Introduction

In the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine which exemplifies the unilateral changing of the status quo by force, after the visit to Taiwan by the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in August 2022, China established and proclaimed seven navigation-restricted sea areas encircling Taiwan and carried out large-scale military exercises. This was the first time that China had established and proclaimed navigation-restricted areas encircling Taiwan in this way, so a burgeoning number of observers point out the possibility of a blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.[1]

Regarding the use of force against Taiwan by China, a short war (war of attrition) based mainly on landing operations has been anticipated until now. However, in the Ukraine war the maneuver warfare against Kyiv by the Russian military forces failed even in Ukraine, which has a land border with Russia, highlighting the difficulty of a use of force in a short period.[2] Furthermore, due to the content of the large-scale military exercises in August 2022, some articles say that China is anticipating a long war using a blockade of Taiwan or considers a long war to be the first scenario.[3] In this discussion, the author analyzes an air and maritime blockade of Taiwan centered on the navigation-restricted areas and large-scale military exercises encircling Taiwan by the PLA in August 2022, with additional verification of the military exercises in April 2023.

To state the conclusion first, through its series of military exercises centered on the large-scale ones in 2022, and also taking into account the situation in the Ukraine war, China has confirmed the simultaneous execution of air and maritime blockade operations even in a short war featuring landing operations. Furthermore, in light of the difficulty of victory in a short war, China added not only a short war plan based on landing operations but also a long-term air and maritime blockade operations plan which does not entail a full-scale use of force and is aimed at an economic blockade.

1. The PLA’s activities and operations before the large-scale military exercises

The PLA’s activities and operations in the vicinity of Taiwan have changed greatly in recent years.

Firstly, on October 4, 2021 there were incursions by 56 PLA aircraft into the air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) of Taiwan, the greatest number ever in one day.[4] Just by looking at the trajectories of these military aircraft,[5] we can see that the incursions had little tactical element and were a political response to the application by Taiwan to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

However, some ADIZ incursions involve behaviors which are clearly intending an air and maritime blockade in a Taiwan contingency. For example, on November 28, 2021 five H-6 bombers and six J-10 and J-16 fighter jets accompanied by one Y-20U aerial refueling tanker (first ADIZ incursion), two KJ-500 early warning and control aircraft and one Y-9 electronic countermeasures aircraft passed through the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan and proceeded on to the eastern sea area of Taiwan.[6] Furthermore, in May 2022, the aircraft carrier Liaoning was active in the sea area east of Taiwan and carried out large-scale ship takeoff and landing drills with carrier-based aircraft.[7]

On February 24, 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russian military forces were unable to achieve their goal of occupying Kyiv in a short period, so the war has become prolonged. The factors behind this are the strong will of the people to protect their country as exemplified by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the enhanced capacity of the Ukrainian military forces which are thought to have been increasing their preparedness for war since the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014. Furthermore, a large factor is the provision of military information and cyberwarfare countermeasures and, from that same 2014 until the present time, the provision of weapons and military assistance from outside Ukraine, including the United States (US) and the rest of NATO.[8] We can interpret as military common sense the fact that the PLA is learning the lessons from this Ukraine war for when it carries out an invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

2. Strategic analysis of the large-scale military exercises in August 2022 and the military exercises in April 2023

The large-scale military exercises in August 2022 were implemented in response to the visit to Taiwan by US House Speaker Pelosi and were joint exercises over an effective seven days by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force and included new elements. The PLA established seven exercise areas encircling Taiwan,[9] launched 11 missiles toward multiple areas within those areas (9 missiles according to an announcement by the Japan Ministry of Defense),[10] and implemented exercises with aircraft and ships which crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait.[11] The person who reportedly presided over these exercises was General He Weidong, a former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command who was selected to be a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party in the first plenary session of the 20th Central Committee after the Party’s National Congress.[12] Furthermore, these exercises besieging Taiwan have been analyzed as exercises trialing a part of a plan to prepare for a Taiwan contingency.[13] If we take into consideration these matters, these large-scale military exercises reflect China’s policy of operations against Taiwan. Furthermore, there is a big spatial change from the large-scale military exercises in 1995 and 1996 (the third Taiwan Strait crisis), which involved navigation-restricted areas only to the north and south of the western side of the main island of Taiwan and centered on the Taiwan Strait.[14] Moreover, in the large-scale military exercises in 1995 and 1996, the crisis ended due to the counterbalancing of the military actions of the US and China after the exercises by China (coercion against Taiwan’s domestic politics with missile launches) and the response of the US (in addition to diplomacy, using military power to put a check on China with the dispatch and cruising of two aircraft carrier strike groups and the passing of the Taiwan Strait). However, in China’s large-scale military exercises in August 2022 the US Navy did not and could not take these counterbalancing actions. Furthermore, China’s establishment of seven exercise sea areas encircling Taiwan spatially restricted or made impossible actions by the US in the vicinity of Taiwan; moreover, the actions of the US military forces were restricted legally as well, by the proclamation of the navigation-restricted sea areas.

The new white paper concerning policy toward Taiwan announced by the Chinese government in the final phase of these large-scale military exercises, The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era, stated about China’s goal with respect to Taiwan policy that “guided by the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same family, the CPC and the Chinese government have promoted peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and integrated development of the two sides for the benefit of both the mainland and Taiwan” and that China will “resolutely oppose interference and obstruction from ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and interference from external forces” and regarding the means of doing this states that “we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.”[15] It can be analyzed that these measures include the PLA imposing an air and maritime blockade to block external forces when aiming to invade and impose economic isolation on Taiwan. The reason for that is clear from the fact that in the large-scale military exercises China established navigation-restricted areas encircling Taiwan for the first time, and aircraft and naval vessels carried out drills encircling Taiwan before the large-scale military exercises. Furthermore, as a means of isolating Taiwan, China is continuing nuclear weapons development for escalation to de-escalate,[16] advancing hybrid warfare including cognitive warfare and cyberwarfare, and proceeding with the development, operationalization, and strengthening, etc. of unmanned weapons (UAVs, USVs, UUVs, etc.) including drones.[17]

What makes Taiwan different from Ukraine is that President Biden has repeatedly mentioned “military involvement in a Taiwan contingency” or in other words a “response to a change in the status quo through the use of force,”[18] although as in the case of Ukraine, Taiwan is outside the scope in which the US can exercise the right to collective self-defense and the US government respects the “One China” policy. On the other hand, we can surmise that looking at the decline in the international influence of the US, its policy toward Afghanistan, its policy toward Ukraine, among others, China is anticipating both the case in which the US uses force in a Taiwan contingency and the case in which it does not. It is estimated that in the planning stage of the operations, China, with the use of force by the US and others in mind, will select a short war in order to occupy Taiwan before the US can advance and exercise force. However, it is anticipated that in the case that China could not achieve the occupation in a short time, the US military forces would advance and the war would be prolonged in the same way as the Ukraine war. It is thought that in the case that the use of force by the US and others was not anticipated, China would select a short war or a long war, including an economic blockade (so-called starvation operations). China’s short period war and its prolongation and air and maritime blockade are mentioned in the 2022 China Military Power Report (CMPR) published by the US Department of Defense.[19] Furthermore, it is thought that China implemented the large-scale military exercises in August 2022 because, based on the lessons learned from the Ukraine war, it recognized the difficulty of a short war and learned that air and maritime blockade operations against Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea unlike Ukraine, would be effective in order to stop information provision from external information-gathering aircraft and the provision of weapons, supplies, and other items.

In April 2023 President of Taiwan Tsai Ing-wen held talks with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in the US State of California, where she stopped off during a tour in the Americas, and after that the PLA implemented military exercises over an effective three days.[20] The scale, scope, and period were on a smaller scale than the previous year. Nonetheless, from a military perspective, we can analyze them as the PLA having carried out a new verification which further increased the effectiveness of air and maritime blockade operations. The first reason for that is that the PLA implemented exercises using aircraft and naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait and on the northern and southern sides of Taiwan and at the same time mounted incursions from the eastern side of the Taiwanese air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) using J-15 fighter jets from the Shandong aircraft carrier task force in the sea area on the eastern side of Taiwan.[21] The second reason is the implementation of precision attack simulations against the key targets of Taiwan and the sea areas in its vicinity.[22] The third reason is that China carried out a verification of its capacity to usurp command of the sea and the air and information dominance from Taiwan.[23] The third item in particular was a direct verification pertaining to air and maritime blockade operations, so it demonstrates that the PLA is planning air and maritime blockade operations against Taiwan. Moreover, because China has made it clear that it is planning such operations, we can see that it is aiming to stop the external forces led by the US military forces.

3. Tactical analysis of the August 2022 large-scale military exercises (air and maritime blockade operations seen in the navigation-restricted areas (exercise areas)) and tactical verification of the April 2023 military exercises

If we analyze the large-scale military exercises in August 2022 specifically from a tactical perspective, firstly, based on the positions in which the seven exercise areas were established (refer to Figure 1), China is anticipating air and maritime blockade operations using the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force encircling the entire main island of Taiwan. Moreover, if we analyze the positions and drill content by exercise area, we can understand that they are areas for each of the following operations.[24]

Exercise area 1: This is the sea area for amphibious operations (advances) and diversionary operations positioned in the center of the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, this is the first time China has deliberately established an exercise area crossing the Taiwan Strait median line in peacetime and China actually made it a fait accompli to carry out exercises and drills across the median line using military aircraft and naval vessels. We can conclude that this destroyed the normal situation that neither the militaries of China nor Taiwan cross the median line, a matter of tacit understanding between them, and made the implementation of drills crossing the median line a new normal going forward as well.[25] This new normal has an extremely important meaning militarily because it extinguished a critical line, namely the median line, enabling incursions by military aircraft and naval vessels into areas as close to Taiwan as possible, and furthermore because it has become possible for China to suddenly launch an actual war after initially labelling the military movements exercises or drills.

Moreover, important sea areas which were not an exercise area in August 2022 are the southern and northern entrances to the Taiwan Strait. We can estimate that the reason that the large-scale areas established near the southern and northern entrances to the Taiwan Strait at the time of the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 and 1996 were not established in August 2022 is that minelaying as a maritime blockade operation utilizing these sea areas is anticipated.[26] If we summarize the tactics of the PLA in the Taiwan Strait centered on the above exercise area 1, it is possible that the PLA in a full-scale use of force situation would blockade the southern and northern exit and entrance side of the Taiwan Strait using mines (Sea Denial) Denial）[27] and then after establishing sea supremacy would implement successive air and sea attacks using the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, economic blockade operations to stop economic activities using the Taiwan Strait are also possible.

Exercise area 2: This is positioned in the East China Sea north of Taiwan (the capital Taipei) where ports which are important both militarily and commercially (the Port of Taipei and the Port of Keelung: these two ports handle 20% of the total cargo of Taiwan) are located and Taipei Songshan Airport, a civilian-military airbase, and Taoyuan International Airport, which has the most frequent departures and arrivals in Taiwan, are nearby. Moreover, the very few places suitable for landing in amphibious warfare in Taiwan (sandy coastal areas positioned northwest and west of Taipei: Xinjinshan, Zhouzi Bay, Shalun, Bali Beidi Beach, etc.) are here.

Exercise area 3: The Fulong coast near Keelung and the Zhuangwei coast and Lize Dunes on the coast of Yilan County, which has the only place suitable for landing in amphibious warfare on the east coast of Taiwan, are nearby. There are important ports and airports (the Port of Taipei, the Port of Keelung, Taipei Songshan Airport, and Taoyuan International Airport), the same as in exercise area 2. Furthermore, it is a sea area close to the Nansei Islands of Japan which can be used to stop the advances of US and other military forces from the direction of Japan. Note that a part of this exercise sea area is inside the EEZ of Japan.

Furthermore, China made 1, 1, 5, and 2 ballistic missiles land in the areas 2, 3, 4, and 6 encircling Taiwan, respectively (including the Dong Feng-15B (DF-15B) and Dong Feng-16 (DF-16) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), of which four missiles passed through the sky over the main island of Taiwan).[28] Moreover, during the exercises period one Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was confirmed.

It is estimated that as an operation in the sea areas 2 and 3 encircling the capital Taipei, China is plotting to overthrow the government in Taipei by stopping foreign enemies from the sea areas north and northeast of Taiwan and then rolling out landing operations using an amphibious task force. It is anticipated that when doing so, China will use three islets which are encircled by areas 2 and 3, including Pengjia Islet, to secure a beachhead for the operation and launch an artillery bombardment against Taipei and other attacks.

Exercise area 4: This is a sea area on the eastern side of Taiwan far from the Chinese mainland and facing the Pacific Ocean, so together with areas 5 and 7 it is a sea area which poses a high risk to the PLA. Nonetheless, it is also the most important sea area because it faces the bases on the east side of Taiwan (the Port of Hualien Navy Base and the Taitung Air Force Base) and the Nansei Islands bases of Japan (JGSDF Camp Yonaguni, JGSDF Camp Ishigaki, and JGSDF Camp Miyakojima/JASDF Miyakojima Sub Base) and can be used to stop US and other military forces advancing from the Pacific Ocean side.[29] Note that a part of this exercise sea area is inside the EEZ of Japan. During the exercises period, the landing of the greatest number of ballistic missiles (five) in the overall area and one UAV were confirmed.

Exercise area 5: This is a sea area positioned between the southern end of Taiwan and the Philippines to the southeast. It is an important sea area in the center of the Bashi Channel (an international channel), which is a strategic location for the transportation of cargo by sea, and is located at a choke point connecting areas within the so-called first island chain, the Philippine Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, important communication cables such as for the Internet have been laid on the ocean floor. Note that a part of this exercise sea area is inside the EEZ of the Philippines. One UAV was confirmed in this area during the exercises period.

Exercise area 6: This sea area is positioned at the southwest end of Taiwan and is the largest sea area among the areas established in August 2022 (some of it is inside the territorial waters of Taiwan). Furthermore, this area and the area south thereof (including inside the ADIZ of Taiwan) is also the area which PLA military aircraft have been flying through most frequently in recent years. A major military base and commercial port (Port of Kaohsiung, which handles approximately 60% of the total cargo of Taiwan and Port of Zuoying) is located here. Moreover, there are multiple places suitable for landing in amphibious warfare. Military aircraft, naval vessels, and the landing of two ballistic missiles were confirmed in this area during the exercises period.

Exercise area 7: This is a sea area established after the announcement of the initial six areas and the features of the area are the same as for exercise area 4.

Looking at the features of the above exercise areas, it is possible for China to ascertain air and maritime blockade operations in the vicinity of Taiwan in a short war by establishing these seven areas and verifying the content of the exercises therein. Moreover, in air and maritime blockade operations in a long war as well, it is possible for China to block more than 80% of the total cargo of Taiwan by controlling exercise areas 2, 3 and 6 only.

In addition, UAVs (TB-001s and BZK-005s) flew into exercise areas 3, 4 and 5 together with the missile launches, so it is thought that China trialed an approach to Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the actual exercise of force, including ascertaining the impact position and status of the missiles.[30] As stated earlier, these areas are the most important and the highest risk sea areas for the PLA, so it is thought that China might execute the operations using only missiles and UAVs. Naturally, due to the fact that the exercises by the Liaoning aircraft carrier task force approximately 150nm east of Taiwan in June 2022, the simultaneous exercises inside and outside the first island chain line by two aircraft carrier task forces in December 2022 (live ammunition firing drills, antisubmarine drills, etc. approximately 180nm from the north side of Taiwan and multiple carrier-based aircraft takeoff and landing drills, antisubmarine drills, etc. on the east side of Taiwan), and the exercises by the Liaoning aircraft carrier task force to the east of Taiwan in the same December (more than 200 multiple carrier-based aircraft takeoff and landing drills, antisubmarine drills, etc.) were carried out,[31] a large-scale armed attack in a manned short war using ships and aircraft can also be estimated.

The exercises in April 2023 further additionally verified the air and maritime blockade operations, including the sea areas east of Taiwan. The PLA got long-range rocket artillery, aircraft carriers, destroyers, missile craft, fighter aircraft, bombers, electronic countermeasures aircraft, and refueling aircraft to all participate in these exercises.[32]Furthermore, regarding the scope of the exercises, China carried out live ammunition firing from naval vessels to Pingtan Island, which is Chinese territory off the coast of Fujian Province, incursion drills by fighter aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, and exercises by fighter aircraft and naval vessels north and south of Taiwan, and at the same time used the Shandong aircraft carrier task force to carry out 120 takeoff and landing drills including the J-15 fighter jet in the sea area on the east side of Taiwan and to make incursions into the Taiwan ADIZ from its east side.[33]

Moreover, through the above exercises China also carried out verifications of its capacity to usurp command of the sea and the air and information dominance from Taiwan as a joint operation. We can see that the exercises in April 2023 were truly verification exercises for air and maritime blockade operations. At the same time, it is thought that the above exercises to verify the capacity of the PLA to usurp command of the sea and the air and information dominance also kept in mind stopping and deterring, etc. external forces using the operation of naval vessels, aircraft, fishing boats with militias on board and unmanned aircraft, and using hybrid warfare, including cyberattacks, in a long war utilizing a gray zone situation for an economic blockade which does not entail a full-scale exercise of force.[34]

Conclusion

In this paper, we have analyzed the fact that the range of military exercises and drills which China has carried out in the vicinity of Taiwan, in particular from 2021 onwards, are greatly different from the large-scale military exercises in 1995 and 1996 and are aimed at a full-scale military invasion of Taiwan. We can estimate that the PLA is attempting to develop more advanced, flexible, and wide-ranging operations in preparation for a military advance into Taiwan. Furthermore, if we learn the lessons from the situation of the buildup of military units immediately before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, we can predict that by getting the PLA to implement large-scale air and maritime blockade operation exercises several times a year with respect to plans for both a short war and a long war, China will increase the ambiguity between exercises and an actual invasion and establish a new normal in which Taiwan, the US, and the countries in the vicinity including Japan get used to the exercises. Actually, in China’s military exercises in April 2023 some articles point out that the residents of Taipei, the central city of Taiwan, stated, for example, “I think many Taiwanese have gotten used to it by now” and “if they invade we can't escape anyway. We'll see what the future holds and go from there.” [35] This means we are in an extremely dangerous normal situation which will lower the hurdles deterring China from invading Taiwan.

The PLA is gradually expanding and enhancing the military power participating in the exercises. Not only that, but it is also establishing exercise air and sea areas encircling Taiwan and bringing the scope of the exercises closer to the main island of Taiwan. Moreover, the PLA’s exercises have de facto extinguished a critical line, namely the median line, and have also increased the effectiveness of an invasion of Taiwan using the format of the joint drills by the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force as well as the participating military power, including aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, bombers, missiles, and UAVs. In other words, we can see that for the purpose of a military advance into Taiwan, the PLA has taken into account the situation in the Ukraine war in its exercises and drills in recent years while focusing on the possibility of both a short war and a long war in the vicinity of Taiwan, and for that reason secured the indispensable command of the sea and the air and information dominance before carrying out dry-run exercises for blockade operations.

It is important for not only Taiwan but also the US, Japan, and other countries who share the values of freedom and democracy, among others, to prepare immediately to ensure that we do not invite a situation similar to the Ukraine war before we become unable to judge whether the format of the exercises by the PLA is the buildup of military units for exercises or the buildup of military units to invade in an actual war.

(2023/6/7)