Introduction

On October 18, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) held its chairmanship election, and former legislator Cheng Li-wun was elected. She took office on November 1 and became the second woman to hold the main opposition party’s leadership, following Hung Hsiu-chu who was elected in 2016. In the early stages of the chairmanship race, Hau Lung-bin, a former Taipei mayor and vice chairman, was widely seen as the frontrunner. However, in the latter half of the campaign, Cheng Li-wun gained support from “the military faction[1],” a major force within the party, and ultimately secured victory[2]. However, Cheng Li-wun openly declares, “I am Chinese,” and stated during the campaign that she wants “Taiwanese people to be able to confidently say, ‘I am Chinese.’” She is a figure with a strong sense of Chinese identity. In Taiwanese society[3] where a strong sense of Taiwanese identity is gaining ground, such an edgy view places her in the minority. If she continues to uphold the hardline belief after taking office and incorporates it into the party’s platform, it could lead to a loss of support among centrist voters and moderate KMT supporters who dislike radical ideas, possibly provoking backlash from other factions within the party. Once the new year begins, campaigns for unified local elections set for autumn 2026 will begin in earnest, followed by the presidential election scheduled for January 2028. As President Lai Ching-te’s approval ratings remain low, attention will be focused on how Cheng Li-wun will lead the KMT in its bid to regain power.

Chaos in KMT Chair Election

The former chairman, Chu Li-luan (aka Eric Chu), who stepped down upon the expiration of his term on November 1, had announced early on that he would not seek re-election, and publicly called on Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen to succeed him as party chair[4]. Lu Shiow-yen is regarded as a leading contender for the 2028 presidential election, and it appears that the idea was for the presidential candidate to also serve as party chair, thereby uniting the party under a single leadership in its bid to regain power[5]. However, when Lu Shiow-yen repeatedly declined the calls[6], stating that she wanted to focus on her duties as mayor of Taichung, the process of selecting the next chairman quickly descended into uncertainty. Some observers believe she was reluctant to take on the role because it would have made her responsible for the party’s much-criticized financial difficulties—often described as “steadily dwindling”—and forced her to play “the unpopular role of mediator” in coordinating nominations for local leaders and legislative candidates[7].

In the end, six candidates ran in the chairmanship election. Initially, Hau Lung-bin, a former Taipei mayor and party vice chairman, was considered the strongest contender, while the other competitors were viewed as close to flyby-night candidates. However, in the final stage of the race, Cheng Li-wun gained momentum, and the contest ultimately became a de facto one-on-one battle between Hau Lung-bin and Cheng Li-wun. Hau Lung-bin is a typical second-generation KMT elite, the son of former Chief of the General Staff Hau Pei-tsun, who was favored by the Chiang family represented by Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Mei-ling, and Chiang Ching-kuo. In other words, he belongs to the party’s establishment—the small circle of elites known in Chinese as quánguì or jiànzhìpài. From 2006, he succeeded future President Ma Ying-jeou as mayor of Taipei, serving two terms, and later held positions such as vice chairman of the party, making him one of its key figures. Although he is a moderate advocate of reconciliation with China, he emphasized a balanced approach during the campaign, stating that he will seek to “build good relations with both China and the United States.”[8] This stance earned him broad support, particularly from conservative elements within the party who dislike major changes. On the eve of the election, 10 local leaders—including Lu Shiow-yen and Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an—as well as Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu and Vice President Chiang Chi-chen, jointly placed a full-width advertisement in their joint names on the lower half of the front pages of the major newspapers United Daily News and China Times to endorse Hau Lung-bin.

Cheng Li-wun’s background, on the other hand, is rather unusual. While studying law at National Taiwan University, she took part in the student movement known as the “Wild Lily Movement,” which called for democratization, and around the same time, she also joined the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocated for Taiwan’s self-determination. At the time, she was said to have even supported Taiwan’s independence and joined a related organization. As the DPP began to downplay its pro-independence stance in favor of a more pragmatic approach after coming to power, however, Cheng grew increasingly disillusioned with what she saw as a departure from the party’s ideals. She eventually began openly criticizing the DPP on television programs, declaring that “the DPP’s principles are an illusion.”[9] As a result, her party membership was suspended, leading her to voluntarily leave the DPP in 2002. In 2005, remarkably, she joined the KMT, whose ideology stands in direct contrast to that of her former party. Within the KMT, she served two terms as a legislator elected through the party’s proportional representation list—from 2008 and again from 2020—and also worked as spokesperson for the Executive Yuan under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. However, she had never held a major leadership position within the party.

Key to Cheng Li-wun’s Victory

What factors led to the election of Cheng Li-wun, who neither held key positions in the party or government nor enjoyed particularly high name recognition? Several explanations have been suggested, including calls from party members for generational change, criticism of the small group of elites dominating the party establishment, possible intervention by China, and support from the military faction. Let us examine each of these in turn.

At the outset, Hau Lung-bin was widely regarded as a frontrunner, standing out among the candidates in terms of background, name recognition, and pedigree—qualities highly valued within the KMT. However, he had previously run twice for the party chairmanship without success and had also lost a legislative election, indicating that he was not necessarily a strong contender capable of attracting broad voter support. Moreover, he is 77 years old. The KMT has been slow to undergo generational change, and its membership is said to be considerably older than that of the DPP[10]. The author has also repeatedly heard complaints from younger KMT members expressing frustration that they are rarely given opportunities to run in elections or hold party positions. A veteran KMT legislator in his 50s once told me, “Even someone like me is still considered young within the party.” While some relatively young legislators can now be seen among the KMT’s ranks, many ordinary party members believe that one reason the KMT has remained out of power for 12 years lies in its outdated, entrenched power structure. As a result, there has been growing demand for reform—specifically, for generational renewal. Amid these calls for change, Hau Lung-bin’s age of 77 inevitably became a source of concern among party members, and it is undeniable that this ultimately contributed to his defeat[11].

Moreover, Hau Lung-bin, the son of former Chief of the General Staff Hau Pei-tsun, is a quintessential KMT elite—having graduated from National Taiwan University and earned a doctorate in the United States. In other words, like former President Ma Ying-jeou, he is a privileged gāojí wàishěngrén (high-ranking mainlander) and part of the party establishment. Among ordinary party members, resentment toward these establishment figures who arbitrarily dominate party affairs has been growing stronger year by year. It is still fresh in memory that Han Kuo-yu, the KMT candidate who won the 2020 Kaohsiung mayoral election, appealed to voters by saying, “I am not an elite within the party—I belong to the non-mainstream faction that struggles just like all of you,” thus criticizing the KMT central leadership; at the time, he also pointed out that Kaohsiung’s administration had long been dominated by the DPP’s establishment, thereby expanding his support base[12]. Irrespective of party lines, there is strong aversion to a small elite holding on to vested interests. Moreover, in the final stage of the KMT chair campaign, prominent party figures such as Chao Shao-kang—who had endorsed Hau Lung-bin—remarked that “external forces (referred to in Chinese as jingwai shili) are interfering in the election through online channels,” pointing out that videos posted on TikTok and YouTube appeared to be skewed in favor of certain candidates. Although Chao Shao-kang used the vague term “external forces,” it was clear that he was referring to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The director-general of the National Security Bureau, which was urged to investigate the matter, noted that “more than half of the accounts spreading the related videos are in place with overseas location data,” further complicating the election landscape. Afterward, as Chao Shao-kang and others used media outlets close to the KMT to actively promote Hau Lung-bin, ordinary party members began to feel resentment, viewing this as “establishment elites with ties to the party manipulating friendly media to interfere in the election through their power.” As a result, Hau Lung-bin even more strongly impressed them with himself as a symbol of entrenched vested interests[13].

According to media reports, once candidates for the chairmanship election were finalized, the CCP decided on a strategy to ensure the victory of Cheng Li-wun, who had repeatedly voiced her pro-China and cross-strait reconciliation positions, and the party is said to have supported her comprehensively from three angles: “organization, public opinion, and funding.”[14] Specifically, the CCP allegedly urged different factions within the KMT through various channels to publicly endorse Cheng Li-wun—or at least refrain from supporting Hau Lung-bin—and conveyed the message that Hau’s election would be “detrimental to KMT-CCP relations.” Furthermore, it was reported that the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (Guótáibàn), the Chinese government agency responsible for Taiwan-related affairs, instructed certain media outlets to strengthen positive coverage of Cheng Li-wun[15]. As for funding, Taiwanese businesspeople operating in China—known as Taishang—were said to have been mobilized under directives from the CCP to provide financial support and campaign assistance for Cheng Li-wun[16].

Moreover, the support she received from the “military faction”—a major bloc within the KMT—helped propel Cheng Li-wun to victory[17]. The “military faction,” composed of retired veterans and military-affiliated members, had strong ties with Cheng Li-wun, partly due to her family background, with her father graduating from a military academy. The overwhelming support she gained from the military faction, which has the strongest mobilization capacity within the party, was likely what determined the outcome of the race. Of the roughly 330,000 party member votes, the military faction is said to account for about 170,000. By securing this vast “vote bank,”[18] Cheng Li-wun was able to draw victory toward herself[19].

Challenges Awaiting Cheng Li-wun

Today, Taiwanese identity—understood as identifying oneself as Taiwanese rather than Chinese—has been growing stronger within Taiwanese society[20]. It is therefore difficult to imagine that Cheng Li-wun’s assertion that she wants to make it possible for Taiwanese to proudly say “I am Chinese” would be accepted by society or gain broad support. Meanwhile, the day after her election, she received a congratulatory message from Xi Jinping, to which Cheng revealed that she replied by stating that she “wishes to promote cross-strait exchanges on the basis of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwanese independence.”[21] The 1992 Consensus refers to an understanding reached in 1992 in which China and Taiwan agreed that the “One China” principle would serve as the basis for cross-strait interactions. However, the DPP administration, in power since 2016, has not accepted the 1992 Consensus. Within Taiwanese society, in fact, public opinion surveys show that more than 60% of voters say they do not support the 1992 Consensus.[22]

Currently, more than 90% of people in Taiwan prefer to maintain the status quo regarding the island’s future,[23] and there is strong caution toward the 1992 Consensus, which treats “One China” as the basis for cross-strait exchanges. Cheng Li-wun’s own position, as well as the content exchanged between her and Xi Jinping in their congratulatory messages, falls outside the mainstream trend of Taiwanese society. If she continues to uphold such a stance after assuming the chairmanship, it could even provoke backlash from the public. However, as noted above, the key to Cheng Li-wun’s “come-from-behind victory” was the military faction, composed of military personnel and retired veterans who, on the whole, are older, more pro-China, and possess a strong Chinese identity. In other words, the birth of the new KMT chair, Cheng Li-wun, was made possible by the convergence of support from a major power bloc within the party—one whose values differ significantly from the mainstream public opinion in Taiwanese society—and support from other party members who opposed generational change or the establishment’s dominance within the party.”

What comes to mind here is Hung Hsiu-chu, who became the KMT’s candidate in the 2016 presidential election. In March 2014, during the later years of the Ma Ying-jeou administration, the “Sunflower Student Movement” erupted over the signing of a trade agreement with China, heightening public concern in Taiwan about moving too close to China. In the local elections held in the autumn of that year, the KMT suffered what was described as the worst defeat in its history[24], and the party struggled to select a presidential candidate for the 2016 election. As a result, Hung Hsiu-chu—who supported the 1992 Consensus and advocated a “One China” position—became the party’s presidential candidate. However, her stance was seen as far too radical in its orientation to unification and far removed from mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. Her approval ratings failed to rise at all, ultimately leading to an unprecedented replacement of the candidate, with Eric Chu taking her place[25]. The greatest challenge for the new chair will be how to bridge “the gap” between the supporters who voted for Cheng Li-wun and the mainstream public opinion in Taiwanese society.

Conclusion

Although the KMT is generally more conciliatory toward China compared with the DPP, a wide range of views exists within the party—from Taiwan-centric factions to moderate pro-engagement groups and centrists. If Cheng Li-wun does not exercise restraint in advancing radical positions and work to maintain party unity, she may provoke internal backlash and even lose public support in Taiwanese society, much like the precedent set during Hung Hsiu-chu’s tenure. Whether Cheng Li-wun can maintain the support of the “military faction”—one of the driving forces behind her election—while leading the party without upsetting its internal balance will be the true test of her leadership. At the same time, it will serve as a litmus test for whether the KMT can achieve victory in the 2026 local elections and the 2028 presidential election.