

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## April 2012



## CONTENTS

### Intelligence Summary in April 2012

#### 1. Information Digest

- 1.1 Maritime Security
- 1.2 Military Developments
- 1.3 South China Sea-related Events
- 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations
- 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

#### 2. Intelligence Assessment

- 2.1 Review of “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy” U.S. Think Tank Report
- 2.2 Analyzing “Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan”
- 2.3 Ships up to 1st Quarter of 2012 -Characteristics viewed in the IMB Report-

This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of April 2012.

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## Intelligence Summary in April 2012

**Maritime Security:** In April, there were two hijacking incidents. On the 6th, the Panama-registered cargo ship owned by Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co., Ltd. (NASCO) in China MV *Xianghuamen* (18,160DWT) was hijacked by nine Somali pirates in the Sea of Oman near Iran's southern port of Chabahar. All 28 Chinese crew members became hostages. On the 6th, just hours after the Panama-flagged cargo ship MV *Xianghuamen* was hijacked by pirates 14 nautical miles off the Iranian coast, Iranian commandos stormed the vessel, rescuing the 28 Chinese crewmembers and capturing the nine pirates on board. Chinese news agency reported that the Chinese embassy in Iran had requested that Iran intervene militarily to free the vessel. On the 17th, Somali pirates hijacked FV *Al Abass*, a Yemeni fishing vessel, in the Arabian Sea. The pirates used a fishing vessel as a mother ship in the attack. The pirate retained only four out of the 24 crewmembers on board the vessel, and 20 were escorted back to Somalia. The move indicates that the pirates were already using *Al Abass* as a mother ship.

On the other hand, two hijacked vessels were released. *Somalia Report* confirms that Somali pirates released the Panama-flagged and UAE-owned Roll-on/ Roll-off (RO/RO) vessel MV *Leila* on the 9th. The vessel was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden on February 15. On the 23rd, Somali pirates released the Italian owned and flagged oil products tanker MT *Enrico Ievoli* (16,631DWT). It is believed that a \$9 million ransom was paid for the vessel. The tanker was hijacked off the Coast of Oman on December 27 2011. 18 crew members were on board the vessel.

The British magazine *The Economist* dated the 14th reports on each country's trend of a private armed security guard and legal regulation for anti-piracy efforts.

On the 23rd, the Cyprus Shipping Chamber welcomed the adoption by the Council of Ministers, of a relevant Bill to combat Piracy on Cyprus ships. With the approval of this pioneering Bill, an innovative and detailed legislative framework was established for lawfully using armed escorts by specially trained and certified guards. Consequently, Cyprus would become the first country in the European Union, and possibly internationally, which would regulate in detail on private armed security guards for anti-piracy efforts.

**Military Developments:** On the 4th, Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith greeted about 180 Marines in the northern coast city of Darwin in Australia. The Marines would engage in training exercises with the Australian Defense Force during their six-month rotation as part of the agreement signed by the two leaders of the United State and Australia in November 2011.

On the 4th, the Indian nuclear-powered submarine INS *Chakra* leased from Russia went into commission. With INS *Chakra* and the indigenous INS *Arihant* expected to start operational patrols soon, India would soon have two nuclear submarines. India on the 27th formally commissioned a new frigate, INS *Teg*, into its navy at a shipyard in Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. INS *Teg* is the first of three modified *Krivak III* class guided missile frigates being

built under a \$1.6 billion deal sealed in 2006. The other two vessels will follow in a year or so. On the 30th, India commissioned its naval base, INS *Dweeprakshak*, in Lakshadweep Islands, for further strengthening its presence in the Arabian Sea and extending its reach in the strategically important Indian Ocean Region.

According to the U.S. magazine *US News & World Report* dated the 6th, Singapore would consider hosting as many as four of littoral combat ships (LCS).

The British magazine *The Economist* dated April 7 carried a comment titled “China’s military rise: The dragon’s new teeth”. *The Economist* said, “At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi, facing a barrage of complaints about his country’s behaviour in the region, blurted out the sort of thing polite leaders usually prefer to leave unsaid. ‘China is a big country,’ he pointed out, ‘and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.’ Indeed it is, and China is big not merely in terms of territory and population, but also military might. And that is just a fact, too—one which the rest of the world is having to come to terms with.” Topic has presented an outline of the comment.

**South China Sea-related Events:** On the 20th, the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) of Taiwan confirmed that Vietnamese patrol vessels twice intruded into Taiwan-controlled waters in the South China Sea in March and were forced to leave the country’s territory by coast guard forces.

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), a think tank that establishes its headquarters office in Brussels, Belgium, released a 50-page report titled “Stirring up the South China Sea (I).” The report states the inside details of the fact that lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies stirs up the South China Sea.

Since April 8, the Philippines and China have continued confronting over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. We have summarized the whole picture of the incident with a variety of sources as “Feature: Confrontation between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal”.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** The U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* dated the 27th reported that China is quietly extending its influence in South Pacific region. The newspaper points out that such China’s movement becomes a difficult problem for the United States, which is seeking to protect its own interests in a region of rich fishing grounds and potential resources.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** Reuters reported on the 18th that Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) appears to replace Malta and Cyprus with the landlocked state Bolivia as a nation to register its ships. Eight formerly Cyprus flagged vessels and six former Maltese flag fliers are currently showing Bolivian flags under the names of two apparently new front companies. All the vessels are identified by the United States as IRISL owned and are listed on the U.S. weapons of mass destruction proliferators (NPWMD) blacklist.

**Intelligence Assessment:** Michael J. Green (Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and Associate Professor at Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) and Andrew Shearer (Director of Studies and a Senior Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia) published a 15-page article titled “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy” in *The Washington Quarterly* published by Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The authors have analyzed and defined the Indian Ocean strategy of the U.S. as there is, now, a growing awareness of the Indian Ocean in the US, Australia and Japan. The intelligence assessment No. 1 will first summarize the main points of the article, followed by expressing reviewer’s opinion.

The intelligence assessment No. 2 is an annotation of Mark Stokes (Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute in Washington, D.C.) and Russell Hsiao (Senior Research Fellow of the Project 2049 Institute)’s paper “Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan” which appeared on *The Diplomat* in April 2012 and takes a general view of Taiwan being an important strategic actor which cannot be ignored when it comes to the stabilization of East Asia’s security environment. In “1. Summary of the Original Paper,” a brief introduction with quotations from the original paper is made, while in “2. Brief Comments,” the author’s personal view and comments toward the issue is stated.

On April 23, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) published a report through the Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) based in Kuala Lumpur on the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships noted in the world up to the first quarter of 2012 (January 1 to March 31, 2012). The intelligence assessment No. 3 is a summary of the characteristics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships viewed from the IMB report noted in the first quarter of 2012. As reference works, some tables on the situations of hijackings by Somali pirates since 2010 created by the OPRF have been attached.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### April 6 “Somali piracy hijacks Chinese ship” (China Daily, April 6, 2012)

On the 6th, the Panama-registered cargo ship owned by Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co.,Ltd.(NASCO) in China MV *Xianghuamen* (18,160DWT) was hijacked by nine Somali pirates in the Sea of Oman near Iran’s southern port of Chabahar. All 28 Chinese crew members became hostages.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, the Panama-flagged cargo ship owned by Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co.,Ltd.(NASCO) in China, MV *Xianghuamen* (18,160DWT) was hijacked by nine Somali pirates in the Sea of Oman near Iran’s southern port of Chabahar. The Somali pirates climbed onto the cargo ship by their own ladders, fired shots on the ship. All 28 Chinese crew members became hostages. The cargo ship, setting off from Shanghai, made a stopover in Singapore and then headed for Imam Khomeini port in southwestern Iran when it was hijacked.

Refer to the article: Chinese ship hijacked by pirates near Gulf

[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/06/content\\_14994943.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/06/content_14994943.htm)



*MV Xianghuamen*

Source: Somalia Report, April 6, 2012

### 【Related article 1】

### “Iranian Naval Commandos free Chinese ship” (Somalia Report, April 6, 2012)

On the 6th, just hours after the Panama-flagged cargo ship MV *Xianghuamen* was hijacked by pirates 14 nautical miles off the Iranian coast, Iranian commandos stormed the vessel, rescuing the 28 Chinese crewmembers and capturing the nine pirates on board.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, just hours after Panama-flagged cargo ship MV *Xianghuamen* was hijacked by pirates 14 nautical miles off the Iranian coast, Iranian commandos stormed the vessel, rescuing the 28 Chinese crewmembers and capturing the nine pirates on

board. Chinese news agency reported that the Chinese embassy in Iran had requested that Iran intervene militarily to free the vessel. Two Iranian naval warships participating in the rescue operation followed the vessel and ordered the pirates to surrender. The pirates later threw their weapons into the sea and surrendered to the Iranian navy.

Refer to the article: XIANG HUA MEN Freed By Iranian Naval Commandos

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3219/XIANG HUA MEN Freed By Iranian Naval Commandos](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3219/XIANG_HUA_MEN_Freed_By_Iranian_Naval_Commandos)

### **【Related article 2】**

#### **“Iranian naval commandos free Iran-linked ship by force” (gCaptain, April 3 and The Tehran Times, April 4, 2012)**

A Bolivian-flagged and Iranian-owned bulk carrier, the MV *Eglantine* (63,400DWT) hijacked by Somali pirates on March 26 was freed by Iranian naval commandos with force. Iranian naval forces conducted a raid and captured 12 pirates in a special operation on March 30 and 31 which lasted 36 hours.

An outline of the article: A Bolivian-flagged and Iranian-owned bulk carrier, the MV *Eglantine* (63,400DWT) was freed by Iranian naval commandos. MV *Eglantine* was hijacked by Somali pirates 305 nautical miles northwest of the Maldivian capital of Male on March 26. The commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, announced on the 3rd that Iranian naval forces conducted a raid and captured 12 pirates in a special operation on March 30 and 31 which lasted 36 hours. 23 crew members were on the vessel. According to Iran’s Naval Commander, Iran’s navy has over 11,000 men and 19 vessels in the Indian Ocean to counter pirate attacks.

Refer to the article: Iranian-Owned Bulker Freed from Pirate Control after Iran’s Navy Launches Raid

<http://gcaptain.com/iran-owned-bulker-freed-pirate/?43660>

Iranian Navy captures 12 pirates

<http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/96530>

#### **April 7 “French naval warship intercepts pirate group” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 8, 2012)**

On the morning of April 7, French Navy frigate *Aconit* belonging to EU Naval Forces spotted a whaler towing a skiff while heading towards a position in the north of the Horn of Africa. The vessel made an inspection of the whaler and captured eight suspected pirates, and then the suspected pirates were transferred on board *Aconit*. The eight suspected pirates were released on the morning of April 8 after transit to get closer to the Somalian coast.

An outline of the article: On the morning of April 7, French Navy frigate *Aconit* belonging to EU Naval Forces spotted a whaler towing a skiff while heading towards a position in the north of the Horn of Africa. The high distance to the shore, nearly 600 km, and the absence of fishing activity raised the suspicion of *Aconit*’s sailors. To search the whaler, the frigate deployed a

boarding team after firing warning shots. As a result of the inspection, the team seized eight suspected pirates and piracy-related equipment, although some of it had likely been thrown overboard before being intercepted. The suspected pirates were transferred on board *Aconit*. The whaler and the piracy-related equipments were destroyed and the skiff was embarked on board the French frigate. The eight suspected pirates were released on the morning of April 8 after transit to get closer to the Somalian coast. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: Another pirate group defeated by EU NAVAL FORCES frigate FS ACONIT  
<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2012/04/another-pirate-group-defeated-by-eu-naval-forces-frigate-fs-aconit/>



Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 8, 2012

#### **April 12 “Somali pirates release Panama-flagged vessel” (Somalia Report, April 12, 2012)**

*Somalia Report* confirms that Somali pirates released the Panama-flagged and UAE-owned Roll-on/ Roll-off (RO/RO) vessel MV *Leila* on the 9th. The vessel was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden on February 15.

An outline of the article: *Somalia Report* confirms that Somali pirates released the Panama-flagged and UAE-owned Roll-on/ Roll-off (RO/RO) vessel MV *Leila* on the 9th. Although the pirates were said to be demanding a ransom of \$2 million, it is unclear whether the ransom was paid or not. On the other hand, there exists information, saying a ransom of \$150,000 was paid. The vessel was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden on February 15. 24 crew members were on board the vessel.

Refer to the article: Pirates Release MV LEILA

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3233/Pirates\\_Release\\_MV\\_LEILA](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3233/Pirates_Release_MV_LEILA)

#### **April 14 “Each country’s trend of private armed security guard and legal regulation” (The Economist, April 14, 2012)**

The British newspaper *The Economist* dated the 14th reports on each country’s trend of a private armed security guard and legal regulation for anti-piracy efforts.

An outline of the article: The British newspaper *The Economist* dated the 14th states as below the main points on each country’s trend of a private armed security guard and legal regulation for



anti-piracy efforts.

- (1) Private security teams patrol the decks of around 40% of large vessels in the “high-risk area” that stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Seychelles in the south and the Maldives in the east. When pirates attack, these armed guards respond with flares or warning shots. If it fails, they fire at an attacking boat’s engine. Most of the companies providing these guards are British. A four-man team can charge \$45,000 for safe passage through the high-risk area. The cost to shipowners is partly offset by savings on insurance.
- (2) There exists no legal framework on a private armed security guard. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea a ship’s crew, including guards, must abide by the home laws of a vessel’s flag state. An array of standards created since 2009 suggests good practice for private security teams, but none is legally binding. Spurred on by the International Maritime Organization, governments are now trying to write rules for armed guards at sea.
- (3) Britain wants a voluntary set of rules in place by the end of 2012, detailing the acceptable use of deadly force and systems for company auditing and accountability. It may suggest and define a “proportional” response to pirate attacks, along with approved weapon types and standards of training. American law now allows for the self defence of U.S.-flagged ships within tight rules of engagement. India also allows armed guards; Greece is considering a similar step. The Japanese government is pondering a change to its strict laws, which prohibit civilian armed guards on ships. The United Arab Emirates will in 2012 start allowing armed international teams into its ports.
- (4) At present most teams use Sri Lanka, Oman or Djibouti for weapons storage between jobs. They run the risk of prosecution if they carry arms in the territorial waters of Yemen and other states. An executive of the Florida-based Maritime Protective Services says some firms play safe by throwing their guns overboard before heading home.

Refer to the article: Laws and guns: Armed guards on ships deter pirates. But who says they are legal?

<http://www.economist.com/node/21552553>

### **April 17 “Somali pirates hijack Yemeni fishing vessel” (Somalia Report, April 23, 2012)**

On the 17th, Somali pirates hijacked FV *Al Abass*, a Yemeni fishing vessel, in the Arabian Sea. The pirates used a fishing vessel as a mother ship in the attack. The pirate retained only four out of the 24 crewmembers on board the vessel, and 20 were escorted back to Somalia. The move indicates that the pirates were already using *Al Abass* as a mother ship.

An outline of the article: Somali pirates armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and AK47s hijacked *Al Abass*, a Yemeni fishing vessel, in the Arabian Sea, some 17 nautical miles south of Ras Fataark, Yemen. The pirates used a fishing vessel as a mother ship in the attack. The pirate retained only four out of the 24 crewmembers on board the vessel, and 20 were escorted

back to Somalia in a pirate skiff. The move indicates that the pirates were already using *Al Abass* as a mother ship. They were unwilling to operate with such a large number of hostages on board. Somali pirates are currently using a further 12 fishing dhows as mother ships.

Refer to the article: Pirates Release MV LEILA

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3233/Pirates\\_Release\\_MV\\_LEILA](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3233/Pirates_Release_MV_LEILA)

#### **April 23 “Somali pirates release Italian tanker” (Somalia Report, April 23, 2012)**

On the 23rd, Somali pirates released the Italian owned and flagged oil products tanker MT *Enrico Ievoli* (16,631DWT). It is believed that a \$9 million ransom was paid for the vessel. The tanker was hijacked off the Coast of Oman on December 27, 2011. 18 crew members were on board the vessel.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, Somali pirates released the Italian owned and flagged oil products tanker MT *Enrico Ievoli* (16,631DWT). It is believed that a \$9 million ransom was paid for the vessel. The tanker was hijacked off the Coast of Oman on December 27, 2011. 18 crew members were on board the vessel. It is believed that a \$9 million ransom was paid for the vessel. Some pirate sources claim the gang received \$14 million for the release of the vessel. However, this sounds too exaggerated to believe it, because pirates frequently inflate ransom prices. MT *Enrico Ievoli* was taken while underway from Iran heading to Yumurtalik port in Turkey laden with a consignment of 15,750 tons caustic soda. 18 crew members were on board the vessel.

Refer to the article: Pirates Release Italian Oil Tanker

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3265/Pirates\\_Release\\_Italian\\_Oil\\_Tanker](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3265/Pirates_Release_Italian_Oil_Tanker)

#### **April 23 “Cyprus approves anti-piracy bill” (The Maritime Executive, April 23, 2012)**

On the 23rd, the Cyprus Shipping Chamber welcomed the adoption by the Council of Ministers, of a relevant Bill to combat Piracy on Cyprus ships. With the approval of this pioneering Bill, an innovative and detailed legislative framework was established for lawfully using armed escorts by specially trained and certified guards. Consequently, Cyprus would become the first country in the European Union, and possibly internationally, which would regulate in detail on private armed security guards for anti-piracy efforts.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, the Cyprus Shipping Chamber welcomed the adoption by the Council of Ministers, of a relevant Bill to combat Piracy on Cyprus ships. The Chamber, as the official representative of the Cyprus Shipping Industry, cooperated very closely with the Cyprus Maritime Administration and especially with the Department of Merchant Shipping, during the preparatory stages of this important Bill, which took over a year. With the approval of this pioneering Bill, an innovative and detailed legislative framework was established for lawfully using armed escorts by specially trained and certified guards. The Cyprus Shipping Chamber anticipates that Cyprus would become the first country in the European Union, and possibly internationally, which would regulate in detail on private armed security guards for anti-piracy efforts.

Refer to the article: Cyprus Ships “Anti-Piracy” Bill Approved

<http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/cyprus-ships-anti-piracy-bill-approved>

## 1.2 Military Developments

### April 4 “The first of 2,500 U.S. Marines arrives in Australia” (The New York Times, April 4, 2012)

On the 4th, Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith greeted about 180 Marines in the northern coast city of Darwin in Australia. The Marines would engage in training exercises with the Australian Defense Force during their six-month rotation as part of the agreement signed by the two leaders of the United State and Australia in November 2011.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith greeted about 180 Marines in the northern coast city of Darwin in Australia. The Marines will engage in training exercises with the Australian Defense Force during their six-month rotation as part of the agreement signed by the two leaders of the United State and Australia in November 2011. The deployment rotation of U.S. Marines is part of the Obama’s strategy of shifting the American military’s long-term focus toward the Pacific. Strengthened ties with Australia, one of Washington’s foremost allies, will restore a substantial American footprint near the South China Sea. “We see this very much as responding and reflecting the fact that the world is moving into our part of the world, the world is moving to the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean,” Mr. Smith said in the welcoming ceremony. “We need to respond to that. The world needs to essentially come to grips with the rise of China, the rise of India, the move of strategic and political and economic influence to our part of the world.” A spokesman for Australian defence department told a local paper that the top three priorities to come out of last year’s bilateral agreement were the deployment of the Marines over five years, the greater use of Australian Air Force bases for American aircraft and, in the longer term, the prospect of increased ship and submarine visits to the Indian Ocean through a naval base outside Perth, on the country’s west coast.

Refer to the article: As Part of Pact, U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in China’s Strategic Backyard

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html? r=1 &ref=world>

### April 4 “Nuclear-powered submarine leased from Russia goes into service—Indian Navy” (The Times of India, April 4, 2012)

On the 4th, the Indian nuclear-powered submarine INS *Chakra* leased from Russia went into commission. With INS *Chakra* and the indigenous INS *Arihant* expected to start operational patrols soon, India would soon have two nuclear submarines.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, the Indian nuclear-powered submarine INS *Chakra*

leased from Russia went into commission. Indian Defence Minister Antony emphasized the induction of nuclear submarine would further strengthen the defence forces, but it was not directed against any country. India had earlier leased and operated *Charlie* Class Russian nuclear submarine from 1988 for training its personnel on such submarines. After a gap of two decades, India joined the elite club of nations having nuclear-powered submarines by leasing the Russian-origin '*Nerpa*' for a decade. With INS *Chakra* and the indigenous INS *Arihant* expected to start operational patrols soon, India would soon have two nuclear submarines. Indian Navy crews have already been imparted training for operating the submarine in Russia. A crew of over 70 people including around 30 officers is required to operate the INS *Chakra*. Its displacement is around 8,140 tonnes. With a maximum speed of 30 knots, the vessel can go up to 600 meters in water and has an endurance of 100 days with a crew of 73. The vessel is armed with four 533mm torpedo tubes and four 650mm torpedo tubes. India is also working to develop arsenal for INS *Arihant* as it has already carried out more than 10 test launches of the K-15 missile (also known as *Sagarika*) in the Bay of Bengal. The nuclear-capable ballistic missile is said to have a range of over 700 kms and the premier research agency plans to increase its strike range in the near future.

Refer to the article: Nuclear submarine INS Chakra joins Navy

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Nuclear-submarine-INS-Chakra-joins-Navy/articleshow/12530238.cms>



INS *Chakra*

Source: The Times of India, April 4, 2012

#### **April 6 “Singapore considers hosting as many as four of U.S. Navy’s LCS” (US News & World Report, April 6, 2012)**

According to the U.S. magazine *US News & World Report* dated the 6th, Singapore would consider hosting as many as four of littoral combat ships (LCS).

An outline of the article: According to the U.S. magazine *US News & World Report* dated the 6th, Singapore would consider hosting as many as four of U.S. littoral combat ships (LCS). In 2011, the U.S. Navy announced plans to base two littoral combat ships. As reported by the magazine, Singaporean leaders told the Pentagon they would consider hosting as many as four of

the ships. The decision to base the LCSs in Singapore is part of the Obama administration's shift of U.S. foreign and security policy placing greater emphasis on Asia.

Refer to the article: Singapore Willing to Host More U.S. Warships

<http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/04/06/singapore-willing-to-host-more-us-warships>

### **April 7 “Indo-U.S. Naval exercise begins” (The Hindu, April 9, 2012)**

The 2012 edition of the annual Indo-U.S. Naval exercise code-named ‘Malabar’ being held in the Bay of Bengal began on the 7th at Chennai. The 10-day exercise would continue till April 16. The Sea phase would extend from Chennai to the Andaman Islands, and would encompass a wide spectrum of exercise ranging from conventional War Fight Missions to Asymmetric Warfare. The focus areas of the exercise would be Boarding Operations, Air Defence Exercise, Helicopter crossdeck Operations, and coordinated Anti-Submarine warfare. The U.S. Navy would be represented by ships from Carrier Task Force 70 of the U.S. 7th Fleet, including the Aircraft Carrier USS *Carl Vinson* as the core of the force.

An outline of the article: The 2012 edition of the annual Indo-U.S. Naval exercise code-named ‘Malabar’ being held in the Bay of Bengal began on the 7th at Chennai. The 10-day exercise would continue till April 16. The Sea phase would extend from Chennai to the Andaman Islands, and would encompass a wide spectrum of exercise ranging from conventional War Fight Missions to Asymmetric Warfare. The focus areas of the exercise would be Boarding Operations, Air Defence Exercise, Helicopter crossdeck Operations, and coordinated Anti-Submarine warfare. The CTF would include the Aircraft Carrier USS *Carl Vinson*, Guided Missile Cruiser USS *Bunkerhill*, Guided Missile Destroyer USS *Halsey*, and logistics ship USNS *Bridge*. In addition, one Los Angeles Class submarine, USS *Louisville*, and one P3C *Orion* Aircraft would participate in the exercise. Maritime Patrol Aircraft TU 142M and other Rotary Wing Aircraft were also scheduled to participate in the bilateral exercise.

Refer to the article: Indo-U.S. Naval exercise begins

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Visakhapatnam/article3295871.ece>

### **April 9 “U.S. Navy deploys second aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf” (The Globe and Mail, AP, April. 9, 2012)**

On the 9th, the U.S. Navy revealed that it has deployed a second aircraft carrier, USS *Enterprise*, to the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. Navy has already deployed USS *Abraham Lincoln* there. The United States had two carriers operating in the region in June 2010.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, the U.S. Navy revealed that it has deployed a second aircraft carrier, USS *Enterprise*, to the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. Navy has already deployed USS *Abraham Lincoln* there. The deployment of a second aircraft carrier is “routine and not specific to any threat,” a press secretary of the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet said. The United States had two carriers operating in the region in June 2010. Two carriers were also deployed in March 2003 during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and in February 2007 in support of wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan. The *Enterprise* is now on its last mission. The carrier is scheduled to be deactivated in the fall of 2012.

Refer to the article: U.S. Navy deploys second aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf amid rising tensions with Iran

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-navy-deploys-second-aircraft-carrier-to-persian-gulf-amid-rising-tensions-with-iran/article2395730/?from=sec431>

#### **April 12 “Indian Navy establishes third UAV squadron in South India” (SUAS News.com, April 12, 2012)**

A website dedicated to Small Unmanned Aircraft System, *SUAS News.com* dated the 12th reported that in order to step-up surveillance and reconnaissance in the Gulf of Mannar, Palk Strait and Palk Bay, Indian Navy is deploying a third squadron of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in Tamil Nadu, in South India

An outline of the article: A website dedicated to Small Unmanned Aircraft System, *SUAS News.com* dated the 12th reported that in order to step-up surveillance and reconnaissance in the Gulf of Mannar, Palk Strait and Palk Bay, Indian Navy is deploying a third squadron of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in Tamil Nadu, in South India. The new UAV squadron ‘INAS 344’ will be operated from INS *Parundu*, the naval air station in Uchipuli. The UAV squadron ‘INAS 344’ would comprise of four units of two Israeli-built Searcher and Heron UAVs. The Indian Navy uses UAVs for surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and damage assessment. As concerns other two squadrons, the 2nd UAV squadron in Porbandar, Gujarat came up in January 2011. It comprises of four units of two Israeli-made Searcher and Heron UAVs. The 1st UAV squadron was commissioned by Navy at its base in Kochi in 2009.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy Establishes Third UAV Squadron In Tamil Nadu For Maritime Operations

[http://www.suasnews.com/2012/04/14495/indian-navy-establishes-third-uav-squadron-in-tamil-nadu-for-maritime-operations/?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed:+SuasNewsMilitary+%28sUAS+News+%C2%BB+Military%29&utm\\_content=Google+Reader](http://www.suasnews.com/2012/04/14495/indian-navy-establishes-third-uav-squadron-in-tamil-nadu-for-maritime-operations/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+SuasNewsMilitary+%28sUAS+News+%C2%BB+Military%29&utm_content=Google+Reader)

#### **April 24 “U.S. Navy kicks off Naval exchange activities with Vietnam” (U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs, April 24, 2012)**

The U.S. Navy began naval exchange activities with the Vietnamese navy on the 24th. This five-day collaboration will focus on non-combatant events and skills exchanges.

An outline of the article: The U.S. Navy began naval exchange activities with the Vietnamese navy on the 24th. This five-day collaboration will focus on non-combatant events and skills exchanges in areas such as diving medicine, navigation, and firefighting. U.S. units participating in the naval exchange activities include the 7th Fleet’s flagship USS *Blue Ridge* (LCC 19); guided missile destroyer USS *Chafee* (DDG 90); the rescue and salvage ship USNS *Safeguard* (T-ARS-50); Sailors from Task Force 73; and a Mobile Diving and Salvage Detachment.

Refer to the article: U.S. Navy Kicks Off Naval Exchange Activities with Vietnam  
<http://www.cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2012/apr/apr23-Vietnam-NEA.shtml>

### **April 27 “Indian Navy commissioned Russian-built new frigate” (RIA Novosti, April 27, 2012)**

India on the 27th formally commissioned a new frigate, INS *Teg*, into its navy at a shipyard in Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. INS *Teg* is the first of three modified *Krivak III* class guided missile frigates being built under a \$1.6 billion deal sealed in 2006. The other two vessels will follow in a year or so.

An outline of the article: India on the 27th formally commissioned a new frigate into its navy, following a handover ceremony at a shipyard in Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. The new frigate INS *Teg* is the first of three modified *Krivak III* class guided missile frigates being built under a \$1.6 billion deal sealed in 2006. The other two vessels will follow in a year or so. The 3,970-ton frigate is armed with eight 290-km BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, and is also equipped with “sensors for three-dimensional warfare.” The Indian navy already has three Russian-built *Krivak III* class (*Talwar* class) frigates.

Refer to the article: Russian-Built Frigate Joins Indian Navy  
[http://en.ria.ru/military\\_news/20120427/173085034.html](http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20120427/173085034.html)



India formally commissioned a new frigate INS *Teg* into its navy at a shipyard in Kaliningrad.

Source: RIA Novosti, April 27, 2012

### **April 30 “India inaugurates naval base in Lakshadweep islands” (IBN Live, May 1, 2012)**

On the 30th, India commissioned its naval base, INS *Dweeprakshak*, in Lakshadweep Islands, for further strengthening its presence in the Arabian Sea and extending its reach in the strategically important Indian Ocean Region.

An outline of the article: On the 30th, India commissioned its naval base, INS *Dweeprakshak*, in Lakshadweep Islands, for further strengthening its presence in the Arabian Sea and extending its reach in the strategically important Indian Ocean Region. Lakshadweep archipelago consists of 36 islands and 12 atolls. The naval base was inaugurated at Kavaratti Island. The water area

around Lakshadweep Islands is one of the busiest shipping lanes of the world, and the new base is used for sea lane defense and intelligence gathering.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy sets new base in Lakshadweep islands

<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/indian-navy-sets-new-base-in-lakshadweep-islands/253595-3.html>



Remarks: The area between Minicoy Island of Lakshadweep islands and Maldives is called the 'eight-degree channel' at latitude 8 degrees North, which witnesses a traffic of about 40 cargo ships on an average every day.

Source: [http://4.bp.blogspot.com/\\_E-QOnTGFX\\_o/TUMU9xPD4nI/AAAAAAAAAKwk/EDGLkJoppHw/s1600/islands.jpg](http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_E-QOnTGFX_o/TUMU9xPD4nI/AAAAAAAAAKwk/EDGLkJoppHw/s1600/islands.jpg)



🐉 **Topic** 🐉

China's military rise: The dragon's new teeth  
~ Comment of the British magazine *The Economist* ~

The British magazine *The Economist* dated April 7 carried a comment titled “China’s military rise: The dragon’s new teeth”<sup>1</sup>. *The Economist* said, “At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi, facing a barrage of complaints about his country’s behaviour in the region, blurted out the sort of thing polite leaders usually prefer to leave unsaid. ‘China is a big country,’ he pointed out, ‘and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.’ Indeed it is, and China is big not merely in terms of territory and population, but also military might. And that is just a fact, too—one which the rest of the world is having to come to terms with.” Below presents an outline of the comment.

- (1) China’s military build-up is ringing alarm bells in Asia and has already caused a pivot in America’s defence policy. The new “strategic guidance” issued in January confirmed what everyone in Washington already knew: that a switch in priorities towards Asia was overdue and under way. The document says that “While the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.” America is planning roughly \$500 billion of cuts in planned defence spending over the next ten years. But, says the document, “to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.”
- (2) China worries the rest of the world not only because of the scale of its military build-up, but also because of the lack of information about how it might use its new forces and even who is really in charge of them. The American strategic-guidance document says, “The growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.” Making things more alarming is a lack of transparency over who really controls the guns and ships. China is unique among great powers in that the PLA is not formally part of the state. It is responsible to the Communist Party, and is run by the party’s Central Military Commission, not the ministry of defence. Although party and government are obviously very close in China, the party is even more opaque, which complicates outsiders’ understanding of where the PLA’s loyalties and priorities lie.
- (3) Taiwan is the main spur for China’s military modernisation. If Taiwan policy has been the immediate focus of China’s military planning, the sheer breadth of capabilities the country is acquiring gives it other options—and temptations. In 2004 Hu Jintao, China’s president, said the PLA should be able to undertake “new historic missions”. Some of

<sup>1</sup> *The Economist*, April 7, 2012; <http://www.economist.com/node/21552193>

these involve U.N. peacekeeping. In recent years China has been the biggest contributor of peacekeeping troops among the permanent five members of the Security Council. But the responsibility for most of these new missions has fallen on the navy. In addition to its primary job of denying China's enemies access to sea lanes, it is increasingly being asked to project power in the neighbourhood and farther afield.

- (4) The navy appears to see itself as the guardian of China's ever-expanding economic interests. These range from supporting the country's sovereignty claims (for example, its insistence on seeing most of the South China Sea as an exclusive economic zone) to protecting the huge weight of Chinese shipping, preserving the country's access to energy and raw materials supplies, and safeguarding the soaring numbers of Chinese citizens who work abroad (about 5m today, but expected to rise to 100m by 2020). The navy's growing fleet of powerful destroyers, stealthy frigates and guided-missile-carrying catamarans enables it to carry out extended "green water" operations (ie, regional, not just coastal tasks). It is also developing longer-range "blue water" capabilities. In early 2009 the navy began anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden with three ships. Last year, one of those vessels was sent to the Mediterranean to assist in evacuating 35,000 Chinese workers from Libya—an impressive logistical exercise carried out with the Chinese air force.
- (5) It is hardly surprising that China's neighbours and the West in general should worry about these developments. The range of forces marshalled against Taiwan plus China's "A2/AD" potential to push the forces of other countries over the horizon have already eroded the confidence of America's Asian allies that the guarantor of their security will always be there for them. Mr. Obama's rebalancing towards Asia may go some way towards easing those doubts. America's allies are also going to have to do more for themselves, including developing their own A2/AD capabilities. But the longer-term trends in defence spending are in China's favour. China can focus entirely on Asia. Asian concerns about the dragon will not disappear.
- (6) On the other hand, according to this article, the threat from China should not be exaggerated because of three limiting factors.
  - (a) First, unlike the former Soviet Union, China has a vital national interest in the stability of the global economic system. The increase in military spending reflects the growth of the economy, rather than an expanding share of national income. The real test of China's willingness to keep military spending constant will come when China's headlong economic growth starts to slow further. Like all the other great powers, China faces a choice of guns or walking sticks.
  - (b) Second, as some pragmatic American policymakers concede, it is not a matter for surprise or shock that a country of China's importance and history should have a sense of its place in the world and want armed forces which reflect that. Indeed, the West is occasionally contradictory about Chinese power, both fretting about it and asking China to accept greater responsibility for global order. As General Yao Yunzhu of the Academy

of Military Science says: “We are criticised if we do more and criticised if we do less. The West should decide what it wants. The international military order is U.S.-led—NATO and Asian bilateral alliances—there is nothing like the WTO for China to get into.”

- (c) Third, the PLA may not be quite as formidable as it seems on paper. China’s military technology has suffered from the Western arms embargo imposed after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The PLA also has little recent combat experience. The last time it fought a real enemy was in the war against Vietnam in 1979, when it got a bloody nose. In contrast, a decade of conflict has honed American forces to a new pitch of professionalism. There must be some doubt that the PLA could put into practice the complex joint operations it is being increasingly called upon to perform.

Refer to the article: The dragon’s new teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion

<http://www.economist.com/node/21552193>

### 1.3 South China Sea-related Events

#### **April 20 “Taiwan confirms Vietnam’s intrusion into sea area around island belonging to Taiwan in the South China Sea” (The China Post, April 21, 2012)**

On the 20th, the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) of Taiwan confirmed that Vietnamese patrol vessels twice intruded into Taiwan-controlled waters in the South China Sea in March and were forced to leave the country’s territory by coast guard forces.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) of Taiwan confirmed that Vietnamese patrol vessels twice intruded into Taiwan-controlled waters in the South China Sea in March and were forced to leave the country’s territory by coast guard forces. The Vietnamese vessels were found in restricted waters near Taiping Island, the largest island in the Spratlys archipelago, on March 22 and 26, the CGA said. On March 22, two of the Coast Guard’s M8 speedboats were dispatched. The Vietnamese vessels left after the CGA speedboats arrived. On the March 26 incident, two Vietnamese ships also entered waters near the island. The two ships later left the restricted waters shortly after discovering they were being monitored by the Coast Guard’s radar. No weapons were fired during both incidents. The CGA statements came in response to media speculation. The CGA and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) were ordered to closely monitor Vietnamese military vessels’ moves in the disputed seas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was also asked to issue a strong protest over the incident to the Vietnamese government.

Taiping Island, just 0.49 square kilometers in size, is located 1,384 kilometers southeast of Kaohsiung. Taiwan’s Coast Guard has had personnel stationed on Taiping since Taiwan Marines pulled out in 1999. Currently around 100 Coast Guard personnel are stationed on the island.

Refer to the article: Vietnam vessels entered Taiwan waters: CGA

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/04/21/338635/Vietnam-vessels.htm>

#### **April 23 “Chinese nine dragons stir up the South China Sea—Thin Tank Report” (Crisis Group, April 23, 2012)**

On the 23th, The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), a think tank that establishes its headquarters office in Brussels, Belgium, released a 50-page report titled “Stirring up the South China Sea (I).” The report states the inside details of the fact that lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies stirs up the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 23th, The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), a think tank that establishes its headquarters office in Brussels, Belgium, released a 50-page report titled “Stirring up the South China Sea (I).” The report states the inside details of the fact that lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies stirs up the South China Sea. Below are the main points of its executive summary.

- (1) The conflicting mandates and lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies,

many of which strive to increase their power and budget, have stoked tensions in the South China Sea. Repeated proposals to establish a more centralised mechanism have foundered. The biggest problem is the growing number of law enforcement and paramilitary vessels playing an increasing role in disputed territories without a clear legal framework. In order to solve the issue of the South China Sea, Beijing is required to promote content policy to put the activities of these agencies together.

- (2) China’s maritime policy circles use the term “Nine dragons stirring up the sea” to describe the lack of coordination among the various government agencies involved in the South China Sea. Most of them have traditionally been domestic policy actors with little experience in foreign affairs. While some agencies act aggressively to compete with one another for greater portions of the budget pie, others (primarily local governments) attempt to expand their economic activities in disputed areas due to their single-minded focus on economic growth. Yet despite the domestic nature of their motivations, the implications of their activities are increasingly international.
- (3) Internally, China has taken measures to calm nationalist sentiment and discourage aggressive actions by local agencies. However, China’s current approach remains characterised by numerous ministerial-level actors and law enforcement agencies with no effective coordinating authority and no high-level long-term policy. While repeated and failed attempts to establish a centralised mechanism on maritime management show a lack of political will to address the coordination issue, Beijing might also see benefit in ambiguity. As long as this situation exists, however, its new conciliatory approach is unlikely to be sustainable.

Refer to the article: *Stirring up the South China Sea (I)*

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.aspx>

Full Report is available at following URL:

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.pdf)



Source: *Stirring up the South China Sea (I)*, Appendix D, p.41

**Role:** patrolling territorial waters; anti-smuggling, anti-piracy; maritime policing and ship inspections; harbour and coastal security; research and surveying; search and rescue; fisheries protection. Mostly operates in the near sea.

304 small patrol boats (100+ tonnes), 149 small cutters (500+ tonnes), 19 mid-size cutters (1,500+ tonnes) and 8 large cutters (3,500+ tonnes) as of 2007.

**Prefix:** Haijing-##

**Largest vessels:** *Haijing-44068* (600 tonnes, 37mm gun); *Haijing-1001* (Pudong-class cutter, 1617.5 tonnes, 37 mm gun); two former Type-053 *Jianghu*-class frigates (dual 37 mm guns, dual anti-aircraft machine guns).

**Role:** Anti-smuggling, mostly patrols in territorial sea.

Approximately 212 vessels.

Small number of armed patrol vessels.

**Prefix:** Haiguan-##

**Role:** Patrolling territorial waters; protecting China's maritime sovereignty; protection of ocean environment and resources against illegal or harmful activities.

280 surveillance vessels, nine aircraft.

**Prefix:** Haijian-##

**Largest vessel:** *Haijian-50* (3,000 tonnes, unarmed), *Haijian-83* (3,000 tonnes, unarmed).

**Major expansion planned by 2020:** 240 patrol vessels, including four 1,000 tonne-class, two 1,500 tonne-class and one 4,000 tonne-class, and seven aircraft.

**Role:** Supervision of maritime traffic safety and security, prevention of pollution from ships, inspection of ships and offshore facilities, navigational safety measures (including Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and the GMDSS), administrative management of port operations, and enforcement of maritime safety law; also responsible for maritime accident investigation.

207 patrol boats; majority small vessels, 2 ships over 1,000 tonnes

**Prefix:** Haixun-##, Haibiao-##

**Largest vessels:** *Haixun-31* (3,000 tonne cutter, helicopter-equipped); *Haixun-11* (3,000 tonne cutter).

Target of significant expansion, 5,400 tonne cutter to be added in 2012.

**Role:** Enforcement of laws concerning fishing and maritime resources in all the waters claimed by China; protecting Chinese fishing vessels and personnel, resolving disputes over fishing activities, preventing illegal fishing, protecting maritime resources and protecting China's maritime sovereignty.

1,300 vessels in total, including many small vessels operating on rivers, lakes

and the near sea; 9 patrol boats over 1,000 tonnes.

**Prefix:** Yuzheng-##

**Largest Vessels:** *Yuzheng-88* (15,000 tonnes); *Yuzheng-310* (2,580 tonnes) & *Yuzheng-311* (4,550 tonnes) both of which can accommodate helicopters.

Some ships fitted with machine and anti-aircraft guns.

Five ships of over 3,000 tonnes to be added before 2016.

## Feature: Confrontation between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal

Since April 8, the Philippines and China have continued confronting over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Below summarizes the whole picture of the incident with a variety of sources.



DISPUTED: The Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal

Source: Rappler.com, April 18, 2012

### 1. What is Scarborough Shoal?

- (1) A chain of uninhabited islands and reefs called Scarborough Shoal is located about 124 nautical miles west of Philippines' Luzon Island in the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea). Scarborough Shoal is a triangle-shaped chain of islands and reefs with a circumference of 34 miles and an area of 58 square miles. It has a lagoon with an area of 50 square miles. Many of the reefs are just below water at high tide. The islands and reefs vary in height from 1.5 to 9.8 feet at low tide. (Zamboanga Today, April 28, 2012)



- (2) The Philippine government calls Panatag Shoal (which ironically means calm in English), not call it Scarborough. In the Philippine Baselines Law, it is referred to as Bajo de Masinloc, while China calls it Huangyan Island. (Rappler.com, April 18, 2012)



Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2012

## 2. Background of Confrontation

- (1) On April 8, the Philippine Navy vessel observed eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside the lagoon. The Philippine Navy's newest ship BRP *Gregorio del Pilar* (PF-15) was immediately deployed that day. Two days later, the *Del Pilar* sent a boarding team to inspect the fishing boats. They found illegally collected corrals, giant clams, and live sharks inside the boats. But before the team could arrest the fishermen, two Chinese surveillance ships moved into positions between the *Del Pilar* and the fishing boats. Since then, the confrontation has continued. (Zamboanga Today, April 28, 2012)



Below is a photograph showing inspecting at the time, which was released by the Philippine Foreign Ministry



Source: Philstar.com, April 12, 2012

- (2) The Philippine Department Foreign Affairs announced on the 11th that two Chinese maritime surveillance ships identified as Zhonggou Haijian 75 and Zhonggou Haijian 84 placing themselves between PF-15 and the eight Chinese fishing vessels, thus preventing the arrest of the erring Chinese fishermen. The Philippine government sought a diplomatic solution, and sent a notification to Chinese ambassador in Manila on the 10th, saying the Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal is an integral part of Philippine territory and the Philippine Navy is enforcing Philippine laws on the Shoal. (The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Philippine, April 11, 2012)
- PF-15 left the disputed Panatag Shoal on the 12th for unexplained “operational” reasons and the frigate was relieved by a smaller Coast Guard boat. (GMA News, April 12, 2012)
- On the other hand, three of Chinese fishing boats and one Chinese naval vessel left a disputed area of the South China Sea on the 13th. (Asia Security Watch, April 13, 2012)
- (3) China’s territorial claim under its nine-dash line does not conform with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and encroaches upon Philippine sovereignty, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III told reporters in a briefing on the 16th. This is the reason why the Philippines and China are caught in a diplomatic deadlock involving the Panatag Shoal, the Philippine leader noted. (GMA News, April 16, 2012)
- (4) On the 18th, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario said the country has decided to bring the matter before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to finally resolve the dispute. The Foreign Affairs chief said he is hoping the Chinese government will join it in the judicious way for a peaceful solution.

The move came amid the series of diplomatic meetings between the Philippine government and the Chinese Embassy in Manila that have all ended in stalemates. But the Chinese Embassy insisted that the Philippine side should leave the area as soon as possible. (Sun Star, April 18, 2012)

- (5) On the 20th, China dispatched the 3rd patrol vessel Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessel 310 after the Philippines refused to withdraw its coast guard ship from Scarborough Shoal. Philippine Foreign Affairs spokesman denounced China as an escalation of the standoff. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the reason for the third ship was because the Philippines violated China's jurisdiction and interfered with Chinese fishermen. (Fox News, AP, April 20, 2012)
- (6) Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary del Rosario has asked the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take a stand on its dispute. The Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary said, "Since the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce in the West Philippine Sea are of great import to many nations, all should consider what China is endeavoring to do in the Scarborough Shoal in order to pursue its so-called full sovereign rights over the entire West Philippine Sea on the basis of [its] nine-dash line claim, using a historical record that's clearly baseless." (Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2012)
- (7) Philippine President Benigno Aquino sought to play down simmering tensions with China on the 29th, saying Beijing was unlikely to resort to military action to resolve their maritime dispute in the South China Sea. (The Straits Times, April 29, 2012)

### 3. Basis of Philippine's Claim over Territorial Dispute

- (1) The Philippines controls Panatag Shoal and also eight of the islands in the Spratly Islands (known as the Kalayaan Island Group: KIG in the Philippine).
- (2) The name Bajo de Masinloc was a name given to the shoal by the Spanish governor in 1734. Another map published in 1808 in Madrid also showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of Philippine territory. (The Manila Times.net, April 17, 2012)
- (3) In March 2009, the Philippine promulgated Republic Act 9522 or the 2009 Philippine Baselines law. The second paragraph of the law stipulates Panatag Shoal and Kalayaan Island Group as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Republic Act 9522 or the 2009 Philippine Baselines law

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

- a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
- b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

(Source: Philippine Law and Jurisprudence Data Bank: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra\\_9522\\_2009.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html))

- (4) On the 18th, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs detailed in its homepage ground for the argument that the Philippines exercise over its jurisdiction and sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc in full scale, and sovereign rights over the surrounding seas and continental shelf.

(BACKGROUND ON THE BAJO DE MASINLOC (PANATAG) INCIDENT, The Official Website of the Department of Foreign Affairs - Republic of the Philippines, April 18, 2012.

<http://dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/5216-philippine-position-on-bajo-de-masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity#> )

### 3. China's Response

- (1) *People's Daily* dated the 16th stated the sum and substance on the incident as follows.
- (a) The Philippine has recently tried to “enforce the law” in the Huangyan Island waters of China, seriously violating China's sovereignty and the consensus of maintaining the peace and stability in the South China Sea.
- (b) China does not hope to see the confrontation between Chinese and Philippine ships in Huangyan Island waters. China has been adhering to the basic principles of “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” The appearance of Chinese ocean surveillance ship sent a clear signal that China will not continue to tolerate the insatiable action. To return to the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” is the only right choice. The negotiation of “the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” with a legal effect has begun brewing and China has proposed to establish the expert group to discuss with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on relevant issues. On the one hand, China should strive to promote cooperation and political consultation and on the other hand it should ensure that China's sovereignty is inviolable. The two hands are complementary and indispensable in the basic framework of China's peaceful development.
- (c) The action of China's ocean surveillance ship must be intensified. (People's Daily Online, April 16, 2012)
- (2) On the 21st, China criticized that U.S.-Philippine military exercises called “Balikatan” which started on the 16th have raised risks of armed confrontation over the disputed South China Sea. China's official *Liberation Army Daily* stressed that the U.S. action will only stir up the entire South China Sea situation towards increasing chaos, and this will inevitably have a massive impact on regional peace and stability. (Reuters, April 21, 2012)

### 4. Taiwan's Response

According to a report by *Rappler.com* dated May 2, Taiwan's Foreign Ministry renewed Taiwan's territorial claim over Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) while looking at the deadlocked territorial dispute over the island between China and the Philippines. According to a report by Taiwan's Foreign Affairs Ministry for a presentation before the country's Foreign and

National Defense Committee, Taiwan is willing to jointly explore South China Sea's resources with other countries. In its report, Taiwan regards the Philippines's claim over Scarborough Shoal as "illegal." Additionally, there is a statement of saying that the Philippines' claim sovereignty over Huangyan Island is illegal in the report. Taiwan's defense ministry also said Taiwanese officials will regularly visit the South China Sea to ensure the surveillance system of the country's Coast Guard Administration on Taiping Island. On April 30, Taiwanese solons flew to Spratly Islands and claimed Taiwan's sovereignty over it. In a position paper published April 20, Taiwan staked a claim to the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Islands, and Pratas Islands as well as Huangyan Island. Taiwan then called on other claimants such as China and the Philippines to respect the United Nations (U.N.) Charter as well as UNCLOS. (Rappler.com, May 2, 2012)

#### 5. U.S.'s Response

- (1) The U.S.-Philippines first meeting in Washington on April 30 was held by ministers in charge of foreign and defense affairs. The joint statement said the U.S.-Philippines alliance is stronger than ever, and the ministers reaffirm our shared obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. (Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, April 30, 2012)
- (2) According to *The New York Times* dated May 1, Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary del Rosario said in answer to a question in a press conference, "The United States have expressed that they will honor their obligations under the mutual defense treaty." However, it is not clear how the treaty obligation might be applied in Scarborough Shoal. (The New York Times, May 1, 2012)
- (3) The United States and Philippine troops kicked off joint military exercises called "Balikatan" on the 16th. The number of American troops totaling 4,500 who will participate in annual war games with the Philippine military is the largest ever. The number of Filipino troops is 2,300. The drill site is around Palawan Islands. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Jesse Dellosa, said while the partnership has helped with the country's response to internal threats, the country's ability to handle international issues such as the territorial dispute with China remains weak. "Given the international situation we are in, I say that this exercise, in connection with all those that we have had in the past, is a timely and mutually beneficial event for us and our U.S. counterparts," he said. (VOA News, April 16, 2012)

#### 6. U.S. Experts' Commentary

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College contributed an commentary titled "Small-Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea" to the U.S. magazine *The National Interest* (electronic version) dated April 23, discussing the sum and substance on "Small-Stick Diplomacy" below, which uses maritime surveillance ships such as China Maritime Surveillance's and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command's, not warships.

- (1) It makes eminently good sense for China to dispatch lightly armed—or even unarmed—noncombat vessels to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea. No Chinese warships got involved in this situation. Beijing’s muted approach fitted Beijing’s response that conforms to its pattern of calibrating deployments of force to the circumstances while holding overwhelming military might in reserve to deter or compel recalcitrant Southeast Asian states. Beijing has displayed an impressive capacity to learn from its mistakes since 2010, when its hamfisted tactics frightened China’s weaker neighbors into making common cause among themselves and with the United States.
- (2) Beijing is evidently expanding its maritime enforcement services so-called “the five dragons” faster than the PLA Navy. Beijing’s buildup of nonmilitary sea power testifies to its balanced approach to managing the nation’s nautical surroundings. Employing non-naval assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims throughout Asian waters.
  - (a) First, using coast-guard-like assets reinforces China’s diplomatic messaging. Sending warships would indicate that China accepts that it is competing for territory claimed by others. Sending enforcement vessels, by contrast, matter-of-factly signals that China is policing sovereign waters. Furthermore, relying on non-naval vessels partially inoculates Beijing against the charge that it is practicing gunboat diplomacy. China’s narrative: this isn’t diplomacy at all, it’s routine law enforcement!
  - (b) Second, the lopsided power mismatch between China and ASEAN dictates a softer touch. Since the Philippines’ naval power rarely rates as a coast guard, Beijing can afford to use its maritime enforcement services, not its warships. Relying on the maritime-enforcement services limits the chances of a diplomatic debacle that seems to be a bully in regional eyes without forfeiting Chinese interests.
  - (c) Third, employing nonmilitary means eschews escalation while keeping disputes local. Using a blunt military instrument like the PLA Navy would internationalize any minor incident, bringing about the outcome China fears most.
  - (d) Fourth, maritime surveillance vessels empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve.
- (3) And if all else fails, Beijing can employ its navy as a backstop to the maritime enforcement services. That China—unlike the Philippines—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. Given the strategic benefits of nonmilitary sea power, maritime-law enforcement promises to remain a growth industry in China in the coming years. It behooves the United States and its Southeast Asian allies to pay as much attention to unglamorous civilian ships—China’s small stick—as they do to big-stick platforms such as an aircraft carrier that dominate headlines. Scarborough Shoal is a harbinger of things to come. Never overlook the political value of maritime surveillance ships.

## 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

### April 27 “China extends its influence in South Pacific” (The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2012)


The U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* dated the 27th reported that China is quietly extending its influence in South Pacific region. The newspaper points out that such China’s movement becomes a difficult problem for the United States, which is seeking to protect its own interests in a region of rich fishing grounds and potential resources.

An outline of the article: The U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* dated the 27th reported that China is quietly extending its influence among island nations in the South Pacific, encroaching in a region of strategic importance to the United States. The newspaper states the salient points of this problem as follows.

- (1) China is quietly extending its influence among island nations dotted across the South Pacific, encroaching in a region of strategic importance to the United States. China’s role presents a problem for the United States, which is seeking to protect its own interests in a region of rich fishing grounds and potential resources.
- (2) Tonga is a prime example of the trend. The Kingdom of Tonga is now dependent on financial assistance from China to support a weak economy and fund new infrastructure. China accounts for about 62% of Tonga’s total external debt. Official figures show that as of December 31, 2011, Tonga owed \$113.6 million to the Export-Import Bank of China and to the Bank of China, equal to about a quarter of the economy.
- (3) A mixture of loans and aid is allowing China to build a foothold far into the Pacific region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned House lawmakers in 2011 about China’s growing presence in the region, but now officials play down her concerns about competing interests. “But we don’t see this as an area for China-U.S. competition.” U.S. financial support for the region was up around a third in 2010 from five years before, to around \$200 million, USAID data show. From 2005 to 2009, China’s grants and loans to Pacific islands swelled to \$600 million from \$23.2 million, according to research by the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank.

Refer to the article: China Seeks to Star in South Pacific

[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577334522576045372.html?mod=rss\\_about\\_china](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577334522576045372.html?mod=rss_about_china)



Source: The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2012

## 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

### April 18 “Bolivia becomes nation to register Iranian ship” (Chicago Tribune, Reuters, April 18, 2012)

Reuters reported on the 18th that Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) appears to replace Malta and Cyprus with the landlocked state Bolivia as a nation to register its ships. Eight formerly Cyprus flagged vessels and six former Maltese flag fliers are currently showing Bolivian flags under the names of two apparently new front companies. All the vessels are identified by the United States as IRISL owned and are listed on the U.S. weapons of mass destruction proliferators (NPWMD) blacklist.

An outline of the article: Reuters reported on the 18th that Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) appears to replace Malta and Cyprus with the land-locked state Bolivia as a nation to register its ships. Despite a 2010 U.N. resolution on dealing with Iranian government front companies, until recently Maltese flags still fluttered at the masts of 48 of 144 IRISL vessels identified by the EU, while Cypriot colours flew above 12. With Malta and Cyprus coming under increased pressure from to stop flagging Iranian government-linked ships, there has been a flurry of registrations in the last few months in landlocked Bolivia. The head of the Bolivian registry told Reuters there was no sign that any of the vessels registered over the last few weeks were Iranian but if there was any evidence of sanctions violating vessels Bolivia would remove them from the list. IRISL is frequently shifting the official registered owners, flags and names of vessels in an attempt to conceal their connection to the firm that is a key supply network suspected as an Iran nuclear weapons program. Eight formerly Cyprus flagged vessels and six former Maltese flag fliers are currently showing Bolivian flags under the names of the Andulena Corporation and the Auris Marine Company. Cross referencing of IMO numbers by Reuters shows that all the vessels are identified by the United States as IRISL owned and are listed on the U.S. weapons of mass destruction proliferators (NPWMD) blacklist.

Refer to the article: Bolivia poised to de-flag Iranian ships

[http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-18/news/sns-rt-iran-shipsbolivial6e8fi8kx-20120418\\_1\\_ship-registry-iran-shipping-lines-iranian-ships](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-18/news/sns-rt-iran-shipsbolivial6e8fi8kx-20120418_1_ship-registry-iran-shipping-lines-iranian-ships)

**April 27 “U.S. supports port security of Indonesia” (The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2012)**

According to the Indonesian newspaper *The Jakarta Post* dated the 27th, the U.S. government is working in partnership with the Indonesian Transportation Ministry to support port security with total donations for training and equipment worth US\$1.02 million throughout 2012.

An outline of the article: According to the Indonesian newspaper *The Jakarta Post* dated the 27th, the U.S. government is working in partnership with the Indonesian Transportation Ministry to support port security with total donations for training and equipment worth US\$1.02 million throughout 2012. Deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and the ministry’s sea transportation director general marked the handover of 74 personal radiation detectors and four radioisotope identification devices on the 27th.

Refer to the article: US donates more than \$1 million for port security

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/27/us-donates-more-1-million-port-security.html>



## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### 2.1 Review of “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy”

In spring 2012, Michael J. Green (Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and Associate Professor at Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) and Andrew Shearer (Director of Studies and a Senior Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia) published a 15-page article titled “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy” in *The Washington Quarterly* published by Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.<sup>1</sup>

The authors have analyzed and defined the Indian Ocean strategy of the U.S. as there is, now, a growing awareness of the Indian Ocean in the US, Australia and Japan. In this article, there are three focuses of US interest as listed below. Firstly, the Indian Ocean is important to maintain as a secure highway for international commerce. Secondly, there are strategic choke points of the Indian Ocean highway in the Strait of Holms on one end and the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea on the other. Considering there is crisis with Iran and China, these areas are of more immediate concern for the US. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean is likely to remain the main arena of Sino-Indian Competition in the long run or at least in near future.

The authors have also analyzed how these three US interests should be dealt with while at the same time analyzing their seriousness. In this review, I will first summarize the main points of the article, followed by expressing my opinion about why Japan and U.S. are presently interested in the Indian Ocean.

#### I . Summary of the main points of the article

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a major center of geostrategic interest in the past few years. U.S. and key U.S. allies have also mentioned the Indian Ocean in their official documents such as The Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper and Japan’s 2011 National Defense Policy Guidelines.

Such official focus on the Indian Ocean, by way of these documents, has been fueled by Robert Kaplan’s 2010 book *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* and documents written in the Naval War College, the American Enterprise Institute, the Lowy Institute (Australia), and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (Japan) etc. All of these strategic researches have made a long list of security issues.

According to the view from U.S., the Indian Ocean region is not a region that resembles the 19th-century strategic vulnerability of the Caribbean under threat from Europe or the

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<sup>1</sup> Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy”, *The Washington Quarterly* Spring 2012 Volume 35 Number.2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. This paper is available at following URL:  
<https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf>

20th-century Western Pacific from Japan. This is because India is likely to be a “net exporter of security” in the Indian Ocean region in the future. If so, what vital U.S. interests really are at stake today? What strategy is required to protect and advance those interests?

### 1. U.S. Interests

While deliberating upon the focal points of U.S. strategy, to maintain the Indian Ocean as a secure highway for international commerce is the most important. To maintain freedom of navigation through the strategic chokepoints of the Indian Ocean highway - the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, around southern Africa and the Mozambique Channel - is second. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean region could become an arena for great power strategic competition between India and China.

#### (1) Thinking through Sino-Indian Competition

It is important to assess these trends cautiously and carefully. Even if China develops effective power-projection forces (20 or 30 years later) including an effective carrier-borne strike forces and military support facilities in the Indian Ocean, this would still operate at some disadvantage. Long distances from ports in southern China would make for their supply lines vulnerable around the Strait of Malacca and other chokepoints. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would face challenges very similar to the situation the imperial Japanese navy faced in the Indian Ocean during 1942 ~ 1943 when they could not dominate in the region.

However, there is another example from history that suggests being cautious. Though the Soviets never had the ability to dominate the Indian Ocean region, but one cannot deny the possibility of them transferring what are now called anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities to the Indian Ocean. This possibility could have been a serious threat during Cold War. A similar threat by China has to be considered in the long run.

In any case, there is a distinct possibility that Beijing would face significant counter-balancing among maritime powers in the Indian Ocean.

#### (2) Nearer-Term Risks?

In the meantime, there is a growing pressure in the eastern gateway of the Indian Ocean. Beijing has upped the ante in the South China Sea (particularly Vietnam and the Philippines) diplomatically and militarily. In the absence of the United States, China would be on track to become the dominant maritime power in that sub-region.

However, the more immediate challenge is actually from Iran but in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States will need to keep two things in place, first, defense-in-depth and deterrence to respond from the Indian Ocean region to any Iranian activities against the Strait of Hormuz an immediate strategy, and second, dissuasion vis-a-vis Chinese pressures from the South China Sea on chokepoints at that end of the Indian Ocean as a longer-term strategy.

### 2. Components of a U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy

The three U.S. geostrategic interests at stake, i.e. “maintaining a secure highway”, “sanitizing great power rivalry in Asia”, and “defending chokepoints” are going to be on top priority for the U.S. In this context, listed below are the five interlocking principles for the U.S. National Security

Council.

(1) Resources Matter

The Obama administration sent a signal by promising not to take defense cuts out of the Pacific Command. However, even the current plans would decrease U.S. defense spending by the size of Japan's defense budget each year. This is of considerable significance as Japan is the largest U.S. ally in the region and the sixth largest defense spender in the world. The Pacific Command's ability to execute its mission could seriously degrade. Japan or other homeports in Australia and Singapore could be based to engage exercises and demonstrate presence in the vast region, but deep budget cuts would affect how much the Pacific Command could actually engage and demonstrate its presence in the vast region. It is a fact that a crisis with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz will draw capabilities out from the Pacific Command's area of responsibility (AOR) because there will be less capability based in Europe.

(2) Diego Garcia and Australia Matter

Although the United States does not need a major new military presence in the Indian Ocean except for Diego Garcia, HMAS Stirling, a major Australian Naval base in Western Australia, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. HMAS Stirling offers deep-water port facilities which are capable of expansion to accommodate aircraft carriers, support facilities for surface vessels and submarines, and ready access to extensive naval exercising areas. In World War II, up to 30 U.S. submarines were based in the same area. A relatively modest investment in upgrading the existing Cocos Islands runway and facilities which are located in Australian territory 3,000 kilometers northwest of Perth, roughly midway between the Australian mainland and Sri Lanka would provide a valuable staging point for long-range U.S. aircraft operating into the Bay of Bengal and beyond.

(3) Balance of Power Matters

The United States does not need to plan for significant increases in its permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean except for Diego Garcia, HMAS Stirling and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. U.S. strategy should focus on supporting Indian preeminence in the Indian Ocean and closer U.S.—India strategic cooperation, recognizing that there are realistic limits to this that stop well short of a full-fledged alliance. In addition, U.S. strategy should encourage closer alignment among the maritime democracies. Enhanced strategic consultations would be useful in time for return to the U.S.—Japan—Australia—India “Quad” concept. A strategy of gradual alignment among maritime powers in the Indian Ocean has three advantages: first, it helps to dissuade China from seeking parity over India alone, thus securing the highway; second, it provides an arena outside of Beijing's most sensitive areas of “core interest” to demonstrate that Chinese assertiveness will make counter-alignment strategies by other states in the region; and third, it creates capacity and norms for security cooperation that will discourage unilateral power plays in response to piracy, terrorism, or other littoral challenges in the Indian Ocean by China.

#### (4) Regional Architecture Matters Less...In This Case

It remains doubtful whether there is another architectural solution to the problem comparable to the U.S. approach to ASEAN or the Western Pacific. The U.S. government should be careful about broad U.S.-led Indian Ocean initiatives for four reasons as listed below. Firstly, if the most important U.S. strategic interest in the region is supporting Indian leadership then it should not undermine or challenge that leadership. Secondly, the areas where U.S. and Indian definitions of national interest often diverge such as the issues of seabed exploitation or climate change, suggesting that these should be handled quietly in bilateral or global forums rather than as centerpieces of an Indian Ocean regional initiative. Thirdly, India's residual non-alignment pathologies tend to come out often in multilateral forums. India's strategic culture is changing in the direction that will underpin U.S. strategic interests. Thus, U.S. strategy should reinforce the changing bilateral cooperation or mini-lateral efforts such as the Quad or the new U.S.—Japan—India trilateral dialogue. Fourthly, because the challenges facing the Indian Ocean region are simply too diverse, one-size-fits-all architectural solution is needed.

#### (5) Taiwan Matters

If U.S. policy shifts toward active promotion of Taiwan's independence from the mainland it would invite direct Chinese confrontation and produce little positive results in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. However, strong and sustained U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and opposing unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is critical. Chinese coercion of Taiwan through economic or military means would weaken U.S. and Japanese strategic influence in the Western Pacific and encourage the PLAN to focus on the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean eventually. In contrast, if democratic Taiwan, for the sake of security concerns, suggests positive changes in China's own political and strategic culture, it makes a positive contribution to a broader Asia including the Indian Ocean region.

### 3. A Strategic Problem: Not a Crisis

"Despite all the recent attention, there is no immediate or looming crisis in the security of the Indian Ocean." Hence, it is important to preserve these interests by old-fashioned alliance management, maintaining naval power in the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea and the highway (supported from Diego Garcia and Australia), maintaining vibrant alliances in East Asia, clear commitments to Taiwan, and developing a strategic partnership with a rising India.

## II. Comments –India is Rising as a Naval Power-

What kind of interests Japan and U.S. have in the Indian Ocean? How vital are these interests? It is to these important questions that I now turn. Military operations in the Indian Ocean have been not been discussed exhaustively either by Japan or U.S. However, both have implemented certain military operations in the region. Many examples may be cited from the past. For example, in World War I, Japan escorted the Allies ships in the Indian Ocean. In the Battle of Ceylon in 1942, it sent five aircraft carriers for the battle. Further, in World War II,

Japan's submarines attacked sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean region. Similar examples may also be cited from the post war era. As a peaceful country, Japan participated in the mission of minesweepers after the Gulf War in 1991. Since then, cases of Japan's involvement in the region have only grown with time. Several examples will substantiate this claim. The refueling mission after 9/11 from 2001 to 2009, the disaster relief operation for the large earthquake offshore Sumatra in Indonesia and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, the disaster relief Operation in Pakistan in 2007, the measures against piracy in the Indian Ocean Region since 2009 etc. However, there remains a gap. Despite Japan implementing these military operations in the Indian Ocean for a long time now, there are few sufficient systematic researches and discussions that explore the various dimensions of the connections between the security of Japan and the security of the Indian Ocean.

Compared to Japan, United States has implemented bigger and more aggressive military activities in the Indian Ocean. Again, we could illustrate with examples from the past. In the Sino-Indian war in 1962, US dispatched aircraft carrier to support India. In the Indo-Pak war of 1971, after the British decided to withdraw from bases "East of Suez", US dispatched an aircraft carrier to support Pakistan in constructing base in Diego Garcia. Naval ship visited for refueling and planned to set up the transmission facilities of Voice of America in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka. These activities compelled India to send Sri Lanka more than 60,000 troopers to Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990. Further, in 1972, U.S. added the India Ocean region as the area of responsibility of US Pacific Command. After the 1973 Arab Israeli War, U.S. became far more concerned with their interests in the Indian Ocean. The Chief of U.S. Naval Operations explained to the Senate that the Indian Ocean was the key area where the balance of power changed on 20 March 1974.

However, despite such kind of military activities, there are certain other factors that better explain US military activities in the Indian Ocean. For example, in 1970s, the main driving force behind US military activities in the Indian Ocean came as a response to the naval activities of USSR. This was typically the Cold War power politics as USSR was concerned with U.S. submarine based ballistic missiles in the Indian Ocean that had most part of USSR within their reach. It would be insightful to compare that U.S. naval activities in the Indian Ocean was one fourth or fifth of the naval activities of USSR. Some scholars would argue that the reason behind US activities in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka had also come as a response to USSR invasion in Afghanistan. Locating this situation in the context of the Cold War, it can be understood that Pakistan was vital for U.S. as a support base for anti-Soviet guerrilla in Afghanistan and that U.S. wanted to divert India's attention from Pakistan to Sri Lanka<sup>2</sup>.

These historical examples indicate that the most important part of the Indian Ocean as highway of international commerce for Japan and US is not the Indian Ocean itself, but the sides of the Indian Ocean like the Strait of Holms and the Strait of Malacca. In the present times, China is constructing ports, setting up military facilities, exporting naval weapons and surveying by using disguised fishing boats in the countries around India. Further, there are also reports

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<sup>2</sup> G D Bakshi, "The Rise of Indian Military Power: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture", Knowledge World, 2010, New Delhi, pp168-184.

about China’s nuclear submarine’s activities in the Indian Ocean. If China integrates Taiwan and sets up bases in the countries around India, PLAN will expand the area of assertive activities. Logically enough, under such circumstances, the sense of crises is rising and we want a more detailed analysis about China’s such activities in this article. Although this information indicates that Indian Ocean will be the more important area in near future, a review of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea (West Philippines Sea) would assert that the situation there is far more serious than in the Indian Ocean.

Here comes an interesting analysis. It could be asked why the commentators and strategists in Japan and U.S. focus more on the security problem in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, for U.S., how different is the security situation in the Indian Ocean now than that during the Cold War.

One of the major differences is the comparative scale of the Indian Navy. The government of India has not altered the officially sanctioned force level for the Indian Navy, which comprises of two aircraft carriers, twenty eight destroyers and frigates, twenty submarines since 1964. If we count small ships, the Indian Navy nearly achieved the number in 1990. However, the force level of Indian Navy in 1990 was still not big when compared with the Navy of US and USSR.

In 2012, despite India maintaining the same force level, the comparative scale of the Indian Navy is growing because the number of US Navy has decreased. In addition, having newer and bigger warships as compared to the older ones also indicates that the Indian Navy is improving its capability as a “Blue Water Navy”. Further, the fact that the Indian Navy has trained other navies like submarine forces in Vietnam and Iran and aircraft carrier crews of Thailand Navy is reason enough why the U.S cannot ignore it.

Chart I : The number of warships

	US			India		
	aircraft carrier	surface combatant	Submarine	aircraft carrier	surface combatant	Submarine
1990	15	259	127	2	14	19
2012 (2013)	11 (10)	110 (101)	72 (73)	1 (2)	21 (27)	15 (16)

\*surface combatant: cruiser, destroyer, frigate, corvette (load displacement more than 3000t)

\*International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance"; Tohru Kizu eds.,

“World’s Navies 2012-2013 Ship of the World”, Kaijin-sya.

As a result, there is a genuine possibility that the sense of presence of the Indian Navy has influenced the debate of policy makers and academics in U.S. which, in turn, has influenced the debate in other democratic countries like Japan. The reason why American commentators and strategists focus more on Sino-Indian competition is caused not only because of Sino-Indian competition itself, but also because of the Indian debate which have frankly expressed their sense of rivalry against China. Last but not the least, because the world cannot ignore India as an

emerging naval power, Japan and U.S. need to focus on the various dimensions discussed in the preceding sections of the paper. They need to understand the Indian debate on the issue and let India join in the friendly naval powers.

(By Dr. Satoru Nagao, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation)

## 2.2 Analyzing “Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan”

This paper is an annotation of Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao’s paper “Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan” which appeared on *The Diplomat* in April 2012<sup>3</sup> and takes a general view of Taiwan being an important strategic actor which cannot be ignored when it comes to the stabilization of East Asia’s security environment. In “1. Summary of the Original Paper,” a brief introduction with quotations from the original paper is made, while in “2. Brief Comments,” the author’s personal view and comments toward the issue is stated.

### 1. Summary of the Original Paper

#### (1) Taiwan’s Strategic Importance

The U.S. Department of Defense has continuously been emphasizing the importance of the Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept as a strong means to counter anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. Stokes and Hsiao first quotes U.S. Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA4)’s view in which the Congressman advocates the importance of the United States cooperating with its allies to project power effectively in the presence of A2/AD.

Such arguments are heard because the United States tackles many security issues in the Asia-Pacific area; among them, the most problematic concern would no doubt be the expansion of China’s military presence and assertive actions. As the ability of People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s A2/AD grows, it would become more difficult for the United States to project its forces into the region.

The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) launched by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs not only shows how the joint forces achieve operational access in the presence of A2/AD, but also proves that, along with the Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, it can reinforce deterrence, “demonstrate to U.S. allies and partners that Washington is committed,” and counter PLA’s military coercion.

On the other hand, the United States must seek ways to “diversify defense relations with traditional allies in the region such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.” However, although Taiwan and the United States share common security interests in the region, “little consideration appears to have been given to the significant role that Taiwan can play in the evolving U.S. defense strategy.”

Thus, according to Stokes and Hsiao, “Taiwan should be the central guiding focus of defense planning in the Asia-Pacific region” and “the greatest emphasis should be placed on contingency planning” in order to counter PLA’s “amphibious invasion” to Taiwan. That said, however, many view and suggest U.S. defense planning should shift towards South China Sea matters and the defense of the global commons. Stokes and Hsiao warn that issues regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan are two separate matters, and respective measures must be conducted.

There is no doubt that the “Chinese Communist Party is obsessed with Taiwan” and hence “China’s main strategic direction remains unchanged:” sharply directed towards Taiwan. Issues

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<sup>3</sup> Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan,” *The Diplomat* [<http://the-diplomat.com/2012/04/13/why-s-s-military-needs-taiwan/?all=true>], accessed on May 1, 2012.



regarding the South China Sea “can be modulated” at China’s will; however, a democratic Taiwan remains a strong threat to the Chinese Communist Party, which leads China to maintain its tough military presence towards Taiwan. As Stokes and Hsiao note, one would hope that President Obama would take Taiwan as a top priority when it comes to U.S. strategies in the Asia-Pacific region.

(2) “Taiwan as JOAC Partner”

So in what areas can Taiwan actually contribute? Stokes and Hsiao first raise Taiwan’s ability to interdict single points of failure in the PLA’s A2/AD system. This knowledge can be helpful as it may reduce the United States’ “heavy operational burden” and “risks of escalation.” This becomes possible because “Taiwan is uniquely positioned to contribute to regional situational awareness of the air, space, and cyber domains.” For example, peacetime air surveillance data collected by Taiwan can be used in combination with other sources of information “to better understand PLA Air Force tactics and doctrine.” Taiwan’s ability to accumulate long range UHF early warning radar data as well as to grasp unique undersea geography and hydrological environment in the West Pacific Ocean can also contribute to being prepared against unpredicted Chinese actions.

But an even more urgent subject is “to build in firewalls to ensure potential adversaries are unable to penetrate U.S. networks through those of its allies and partners,” say Stokes and Hsiao. They suggest that releasing space-based systems including broadband communications and remote sensing satellites to Taiwan would promote broader regional situational awareness architecture which may contribute both in the military and civilian sphere.

Of course, cooperation in the field of defense industry cannot be forgotten. The U.S. Department of Defense can seek R&D cooperation with institutions that possess highly sophisticated industrial and military technologies such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute and Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology.

It is not that the United States has done nothing towards Taiwan: the Bush administration assisted Taiwan in acquiring diesel electric submarines which are crucial “for island defense and could play a critical role in interdicting amphibious ships transiting from mainland China in waters northwest and southwest of Taiwan, counter-blockade operations, and surveillance. Submarines act as a strong deterrent means against China.

Alongside with the above cooperation, the U.S. Department of Defense and its Taiwanese counterpart “should consider the formation of an innovative capabilities working group.” This working group could deal with issues such as cruise missile defense, anti-submarine warfare and also Taiwan’s role in the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia.

Stokes and Hsiao emphasize that there is “no free and open society” that “understands China as well as Taiwan.” Nonetheless, neither are there hardly any U.S. military officers who conduct training in Taiwan nor any known students who attend Taiwan’s intermediate/senior service schools. More interactions between military institutions which enhance personal exchanges are thus required.

### (3) “Political Paradox in the Taiwan Strait”

Since economic interdependence between Taiwan and China is growing, the likelihood of conflict is diminishing. On the other side of the coin, however, Taiwan’s democratic system of government remains an existential challenge to the Chinese Communist Party, leading China to further military buildups and coercion. Stokes and Hsiao call this the “political paradox in the Taiwan Strait.” They underline that as long as China retains its attitude to use force to resolve political differences in the Taiwan Strait, the United States “should deepen and broaden defense relations with Taiwan.” In doing this, “acknowledging Taiwan’s pivotal role in the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region would be a proper starting point.”

By implementing cost effective solutions to meet China’s military challenge, Taiwan may be looked on as “a transformational test bed for others to emulate.”

Integrating Taiwan and the United States’ efforts in defense-related R&D and low cost, high quality electronic components may be worth considering. Since the United States supplies a large amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan, “industrial and technological cooperation has been limited to date.” For the United States, arms sales to Taiwan serves as a supporter for the promotion of Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept since interoperability and cost savings are promoted. Arms sales through FMS clearly implies “a patron-client relation” between the two countries, and thus Stokes and Hsiao argue that “rebalancing U.S.-Taiwan defense relations into a true partnership would likely be more suitable” when it comes to strategies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since “Taiwan attempts to become more self-reliant in its defense,” it will need to develop cutting-edge technologies and obtain a sound economy in order to draw resources for modernization, manpower and readiness. The same can be said regarding the United States as it promotes Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept. Stokes and Hsiao stress that cooperation between the two countries can equally and mutually benefit both countries.

In conclusion, the authors reiterate that Taiwan is the country that “has the greatest interest in the success of Air-Sea Battle.” Friends and allies of the United States must “play important roles in sustaining a stable military balance” in the region, and among them, Taiwan is the most important potential partner.

## 2. Brief Comments

When contemplating many of the security issues in East Asia in regards to Japan’s national interest, one cannot ignore the presence of Taiwan. This is because Taiwan’s behavior along with cross-strait relations affects greatly the achieving of peace and stability in East Asia as well as moves toward the integration of this region.

This tendency can be seen not only in the counter China strategy, but also when considering the issue of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For one thing, there is tremendous potential in the Taiwan Strait which can lead China and Taiwan to an intensive arms race; but more importantly, Taiwan is geographically located in a place which the world’s main

sea lanes cross, making Taiwan a potential port for proliferators transporting WMD related materials for transshipment. This makes Taiwan a crucial actor when considering international nonproliferation policies.

Keelung port, which is located north of Taiwan, and Kaohsiung port, south of Taiwan, are two mammoth hub ports that rank in the world's top 100 ports regarding the number of containers that are transported through them. In August 2003, Taiwan's customs authority took into custody a North Korean cargo ship which had 158 barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide at Kaohsiung port. The cargo ship had departed from Italy heading to Thailand, then stopping at Kaohsiung, heading to its final destination, North Korea. At that time, Thailand had no export control legislation that made it able to handle the cargo ship in question, and hence Taiwan's export control legislation was applied. This shows a clear case in which the international community can cooperate to detect suspicious activities that may cause further proliferation.

Although Taiwan has shown increasing interest in the issue of WMD nonproliferation and specific measures, international treaties that deal with nonproliferation do not apply to Taiwan: strictly speaking, Taiwan has no obligation to implement these treaties. On the other hand, Taiwan has constantly been seeking strategic ways to be recognized by the world by actively being involved in worldwide polices: Taiwan has been participating in the U.S.-led Container Security Initiative (CSI), for example<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, Taiwan has adopted respective control lists of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in order to reinforce its export control mechanisms. It has also enthusiastically amended its domestic laws to cope with respective situations.

Taiwan's interest in nonproliferation policies can be heard constantly from officials and/or knowledgeable academics at various conferences and seminars. For example, at the "Japan-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue for a New Era," a track II conference hosted by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, various participants have stated that Taiwan's cooperation and contribution towards improving the security environment in East Asia in the field of anti-terrorism and international nonproliferation movements such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are truly welcomed and much needed. Active contribution in the field of nontraditional security is needed for Taiwan in order to prove itself as a sensible and responsible actor in the international society.

On the other hand, continued attention must be given to the relation between Taiwan and China. The conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and operations of direct flights between the two countries are clear signs that the Taiwan-China relation is maturing. If Taiwan continues its appeal to international society, it may create suspicion and invite containment from China, which can lead to deterioration between the two countries. Since Taiwan wishes to avoid additional conflict with China, it is rather rational for Taiwan to be passive in further international cooperation that may make China feel uncomfortable. Therefore, Taiwan must face a complex dilemma and weigh its relation with

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<sup>4</sup> "CSI: Container Security Initiative" U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Custom and Boarder Protection website [[http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo\\_security/csi/](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/)] accessed on May 15, 2012.

China against cooperation towards certain policies that the international society is promoting.

From an international society's point of view, as much as Taiwan craves recognition from the world by actively contributing to certain policies, the international society also is in strong need of Taiwan's cooperation. As both stakes match, the way in which we will be able to embrace and make Taiwan cope with multiple international issues becomes extremely important not only for Taiwan itself, but also for the rest of the world.

(By Wakana Mukai, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation)

## 2.3 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships up to 1st Quarter of 2012 -Characteristics viewed in the IMB Report-

On April 23, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) published a report through the Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) based in Kuala Lumpur on the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships noted in the world up to the first quarter of 2012 (January 1 – March 31, 2012). Below is a summary of the characteristics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships viewed from the IMB report (hereinafter referred to as the Report) noted in the first quarter of 2012.

Regarding the definition of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, the IMB accepts the “definition of piracy” in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As for the armed robbery, the IMB accepts the definition of the “Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its Assembly session in November 2001.

(In view of circumstances for the descriptions, related Tables and Charts were carried en bloc at the end of the report.)

### 1. Characteristics viewed from numbers and locations of the incidents (including attempted attacks)

The number of the incidents reported in the first quarter of the year 2012 was 102 (142 during the same period in 2011). Looking at the monthly number of the incidents, June marked the highest number at 41. There were 35 incidents in February and 26 incidents in March. Of them, 56 were actual attacks. Of them, 11 were hijackings, and 56 incidents were boarding. There were 46 attempted attacks. Of them, 14 cases were firing and 32 were attempted boarding. However, the IMB is regarding there are a great number of the unreported cases apart from the reported cases, advising the shipping owners and masters of the ships to report all piratical attacks and suspicious movements of the crafts to the bureau.

A total of 102 incidents reported in the first quarter of the year 2012 showed a large decrease, compared with 142 incidents (439 incidents throughout the year of 2011) noted during the same period in 2011. The trends of attacks during each first quarter of the recent six years are as shown in the Table 1. Looking at the attacks by location, of 102 incidents, 71 incidents which occupy 70% of the total have occurred in the five areas as follows. Looking at the cases in order of higher frequency, there were 28 incidents off Somalia (including the Indian Ocean), 18 incidents in Indonesia, 10 incidents in Nigeria, eight incidents in the Gulf of Aden, and seven incidents in the Red Sea.

According to the Report, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Aden, off Somalia (including the Indian Ocean) and the Red Sea in the surrounding waters of the “Horn of Africa” totals 43, which distinctly indicates a large number of incidents attributed to Somali pirates surrounding area of the Horn of Africa. Compared with 93 during the same period of 2011 (16 hijackings), the number of the incidents decreased by half. However, the Report says that there is no evidence to suggest that the danger from Somali piracy is likely to go away. According to the Report, of 43

attacks, nine hijacked incidents (three in the Gulf of Aden and six off Somalia, including the Indian Ocean), one boarded incident (off Somalia including the Indian Ocean) were noted. 152 seafarers have been taken hostage and one has been injured and two killed. As of March 31 2012, Somali pirates hold 15 vessels for ransom with 253 crew members as hostages, with an additional 49 crew members being held on land as hostages.

According to the Report, the attack area by Somali pirates continue to expand, and it covers the southern part of the Red Sea in the west to 76 degrees East longitude and beyond in the east. Incidents have also been reported off the coast of Oman/Arabian Sea in the north extending southward to 22 degrees. In these waters Somali pirates are also using hijacked ocean going fishing vessels, merchant vessels and dhows as “mother vessels” (hijacked vessels include four dhows and one fishing vessel) to conduct piracy operations. With pirates in control of these mother vessels, there is no boundary that the pirates could not sail to with fuel onboard. Somali pirates expands their operational area to off Kenya, off Tanzania, off Seychelles, off Madagascar, off Mozambique, the Mozambique Channel, Arabian Sea, off Oman, the Gulf of Oman, off Indian west coast, and off Maldives.

On the other hand, the Report evaluates that the overall number of incidents and the hijack success rate have reduced due to the deployment of naval vessels from respective nations to waters in the Gulf of Aden, and preventive measures used by the merchant vessels including the use of citadels, evasive maneuvers taken by vessels in accordance with the anti-piracy manual of the Best Management Practices (BMP), and employment of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).

Meanwhile, as shown in the **Table 1**, in Asia, the number of incidents in Indonesia has increased to 18 cases (15 were boarding and three were attempted boarding). This represents a steep increase from five cases during the same period in 2011. Most attacks were boarding while vessels were berthed or anchored at night, which were robberies at a low level as pirates/robbers usually abort when spotted. There were three cases in Vietnam including two actual attacks and one attempted attack. The actual attacks were conducted ships at anchor during the night and the attempted attack was an aborted robbery. Except two attacks against sailing vessels (one was boarding and the other was attempted boarding a chemical tanker) in the Singapore Strait, most incidents in Asia occurred in port.

## 2. Characteristic viewed from activities

The **Table 2** shows the status of attacks by location noted frequently in the areas in Asia and others up to the first quarter of 2012. The **Table 3** shows the status of ships attacked, including the attempted cases, by location in 2012.

According these data, the feature of the attacks by Somali pirates is clear. The incidents, including the attempted attacks, by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and off Somalia including the Indian Ocean, occurred while the ship were steaming. These incidents show the feature of Somali pirates that they attack the steaming ships by “mother vessels” and skiffs – small high speed boats. On the other hand, in case of Asia, as for a posture attacks, most

were boarded attacks, and in most cases they were attacked while the ships were anchored.

On the other hand, in the first quarter of 2012, there were four locations where more than three incidents were reported in ports and anchorages, totaling 14 incidents. According to the Report, four locations in the first quarter of 2012 include Dumai, Indonesia, and Lagos, Nigeria with four attacks respectively, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and Chittagong, Bangladesh with three attacks respectively.

As for the types of vessels attacked (including those of attempted attacks) during the first quarter of 2012, the highest number of attacks at 21, including attempted attacks, was recorded on bulk carriers. The following were 19 chemical tankers, 17 containers, 11 crude oil tankers, six general cargos, five product tankers, four dhows, two fishing vessels, and others. The Report points out that the vessels attacked were targets of opportunities, and pirates did not necessarily target the specific vessels by type.

Looking at the ships attacked by nationality, of all incidents of 102 cases in the first quarter of the year 2012, the highest number of attacks at 19 was made on Liberia-flagged vessels, 17 were on Panama-flagged vessels, 14 were on Singaporean-flagged vessels, five were on Bahamas-flagged vessels, five were on Marshall Islands-flagged vessels, and five were on Hong Kong-flagged vessels. In case of Japanese-flagged vessels, in the past six years, one vessel was attacked during the same period in 2011.

On other hand, looking at the operational status of the ships attacked by nationality of the countries, where victim ships were controlled/managed, the highest number falls on Singapore with 24 vessels. Singapore is followed by Germany with 17 vessels, Greece with 12 vessels, Hong Kong with eight vessels, India with six vessels. Japan has one attack.

### 3. Types of violence to crew and peculiarities of weapons used

Looking at the status of violence to crew, as shown in the **Table 4**, in the past four years, the incidents in which the crews were taken hostage have dramatically increased, which occupies a greater part of violence. During the first quarter of 2012, 212 persons were taken hostage, which considerably decreased with decreasing the number of hijacking incidents, compared with the same period in 2011. On the other hand, looking at the violence by locations, of 212 hostage incidents in the first quarter of 2012, there were 118 cases in Somalia, 34 cases in the Gulf of Aden, 24 cases in Nigeria, 18 cases in Benin, 11 cases in the Singapore Straits, five cases in Indonesia, and others. The incidents by Somali pirates occupy a greater part of the incidents. From a perspective of human violence, this area abounds in many cases of demanding ransom for the hostages, which shows a peculiarity of the attacks by Somali pirates.

The **Table 5** shows types of arms used by pirates in the incidents which occurred during the respective first quarter of the recent six years. Looking at this chart, you will find few changes in the trend that guns and knives are major arms of pirates for the past six years. On the other hand, looking at the types of arms to be used by pirates by location, of 48 attacks in which guns were used, 20 cases in Somalia, eight cases in the Gulf of Aden, and three cases in the Red Sea were noted. The incidents by Somali pirates occupy a greater part of the incidents (10 cases in

Nigeria). This will make us find how dangerous the Somali pirates armed with AK-47rifles and RPG-7 rocket weapons are. In cases of Asia, knives, not guns, were mainly used. In Indonesia, of 17 cases, one gun, six knives, and nine cases not stated were noted. In Malaysia, of two cases, one gun and one knife were noted. In the Singapore Straits, one gun and one not stated were noted.

(By Hideshi UENO, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation)



Table 1: Trends of incidents (including the attempted attacks) that occurred frequently in Asia and other areas in January – March, 2007 - 2012

Locations	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007
Indonesia	18	5	8	1	4	9
Malacca Straits				1		2
Malaysia	2	9	4	2	1	1
Philippines	2	1	1		2	
Singapore Straits	2	4			1	
Thailand				1		
South China Sea		4	2			
Vietnam	3	2	2	4	1	1
Bangladesh	3	4	1	1	2	2
India	3	3	3	3	5	3
Gulf of Aden *	8	10	12	41	5	3
Somalia	28	85	18	20	1	2
Red Sea **	7	2	3			
Nigeria	10	5	2	7	10	6
Tanzania	1			2	4	3
Arabian Sea ***			2			
Indian Ocean ****			1			
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Total at year end</b>		<b>439</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>263</b>

Source: Made from Table 1 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January – 31 March, 2012), p. 5. The total of the incidents covers all area in the report.

Note: \*, Gulf of Aden, \*\*, Red Sea, \*\*\*, Arabian Sea, \*\*\*\*, Indian Ocean, all of the above attacks are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 2: Status of attacks frequently noted in Asia and other areas in January – March, 2012

Locations	Actual Attacks		Attempted Attacks	
	Boarded	Hijacked	Fired Upon	Attempted Boarding
Indonesia	15			3
Malaysia	2			
Philippines	2			
Singapore Straits	2			
Vietnam	2			1
Bangladesh	3			
India	2			
Gulf of Aden*		3	3	2
Red Sea**				7
Somalia	1	6	8	13
Tanzania				1
Nigeria	5	1	3	1
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>			

Source: Made from Table 2 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January – 31 March, 2012), p. 8. The total of the incidents covers all area in the report.  
 Note: \*; Gulf of Aden, \*\*; Red Sea, all of the above attacks are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 3: Status of ships attacked (including the attempted cases) by location in January – March, 2012

Locations	Actual			Attempted		
	B	A	S	B	A	S
Indonesia	1	13	1		3	
Malaysia		1	1			
Philippines		2				
Singapore Straits			2			
Vietnam		2		1		
Bangladesh		3				
India		2			1	
Gulf of Aden*			3			5
Red Sea**						7
Somalia			7			21
Tanzania						1
Mozambique	1					
Nigeria		2	4			4
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>19</b>			
<b>Total</b>		<b>56</b>				

Source: Made from Table 4, 5 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January – 31 March, 2012), pp. 9-10. The total of the incidents covers all area in the report.  
 Note: \*; Gulf of Aden, \*\*; Red Sea, all of the above attacks are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 4: Type of violence to crew in January – March, 2007 - 2012

Type of violence	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007
Hostage	212	344	194	178	7	39
Kidnap	3	6		5	6	17
Threatened	4	4	1	3	4	1
Assaulted	1	2	1	2	4	
Injured	9	34	12	9	8	1
Killed	4	7		2	3	
Missing					1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>60</b>

Source: Made from Table 8 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January – 31 March, 2012), p. 11.

Table 5: Types of arms used during attacks in January – March, 2007 - 2012

Types of Arms	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007
Guns	48	88	33	59	13	10
Knives	21	16	11	14	15	13
Other Weapons	2	3	1		1	4
Not stated	31	35	22	29	20	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>127</b>

Source: Made from Table 7 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January – 31 March, 2012), p. 10.



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