

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

November 2011



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This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of November 2011.

Publisher: Masahiro Akiyama

Staff writers:

Kazumine Akimoto, Takehisa Imaizumi, Masami Kawamura, Aki Mori, Wakana Mukai,
Eiji Sakai, Daisuke Sekine, Takehisa Tomomori, Hideshi Ueno, Yuko Takada

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Intelligence Summary in November 2011

Maritime Security: The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) warship RSS *Endeavour*, an amphibious transport, of the Republic of Singapore assigned to counter-piracy Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 has disrupted two separate attacks by suspected pirates on merchant vessels transiting the Arabian Sea south of Oman. On the 4th, a French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aircraft and the German navy's frigate, FGS *Köln*, both operating as part of the EU NAVFOR, captured a pirate action group (PAG) and destroyed the attack boats 50 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. On the morning of the 10th, the Indian Navy's patrol ship INS *Sukanya* successfully intercepted a pirate attack group in IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, and nabbed 26 Somali pirates with six AK 47 rifles, 12 magazines and about 300 rounds of ammunition.

There were three incidents, in which the vessels were released by pirates. On the 3rd, Somali pirates released the Algerian-flagged bulk carrier *MV Blida* operated by the Greek shipping company after they agreed with the ship-owner side to accept a \$2.6M ransom. The vessel was hijacked on January 1 approximately 130 miles south east of the Port of Salalah, Oman. On the 25th, Somali pirates have released an Italian-flagged bulk carrier *MV Rosalia D'Amato* (74,500DWT). *MV Rosalia D'Amato* was seized by the pirates in the Arabian Sea on April 21. She has a crew of 21. On the 30th, Somali pirates released the Singapore-flagged product tanker *MT Gemini* (29,871DWT) operated by a Singaporean company. The vessel was hijacked off east of Kenya on April 30. Of her 25 crewmembers, 21 men were released, but pirates still keep Korean captain and three crewmembers. Pirates are holding South Korean sailors as a compensation for five pirate suspects held in custody in South Korea while the Korean Navy stormed and released the hijacked South Korean tanker *Samho Jewelry* on January 21, 2011.

On the 2nd, the Singaporean Ministry of Defence announced that they will test and validate the effectiveness of the National Maritime Security System (NMSS) at the Exercise Northstar VIII which will be co-organized by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Ministry of Home Affairs and conducted from November 10 to 25, 2011.

On the 11th, the three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) set up under the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Singapore-based ReCAAP ISC signed the agreement to establish a set of standard operating procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information in Singapore, which will result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents.

On the 15th, France has held first trial of six suspected Somali pirates. Six men are charged with hijacking, and kidnapping after allegedly seizing the yacht *Carre D'as IV* and its crew, a married couple, on September 2, 2008.

On the 22nd, the European Union (EU) Military Committee said it is short of warships for its counter-piracy mission off Somalia and is unlikely to fill the gap from December to March 2012 given economic constraints, and a normal minimum force requirement of at least four to six warships would not be met in the period [from December until March 2012].

On the 22nd, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2020 to extend for 12 months its authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against all acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia to enter Somalia's territorial waters and use "all necessary means."

According to the Somalia Report dated November 25, as of the 25th, at least 16 ships (nine commercial vessels, and seven fishing vessels) and an estimated 304 hostages are in the control of Somali pirates. In addition, up to November 11, 2011, estimated ransom payments in 2011 amounted to \$128.5 million for the release of 27 vessels.

Military Developments: On the 2nd, visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa during his tour in Japan, Indian Defence Minister A K Antony held a meeting with him. According to the press-release issued after the talks, two sides have commonly possessed recognition that Japan and India are maritime nations, which have common benefits in securing the sea lanes, and strengthening the cooperative relations between Japan and India in the area of maritime security is important.

On the 9th, the Department of Defense announced the creation of the Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO). The ASBO will integrate development efforts of air and naval combat capabilities under the new security environments.

On the 9th, the Hong Kong newspaper, *The South China Morning Post*, reported that China will station up to 1,000 armed officers to patrol the Mekong River. It is based upon an agreement which officials from China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand reached in Beijing on October 31 on joint law enforcement and patrols on the Mekong following the killing of 13 Chinese sailors in October.

According to India's Zee News on the 10th, in its efforts to tighten security, the Indian government has decided to procure 150 patrol boats to be given to coastal states to intensify vigil along the country's coastline. The 150 vessels are eventually deployed in nine coastal states and four Union Territories. The first delivery of 30 boats will start from the middle of the year 2012.

On a web page titled "Maritime Security Asia" dated the 21st, an expert on the national security issues, Frederik Van Lokeren, is discussing the modernization program of the submarines, corvettes and destroyers of the Russian Navy. Additionally, the expert mentions that, in the near future, of four Russian fleets, the Pacific Ocean will be an important maritime theater for Russia from the point of maritime security. The deployment of *Borei* class submarines, the first purchased *Mistral* class ship, the modernization of a *Kirov* class nuclear cruiser and the deployment of a *Slava* class cruiser to the Pacific Fleet show a clear concentration of modern Russian maritime firepower in this theater.

On the 29th, China's aircraft carrier commenced sailing for its second sea trial for relevant scientific research and experiments, Chinese Ministry of National Defense said in a press release. According to the press release, the current sea trial for relevant scientific research and experiments was started as the aircraft carrier had completed all the refitting and testing work as

scheduled after its first sea trial in August.

South China Sea-related Events: Contributing an article titled “Competition deepens in the South China Sea” to the Hong Kong-based on-line newspaper, Asia Times Online, on the 3rd, Robert Tofani, a freelance journalist and analyst covering Southeast Asia, has pointed out in it about the features of recent Vietnamese and Philippine diplomacy in the South China Sea as follows: The Philippines and Vietnam aim to enhance their strategic cooperation and have effectively invited the United States and other regional powers to help counterbalance China's claims of sovereignty over the territory in the brewing multilateral dispute over the SCS issues.

On the 13th, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began their first talks on creating a code of conduct (COC) on the South China Sea in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN is persuading the five nuclear countries (P5) - the US, UK, Russia, China and France - to respect the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ) which was signed by 10 ASEAN leaders in Bangkok on December 15, 1995.

Visiting the Philippines for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Partnership for Growth (PFG) with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario on the 16th. On the USS *Fitzgerald* in Manila Bay, Clinton and her Philippine counterpart, Del Rosario, and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, signed a declaration calling for multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputes. During her stay of Secretary Clinton pledged the US commitment to the Philippines.

On the 18th, the 14th Japan-the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia. Representing Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda attended the meeting. The joint declaration issued after the talks called for promoting and deepening cooperation between Japan and ASEAN nations on maritime security and maritime safety.

On the 18th, the third ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting between the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Barack Obama, President of the United States, was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, regarding the maritime securities issues, they reaffirmed the importance of freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce in accordance with the relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other agreed international maritime law, as well as their support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea.

On the 18th, the 14th ASEAN-China Summit between the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, premier Wen Jiabao, was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, in relation to the South China Sea issues, the participants made confirmations that they remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force, as well as to working toward the eventual adoption of a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

On the 19th, the Sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the “Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations” issued after the meeting the Heads of State/Government of the Member States reiterated their commitment to the recognized principles of international law, as well as recognized that the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the statement of the chairman on maritime cooperation recognition was shown that promotion of cooperation at sea is important. Additionally, dialogue between the participating nations in the EAS based on the existing ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) was advocated.

The Taiwan’s newspaper dated the 29th, *Taipei Times* (Online) carried an article contributed to the recent Chinese *People’s Daily* and *Global Times* by Pan Guoping, a law professor at China’s Southwest University of Law and Politics. According to the newspaper, in the article, Pan Guoping disputes the claim that the South China Sea comprises gonghai (Chinese), or “high seas,” as the term is translated in Article 86 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By denying the presence of high seas in the South China Sea, China would deny freedom of navigation and use of airspace to other countries over the entire area, which Pan made clear. On the other hand, James Tien Taiwan’s director-general of the ministry’s Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said a project to draw up and publish a new map of the South China Sea where the country has sovereignty is currently underway.

Diplomacy and International Relations: On the 8th, China has opened an embassy in the Maldives in the Indian Ocean archipelago. It is estimated to be a move seen as another step to increase its influence across a South Asian region

On November 16, U.S. President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced to expand strategic cooperation between the United and Australia, having an eye on the growing China’s influences in the Asia-Pacific region. As a topic, we have carried major articles on basing the U.S. Marine in Australia and Chinese reactions to it.

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: According to an International Maritime Organization (IMSO) study report issued on the 14th, research into the impact of mandatory energy efficiency measures for international shipping shows that implementation of the measures will lead to significant reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships, specifically reductions of carbon dioxide (CO₂), resulting from enhanced fuel efficiency. The study found that, by 2020, an average of 151.5 million tons of annual CO₂ reductions are estimated from the introduction of the measures, a figure that by 2030, will increase to an average of 330 million tons annually. Based on the study, Amendments to the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Annex VI Regulations for the prevention of air pollution from ships, add a new chapter on Regulations on energy efficiency for ships.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: On the 16th, the United States Navy

and the Indonesian Navy held a reception celebrating the completion of one-month of joint oceanographic survey in the Indonesian coastal area. This survey was conducted by a team of 13 U.S. oceanographers and hydrographers from the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) under the U.S. Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command and five Indonesian surveyors, who were embarking the Military Sealift Command (MSC) oceanographic survey ship USNS *Henson* (T-AGS 63), in the territorial waters off Indonesia's coast including the Java Sea and the Sunda Straits from October 14 to November 14.

On the 25th, Australia's Environment Minister Tony Burke said the proposed Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve would cover 989,842 square kilometers, more than half the size of Queensland.

Intelligence Assessment: In October 2011, the U.S. think tank, The Rand Corporation, issued the report titled "Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence" (hereinafter the Rand Report). Pointing out the scenarios of high probability of the U. S. military conflict with China, including clashes over North Korea, China-Taiwan relations, the South China Sea, maritime issues between china and Japan, the Rand Report says the United States may not be able to control the ambitions of China, if Washington fails to make proper efforts of maintaining deterrence and direct military capabilities. On the other hand, the Project 2049 Institute issued the report titled "Asian Alliances in the 21st Century" in September 2011 (hereinafter the 2049 report). This 2049 report mentions that China's military ambition is threatening the U.S. Asian allies, making reliability of the U.S. commitments to allies unstable, and endangering the U.S. strategy of maintaining global military superiority, concluding the necessity of changing the alliance systems.

Analysis of this monthly report has examined the response of the U.S. and its allies to the rise of China, providing a focus on two major reports above-mentioned.

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

November 1 “Pirate attacks thwarted by Singaporean navy vessel” (Defence Web, November 7, 2011)

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) warship RSS *Endeavour*, an amphibious transport, of the Republic of Singapore assigned to counter-piracy Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 has disrupted two separate attacks by suspected pirates on merchant vessels transiting the Arabian Sea south of Oman.

An outline of the article: The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) warship RSS *Endeavour*, an amphibious transport, of the Republic of Singapore assigned to counter-piracy Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 has disrupted two separate attacks by suspected pirates on merchant vessels transiting the Arabian Sea south of Oman. Firstly, on the early morning of the 1st, responding to a rescue signal issued by the Liberian-flagged LPG tanker, MT *Bw Broker*, that it was being chased by a suspicious skiff with seven people on board and a ladder visible in the skiff, RSS *Endeavour* launched one of its embarked helicopters to rapidly provide direct support to the merchant vessel taking evasive maneuvers. Less than two hours later, RSS *Endeavour* received another rescue signal from the Greek-flagged chemical tanker, MT *Elka Athina*, operating in the vicinity. The skiff with five persons on board carrying weapons was approaching the vessels. RSS *Endeavour's* helicopter then located the suspected pirate skiff and followed it to its mother ship. Communication was established between the helicopter and the dhow. Confirming it was the mother ship of the group attempting to attack *MT Bw Broker*, RSS *Endeavour's* helicopter destroyed the skiff and all associated pirate equipment.

Refer to the article: Pirate attacks thwarted by Singaporean navy vessel

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20856:pirate-attacks-thwarted-by-singaporean-navy-vessel&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106

November 2 “Singapore tests national maritime security system” (MINDEF, Singapore, News Release, November 2, 2011)

On the 2nd, the Singaporean Ministry of Defence announced that they will test and validate the effectiveness of the National Maritime Security System (NMSS) at the Exercise Northstar VIII which will be co-organized by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Ministry of Home Affairs and conducted from November 10 to 25, 2011.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, the Singaporean Ministry of Defence announced that they will test and validate the effectiveness of the National Maritime Security System (NMSS) at the Exercise Northstar VIII which will be co-organized by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs and conducted from November 10 to 25, 2011. The NMSS is a whole-of-government framework that tightens the integration among various maritime agencies

to deal with maritime security threats in Singapore. The framework promotes information sharing, situation awareness, decision-making and operational coordination among our maritime security agencies. The NMSS will consist of the National Maritime Sense-making Centre (NMSC), which provides early warning of threats by analyzing and compiling information, and the National Maritime Operations Group (NMOG), which will plan, coordinate and direct security operations. The testing and validation of the NMSS will be done during the exercise from November 21 to 25, 2011. Based on the information collected by the NMSC, the NMOG will proceed to plan, coordinate and direct operations on the ground to deal with a security threat scenario where terrorists hijack a tanker. A maritime demonstration exercise will be staged on the November 25.

According to an announcement of the defense ministry on the 25th, about 700 personnel from 18 different agencies, including 230 personnel from the Singapore Armed Forces, participated in the Exercise Northstar VIII. On the 25th, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chea Hean, Defense Minister, as well as senior officials from various ministries observed the exercise.

Refer to the article: Exercise Northstar VIII - Testing and Validating the National Maritime Security System

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2011/nov/02nov11_news2/02nov11_fs.html

DPM Teo Observes Maritime Security and Consequence Management at Exercise Northstar VIII

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2011/nov/25nov11_nr.html



Exercise Northstar VIII - Special Operation Task Force in Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat supported by Super Puma helicopter to intercept a tanker hijack by terrorist

Source: Today Online, November 26, 2011

November 3 “Somali pirates free Algerian-flagged vessel” (Somalia Report, November 3, 2011)

On the 3rd, Somali pirates released the Algerian-flagged bulk carrier *MV Blida* operated by the Greek shipping company after they agreed with the ship-owner side to accept a \$2.6M ransom. The vessel was hijacked on January 1 approximately 130 miles south east of the Port of Salalah, Oman.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, Somali pirates released the Algerian-flagged bulk carrier *MV Blida* operated by the Greek shipping company after they agreed with the ship-owner side to accept a \$2.6M ransom. According to a reliable source, the cash was dropped on the 2nd, and, after counting and dividing the money, the pirate group released the vessel. The vessel was hijacked on January 1 approximately 130 miles south east of the Port of Salalah, Oman. The vessel had 27 crewmembers, of whom two had been released on October 13.

Refer to the article: MV Blida Released, Heading to Mombasa

http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1932/MV_Blida_Released_Heading_to_Mombasa

November 4 “German warship captures pirate group, destroys attack boat” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 5, 2011)

On the 4th, a French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aircraft and the German navy’s frigate, FGS *Köln*, both operating as part of the EU NAVFOR, captured a pirate action group (PAG) and destroyed the attack boats 50 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, a French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aircraft and the German navy’s frigate, FGS *Köln*, both operating as part of the EU NAVFOR, captured a pirate action group (PAG) and destroyed the attack boats 50 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. The FGS *Köln* stopped and boarded the PAG composed of a whaler and a skiff which had been found by the French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aircraft. The PAG jettisoned their pirate equipment overboard before being stopped. Having transferred the pirates on board the naval ship, the FGS *Köln* destroyed the mother ship and the skiff. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR warship FGS KOELN disrupts and sinks Pirate Action Group

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/11/eu-navfor-warship-fgs-koeln-disrupts-and-sinks-pirate-action-group/>



German frigate FGS *Köln* intercepts a mother ship with suspected pirates 50 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania.

Source: Arab News, Reuters, November 17, 2011

November 8 “SA, Mozambique sign memorandum of maritime security cooperation” (Defence Web, November 15, 2011)

On the 8th, South Africa (SA) and Mozambique held the third session of Joint Permanent Commission on Defense and Security Ministerial in Mozambique. The commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for enhancing the effort to combat piracy activities to support joint naval and air patrols of the two countries in the Mozambique Channel. The United States ambassador to Mozambique has described this memorandum as innovative.

An outline of the article: On the 8th, South Africa (SA) and Mozambique held the third session of Joint Permanent Commission on Defense and Security Ministerial in Mozambique. At the session two nations discussed fighting piracy, and transnational maritime crime. According to the SA Department of Defense, the commission noted that joint naval and air patrols in the Mozambique Channel have significantly reduced piracy activities. To support this effort the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance the effort to combat piracy activities. The commission further emphasized the importance of involving Tanzania in an effort to deal with piracy along the east coast and urged that given the urgency of the matter, the Trilateral MOU on Maritime Security between the SA, Mozambique and Tanzania must be finalized as soon as possible. On the 14th, at the seminar in Mozambique, the United States ambassador to Mozambique has described this MOU as innovative, although Mozambique authorities hesitate to allow the US Navy and EU fleet in their waters. At present, the South African Navy *Valour*-class frigate SAS *Mendi* (F148) is reported on station off Pemba port in northern Mozambique where she is conducting an anti-piracy patrol, her second this year in the northern Mozambique Channel. On December 28, 2011, Somali pirates hijacked a Mozambique fishing trawler, the *Vega 5*, in northern Mozambican waters, using it as a mother ship, which was noted the furthest south ever. The fishing vessel was freed by the Indian Navy on March 12, 2011. (As for the FV *Vega 5*, see OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, March 2011, 1. 1 Security.)

Refer to the article: US praises SA-Mozambique anti-piracy agreement

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21128:us-praises-sa-mozambique-anti-piracy-agreement&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111

November 10 “India Navy apprehends pirate attack group” (Zee News, November 11, 2011)

On the morning of the 10th, the Indian Navy’s patrol ship INS *Sukanya* successfully intercepted a pirate attack group in IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, and nabbed 26 Somali pirates with six AK 47 rifles, 12 magazines and about 300 rounds of ammunition.

An outline of the article: On the morning of the 10th, while the Indian Navy’s patrol boat INS *Sukanya* was escorting a merchant ship group of five ships in IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, INS *Sukanya* spotted a group of five suspicious boats speedily approaching the merchant vessels of her group. When the warship immediately altered its direction towards the suspicious boat, the pirate skiffs reversed course and tried to flee the area. While two of them managed to escape, INS *Sukanya* successfully intercepted the remaining three boats and, in a well-practiced and professionally executed boarding-and-search action, nabbed 26 Somali pirates with six AK 47 rifles, 12 magazines and about 300 rounds of ammunition. This is the fifth successful anti-piracy operation conducted by INS *Sukanya* in the course of her ongoing patrol mission in the Gulf of Aden that commenced in September. In their five operations so far, the personnel on board the warship have confiscated 14 AK-47 Rifles, 31 magazines and 923 rounds of ammunition.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy foils pirate attack in Gulf of Aden

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/indian-navy-foils-pirate-attack-in-gulf-of-aden_741315.html

November 11 “Piracy Center expand information network” (The Maritime Executive, November 11, 2011)

On the 11th, the three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) set up under the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Singapore-based ReCAAP ISC signed the agreement to establish a set of standard operating procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information in Singapore, which will result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, the three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) set up under the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Singapore-based ReCAAP ISC signed the agreement to establish a set of standard operating procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information in Singapore, which will result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents. Under the Djibouti Code of Conduct (The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, signed in Djibouti on 29 January 2009), three ISCs have been established, in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, Mombasa, Kenya and Sana’a, Yemen. The three ISCs were declared operational during the first half of 2011 and have since actively collected and

disseminated piracy-related information. The move to forge closer ties between the ISCs comes against the background of the continuing threat posed by piracy to maritime trade and the safe passage of ships through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Piracy attacks have been reported close to the western coast of India, which is also a responsible area for ReCAAP Contracting Party. Many ships with flag or crews from ReCAAP Contracting Parties are being affected. Pooling resources between Djibouti Code of Conduct and ReCAAP ISCs will ensure vital piracy information can be shared across as wide an area as possible.

Refer to the article: Piracy Centers Expand Information Network

<http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/piracy-centers-expand-information-network>

November 15 “France holds trial of suspected pirates” (BBC News, November 15, 2011)

On the 15th, France has held first trial of six suspected Somali pirates. Six men are charged with hijacking, and kidnapping after allegedly seizing the yacht *Carre D'as IV* and its crew, a married couple, on September 2, 2008.

An outline of the article: On the 15th, France has held first trial of six suspected Somali pirates. Six men are charged with hijacking, and kidnapping after allegedly seizing the yacht *Carre D'as IV* and its crew, a married couple, on September 2, 2008. Two weeks later, on September 15, the couple was freed after French special forces stormed the yacht. Of seven suspected hijackers, one was killed and six were captured. At present, Somali suspects in three other French piracy cases are currently held in detention, awaiting trial. (Note: Regarding the incident on September 2, 2008, and freeing couple by military force on September 15, 2008, see OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, September 2008, 1.1 Security.)

Refer to the article: France holds first trial of suspected Somali pirates

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15740344>

【Related article】

“French Court sentences pirate suspects to 4-8 years in jail” (BBC News, November 30, 2011)

On the 30th, a French court has sentenced five Somali pirate suspects to between four and eight years in jail.

An outline of the article: On the 30th, a French court has sentenced five Somali pirate suspects to between four and eight years in jail. The prosecutors had asked for the men to be sent to jail for between six and 16 years.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates jailed in France for kidnapping couple

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15976883>

November 22 “EU Military Committee faces warship shortage for Somali piracy mission” (Reuters, November 23, 2011)

On the 22nd, the European Union (EU) Military Committee said it is short of warships for its counter-piracy mission off Somalia and is unlikely to fill the gap from December to March 2012 given economic constraints, and a normal minimum force requirement of at least four to six warships would not be met in the period [from December until March 2012].

An outline of the article: The European Union (EU) is short of warships for its counter-piracy mission off Somalia and is unlikely to fill the gap from December to March 2012 given economic constraints, the top EU Military Committee said on the 22nd. According to the military committee, the EU operation, codenamed Atalanta, had a normal minimum force requirement of at least four to six warships, and this would not be met in the period [from December until March 2012].

Refer to the article: EU faces warship shortage for Somali piracy mission

<http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7AM02320111123>

November 22 “UN Security Council extends resolution for counter-piracy off Somalia for 12 months” (UN News Service, November 22, 2011)

On the 22nd, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2020 to extend for 12 months its authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against all acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means.”

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2020 to extend for 12 months its authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against all acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means” such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy. Additionally, putting anew the blame for acts of piracy and armed robberies off Somalia, the resolution calls upon all States the need to investigate the acts of piracy and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from such attacks.

Refer to the article: By Resolution 2020, Security Council Extends for 12 Months Authorization

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10454.doc.htm>

November 25 “Somali pirates detain at least 16 vessels” (Somalia Report, November 25, 2011)

According to the Somalia Report dated November 25, as of the 25th, at least 16 ships (nine commercial vessels, and seven fishing vessels) and an estimated 304 hostages are in the control of Somali pirates. In addition, up to November 11, 2011, estimated ransom payments in 2011 amounted to \$128.5 million for the release of 27 vessels.

An outline of the article: According to the Somalia Report dated November 25, as of the 25th, at least 16 ships (nine commercial vessels, and seven fishing vessels) and an estimated 304 hostages are in the control of Somali pirates, as well as an unknown number of small dhows. On the other hand, so far, estimated ransom payments in 2011 amounted to \$128.5 million for the release of 27 vessels. In addition, 25 hostages have been released, apart from vessels freed.

Refer to the article: Weekly Piracy Report

http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2122/Weekly_Piracy_Report

November 25 “Somali pirates release Italian-flagged vessels” (Somalia Report, November 26, 2011)

On the 25th, Somali pirates have released an Italian-flagged bulk carrier MV *Rosalia D'Amato* (74,500DWT), after allegedly receiving a \$6M in ransom money. MV *Rosalia D'Amato* was seized by the pirates in the Arabian Sea on April 21. She has a crew of 21.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, Somali pirates have released an Italian-flagged bulk carrier MV *Rosalia D'Amato* (74,500DWT), after allegedly receiving a \$6M in ransom money. MV *Rosalia D'Amato* was seized by the pirates on April 21, approximately 350NM South East of Salalah, in the Arabian Sea. She has a crew of 21, comprising six Italians and 15 Filipinos.

Refer to the article: Pirates Release The MV Rosalia D'Amato

http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2132/Pirates_Release_The_MV_Rosalia_Drsquo_Amato

November 30 “Somali pirates free Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, but keep some Korean crew” (Maritime Bulletin, December 2, 2011)

On the 30th, Somali pirates released the Singapore-flagged product tanker MT *Gemini* (29,871DWT) operated by a Singaporean company. The vessel was hijacked off east of Kenya on April 30. Of her 25 crewmembers, 21 men were released, but pirates still keep Korean captain and three crewmembers. Pirates are holding South Korean sailors as a compensation for five [pirate suspects] held in custody in South Korea while the Korean Navy stormed and released the hijacked South Korean tanker *Samho Jewelry* on January 21, 2011.

An outline of the article: On the 30th, Somali pirates released the Singapore-flagged product tanker MT *Gemini* (29,871DWT) operated by a Singaporean company. The vessel was hijacked off east of Kenya on April 30. Of her 25 crewmembers, 21 men were released, but pirates still keep Korean captain and three crewmembers. Pirates are holding South Korean sailors as hostages, because they are seeking an extra ransom for them from South Korea as a compensation for eight

pirates killed and five [pirate suspects] held in custody in South Korea while the Korean Navy stormed and released the hijacked South Korean tanker *Samho Jewelry* on January 21, 2011. As for MT *Gemini* ransom, it is reported to be the sum of \$6 million or \$4.05 million, but the exact figure remains unknown.

Refer to the article: Pirates released product tanker Gemini

<http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=246>

1.2 Military Developments

November 2 “Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting agree on closer cooperation in maritime security” (Defense Ministry’s HP, November 2, 2011)

On the 2nd, visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa during his tour in Japan, Indian Defence Minister A K Antony held a meeting with him. According to the press-release issued after the talks, two sides have commonly possessed recognition that Japan and India are maritime nations, which have common benefits in securing the sea lanes, and strengthening the cooperative relations between Japan and India in the area of maritime security is important.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa during his tour in Japan, Indian Defence Minister A K Antony held a meeting with him. According to the press-release issued after the talks, two sides have commonly possessed recognition that Japan and India are maritime nations, which have common benefits in securing the sea lanes, and strengthening the cooperative relations between Japan and India in the area of maritime security is important and the bilateral training will be the important first step for it. Taking the opportunity, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Indian Navy will carry out mutual visits of vessel and aircraft, as appropriate, and conduct bilateral exercises between MSDF and Indian Navy. In 2012, vessels of both sides will make mutual visits and MSDF aircraft will visit India. Bilateral exercise will be carried out on these occasions.

Refer to the article: Press Release after talks between Ministry of Defense of Japan and Ministry of Defence of India

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/11/02_pr.pdf

November 9 “U. S. Defense Department to advance Air-Sea Battle Concept” (U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, November 9, 2011)

On the 9th, the Department of Defense announced the creation of the Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO). The ASBO will integrate development efforts of air and naval combat capabilities under the new security environments.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, the Department of Defense announced the creation of the Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO). The ASBO will integrate development efforts of air and naval combat capabilities under the new security environments. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense

Review, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to develop a comprehensive concept to counter emerging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges. The services collaborated to develop the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept. On Aug. 12, 2011, they decided to establish the Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO) as a framework to develop the ASB concept. The ASB concept will guide the services as they work together to maintain a continued U.S. advantage against the global proliferation of advanced military technologies and A2/AD capabilities. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will each dedicate a minimum of two field grade officers or civil service equivalents to the ASBO. Implementation of the ASB concept by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will foster positive change in the institutional relationships among the services, the integration of acquisition strategies, and the conceptual approach to warfare. The ASB concept is a natural and deliberate evolution of U.S. war-fighting to counter emerging A2/AD threats that include conventional ballistic missiles, long-range precision cruise missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense systems, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, submarines, surface combatants, and modern combat aircraft. Air-Sea Battle will enable the projection of force in defense of U.S. interests and those of our allies and by sustaining stability and freedom of access throughout the global commons.

Refer to the article: Multi-Service Office to Advance Air-Sea Battle Concept

<http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14910>

Background Briefing on Air-Sea Battle by Defense Officials from the Pentagon

<http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4923>

【Related article】

“AirSea Battle concept is core of military hedge to China: Article by Krepinevich” (Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2011)

Andrew F. Krepinevich, president of a U.S. think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has contributed an article titled “The way to respond to China” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Los Angeles Times*, on the 9th. The author discusses that the best path of convincing Beijing to adopt a policy toward cooperating and collaborating with its neighbors is to build a military hedge to China by expecting contribution from allies and partners - Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan based on the AirSea Battle concept while the United States maintains engagement policy with China.

An outline of the article: Andrew F. Krepinevich, president of a U.S. think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has contributed an article titled “The way to respond to China” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Los Angeles Times*, on the 9th. The author discusses that the best path of convincing Beijing to adopt a policy toward cooperating and collaborating with its neighbors is to build a military hedge to China by expecting contribution from allies and partners - Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan based on the AirSea Battle concept while the United

States maintains engagement policy with China, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) The rise of China has triggered a debate among policy experts. On one side, experts advocate greater engagement policy, focusing on improving our economic and political relations with China to maintain stability and peace. On the other side, the United States and its allies advocate taking steps to offset China's growing military power with the goal of retaining the stable military balance.
- (2) A careful examination of Chinese military articles and strategic culture suggests both sides may have a point. Although writings in its military journals strongly indicate the PLA sees the U.S. as its principal rival, Chinese strategy draws heavily from military theorist Sun Tzu, who declared “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” The objective of China's buildup may not be to wage war. Rather, Beijing may seek to steadily shift the military balance in its favor to the point where Washington can no longer credibly defend either its interests or its allies. In that case, war would not be necessary to ensure China's regional hegemony.
- (3) Thus, what is needed is a policy that combines elements of continued economic and political engagement with a military hedge. The latter would maintain the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments and preserve the military balance that has fostered unprecedented peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Toward this end, the Pentagon has been working for more than a year to develop a new military concept — AirSea Battle — whose principal purpose is to preserve regional stability. It focuses on removing the temptation for Beijing to pursue its security objectives through aggression or coercion by maintaining a credible U.S. and allied capability to successfully resist such actions.
- (4) The AirSea Battle concept is now completed and awaits Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's decision. If Panetta approves AirSea Battle, the question is how will it be implemented in an environment of fiscal austerity? The key to success or failure will be found in the Pentagon's willingness to shift the focus of its investments and in the response of America's allies and partners in the Western Pacific. In particular, capabilities that can perform effectively in the high-threat environment being created by China, such as the Pentagon's family of long-range strike systems, attack submarines and robust battle networks, must be protected from budget cuts. Equally important, allies and partners - Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in particular - will have to contribute substantially more than they have in the recent past to preserve regional security. If together they can demonstrate their determination to preserve stability in the Western Pacific by hedging against China's military buildup, the U.S. and its allies stand the best chance of convincing Beijing that the path toward achieving long-term security and prosperity lies in cooperating and collaborating with its neighbors.

Refer to the article: The way to respond to China

<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/09/opinion/la-oe-krepinevich-pacific-20111109>

November 9 “China sends patrol force to Mekong” (South China Morning Post, November 9, 2011)

On the 9th, the Hong Kong newspaper, *The South China Morning Post*, reported that China will station up to 1,000 armed officers to patrol the Mekong River. It is based upon an agreement which officials from China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand reached in Beijing on October 31 on joint law enforcement and patrols on the Mekong following the killing of 13 mainland sailors in October.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, the Hong Kong newspaper, *The South China Morning Post*, reported that China will station up to 1,000 armed officers to patrol the Mekong River as it prepares for the resumption of navigation by its ships on the waterway following the killing of 13 mainland sailors in October. Officials from China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand reached an agreement in Beijing on October 31 on joint law enforcement and patrols on the Mekong after the sailors were attacked. Details of the operations have not been announced by the central government. China had bought five ships to be refitted for the patrols and was also delivering speedboats. According to the Chinese authorities concerned, the joint operation by the four countries would only cover certain sections of the Mekong, but Chinese force would be stationed at key locations. Armed Chinese vessels are allowed to enter waters of the three countries.

Refer to the article: Armed Chinese force set to patrol Mekong

<http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Armed-Chinese-force-set-to-patrol-Mekong>

November 10 “India to buy 150 patrol boats for coastal security” (Zee News, November 10, 2011)

According to India’s Zee News on the 10th, in its efforts to tighten security, the Indian government has decided to procure 150 patrol boats to be given to coastal states to intensify vigil along the country's coastline. The 150 vessels are eventually deployed in nine coastal states and four Union Territories. The first delivery of 30 boats will start from the middle of the year 2012.

An outline of the article: According to India’s Zee News on the 10th, in its efforts to tighten security, the Indian government has decided to procure 150 patrol boats to be given to coastal states to intensify vigil along the country's coastline. The boats, to be procured under the Coastal Security Scheme Phase-II, will be distributed among nine coastal states - Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal and four Union Territories - Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. According to a Home Ministry official, the first delivery of about 30 boats will start from the middle of the year 2012. Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-II) has been approved by the government for implementation over a period of five years beginning April 1, 2011. The approved financial outlay of scheme is around Rs 1,579 crore (about 23.4 billion yen). The total length of India's coastline is 7,516-km with 13 major and 185 minor ports and a huge 2.01 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone. Though the Phase-I of the Coastal Security Scheme was launched in 2005-2006, it gained momentum only after the November 26, 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai. A

total of 204 patrol boats were built.

Refer to the article: Govt to buy 150 patrol boats for coastal security

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/govt-to-buy-150-petrol-boats-for-coastal-security_741012.html

December 21 “Modernization program of the Russian Navy” (Maritime Security Asia, November 21, 2011)

On a web page titled “Maritime Security Asia” dated the 21st, an expert on the national security issues, Frederik Van Lokeren, is discussing the modernization program of the submarines, corvettes and destroyers of the Russian Navy. Additionally, the expert mentions that, in the near future, of four Russian fleets, the Pacific Ocean will be an important maritime theater for Russia from the point of maritime security. The deployment of *Borei* class submarines, the first purchased *Mistral* class ship, the modernization of a *Kirov* class nuclear cruiser and the deployment of a *Slava* class cruiser to the Pacific Fleet show a clear concentration of modern Russian maritime firepower in this theater.

An outline of the article: On a web page titled “Maritime Security Asia” dated the 21st, an expert on the national security issues, Frederik Van Lokeren, is discussing the modernization program of the submarines, corvettes and destroyers of the Russian Navy, the gist of which is as follows:

- (1) Submarines: The most important branch of the Russian Navy is the nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBN). Russia currently depends on its modernized *Delta IV* class submarines, which will be replaced by Project 955 *Borei* class submarines. The first unit of the *Borei* class SSBN is entering the actual deployment, and it is now used as a test-platform of launching onboard SLBMs of Bulava-type. Additionally, two more 955 *Borei* class submarines are under construction at present. The second unit, the *Aleksandr Nevskiy*, is undergoing its sea trials, and the third unit, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, is being built, both of which are expected to enter service in 2012. Russia will eventually plans to build eight *Borei* class SSBN's. On the other hand, Russia started to build first unit of *Yasen* class SSN, the *Severodvinsk*, in 1993, but it was finally completed in 2010. The construction of the second unit of the SSN, the *Kanzan*, has been started. Russia has a plan to build 10 *Yasen*-class SSN's to replace the ageing *Alpha*, *Akula* and *Oscar* classes of submarines.
- (2) Corvettes and Destroyers: A large part of the modernization program of the Russian surface fleet is the construction of the *Steregushchy* class corvette. The first ship of this class entered active duty during October of 2008 as part of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Russia plans to construct a total of 30 of these corvettes and to divide them among its four fleets. The specific purpose of these corvettes is the protection of Russian coastal waters. Russia is also producing an export version of the *Steregushchy* class named Project 20382 *Tigr* class of which Algeria is planning to buy two vessels. Russia also plans to construct 20 to 30 of its new *Sergey Gorshkov* class of frigates. One vessel of this class has already been completely

constructed and is going through the process of becoming actively deployed during 2011. Regarding the planned construction of a new class of destroyers, although this project does not carry a name yet, Russia is planning the construction of about 14 to 16 vessels in the next two decades. These vessels are meant to become multi-purpose destroyers with various missile-capabilities. These destroyers can be viewed as a direct answer to the American *Arleigh Burke* class of destroyers.

- (3) Capital Ships: Although a powerful Blue Water navy demands a number of capital ships such as cruisers and aircraft carriers, Russia currently owns only one aircraft carrier named *Admiral Kusnetsov*, one nuclear cruiser of the *Kirov* class and two cruisers of the *Slava* class. At present, Russia has plans to modernize a spare cruiser of the *Slava* class named *Marshal Ustinov* and two *Kirov* class cruisers to bring them back into active duty. The most notable capital ships that Russia is planning to obtain are the four *Mistral* class ships that Russia is purchasing from France. (Two of these ships will be constructed within Russia.) The first ship of this class is planned to enter service in the Pacific Fleet. It is still unknown where the three other *Mistral* class ships will be deployed. Russia also plans to construct new aircraft carriers. Russia still lacks necessary financial means to initiate the construction of these ships. However, Kremlin reasonably aims for a deadline of 2050 to have new aircraft carriers enter active service. Details of the plan remain unknown.
- (4) Of four Fleets, which one is the most important? : Russia has organized its navy in four fleets; the Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. The most interesting naval area of interest to Russia is currently the Arctic. Russia is planning to enlarge its military presence in the Arctic region. A powerful Northern Fleet is an essential part of this. However, in the near future, from the maritime security point of view, the theater that will be of the largest maritime importance to Russia is likely to be the Pacific. The growth of the Chinese navy, followed by that of surrounding navies and the presence of the US Navy, leaves Russia with no other choice than to bolster its military presence in that area. Russia requires the means to act decisively in the case of a conflict in the Asian region. The deployment of *Borei* class submarines, the first purchased *Mistral* class ship, the modernization of a *Kirov* class nuclear cruiser and the deployment of a *Slava* class cruiser to the Pacific Fleet show a clear concentration of modern Russian maritime firepower in this theater.

Refer to the article: Update on the modernization of the Russian Navy

<http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-asia/update-on-the-modernization-of-the-russian-navy/>

November 29 “China’s aircraft carrier sets sails for 2nd trial” (Xinhua, November 29, 2011)

On the 29th, China's aircraft carrier commenced sailing for its second sea trial.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, China's aircraft carrier commenced sailing for its second sea trial for relevant scientific research and experiments, Chinese Ministry of National Defense

said in a press release. According to the press release, the current sea trial for relevant scientific research and experiments was started as the aircraft carrier had completed all the refitting and testing work as scheduled after its first sea trial in August.

Refer to the article: China's refitted aircraft carrier platform sets sail for 2nd trial

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/29/c_131276715.htm

1.3 South China Sea-related Events

November 3 “Features of SCS diplomacy: Views of Hanoi and Manila” (Asia Times Online, November 3, 2011)

Contributing an article titled “Competition deepens in the South China Sea” to the Hong Kong-based on-line newspaper, Asia Times Online, on the 3rd, Robert Tofani, a freelance journalist and analyst covering Southeast Asia, has pointed out in it about the features of recent Vietnamese and Philippine diplomacy in the South China Sea as follows: The Philippines and Vietnam aim to enhance their strategic cooperation and have effectively invited the United States and other regional powers to help counterbalance China's claims of sovereignty over the territory in the brewing multilateral dispute over the SCS issues.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Competition deepens in the South China Sea” to the Hong Kong-based on-line newspaper, Asia Times Online, on the 3rd, Robert Tofani, a freelance journalist and analyst covering Southeast Asia, has pointed out in it about the features of recent Vietnamese and Philippine diplomacy in the South China Sea, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) The loose alliance between the Philippines and Vietnam aims to enhance their strategic cooperation and has effectively invited other regional powers to help counterbalance China's claims in the brewing multilateral dispute. In recent months, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken a similar two-way diplomatic approach by strengthening relations with China's traditional regional competitors, including Japan and India, while at the same time maintaining dialogue and growing commercial ties with Beijing. At the same time, the two nations have strengthened their bilateral security ties in an apparent bid to counterbalance China's rising naval power.
- (2) While Manila's policy towards China is backed by its historical alliance with the US, Hanoi has been somewhat more ambiguous in its position. On one hand, Vietnam's foreign policy is based on the so-called “friends to all” principle; on the other, the ambiguity reflects internal divisions inside the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and government, according to a well-placed CPV source who spoke with Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity. While CPV general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is viewed as pro-Chinese, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is thought to be more pro-West in outlook and keen to improve relations and strategic cooperation with the US. President Sang is seen to hold the

balance of power and recent moves indicate that he too is leaning towards the West.

- (3) The US is responding - at least rhetorically - to those strategic calls. During his first tour in Asia, newly appointed US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta reaffirmed the US's strategic role in the region. In addition, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for more US strategic involvement in the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) outlined in a recent essay published in Foreign Policy. (Regarding Hillary's article, refer to OPRF MARINT Monthly report, October 2011, 1. 4 Diplomacy and International Relations.)
- (4) Vietnam and the Philippines are in their own ways promoting more US and regional power involvement in the South China Sea dispute. They will need to tread carefully to avoid deepening the dispute: China is now able to exercise influence, including through trade and investment, over the Asia-Pacific region in ways that an economically weakened US can no longer match.

Refer to the article: Competition deepens in the South China Sea

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MK03Ae01.html

November 13 “ASEAN begin talks on ‘Code of Conduct’” (The Jakarta Post, November 14, 2011)

On the 13th, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began their first talks on creating a code of conduct (COC) on the South China Sea in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN is persuading the five nuclear countries (P5) - the US, UK, Russia, China and France - to respect the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ) which was signed by 10 ASEAN leaders in Bangkok on December 15, 1995.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began their first talks on creating a code of conduct (COC) on the South China Sea in Bali, Indonesia. Their meeting to discuss a COC which is more legally binding rules on disputed areas in the South China Sea is symbolic, showing that ASEAN will be united confronting China in the future. Each ASEAN member country has its own interpretation on what should constitute a code of conduct. “These talks on the COC are only at an early stage. But we have begun the discussion,” Indonesian Foreign Ministry director for ASEAN security and political affairs Ade Padmo Sarwono said.

On the other hand, ASEAN is persuading the five nuclear countries (P5) - the US, UK, Russia, China and France - to respect the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ). The SEANWFZ Treaty was signed by 10 ASEAN leaders in Bangkok on December 15, 1995.

Refer to the article: ASEAN begins talks on COC, will push for nuke-free zone

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/14/asean-begins-talks-COC-will-push-nuke-free-zone.html>

November 16 “U.S. Secretary of State Clinton confirm commitment to Manila”(Philstar.com, November 17, 2011)

Visiting the Philippines for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Partnership for Growth (PFG) with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario on the 16th. On the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, Clinton and her Philippine counterpart, Del Rosario, and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, signed a declaration calling for multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputes. During her stay, Secretary Clinton pledged the US commitment to the Philippines.

An outline of the article: Visiting the Philippines for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Partnership for Growth (PFG) with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario on the 16th. The PFG aims to unlock the constraints to Philippine economic growth. On the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, Clinton and her Philippine counterpart, Del Rosario, and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, signed a declaration calling for multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputes.

During her stay, Secretary Clinton pledged the US commitment to the Philippines with words as follows:

- (1) The United States will remain in the corner of the Philippines to help its trusted ally achieve its development goals and address security concerns;
- (2) Washington strongly holds the view that the dispute of the Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea, (Note: Clinton used Manila’s reference to the South China Sea), should be resolved peacefully. The United States does not take any position on any territorial claim because any nation... has a right to assert it. But they do not have a right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion;
- (3) We must ensure that our alliance remains strong, capable of delivering results for the people of the Philippines and the United States and our neighbors throughout the Pacific;
- (4) We are helping its longtime Asian ally reinforce its weak navy. We are making sure that our collective defense capabilities and communications infrastructure are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocations from the full spectrum of state and non-state actors.

In reply to Clinton’s address, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario said as follows: (1) Washington’s support for a stronger, reliable Philippine defense was crucial for stability and the two allies’ common goals in the West Philippine Sea and South China Sea. He reiterated that the Philippines planned to seek UN arbitration in the territorial dispute. (2) We open new avenues to bridge the operational gaps between the defense forces of the Philippines and the United States. A stronger, reliable Philippine defense in the West Philippine Sea upholds our common and shared interests to freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and respect for international law.

Refer to the article: Hillary: US will always be in Phl's corner

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=748938&publicationSubCategoryId=63>

November 18 “Japan declares to boost maritime cooperation with ASEAN: Japan-ASEAN summit talks” (Foreign Ministry HP, November 18, 2011)

On the 18th, the 14th Japan-the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia. Representing Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda attended the meeting. The joint declaration issued after the talks called for promoting and deepening cooperation between Japan and ASEAN nations on maritime security and maritime safety.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, the 14th Japan-the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia. Resenting Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda attended the meeting. The joint declaration issued after the talks called for maritime security cooperation, the gist of which is as follows. We, the Heads of State/Government of Japan and ASEAN,

- (1) Promote and deepen ASEAN-Japan cooperation on maritime security and maritime safety in the region in accordance with universally-agreed principles of international law such as freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international maritime law;
- (2) Welcome the adoption of the Guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and look forward to the eventual conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, so as to further contribute to peace, stability, respect of freedom and safety of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea, with adherence to international law.

Refer to the article: JOINT DECLARATION FOR ENHANCING ASEAN-JAPAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERING TOGETHER (BALI DECLARATION)

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/j_asean/pdfs/bali_declaration_jp_1111.pdf

November 18 “Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting confirms Importance of Freedom of Navigation, etc.” (ASEAN HP, Press Release, November 18, 2011)

On the 18th, the third ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting between the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Barack Obama, President of the United States (U.S.), was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, regarding the maritime securities issues, they reaffirmed the importance of freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce in accordance with the relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other agreed international maritime law, as well as their support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, the third ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting between the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Barack Obama, President of the United States (U.S.), was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement

issued after the meeting, regarding the maritime securities issues, the participants discussed the matters, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) We reaffirmed our shared interests on the importance of regional peace and stability. In this context, the Leaders underscored the importance of maritime security to regional peace, security and prosperity and noted the importance of freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce in accordance with the relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other agreed international maritime law. We welcomed the deepening promotion of ASEAN-U.S. cooperation on maritime issues, including maritime security, search and rescue, and safety of navigation in the region through promotion of capacity building, information sharing and technology cooperation and explore the possibility of utilizing such venues as the ASEAN Maritime Forum.
- (2) We reaffirmed our support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and welcomed the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, including the eventual conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Refer to the article: Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting

<http://www.aseansec.org/26742.htm>

November 18 “China pledges to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations: China-ASEAN Summit” (ASEAN HP, Press Release, November 18, 2011)

On the 18th, the 14th ASEAN-China Summit between the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, premier Wen Jiabao, was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, in relation to the South China Sea issues, the participants made confirmations that they remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force, as well as to working toward the eventual adoption of a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, the 14th ASEAN-China Summit between the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, premier Wen Jiabao, was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, regarding the South China Sea issues, the participants made confirmations of the points as follows.

- (1) We reaffirm our mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with international law, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. We remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force.
- (2) We will make use of existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks and mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote defense and military exchanges and cooperation.

- (3) We are firmly committed to fully and effectively implementing the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) [of Parties in the South China Sea], and work toward the eventual adoption, on the basis of consensus, of a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, so as to further contribute to peace, security, and stability in the region.
- (4) We will cooperate to enhance maritime security, including ensuring freedom of commerce, safety of navigation and maritime traffic, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Refer to the article: Joint Statement of the 14th ASEAN-China Summit to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations

<http://www.aseansec.org/26739.htm>

November 19 “International law of the sea, crucial norms to regional peace and maintenance of stability: The 6th East Asia Summit” (Foreign Ministry HP, November 19, 2011)

On the 19th, the Sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the “Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations” issued after the meeting the Heads of State/Government of the Member States reiterated their commitment to the recognized principles of international law, as well as recognized that the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the statement of the chairman on maritime cooperation recognition was shown that promotion of cooperation at sea is important. Additionally, dialogue between the participating nations in the EAS based on the existing ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) was advocated.

An outline of the article: On the 19th, the Sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) was held in Bali, Indonesia. In the “Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations” issued after the meeting the Heads of State/Government of the Member States reiterated their commitment to the recognized principles of international law, as well as recognized that the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the statement of the chairman on maritime cooperation recognition was shown that promotion of cooperation at sea is important. Moreover, it was confirmed that the EAS participating countries are guided in future by the following principles for friendly and mutually beneficial relations:

(1) Enhancement of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity; (2) Respect for International law, as well as enhancement of mutual understanding, mutual trust and friendship; (3) Promotion of good neighborliness, partnership and community building; (4) Promotion and maintenance of peace, stability, security and prosperity; (5) Non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, as well as renunciation of the threat of use of force or use of force against another state, consistent with the UN Charter, and others.

Additionally, in the chairman’s statement, regarding maritime cooperation, the EAS

participating countries recognized the importance of promoting maritime cooperation, including sea piracy, search and rescue at sea, marine environment, maritime security, maritime connectivity, freedom of navigation, fisheries and other areas of cooperation. Furthermore, EAS participating countries encouraged dialogue involving the countries concerned to utilize opportunities and address common challenges on maritime issues building upon the existing of ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). The EAS participating countries also noted positively the proposal of convening an expanded AMF, back-to-back with the future meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region.

Refer to the article: Foreign Ministry HP “DECLARATION OF THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS” (Tentative translation)

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/eas/shuno_6th_gokei.html

November 29 “South China Sea is all PRC’s: China’s scholar” (Taipei Times, November 29, 2011)

The Taiwan’s newspaper dated the 29th, *Taipei Times* (Online) carried an article contributed to the recent Chinese *People’s Daily* and *Global Times* by Pan Guoping, a law professor at China’s Southwest University of Law and Politics. According to the newspaper, in the article, Pan Guoping disputes the claim that the South China Sea comprises gonghai (Chinese), or “high seas,” as the term is translated in Article 86 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By denying the presence of high seas in the South China Sea, China would deny freedom of navigation and use of airspace to other countries over the entire area, which Pan made clear. On the other hand, James Tien, Taiwan’s director-general of the ministry’s Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said a project to draw up and publish a new map of the South China Sea where the country has sovereignty is currently underway.

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views on the South China Sea were “main stream” among international law experts and Chinese government officials.

On the other hand, James Tien, Taiwan’s director-general of the ministry’s Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that Taiwan’s assertion of sovereignty in the region was not in contradiction with US concerns over freedom of navigation. “We are never opposed to freedom of navigation,” Tien said. In addition, at the request of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Herman Shuai, a project to draw up and publish a new map of the South China Sea where the country has sovereignty is currently underway, Tien said. Tien said the Ministry of the Interior would present a detailed report on the country’s territorial position and its line of reasoning after it completes the map. The government bases its sovereignty claim on a map developed in 1947 using 11 interrupted lines drawn in a “U-shape” showing that the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Pratas Islands were within the territory of the country with reference to history, geography and international law.

Refer to the article: South China Sea all PRC’s, opened claims

<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/11/29/2003519472>

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

November 8 “China opens embassy in Maldives” (The Washington Post, A P, November 11, 2011)

On the 8th, China has opened an embassy in the Maldives in the Indian Ocean archipelago. It is estimated to be a move seen as another step to increase its influence across a South Asian region

An outline of the article: On the 8th, China has opened an embassy in the Maldives in the Indian Ocean archipelago. It is estimated to be a move seen as another step to increase its influence across a South Asian region that India has traditionally dominated. The Maldives says the embassy in the Indian Ocean archipelago was opened on the 8th. That was two days before the Maldives began hosting a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation that is being attended by the leaders of India and Pakistan. China is among the nine observer nations of the association, which also includes the United States.

Refer to the article: China opens embassy in Maldives as it spreads influence in Indian Ocean

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-opens-embassy-in-maldives-as-it-spreads-influence-in-indian-ocean/2011/11/11/gIQAf6GDBN_story.html

 **Topic** 

America's Recurrence in Asia-Pacific region
- Comments on Enhancement and Strengthening of U.S.-Australian Alliance –

On November 16, U.S. President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced to expand strategic cooperation between the United and Australia, having an eye on the growing China's influences in the Asia-Pacific region. In the joint press interview after the talks, based on the Australia, New Zealand, U.S. (ANZUS) Treaty, two leaders said as follows:

- (1) The United States will deploy Marine Air Ground Task Force in Darwin and bases in Northern Australia, in which they locate in six months. The "force posture initiative" will begin in 2012 with 200-250 U.S. Marines deployed. This would expand to a 2,500-person Marine Air Ground Task Force by 2016-17.
- (2) The United States announced it had agreed to expand military cooperation, involving an increase in rotations of US aircraft and an expansion of the bases. Moreover, the U.S. Marines will improve interoperability in case of emergency through joint exercises with Australian armed forces. Together with the armed forces in the neighboring countries in East and Southeast Asia, an objective was announced to train and exercise with them, in such areas as anti-piracy and disaster response in Australia.

On the next day of 17th, President Obama made an address at the Australian Federal Parliament, in which he said, "I directed the team in charge of national security to make the U.S. presence and missions in the Asia-Pacific region as the highest priority." He made his idea clear that the national security in the Asia-Pacific region should be positioned as the highest priority issue. The president checked a Chinese move by expressing his idea of emphasizing national security, economic prosperity, and respects for human rights, as well as principles of "respects for international law and public orders," the rules of the road, and others. Based upon them, while mentioning that the moves of cutting defense budget are increasing in the U.S. Congress, the president definitely said, "Reductions in U.S. defense spending will not have influence over the Asia-Pacific region."

Major comments on basing the U.S. Marines in Australia and reactions to it, including Chinese one, are discussed below.

Note: Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>

1. Overview of Expanded Military Cooperation

November 16 “US, Australia agree on expanded military cooperation” (VOA News, November 16, 2011)


The United States and Australia have announced expanded military cooperation aimed at bolstering security in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States will deploy as many as 2,500 U.S. Marines which will rotate through bases in Darwin in the north.

An outline of the article: The United States and Australia have announced expanded military cooperation aimed at bolstering security in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States will deploy as many as 2,500 U.S. Marines which will rotate through bases in Darwin in the north. The “force posture initiatives,” as a White House statement describes them, will begin in mid-2012 with 250 U.S. Marines deployed and conducting exercises and training in Darwin and bases in Northern Australia. This would expand to a 2,500-person Marine Air Ground Task Force. Furthermore, there would also be closer cooperation between two countries’ air forces, involving what White House official called “a significant increase” in rotations of U.S aircraft through northern Australia and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies.

Both leaders fielded reporter's questions about the extent to which the agreement is designed as part of the response to rising capabilities of China in the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama put his answer as follows. “With their rise come increased responsibilities,” said the president. “It is important for them to play by the rules of the road and, in fact, help underwrite the rules that have allowed so much remarkable econ progress to be made over the last several decades. And, that is going to be true on a whole host of issues.” President Obama, Prime Minister Gillard, and U.S. officials say a major objective of the agreement is also to increase the ability of the United States to quickly assist countries in East and Southeast Asia, and train and exercise with them, in such areas as anti-piracy and disaster response. The president says the U.S. message to the entire region is “we are here to stay.” A White House official says the United States is maintaining its security capabilities and alliances in Northeast Asia while enhancing them in Southeast Asia.

Refer to the article: US, Australia Announce Expanded Military Cooperation

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/east-pacific/US-Australia-Announce-Expanded-Military-Cooperation-133955288.html>



Source: VOA News, November 16, 2011

November 17 “U.S. pledges military power in the Pacific – Its intention” (CNN, November 17, 2011)

On the 17th, the Cable News Network (CNN) reports Obama’s trip to Australia and speech at its parliament, his first as president, signaled a policy objective to compete head-on with China for influence in the region while also providing security assurances for allies. Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told reporters that the policy comes in part from nations of the region seeking increased U.S. presence.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, President Barack Obama traveled to Indonesia after spending two days in Australia, where he declared that the United States will increase its military presence and expand its role in shaping the Asia Pacific region. “Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in this region,” Obama told the Australian Parliament. “The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.” In a speech a day later, Obama made it clear that the military expansion is a top priority, even as the United States faces the need to reduce mounting federal deficits and debt. “I have directed my national security team to make our presence and missions in the Asia Pacific a top priority,” Obama said. “As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not - I repeat, will not - come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.”

Obama’s trip to Australia and speech at its parliament, his first as president, signaled a policy objective to compete head-on with China for influence in the region while also providing security assurances for allies. Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told reporters that the policy comes in part from nations of the region seeking increased U.S. presence. “The ability of the

United States to help respond to contingencies is something that has been welcomed in recent years, whether, again, it was work that we're doing in the Philippines to counter violent extremism, work that we're doing to counter piracy in the region, the response to the tsunami in Indonesia," Rhodes said. "So in other words, there's a demand signal from the nations of the region, and this is something that we're doing in concert with one of our closest allies. So we believe it's not just entirely appropriate, but an important step to dealing with the challenges of the future of the Asia Pacific region."


In addition to deployment of U.S. Marines, Gen. Michael Keltz, director of strategic planning and policy for the U.S. Pacific Command, told that the United States would be basing some of its most sophisticated weapons in the Pacific, including squadrons of F-22 fighters and C-17 transport planes. The F-22s provide leading-edge technology for potential air-to-air combat as well as cyber- and electronic warfare," Keltz said. They replaced older F-15s, he added.

While U.S. officials cited the need to respond to regional natural disasters as a reason for the agreement, concern over China's military expansion is widely acknowledged as a driving factor. "What we look at is how does our general force posture allow us to protect U.S. interests, protect our allies, and ... secure the region broadly," Rhodes said. "China is obviously a piece of the Asia Pacific region, an emerging power." Rhodes later added that the deal is "part of the U.S. sending a signal that we're going to be present, and that we're going to continue to play the role of underpinning security in this part of the region. Part of that context is a rising China."

In China, a foreign ministry spokesman questioned the appropriateness of an increased U.S. military presence in Australia. Analysts note that the deal sends a message to China in a less confrontational way than building up bases closer to Chinese shores."The Chinese can squawk about it," said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. "But it's not like having an aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea."

Refer to the article: Obama pledges U.S. military power in Pacific

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/australia-obama-trip/index.html?hpt=wo_c2



Source: The Australian, November 17, 2011

2. Deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin – Views of an Australian expert

November 17 “Renewing an Alliance: Andrew Shearer” (The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2011)

On the 17th, Andrew Shearer, director of studies of Lowy Institute for International Policy, an Australian think tank, contributed an article titled “Renewing an Alliance” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal*. In the article, welcoming U.S.–Australian military alliance, author mentions: (1) Australia should continue working with what is still the world's superpower to keep peace in the region; and (2) President Obama's current Asia tour is part of a wider effort by Washington to reassure its friends and allies that despite its economic travails and looming defense cuts, America will not abandon them to face an increasingly assertive China on their own.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal*, on the 17th, Andrew Shearer, director of studies of Lowy Institute for International Policy, an Australian think tank, said in it that he would welcome an expansion of U.S.-Australian military cooperation, gist of which is as follows.

- (1) Basing U.S. marines in Darwin has ignited a debate Down Under about Australia's strategic future. Can a country that depends so heavily on China for its prosperity remain a stalwart U.S. ally? Some academics and businessmen say “No.” However, trade benefits both countries. Just because Australian trade with China is flourishing does not mean Australia must be a supplicant. What's more, critics are out of step with mainstream opinion. According to polling by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute, 55% of Australians support U.S. military bases. Improving cooperation now makes a lot of sense. Australia's

forces will have valuable opportunities to train and operate closely with the world's most potent military.

- (2) A greater U.S. presence will provide Australia with welcome strategic reassurance in a more uncertain regional security environment, helping to deter any potential aggressor. American forces will be able to respond quickly to contingencies in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean such as natural disasters and to engage more intensely with Southeast Asian military partners. They will also be able to help calm the South China Sea, increasingly roiled by disputes over territory and resources. Critically, they will be safer in Australia than they would at exposed U.S. bases such as Guam, which is within ready striking range of China's burgeoning missile arsenal. It's true the Darwin arrangement is no substitute for the major bases that host forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea. But Australia offers a politically stable, dependable jumping-off point with ready access to the Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf) and to the vital sea-lanes that join it to the Western Pacific.
- (3) Australia has long been the steadfast "southern anchor" of the U.S. alliance network in Asia, fighting alongside America in every major conflict since World War I. It already plays host to vital joint intelligence facilities and major joint exercises. Over the past decade, this partnership has become steadily closer. Australia should continue working with what is still the world's superpower to keep peace in the region. The U.S. never really left Asia, but Mr. Obama's current Asia tour is part of a wider effort by Washington to reassure its friends and allies that despite its economic travails and looming defense cuts, America will not abandon them to face an increasingly assertive China on their own.
- (4) Belated U.S. trade leadership on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) summit in Honolulu is one key element in this strategy. Stronger diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia, which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has successfully pushed since last year, and maintaining a favorable military balance in the region are the other elements. Now, Indonesia, the Philippines and even Vietnam are all moving quietly to strengthen security links with the United States. They may not say so publicly, but Australia's neighbors will quietly welcome the marines. Beijing will grumble, but it has only itself to blame. By throwing around its increasing weight over the last couple of years, China has unnerved much of East Asia. Its behavior is driving U.S. friends and allies even more firmly into Washington's arms and creating unlikely new security partnerships, despite the fact that for many China is now a major trading partner. The future of this key relationship depends on whether America's "pivot" to Asia proves to be a lasting trend or a passing media sound bite. U.S. friends and allies in the region, and its rising competitor, will be watching closely to see that U.S. defense cuts do not undermine security in Asia.

Refer to the article: Renewing an Alliance

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203699404577041633002544456.html?KEYWORDS=Renewing+an+Alliances>

November 18 “US Marines in Northern Australia: Strategic Benefits with Social Costs: Sam Bateman” (RSIS Commentaries, No. 171, November 18, 2011)

Sam Bateman, an adviser to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, a former Australian naval commodore, contributed an article titled “US Marines in Northern Australia: Strategic Benefits with Social Costs” to the RSIS Commentaries dated November 18, 2011. In the article, Batman is pointing out that there are strategic benefits for Australia and the US in having American marines in Northern Australia. While this is so, serious social problems might also arise requiring careful management by both countries.

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- (1) US marines will reportedly use the large Robertson Army Barracks outside of Darwin in northern Australia. These barracks were established in the 1990s as a reflection of Australia’s changing strategic circumstances following the end of the Cold War. They allowed the move of major army units from existing bases in south-eastern Australia to the North. The language of the two national leaders was carefully chosen to describe US use of Robertson Barracks. Instead of “basing”, there were references to “positioning” and “rotations.” This is intended to accommodate the strong opposition to the increased American military presence in Australia likely to come from the Australian Greens Party and the left-wing of the Australian Labor Party.
- (2) Strategic Benefits
 - a. Other Australians will question whether the strategic and possible economic benefits of having US marines in Darwin outweigh the major social problems that their presence may create. Darwin is a volatile community with higher levels of crime, drug and alcohol abuse than any other Australian city. It has a large aboriginal population and more males than females. Sexual violence figures prominently in its crime statistics. Hundreds of US marines seeking rest and recreation will not help the situation. The experience of the American military in Okinawa gives few grounds for optimism that ugly incidents can be avoided.
 - b. The strategic alliance between Australia and the US is long-standing and the most enduring of any that the US has in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The increased US military presence in Australia is a strong practical demonstration that this alliance is as strong as ever. There are strategic benefits for both parties. China has expressed concern about the US military presence in Australia, but both Australia and

the US believe that this concern can be managed.

- c. For the US, its military presence increases its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. It is another demonstration that the US has a long-term strategic commitment to these regions. The US marines in Darwin will have access to training facilities not available elsewhere in the Western Pacific. Key front-line fighting units of the Australian Army are based at Robertson Barracks, including the 1st Brigade, the 1st Armored Regiment with its Abram tanks, and the 1st Aviation Regiment with Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters. Extensive training areas outside of Darwin provide unique opportunities for joint exercises involving American and Australian land forces.
- d. Australia gains strategic benefit from the increased US military presence at a time when there is increased concern in Canberra about stability both in the Indian Ocean and East Asia. The close links evident between Australian and US force postures will help buttress US presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as in the Western Pacific. The announcement of the increased US military presence in Australia, particularly in the western part of the continent, is in line with Canberra's plans to increase its own military presence along the West coast and in the Indian Ocean.

(3) Social Issues

- a. Darwin is not a tropical paradise and keeping the marines happy in their off duty hours will not be easy. For much of the year, during the "dry" season, Darwin is a hot, dusty place, and then for the rest of the year, during the "wet" season, it experiences heavy rain, frequent flash squalls and occasional severe cyclones. On Christmas Eve 1974, Darwin was devastated by Cyclone Tracy that killed 71 people and destroyed over 70% of the city's buildings.
- b. The change of season from the "dry" to the "wet" in October-November each year brings the so-called "silly season", when the humidity becomes oppressive, people behave erratically, and the suicide rate is high. Just to add to the rigors of life in the "Top End," as this part of northern Australia is known, crocodiles lurk in local river systems and waterholes.
- c. Recreational activities for the marines will be difficult. Darwin does not have the "bright lights" they may be accustomed to near other bases in Asia or Hawaii. There is a hard drinking, hard playing culture in Darwin with an endemic drug scene. Testosterone-driven males can get into a lot of trouble in the place, and over the years, the Australian Army has experienced serious morale and social problems with its soldiers at Robertson Barracks.

(4) Managing the Problem

- a. There will be a challenge for Australian and American military authorities in avoiding a repeat in Darwin of the "Battle of Brisbane" that occurred in November 1942. Large numbers of troops from the two countries were then based in Brisbane, but discontent among Australian soldiers mainly due to envy of the conditions of service enjoyed by their American counterparts, particularly access to post exchange (PX) stores with

cheap alcohol, cigarettes and luxury goods, led to serious brawling around the city. One soldier was killed and many injured, including some with gun-shot wounds.

- b. A fundamental requirement will be to ensure that the conditions enjoyed by personnel from the two countries are roughly similar. Regular joint exercises, sporting competitions and access for the Americans to the many unique tourist attractions that exist out of Darwin, such as Kakadu National Park, will all help to generate a more favorable social environment both on base and when personnel of the two countries are on leave together in and around Darwin. Despite strong links between the militaries of the two countries, the US marines will be just as challenged to be good ambassadors for their country in Darwin as they are on foreign bases elsewhere in the world.

3. Australia's expectations

November 17 "Deployment of U.S. Marines – Australia's expectations" (The Sydney Morning Herald, November 17, 2011)

On the 17th, the Australian newspaper, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, says, "With regard to the true intention of what Labor has done by inviting the US to park more troops in Australia, it is homage to the U.S.-Australian alliance as an insurance policy in an uncertain region from a long-standing point of view."

An outline of the article: Anyone who worries about their house burning down will go out and buy insurance - rather than a fire engine. That's essentially what Labor has done by inviting the US to park more troops in Australia, homage to the long-standing view of the American alliance as an insurance policy in an uncertain region. The word "inviting" is a bit tricky because the government is very careful not to say who asked for this American presence in the Northern Territory: us or them. Labor won't be caught uttering the word "base" either, though it's artful dodging to refer to "places" or "rotations" or whatever. The fact is 2,500 US marines will soon be in Australia for at least six months of the year, with a lot of their gear left here permanently. People can make a sensible judgment what this means. To call it a base hardly seems unreasonable, and playing with semantics to avoid a political fight only makes the government appear slippery. In reality, practical consequences will flow from hosting more US troops, in joint training, environmental impacts, to marginally raising the target profile of Australia. But the main effect will be symbolic. That's where the question of who asked whom becomes most important - for the signal it sends to the region. And by "region," read China. The spin around all this is a claim that no one country is being targeted as the US shifts its focus back to Asia after a decade of entanglements in the Middle East. Maybe this is the start of such a shift, but it won't be achieved with this handful of troops. The evidence suggests this was an Australian initiative to offer the American military use of the Northern Territory.

Refer to the article: Labor bases future on taking out stabilizing insurance

<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/labor-bases-future-on-taking-out-stabilising-insurance-20111116-1nje9.html>

Note: *The Sydney Morning Herald* is, together with its affiliate newspaper, *The Age*, regarded to be the liberal newspaper.

4. China's Reaction

November 17 "China strongly warns Australia about strengthened U.S.-Australia defense ties" (The Australian, November 17, 2011)

On the 17th, the Australian newspaper, *The Australian*, carried China's reactions to basing U.S. Marines in Australia. For instance, the state-owned People's Daily has strongly warned that Australia may be "caught in the crossfire" if the United States uses new Australian-based military forces to threaten its interests.

An outline of the article: China has strongly reproached Canberra over strengthened US defense ties, warning Australia may be "caught in the crossfire" if the United States uses new Australian-based military forces to threaten its interests. A strongly-worded editorial in the state-owned People's Daily admonished Australia for relying on China for its economic interests while turning to the United States for political and security purposes. It added, "Prime Minister Gillard may be ignoring something - their economic co-operation with China does not pose any threat to the US, whereas the Australia-US military alliance serves to counter China."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry also branded the strengthened alliance as inappropriate and it counters to the peaceful development of the region. It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the interest of countries within this region," Foreign Ministry spokesman said. "China believes that peaceful development and co-operation is a trend of the times and is the mainstream of the foreign policy of countries within this region, especially against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth." In relation to China's strong reaction, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa warned that deploying the U.S. military forces in northern Australia would risk creating a vicious cycle of tension and mistrust in the region, unless its purpose was made transparent.

Under plans for an increased military presence in Australia, US troops will engage in joint exercises with their Australian counterparts, as well as conduct their own exercises. Australia has agreed to facilitate greater use of Darwin by US military aircraft including jet fighters and B52 bombers, and will develop plans to boost use of Western Australia's Stirling naval base by US vessels.

Refer to the article: China reproaches Australia over strengthened US defence ties

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/our-indispensable-alliance-barack-obama/story-fnb0o39u-1226197460882>

Note: *The Australian* is regarded to be the conservative newspaper.

1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

November 14 “Study shows reduction in CO2 emissions from ships from IMO measures” (IMO, Press Briefing, November 14, 2011)

According to an International Maritime Organization (IMO) study report issued on the 14th, research into the impact of mandatory energy efficiency measures for international shipping shows that implementation of the measures will lead to significant reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships, specifically reductions of carbon dioxide (CO₂), resulting from enhanced fuel efficiency. The study found that, by 2020, an average of 151.5 million tons of annual CO₂ reductions are estimated from the introduction of the measures, a figure that by 2030, will increase to an average of 330 million tons annually. Based on the study, Amendments to the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Annex VI Regulations for the prevention of air pollution from ships, add a new chapter on Regulations on energy efficiency for ships.

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Based on the study, Amendments to the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Annex VI Regulations for the prevention of air pollution from ships, add a new chapter on Regulations on energy efficiency for ships. The regulations will apply to all ships of 400 gross tons and above and are expected to enter into force on 1 January 2013. This new chapter makes mandatory the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), for new ships, which, in essence, requires new ships to be designed to be more energy efficient (and thereby release less greenhouse gases). The regulations are non-prescriptive: as long as the required energy-efficiency level is attained, ship designers and builders are free to use the most cost-efficient solution or solutions for each particular ship. In addition, the new regulations also make mandatory a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships. This is a plan which sets out, for an individual ship, how energy savings can be made. There are a variety of options to improve efficiency – speed optimization, weather routing and hull maintenance, for example – and the best package of measures for a ship to improve efficiency differs to a great extent depending upon ship type, cargo, route and other factors. The new regulations make such a ship-specific plan mandatory thereby encouraging the shipping industry to review its practices in a systematic way to find the best balance.

Refer to the article: Study shows significant reductions in CO2 emissions from ships from IMO measures

<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/57-EEDIstudy.aspx>

1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others

November 16 “U.S. and Indonesia Navies complete bilateral ocean survey mission” (U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, November 25, 2011)

On the 16th, the United States Navy and the Indonesian Navy held a reception celebrating the completion of one-month of joint oceanographic survey in the Indonesian coastal area. This survey was conducted by a team of 13 U.S. oceanographers and hydrographers from the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) under the U.S. Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command and five Indonesian surveyors, who were embarking the Military Sealift Command (MSC) oceanographic survey ship USNS *Henson* (T-AGS 63), in the territorial waters off Indonesia’s coast including the Java Sea and the Sunda Straits from October 14 to November 14.

An outline of the article: According to the U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, on the 25th, the United States Navy and the Indonesian Navy held a reception celebrating the completion of one-month of joint oceanographic survey in the Indonesian coastal area on November 16. This survey was conducted by a team of 13 U.S. oceanographers and hydrographers from the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) under the U.S. Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command and five Indonesian surveyors, who were embarking the Military Sealift Command (MSC) oceanographic survey ship USNS *Henson* (T-AGS 63), in the territorial waters off Indonesia’s coast including the Java Sea and the Sunda Straits from October 14 to November 14. Additionally, Liaison officers from the Indonesian Navy participated in all phases of the data collection and processing during the survey. USNS *Henson* collected hydrographic and oceanographic data for nautical charting in Indonesia territorial waters by using sophisticated sonar technology to create three-dimensional maps of the sea floor. Sensors were also used to measure water temperature, salinity, and currents in the ocean. Once all the data were analyzed, it was determined that a charted wreck and some charted shoals were incorrectly marked on existing charts by up to a half-mile. Since the first joint survey mission was conducted in 1978, the U.S. and Indonesia have engaged in over 200 survey missions around Indonesia’s vast archipelago of more than 17,000 islands.

Refer to the article: U.S. and Indonesia Navies complete bilateral ocean survey mission

http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/embnews_11252011.html


November 25 “Australia sets Coral Sea for marine park” (The Age, November 25, 2011)

On the 25th, Australia’s Environment Minister Tony Burke said the proposed Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve would cover 989,842 square kilometers, more than half the size of Queensland.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, Australia’s Environment Minister Tony Burke said the proposed Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve would cover 989,842 square kilometers, more than half the size of Queensland. The Coral Sea is recognized across the world as a marine region of significance, and the area within Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is in near pristine condition. The proposed park will start 60km from the coast, extending out 1100 kilometers. “Australia has a unique opportunity to protect this precious marine environment for future generations,” Burke said.

Refer to the article: Coral Sea marine reserve on the way

<http://www.theage.com.au/environment/conservation/coral-sea-marine-reserve-on-the-way-20111125-1nytd.html>



Coral Sea (Source: Wikipedia)

November 29 “China uses unpiloted aircraft for coastal surveillance: Liaoning Providence” (Xinhua, November 29, 2011)

On the 29th, director of the Liaoning provincial marine patrol center said Liaoning has become the first province in the country to use pilotless aircraft for marine surveillance over its northeastern coastal area.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, director of the Liaoning provincial marine patrol center

said Liaoning has become the first province in the country to use pilotless aircraft for marine surveillance over its northeastern coastal area. Liaoning previously relied on satellite photos and field surveys to monitor its coast. Liaoning is China's northernmost coastal province with more than 150,000 square km of sea space and 506 islets. According to the center, unpiloted aircraft are flexible and can be remotely controlled to take high-definition photos to discover illegal land reclamation and sand dredging as well as monitor marine environment along the coast and on the islets. Currently the pilotless aircraft are rented from a mapping company. But the provincial marine and fishing bureau has allocated 10 million yuan (7.5 million U.S. dollars) for the purchase of drones for the year 2012.

Refer to the article: China uses unpiloted aircraft for marine surveillance

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-11/29/content_24033916.htm

2. Intelligence Assessment

Scenario of U.S. Military Conflicts with China and Asian Alliances - Viewed from reports of 2 U.S. think tanks -

In October 2011, the U.S. think tank, The Rand Corporation, issued the report titled “Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence”¹ (hereinafter the Rand report). Pointing out the scenarios of high probability of the U. S. military conflict with China, including clashes over North Korea, China-Taiwan relations, the South China Sea, maritime issues between china and Japan, the Rand report says the United States may not be able to control the ambitions of China, if Washington fails to make proper efforts of maintaining deterrence and direct military capabilities. On the other hand, the Project 2049 Institute issued the report titled “Asian Alliances in the 21st Century”² in September 2011 (hereinafter the 2049 report). This 2049 report mentions that China’s military ambition is threatening the U.S. Asian allies, making reliability of the U.S. commitments to allies unstable, and endangering the U.S. strategy of maintaining global military superiority, concluding the necessity of changing the alliance systems.

Analysis of this monthly report has examined the response of the U.S. and its allies to the rise of China, providing a focus on two major reports above-mentioned.

1. U.S.-China conflict scenario

The Rand report says on page 11 of the text: (a) Over the next twenty years, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and defense budget could grow to exceed those of the United States, allowing it to become a true peer competitor; and (b) Despite this potential, we believe China’s security interests and military capabilities will remain focused on its immediate periphery. And then, The Rand report mentions several scenarios of military conflicts as follows to judge that the United States will retain the capacity to deter behavior that would lead to such a clash.

(1) North Korea scenario

This scenario shows that a North Korean collapse could emanate from a failed economy, a contested power transition after the death of Kim Jong-il, or defeat in a war with the South. In

¹ James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak & Andrew Scobell, *Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence*, Occasional Paper, RAND Arroyo Center, 2011

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf

² Dan Blumenthal with Randall Schriver, Mark Stokes, L.C. Russell Hsiao & Michael Mazza, *Asian Alliances In The 21st Century*, Project 2049 Institute, 2011

http://project2049.net/documents/Asian_Alliances_21st_Century.pdf

any such scenario, (a) the situation in North Korea would likely be chaotic and confused. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of civilians would migrate toward North Korea's borders in search of food and safety from clashes between rival armed groups; (b) Collapse of central control would also jeopardize the security of the North's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile assets; and (c) China might fully mobilize in the Shenyang Military Region (Shenyang MR), and could well send sizable forces cross the Yalu in an effort to sort out refugee flows on the Korean side of their border.

On the other hand, the immediate operational concerns for United States Forces–Korea/Combined Forces Command (USFK/CFC) would be to secure ballistic missile launch and WMD sites. If any coherent North Korean army remained, neutralizing Korean People's Army (KPA) long-range artillery threatening Seoul could also be needed. For these missions, special operations forces (SOF), forced entry, and airlift capabilities will be at a premium. China meanwhile would view the insertion of U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces north of the DMZ with concern, and might move its own forces in, if it had not already begun to do so, both to contain the disorder and preempt a ROK/U.S. takeover of the entire country. While the ROK would provide sizable forces and capabilities for these missions, they would be inadequate to deal with the scope and complexity of a complete DPRK collapse. Substantial and extended commitments of U.S. ground forces would be required to rapidly seize and secure numerous locations, some with vast perimeters. SOF and dedicated chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) units will be insufficient to deal with the situation.

The likelihood of confrontations, accidental or otherwise, between U.S. and Chinese forces is high, with significant potential for escalation. Beyond the pressures to intervene and deal with the immediate consequences of a failed DPRK, the United States will be forced to confront the thorny issue of the desired end-state: unification (the preferred outcome of our ally, the ROK) or the continued division of Korea (China's strong preference).

(2) Taiwan scenario

Viewing that the chance of conflict across the Taiwan Strait will remain, so long as this fundamental disagreement on the final status of Taiwan persists, the Rand report estimates the Taiwan scenarios as follows.

According to the report, a cross-Strait conflict could take many forms, from a Chinese blockade of Taiwanese ports, to varied levels of bombardment of targets on Taiwan, to an outright invasion attempt. Should the United States engage directly in any such contingency, its goals would be to prevent Chinese coercion or conquest of Taiwan and limit to the extent possible the damage inflicted on Taiwan's military, economy, and society. Therefore, core missions for the United States would include preventing China from gaining air and sea dominance, and limiting the impact of Beijing's land-attack missiles, all achieved through flexible combinations of active and passive defense and offensive action, to include the possibility of U.S. strikes on mainland targets associated with the offensive against Taiwan, with all the attendant risks of further escalation. Indeed, China might well anticipate and

seek to preempt such U.S. actions with attacks of its own on U.S. assets in the region.

Based on it, in the near term, as China is deploying capabilities that threaten U.S. land and sea power projection platforms—air bases and aircraft carriers—as well as Taiwan’s own defenses, a direct defense of Taiwan has already become a challenge and is likely to become increasingly difficult in coming years.

(3) Cyber-Space scenario

The Rand report is pointing out as follows. Sino-U.S. cyber-war could be an aspect of – or prelude to – armed hostilities. Or it could begin and stay in cyber-space. This case is confined to that domain, though with some danger of triggering armed conflict. Even if there no lives lost – just extensive harm, or we could avoid an escalation to an armed conflict, an exchange of cyber attacks on the net works of two countries would bring about considerable economic damage, and there would be “no winner” in the cyber-war.

(4) South China Sea scenario

Mentioning there are many flashpoints in the South China Sea, the Rand report is pointing out the issues, the gist of which is as follows.

(a) China’s assertion of some degree of sovereignty over virtually the entire area rubs up against the rival claims of numerous other states. A confrontation at sea could lead to a broader conflict if, for example, an oceanic dispute between Vietnam and China escalated into a land war between the two.

(b) The presence of a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, may elevate the stakes for Washington if some deep crisis arises in or around the South China Sea. China’s recent claims that the region is part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and therefore subject to Chinese control, represent a test to global norms of free navigation and are a direct challenge to U.S. interests in East Asia.

(c) Depending on the nature and severity of a conflict, U.S. objectives could range from enforcing freedom of navigation against a Chinese effort to control maritime activities in the South China Sea, to helping the Philippines defend itself from an air and maritime attack, to supporting Vietnam and shielding Thailand – another treaty ally – in the event of a land war in Southeast Asia. Any likely missions will make demands on U.S. air and naval power, but a war on land could create a demand for U.S. land forces – especially SOF and forced-entry capabilities. At present China’s current ability to project substantial power into the South China Sea region is limited. However, The Rand report estimates, if China builds aircraft carrier and air-refueling capabilities in the coming years, their evaluation would be changed.

(5) Japan scenario

Sino-Japanese relations are contentious for at least two reasons. (a) First, on the Chinese side, anger, fear, and resentment over Japanese actions from the last years of the 19th century until 1945 remain alive and are not infrequently exacerbated by what China sees as insensitive or insulting Japanese behavior. (b) Second, an ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and overlapping claims to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea are persistent irritants to the relationship. Therefore, The Rand report estimates

that conflict could arise from an at-sea incident in the East China Sea, or from the escalation of a war of words amplified by some sort of maritime encounter.

The Rand report says, “U.S. goals in the event of a Sino-Japanese dispute would be to help defend Japan and, not incidentally, make the case that the United States remains the preferred security partner in Asia despite China’s ‘rise.’” In case of assisting defense of Japan, the Rand report is pointing out that it would be necessary for the United States to limit damage to Japan and its military and regaining control of the pertinent air and maritime domains. This might require consideration of U.S. as well as Japanese strikes on mainland targets, with all the attendant concerns for escalatory risk. In addition, if the United States does not withdraw from the Western Pacific, or, so long as Japan does not make a dramatic reduction in Japan’s own self-defense capabilities, direct defense of Japan should remain a credible for the next twenty to thirty years, even if it gradually becomes difficult, as the China’s power-projection capabilities are increasing.

(6) India scenario

The Rand report is pointing out that conflict between China and India could be triggered by an incident along their long-contested common border or a dispute over how to respond to a failing neighboring state such as Burma/Myanmar. Above and beyond the dangers posed by a clash between the world’s two most populous countries, the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides creates substantial escalatory risks. In either circumstance, the United States would probably seek to stay out of the conflict. U.S. strategic goals would be to prevent a Chinese victory and avoid vertical escalation (i.e., the use of conventional or nuclear armed ballistic missiles) or horizontal escalation (i.e., involvement of Pakistan).

2. U.S. deterrent against China – Present situation and tasks

The Rand report says, “Although we do not believe it likely that a China-U.S. military clash will occur in any cases, that judgment is based on the view that the United States will retain the capacity to deter behavior that could lead to such above-mentioned clashes over the next 20 years.” Well then, under the growing military power of China, is the U, S. deterrent against China is solid?

(1) According to the Rand report, the United States needs a wide range of advanced military capabilities to deter or prevail, and in any case to preserve stability and exert influence in regional affairs despite China’s growing power and reach. However, generally speaking, direct defense by U.S. forces as an operational option is feasible at present, though confidence in this varies from the South China Sea (high) to North Korea (medium) to Taiwan (medium-low). Nevertheless, over time, China will be able both to increase its anti-access advantage where it currently exists and to expand it into the Pacific, to Northeast Asia, and eventually to Southeast Asia. In addition, as Chinese cyber and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities are strengthened, forward operating U.S. forces could become more vulnerable, precisely the top priority of China’s military investments and deployments. While stressing that cyber-attack and ASAT capabilities are keys to U.S.-China military conflict, the Rand report is pointing out

that in any case, any Sino-U.S. armed conflict will be increasingly affected if not decided by warfare in these new domains.

- (2) How should the United States respond to increasing vulnerabilities of the forward-deployed forces? According to the Rand report, over time, the United States will feel the need to rely increasingly on its more distant and less vulnerable capabilities. As U.S. forward operating survivability declines, strike range must increase. The report says, “U.S. military-operational emphasis in the Western Pacific will thus shift from geographically limited direct defense to more escalatory responses and eventually, when even these will not suffice, from deterrence based on denial to deterrence based on the threat of punishment, with the speed of the shift varying from, first of all, Taiwan, then Northeast Asia, then Southeast Asia at a somewhat later date.” As a consequence, the report says, “As Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) enhancements improve, the United States will become more dependent on capabilities associated with the threat of escalation (which is deterrence by punishment, shifting away from deterrence by denial based on preventing attack by forward-deployed force.) In addition, the report is pointing out: “This (shifting to deterrence by punishment) will move the United States toward a choice between escalation — and deterrence based on Chinese fear of escalation — and noninvolvement in hostilities near China that could bring about (large-scale) armed conflict (and should be avoided before escalating into a grave situation).” (Comment: Words in parentheses in the sentences above-mentioned refer to explanatory notes of the person who has cited the source.).

In sum, deterrence by denial which deters the occurrence of an armed conflict by showing defense power directly with forward-deployed force, which could only prevent attack of another party, is gradually becoming more vulnerable because of improvements in Chinese A2/AD capabilities. Therefore, the United States could not help relying on deterrence by punishment, which is threat of an attack by punishment on the Chinese mainland beyond geographically limited direct defense, that is, horizontal escalation of expanding the theater, or vertical escalation by using from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons.

Regarding paths of escalation, the Rand report mentions three as follows. First, as for the use of nuclear weapons, as China could have a second-strike capability survivable from the first U.S. strike, which is able to defeat U.S. missile defense, Beijing is regarding that U.S. reliability of deterrence by threat by nuclear escalation will be downgraded. As the second option, pointing Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) and cyber-war, China believes both of them are not free from being disabled. Perhaps the most promising path for the United States – most credible, least dangerous, and most one side in its effects – is that of conventional precision strikes against Chinese war-fighting and war-supporting targets on the on the mainland and theaters. Such strikes can be carried out from survivable platform and/or beyond the range of China’s medium range missiles.

At present, the United States is pushing ahead with implementing so-called Air Sea Battle Concept – in particular, the capabilities of U.S forces that can perform effectively in high-threat environment being created by China, such as long range strike systems, attack

submarines and robust battle networks. Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who is said to be an advocate for Air-Sea Battle Concept, is pointing out: “The Concept aims to prevent Chinese goal of attaining its strategic objective by aggression or threat through maintaining reliable capabilities by the United States and its allies.”³

Table below indicates the defense capabilities that are required in case of responding to direct defense capabilities and threat of escalation.

Table: Defense Capabilities

Priority	Direct Defense	Escalation
Surface fleet	X	
Submarine (attack)	X	
Submarine (strike)		X
Tactical air	X	
Long-range airstrike		X
Long-range missiles		X
Heavy land forces	X	
Heavy mobility	X	
Light expeditionary land forces	X	X
Fast mobility	X	X
SOF	X	X
Unmanned platforms		X
Ballistic missile defense (BMD)	X	
Cyber-war (offense and defense)		X
ASAT		X

Source: The RAND report, p.8.

However, as the Rand report points out, even if diminishing capabilities of the U.S. forward-deployed force can be offset by employing horizontal and vertical escalation, China also has options in this regard. Therefore, in the future, a strategy based upon escalation and ultimately deterrence by punishment may not justify threat of escalation in the specific area, looking from the national interests of the United States there. In that case, the United States cannot help making a choice of not intervening in disputes on the Chinese periphery.

- (3) Therefore, suggesting that it is necessary to supplement military deterrence with other forms of dissuasion, resistance, and permission, the Rand Report is pointing out mutual assured economic destruction (MAED), reliance on diplomacy, building partner capacity and shifting the U,S,-China relations, the gist of which is mentioned as follows.

(a) Mutual Assured Economic Destruction (MAED): Short of a nuclear exchange, the greatest damage from any conflict with China is likely to come in the economic realm. The operation of MAED is somewhat different from classic mutual assured destruction (MAD). It is

³ Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The way to respond to China,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 9, 2011.

at least theoretically possible to limit the escalation of a military clash to the sub-nuclear level. However, it is not possible to so limit the economic consequences. On the other hand, as is the case with MAD, even the weaker party gains deterrent benefit. At the moment the balance of advantage rests with the United States, but even the winner in such a contest will wish it had been avoided.

(b) **Reliance on Diplomacy:** In case the United States may be increasingly left without good military operational alternatives in regional contingencies involving Chinese forces, there is a possibility that it may weigh against U.S. involvement in contingencies where important U.S. interests are not at stake. Unless China commits large-scale aggression, the United States may rely on diplomacy and attempts to head off conflict by accommodating Chinese interests, especially if they have merits.

(c) **Building Partner Capacity:** The United States has very capable allies in the region in Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as other existing and prospective partners that are already bristling at China's growing power and assertiveness. Whether this pattern continues depends on how the United States encourages regional states to "stand up" to China, politically and materially. In seeking to stimulate greater local self-reliance, the United States will need to avoid policy that that the United States is seen trying to align East Asia against China. Therefore, the United States follows a dual strategy of engaging China.

(d) **Shifting the U.S.-China Relationship:** The U.S.-China competition should not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Indeed, the United States has a strong interest in changing these perceptions. As China becomes a true peer competitor, it also becomes potentially a stronger partner in the defense as well as economic field. At present, the United States, as the world's only superpower, bears a disproportionate burden for policing the global commons, protecting international commerce and travel, and maintaining international security. China, like most of the world, is a free rider on these efforts. The United States will also have an interest in encouraging China to assume greater responsibilities for international peace and security as the world's other emerging superpower. This will be easier and safer to do from a position of relative strength.

3. Alliance Systems in Asia – From “Hub and Spoke” to “Mutual Assistance”

Based upon the above-mentioned situation of U.S. deterrent against China and issues, what kind of alliance systems are most suitable in Asia? Here the Project 2049 Institute report (hereafter the 2049 report) gives us a beneficial key. The 35-page 2049 report by researchers of the Project 2049 Institute is looking at China's rise from the point that China has become the biggest challenger to the international order led by the United States from the greatest benefactor to it. Taking this view, the report recognizes that Asia will become the epicenter of geopolitical activity in the 21st century and the budding U.S.-China security rivalry, conditioned by deep economic interdependence, will shape the region's future.

(1) The 2049 report is pointing out that the U.S. “hub and spoke” in Asia since the Cold War period has become old-fashioned. It goes without saying that the main cause is the rise of

China as well as its modernization of military power. This alliance system has basically functioned under the provisions of bases and ports by the allies (as the “spokes”) to the United States (as the hub) to support forward deployment of the U.S. military forces. On the other hand, the United States has functioned by providing defense commitments, including a nuclear umbrella. However, there has been no coordination among U.S allies in this system.

(2) The 2049 report says Washington should now build upon these allied trends and knit them together. For Washington, this is a unique strategic opportunity—perhaps a once in a generation chance—to refashion allied military posture to better face new challenges (including China’s military rise) as follows.

(a) In Asia, habits of collective cooperation are minimal, and legacies of distrust among several pairs of U.S. allies are strong. However, now, it is necessary that Asian allies should cooperate in order to respond to China. Although allied nations in Asia are strengthening their self-defense capabilities respectively, there is no strategic dialogue or cooperative procedure plan. First, Japan and South Korea should form a trilateral alliance with the United States as the building block of a new Asian alliance network. Just as France and England accepted Germany in NATO only a few short years after the War, surely South Korea can help incorporate it into an Asian alliance system. Once South Korea moves in that direction, other Asian allies will follow.

(b) Perhaps the greatest obstacle, however, will be the U.S. temptation to pull forces “offshore” as Chinese forces increasingly come in range of U.S. forward military presence, which could lead to the erosion of U.S. military power. Nothing would do more damage to Asian security. Moreover, if Washington becomes too reliant on a long-range strike strategy, it could find itself short of options in case of a Chinese attack. Instead, the United States need to remain in place, as they did during the Cold War. Washington’s greatest advantage is a set of highly capable allies. Now is the time to help these alliances become greater than the sum of their parts.

4. Conclusion – Military Hedge against China and Involvement

Robert Kaplan, a journalist of the U. S. magazine, *The Atlantic*, and a senior fellow of the CNAS, issued an article titled “The Geography of Chinese Power” (hereafter the article) in the U. S. magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010.⁴ In the article, Kaplan discusses the background of the Chinese advance into the oceans from geo-political points of view. In the conclusion of the article Kaplan says, “Can the United States work to preserve stability in Asia, protect its allies there, and limit the emergence of a Greater China while avoiding a conflict with Beijing?”

The United States has pursued a two-pronged strategy toward China. That is: (a) On the one hand, the United States has sought to engage China. (b) On the other hand, it has purchased

⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, Vol. 89 Issue 3, pp.22-41. As for the comments of this article, see the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, May, 2010, 2 Analysis.

insurance (hedge) against a revisionist China by strengthening its alliance ties in East Asia.⁵ U.S. policy toward China cannot help becoming what contains these two strategies for a long period to cope with the challenges raised by Kaplan mentioned above. Together with the rapid increase of Chinese military power, as seen in the two reports above-mentioned, how the “hedge” policy should be is becoming an imminent issue. Meanwhile, in adopting a policy toward China, these two strategies should be balanced. If the strategies were declined to either side, or either of them were lacking, the policy toward China would not succeed.

However, this mix of strategies carries with it inherent risks and dilemmas. At this point, as the 2049 report says, U.S. policymakers must be careful not to let a policy of engagement slip into one of accommodation or appeasement, which would undermine balancing efforts. If U.S. engagement of China is not coupled with balancing, allies may question Washington’s security commitments. To sum up, as the 2049 report says, Washington must engage China in order to balance against it, and balance against it in order to engage it.

On the other hand, the struggle between China and America is already posing awkward choices for Asian countries. China is now the largest trading partner for Japan, India, Australia, South Korea and most of the nations of south-east Asia. On the other hand, as the 2049 report is pointing out, these countries do not wish for Asia mainly led by China. These countries still attach greater importance to military relationship with the US, and expect security commitments with the US. The dilemma of choosing economic and strategic interests for the Asian countries will continue in the future.

In addition, as Andrew F. Krepinevich, president of a U.S. think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, is pointing out, the allies and partners will be expected to make more than ever contributions to building a military hedge to China. Krepinevich says that “By building military hedge against China’s military buildup, the US with its allies can show their commitments to maintaining stabilities in the Western Pacific. It is the best way to let Beijing realize that the way of accomplishing a long period of security and prosperity lies in working with the neighboring countries.”⁶ However, the allies might hesitate to be involved in building up the system which is apt to be taken as a clear anti-China encirclement net. Any way, how should we respond to Kaplan’s proposal of an issue? It will be the difficult issue that cannot be avoided for both the United States and its allies and partners in Asia.

(By Hideshi UENO, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

⁵ Joseph Grieco, “China and America in The New World Polity,” in Caronlyn W. Pumphrey, ed., *The Rise Of China In Asia: Security Implications* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, SSI, January 2002), pp.34-35. (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/survvy/risechin.pdf>)

⁶ Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The way to respond to China,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 9, 2011. See also 1. 2 Military Development in this monthly report.

Ocean Policy Research Foundation

3F, Kaiyo Senpaku Bldg., 15-16 Toranomom 1-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan
TEL.81-3-3502-1828 FAX.81-3-3502-2033

The "Ship & Ocean Foundation" is operating under the name of "Ocean Policy Research Foundation"