

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## February 2012



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This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of February 2012.

Publisher: Masahiro Akiyama

Staff writers:

Kazumine Akimoto, Masami Kawamura, Wakana Mukai, Satoru Nagao, Eiji Sakai,

Daisuke Sekine, Yuko Takada, Takehisa Tomomori, Hideshi Ueno, Daiju Wada

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## Intelligence Summary in February 2012

**Maritime Security:** On the 7th, in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime security, in a move designed to enhance collective efforts in fighting criminal activities.

In February there were two hijacking incidents. On the 7th, a Greek-owned bulk carrier MV *Free Goddess* (22,051DWT) was hijacked by heavily armed pirates in the waters of some 520 nautical miles north east of Socotra Island. On the 16th, Somali pirates hijacked the Panama flagged Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro/Ro) vessel, the MV *Leila*.

On the 7th, Somali pirates released the Iranian fishing dhow, the *al-Khaliil*, and its 19 crews (all Iranian) without any ransom paid.

The project “Oceans Beyond Piracy” by The One Earth Future Foundation in Colorado, the United States issued *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011*. Accordingly, the sea transportation industry shouldered 80 percent of Somali piracy’s impact on the global economy, and the remaining 20 percent was the expense of each country’s government for anti-piracy efforts. The report says, the total cost is estimated to reach \$6.6~6.9 billion.

In the evening of the 15th, the security personnel of Italian ship MT *Enrica Lexie* (104,769DWT) fired and killed two Indian fishermen by accident off the coast of Kerala, South India, mistaking an Indian fishing ship for a pirate ship. On the 19th, the two Italian guards were arrested and remanded to police custody after negotiations between Indian and Italian diplomats. The incident is the first involving the death of innocent civilians at the hands of armed security personnel onboard ships. On the 20th, the Italian government announced that it considered as within its jurisdiction since the incident took place in international waters on a ship flying the Italian flag. On the 26th, Indian Defence Minister AK Antony said that the Italian marine security guards would be prosecuted under the Indian law. The arrested Italian marines were charged with murder under Section 302 of IPC.

On the 27th, Danish Naval ship HDMS *Absalon* belonging to the NATO fleet intercepted a pirate mother ship when the vessel tried to move away from Somali coast. Of 18 hostages, two were killed and 16 others freed. 17 pirates were detained.

The 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla, consisting of destroyer, *Qingdao*, frigate, *Yantai* and comprehensive supply ship, *Huishanhu* departed from Qingdao on the 27th for the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. Warships of the Chinese North Sea Fleet have been deployed to the pirate-infested area for the first time since the Chinese navy started the escort mission in 2008.

**Military Developments:** On the 2nd, *The Diplomat’s* assistant editor spoke with U.S. Congressman James Langevin (D-RI) of the subcommittees on Seapower and Projection Forces, and Strategic Forces about the U.S. “pivot” to the Pacific, defense restructuring and emerging

national security threats.

On the 3rd, Russian navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said, “On June 1 or a bit later we will resume constant patrolling of the world’s oceans by strategic nuclear submarines.” The number of annual routine patrols made by Russian submarines has dropped significantly from more than 230 in 1984 to less than 10 today.

On the 6th, the Indonesian Navy’s submarine, KRI *Nanggala 402* was brought to Indonesia after an overhaul process for the past 24 months by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) in Busan, South Korea.

On the 7th, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, told sailors and Marines aboard USS *Wasp* that the number of ships in the fleet in 2017 will be about the same.

On the 22nd, the Royal Navy has chosen South Korean firm Daewoo to build four new fuel tankers. The 37,000-tonne Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) tankers will allow the Royal Navy to refuel at sea.

On the 26th, Austal announced that the U.S. Navy has exercised contract options funding the construction of two Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) at Austal USA. Austal was awarded the construction contract for the first JHSV in November 2008, with options for nine additional vessels between FY09 and FY13. This time, the option contract is executed to construct the eighth and ninth JHSV.

According to *Indian Defence* dated the 29th, as the induction of the first locally built Indian nuclear powered submarine, INS *Arihant* is almost complete, the Indian government has decided to build two more of its type. It is expected to complete its marine trials by early 2013.

**South China Sea-related Events:** The BRP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the Philippines’ newest hand-me-down warship from the United States, completed the first patrol of the West Philippine Sea (the South China Sea). The patrol route included the Camago-Malampaya gas field west of northern Palawan, which hosts the country’s lone natural gas extraction facility, and the Balabac Strait next to the Malaysian maritime border.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski contributed an article titled “As China Rises, A New U.S. Strategy” to a U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* dated 14th. Brzezinski argues that the United States should play as a regional balancer or a regional conciliator to respond the rise of China in Asia as Britain used to act in the international relations of Europe from the 19th century to the early 20th century.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** IMO Secretary-General Sekimizu visited the Philippines from February 7 to 8, in his first official mission to a Member State since he took office on January 1, 2012. He affirmed IMO’s commitment to provide the Philippines with assistance in all aspects of its maritime development, including the fields of education, training, and certification of seafarers under the STCW Convention.

A university lecturer in Malaysia, Dr. Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli contributed a discussion titled “Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?” to RSIS Commentaries dated the 10th. He examines whether the Indonesian archipelagic waters would actually be effective as the alternative waterways under the situation that growing shipping traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has led to a search for alternative shipping routes. After examining three in particular being the Sunda Strait, the Lombok and Makassar Straits and the Ombai-Weitar Straits in the north of the island of Timor, given the geographical inconvenience of the passageways through the Indonesian archipelagic waters, the author concludes that these routes through the Indonesian archipelago are more complementary than alternative routes to the primary maritime highway of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, though vital for international shipping.

**Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others:** U.S. online shipping news dated the 28th, *gCaptain* delivers a detailed report on the actual harsh conditions of the ship breaking in Bangladesh.

**Intelligence Assessment:** On December 11, 2011, an online international current-affairs magazine, *The Diplomat*, carried an article titled “From Mahan to Corbett?” by James R. Holmes, an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Analysis of this monthly report has covered this article and examined the maritime strategy of Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), a British historian and strategic thinker. This analysis attempts to introduce Corbett’s strategic theory and compare it to Mahan’s.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### February 2 “Seychelles intensifies bilateral anti-piracy cooperation with India” (Neptune Maritime Security, February 2, 2012)

On the 2nd, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held talks with Seychelles President James Alix Michel, who visits India, about security issues, piracy and ways to expand developmental cooperation between the two countries.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held talks with Seychelles President James Alix Michel, who visits India. The two leaders discussed security issues, piracy and ways to expand developmental cooperation between the two countries. Seychelles has assured India that it remains its key developmental partner and sought to intensify bilateral anti-piracy cooperation. Last year, the Indian Navy deployed a Dornier maritime surveillance aircraft in the Seychelles’ capital Victoria for conducting anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean Region.

Refer to the article: With China watching, India & Seychelles to up anti-pirate operations

<http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/with-china-watching-india-seychelles-to-up-an>

### February 7 “Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa signed MoU on maritime security” (All Africa, February 8, 2012)

On the 7th, in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime security, in a move designed to enhance collective efforts in fighting criminal activities.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, in in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania, Tanzania signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime security, in a move designed to enhance collective efforts in fighting piracy, drug trafficking and other criminal activities. President Jakaya Kikwete said, “Piracy was adversely affecting the country’s trade and economic growth. The MoU would help the three countries deal with piracy in the Indian Ocean, stressing that combating piracy needed collective approach.” The MoU involves naval forces from the three countries to co-operate in various aspects of maritime security including exchange of information, surveillance, joint military exercises and operations.

Refer to the article: Tanzania: Country Signs Joint Anti-Piracy Pact

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201202080377.html>

### February 7 “Somali pirates hijack Greek vessel” (gCaptain, February 9, 2012)

On the 7th, a Greek-owned bulk carrier MV *Free Goddess* (22,051DWT) was hijacked by heavily armed pirates in the waters of some 520 nautical miles north east of Socotra Island.

An outline of the article: A Liberian-flagged Greek-owned bulk carrier MV *Free Goddess*

(22,051DWT) hijacked by heavily armed pirates in the waters of some 520 nautical miles north east of Socotra Island. The vessel carrying 21 Filipino crew and 19,475 tons of steel cables was underway to Singapore from Egypt.

Refer to the article: Piracy Report: Steel-Carrier Captured in Central Arabian Sea

<http://gcaptain.com/piracy-report-steel-carrier-central/?39577>



*MV Free Goddess*

Source: Somalia Report, February 11, 2012

### **February 7 “Somali pirates release the Iranian fishing dhow” (Somalia Report, February 7, 2012)**

On the 7th, Somali pirates released the Iranian fishing dhow, the *al-Khaliil*, and its 19 crews (all Iranian) without any ransom paid.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, Somali pirates released the Iranian fishing dhow, the *al-Khaliil*, and its 19 crews (all Iranian) without any ransom paid. On January 25, the vessel was hijacked off the Puntland autonomous region. At the time of the incident, a security teams assigned by the Puntland government was on board, but they were asleep. Pirates dropped the four-man security team from the vessel, and then used it as their mother ship during the past nine days.

Refer to the article: Pirates Release Vessel, Crew Without Ransom

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2728/Pirates\\_Release\\_Vessel\\_Crew\\_Without\\_Ransom](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2728/Pirates_Release_Vessel_Crew_Without_Ransom)



Iranian Fishing Dhow, FV *al-Khalilil*, apparently used by Pirates as a Mothership

Source: Somalia Report, February 7, 2012

## February 8 “Somali piracy’s impact on the global economy nears \$7 billion in 2011” (Oceans Beyond Piracy, February 8, 2012)

According to *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011*, Somali piracy’s impact on the global economy appears to amount to \$6.6~6.9 billion. The world’s sea transportation industry shouldered 80 percent of the cost, and the remaining 20 percent was the expense of each country’s government for anti-piracy efforts.

An outline of the article: The project “Oceans Beyond Piracy” by The One Earth Future Foundation in Colorado, the United States issued *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011*. Accordingly, the sea transportation industry shouldered 80 percent of Somali piracy’s impact on the global economy, and the remaining 20 percent was the expense of each country’s government for anti-piracy efforts. The report says, the total cost is estimated to reach \$6.6~6.9 billion. According to the report, there are the nine following factors for the cost:

(1) INCREASED SPEEDS: \$2.7 billion

Many vessels will increase their speed while they transit the high risk area, since no recorded vessels have been hijacked while traveling at 18 knots or faster. This increased speed generates significant costs to ships by substantially increasing their fuel consumption, in particular to containerships.

(2) MILITARY OPERATIONS: \$1.27 billion

In 2011, 30+ countries dispatched naval vessels, patrol aircraft, etc. The operational cost was the estimated expenses of each country including budgets of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, NATO Operation Ocean Shield, CTF 151, and independent deployers.

(3) SECURITY: \$1.06 billion - \$1.16 billion

There was a rapid escalation in the use of private armed security onboard vessels in 2011. 25% of ships carried armed guards in 2011. In total, private armed security cost ship owners approximately \$530 million. Ship owners also invest in ‘ship hardening’ equipment to protect against pirate attacks. The total cost of this security equipment in 2011 was \$534 - \$629 million.

(4) RE-ROUTING: \$486 million - \$680 million



In 2011, ships re-routed by hugging the Indian coastline, and transiting to the east of the piracy high risk area. This report assesses the excess costs of re-routing.

(5) INSURANCE: \$635 million

The two major forms of piracy-related insurance are war risk and kidnap and ransom (K&R). Over 2011, the war risk region was expanded to the larger Indian Ocean, and an increasing number of ships received premium reductions for having armed guards onboard.

(6) LABOR: \$195 million

Some seafarers are entitled to double compensation in wages as they transit the high risk area and/or if they are held hostage by pirates.

(7) RANSOMS: \$160 million

31 ransoms were paid to Somali pirates in 2011. Average ransom in 2011 was \$5 million, up from \$4 million in 2010. 2011 saw a lower success rate in pirate attacks, but increased ransom prices, so that pirates received greater revenues for fewer hijackings.

(8) COUNTER-PIRACY ORGANIZATIONS: \$21.3 million

More than 11 organizations were working on counter-piracy initiatives in 2011 (the followings are major organizations: Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States to Counter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia ("Trust Fund"), The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), The Djibouti Code of Conduct The United Nations Development Programme – Somalia UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)).

(9) PROSECUTIONS AND IMPRISONMENT: \$16.4 million

20 countries have arrested, detained, or tried pirate suspects in recent years. The cost is the estimate of trials and imprisonment in each country.

Refer to the article: Somali Piracy's Impact on the Global Economy Nears \$7 Billion in 2011: According to Oceans Beyond Piracy Report

[http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop\\_press\\_release\\_feb\\_8\\_2012.pdf](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop_press_release_feb_8_2012.pdf)

Full Report is available at:

[http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic\\_cost\\_of\\_piracy\\_2011.pdf](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf)

## **February 15 "Armed guards on board Italian vessel mistakenly fires at Indian fishermen" (Neptune Maritime Security, February 16, 2012)**

In the evening of the 15th, the security personnel of Italian ship MT *Enrica Lexie* (104,769DWT) fired and killed two Indian fishermen by accident off the coast of Kerala, South India, mistaking an Indian fishing ship for a pirate ship.

An outline of the article: In the evening of the 15th, the security personnel of Italian ship MT *Enrica Lexie* (104,769DWT) fired and killed two Indian fishermen by accident off the coast of Kerala, South India, mistaking an Indian fishing ship for a pirate ship. On the 16th, Ministry of External Affairs of India officials said that 11 fishermen were on the boat, when the Italian ship came close to them. While nine of those on board were sleeping, two were awake. These two

fishermen were killed when the guards of *Enrica Lexie* opened fire in the evening of the 15th. The Directorate General of Shipping of India said, “According to the report, the Italian vessel fired at the fishing ship while bound from Singapore to Egypt with a crew of 34, including 19 Indians. The Italian vessel is carrying six Italian armed guards. The Indian Coast Guard intercepted the vessel and escorted her to Kochi for investigation. The vessel has anchored at Kochi on February 15, 2012 at 2300hrs (IST). The Principal Officer, MMD Kochi has been directed to conduct the preliminary inquiry into this incident.”

On the other hand, the Italian Embassy in India said on the 16th, “The Italian ship was attacked on the 15th in international waters about 30 nautical miles of the south west coast of India. Italian navy personnel on board following international protocols after repeated warnings and after ascertaining from binoculars that the pirates were armed gradually fired some warning shots and the pirates withdrew. Later, the master of the Italian ship was contacted by the Indian coast guards and requested to direct towards the Kochi harbour to offer information on the pirate attack. The ship is now in Kochi harbour.”

Kerala Police said, “The fishermen did not fire at the Italians ship, and could not have been mistaken for pirates. The Indian boat was 100 meters from the ship. The boat wanted the ship to pass.”

Refer to the article: Italian Navy Personnel Kill Two Indian Fishermen

<http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/italian-navy-personnel-kill-two-indian-fisher>



MT *Enrica Lexie*

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=1464800>

### **【Related Article 1】**

#### **“India arrests two armed guards of Italian Navy” (Marine Log, February 20, and gCaptain, February 21 and 22, 2012)**

On the 19th, the two Italian guards were arrested and remanded to police custody after negotiations between Indian and Italian diplomats. The incident is the first involving the death of innocent civilians at the hands of armed security personnel onboard ships. The two Italian could be facing murder charges. On the 20th, the Italian government announced that it considered as within its jurisdiction since the incident took place in international waters on a ship flying the Italian flag.

An outline of the article: On the 19th, the two Italian guards were arrested and remanded to

police custody after negotiations between Indian and Italian diplomats. The incident is the first involving the death of innocent civilians at the hands of armed security personnel onboard ships. The two Italian could be facing murder charges.

On the 20th, the Italian government said in a statement, “The Italian government considers as within its jurisdiction since the incident took place in international waters on a ship flying the Italian flag. Italy has also underscored that the military presence aboard Italian mercantile ships is regulated by a specific Italian law that also corresponds with the needs of UN counter-piracy resolutions. In this context the military is an organ of the Italian republic and therefore enjoys immunity from prosecution by foreign governments.” According to Italian authorities, the armed guards aboard MT *Enrica Lexie* fired warning shots into the air and in water (warning shots) and did not hit the hull of the fishing vessel.

Italy changed its laws in August 2011 to allow groups of six Italian Navy marines to travel on commercial ships. There are currently 60 marines seconded on this kind of duty.

Refer to the article: Indian court remands Italian Marines in custody following shooting incident

[http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1942:2012feb00200&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=107](http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1942:2012feb00200&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=107)

Italy and India Stand Off Over M/V Enrica Lexie Incident

<http://gcaptain.com/italy-india-standoff-enrica-lexie/?40449>

Italy and India Stand Off Over M/V Enrica Lexie Incident [UDPATED]

<http://gcaptain.com/italy-india-clash-enrica-lexie/?40576>

## **【Related Article 2】**

### **“Italian marines to be prosecuted under Indian law—Indian Defence Minister” (DNA India, February 26, 2012)**

On the 26th, Indian Defence Minister AK Antony said that the two Italian marine security guards would be prosecuted under the Indian law. The arrested Italian marines were charged with murder under Section 302 of IPC.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, Indian Defence Minister AK Antony said that the Italian marine security guards would be prosecuted under the Indian law. “The investigation in the case was progressing on the right direction and the Kerala government was handling it very strongly and powerfully. The Centre had extended full support to the state's initiative,” he said. The arrested Italian marines were charged with murder under Section 302 of IPC.

Refer to the article: Fishermen killing: Italian marines to be prosecuted under Indian law

[http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report\\_fishermen-killing-italian-marines-to-be-prosecuted-under-indian-law\\_1655071](http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_fishermen-killing-italian-marines-to-be-prosecuted-under-indian-law_1655071)

**【Related Article 3】****“Shipboard Security Teams and the Rules of Engagement—discussion by maritime consultant” (gCaptain, February 17, 2012)**

A maritime consultant, Captain Richard Madden discusses where the responsibility lines in association with this incident, in the article titled “Shipboard Security Teams and the Rules of Engagement.”

The outline of the article: A maritime consultant, Captain Richard Madden discusses where the responsibility lines in association with this incident, in the article titled “Shipboard Security Teams and the Rules of Engagement.”

- (1) One of the greatest concerns with putting armed security onboard a vessel is responsibility; Responsibility for weapons laws – responsibility for taking lethal action and ultimately, responsibility for deaths or injuries.
- (2) The security team was Italian military, not a private contractor. When discussing the difference between embarking military personnel versus private contractors, much of the conversation must come down to the chain of command. Having military security teams onboard vessels is not new – Portuguese and French fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean have had military security onboard for years. The U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) has embarked U.S. Navy security personnel onboard their vessels, dependent on their area of operation. In the case of MSC vessels, the security team detachment’s chain of command did not run through the master of the vessel. Instead, it operated under its own rules of engagement (ROE),
- (3) Steps for a scaled escalation of force were problems. The particulars of the *Enrica Lexie* incident are unknown, but there will seldom be an instance where a security team jumps directly to lethal force. A scaled escalation of force always starts with the lowest level of force, with additional force added until the threat is eliminated. The presence of a security team alone may be enough to dissuade robbers or pirates. If not, non-lethal measures may be tried next – there are various systems such as the Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD). At any rate, a thorough investigation into this incident is required.

Refer to the article: Shipboard Security Teams and the Rules of Engagement

<http://gcaptain.com/shipboard-security-teams-rules/?40237>

**February 16 “Somali pirates hijacks Panama flagged vessel” (Somalia Report, February 19, 2012)**

On the 16th, Somali pirates hijacked the Panama flagged Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro/Ro) vessel, the MV *Leila*.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Somali pirates hijacked the Panama flagged Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro/Ro) vessel, the MV *Leila*. The vessel last known position was the eastern entrance to the Gulf of Aden. Although, according to the hijackers, there were 24 crews on board, the IMB report says that the number was only 15. Being hijacked is extremely unusual for a Ro/Ro vessel because its high freeboard make it difficult for pirates to get aboard.

Pirates Hijack Ro/Ro Vessel: MV Leila Confirmed Hijacked in the Gulf of Aden

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2836/Pirates\\_Hijack\\_RoRo\\_Vessel](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2836/Pirates_Hijack_RoRo_Vessel)



MV Leila

Source: Somalia report, February 19, 2012

### **February 27 “Danish Navy warship frees pirate’s mother ship by force; 2 hostages killed” (The Star, AP, February 28, 2012)**

On the 27th, Danish Naval ship HDMS *Absalon* belonging to the NATO fleet intercepted a pirate mother ship when the vessel tried to move away from Somali coast. Of 18 hostages, two were killed and 16 others freed. 17 pirates were detained.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, Danish ship HDMS *Absalon* belonging to the NATO fleet intercepted a pirate mother ship when the vessel tried to move away from Somali coast. Of 18 hostages, two were killed and 16 others freed. 17 pirates were detained. According to a spokesman for the Danish Navy, HDMS *Absalon* had been following the hijacked vessel for several days. On the 27th, the crew fired warning shots at the vessel, which was about to sail, but it failed to stop the pirates. Danish forces then opened fire on the ship after getting permission from the NATO command. The pirates then surrendered and the Danes took control of the ship. Two of the hostages were found seriously injured and even with speedy assistance from *Absalon*'s doctor, their lives could not be saved.” It wasn't clear how the hostages were injured. Danish military prosecutors were investigating the incident. The Navy spokesman refrained from commenting about the nationalities of the hostages.

Refer to the article: Denmark's navy frees ship hijacked by pirates; 2 hostages killed

<http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1137988--denmark-s-navy-frees-ship-hijacked-by-pirates-2-hostages-killed>



Source: <http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/Nyt%20og%20Presse/pirateri/Pages/ABSALONharstandsetendnuetpiratmoderskib.aspx>

## February 27 “The 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla departs” (China Daily, February 28, 2012)

The 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla, consisting of destroyer “*Qingdao*,” frigate “*Yantai*” and comprehensive supply ship “*Huishanhu*,” departed from Qingdao on 27th for the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters.

An outline of the article: The 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla, consisting of destroyer “*Qingdao*,” frigate “*Yantai*” and comprehensive supply ship “*Huishanhu*,” departed from Qingdao on 27th for the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. Special force soldiers also take part in the mission. Warships of the Chinese North Sea Fleet have been deployed to the pirate-infested area for the first time since the Chinese navy started the escort mission in 2008.

Refer to the article: Chinese navy flotilla heads for escort mission in Gulf of Aden  
[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/shandong/e/2012-02/28/content\\_14713021\\_2.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/shandong/e/2012-02/28/content_14713021_2.htm)

## 1.2 Military Developments

### February 2 “Interview with U.S. Democratic congressman: America’s Military Future Trends” (The Diplomat, February 2, 2012)

On the 2nd, the Diplomat’s assistant editor spoke with U.S. Congressman James Langevin (D-RI) of the subcommittees on Seapower and Projection Forces, and Strategic Forces about the U.S. “pivot” to the Pacific, defense restructuring and emerging national security threats.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, the Diplomat’s assistant editor spoke with U.S. Congressman James Langevin (D-RI) of the subcommittees on Seapower and Projection Forces, and Strategic Forces about the U.S. “pivot” to the Pacific, defense restructuring and emerging national security threats. The summary of the interview is the following:

**Q1:** The United States appears to be shifting its focus from counter-insurgency efforts towards a stronger role in the Asia-Pacific. Is this the right move, and if so what rewards and challenges await the United States?

**A1:** For too long we’ve let our interests in Asia and Pacific region take a backseat to the focus of our large ground war engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Shifting focus

towards programs and capabilities to reengage with our long term allies in the Pacific, and prepare our military to face a rapidly changing global security environment, is critical to maintaining U.S. military dominance across all domains for decades to come. To ensure both regional and global success, it's vital that we lead in technological capabilities, including unmanned systems, underwater tactical and strategic systems, and strengthened cybersecurity to address current and emerging threats.

**Q2:** During President Barack Obama's recent trip to Australia, there was much debate over the strengthening of U.S.-Australian ties and the basing of a small detachment of U.S. forces in Darwin. Do you agree with such a move?

**A2:** I think this move is appropriate as part of our broader strategy to strengthen our ties in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Q3:** Some have argued that U.S. military and diplomatic efforts in the Pacific are nothing more than a veiled attempt to "contain China." How would you respond to those who make such an accusation? What would you recommend to reduce tensions with China?

**A3:** It's important for the benefit of U.S. citizens that we foster a good working relationship with China, which has now become the second largest economy in the world. At the same time, their trade practices and foreign policy positions aren't necessarily parallel, nor working in concert with our own. Maintaining a strong military presence in the Pacific is part of ensuring and continuing stability in the region to protect not only our interests, but those of our allies as well. I believe tensions with China could be eased by opening more opportunities to work together in areas of mutual concern such as piracy, disaster relief, and search and rescue, but only if they in turn are open to changing some of their current policies which remain troublesome to the United States and our allies.

**Q4:** There has been a lot of coverage of recent plans to cut the U.S. defense budget. Do you agree with President Obama's strategy? Republican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney, for example, argues such cuts will have a devastating effect on U.S. abilities to project power. How would you respond to such comments? Are there any areas you are particularly against or in favor of cutting?

**A4:** The plan developed under the strong leadership of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta provides a sustainable and viable framework for reducing Pentagon spending in ways that ensure we maintain the strongest military in the world and strengthen our national security. Adm. Mullen said it well when he remarked that our national debt is our greatest national security challenge. We simply can't be as secure as possible without finding responsible ways to deal with that debt over the long term. Particularly as we have withdrawn our forces from Iraq and are going to be bringing more troops home from Afghanistan, we can and must find efficiencies. For example, we are able to reduce the size of our military and our presence in Europe, while maintaining – and even increasing – its capabilities as we move away from protracted ground wars. We have to accept the reality that there's no way for us to be everywhere all the time and direct our resources to the most important efforts, while continuing the president's goals to strengthen our

alliances so we can be victorious in places like Libya with less American involvement.

I am in favor of the Secretary's priorities to:

- (1) Make the U.S. joint force smaller and leaner, with its great strength being its agility, flexibility, readiness to deploy, and innovative and technological advances.
- (2) Rebalance our global posture and presence, emphasizing the Pacific and the Middle East, which present the greatest challenges for the future.
- (3) Strengthen key alliances, building partnerships and developing innovative ways to sustain U.S. presence elsewhere in the world.
- (4) Shift the size and composition of our ground, air, and naval forces, so that we are capable of successfully confronting and defeating any aggressor and respond to the changing nature of warfare.
- (5) And protect our investments in special operations forces, new technologies like Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and unmanned systems, space and cyberspace capabilities and our capacity to quickly mobilize.

**Q5:** Where how would you rate China's military rise in terms of a threat to U.S. interests? Much has been made of China's capabilities in the area of access denial (A2/AD), for example.

**A5:** The major emerging threat I'm concerned about is in cyberspace. While the military is making tremendous strides in protecting its assets, other nations, particularly China and Russia, and groups within them are getting access to sensitive information, stealing research and development worth hundreds of billions of dollars to U.S. businesses, and gaining the ability to damage our vulnerable critical infrastructure. We should also be cognizant of China's naval expansion in ensuring our interests are protected. That's why I have been so supportive of maintaining an adequate level of submarines and have worked with Electric Boat in Rhode Island to increase the number of *Virginia*-class subs they are building. I'm pleased that Secretary Panetta has expressed his strong support for this program, and I am hopeful that it will remain a top priority.

Refer to the article: Assessing America's Military Future

<http://the-diplomat.com/2012/02/02/assessing-americas-military-future/>

### **February 3 "Russia to resume constant patrolling by SSBN" (UPI, February 4, 2012)**

The Russian Navy will resume constant patrolling of the world's oceans by strategic nuclear submarines (SSBN).

An outline of the article: The Russian Navy will resume constant patrolling of the world's oceans by strategic nuclear submarines (SSBN). On the 3rd, Russian navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said, "On June 1 or a bit later we will resume constant patrolling of the world's oceans by strategic nuclear submarines." The number of annual routine patrols made by Russian submarines has dropped significantly from more than 230 in 1984 to less than 10 today. The Russian navy has suspended its plan to dispose of its 12 nuclear-powered strategic submarines currently in service until 2020, at which time eight new Borey-class strategic submarines will be



built.

Refer to the article: Russia to continue submarine patrols

[http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/World-News/2012/02/04/Russia-to-continue-submarine-patrols/UPI-54701328368804/?spt=hs&or=tn](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/02/04/Russia-to-continue-submarine-patrols/UPI-54701328368804/?spt=hs&or=tn)

### **February 6 “Indonesia Navy’s submarine completes overhaul in South Korea” (The Jakarta Post, February 6, 2012)**

On the 6th, the Indonesian Navy’s submarine, KRI *Nanggala 402* was brought to Indonesia after an overhaul process for the past 24 months by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) in Busan, South Korea. Navy chief of staff Adm. Soeparno said, “With the completion of the overhaul, now the capabilities of our submarines are on par with submarines deployed by our neighbors.”

An outline of the article: On the 6th, the Indonesian Navy’s submarine, KRI *Nanggala 402* was brought to Indonesia after an overhaul process for the past 24 months by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) in Busan, South Korea. Made in 1981 by German shipbuilder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft in Kiel, the Type 209/1300 KRI *Nanggala* was the second submarine after being overhauled at DSME facilities after KRI *Cakra 401* was overhauled in 2006. Navy chief of staff Adm. Soeparno said, “With the completion of the overhaul, now the capabilities of our submarines are on par with submarines deployed by our neighbors.” During the overhaul process, KRI *Nanggala* was undergoing a retrofit, including replacing the upper structure from bow to stern, some parts of the propulsion system, sonar, radar, weapons system and combat management system (CMS). KRI *Nanggala* can now submerge to a depth of 257-meters with a top speed of 25 knots, increasing from 21.5 knots. The implementation of the latest CMS allows the submarine to simultaneously fire four wire-guided surface underwater torpedoes (SUTs) in a salvo at four different targets. The Defense Ministry and DSME had signed a contract to procure three submarines worth about US\$1.1 billion. The first two submarines will be manufactured in Busan, while the third at state shipyard PT PAL facilities in Surabaya through a transfer-of-technology mechanism.

Refer to the article: RI submarines on par with neighbors after overhaul

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/06/ri-submarines-par-with-neighbors-after-overhaul.html>



Welcome aboard: A number of the KRI *Nanggala*'s crew members stand on the ship's deck as it arrives at the Navy's Eastern Fleet headquarters in Surabaya, East Java on February 6.

Source: The Jakarta Post, February 6, 2012

### **February 7 “Navy Fleet will not grow for 5 Years: CNO” (AOL Defense, February 7, 2012)**

On the 7th, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, told sailors and Marines aboard USS *Wasp* that the number of ships in the fleet in 2017 will be about the same.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, told sailors and Marines aboard USS *Wasp* that the number of ships in the fleet in 2017 will be about the same. He argued main points below.

- (1) The number of ships in the fleet in 2017 “will be about the same, 285, but it won’t be going up as high as we wanted.” The Navy has planned for at least 313 ships in the battle fleet for years, and has counted on rapid procurement of the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and serial production of the *Arleigh Burke* destroyers and *Virginia*-class attack submarines to help reach that number. But in his preview of the fiscal year 2013 budget, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the Navy will retire seven *Ticonderoga*-class cruisers and two amphibious ships earlier than planned, would remove two LCS and eight Joint High Speed Vessels from the five-year defense budget plan and delay other ship construction starts.
- (2) Asked during a brief meeting with reporters how he expected to sustain the current 285-ship fleet with those changes, Greenert acknowledged the obvious that ships retired early are gone, but said ships removed from future construction plans are not an immediate loss. “We have a lot of ships in the ship construction plan and they will be delivered over time. So the fleet will look about the same in 2017 in actual numbers as today,” he said. But the Navy’s latest 30-year shipbuilding plan, released before the new budget numbers, predicted the fleet would be at 301 ships by 2017.
- (3) Greenert, who visited USS *Wasp* during the Bold Alligator amphibious exercise off the coast of North Carolina, also was asked about how the Navy and Marine Corps could carry out their renewed emphasis in amphibious operations when the “Gator” fleet will be

dropping below the 33 ships considered the minimum requirement. Greenert said he and Gen. James Amos, the Marine Corps commandant, “will look at innovative ways to deploy Marines.” He mentioned using the LCS, the new Mobile Landing Platforms and possibly other ship types. The Marines have been seeking an LCS mission package that would support a small Marine force for some missions, but the Navy has been reluctant to go beyond the currently planned anti-mine, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare packages.

Refer to the article: Navy Fleet Will Not Grow for 5 Years: CNO

<http://defense.aol.com/2012/02/07/navy-fleet-will-not-hit-313-no-growth-for-5-years-cno/>

### **February 22 “Royal Navy to build fuel tankers in South Korea” (BBC News, February 22, 2012)**

On the 22nd, the Royal Navy has chosen South Korean firm Daewoo to build four new fuel tankers. The 37,000-tonne Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) tankers will allow the Royal Navy to refuel at sea.

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, the Royal Navy has chosen South Korean firm Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) to build four new fuel tankers. The 37,000-tonne Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) tankers will allow the Royal Navy to refuel at sea. The total cost of constructing the tankers is estimated at £452 million including £150million to procure relevant equipments in the United Kingdom. The winning design of the four tankers has been completed by U.K. company, BMT Defence Services. The tankers, which are due to enter service in 2016, will replace models that date back to the 1970s. A part of the United Kingdom is discontented with the fact that the South Korean company has accepted the order.

Refer to the article: South Korea wins Royal Navy tanker deal worth £452m

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17127488>



Source: gCaptain, February 22, 2012

**February 26 “U.S. Navy to build two additional JHSV” (Austal News, February 27, 2012)**

On the 26th, Austal announced that the U.S. Navy has exercised contract options funding the construction of two Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) at Austal USA. Austal was awarded the construction contract for the first JHSV in November 2008, with options for nine additional vessels between FY09 and FY13. This time, the option contract is executed to construct the eighth and ninth JHSV.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, Austal announced that the U.S. Navy has exercised contract options funding the construction of two Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) at Austal USA. Austal was awarded the construction contract for the first JHSV in November 2008, with options for nine additional vessels between FY09 and FY13. This time, the option contract is executed to construct the eighth and ninth JHSV. USNS *Spearhead* (JHSV 1) started to construct in December 2009, and is scheduled for builder’s sea trials in early March. USUN *Choctaw County* (JHSV 2) is taking shape in Austal’s final assembly bay and modules for JHSV 3 are being constructed; official keel laying is scheduled for April 12. The contract of JHSV 10 is planned to be executed within a year. The 100m-long, aluminium-hulled catamarans can transport more than 300 troops, plus vehicles, at a speed of more than 40 knots to a range of 1,500km.

Refer to the article: Austal Awarded Construction Contract for JHSV 8 and 9

<http://www.austal.com/en/media/media-releases/12-02-27/Austal-Awarded-Construction-Contract-for-JHSV-8-and-9.aspx>



JHSV

Source: gCaptain, February 26, 2012

**February 29 “Indian Navy to build two more domestic SSN” (Indian Defence, February 29, 2012)**


According to *Indian Defence* dated the 29th, as the induction of the first locally built Indian nuclear powered submarine, INS *Arihant* is almost complete, the Indian government has decided to build two more of its type. It is expected to complete its marine trials by early 2013.

An outline of the article: According to *Indian Defence* dated the 29th, as the induction of the

first locally built Indian nuclear powered submarine, INS *Arihant* is almost complete, the Indian government has decided to build two more of its type. It is expected to complete *Arihant's* marine trials by early 2013. The Indian Navy has already leased SSN INS *Chakra* from Russia. However defence sources were sceptical whether the Indian Navy was technically advanced enough to operate two additional nuclear submarines without overstretching the resources.

Refer to the article: India to build two more nuclear powered submarines

<http://www.indiandefence.com/india-build-nuclear-powered-submarines-1281/>



INS *Arihant*

Source: Indian Defense, February 29, 2012

### 1.3 South China Sea-related Events

#### February 6 “Philippine Navy’ warship completes first patrol” (Inquirer.net, February 7, 2012)

The BRP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the Philippines’ newest hand-me-down warship from the United States, completed the first patrol of the West Philippine Sea (the South China Sea).

An outline of the article: The BRP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the Philippines’ newest hand-me-down warship from the United States, completed the first patrol of the West Philippine Sea (the South China Sea). Joseph Rostum Peña, Naval Forces West commanding officer, said in a press conference held on the 6th at the *Gregorio del Pilar* that the ship went on a 12-day “sovereignty patrol” in the West Philippine Sea. According to Peña, included in the patrol route was the Camago-Malampaya gas field west of northern Palawan, which hosts the country’s lone natural gas extraction facility, and the Balabac Strait next to the Malaysian maritime border. He admitted, however, that the ship kept a distance from other islets being claimed by China and other nations in the disputed area. Peña added that the Philippine Navy would further upgrade the ship’s defense capabilities with the installation of its own missile system hereafter.

Refer to the article: PH’s newest warship completes first patrol

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/141477/ph%E2%80%99s-newest-warship-completes-first-patrol>

**【Related article】****“U.S. to give second Coast Guard cutter to Philippines” (Defense News, February 7, 2012)**

The United States will soon give a second Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines.

An outline of the article: The United States will soon give a second Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines. On the 7th, Representative Ed Royce (a Republican) announced as he chaired the hearing of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that lawmakers will this week conclude formalities to send to the Philippines another cutter, the *Dallas*. Royce said, “It should soon be on its way to Manila. The U.S. and the Philippines want peace and stability in this region, which is a key to the global economy.” The United States last year transferred its *Hamilton* cutter to the Philippines.

Refer to the article: U.S. to Send Second Ship to Bolster Philippines

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120207/DEFREG02/302070006/U-S-Send-Second-Ship-Bolster-Philippines>

**February 23 “PCG, PN jointly conduct offshore patrol on West Philippine Sea” (Manila Bulletin, February 23, 2012)**

According to a published report by *Manila Bulletin* dated the 23th, the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy will jointly conduct offshore patrol on the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea).

An outline of the article: According to a published report by *Manila Bulletin* dated the 23th, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Philippine Navy (PN) will jointly conduct offshore patrol on the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), a task mandated under the newly-created National Coast Watch System (NCWS) by virtue of Executive Order No. 57, signed and issued by President Benigno C. Aquino III in September 2011. The PCG chief of staff said that the PCG has been mandated with a leading role in the West Philippine Sea in terms of enforcement of national laws particularly relative to customs, immigration and quarantine.

Refer to the article: PCG, PN Jointly Conduct Offshore Patrol On Philippine West Sea

<http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/352259/pcg-pn-jointly-conduct-offshore-patrol-on-philippine-west-sea>

## **1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations**

**February 14 “Way of U.S. strategy to respond rise of China—Zbigniew Brzezinski” (The Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2011)**

Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski contributed an article titled “As China Rises, A New U.S. Strategy” to a U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* dated 14th. Brzezinski argues that the

United States should play as a regional balancer or a regional conciliator to respond the rise of China in Asia as Britain used to act in the international relations of Europe from the 19th century to the early 20th century.

An outline of the article: Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski contributed an article titled “As China Rises, A New U.S. Strategy” to a U.S. newspaper *The Wall Street Journal*. Brzezinski argues that the United States should play as a regional balancer or a regional conciliator to respond the rise of China in Asia as Britain used to act in the international relations of Europe from the 19th century to the early 20th century. He discusses the summary of the article below. This article is an excerpt from Brzezinski’s new book *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* published at the end of January.

- (1) In a potentially conflicted setting, marked by increased political restlessness, rising nationalism, and growing competition for natural resources, the stability of Asia in the 21st century will depend in part on the status of two overlapping regional triangles centered on China – and how the United States responds to each. The first pertains to China, India, and Pakistan. The second is tied to China, Japan, and Korea, with the Southeast Asian states playing a supporting role. In the case of the former, Pakistan could be the major point of contention and the precipitating source of instability. In the case of the latter, Korea (both South and North) and/or possibly also Taiwan could become the focus of insecurity.
- (2) In both cases, the United States is still the key player, with the capacity to alter balances and affect outcomes. It therefore needs to be stated at the outset that the United States should avoid direct military involvement in conflicts between rival Asian powers. No outcome of either a Pakistani-Indian war, or of one also involving China, is likely to produce consequences more damaging to U.S. interests than a direct U.S. military engagement on the Asian mainland. Such efforts should entail the participation of other powers potentially also affected by any major regional instability in Asia.
- (3) The first triangle involves competition for Asian primacy. China and India are already major players on the international scene, and the Chinese-Indian relationship is inherently competitive and antagonistic, with Pakistan being the regional point of contention. The United States’ role in this rivalry should be cautious and detached. A prudent U.S. policy, especially in regard to an alliance with India, should not, however, be interpreted as indifference to India’s potential role as an alternative to China’s authoritarian political model. India offers promise for the future, especially if it succeeds in combining sustained development with more pervasive democracy. Hence cordiality in relations with India is justified, though it should not imply support on such contentious issues as Kashmir nor imply that a cooperative relationship with India is aimed at China. Given that some policy circles in the United States have started to advocate a formal U.S.-India alliance, presumably against China and in effect also against Pakistan, it also needs to be stated explicitly that any such undertaking would be contrary to U.S. national

security interests. Insofar as the first Asian triangle is concerned, the better part of wisdom is abstention from any alliance that could obligate the United States to military involvement in that part of Asia.

- (4) The issue is not that clear-cut with regard to the second regional triangle involving China, Japan, South Korea, and to a lesser degree Southeast Asia. Most importantly, the U.S. and China already have an economic relationship that makes both vulnerable to any reciprocal hostility, while the growth of China's economic and political power poses a potential future challenge to America's current global preeminence. China's influential and rising role in world affairs is a reality to which Americans will have to adjust, rather than demonizing it or engaging in thinly concealed wishful thinking about its failure. An intensely nationalist and militaristic China would generate its own self-isolation. It would dissipate the global admiration for China's modernization and could stimulate residual anti-Chinese public sentiments within the United States. It would also be likely to give rise to political pressures for an overly anti-China coalition with whatever Asian nations had become increasingly fearful of Beijing's ambitions. In that context, how Beijing conducts itself in its immediate neighborhood will impact directly the overall American-Chinese relationship. China's geopolitical and economic goals, including a reduction in the dangers inherent in China's potential geographical encirclement and the establishment for itself of a favored position in an emerging East Asian community, can be sought flexibly and patiently, or China can pursue each goal aggressively, in order to undermine America's position in the East. Which of these two becomes more likely will depend on two fundamental considerations: how the United States will respond to an ascending China, and how China itself will evolve.
- (5) It follows that in seeking to increase the probability that China becomes a major global partner, the United States should tacitly accept the reality of China's geopolitical preeminence on the mainland of Asia, as well as China's ongoing emergence as the predominant Asian economic power. But the prospects of a comprehensive American-Chinese global partnership will actually be enhanced if the United States at the same time retains a significant geopolitical presence of its own in the Far East, based on its continued ties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia – and does so whether or not China approves. Such a presence would encourage, in general, China's neighbors to take advantage of America's involvement in Asia's financial and economic structures – as well as of America's geopolitical presence – to pursue peacefully, but with greater self-confidence, their own interests in the shadow of a powerful China.
- (6) Ultimately, the United States' geopolitical role in the new East will have to be based on mediation, conciliation and balancing and not on military engagement in mainland Asia. An America cooperatively engaged in multilateral structures, cautiously supportive of India's development, solidly tied to Japan and South Korea, and patiently expanding both bilateral as well as global cooperation with China is the best source of the balancing leverage needed for sustaining stability in the globally rising new East.



Refer to the article: How U.S. Can Secure the New East

<http://the-diplomat.com/2012/02/16/how-u-s-can-secure-the-new-east/>

## **1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors**

### **February 8 “IMO Secretary-General Sekimizu visits the Philippines” (The Maritime Executive, February 9, 2012)**

IMO Secretary-General Sekimizu visited the Philippines from February 7 to 8, in his first official mission to a Member State since he took office on January 1, 2012. He affirmed IMO’s commitment to provide the Philippines with assistance in all aspects of its maritime development, including the fields of education, training, and certification of seafarers under the STCW Convention.

An outline of the article: IMO Secretary-General Sekimizu visited the Philippines from February 7 to 8, in his first official mission to a Member State since he took office on January 1, 2012. In wide-ranging talks in Manila with Philippines’ President Benigno S. Aquino III, as well as the country’s Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, Transport and Communication, and Labour and Employment, Mr. Sekimizu expressed his appreciation for the efforts made by the Government of the Philippines to provide a continuous supply of competent seafarers to the global shipping community. He also affirmed IMO’s commitment to provide the Philippines with assistance in all aspects of its maritime development, including the fields of education, training, and certification of seafarers under the STCW Convention. This can be seen as a clear indication of the priority he places on seafarer-related matters, and as recognition of the key role which seafarers play in the Philippines and the maritime community.

Refer to the article: IMO Secretary-General Pledges Support for Philippines Maritime Development

<http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/imo-secretary-general-pledges-support-for-philippines-maritime-development>

### **February 10 “How can Indonesian archipelagic waters be alternative shipping routes of Straits of Malacca and Singapore?” (RSIS Commentaries, No. 024, February 10, 2012)**

A university lecturer in Malaysia, Dr. Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli contributed a discussion titled “Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?” to RSIS Commentaries dated the 10th. He examines whether the Indonesian archipelagic waters would actually be effective as the alternative waterways under the situation that growing shipping traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has led to a search for alternative shipping routes. After examining three in particular being the Sunda Strait, the Lombok and Makassar Straits and the Ombai-Weitar Straits in the north of the island of Timor, given the geographical inconvenience of

the passageways through the Indonesian archipelagic waters, the author concludes that these routes through the Indonesian archipelago are more complementary than alternative routes to the primary maritime highway of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, though vital for international shipping.

An outline of the article: A university lecturer in Malaysia, Dr. Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli contributed a discussion to RSIS Commentaries titled “Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?” dated the 10th. He argued main points below on whether the Indonesian archipelagic waters would actually be effective as the alternative waterways under the situation that growing shipping traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has led to a search for alternative shipping routes.

- (1) A projected increase of shipping traffic in the next decade has sparked concerns about traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Alternative shipping routes through the Indonesian archipelagic waters have been identified, three in particular being the Sunda Strait, the Lombok and Makassar Straits and the Ombai-Weitar Straits in the north of the island of Timor (see the figure below). How can these be the alternative waterways? Although these straits are part of Indonesia’s archipelagic waters and have been designated by Indonesia as archipelagic sea lanes, all ships and vessels are entitled the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in these shipping routes (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 52).
- (2) The Sunda Strait: the Sunda Strait remains an important waterway for ships travelling by the Cape route to East Asia, as well as for vessels sailing from Australian ports to Southeast or East Asian destinations. The Sunda Strait is quite deep at its western entrance but the depth decreases towards its eastern exit with irregular bottom topography. Unlike the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which is about 1.3 nautical miles at its narrowest point at the Philips Channel, the Sunda Strait is much broader; about 13 nautical miles wide at its narrowest. However the Sunda Strait is less convenient than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as it contains many navigational hazards including strong tidal flows; sandbank formations along the waterway; a live volcano; poor visibility during squalls; and the existence of numerous oil drilling platforms and small islands and reefs which may disrupt safe navigation. Yearly, about 2, 280 ships transit the Sunda Strait carrying in total some 100 million tonnes of cargo valued at US\$5 billion. A plan to build a bridge across the Sunda Strait to connect Java and Sumatra is under study. A pre-feasibility study conducted by a construction firm found that the 29-kilometre bridge would cost up to about US\$10.8 billion. If this project does take place, it will, directly or indirectly, affect the passage of maritime traffic in the already navigationally difficult Sunda Strait.
- (3) The Lombok and Makassar Straits: The Lombok and Makassar Straits are wider (its minimum width is 11.5 miles) and deeper than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. As its depths are greater than 150 metres. It is therefore used by the largest ships of over 100,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT). Tankers of over 230,000 DWT have to use the deeper


Lombok-Makassar route. The Lombok Strait provides a shipping route connecting the Indian Ocean to the Makassar Strait (the length is about 400 nautical miles) and East Asia via the Sulawesi Sea. While little east-west traffic transits Lombok-Makassar still an important route for Australian north-south shipping. Yearly, 420 ships ply the Lombok and Makassar passageway carrying a total of 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US\$40 billion. Even though the Lombok-Makassar route is much safer as it is relatively wide and deep and does not pose significant navigational hazards, it is not as navigationally convenient as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This is because passage along this route consumes more time: a typical voyage from an Arabian Gulf port, Rastanurah, to Yokohama, Japan is about 6,600 nautical miles via the Malacca-Singapore route. However the journey by the Lombok-Makassar route would add another 7,500 nautical miles. The route through the Lombok-Makassar Straits would incur an additional shipping cost of between US\$84 billion and US\$250 billion per year. As a result, compared to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route, both the Sunda and Lombok-Makassar passageways are little used by international traffic.

- (4) The Ombai-Wetar Straits: The Ombai-Wetar Straits route is used generally by local shipping including vessels proceeding between Australia and the Java Sea. Ombai-Wetar is not really a preferred alternative to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as this route is longer in distance for West to East traffic. Nevertheless the extremely deep channels of the Ombai-Wetar Straits provide an undetected access route for submarines between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, making them collectively, an important waterway for American defence interests.
- (5) Given the geographical inconvenience of the passageways through the Indonesian archipelagic waters, it is reasonable to conclude that these routes through the Indonesian archipelago, though vital for international shipping, are more complementary than alternative routes to the primary maritime highway of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Still, these archipelagic straits play a critical role in the flow of the world's shipping. Any disruption of shipping traffic through these straits in the Indonesian archipelagic waters would compromise the well-being of seaborne global trade and the world economy, particularly the Asia-Pacific region.

Refer to the article: Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?

<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0242012.pdf>

Figure: Straits in the Indonesian archipelagic waters



Source: Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, Cooperation with the Centre for naval Analyses, October 1996. p.3

## 1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others

### February 28 “Actual harsh conditions of ship breaking in Bangladesh” (gCaptain, February 28, 2012)

U.S. online shipping news dated the 28th, *gCaptain* delivers a detailed report on the actual harsh conditions of the ship breaking in Bangladesh.

An outline of the article: U.S. online shipping news dated the 28th, *gCaptain* delivers a detailed report on the actual harsh conditions of the ship breaking in Bangladesh. The following are the main points of the report.

- (1) The following two incidences are considered to be the beginning of the ship breaking industry in Bangladesh. Ship breaking in Bangladesh started back in 1960 when a giant cargo ship beached near the sea shore near Chittagong due to a cyclone. The ship owners abandoned the wreck, and local metal workers slowly began to scrounge it for scrap metal and material. In the other incident, in 1974, a salvaged Pakistani navy vessel, which was sunk during the Bangladeshi liberation war, was scrapped. The ship breaking industry gradually grew since then, and by the mid 80s Bangladesh had become one of the major ship breaking nations in the world.

- (2) The ship breaking industry in Bangladesh is estimated worth an annual turn over of around 1.5 billion dollars. Globally some 700 ocean-going vessels are scrapped each year, and more than 100 of them are scrapped in Bangladesh. Some of the ships are 350 meter long with a weight up to 10-15,000 Light Displacement Tonnes (LDT).(see Note) It is estimated that app. 30 percent of the world's LDT were scrapped in Bangladesh during the period 2000-2010. Since then the business has been slightly declining due to the global recession. But the business is now picking up again, and the number of ship yards increases year by year. Ship breaking generates a lot of jobs, and it is estimated that some 30-50,000 people are directly employed in the ship breaking industry in Bangladesh. Additionally, another 100,000 are indirectly involved in the business. Most of the labourers are hired by the ship yards through local contractors on a ship by ship basis. A labourer earns around 1-3 dollars per day depending on the type of work. Some 300-500 people are typically employed on a temporary basis for dismantling a ship, and many more are employed in downstream activities for recycling of all kind of materials from the ships. Some of the recycled materials are exported, and the rest is sold of and reused in Bangladesh. Up to 70-80 percent of the steel used in Bangladesh is believed to originate from the ship breaking yards in Chittagong. One of the most valuable parts of a ship is the propeller, which is often worth 50,000-100,000 dollars. Propellers and other high value items are exported to other countries. It is estimated that there are around 100 ship breaking yards along the coast north of Chittagong, and every year new yards are being constructed. The ship yards are owned by politicians and business people. (Note: Light Displacement Tonne (LDT) is the total weight of hull and machinery weight, which is the basis to calculate the sale price of a scrap ship)
- (3) The ship breaking practices applied in Bangladesh are strictly prohibited by most countries in the world due to very dangerous nature of the work and the huge environmental implications. It is the so-called beaching method that is being used in Bangladesh. The ship is sailed with maximum speed during the high tide and will be beached over the flat muddy land where it is completely dismantled by a number of labourers during the low tide. Beaching is considered a specialised operation. The closer the ship is beached to the shore, the more profitable it becomes for the ship yard owner. The gigantic ships are ripped apart by blowtorches and large steel parts are taken to shore with use of electric winches. Most work is done by raw human man power. A ship breaker will typically buy a ship to be scrapped for around 4-10 million dollars depending on the size and quality of the ship. A scrapped ship is sold to the local or international trader.
- (4) Working in the ship breaking yards is a very dangerous job, which involves many human health risks. Workers are often exposed to asbestos used for insulation in older ships and from paint containing lead, cadmium and arsenic. It is not seldom that workers die caused by gas poisoning or explosions and fires. Old ships are imported without pre-cleaning or removal of toxic gases and dangerous materials. Each ship contains an average of 7000 – 8000 kilo of asbestos and 10 – 100 tons of lead paint. Many of the oxyacetylene cutters

work without goggles. Few wear shoes, let alone protective clothing. Local organisations in Bangladesh estimate that some 1000-2000 workers have died in the last 30 years, and many more have suffered serious injuries. General health statistics show that the percentage of people with disabilities in the Chittagong area is above average for the country as a whole, because many workers have lost limbs or got other disabilities from working in the ship breaking yards. It is estimated that half of the workers are under 22 years and nearly half of them are illiterate. Some believe that up to around 20 percent of the total work force consist of children. The labourers or their families are poorly compensated when injured or killed. The Government of Bangladesh has recently introduced new national policies and legislation to improve the environmental and occupational health and safety standards in the ship breaking yards. But there is a long way to go. The workers in the ship breaking yards are clear on two things: that they will die early and that there have been no improvements over the last thirty years in terms of worker rights, health and safety.

Refer to the article: The Graveyard of Giants: A history of ship breaking in Bangladesh

<http://gcaptain.com/graveyard-giants-history-ship/?41012>



Ship breaking beach in Chittagong

Source: [http://janmoellerhansen.smugmug.com/gallery/21351802\\_B7fnj6/1708058161\\_68LW6tv#!i=1707013174&k=MdpCwBn](http://janmoellerhansen.smugmug.com/gallery/21351802_B7fnj6/1708058161_68LW6tv#!i=1707013174&k=MdpCwBn)

See Photo Gallery: Ship breaking beach in Chittagong

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## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### Review of From Mahan to Corbett?

On December 11, 2011, an online international current-affairs magazine, *The Diplomat*, carried an article titled “From Mahan to Corbett?”<sup>1</sup> by James R. Holmes, an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Analysis of this monthly report has covered this article and examined the maritime strategy of Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), a British historian and strategic thinker.

The superordinate concept of “Air Sea Battle,” the Joint Operational Access Concept (hereafter JOAC), was announced last December. In this regard, the article mentioned that the superiority of the United States in military strategy was threatened in the current international security environment; it introduced the different ways in which Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) and Corbett perceived command of the sea, along with the significance of the JOAC. Corbett’s theory was different from that of Mahan, who was suspected to have advocated “navalism” and an “ocean supremacy theory.” Corbett stressed on land space as being the most important for human life. He offered incisive suggestions for modern military operations by advocating a “maritime strategy” based on a sophisticated joint operation. When the issue of seapower is debated in Europe and the United States, the general tendency is to focus on the strategic theories of Mahan, who advocated sea power, and of Corbett, who stressed on maritime strategy. (In practice, their theories should not be classified in such a dualistic manner.) However, Corbett is undeniably little known in Japan. This analysis attempts to introduce Corbett’s strategic theory and compare it to Mahan’s.

#### 1. Outline

- (1) The announcement of the JOAC seems to signify a healthy shift in the attitude toward the contested regions of the globe.
- (2) The Soviet Union was dissolved twenty years ago. With no major rival, the U.S. armed forces grew accustomed to “commanding” the global “commons,” the seas and skies beyond the jurisdiction of any government. If the United States no longer had to fight for control of the commons, it was logical for American leaders to refocus their energies on “power projection” in embattled regions. Command seemed a virtual U.S. birthright.
- (3) In recent years, however, regional powers like China and Iran have bought or built weaponry that equips them to challenge U.S. mastery of offshore waters and airspace. U.S. commanders can no longer assume that they can gain access to forward bases in places like Japan or Bahrain, let alone project power onto foreign shores with impunity. The JOAC acknowledges the old yet still-relevant reality that external powers may encounter resistance from strong local powers that boast sizable advantages when

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<sup>1</sup>James R. Holmes, “From Mahan to Corbett,” in *Diplomat*, 11 December 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/12/11/from-mahan-to-corbett/>.

- fighting in their own backyards.
- (4) The JOAC's central idea is that "cross-domain synergy" across military services will be critical to piercing the "anti-access" and "area-denial" measures of regional antagonists. Equally important is that this document tries to dispel any lingering illusions about untrammelled U.S. access to disputed regions.
  - (5) More likely, say the JOAC's drafters, the U.S. expeditionary forces will have to impose local, temporary superiority at critical places on the map at critical times. "Superiority in any domain," it observes, "may not be widespread or permanent; it more often will be local and temporary." Only the complete integration of land, air, and sea power can help commanders exploit "fleeting local opportunities for disrupting the enemy system." If the United States holds command at the outset of a conflict, it may lose command eventually and have to restore it by force of arms. It may be no coincidence that the JOAC was released the day after the seventieth anniversary of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor—the last time U.S. sea and air forces found themselves driven from the Western Pacific and had to battle their way back.
  - (6) The JOAC seems to mark a transition from "Mahanian" to "Corbettian" assumptions about warfare in regions like the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
  - (7) Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted naval commanders to seek out and defeat enemy battle fleets, thereby winning command of the sea. He defined command as "overbearing power" that rid vital waters of the enemy's flag or, at most, allowed the flag to appear as a "fugitive." He seemed to assume that permanent, absolute command of important expanses was possible.
  - (8) Mahan's contemporary, British historian Julian Corbett, agreed that "permanent general control" was a worthy goal, but also insisted that it might prove unattainable. He believed that the "normal position" was an "uncommanded sea," simply because no navy was big and wide-ranging enough to be at all places at all times. Therefore, naval commanders needed to think in terms of wresting control of key points from adversaries for finite intervals.
  - (9) However, naval campaigns need not proceed in a linear fashion. According to Corbett's classic treatise *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911), logic dictates that fleets overcome enemy fleets before exercising command, which involves blockading enemy shores, landing troops, and doing the other things that victory entitles a navy to do.
  - (10) On the other hand, as Corbett explained in *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, war "is not conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice." The "special conditions of naval warfare" rendered it "inevitable that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow operations for securing command." In other words, a navy might have to exercise command before winning the war and accept the attendant dangers and hardships.
  - (11) As the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force commanders ponder over how to execute the JOAC, they could do worse than dust off that old a copy of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.



## 2. Comments

### (1) Julian Corbett

In this article, Holmes explains the thinking behind acquiring command of the sea and the importance of joint operational capability based on Corbett's strategic theory. Though a contemporary of Mahan, Corbett developed strategic theories on maritime space that were different from Mahan's. The following is a brief summary of Corbett's career.

Corbett was born on September 12, 1852. He graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge, with a first-class law degree and then became a barrister.<sup>2</sup> However, he did not seem dedicated to his vocation and began to go on overseas trips and produce maritime novels.<sup>3</sup> He began working for the Navy Records Society in 1893<sup>4</sup> and taught the history of naval affairs at the University of Oxford in 1903.<sup>5</sup> He never served in the armed forces unlike others who wrote seminal books on naval strategy, such as Mahan, Philip Colomb (1831–1899), Herbert Richmond (1871–1946), and Raoul Castex (1878–1968). Possibly because of his career, Corbett's strategic theory covers a wider field than Mahan's theory,<sup>6</sup> which aimed to encourage naval officer education on the history and construction of a larger American navy. Unlike Mahan, Corbett summarized the results of his research; his book, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, came out in 1911.

### (2) Corbett's Strategic Thought

#### Navy as an Extension of Policy

On studying the work of Karl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), the Prussian author of *On War*, Corbett had a strategic observation on the need to relate strategy and diplomatic policy.<sup>7</sup> Corbett said that one of the functions of fleets was to “support or obstruct diplomatic effort”<sup>8</sup> and he regarded war as a form of political intercourse and a continuation of foreign policy that begins when force is introduced to achieve aims.<sup>9</sup> Even though previous naval history books had never highlighted the comprehensive relationship between naval, military, and political events, Corbett covered not only naval operations but also foreign and national policy and the personalities involved in his work.<sup>10</sup> Unlike Mahan, his most significant contribution to maritime thought was his finding that the success of the British maritime empire could be attributed to not only seapower but also the combined interplay and exploitation of all its naval, military, economic, and

<sup>2</sup> John B. Hattendorf, ed. in chief, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, Vol.1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 502.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Eric Grove, “Introduction,” in Sir Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Introduction by Eric Grove, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989, first published, 1911) p. xiii-xv.

<sup>5</sup> Hiromichi Takahashi, ed., *Strategic Theoretical System Eighth: Corbett* [Senryaku Ron Taikei 8: Corbett] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 2006), p. 285.

<sup>6</sup> John Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 106-107.

<sup>7</sup> Geoffrey Till, *Seapower a Guide for the Twenty-first Century*, 2nd ed., (London: Frank Cass, 2009), p. 57.

<sup>8</sup> Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Year's War*, Vol 1, (London: Greenhill Books), p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Barry D. Hunt, “The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian S. Corbett,” in John B. Hattendorf, Rosert S. Jordan, and Robert O'Neill eds., *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1989), p. 115.

<sup>10</sup> John B. Hattendorf, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy*, (Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 2000), p. 82.

diplomatic powers in a comprehensive manner. He also insisted that the maritime and continental schools of strategy should not compete against, but complement each other.<sup>11</sup>

#### Limitations of Sea and the Complementary Relationship with Land

Corbett applied Clausewitz's idea to the development of the theory of "limited war." With command of the sea, an insular country or a country isolated from great powers by the oceans could expand or reduce the scale of war on its own terms. Such a favorable strategic environment enables such countries to conduct "war limited by contingent." In fact, Britain adopted a businesslike approach to the situation in Europe and controlled the balance of power there by making the maximum use of seapower.

On the other hand, through the study of naval history, Corbett understood the limitations as well as the advantages of seapower.<sup>12</sup> He investigated how the navy influenced the outcome of war through ways other than its operations. Despite the fact that Britain won the Battle of Trafalgar, Corbett took considerable notice that the Napoleonic Wars continued for another ten years.<sup>13</sup> He felt that seapower was used defensively in war and that it was powerless during the final stage of a war against a great continental power.<sup>14</sup> Corbett also imagined that if Britain had sea power alone, it could be a mere balancer for Europe, but not overpower, a continental European foe, and joint operations between naval and land forces and continental allies were essential to defeat a formidable continental opponent. Many of Corbett's readers at the time were surprised that he considered the Battle of Trafalgar as an event that highlighted the limitations of sea power rather than the glory of the navy.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, Corbett believed that the navy was required to assist the army, diplomats, and allies by putting pressure on hostile forces in diverse ways to achieve a greater goal.<sup>16</sup> Although Mahan often used the term "naval strategy," Corbett maintained a distance from the term "navy supremacy group" by using the term "maritime strategy" in a broader context<sup>17</sup> and making a terminological distinction between "naval strategy" and "maritime strategy." Corbett insisted that inhabited land was the most important strategic space, and he underscored the significance of joint operations by the navy and army. He called this "maritime strategy."<sup>18</sup> He believed that naval and military history should never be separated and that the army should consider how the navy can help them and vice versa.<sup>19</sup> Corbett believed that the relationship between seapower and landpower should be complementary, not an adversarial, and defined maritime strategy as an

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<sup>11</sup> Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir. Julian S. Corbett," p.111.

<sup>12</sup> Donald M. Schurman, *Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe*, (London: Royal Historical Society), p. ix.

<sup>13</sup> Hattendorf, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy*, p. 83.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>16</sup> Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir. Julian S. Corbett," p.111.

<sup>17</sup> Till, *Seapower*, p. 59.

<sup>18</sup> Sir Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Introduction by Eric Grove, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989, first published, 1911), pp. 15-16.

<sup>19</sup> Hattendorf, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy*, p. 84.

extension of continental strategy.<sup>20</sup> Corbett's point of view was not easily influenced by dualistic terms and he took a comprehensive and panoramic view of national strategy, considering the original purpose of a state.

#### Command of the Sea and Sea Lines of Communication

As mentioned in "From Mahan to Corbett?", Mahan and Corbett had differing views on command of the sea. One of the main reasons for Corbett's continued skepticism toward the concept of absolute command of the sea was the difference between land and sea as a strategic space. Human beings are unable to occupy the sea, unlike land, so that they can exclude forces other than friends from the sea, or reside at sea.<sup>21</sup> Corbett discussed command of the sea as follows:

That error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea.<sup>22</sup>

He insisted that command of the sea is not a dualistic concept like "black or white" or "winner takes all." He clarified the difference between land and sea as strategic spaces, saying, "The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory."<sup>23</sup> While he acknowledged that the navy's ideal is to wipe out the enemy's fleets, as Mahan held, he pointed out that this ideal might not be realized. He believed that one of the two goals of naval operations was to obtain or dispute the command of the sea and the other was to exercise such control of communications as it previously had.<sup>24</sup> Corbett emphasized the superiority of defense and dispersion of forces in naval war and insisted on the significance of silent pressure using the navy's presence, like the "fleet in being," a strategy to temporarily disperse and avoid the enemy's forces. Such opinions differed significantly from those of Mahan, who placed importance on the concentration of forces and a decisive fleet battle. Undeniably, Corbett was challenging Mahan's idea.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, his strategic theory, said to be as an application of Clausewitz's theory and similar to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*,<sup>26</sup> is an example of the application of a theory, and can be applied to other things as referred to hereafter.

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<sup>20</sup> Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir. Julian S. Corbett," p. 123.

<sup>21</sup> Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, pp. 91-106.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>23</sup> Takahashi, *Corbett*, p. 84.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Eric Grove, "Introduction," p. xxxiv.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Handel, "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2000, pp. 106-124.

## (3) Mahan or Corbett?

Mahan earned his place in history by emphasizing that oceans, navies, and international relations were of paramount importance to states. He emphasized the following three notions: “maritime commerce was essential to the economic prosperity of a great power”; “the best means of protecting one’s own trade while interdicting the enemy’s was to deploy a fleet of battleships capable of maintaining naval supremacy”; and “a nation with naval supremacy could defeat a country that was militarily pre-eminent.”<sup>27</sup> In 1890, when he published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, “control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.”<sup>28</sup> *The Times* of London then proclaimed that Mahan was “the new Copernicus.”<sup>29</sup> Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), called the founder of modern geopolitics, said of Mahan’s work, “The ocean was one ocean all the time, but the practical meaning of that great reality was not wholly understood until a few years ago—perhaps it is only now being grasped in its entirety.”<sup>30</sup> Mahan is most commonly remembered for emphasizing the significance of sea lanes and the shipping industry, the importance of naval stations, the concentration of naval forces, and the positive effects of naval blockades. He received praise for publishing *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, from the leaders of the great powers and navy circles at the time. Such arguments, however, became a target for criticism because Mahan’s works had the potential to trigger a new round in the arms race, cause navalism, and failed to foresee the importance of scientific and technological progress. Later, it was suggested that he was the main source of the decisive battle doctrine, the “Big Gun Navy,”<sup>31</sup> and the principle of the big navy, and he was called an expansionist and a propagandist.<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, Corbett developed his strategic theories to neutralize Mahan’s navalist outlook, which was highly popular at the time. Indeed, he observed the significance of joint operations, limited war, adjusting naval operations for political or diplomatic purposes, the control of sea lines of communication, and the attack and defense of commercial shipping and the fleet-in-being strategy.<sup>33</sup> Corbett wanted his works to be more a common guideline for a state’s general policy than something to overemphasize the role of the navy.<sup>34</sup> He was unable to overcome students’ skepticism in his lecture at Royal Naval College, Greenwich, because he was a

<sup>27</sup> Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician,” in Colins S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan eds., *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy*, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 39.

<sup>28</sup> Philip A. Crawl, “Aldred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Peter Paret ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 450.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 447.

<sup>30</sup> Halford Mackinder, *Democracy no Risō to Genjitsu* [Democratic Ideals and Reality], translated by Yasunobu Somura, (Tokyo: Harashobō, 2008), p. 39.

<sup>31</sup> Kenichi Kitamura, “Comment by the translator: How Should We Comprehend Seapower—Today’s Significance—,” Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, translated by Kenichi Kitamura, commentary by Kazushige Todaka (Tokyo: Harashobō, 2008), p. 15.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup> See, for example: Hiromichi Takahashi, “Kaiyō Senyraku no Keifu—Mahan to Corbett—(3) Kaiyō Ryoku Riron [The Genealogy of Maritime Strategy—Mahan and Corbett—(3) Seapower Theory],” *Hatō*, No. 166 (May, 2003), p. 20; and Takahashi, *Corbett*, pp. 284-317.

<sup>34</sup> Eric Grove, “BR 1806, Joint Doctrine and Beyond,” in Andre Dorman, Mike Lawrende Smith, and Matthew R. H. Uttley, eds, *The Changing Face of Maritime Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 63.

citizen with no military experience.<sup>35</sup> His strategic thought that underscored the superiority of defense became a focus of criticism—both the Royal Navy<sup>36</sup> and the Imperial Japanese Navy<sup>37</sup> were opposed to such thought. His works continued to be ignored for decades after his death, even in the United Kingdom and the United States, but since then, they have gained gradual acceptance.

#### (4) China and Corbett

The intelligence assessment of the monthly report from May 2011, “Review: When Land Powers Look Seaward,” mentioned that China highly appreciated Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, and attempted to transform itself from a land power state to a sea power state by remembering the importance of protecting commercial intercourse and the sea lines of communication. China, taking into account Mahan’s strategic thought, treated seapower as a pillar of its national progress. However, in recent years, after Chinese seapower has gradually taken shape, China is attempting to evolve further as a maritime state by shifting its strategic direction toward the application of Corbett’s theory. This is explained in “China’s Navy: A Turn to Corbett?” written by James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara (a professor of the U.S. Naval War College), in the December 2010 volume of *Proceedings* published by the United States Naval Institute. According to this paper, the elaborate assessments of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* and comparisons of Corbett with Mahan have appeared gradually in Chinese military literature since 2008.<sup>38</sup> Although they learned and incorporated the basic framework of sea power from Mahan, Chinese experts believed that “only knowing Mahan is dangerous” and were highly appreciative of Corbett’s sea power theory.<sup>39</sup> This paper points out that the relationship between China and Corbett’s strategic theory is as follows: (1) Corbett’s theory, which places such significance on land, is highly relevant to China, which has the traditions of a great continental power; (2) the explanation and definition of command of the sea by the Chinese navy evidently uses Corbett’s theory as a reference; (3) Corbett, influenced by Clausewitz, insisted that the strategy of true defense or “active defense” involved waiting for a chance to strike back, and can be associated with Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war; (4) the elastic cohesion of forces that Corbett advocated is suitable for China’s extended coastline; (5) the Chinese maritime periphery has a number of islands and territorial disputes, and Corbett’s works, which link naval power to landing operations, could help the Chinese navy strategize when conducting operations in such areas.<sup>40</sup>

Mahan’s thoughts on the significance of the sea are profound and philosophical, and are

<sup>35</sup> Hunt, “The Strategic Thought of Sir. Julian S. Corbett,” p.112.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example; Till, *Seapower*, p. 61.

<sup>37</sup> Takahashi, *Corbett*, p. 304.

<sup>38</sup> James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Navy: A Turn to Corbett?,” *Proceedings Magazine*, December 2010, Vol.136, No. 12, <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-12/chinas-navy-turn-corbett>.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

relevant and persuasive even in changing times.<sup>41</sup> China focuses its national maritime strategy on Mahan's sea power theory but understands that knowledge of Mahan alone is not enough. Consequently, Chinese experts study Corbett's strategic theory, which is well balanced and introduced a broader perspective. They use a combination of Mahan's and Corbett's theories in actual operations and policy aspects and attempt to apply their theories to the country's strategic environment. China's ability to set a definite goal and work promptly and flexibly in this direction inspires respect, even though its political system is a one-party regime.

### 3. Implications for Japan

Not only the application to a sophisticated joint operations essential to seize Taiwan, and the JOAC but also the efficacy of Corbett's theory has attracted attention, such as in the case of the theory of space strategy that China is now promoting.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, "offshore balancing," which is currently becoming a much-discussed concept, is suggestive of the possible association of limited war that Corbett spoke of. His theory seems to have had a deep influence on both U.S. and Chinese strategy; hence, Japan, which is inevitably influenced by these two countries, must seek to comprehend both Mahan and Corbett. The incisiveness of Corbett's forethought can be adapted even today and cannot be disregarded.<sup>43</sup>

The views of both Mahan and Corbett contain weak and strong points. Different eras of history seem to validate or bring into question different parts of their arguments. Their reputations do change with time, but Mahan and Corbett are great figures in the history of strategic studies, and both arguments have their strong points. Which of them should be chosen, learned, and applied? The wisdom of a state or an organization is tested by its capability to assess and properly use sea power strategies and other strategies. What is worrisome is the fact that Japan is ill equipped to research strategic studies, and the lack of strategic-studies knowledge makes one feel insecure. Even those in Japan whose positions require them to have some background in strategic studies lack a theoretical grounding and have trouble discussing the arguments of foreign experts such as Holmes and Chinese experts. These individuals need to acquire both the theoretical knowledge and a background on current debates in the field.

(By Daisuke SEKINE, Research Fellow of the OPRF)

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<sup>41</sup> See, for example, James R. Holmes, "What's the Matter with Mahan?," May 2011, Vol. 137, No. 5, <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/whats-matter-mahan>.

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, Lieutenant Commander John J. Klein, U.S. Navy, "Corbett in Orbit," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2004, Vol. LVII, No 1, pp. 59-74; and John J. Klein, *Space Warfare: Principles, Strategy and Policy*, (London Routledge, 2005).

<sup>43</sup> For example, *British Maritime Doctrine: BR1806* has been strongly influenced by Corbett.



## **Ocean Policy Research Foundation**

Toranomon 35 Mori Bldg., 4-10 Toranomom 3-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan  
TEL.81-3-5404-6828 FAX.81-3-5404-6800

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