1. Introduction

On October 14, 2024, a spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China announced that a military exercise called “Joint Sword 2024B” would be conducted around Taiwan. The spokesperson explained that the exercise serves as a strong deterrent against “Taiwan independence forces” and that it is a legitimate and necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and maintain national unity.[1] The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) announced that a total of 153 operational aircraft and 14 naval vessels belonging to the PLA as well as 12 China Coast Guard ships participated in the exercise.[2]

An editorial in the PLA’s official newspaper, the PLA Daily, on the day of the exercise criticized Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s October 10 speech on the occasion of the “Double Tenth Day” (the ROC’s National Day), accusing him of advocating a “new two-state theory” , because his speech asserted that the ROC and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. The editorial further claimed that this stance severely undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and asserted that the PLA would firmly counter “Taiwan independence forces” and external interference.[3] On the same day, a spokesperson for Beijing’s Ministry of National Defense also criticized Lai Ching-te as a “destroyer of cross-strait peace” and a “creator of crises in the Taiwan Strait.” The spokesperson explained that “Joint Sword 2024B” was intended to strike against “Taiwan independence forces.” Furthermore, the spokesperson asserted that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and that no one is allowed to interfere.[4]

Prior to the exercise, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council had pointed out on October 10, 2024, that Lai Ching-te’s speech represented a “new two-state theory” and criticized him as a stubborn “Taiwan independence advocate.” Additionally, on October 9, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense criticized U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. On October 10, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions against the U.S. defense industry, and at a press conference on October 11, a spokesperson for the ministry criticized the U.S. response.[5]

It would be safe to say that, as these statements make clear, “Joint Sword 2024B,” like “Joint Sword 2024A” conducted in May 2024, was intended to restrain the Lai Ching-te administration and the United States, which has been strengthening security cooperation with Taiwan. Considering the well-prepared manner in which the PLA reported on the exercise, it is reasonable to assume that this exercise had been planned in advance and was carried out regardless of the content of Lai Ching-te’s speech.[6]

The purpose of this paper is to compare “Joint Sword 2024B” with “Joint Sword 2024A” and to clarify its changes and continuity. In this paper, the analysis will be conducted based on relevant prior research while drawing on articles from the PLA Daily, statements by PLA researchers in the Global Times (a media outlet under the People’s Daily), announcements from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, and reports from Japanese and Hong Kong media. The aim is to carry out an empirical analysis to the greatest extent possible.[7]

2. Change – Balancing Military Pressure with Emphasis on United Front Work Focused on “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy”

When comparing “Joint Sword 2024A” and “Joint Sword 2024B,” what we can point out as a notable subsequent change is that the PLA explicitly mentioned “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. An editorial published in the PLA Daily on the day of the exercise criticized Lai Ching-te's remarks, claiming they would bring great disaster to the people of Taiwan. At the same time, it stated that China aims for “peaceful reunification” with the utmost sincerity and effort. However, it also asserted that China would never renounce the use of force to ensure that “Taiwan independence supporters” are left with no room for maneuver.[8] On the same day, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense expressed a view on “peaceful reunification” similar to that of the PLA Daily editorial. The spokesperson also stated that the exercise was by no means directed at Taiwan’s compatriots.[9] Also, it was announced that the exercise would conclude in just one day.[10]

These changes appear to be related to the Xi Jinping leadership’s approach to Taiwan policy, which involves containing Taiwan through military intimidation and diplomatic pressure while simultaneously returning to the expansion of united front efforts toward the island.[11] In particular, it is possible that this approach is aimed at balancing military pressure with the promotion of the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy,” which was proposed in the 14th Five-Year Plan in March 2021 and further outlined in the September 2023 document, “Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Supporting Fujian in Exploring New Pathways for Promoting Integrated Development between the Two Sides of the Straits and Building a Demonstration Zone for Integrated Cross-Straits Development.” The “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy” emphasizes strengthening ties between Xiamen and Kinmen, as well as Fuzhou and Matsu, while also accelerating the opening and development of the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone, thus aiming to enhance economic and social relations between Fujian Province and Taiwan.[12] In June 2024, Wang Huning, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, attended the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Model Zone Construction Promotion Conference” held in Xiamen and instructed the promotion of the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy.”[13] On October 15, immediately after the exercise, Xi Jinping, during his inspection of Fujian Province, also instructed the province to take a significant step forward in the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy.”[14]

As evidenced by the participation of the largest-ever number of the PLA’s operational aircraft and naval vessels as well as China Coast Guard ships in this exercise, these changes do not indicate a relaxation of the PLA’s military activities around Taiwan. These changes should be understood as an effort to deepen the combination of a moderate approach – centered on the expansion of united front work through the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy” – and a hardline approach involving the normalization, operationalization, and increased propaganda of military activities. The goal is to divide Taiwanese society and isolate the Lai Ching-te administration.

3. Continuity – Normalization, Operationalization & Greater Propaganda

In terms of continuity with “Joint Sword 2024A,” three key aspects can be identified in “Joint Sword 2024B”: normalization, operationalization, and increased propaganda. These trends have been ongoing since U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[15]

(1) Normalization
When “Joint Sword 2024A” was conducted in May 2024, the Global Times suggested the possibility of future exercises such as “B” and “C.”[16] This exercise materialized that possibility. In the past, the PLA conducted joint operational exercises at the theater command level over multiple years under the code-name of “Joint Action.”[17] “Joint Sword” drills may also continue to be conducted regularly over the coming years.

Even after the conclusion of “Joint Sword 2024A,” the PLA continued active military operations around Taiwan. In June 2024, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense announced that the PLA had deployed 23 aircraft, including helicopters, and 7 naval vessels around Taiwan. Experts made an analysis based on this announcement and suggested that the PLA may have conducted anti-submarine training around Taiwan.[18] In July 2024, the PLA’s Air Force sent 56 operational aircraft across the Taiwan Strait median line and conducted exercises with a Chinese naval fleet centered around the aircraft carrier Shandong. According to Taiwan’s announcement, this marked the highest number of aircraft crossing the median line in a single day.[19]

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the PLA has continued its military activities around Taiwan, deploying operational aircraft and naval vessels even after the conclusion of “Joint Sword 2024B.”[20] Chinese experts have pointed out as well that the PLA is establishing a routine of both regular and irregular exercises targeting Taiwan. It can be safely said that the normalization of the PLA’s military activities around Taiwan is becoming increasingly evident.[21]

(2) Operationalization
The spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command said that “Joint Sword 2024B” involved the participation of the command’s Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force. The exercise focused on combat readiness patrols in the sea and air, strikes on maritime and land targets, and the attainment of integrated control. It aimed to assess the joint operational combat capabilities of the theater forces.[22] As far as reports from Chinese and Hong Kong media are concerned, the exercise was oriented toward operationalization with a focus on the following aspects, assuming a potential Taiwan contingency.

I) Taiwan Blockade & Attacks on Key Ports/Strategic Areas
Similar to “Joint Sword 2024A,” the PLA demonstrated in this exercise that it was considering a blockade operation with a Taiwan contingency in mind. This time, the exercise was conducted at a total of six locations, one more than in “Joint Sword 2024A,” with several exercise sites being closer to the main island of Taiwan than before (see Figure 1).[23]

Figure 1: Comparison of PLA’s military drill locations around Taiwan

A researcher from the Academy of Military Science explained that this exercise implemented a more intensive blockade against Taiwan. The researcher emphasized its significance, saying that it effectively encircled all key areas: northern Taiwan, the political and economic center; southern Taiwan, the “spiritual stronghold” of the “Taiwan independence forces”; eastern Taiwan, traditionally considered a refuge and safe zone; and western Taiwan, the core of Taiwan’s defense system.[24] A researcher from the National Defense University also pointed out that the exercise area in northern Taiwan was aimed at directly striking the Lai Ching-te administration, while the area in the south targeted the stronghold of “Taiwan independence forces.” The exercise area in eastern Taiwan was intended to cut off Taiwan’s energy import “lifeline,” the “support line” provided by external forces, and the “escape route” for “Taiwan independence forces.”[25] The researcher also claimed that the fleet centered around the aircraft carrier Liaoning was deployed to key locations in eastern Taiwan. By coordinating with bombers that crossed the First Island Chain, it created both external blockade pressure and internal coercion, serving as a deterrent against “Taiwan independence forces.”[26]

In this exercise, the blockade and control of Taiwan’s key ports and critical areas were carried out, with a strong emphasis on securing integrated dominance,[27] which entails the comprehensive seizure of information control, air superiority, sea control, space dominance, and land control.[28] To achieve this exercise objective, a simulated integrated attack was conducted, in which H-6K bombers armed with live ammunition hit key targets in enemy ports with support from early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and carrier-based fighter jets.[29]

II) Nighttime Troop Deployment & Early Morning Attack Execution
In this exercise, a naval fleet centered around the aircraft carrier Liaoning and units of the Rocket Force were deployed at night, and carrier-based aircraft began takeoff drills during pre-dawn hours.[30] Researchers from the Academy of Military Science and the Naval Research Academy highlighted this as a key aspect of the exercise, emphasizing that it demonstrates the PLA’s high level of combat capability.[31] It has also been pointed out that the aircraft carrier Liaoning arriving at the exercise area at maximum speed after departing from the Sanya Naval Base demonstrates its rapid response capability.[32]

III) Strengthening Coordination with Coast Guard
As with the implementation of “Joint Sword 2024A,” the “Joint Sword 2024B” exercise also included vessels from the China Coast Guard. On October 14, 2024, a spokesperson for the China Coast Guard announced that four formations would conduct law enforcement patrols around Taiwan (Figure-2).[33] On the same day, the Fujian Coast Guard also announced that two formations had been organized to conduct comprehensive law enforcement patrols in the waters surrounding Dongyin Island and Matsu Island.[34] According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, 12 ships from the Coast Guard were involved in the exercise,[35] and it was confirmed that the Coast Guard ship “2901,” with a displacement of over 10,000 tons, participated in the “Joint Sword” exercise for the first time.[36]

It has been pointed out that these activities of the China Coast Guard formations were coordinated with the movements of the PLA’s Navy. A researcher from the Academy of Military Science noted that the principle of “military-local cooperation and military-civilian integration” was particularly evident in this exercise, emphasizing that the Coast Guard vessel “2901” played a significant role.[37] A researcher from the National Defense University, while mentioning the joint operational exercise between the naval fleet centered around the aircraft carrier Liaoning and the bombers, also referred to the law enforcement patrols conducted by the Coast Guard formations. This development was touted as evidence that the PLA’s joint operational command had become more seamless and that its integrated operational capability had been further strengthened. A former PLA officer, in an interview with a Hong Kong newspaper, stated that Coast Guard vessels would play an important role in supporting the PLA during a Taiwan contingency, including the prevention of foreign merchant ships from docking in Taiwan.[38]

After the China Coast Guard was placed under the PLA’s command in March 2018, several challenges were pointed out regarding command and control relations between the two entities.[39] Similar to “Joint Sword 2024A,” the close coordination between the China Coast Guard and the PLA in this exercise suggests that such challenges are being gradually overcome.

Figure 2: Deployment map of law enforcement patrols around Taiwan announced by China Coast Guard

(3) Propaganda
The PLA released numerous video clips related to “Joint Sword 2024B,” as it did for the “Joint Sword” and “Joint Sword 2024A” drills. Some of them were videos prepared in advance while others were quickly released on the same day they were filmed.[40] Chinese military experts pointed out that the reason the Eastern Theater Command released pre-recorded footage was to serve as a warning to “Taiwan independence forces” and to emphasize that their attempts at national separation are destined to fail.[41] The China Coast Guard also released footage showing the activities of public vessels participating in “Joint Sword 2024B.”[42]

As in the previous exercises, researchers from military research institutions such as the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Science and the Naval Research Academy provided analysis and commentary. Their statements covered: (1) a detailed explanation of the exercise’s content and objectives, (2) references to the significant economic and social impact of a blockade operation cutting off liquefied natural gas supply to Taiwan,[43] and (3) the promotion of propaganda for the exercise’s legality based on the non-interference principle in the 1949 UN “Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States” as well as Chinese domestic laws, including the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” “National Security Law,” “National Defense Law” and “Anti-Secession Law.”[44]

At the same time, the PLA also produced “Joint Sword 2024B” footage aimed at a soft approach toward Taiwan’s residents. The Eastern Theater Command created a music video for the exercise, featuring Air Force fighter jets and Navy warships, while emphasizing that Taiwanese civilians were not the target of the operation. The video concluded with lyrics “There are smiles of our Taiwan compatriots” and showed scenes of residents enjoying themselves.[45]

In this way, like previous exercises, the PLA placed a strong emphasis on propaganda for “Joint Sword 2024B.” Considering its content, it would be safe to say that this focus on propaganda aligned with the so-called “Three Warfares” strategy[46] – public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.

4. Conclusion

Although “Joint Sword 2024B” lasted only one day, it was meticulously prepared by China to coincide with Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth Day” speech and was carried out with the mobilization of the PLA and the China Coast Guard. Compared with “Joint Sword 2024A,” the exercise exhibited the following changes and continuity.

One notable change is that the PLA explicitly mentioned “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. This shift aligns with the united front efforts led by Xi Jinping, centered on the “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Strategy.” The objective appears to be to deepen the divide within Taiwanese society by reinforcing a dual approach – combining the moderate stance of united front work with the hardline stance of military actions – and ultimately aiming to isolate the Lai Ching-te administration.

In terms of continuity, “Joint Sword 2024B,” like “Joint Sword” in April 2023 and “Joint Sword 2024A” in May 2024, was characterized by normalization, operationalization, and increased propaganda. Additionally, while aligning with united front efforts, there has been no change in the policy of exerting military pressure on Taiwan, particularly on the Lai Ching-te administration.

These trends are expected to continue and intensify in the future. In this regard, it will be essential to closely monitor the developments of the “Joint Sword” series of exercises conducted by the PLA, regardless of their scale.