Contents *Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited
SPF China Observer
HOMENo.61 2025/06/06
The “Ageing” Dalai Lama and China:
Focus on the Selection of New Dalai Lama
Kota Kanemaki (Part-time lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Keio University)
Introduction
Tibetan communities worldwide, including the so-called “Tibetan government-in-exile” (the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA))[1] have recently expressed growing concern among themselves. This concern centres on the ageing of the 14th Dalai Lama, the highest spiritual leader in Tibet, who will turn 90 this year. However, this ageing issue differs from that discussed during the 2024 U.S. presidential election[2]. For Tibetans, the focus is not on his ability to perform his duties, but rather on who will be the 15th Dalai Lama, or in other words, who will succeed him. In September 2024, the author visited Dharamshala, India, the Dalai Lama’s place of exile[3]. Several Tibetan Buddhist monks expressed concerns regarding this issue. One of the primary reasons behind their concern is the potential for China to interfere in the selection of his successor.
The purpose of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the issue surrounding the selection of the next Dalai Lama, which is considered one of the most significant problems in the contemporary China-Tibet issue. To achieve this, the author first provides an overview of the selection process for Tibet’s highest spiritual leader. Subsequently, with the question of how China might respond to the selection of the next Dalai Lama in mind, the author reviews the events surrounding the selection of the 11th Panchen Lama, who holds the position next to the Dalai Lama, and the recent policies of the Communist Party towards Tibet. Finally, the author examines how Tibet intends to respond to China’s actions, thereby partially highlighting the limitations of the Chinese Communist Party’s religious policy.
Selection of the Dalai Lama
It should first be noted that the Dalai Lama is not selected through a secret ballot such as a conclave, nor by elections or hereditary succession. Based on the concept of reincarnation,[4] the Dalai Lama is believed to be born, die, and be reborn. In other words, for followers of Tibetan Buddhism, recognising the next Dalai Lama is nothing less than finding the reincarnation of the current Dalai Lama. As a reincarnation, the Dalai Lama cannot logically be chosen through voting or elections, as mentioned above.
The question here is: how was the current 14th Dalai Lama recognised? After the 13th Dalai Lama passed away in 1933, his body was laid facing south at Norbulingka Palace in Lhasa. Several days later, his face was found to have turned eastward. Furthermore, a star-shaped mushroom is said to have grown on the northeastern side of the pillars of the building where his body was placed. This led to the belief that the reincarnation would be born east of Potala Palace. Subsequently, it was recorded that the regent of the 13th Dalai Lama, who prayed at Lhamo Latso Lake, considered sacred by the Tibetan people and believed to reflect visions of the future, saw a monastery with a green and gold roof and a house with a turquoise-tiled roof. The high monks who travelled east in search of a location matching this vision discovered such a house. Disguised in poor attire to conceal their purpose, the search group visited the house and encountered a boy named Lhamo. He immediately desired a rosary worn by one of the high monks in the search group, which had belonged to the 13th Dalai Lama. When presented with several other rosaries, Lhamo again chose the same one. Later, when presented with two drums—a large, decorative one that children would like and a smaller one used by the 13th Dalai Lama—the boy selected the smaller one. This series of miraculous events convinced the search group that Lhamo was the reincarnation[5]. After several additional processes, Lhamo was formally recognised as the 14th Dalai Lama and officially enthroned on 14 January 1940. This process reveals the presence of ambiguity, which allows room for significant arbitrary intervention. In fact, there is potential for the creation of multiple reincarnations. The selection process of the Panchen Lama, the second highest in the Tibetan religious hierarchy, also demonstrates similar ambiguity. This selection process will be discussed in the following section.
China’s Intervention
In 1995, during the selection of the 11th Panchen Lama, it became known that, in addition to the candidate selected by the Tibetan side, China had appointed another “11th” Panchen Lama. The details of how this came about are as follows: after the death of the 10th Panchen Lama[6] on 28 January 1989, a six-year-old boy was selected as the 11th Panchen Lama on 14 May 1995, based on divination. He was later officially recognised as the Panchen Lama[7] with the approval of the Dalai Lama. However, immediately afterwards, the Chinese authorities detained the Panchen Lama. The Chinese government then “discovered” another boy as the 11th Panchen Lama, who was enthroned on 8 December of the same year[8]. This individual currently serves as a Standing Committee member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference[9] and as vice president of the Buddhist Association of China[10]. He participates in Chinese government and Communist Party events, advocating for the legitimacy of China’s “liberation” and rule over Tibet. For example, in 2019, on the 60th anniversary of the Communist Party’s “peaceful liberation” of Tibet, he stated: “The democratic reforms (by the Communist Party) led Tibetan society from the darkness of corruption to the light of victory” (quotation by the author)[11]. However, the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama selected by the Dalai Lama have remained unclear for a long time. Foreign media reported that a spokesperson stated at a Chinese Foreign Ministry press conference on 19 May 2020 that he had graduated from university, but his whereabouts remained unknown[12]. Under such circumstances, the Tibetan side continued to call for his release, and on 17 May 2024 a U.S. State Department spokesperson called on China to disclose the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama selected by the Tibetan side[13], demonstrating continued high attention to this issue.
The Chinese Communist Party is steadily developing policies and legal mechanisms to intervene in the selection of the next Dalai Lama. For example, at the Tibet Buddhist Work Symposium held from 25 to 28 August 1992, it was confirmed that the reincarnation of the Lama should follow government guidance and that overseas involvement would be prohibited[14]. Furthermore, in 2007, the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism[15] were enacted, further clarifying that reincarnation should be “institutionalized” and managed by the government. Given these facts, significant Chinese intervention is anticipated in the selection of the next Dalai Lama. This is precisely the critical issue shared by Tibetans, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper.
Countermeasures Against China
Despite these circumstances, the Dalai Lama has not remained passive. The 14th Dalai Lama stated in 2011: “When I reach around 90 years old... I would like to reconsider whether it is necessary to continue the system of recognizing the Dalai Lama as reincarnation.[16]” In July 2025, the 14th Dalai Lama will turn 90[17]. Therefore, it is believed that decisions regarding the selection of the 15th Dalai Lama will be made this year[18]. In 1999, the 14th Dalai Lama, anticipating Chinese intervention, stated: “If my reincarnation is to be selected through traditional methods, there will be no reincarnation of mine in Tibet or areas under Chinese rule[19]”, thereby checking China. Furthermore, in a 2011 lecture regarding his retirement, he mentioned his own introduction of a system to democratically elect the Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, which had originally been an appointed position, adding: “Since the beginning of our exile, I have sincerely worked for over 30 years to establish a democratic system of governance.” He went on to say: “We, in exile, have realized a genuine electoral process by remaining as refugees in a foreign country”, arguing that these changes reflect “the growing political awareness of Tibetans and the progress in the democratic process of the Tibetan government-in-exile[20]”, emphasising the importance of democratisation through the introduction of elections. Certainly, while the current Dalai Lama expressed his retirement from politics in 2011[21], the Prime Minister of the government-in-exile stated: “The government-in-exile does not have a say in the actual views of His Holiness (the Dalai Lama) regarding reincarnation”, and “Thinking about reincarnation is up to His Holiness himself, and everything is decided by His Holiness himself[22].” Furthermore, based on the author’s local interviews, there were no views other than the idea that the 14th Dalai Lama’s decision was absolute, suggesting that the possibility of the democratic selection of the next Dalai Lama cannot be denied.
Conclusion
The actions observed thus far highlight the limitations of the Communist Party’s religious policy, or in other words, the Party’s attempt to intervene in the selection of leaders, which forms the core of the Tibetan Buddhist faith, by exploiting religious rituals while verbally guaranteeing freedom of religious beliefs[23]. A more fundamental contradiction can also be pointed out: the Chinese Communist Party is supposed to advocate revolution. In other words, it should have proclaimed “liberation” from traditional society. In contrast, the Dalai Lama has governed Tibetan society based on religious values and in accordance with tradition in the spiritual realm. Based on the current situation outlined in this paper, it can be seen that the Party, which still calls itself the “Communist” Party and advocates revolution and materialism, despite undergoing many changes since its founding, is trying to employ mystical methods, while the Tibetan side, which should uphold tradition in the religious world, is rather considering a departure from mystical customs. In short, the two have reversed roles. Therefore, the discussion in this paper highlights the limitations of the Chinese Revolution.
1 The 14th Dalai Lama has stated that he refers to his governing body as the “Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)”. However, in this paper, the author will use the more common term, “Tibetan government-in-exile”.
The establishment of the Tibetan government-in-exile is as follows: After the People’s Liberation Army established its full-scale presence in Lhasa in 1951, the seeds of rebellion, which had been smouldering, finally erupted into a conflagration, leading to a major uprising in Lhasa in the spring of 1959. This uprising triggered the 14th Dalai Lama’s departure from Lhasa, the capital of the present-day Tibet Autonomous Region, and his exile to Dharamshala, India. During the journey of exile, the Tibetan government-in-exile was established in Mussoorie, India, on 29 April 1959, and subsequently moved to Dharamshala, where it remains to this day. “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Remarks on His Retirement (ダライ・ラマ法王、引退について語る)” (Dalai Lama’s speech on 19 March 2011), Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan (ダライ・ラマ法王日本代表部事務所) website: The Official Website of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, accessed 10 January 2025. “Central Tibetan Administration (中央チベット政権)” , Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan: the Central Tibetan Administration—Tibet House Japan, accessed 10 January 2025.
2 At the time of the election, former President Biden was 81 years old (born on 20 November 1942). President Trump was born on 14 June 1946.
3 From 17 to 20 September 2024, the author of this paper visited Tibetan government-in-exile organizations in Dharamshala, India with the support of the Resona Foundation for Asia and Oceania (公益財団法人りそなアジア・オセアニア財団).
4 “Reincarnation” (輪廻転生) refers to the cycle of birth and death, in which one is reborn into a different form. For detailed information, see Iwanami Buddhism dictionary (『岩波 仏教辞典』), third edition, edited by Hajime Nakamura, Mitsuji Fukunaga, Yoshiro Tamura, Toru Konno, and Fumihiko Sueki, Iwanami Shoten, 2023, pp. 1096-1097.
5 Dalai Lama, Hisao Kimura (trans.), My Land and My People: Memoirs of the Dalai Lama of Tibet (『チベットわが祖国』), Chuo Koron Sha, 1989, pp. 39-44. For further details, see also the following website: “The discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama and the system of reincarnation (14世ダライ・ラマ法王発見の経緯と輪廻転生制度)”, Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan website: The discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama and the system of reincarnation—Tibet House Japan, accessed 10 January 2025.
6 The 10th Panchen Lama was recognized by the Kuomintang government on 11 June 1949, before the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
7 Due to space limitations, a detailed explanation of this process is omitted in this paper. For further information, refer to the following publications: Isabel Hilton, The Search for the Panchen Lama, New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 2000. Additionally, the following website provides an detailed explanation: “About the Panchen Lama (パンチェン・ラマについて)”, Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan website: What is the Panchen Lama?, accessed 10 January 2025. For the historical relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, refer to Bunkyo Aoki, Modern Tibetan History Series 1: The Tibetan issue—Bunkyo Aoki’s Diplomatic Records (『近代チベット史叢書1 西蔵問題-青木文教外交調書』), Keibunsha, 2009.
8 “About the Panchen Lama”, op.cit.
9 “List of the Standing Committee members of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政治协商会议第十四届全国委员会常务委员名单)” ,website of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 11 March 2023, accessed 10 January 2025.
10 “Governing Member (领导机构)” ,website of the Buddhist Association of China (中国佛教协会), 15 April 2024, accessed 12 January 2025.
11 “Exclusive interview with the Panchen Lama: 60 Years of democratic reform in Tibet, policy of freedom of religious belief fully implemented (专访班禅:西藏民主改革60年,宗教信仰自由政策得到全面落实) ” , China News Service, 10 June 2019, accessed 8 January 2025.
12 “China Says Panchen Lama Leading ‘Normal Life’ Following Disappearance 25 Years Ago” , AFP, 20 May 2020, accessed 12 January 2025. The statement was not found in the transcript of the 19 May regular press conference of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on May 19, 2020”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website, 19 May 2020, accessed 12 January 2025.
13 Related content was found on the following State Department of U.S. website (confirmed by the author in 2024), but as of 19 March 2025, it is no longer displayed. However, the content can likely be inferred from the URL text
14 Susumu Kawata, “Religious policy and Tibetan policy of the Chinese Communist Party from the Mao Zedong era to the Hu Jintao era (毛沢東から胡錦涛時期における中国共産党の宗教政策とチベット政策)”, Memoirs of the Osaka Institute of Technology (『大阪工業大学紀要』), Series B, Liberal Arts, 2014, p. 39.
15 “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (藏传佛教活佛转世管理办法)” (Order No. 5 of the State Administration for Religious Affairs), website of the State Counsil of the People’s Republic of China, 18 July 2007: Order of the State Administration of Religious Affairs (No. 5), Measures for the Administration of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, State Council Gazette No. 8 of 2008, China Government website, accessed 12 January 2025.
16 Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, “About the Reincarnation of Dalai Lama (ダライ・ラマの化身認定制度について),” Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan website: The Official Website of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, accessed 10 January 2025.
17 The 14th Dalai Lama was born on 6 July 1935.
18 The Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile has also expressed a similar view. “ Detailed interview with Prime Minister Penpa Tsering of the Tibetan government-in-exile: Tibet, Uyghur, Hong Kong, the perpetrators are all the same (チベット亡命政府ペンパ・ツェリン首相インタビュー詳報「チベット、ウイグル、香港、加害者はすべて同じだ」)” , The Sankei Shimbun, 7 October 2023, チベット亡命政府ペンパ・ツェリン首相インタビュー詳報「チベット、ウイグル、香港、加害者はすべて同じだ」 - 産経ニュース,accessed 5 February 2025.
19 “There will be no reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in areas under Chinese rule (ダライ・ラマの生まれ変わりは 中国支配下の地ではないだろう)”, Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan website, 「ダライ・ラマの生まれ変わりは 中国支配下の地ではないだろう」 – Tibet House Japan , accessed 10 January 2025.
20 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Remarks on Retirement”, op.cit.
21 Ibid.
22 “How will the successor of the 14th Dalai Lama be chosen? Interview with the Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile(ダライ・ラマ14世の後継どうする? チベット亡命政府首相に聞いた)”, The Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 2025, accessed 5 February 2025.
23 For example, it is stipulated in Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.