Introduction

Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his strong determination to achieve unification with Taiwan in his New Year’s address. “The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification,” he said in the speech televised on China Central Television (CCTV) on December 31, 2024.[1]。

Coincidentally, it was reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) were confirmed to have jointly carried out activities similar to a naval blockade in December 2024 in waters around Taiwan, including the Miyako Strait between the main island of Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako Island, with a heavily armed CCG fleet dispatched to areas near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture.[2]。

Despite the situation Russia is facing in Ukraine, and in spite of a string of reported incidents within the Chinese military,[3] President Xi remains firmly determined to unify Taiwan with mainland China, steadily making preparations for “liberation by force.” And the possibility is emerging that such liberation—should it become a reality—could develop into hostilities against Japan.

While saying that unification with Taiwan is a “must for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” why does Xi appear in a hurry—as if driven by some unknown force—to achieve that goal? Several reasons have been cited, including: 1) Xi is aware that China’s growth has peaked out and wants to achieve unification with Taiwan while China still has power to do so;[4] 2) With his third term set to end in 2027, Xi needs to hurry to unify with Taiwan in order to maintain power and secure a fourth term;[5] 3) Xi needs to pursue a hardline foreign policy in order to divert people’s attention from mounting economic and social problems within the country, and unification with Taiwan is the topmost target of his foreign policy;[6] and 4) As the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continues to rule Taiwan, China’s Taiwan policy is stuck in a deadlock with its conciliatory policy failing and chances for peaceful unification slipping away.[7]The purpose of this article is not to deny the relevance of any of those reasons, but to present an argument based on the view that China is acutely aware that the international community’s perception of “one China” is beginning to reverse along with the rising international status of Taiwan and China’s wolf warrior diplomacy, and that the resulting sense of frustration is driving China to seek a quick solution to the Taiwan problem.

1. One China and UNGA Resolution 2758

(1) Background
On October 25, 1971, Resolution 2758 on China’s right of representation was passed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with 76 votes in favor to 35 against with 17 abstentions and three absent. In Japan, it is popularly called the “Albanian resolution,” because among the 23 countries that jointly submitted the resolution, the People’s Republic of Albania (currently, the Republic of Albania) played the most active role.

Regarding China’s right of representation, the resolution states that:
1) the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations;
2) the PRC is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council; and
3) the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek are expelled forthwith from the United Nations.

Of these, the third item is said to have been added by the PRC at the time through Albania. It is also understood that the delegation of the Republic of China (ROC) left the chamber before the voting took place on the Albanian resolution. As a result, a draft resolution calling for affirming the rights of representation of both the PRC and the ROC was not put to the vote.

(2) Assertion of the one-China principle
Subsequently, having regained its seat in the United Nations, China “normalized” diplomatic relations with countries around the world one after another, like a domino effect. In doing so, Beijing stretched the interpretation of UN Resolution 2758 and demanded that the one-China principle (that the PRC is the only sovereign state that exists under the name of China in the international community and Taiwan is no more than its province) be upheld as a prerequisite for the normalization of diplomatic relations.[8] Basically, each country coped with this demand in its own way. Some countries embraced the one-China principle as asserted by China. Others, however, did not accept the principle as is; Japan said it “fully understands and respects” China’s stand that there is but one China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory, while the United States only “acknowledged” the China’s position on the status of Taiwan.[9] Both Japan and the United States held some reservations about the status of Taiwan to maintain practical relations with the self-governed island (one-China policy).[10] In particular, the United States established the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that it is the policy of the United States “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” to be “of grave concern,” and “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”.[11]

(3) “Reform and opening-up” and Deng Xiaoping’s magic
At the time of embarking on the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China was just a small economy, far from matching its large area. All China had was its people numbering one billion. It was then that Deng Xiaoping worked magic on the world with a declaration, in which he effectively said: “We are now launching a reform and opening-up policy to open the Chinese market of one billion people to the world. Please feel free to come and make money in China. This is a big opportunity. But just one thing. If you want to come, please buy a ticket for entry.”

The ticket for entry means the acceptance of the one-China principle. As if bewitched by magic, countries accepted this condition and entered the Chinese market, one after another. But even then, some countries having close ties with Taiwan—such as Japan and the United States—remained cautious. They entered the Chinese market by simply saying that they “fully understand and respect” China’s position. Having succeeded in bringing in foreign capital, the Chinese economy began to achieve remarkable growth.

However, the fate of those companies having improvidently entered the Chinese market often turned out to be brutal. As literally indicated by the three Chinese words “yang (raise),” “tao (trap),” and “sha (kill),” China first welcomed investments from foreign companies with smiles and enabled them make money (yang), then gradually forced them to transfer technology and know-how to China and made it difficult for them to leave through the formation of joint ventures or by other means (tao), and finally allowed Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that had grown strong enough to take over the entire market (sha). The Belt and Road Initiative can be defined as a process in which those SOEs advanced into the world market.

2. Beginning of a reversal in the perception of the one-China principle

(1) On September 12, 2024, the House of Representatives of the Netherlands adopted a motion on Taiwan, with 147 votes in favor to three against, resolving to: 1) reject China’s distortion of the Albanian resolution and affirm that the resolution does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; 2) support Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations and affiliated international bodies; and 3) request the Dutch government to seek support for its approach within the European Union (EU). Likewise, on November 28, 2024, the UK House of Commons unanimously passed a motion on Taiwan’s international status, stating that UNGA Resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and is silent on the status of Taiwan in the United Nations.[12] Similar resolutions have been adopted in other countries, such as one by the New South Wales Senate in Australia[13] on October 23, 2024 and another by the Canadian House of Commons[14] on November 6, 2024. Amid those developments combined with growing calls for Taiwan’s return to the United Nations,[15] there is increasing criticism against China’s stretched interpretation of the Albanian resolution.

(2) The COVID-19 pandemic and China’s wolf warrior diplomacy can be cited as factors behind these developments.

Amid the spread of coronavirus that began in 2020 and in the wake of resulting shortages of medical supplies and masks across the world, China and Taiwan showed distinct differences in their responses. Taiwan, a non-member of the World Health Organization (WHO), was the first to detect and report to the WHO an outbreak of an infectious virus in Wuhan, China, whereas the Chinese government unreasonably hid the origin of the virus. At the time, many countries were relying on China for the production of masks and medical supplies for their people. Upon the outbreak of the pandemic, however, China imposed a uniform ban on the export of those materials and provided them only to those countries accepting the one-China principle. In contrast, Taiwan unconditionally provided such products for free to countries in need.[16] This prompted the international community to renew its recognition that there is no reason for Taiwan to be excluded in dealing with cross-border issues such as pandemics, and hence momentum built up to call for Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the WHO.[17]

In the past, Europe was different from Japan and the United States in that it focused solely on economic aspects and saw little significance in Taiwan, a far smaller economy than mainland China. However, Europe’s attitude has changed drastically after witnessing Taiwan’s response to COVID-19.[18]

Another factor that triggered this change in Europe is China’s wolf warrior diplomacy. When Australia’s prime minister called for an investigation into a laboratory in Wuhan to determine the source of the novel coronavirus, China responded with a bombardment of harsh words followed by a ban on the import of beef, wine, and lobsters from Australia. This, along with extreme statements—including those completely lacking in diplomatic decency—made repeatedly by Chinese ambassadors to the United Kingdom, France, and Australia,[19] had a particularly profound impact. Also, despite its upper-hand behavior in the Belt and Road Initiative as seen in its summoning of the leaders of Eastern Europe, China has given little regard to the region and failed to deliver tangible economic benefits, drawing resentment among those countries. Other contributing factors include: China’s uncooperative attitude in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, the rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry that has attracted global attention, and growing criticism of authoritarian states following Russia’s invasion into Ukraine.

(3) However, the most decisive blow came when China came into confrontation with the Czech Republic. Jaroslav Kubera, a pro-Taiwan politician who was then the president of the Czech Senate, was planning to make an official visit to Taiwan but died unexpectedly before the trip could take place, amid fierce criticism and pressure from Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jianmin. On August 30, 2020, Milos Vystrcil, who had succeeded Kubera as the president of the Senate, forced his way to make an official visit to Taiwan, defining it as revenge for his friend. He led a delegation of more than 100 representatives from political, government, and business circles. In his address before the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament, he proclaimed “I’m Taiwanese,” mimicking a phrase used by the late US President John F. Kennedy in his famous speech in Berlin.[20]

The visit to Taiwan by Senate President Vystrcil of the Czech Republic, an East European country just as small as Albania that proposed UNGA Resolution 2758 resulting in the reversal in the positions of China and Taiwan, was an open show of defiance against the one-China principle, triggering yet another reversal of fortune for China and Taiwan. Needless to say, the visit enraged China, which responded by imposing “trade sanctions.” However, with its exports to China being by no means large,[21] the Czech Republic did not suffer much.

In January 2023, Petr Pavel was elected as the new president of the Czech Republic and immediately embarked on a pro-Taiwan policy, holding a conference call with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen before assuming his post.[22] Then, in March 25, 2023, Czech Chamber of Deputies Speaker Markéta Pekarová Adamová made a visit to Taiwan, leading a government-private sector mission of the largest-ever scale.[23] All the while, China was unable to respond with any effective measures. Having witnessed these course of events, Eastern European countries began to change their positions, with some countries—such as Poland and Lithuania—strengthening ties with Taiwan. Major European countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, followed suit, reassessing their relations with Taiwan. In particular, when Nancy Pelosi made a visit to Taiwan on August 2, 2022 as the first U.S. House of Representative speaker to have done so in 25 years,[24] it opened the gate for a flood of visits by high-ranking officials from many countries.[25]

Conclusion

This article has discussed the change in the international community’s perception of Taiwan’s status, which has taken place in the course of history from the adoption of UNGA Resolution 2758 in 1971 to date, and the factors that have contributed to this reversal of history. The change that began with one Eastern European country was a result of Europe’s awakening prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s wolf warrior diplomacy. European countries have reached a new conclusion: “There have been lots of talks about one China but it has brought no tangible benefits. Then, why do we have to be bound by China?” In other words, Europe rediscovered the value of Taiwan, which resulted in a significant elevation in Taiwan’s status in the international community.

Needless to say, Europe’s growing antagonism against China, which has been supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine behind the scenes, is also a contributing factor. However, the reason why it feels like the wheel of history has been reversed is that China’s core interest, the one-China principle, has come under challenge head-on as a result of changing perceptions in the world.

In her Double Tenth Day address in 2021, then-President Tsai Ing-wen said, “The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other… the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people.” Back then, the China Times, a pro-China newspaper published in Taiwan, said that there was nothing new in the speech and Beijing’s criticism was not so harsh in that regard. However, when new President Lai Ching-te repeated the same line in his inaugural address on May 20, 2024, Beijing responded with vehement criticism, calling it a “de-facto declaration of independence.” Seeing the change in the international community’s perception, former President Tsai had set a new red line as to how Taiwan refers to the cross-strait relationship, stretching it to the limit. Going forward, the one-China principle will be confronted with further challenges. All this began, not as a pro-independence movement from within Taiwan, but in a tiny Eastern European country, somewhere outside Taiwan. Today, Beijing must be keenly aware that its one-China principle is at risk. It is because of this sense of crisis that China strongly insists on the 1992 Consensus[26] in responding to Taiwan’s call for dialogue. It is expected that China will become increasingly hysterical and uncompromising on the question of Taiwan. And it is understood that this proclivity is reflected in the recent heightening of pressure on Taiwan under the Anti-Session Law.[27]