risk becoming little more than aspirational rhetoric.

Reference: CSIS, Jane Nakano and Leslie Abrahams “White House Executive Orders Target Ambitious Nuclear Deployment in the United States and Abroad” June 9, 2025.

(2) Streamlining the NRC Review Process

The directive to accelerate and simplify the NRC’s review procedures, as part of efforts to expand nuclear power generation capacity, has sparked considerable debate in the United States. Nuclear industry stakeholders have welcomed the move, arguing that greater predictability in the review timeline will help revitalize the sector. However, nuclear safety researchers and experts have voiced concerns that such reforms could undermine public trust in the U.S. nuclear industry and erode its international competitiveness.

The NRC has long maintained two pillars of institutional independence: (1) political independence, meaning its authority over budget, personnel, and licensing decisions is insulated from interference by political actors or other administrative agencies; and (2) technical independence, whereby its judgments on nuclear safety are made without reliance on utilities, reactor manufacturers, or other external entities. This tradition has earned the NRC a reputation as a professional and impartial body in safety reviews. The executive order’s directive to accelerate and simplify the review process has raised concerns that such political intervention may undermine the Commission’s independence.⁹

From this perspective, researchers from the Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program contributed an op-ed to The Hill, stating the following:

Reference: The Hill website, Toby Dalton and Ariel E. Levite "Trump’s executive orders could endanger America’s nuclear renaissance” May 28, 2025.

Similarly, given that President Trump publicly pressured the Federal Reserve—an institution whose independence is traditionally respected—to lower interest rates¹⁰, it is perhaps unsurprising that he would intervene in the NRC’s review process without hesitation. However, it is important to recognize the potential consequences of such political interference. If the NRC is perceived as having lost its independence, and if it appears that reactor safety standards can be altered at the discretion of the administration in power, this could seriously undermine trust in the U.S. nuclear industry both domestically and internationally.

(3) Strengthening the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle centers on the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for reuse as reactor fuel. However, due to the potential for diversion to nuclear weapons, this technology remains a sensitive issue for non-nuclear-weapon states such as Japan and other countries engaged in fuel cycle activities. Even for a nuclear-armed state like the United States, concerns over nuclear proliferation have led to international efforts to regulate the fuel cycle and repeated bipartisan calls within Congress to freeze domestic fuel cycle development. As stipulated in the executive order, the Secretary of Energy is required to propose a national policy—including on the nuclear fuel cycle—within 240 days of the order’s issuance. Whether Congress will subsequently move to revise relevant legislation remains uncertain and warrants close attention.

The United States was once a global leader in nuclear reprocessing, with private companies operating reprocessing facilities as early as the 1960s. However, in the 1970s, growing concerns over the potential military applications of reprocessing technology led the U.S. to spearhead the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), alongside other nuclear-weapon states and advanced civilian nuclear technology holders—including Japan. The NSG established international non-proliferation policies, including restrictions on the transfer of reprocessing technologies.11 In 1977, President Jimmy Carter formally froze domestic reprocessing policy, a stance that subsequent administrations—regardless of party affiliation—continued to uphold. Under the Biden administration, bipartisan support led to the enactment of National Security Memorandum (NSM) 19 in 2023. In accordance with this legislation, the White House articulated the following principles as the foundation of U.S. policy.

Reference: Whitehouse “FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security” March 2, 2023.

Given this background, it is clear that a full-scale revival or strengthening of the nuclear fuel cycle cannot be pursued solely at the discretion of the executive branch. Advocacy for the United States to serve as a global model in nuclear non-proliferation comes from a bipartisan coalition in Congress, and persuading these lawmakers to support the advancement of the fuel cycle is likely to prove challenging.

(4) Deployment of Small Modular Reactors at Military Bases

Installing nuclear reactors at land-based military installations presents fundamentally different risks compared to deploying reactors aboard aircraft carriers or submarines. In the event of a military strike targeting such a reactor, the resulting release of radioactive materials could lead to widespread collateral damage, including harm to nearby civilian populations and non-combatants.

Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions—an instrument of international humanitarian law¹²—emphasizes the protection of civilians from incidental harm. Paragraph 1 specifically identifies three categories of installations as containing “dangerous forces”: dams, dykes, and nuclear power plants, and prohibits military attacks against them. In the case of nuclear power plants, the “dangerous force” clearly refers to the potential release of radioactive materials.

However, Article 56 also contains an exception clause in Paragraph 2.

In other words, installing nuclear reactors at military bases could place them outside the protective scope of international humanitarian law, making them legitimate military targets. The United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and there is no indication that the executive order was drafted with consideration for its provisions. While the order currently limits deployment to domestic bases, any future declaration of intent to install reactors at U.S. military bases located in countries that have ratified the Protocol—such as Japan—would likely provoke significant debate.

As this analysis has demonstrated, President Trump’s executive orders go beyond the stated goals of revitalizing the U.S. nuclear industry and restoring its competitiveness in the global nuclear market. The aggressive push for nuclear expansion raises critical questions within the United States regarding budgetary priorities—specifically, whether such policies can be reconciled with efforts to promote renewable energy and other sources, or whether nuclear power will be given preferential treatment. These issues are certain to spark domestic debate. Internationally, the content of the orders also evokes concerns about the erosion of nuclear safety regulations and the potential for renewed proliferation risks. In light of these developments, it is essential to revisit the background and context of the executive orders and consider how Japan should position itself in response.

1. President Trump views the loss of U.S. competitiveness in the global nuclear market—and the rise of China and Russia—as a national security crisis.
2. He believes that revitalizing the U.S. nuclear industry will strengthen national security.
3. As a concrete objective, the administration aims to quadruple nuclear power generation capacity by 2050.
4. To achieve this goal, the executive order directs the NRC to shorten its review process, raising concerns about the erosion of its regulatory independence.
5. The emphasis on strengthening the nuclear fuel cycle marks a departure from the longstanding bipartisan U.S. commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
6. Deploying reactors at military bases risks placing them outside the protection of international humanitarian law, potentially inviting inhumane military attacks and provoking concern within the international community.

The international landscape surrounding nuclear energy has grown increasingly complex in recent years. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, rising fossil fuel prices and the subsequent reassessment of energy security policies have led to renewed interest in nuclear power as a decarbonized energy source. As a result, nuclear power is beginning to expand into regions such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which previously had little or no experience with civilian nuclear energy. In Japan, too, there has been a notable policy shift—from the anti-nuclear stance that followed the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident to a renewed emphasis on maximizing the use of nuclear power. Compounding this complexity is the emerging reality that attacks on nuclear facilities during armed conflict are no longer considered taboo. Against this backdrop, President Trump’s executive orders—laden with elements that may further destabilize the global nuclear order—raise critical questions about how Japan should respond and position itself moving forward.

Japan possesses the technological capability to manufacture centrifuges required for uranium enrichment, as well as the specialized nuclear fuel production technologies needed for small modular reactors—classified by the United States as advanced reactors. Japan has also maintained its nuclear fuel cycle policy and continues to pursue the operation of a spent fuel reprocessing facility. Although the “Fact Sheet” released by the White House following the U.S.-Japan tariff negotiations in July 2025 did not include any reference to nuclear cooperation,¹³ it is entirely plausible that the United States will take interest in Japan’s advanced capabilities and seek avenues for collaboration. Should such cooperation be proposed, Japan—having long recognized the sensitive nature of nuclear technologies with potential military applications and having worked closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent nuclear proliferation—will be compelled to make a clear distinction between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. Japan must carefully consider whether, and how, to engage in technical cooperation with the United States under these conditions. Strategic deliberation in preparation for such a decision is essential.

Japan should take seriously the fact that the executive order interfered with the review process of the U.S. nuclear regulatory authority. In Japan as well, nuclear safety reviews have often been prolonged, with some cases taking more than a decade before reactors are restarted, leading to criticism of regulatory administration. However, in a field as technically demanding as nuclear energy, undermining the independence of regulatory authorities and allowing the government alone to dictate the terms of nuclear utilization would not only compromise safety, but also pose serious risks to nuclear non-proliferation, including the potential for military diversion. As nuclear power plants begin to be introduced in countries that have not previously used nuclear energy—including those without democratic governance—it is essential not to overlook the danger that the executive order’s approach to regulatory independence could be misused as a precedent. Japan should actively promote the principle that regulatory independence is a prerequisite for the safe and socially trusted use of nuclear energy. This can be achieved, for example, by supporting the development of regulatory personnel in newly nuclear-capable countries and advocating this principle widely within the international community.