In discussions on nuclear strategy, including balance and deterrence, as a prerequisite it is necessary to know the perceptions and psychology of the other party and their differences to our own. However, even now security still tends to be disliked and discussions on nuclear issues often end up as an emotional clash. In addition, for some reason, the stance of attempting to understand the circumstances of the other party in international relations is easily seen as a concession or kowtowing.

However, it goes without saying that, as in the words of Sun Tzu, you cannot do anything if you do not know your opponent (and yourself). When applying discussions of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategic stability to policy, knowing the characteristics of your opponent in detail is the most basic of basics, just as in general human relationships. Understanding the situation as accurately as possible is a prerequisite for Japan to consider policy regarding what to do in this situation. The problem will not go away just because we turn a blind eye to it and do not discuss it. Therefore, here this author will explain China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces, which are not well known in Japan, and how they are changing in the new situation.

China’s nuclear forces as seen in media reports

There have been media reports that China’s nuclear forces have been advancing at a rapid pace, and interest in this field has been growing. According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report (January 2023), China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads, and it will have probably over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. Furthermore, the report also presents an analysis which concludes that China has already completed the construction of 300 ICBM silos, several of which are ready for launch on warning (LOW).

Including the buildup of strategic nuclear submarines and strategic stealth bombers (which are said to be capable of reaching the U.S. mainland with aerial refueling), these moves are a threat to the U.S. as well, and if China deepens its confidence that the U.S. will not launch a nuclear attack against China, the threshold for conventional attacks against Taiwan and Japan will be lower.[1]

At exactly this time, the People’s Liberation Army’s military exercises anticipating the presidential election in Taiwan were carried out in the vicinity of Taiwan and talk of a “Taiwan contingency” was all over the media and the Internet. In Japan as well, there were discussions based on information from the U.S. Upon the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president in May, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (the Chinese military) carried out military exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and outlying islands such as Kinmen Island.

Some analysts have suggested that China is moving away from “minimal nuclear deterrence,” for which 200 warheads should be sufficient. “Minimal deterrence” means being able to reliably launch a second strike (a counterstrike) in the case that a nuclear attack is launched against the mainland of China. On the other hand, research by the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST), The University of Tokyo, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (February 2024)[2] observed that China had changed its nuclear strategy, rather than adopting a solid nuclear strategy such as “minimal nuclear deterrence.” The fields of nuclear strategy and nuclear forces require extremely advanced specialist knowledge, and the possession of weapons is predicated on the assumption that rival countries are watching using reconnaissance satellites and other techniques, so dummies are often created for the purpose of deception, meaning that it is not simple to grasp the situation accurately. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know the framework of the opponent’s strategy.

Opinions about nuclear strategy is diverse among experts, and not a few people among the general public believe that nuclear war is not imminent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many people believed that there was no longer the fear of an imminent nuclear war like during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. However, in the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022, President Putin of Russia has repeatedly made nuclear threats. Putin has not been able to ignore Western nuclear weapons either and has avoided an all-out conflict with NATO countries. Xi Jinping also clearly opposed the use of nuclear weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine in a meeting with German Chancellor Scholz, who visited China in April 2024. In the first place, China has never recognized Russia’s unilateral annexation of Crimea in 2014 nor the independence of the eastern regions of Ukraine in 2022.

While China has, through its statements, presented a stance maintaining a certain distance from Russia, China has increased its imports of highly enriched uranium from Russia as the two Sasakawa reports (May 9, 2023, and May 17, 2024) have revealed. It is said that China can obtain a large amount of plutonium from this nuclear fuel that can be diverted into use in nuclear weapons, which will enable China to rapidly increase its nuclear warheads. If this is the case, it would be strange not to think that the rapidly increasing number of Chinese nuclear weapons would have an impact on relations between the U.S. and China, China and Taiwan, and Japan and China.

Although China has not necessarily been fully supportive of Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s reason for presenting a close relationship with Russia, as seen in the repeated mutual visits between the Chinese and Russian leaders, is not only to deter the U.S. through diplomacy, but also because China is trying to expand its nuclear forces as part of its military strategy while the U.S. is distracted by the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Expanding on this point, we can say that a new international order is emerging. The ties between the authoritarian nuclear-armed countries that are in confrontation with the U.S., namely China, Russia, and North Korea, are growing stronger, and this international order is made up of these countries, the group of Western democracies, and the diverse countries that are lumped together as the “Global South” which are each adopting a balance between the former two groups.

This nuclear situation seems complex and contradictory. However, simply saying it is complex does not provide any answers and is of no use in actual policy. How should we interpret this complex nuclear situation?

Even if nuclear war never breaks out suddenly, the process of escalation in which tensions rise will cause public opinion in each country to react sensitively, significantly curtail economic activity, greatly affect daily life, and put great pressure on governments. Japan cannot be an exception, so how will the public and politicians respond when they know very little about nuclear strategy and nuclear forces?

It is obviously necessary to consider escalation advanced by nuclear-weapon states which dangle the threat of using nuclear weapons. In other words, it is necessary to envisage what negotiations are like in a situation involving intimidation using nuclear weapons and the new order that will be built as a result. As far as Japan is concerned, for the time being, this applies to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.

Countries that already possess nuclear forces will continue to consider the role of nuclear weapons to effectively utilize their strategic resources. The same is true for China, where U.S.-China, China-Taiwan, and Japan-China relations will be affected without exception. As with the case of the infectious disease we have very recently experienced, it is necessary to anticipate how the nuclear situation will develop.

Therefore, this column discusses China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces, but since there are already researchers in this field who are much more specialized than this author, this column will rely on their accumulated research, while also attempting to discuss it from a different angle, by broadening the scope of the analysis. Basic discussions on nuclear strategy, including important logic such as the concept of mutual assured destruction, begin with looking through textbooks written mainly during the era of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. However, strategies usually change when the situation changes, and the situation in the early part of the 21st century is not the same as during the Cold War era. Of course, there are some commonalities, and old textbooks continue to be useful, but they are not acceptable as they are. They should only be used as a springboard for discussion, and it is necessary to think about them yourself. Of course, new textbooks written in foreign languages are useful, but this does not mean you can stop thinking until the textbooks are published.

The number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, which were given the most importance in the analysis of nuclear forces during the Cold War era, continues to be important and serves as the basis for analysis in the early part of the 21st century, but this alone is not enough to evaluate the size of nuclear forces. During the Cold War era, qualitative changes caused by Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and other factors made it difficult to evaluate the size of nuclear forces based on numbers alone. Furthermore, in the 1980s, Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles such as the SS-20, which were deployed on the European front, further complicated the calculation of strategic stability by the U.S. and Europe. This was because intermediate-range missiles could not reach the U.S. mainland and therefore did not pose a direct threat to the U.S. and only Europe was exposed to the threat.

Not only that, but in an age where science and technology have made great advances, surveillance is global, and offense and defense are carried out on the millisecond timescale, we must have broad knowledge which includes not only the numbers of weapons, but also how to use them and the systems that support them. Some believe that numbers are an advantage, but this is not always the case, and the situation will be extremely dangerous unless we clarify the conditions under which the numbers are an advantage.