China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces and their future under the cross-domain

Looking at the few research results that have been made public, we can see that Chinese researchers have had an extremely strong interest in the U.S.’s nuclear forces, nuclear strategy, command and control communications, and so on. In fact, in many cases the Chinese military has built its nuclear forces and nuclear strategy theories with the U.S. as a model, so we can estimate with a high degree of certainty the trends in China, which are difficult to understand from the Defense White Paper alone. China is paying attention to topics such as attacks on opponents’ strategic missiles with submarine-launched nuclear missiles and precision-guided long-range nuclear missiles mounted on strategic stealth bombers, which are all fairly important topics, but the author cannot cover them all here, so this column will only introduce a few examples that are still in the nascent stage now but have a fairly wide-ranging impact.

Chinese experts are keeping an eye on the U.S. nuclear forces as well as the question of how to incorporate nuclear weapons into operations. For example, China is almost certain to be considering a posture in its relationship with the U.S. under which if the U.S. deploys nuclear-equipped submarines near the Russian mainland and there are signs that Russia is trying to attack the U.S. mainland with ballistic missiles, the U.S. will destroy the Russian nuclear missile silos before the missiles are launched. What the Chinese side is particularly focusing its attention on is a tactical nuclear attack that would aim to pinpoint the opponent’s core or strategic military locations. In documents released by the U.S., the targets of a tactical nuclear attack include the opponent country’s supreme leader. Chinese experts seem to be nervous about their own country’s supreme leader being the target of an attack. In a traditional way of fighting, such as a people’s war, the supreme leader would hide in the hinterland and be able to quickly escape to safety if attacked, but they probably think that the possibility of a safe retreat would be lower than before if subjected to a tactical nuclear attack.

Another aspect that cannot be overlooked in nuclear strategy or nuclear forces is the application of artificial intelligence (AI). In the relationship between AI and nuclear strategy, discussions regarding the strategic stability of the nuclear balance are comparatively well known. Simply put, strategic nuclear stability is the problem of whether two countries confronting each other with nuclear weapons will easily trigger a nuclear war. When on the brink of a nuclear war breaking out, the fear of policymakers reaches an extreme level, but AI does not feel fear. Moreover, the time it takes for AI to start a counterstrike after receiving information that the opponent is about to fire a nuclear missile is orders of magnitude faster than a human decision.

Therefore, if we leave it to AI, there is a greater possibility of neutralizing the opponent while they are preparing to launch a missile. However, a major issue is whether the information obtained at the start is correct, and discussions have been held on the fact that there is a risk of war if the AI takes counterstrike measures because it misunderstood information it received. Conversely, the counterargument has been made that if humans confirm the information, the counterstrike will be delayed, and they will be defeated. The strategic stability of AI under the cross-domain condition is also being studied in China, using the term “complex strategic stability.”

This application of AI to nuclear warfare is, in the U.S. military’s specialized terminology, the use of AI in NC3 (Nuclear Command, Control and Communications). NC3 constitutes part of the command, control and communications of the JADC2, so the application of AI to NC3 is also part of the conversion of JADC2 to AI. This is easy to say, but technological progress is also extremely fast in this field, and it is said that even while a system is being built using one method, the system is being repeatedly rebuilt using the next, higher-level method.

Chinese researchers have had a strong interest in the conversion of NC3 to AI, so they have read U.S. materials. Furthermore, the European countries also have a strong interest in the conversion of NC3 to AI, and when symposiums take place, apparently Chinese researchers also participate. For China to obtain technical information from Europe, good diplomatic relations are necessary, so there is more room here than ever before to cooperate in the development of the military and diplomacy.

The conversion of NC3 to AI can be a global trend. However, as NC3 becomes more advanced, it will undoubtedly become a good target for cyberattacks. Here too, cyberattacks will be carried out even in space.

As the author has already mentioned, space cannot be free from nuclear weapons, but let’s look at this issue in slightly greater detail from the perspective of how to use nuclear energy, rather than nuclear explosions. If artificial satellites are powered by nuclear energy, the scope and duration of their operation can be improved, and the efficiency of reconnaissance and surveillance will also be greatly improved. Furthermore, if nuclear weapons are installed on artificial satellites, they can be effectively used for physical and electromagnetic pulse attacks against the opponent’s artificial satellites and communication systems. However, cyberattacks can disrupt these nuclear weapon systems and artificial satellite systems in space.

The author has already touched on cross-domain fusion and integration, in other words, at least the four fields of nuclear, cyber, electromagnetic waves and space have been developing while advancing fusion at a deep level in the cross-domain, to such an extent that they can be said to be a quaternity, and it is almost certain that this will continue in the future. Moreover, it is thought that the brain and AI will be fused to carry out command and control communications, and the ultimate fusion of the cross-domain will make progress. And the Chinese side has an extremely strong interest in these aspects. Many Chinese researchers seem to take the view that for the time being, the U.S., China, and Europe will also focus on the security of the part of space which connects the Earth and the Moon.

Of course, it is too short-sighted to think that China will carry out such an attack anytime soon. Furthermore, no country has sufficient capabilities. Even if China has the capability soon, it will not happen unless one person, Xi Jinping, makes the decision. Since Xi Jinping’s health and psychological condition are not well known, we can conclude that future security is in a dangerous situation, like walking a tightrope on a thin silk thread. From the perspective of a calm strategy, China itself would be exposed to such attacks, so it is unlikely that it would start a war, since it would be essential to develop a defense system with respect to cross-domain and with respect to nuclear war under the cross-domain condition.

The role of Xi Jinping must be discussed separately, but it cannot be denied that there is a possibility that China could continue to take a hardline stance and escalate without preparing such a defense system if Xi Jinping goes ahead with it or if he loses his ability to lead. Just as the role of individuals cannot be ignored even though there are trends in history, the fate of the choice between peace and war is ultimately determined by the decisions of individuals. Prior information about those individuals is extremely important.

The circumstances on the Chinese side and the circumstances of Japan

Below, the author will simply explain the departments that have overseen operations and their recent situation, rather than the theory of China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces. This is because discussions on paper (or a computer screen) differ greatly from the actual situation in the field where policies are being implemented.

The purge of top-ranking officers in the Rocket Force

Recently, in the Chinese military, factors other than those at the reasoning and weapons system level must be considered. In China’s case, a major factor is the fact that the core of the Rocket Force was almost completely purged in 2023, including commanders and a political commissar. The reason for this purge is said to be corruption but doubts remain as to whether this is true. It is so shocking that it could be called the Chinese Rocket Force version of the Tukhachevsky Incident.[1] Naval and air force personnel who had no relationship to the Rocket Force were respectively appointed the new commander and political commissar. It is thought that because of the purge, it is highly likely that there is no nuclear strategy leader left in China. Theory is important, but the actual people in charge have been completely replaced. Theory also has a normative aspect, but it is not known whether those norms have been passed down.

Conversely, if the younger officers have flexible minds, their fresh concepts may be realized quickly because the older officers have suddenly gone. For the time being, the approach is to either obediently follow what Xi Jinping says or rely on existing policy manuals (it is unlikely that there are no manuals). From the perspective of Japan’s security as well, there is a strong need to clarify at least some of the actual missile deployment situation through academic exchanges and contacts.

United front work

Here, the author will discuss a problem that has rarely been addressed to date in discussions of nuclear strategy and nuclear forces. That is united front work. Simply put, united front work is a policy to increase allies outside the Chinese Communist Party and, since it often involves infiltrating opponent groups and organizations, it is said to have been closely related to propaganda and espionage. This method is also mentioned by Sun Tzu, who has been widely read in Japan. As the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2023) reported under the heading of “united front work,” it is relatively rare for China’s military power not to be combined with indirect means other than military means.[2]

However, we cannot conclude that knowledge around nuclear strategy and nuclear forces, as well as knowledge concerning united front work, is as widely shared as Sun Tzu in Japan. Many of the theories about nuclear warfare, such as balance and deterrence, have a particularly strong character related to psychology and perception, so this situation is easily influenced by “influence operations” using disinformation and other techniques which permeate the public opinion, media and the Internet of the opposing country. We can say that China’s united front work is what the West calls “influence operations.” Nowadays, activities through cyberspace are also possible, and the People’s Liberation Army has cyber units. It is easy for Japanese people, who respect the power of words, to accept the idea that discussing nuclear issues will lead to nuclear war. The idea is that if you think bad things, bad things will happen, as in the saying “speak of the devil and he shall appear.”

The situation in the vicinity of Japan

When considering the specific development of problems involving Japan, such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, scenarios involving nuclear weapons cannot be avoided. The problem will not disappear even if we turn a blind eye and just talk about other things. Even if nuclear weapons are not actually used, they have almost always been taken into consideration in policy decisions regarding war. The Russia-Ukraine war is no exception, and it is thought that the backdrop to the battlefield not expanding readily there is that the main policymakers considered not only the economy but also the avoidance of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are deeply related to psychology and perception, and Japan is not good at hard-nosed analysis in this field, so it is an arena where united front work is easily used.

In addition, just due to the image of nuclear war spreading internationally, the Japanese currency, the yen, would fall sharply, energy and trade would stagnate, and routes that take more time and money than the Strait of Malacca would have to be used for sea lanes. However, there are pro-China countries in the South Pacific, and China’s influence is strong there, so this may put pressure on Japan. The Japanese economy is deeply tied to the international economy and economic routes such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea are highly sensitive and vulnerable. This is one example of how China’s military threats against the backdrop of nuclear and conventional forces are tied to economic statecraft and economic security; moreover, these threats are also linked to psychological warfare and infiltration operations such as the united front work. This kind of comprehensive idea is essential to measure Japan’s capacity to continue fighting.

On the other hand, China has been trying to diversify sea lanes and transportation routes for energy and goods under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to reduce the cost of war as much as possible. Even if it does not turn into an actual war, it is inconceivable that China will not take advantage of this asymmetry. However, China is also extremely cautious, which is why it has been strengthening anti-espionage laws and other measures, even if that means sacrificing its economic interests.

Looking at the issues this way, it is thought that discussions on nuclear strategy and nuclear forces will become more grandiose, strengthening the links with economic and technological security more than ever before while further advancing the quaternity with space, cyberspace, and electromagnetics, and intertwining with espionage and diplomatic strategies, the political circumstances of each country, and military problems. What the author has done in this column is nothing more than attempt to produce a sound by poking a temple bell with a needle. Research in this field never stops.