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## Intelligence Summary in August 2011

**Maritime Security:** Three of the largest flag states, accounting for around 40% of the world's commercial shipping tonnage – Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, have signed an agreement condemning the acts of violence against seafarers by pirates in Washington D.C. on the 3rd. The Declaration recognized that the increasing use of violence against captured seafarers was underreported, and affirmed their commitment to provide information on the levels of violence faced by seafarers to the IMB from reports received by them.

The U. S. military has opened a course in the Seychelles for officers of the Coast Guards of Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles under the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program aimed at beefing up the capacity of African military forces to deal with regional challenges. The two-week course is focusing on investigations, fish protection and firefighting on ships.

On the 14th, the Indian navy detained an Iranian-flagged cargo vessel, MV *Nafis-1*, off the Mumbai coast. Although Indian security agencies had been hinting at a Pakistani link to Somali sea pirates since long, material evidence to support this assertion has only been recently recovered from MV *Nafis-1*.

Gujarat customs officials seized a large quantity of food items from the vessel that was brought to Porbandar and also found rice packets and juice pouches bearing names of Pakistani companies. Gujarat customs officials also recovered two AK-47s, a pistol and a cache of foreign currency including \$86,000 and 1,500 Saudi Riyal.

In August there were one hijacking and two incidents in which the ships and crew members who had been captured by pirates were released. On the 20th, Somali pirates seized the Marshall Island -flagged chemical tanker, MT *Fairchem Bogey* (25,390DWT) while it was anchored off Salalah port, Oman. On the other hand, on the 13th, Somali pirates freed the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier MV *Sinin* (52,466DWT) with her 23 crew. Ransom is reported to be some US\$4million. On the 26th, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged tanker, MT *Polar* (72,825DWT) operated by the Greek-shipping company. The tanker was hijacked in the Indian Ocean some 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia on October 30, 2010. A US\$ 7.7 million was reportedly paid as the ransom money to secure the release of the merchant's vessel. (Other reports indicated they received \$8M.) It is said that the fighting broke out between two pirate groups over how to share the money paid by the ship-owner.

On the 29th, the Indian ministry of shipping issued guidelines allowing ships with Indian crew to deploy armed guards in a bid to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

**Military Developments:** On the 4th, two Chinese warships, missile frigate *Luoyang* and training ship *Zheng He*, arrived at a North Korean port of Wonsan on a goodwill visit to mark the 50th anniversary of a friendship treaty between the countries.

India's coastal security concerns are exacting a heavy toll on its naval 'blue-water' aspirations,

maritime diplomacy and operational readiness. Even since the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai in 2008, operational deployment of warships and surveillance aircraft of both Navy and Coast Guard has seen 'a quantum jump' on both the west and east coasts. Regarding this issue, contributing an article titled "Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle" to Asia Times Online on the 20th, Sudha Ramachandran, an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore, India, says that the Indian Navy is pumping up the muscle of its eastern command with an eye on Chinese Navy's deployment to the Gulf of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

On the 17th, the Republic of Singapore Navy's (RSN's) first Archer-class submarine, RSS *Archer*, arrived at Changi Naval Base (CNB) from Sweden. Launched in Karlskrona, Sweden on 16 Jun 2009, RSS *Archer* is one of two ex-Royal Swedish Navy *Vaastergotland*-class submarines acquired by Singapore in 2005.

U. S. Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS *Richard E. Byrd* visited Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam on August 18-23. USNS *Byrd* spent seven days at Cam Ranh Shipyard for routine maintenance and repairs.

After docking at the Dalian Port on March 3, 2002, and completing refitting after about nine years and five months, China's aircraft carrier *Varyag* left the quay of the Dalian Port in a dense fog under tow by tugs and began its maiden sea trial on the early morning of 10 August. The *Varyag* was accompanied by the Chinese navy's training ship No. 88. The sea trial was conducted in the restricted waters of Liaoning Bay in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, where a prohibition of activities by other vessels had been noticed. Having completed its 4-day maiden sea trial, the *Varyag* under tow by tugs returned to the Dalian Port on the evening of August 14 to be berthed again at the place where she had been berthed before she left. In addition, navy's training ship under tow by tugs also returned to the Dalian Port, and was berthed in front of the aircraft carrier on the afternoon of the same day. Regarding the details of sea trial, no information is available from Chinese side. The sea trial of the *Varyag* kept the attention of the overseas media and experts. The OPRF has carried major discussions and comments on China's aircraft carrier noted before and after its sea trial in August as a topic in this monthly report.

**South China Sea-related Events:** The Philippines Navy's construction battalion is building a star shell-like structure on Patag Island in the Spratlys, construction of which is now nearing completion. The building is a second star shell-like structure which is intended to shelter and protect troops guarding and securing the country's island. Patag Island is the sixth largest among the nine islands being occupied by Filipino troops in the West Philippine Sea (the South China Sea). In a signed article of the People's Daily dated the 2nd, China slammed the Philippines for constructing a military structure, saying the action is a serious violation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002.

On the 5th, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario said that China's 9-dash line claim to the whole of the West Philippine Sea (WPS or South China Sea) is the "crux of the problem" that poses a stumbling bloc to the resolution of disputes in the WPS, on the basis of international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS.

Professor Renato C. De Castro, Ph. D., in the International Studies Department at De La Salle University (Manila) and Walter Lohman, Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, issued a long article titled “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense” in *Backgrounders*, No.259, at The Heritage Foundation on the 8th. An awareness of the issues by these authors in this article is that recent events in the South China Sea illustrate once again the urgent need for the Philippines to shift its focus from internal security to maritime defense with an eye to Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Authors are putting forward several proposals in order that the U.S. can assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ challenging transition from internal security to territorial and maritime defense.

Having visited Thailand on July 6-11, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) welcomed aboard top Vietnamese government officials off southern Vietnam, as the ship transited through the South China Sea on August 13.

On the 22nd, the Vietnamese navy received the second unit of the Russian-built Gepard 3.9 class guided missile frigate, *King Ly Thai To*. On the other hand, on the 23rd, RP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the latest warship that the Philippine Navy had bought from the United States, was delivered to Manila. Philippine President Aquino-III said at the ceremony, “The arrival of the ship represents the beginning of modernization of the Philippine Armed Force, and symbolizes new capabilities to protect the national interests and fight, if necessary.”

According to the British newspaper, *Financial Times*, Aug 30, while an Indian navy’s amphibious assault ship INS *Airavat* was sailing 45 miles off the Vietnamese coast considered to be within Vietnam’s economic zone, it was given a warning that the vessel was violating the territorial waters by the Chinese navy. It is said that the INS *Airavat* could not see any ship or aircraft, and proceeded on its journey. It is the first such encounter between the two countries’ navies in the South China Sea.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** Thai energy planners are eager for the revival of talks with Cambodia on the oil-rich overlapping claims area (OCA) between the two countries. The issue of revenue sharing is a stumbling block for negotiations between both sides.

India detected a Chinese spy ship disguised as a fishing trawler in the Indian Ocean a few months ago. In order to avoid the Indian Navy tail, the Chinese Ship moved toward Sri Lanka and docked at the Colombo. Inquiries by the Indian security agencies revealed that ship as many as 22 Laboratories on board. Based on information, the Chinese ship was mapping the Indian Ocean and picking up crucial Bathymetric data. Other Laboratories on board the ship were designed to collect data on the currents of the Indian Ocean, the temperature at various depths and also very crucially, underwater obstructions and obstacles.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** In Vietnam a vessel traffic services system (VTS) applying automatic identification system (AIS) is expected to be introduced one after another at seaports nationwide, firstly at national and international ones. The fist system is expected to be operational soon.

On the 12th, Sri Lankan government entered into a US\$500 million Build Operate Transfer (BOT) agreement with China Merchants Holdings to upgrade Colombo South Container Terminal. The project is expected to take two phases, with Phase I to be ready for operation by early 2013.

The Indian government will tighten the rules for vessels older than 25 years. The new conditions require that all ships must be inspected by societies that are a “full member” of the International Association of Classification Societies; ships carry adequate insurance to cover potential costs of wreck removal or cleanup from oil spills; and a local agent be appointed to represent the ship-owner/shipping company.

**Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others:** The new fishing regulation enacted by the Indonesian government to take effect December this year will virtually ban all Philippine fishing vessels and Filipino fishermen from catching tuna in Indonesian waters and shipping them out to General Santos City and other cities in Mindanao. Tuna production is one of the top dollar earners of Mindanao with annual export proceeds hovering around US\$280 million.

**Intelligence Assessment:** In this monthly report, the OPRF has taken up several phenomena of the issues in the South China Sea in the article titled “Strategic environment in East Asian waters and issues of the South China Sea,” giving an explanation for it. In the commentary, regarding the Japanese response, the article points out that it is necessary for Japan to stabilize the security environment and to create the situation that will meet the Japanese national interests jointly with the United States as an ally, Australia and others, as well as cooperatively with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Additionally, as a policy to stabilize the security environment of the South China Sea, the article stresses that an approach from three directions -- stabilization of balance of power, the promotion of confidence-building measures and improvement of the capabilities of the nations in the South China--is necessary to be taken.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### August 3 “Top-three flag states sign declaration condemning acts of violence against seafarers” (IMB Press Release, August 9, 2011)

Three of the largest flag states, accounting for around 40% of the world’s commercial shipping tonnage – Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, have signed an agreement condemning the acts of violence against seafarers by pirates in Washington D.C. on the 3rd. The Declaration recognized that the increasing use of violence against captured seafarers was underreported, and affirmed their commitment to provide information on the levels of violence faced by seafarers to the IMB from reports received by them.

An outline of the article: According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) press release dated the 9th, on the 3rd, three of the largest flag states, accounting for around 40% of the world’s commercial shipping tonnage – Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, have signed an agreement condemning the acts of violence against seafarers by pirates. The Declaration recognized that the increasing use of violence against captured seafarers was underreported and noted that there were significant sensitivities associated with such information. The Declaration affirmed their commitment to provide information on the levels of violence faced by seafarers to the IMB from reports received by them in accordance with their internal procedures. The IMB will collate and disseminate aggregated data of the levels of violence. The reports will omit their names, the names of the vessels, owners, operators and flag states to protect identities and privacy. The project is supported by the One Earth Future Foundation (OEFF) and the TK Foundation. This agreement is a result of the OEFF’s Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) working group, which in June 2011 produced the Human Cost of Piracy Report. The OBP report found that thousands of seafarers were subjected to several cases of violence, though these cases were underreported and misunderstood by the public.

Refer to the article: Flag States sign Declaration condemning acts of violence against seafarers  
<http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/451-flag-states-sign-declaration-condemning-acts-of-violence-against-seafarers>

“Human Cost of Piracy Report” is available at following URL:

[http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human\\_cost\\_of\\_somali\\_piracy.pdf](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf)

### August 4 “German shipping owners dissatisfied with anti-piracy efforts” (Shiptalk, August 4th, 2011)

PricewaterhouseCoopers has surveyed German ship-owners, and the results show clear dissatisfaction with the current efforts to fight piracy. Of the owners questioned, just 17% believed the European Union’s naval mission Atalanta is contributing notably to solving piracy. It’s down from 40% last year.

An outline of the article: PricewaterhouseCoopers has surveyed German ship-owners, and the results show clear dissatisfaction with the current efforts to fight piracy. Of the owners questioned, just 17% believed the European Union's naval mission Atalanta is contributing notably to solving piracy. It's down from 40% last year. Around 33% of the owners had been directly affected by piracy, and around a third of those questioned stated that they employ additional security forces on board for dangerous passages. When asked about ransoms, the vast majority (80%) agreed that paying ransoms does worsen the overall threat, however 4% admitted to having paid a ransom. Almost half of the owners (43%) claimed difficulty in finding crews willing to work in the High Risk Area. Almost 50% ship-owners have experienced increased costs which have come in the form of special wages, through increased insurance premiums, and others.

Refer to the article: Security Surveyed

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=9497>

Note: According to the IMB Report on "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships for the period of 1 January-30 June 2011, looking at the operational status of vessels by countries where victim ships were controlled /managed in the first half of the year 2011, Germany is listed at the top with 33 vessels attacked (28 vessels during the same period of the year 2010, and 69 throughout the year 2010). It has recorded the highest number of vessels attacked annually in the past several years.

#### **August 4 "Maldives, Seychelles sign MoUs on fisheries cooperation, maritime security" (Neptune Maritime Security, August 5, 2011)**

On the 4th, Maldives and Seychelles signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on fisheries cooperation and cooperation to combat piracy and other maritime security threats.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, Maldives and Seychelles signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on fisheries cooperation and cooperation to combat piracy and other maritime security threats. Before signing the agreements by two foreign ministers on behalf of their respective governments, President Mohamed Nasheed of Maldives met with the President of Seychelles James Michel at the State House, the official Presidential residence of Seychelles. Discussions were held on the close bilateral relations between the two countries, and ways to further strengthen these ties.

Refer to the article: Seychelles, Maldives sign MoUs on fisheries cooperation, maritime security

<http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/seychelles-maldives-sign-mous-on-fisheries-co>

#### **August 9 "US military opens course for Coast Guards in the Seychelles" (Neptune Maritime Security, August 10, 2011)**

The U. S. military has opened a course in the Seychelles for officers of the Coast Guards of Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles under the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program aimed at beefing up the capacity of African military forces to deal with regional challenges. The

two-week course is focusing on investigations, fish protection and firefighting on ships.

An outline of the article: The U. S. military has opened a course in the Seychelles for officers of the Coast Guards of Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles under the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program aimed at beefing up the capacity of African military forces to deal with regional challenges. The two-week course, which will be partly ship-based and partly held at the naval base of the Seychelles Coast Guards in Port Victoria, is focusing on investigations, fish protection and firefighting on ships. The course being run in the Seychelles is the third of its kind as two previous ones were held in Mombasa, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania respectively. Following the one in Seychelles another course will be conducted in Mauritius. It is trying times for the Coast Guards of the countries of East Africa and the southwestern Indian Ocean due to increasing threat from Somali pirates.

Refer to the article: US Military Opens Course for Coast Guards in the Seychelles

<http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/us-military-opens-course-for-coast-guards-in>

### **August 13 “Somali pirates free Maltese-flagged vessel” (Somalia Report, August 14, 2011)**

On the 13th, Somali pirates freed the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier MV *Sinin* (52,466DWT) with her 23 crew. Ransom is reported to be some US\$4million.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, Somali pirates freed the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier MV *Sinin* (52,466DWT) operated by the Iranian shipping company. The vessel was taken by pirates on February 12 off Oman while en route to Singapore from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Her 23 crew are reported safe. Although the pirate group demanded a ransom amounting US\$5million, the vessel's owner paid them some US\$4million ransom money to release the ship and her crew.

Refer to the article: Maltese-Flagged Vessel Freed By Pirates

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1362/Maltese-Flagged\\_Vessel\\_Freed\\_By\\_Pirates](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1362/Maltese-Flagged_Vessel_Freed_By_Pirates)

### **August 14 “India navy intercepts Iranian ship off Mumbai” (Deccan Herald, August 15, 2011)**

On the 14th, the Indian navy captured an Iranian-flagged cargo vessel, MV *Nafis-1*, off the Mumbai coast. According to a defense ministry spokesperson, it is possible that this 500-ton vessel may have been hijacked. The vessel had five Yemenis, two Tanzanians and a Kenyan and a Somalian on board. Upon search, two AK-47 rifles and a pistol were found in the ship. It was not yet clear whether all the nine men were the crew members, or all of them were pirates, or only some of them pirates and other crew-members.

An outline of the article: On the 14th, the Indian navy captured an Iranian-flagged cargo vessel, MV *Nafis-1*, off the Mumbai coast, said the Indian navy on the 15th. Following intelligence inputs that it may be carrying arms, ammunition and contraband, the Iranian-flagged vessel had been located by the Navy's Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft on August 12, which thereafter kept it under continuous surveillance. NS Mysore, a guided missile destroyer, was sent to intercept the



vessel, along with two helicopters and 24 marine commandos (MARCOS). The Indian navy detained the cargo vessel. According to a defense ministry spokesperson, it is possible that this 500-ton vessel may have been hijacked. The vessel had five Yemenis, two Tanzanians and a Kenyan and a Somali on board. Upon search, two AK-47 rifles and a pistol were found in the ship. It was not yet clear whether all the nine men were the crew members, or all of them were pirates, or only some of them pirates and other crew-members.

Refer to the article: Iranian ship intercepted by navy off Mumbai, reaches Porbander  
<http://www.deccanherald.com/content/183859/hijacked-cargo-ship-captured-navy.html>



MV *Nafis-1*

Source: NDTV, Aug 15, 2011

### **【Related article】**

#### **“Pakistan training Somali pirates; Indian custom office” (The Times of India, August 29, 2011)**

Although Indian security agencies had been hinting at a Pakistani link to Somali sea pirates since long, the evidence was obtained from nine foreign nationals caught from a hijacked Iranian vessel — MV *Nafis-1* detained by the Indian Navy off Mumbai on August 14. Gujarat customs officials also recovered two AK-47s, a pistol and a cache of foreign currency including \$86,000 and 1,500 Saudi Riyal.

An outline of the article: Although Indian security agencies had been hinting at a Pakistani link to Somali sea pirates since long, the evidence was obtained from nine foreign nationals caught from a hijacked Iranian vessel — MV *Nafis-1* detained by the Indian Navy off Mumbai on August 14. Gujarat customs officials had seized a large quantity of food items from the vessel that was brought to Porbandar and also found rice packets and juice pouches bearing names of Pakistani companies. Gujarat customs officials also recovered two AK-47s, a pistol and a cache of foreign currency including \$86,000 and 1,500 Saudi Riyal. Officials seized bags full of tea leaves, which customs officials believe, were chewed by the pirates to stay awake. “The guns have no label but the food items are packed and manufactured in Pakistan. Smugglers are not generally found carrying such a large amount of foreign currency,” said a senior customs official. “We are taking help of foreign embassies to know if those arrested have a criminal record.”

Refer to the article: India finds proof of Pakistan training Somali pirates

[http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-08-29/india/29941064\\_1\\_customs-officials-somalian-foreign-currency](http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-08-29/india/29941064_1_customs-officials-somalian-foreign-currency)

### **August 20 “Somali pirates hijack Marshal Island-flagged vessel” (Daiji World.com, August 20, 2011)**

On the 20th, Somali pirates seized the Marshall Island -flagged chemical tanker, MT *Fairchem Bogey* (25,390DWT) while it was anchored off Salalah port, Oman.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, Somali pirates seized the Marshall Island -flagged chemical tanker, MT *Fairchem Bogey* (25,390DWT) operated by the Indian shipping company while it was anchored off Salalah port, Oman. The vessel has 21 Indian crew members.

Refer to the article: Tanker with 21 Indians Hijacked Off Oman

[http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news\\_disp.asp?n\\_id=112723](http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news_disp.asp?n_id=112723)



MT Fairchem Bogey



Salalah Port

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, August 22, 2011

### **August 26 “Somali pirates free Panamanian-flagged vessel” (Antara News, August 27 and Somalia Report, August 27, 2011)**

On the 26th, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged tanker, MT *Polar* (72,825DWT) operated by the Greek-shipping company. The tanker was hijacked in the Indian Ocean some 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia on October 30, 2010.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged tanker, MT *Polar* (72,825DWT) operated by the Greek-shipping company. The tanker was hijacked in the Indian Ocean some 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia on October 30, 2010. When seized, the vessel had a crew of 24 -- one Romanian, three Greek, three Montenegrin, one Serbian and 16 Filipino. But, one of them died in captivity in November 2010. The ship had been used as a “mother-boat” of pirates. According to Somalia Report on the 27th, a US\$ 7.7 million was reportedly paid as the ransom money to secure the release of the merchant's vessel. (Other reports indicated they received \$8M.) It is said that the fighting broke out between two pirate groups over how to share the money [paid by the ship-owner].

Refer to the article: Somali pirates release Greek-owned tanker: company

<http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/75180/somali-pirates-release-greek-owned-tanker-company>

Pirate Groups Exchange Heavy Gunfire: Groups Wrangling Over Ransom Money

<http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/category/3/Piracy%20REPORT>

### **August 29 “Ships with Indian crew can have armed guards: guidelines” (Indian Express.com, August 30, 2011)**

On the 29th, the Indian ministry of shipping issued guidelines allowing ships with Indian crew to deploy armed guards in a bid to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, the Indian ministry of shipping issued guidelines allowing ships with Indian crew to deploy armed guards in a bid to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The move comes on the back of recommendations from the inter-ministerial group (IMG) of officers constituted to handle the hostage situation on hijacked ships and also suggest preventive measures. According to the Indian ministry of shipping, it has been found that about 35 percent of the ships transiting in these waters deploy armed security guards and that the pirates generally don't attack ships with armed guards on board. As per the new guidelines, ship owners are allowed to engage private maritime security companies (PMSC) through a proper selection procedure. In line with these, all Indian ships visiting Indian ports are to furnish details of security personnel on board, the firearms carried by them and the details of license issued, etc, to the port authority, customs, Coast Guard and the Navy. Foreign merchant vessels visiting Indian ports with security guards are also required to follow similar procedure, as per the guidelines. So far, 120 Somali pirates have been apprehended by India as on date.

Refer to the article: Ships with Indian crew can have armed guards

<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ships-with-indian-crew-can-have-armed-guards/838994/>

## **1.2 Military Developments**

### **August 4 “Chinese warships visit North Korea” (The Washington Post, AP, Aug 4, 2011)**

On the 4th, two Chinese warships, missile frigate *Luoyang* and training ship *Zheng He*, arrived at a North Korean port of Wonsan on a goodwill visit to mark the 50th anniversary of a friendship treaty between the countries.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, two Chinese warships, missile frigate *Luoyang* and training ship *Zheng He*, arrived at a North Korean port of Wonsan on a goodwill visit to mark the 50th anniversary of a friendship treaty between the countries. They stay there for four days.

Refer to the article: Chinese warships visit NKorea on goodwill visit marking 50th anniversary of friendship treaty

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-warships-visit-nkorea-on-goodwill-visit-marking-50th-anniversary-of-friendship-treaty/2011/08/04/gIQAVUedtI\\_story.html?wpisrc=nl\\_headlines](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-warships-visit-nkorea-on-goodwill-visit-marking-50th-anniversary-of-friendship-treaty/2011/08/04/gIQAVUedtI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines)

### **August 15 “Coastal security pressures limit blue-water dreams: Indian Navy” (The Times of India, August 15, 2011)**

India’s coastal security concerns are exacting a heavy toll on its naval 'blue-water' aspirations, maritime diplomacy and operational readiness. Even since the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai in 2008, operational deployment of warships and surveillance aircraft of both Navy and Coast Guard has seen 'a quantum jump' on both the west and east coasts.

An outline of the article: India’s coastal security concerns are exacting a heavy toll on its naval 'blue-water' aspirations, maritime diplomacy and operational readiness. Navy has been forced to cancel the deployment of its frontline warships to Mediterranean Sea and North Atlantic in August-September, which was to include a series of combat exercises with several countries like France, UK and Turkey, due to 'heavy commitments' in the coastal security arena. Navy did dispatch five of its eastern fleet warships to Vladivostok in Russia earlier this year, with the exercise with Singaporean Navy and the one with US warships being conducted on the way. But the western fleet's overseas deployment stands scrapped now. Even since the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai in 2008, operational deployment of warships and surveillance aircraft of both Navy and Coast Guard has seen 'a quantum jump' on both the west and east coasts. According to a defense ministry official, warship deployment has gone up by 60-80% and aircraft deployment by 100% for coastal security tasking. Moreover, a total of 165 coastal security operations, 54 exercises and 259 awareness campaigns for fishermen have been conducted between January 2009 and June 2011. As a result, an official admitted that, although a warship was at sea for 15 days in a month earlier, with the remaining time left for maintenance at harbor, it is at sea for 20-25 days now.

Refer to the article: Coastal security pressures 'sink' blue-water dreams

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Coastal-security-pressure-sink-blue-water-dreams/articleshow/9606069.cms>

### **August 17 “Singapore’s submarine delivered from Sweden” (MINDF, Singapore, Aug 17, 2011)**

On the 17th, the Republic of Singapore Navy's (RSN's) first Archer-class submarine, RSS *Archer*, arrived at Changi Naval Base (CNB) from Sweden. Launched in Karlskrona, Sweden on 16 Jun 2009, RSS *Archer* is one of two ex-Royal Swedish Navy *Vaastergotland*-class submarines acquired by Singapore in 2005.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, the Republic of Singapore Navy's (RSN's) first Archer-class submarine, RSS *Archer*, arrived at Changi Naval Base (CNB) from Sweden. Launched in Karlskrona, Sweden on 16 Jun 2009, RSS *Archer* is one of two ex-Royal Swedish Navy *Vaastergotland*-class submarines acquired by Singapore in 2005. RSS *Archer* has been

comprehensively upgraded, refurbished to ensure its suitability for operations in local and tropical conditions. Crew members of RSS Archer have also undergone extensive training in Sweden since 2007.

Refer to the article: First Archer-Class Submarine Returns to Singapore

[http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news\\_and\\_events/nr/2011/aug/17aug11\\_nr2.html](http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2011/aug/17aug11_nr2.html)



RSS Archer, which arrived from Sweden today, berthed at Changi Naval Base

Source: MINDEF, Singapore, August 17, 2011

### **August 18 “USN transport ship visits Cam Ranh Bay” (U.S. Military Sealift Command Far East Public Affairs, Press Release, Aug 23, 2011)**

U. S. Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS *Richard E. Byrd* visited Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam on August 18-23. USNS *Byrd* spent seven days at Cam Ranh Shipyard for routine maintenance and repairs.

An outline of the article: U. S. Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS *Richard E. Byrd* visited Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam on August 18-23, marking it a historic visit - the first by a U.S. Navy ship to the port in more or less 38 years. USNS *Byrd* spent seven days at Cam Ranh Shipyard for routine maintenance and repairs that included underwater hull cleaning, polishing of the ship's propeller, repairing shipboard piping, and others. MSC Ship Support Unit Singapore routinely contracts shipyards throughout Southeast Asia to conduct maintenance and repairs on the command's Combat Logistics Force ships, working for saving time and money. “Working at Cam Ranh Bay provides the U.S. Navy with an additional option to repair our ships at the new facilities,” said the officer in charge of MSC SSU Singapore.

Refer to the article: MSC ship completes first U.S. Navy ship visit to Vietnam port in 38 years

<http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00p/pressrel/press11/press40.htm>



Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS *Richard E. Byrd* at anchor in the port of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, Aug. 18 while undergoing routine seven-day maintenance availability. Byrd is the first U.S. Navy ship to visit the port in more than 38 years.

Source: U.S. Military Sealift Command Far East Public Affairs, Press Release, August 23, 2011

### **August 20 “Indian Navy pumps up eastern muscle” (Asia Times Online, August 20, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle” to Asia Times Online on the 20th, Sudha Ramachandran, an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore, India, says that the Indian Navy is pumping up the muscle of its eastern command with an eye on Chinese Navy’s deployment to the Gulf of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle” to Asia Times Online, Sudha Ramachandran, an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore, India, says that the Indian Navy is pumping up the muscle of its eastern command, discussing its background and status of its rising power. The gist of the article is as follows.

- (1) For decades, the navy's “sword arm” is considered to be the western command, which is headquartered at Mumbai. That appears to be changing now. The Indian Navy which is the world's fifth largest has three commands - the western, southern and eastern commands. The eastern command, which is headquartered at Visakhapatnam, is home to the Indian Navy's submarine arm. A tri-services command was set up in 2001 at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which is located to control the Straits of Malacca.
- (2) The enhanced attention being paid to the eastern command is prompted in part by apprehensions over China's looming naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. But it is part of India's two decades-long effort to focus its diplomatic, economic and military energies eastward as part of its “Look East” policy. Besides, the navy's new eastward orientation is also aimed at enabling India to emerge a significant player in the emerging Asia-Pacific security architecture.
- (3) The eastern naval command has grown remarkably in recent years. In 2005, it had 30 warships under its command. Six years later, that number has grown to 50 - roughly a third of the Indian Navy's entire fleet strength. It is poised to expand further. India's only aircraft

carrier INS (Indian Naval Ship) *Viraat* is to be assigned to the eastern command after the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov* (renamed INS *Vikramaditya*) joins the western fleet. All five Rajput-class guided-missile destroyers (modified versions of Soviet Kashin class destroyers), which were with the western command have joined the eastern fleet. The Indian Navy's only ship to be acquired from the Americans, the amphibious USS *Trenton*, now renamed INS *Jalashwa*, has been put under the eastern command. It will be joined soon by the indigenously manufactured stealth frigates INS *Shivalik*, INS *Satpura* and INS *Sahyadri* as well as the US-manufactured P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the Italy-made new fleet tanker, INS *Shakti*. It will be the eastern command that will take charge of India's nuclear submarines. INS *Arihant*, which is undergoing sea trials, was constructed at Visakhapatnam. Two other nuclear submarines are reportedly under development here.

- (4) Currently, the Eastern Naval Command has bases in Vizag, Chennai and Kolkata. An operational turnaround base will also be created at the Paradeep and Tuticorin bases. The eastern command has bases at Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. It will soon have a forward base at Tuticorin and an operational turnaround base at Paradeep. In addition to naval air stations at Dega and Rajali, the eastern command has got a new one, INS Parundu at Uchipuli, where UAVs are being deployed. In the wake of the eastern command's rising profile and strength, the Indian navy recently upgraded the post of the eastern command's chief of staff to three-star rank, ie the same as that of his counterpart at the western naval command.

Refer to the article: Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle

[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/MH20Df02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MH20Df02.html)

### **【Related article】**

#### **“India gets its 2nd indigenous stealth frigate” (The Indian Express, Aug 22, 2011)**

NS *Satpura*, the second indigenous stealth frigate of Project 17 class of the Indian Navy, was commissioned on the 20th.

An outline of the article: INS *Satpura*, the second indigenous stealth frigate of Project 17 class of the Indian Navy, was commissioned on the 20th. INS *Shivalik*, the first of the class, had already been commissioned in April 2010. The third ship INS *Sahyadri* is in final stages of construction. Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy ADM Nirmal Verma said, “The commissioning of INS *Satpura* will strengthen the fighting fleet of the Indian Navy. Its improved survivability, maneuvering and stealth ability will act significantly toward navy’s status as blue water navy.” Armed with long range anti-ship missile, anti-aircraft missile as well as missile defense system, INS *Satpura* has the capacity to engage into a three dimensional warfare on surface, air as well as sub surface levels.

Refer to the article: Navy gets its 2nd indigenous stealth frigate

<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/navy-gets-its-2nd-indigenous-stealth-frigate/834866/>



*INS Satpura*

Source: The Hindu, August 20, 2011



## 👁️👉 Topic 👈👁️

### China's aircraft carrier begins first sea trial

Its aims, influence, anticipated missions, among others seen in overseas commentary

#### Introduction

After docking at the Dalian Port on March 3, 2002, and completing refitting after about nine years and five months, China's aircraft carrier *Varyag* left the quay of the Dalian Port in a dense fog under tow by tugs and began its maiden sea trial on the early morning of August 10. The *Varyag* was accompanied by the Chinese navy's training ship No. 88. The sea trial was conducted in the restricted waters of Liaoning Bay in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, where a prohibition of activities by other vessels had been noticed. Having completed its 4-day maiden sea trial, the *Varyag* under tow by tugs returned to the Dalian Port on the evening of August 14 to be berthed again at the place where she had been berthed before she left. In addition, navy's training ship under tow by tugs also returned to the Dalian Port, and was berthed in front of the aircraft carrier on the afternoon of the same day. Regarding the details of sea trial, no information is available from Chinese side. As for the name of the "*Varyag*," although some overseas media call it "*Shi Lang*," there is no announcement from the China-side.

No matter what it is, the sea trial of the "*Varyag*" kept the attention of the overseas media and experts. Below are the major discussions and comments on China's aircraft carrier which were noted before and after its sea trial in August.

### I . Aims, influence, and anticipated missions

#### 1. China's first aircraft carrier takes to sea (Financial Times, August 10, 2011)

China's Defense Ministry said China's first aircraft carrier began its maiden sea trial on the morning of the 10th. However, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy must struggle for years to master the skills needed to operate the ship. As for the deployment place of this aircraft carrier, it will probably be put under the Dalian Naval Academy. "The carrier is likely to remain in Dalian," added a PLA officer who asked not to be identified. "Such an organizational set-up will also make clear that the carrier is indeed a training platform." The Dalian Naval Academy is training fighter pilots for China's new carrier group. A new training base for carrier fighters is also being built in the region.

An outline of the article:

- (1) China's Defense Ministry announced that the carrier "*Varyag*" commenced first sea trial on the early morning of the tenth. For the long-awaited maiden sea trial of the carrier many Chinese exclaimed patriotic exhilaration. However, navy must endeavor to acquire expertise necessary for operating the carrier for several years in future. Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo said on state television that it could take up to four more years to train pilots for carrier operations. This sea trial will test the carrier's engines and maneuverability, with exercises involving fighter aircraft not expected to take place for months.

- (2) Regarding the deployment place of the carrier, military observers believe it would make most sense for the PLA Navy to station the carrier in either southern Guangdong or Hainan province. But Chinese and foreign military experts said they expected the *Varyag* to remain in Dalian for now. “It will probably be put under the Dalian Naval Academy rather than become a command of its own,” said a foreign military official in Beijing. “The carrier is likely to remain in Dalian,” added a PLA officer who asked not to be identified. “Such an organizational set-up will also make clear that the carrier is indeed a training platform.” Bai Yaoping, long viewed as one of the top contenders to command the *Varyag*, was recently appointed president of the Dalian Naval Academy, which is training fighter pilots for China’s new carrier group. A new training base for carrier fighters is also being built in the region.
- (3) The strategic and technical writings by the Chinese military analysts indicate that Beijing intends to build more carriers. In addition, some US-based analysts believe that construction has started in a shipyard on Chanxing Island off Shanghai and have predicted that the PLA could have one or two more carriers by 2020. However, the Chinese government remains mum.

Refer to the article: China’s first aircraft carrier takes to sea

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b20cdce-c300-11e0-8cc7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1V3tS0B1q>

## **2. China’s aircraft carrier has problems in sea trial (China Sign Post, No. 43. August 9, 2011)**

Website China SignPost sponsored by Andrew Jackson, China expert of the U.S. Naval War College, and Gabe Collins carried a joint article titled “China’s ‘Starter Carrier’ Goes to Sea” on the 9th (renewed on the 10th). Citing an example of high accident rate of the combined U.S. Navy/USMC during a period of its establishment, authors are pointing out it is clear that the first Chinese aircraft carrier will face severe problems in the future.

An outline of the article:

Website China SignPost sponsored by Andrew Jackson, China expert of the U.S. Naval War College, and Gabe Collins carried a joint article titled “China’s ‘Starter Carrier’ Goes to Sea” on the 9th (renewed on the 10th). Authors say: Although China’s ‘starter carrier’ is of very limited military utility, it will primarily serve to confer prestige on a rising great power, and to help the military master basic procedures. But it is clear that China eventually face severe problems in the future. The gist of the article is as follows.

- (1) A new great power wants a ‘starter carrier.’ Key questions that may arise in the course of this maiden voyage include:
- a. How reliable is the vessel’s propulsion system? The ship’s power plant and drive train are among the highest probability risk factors that could complicate the maiden cruise.
  - b. Will China more aggressively intercept reconnaissance flights and/or declare a maritime and aerial exclusion zone in the ship’s vicinity? The carrier’s first excursion from port offers an excellent opportunity for air and seaborne reconnaissance assets from the U.S., Japan, and other regional armed forces to gather photographic, acoustic, and perhaps signals

intelligence on the new Chinese carrier.

- c. Will PLA Navy (PLAN) Aviation attempt to land aircraft on the ship at sea? There are other possibilities, include helicopter operations and touch and go runs. They could be facilitated by the growing base of PLAN helicopter pilots with ship-borne operating experience in the Gulf of Aden.
- (2) Aircraft operation is risky if the maiden cruise includes actual landings of fixed wing aircraft. Prof. Robert Rubel (CAPT, Ret.), a former U.S. Naval Aviator who is now Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, notes that between 1949, when jets started being deployed in large numbers by the U.S. Navy, until 1988, when the combined U.S. Navy/USMC accident rate was lowered to USAF levels, the naval services lost almost 12,000 aircraft and 8,500 aircrew. In 1954 alone, the Navy and Marines lost 776 aircraft and 535 crewmen and carrier-based tactical aviation suffered higher proportionate losses than the naval services as a whole.
- (3) The process remains immensely difficult for Chinese carrier and it is certain that carriers suffer substantial unexpected losses. It remains uncertain what financial and political costs Chinese carrier aircraft losses will incur, but clearly the first Chinese carrier aviators and ship captains face steep challenges ahead.

Refer to the article: China's 'Starter Carrier' Goes to Sea

<http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/08/china%e2%80%99s-starter-carrier-goes-to-sea/>

### 3. China's aircraft carrier and anticipated missions (Hudson New York, August 3, 2011)

Hudson New York, Website of a U.S. think tank, The Hudson Institute (HI), carried an article titled "China's New Aircraft Carrier Program: Regional Ambitions - or Global?" by Taylor Dinerman, Senior Fellow of HI, on the 3rd. In the article, author mentions that the main reason Beijing wants a carrier is clearly not to deal with a Taiwan situation but to project power in and around the South China Sea. If, in the future, China sends its carrier -- or carriers -- onto the oceans beyond the South China Sea, this will be proof that it is indeed seeking to become a global power.

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- (1) It appears that the main reason Beijing wants a carrier is to project power in and around the South China Sea. To China, it seems as if the use of carriers by mid-sized countries that is of the most interest. They see how France, with a single medium sized, nuclear-powered carrier, has been able to project its own power against the Gaddafi regime in Libya; they

have also noted how Britain's lack of sea-based air-power has limited the UK's ability to influence events on the ground in North Africa or elsewhere. Additionally, China seems to evaluate the British use of an aircraft carrier in the Falklands War in 1982, as well as roles of an Indian aircraft carrier during the Bangladesh War on Independence in 1971.

And, thereafter, India continues to keep and build aircraft carriers.

- (2) Carriers always sail as the centerpiece of what the US Navy calls a Carrier Battle Group; these usually include at least three or four destroyers and cruisers, a supply ship and a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Other navies may not support their carriers quite so lavishly, but they never allow their carriers to sail unescorted. Any navy needs a good deal of institutional knowledge to effectively use an aircraft carrier and its support fleet. This is something that can only be developed with decades of hard training and experience. China's decision to take the time and spend the money needed to win for themselves the benefits of seagoing airpower has implications for the East Asian region and for its relations the US.
- (3) Once China has an operational aircraft carrier, it will have by far the "biggest stick" in the region. With a carrier, China will be able to put intense military pressure on all the states around the South China Sea; not just Vietnam and the Philippines, but Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, as well.
- (4) For the Taiwan operation; amphibious warfare ships, small missile-carrying ships and submarines, and a variety of escort ships to defend the other ships would be what the navy needed. Of course, such an invasion would require air superiority and an invasion force of several divisions of ground troops, but without local naval superiority, this attack across the Taiwan Strait, is simply "not on." An amphibious assault on Taiwan does not require an aircraft carrier; neither did the Allied Normandy invasion of June 6th, 1944. In both events, the distance from the invasion ports to the landing beaches is about 100 miles; land-based aviation would be more than enough for China to gain the required air superiority,
- (5) If, in the future, China sends its carrier -- or carriers -- onto the oceans beyond the South China Sea, this will be proof that it is indeed seeking to become a global power. For the moment, however, the U.S. and its allies can afford to wait and watch. It may be soon that China begins to build effective carriers that could match those of the US Navy. It is an event for which we should start preparing -- now.

Refer to the article: China's New Aircraft Carrier Program: Regional Ambitions - or Global?

<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2298/china-aircraft-carrier>

#### **4. China's aircraft carrier, its aims and problems in future (The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2011)**

On the 11th, the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street*, carried an analytical article titled "China Flexes Naval Muscle," in which it gives an outline of the influence on the inside and outside of the country, limited military effectiveness, as well as China's future aircraft construction program and others, with regard to China's first aircraft carrier that departed the Dalian Port for its maiden sea trial on August 19.

An outline of the article:

- (1) China's first aircraft carrier is far from fully operational: It has a new engine (probably gas/turbine or diesel engine), radar, guns and other equipment, but has limited combat potential without backup from other carriers and an array of support ships. For the moment, it will be used mainly for training personnel, especially fighter pilots who must learn to take off from and land on a moving deck.
- (2) China says in a Xinhua commentary: "There should be no excessive worries or paranoid feelings on a China's aircraft carrier, as it will not pose a threat to other countries." In fact, for Beijing, the carrier's limited capabilities are less important than its symbolic significance, especially for Communist Party leaders. They also point out that of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council China has been the only one without an operational carrier. India and Thailand have a carrier each, while Japan has one that carries helicopters. It is the most potent symbol yet of China's long-term desire to develop the power both to deny U.S. naval access to Asian waters and to protect its global economic interests, including shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and oil sources in the Middle East. Both active and retired Chinese military officials concerned have never hid that China desires to develop four aircraft carriers of a large type by around the year 2020.
- (3) Andrei Chang, Hong Kong editor of Kanwa Defense Review, which monitors China's military, said the first tests were probably designed to check the engines - a potential weak point, and those sea trials would continue sporadically for another year or two. Once basic tests are concluded, however, analysts said the carrier could be used for conducting visits to foreign countries to present China's naval strength. "U.S. carriers come to Hong Kong, so why shouldn't ours go to California or New York?" said Xu Guangyu, a retired Chinese general.
- (4) Most importantly, however, the carrier will give China experience to develop indigenous carriers, the first of which some defense experts say is already under construction at a shipyard in Shanghai and could be completed as soon as 2012. China, like most countries, considers at least three carriers necessary to be effective, so that one can be in action, one in transit and one in port for repairs and re-supplies, according to Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan. But each active one requires its own carrier group, which could take at least 10 years to develop, according to retired Chinese navy Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo.

Refer to the article: China Flexes Naval Muscle

[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576499423267407488.html?mod=WSJ\\_World\\_LeadStory](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576499423267407488.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory)

## 5. Is China's aircraft carrier a threat to U.S.?

The U.S. think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), carried an article titled "Is China's Aircraft Carrier a Threat to U.S.?" in the form of questions and answers by CSIS Fellows Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingley in its homepage dated the 11th. Is China's first aircraft carrier really a threat to the United States? Authors conclude: Although the

military capabilities of a single, old aircraft carrier are limited, political influence of carrier's presence is so great potentially that it will urge many neighboring countries, which are worrying about the modernization of the Chinese military force and its show of force in the disputed areas, to enhance their continued efforts to strengthen their respective capabilities.

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Q1: Why is China deploying an aircraft carrier?

A1: The acquisition of an aircraft carrier is driven in part by China's desire for international prestige. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, India, Brazil, and Thailand operate a total of 21 active-service aircraft carriers (the United States alone operates 11). An aircraft carrier is widely viewed by Chinese as a symbol of national power and prestige. PLA officers often remind foreigners that China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council without a carrier. At the same time, however, the procurement of the carrier is a consequence of an improved continental threat environment that has imposed constraints on China's ability to develop sea power. It also represents expanded Chinese national interests created by deeper integration into the global economy. In the past decade, China's trade dependence doubled from 40 percent in 2000 to 73 percent during the year 2006–2008, with more than 80 percent of that trade carried by ship. Moreover, acquisition of a carrier will better enable the PLA to implement Hu Jintao's 2004 "New Historic Missions" and respond to demands to undertake a range of nontraditional security operations.

Q2: What are the aircraft carrier's capabilities?

A2: The ex-*Varyag* is an *Admiral Kuznetsov*-class aircraft carrier, measuring roughly 304.5 meters long and 37 meters wide. The vessel has a displacement of 58,500 metric tons and can travel at speeds of 32 knots (37 miles per hour). Engines, generators and defense systems, including the Type 1030 CIWS (close-in weapon system) and the FL-3000N missile system, were added to the vessel in Dalian. As designed, it could be armed with 8 AK-630 AA (antiaircraft) guns, 8 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS, 12 P-700 Granit SSM (surface-to-surface missiles), 18 8-cell 3K95 Kinzhal SAM VLS (surface-to-air missiles, vertical-launch system), and the RBU-12000 UDAV-1 ASW (antisubmarine warfare) rocket launcher. Also as designed, the carrier could carry 26 fixed-wing aircraft (likely the Shenyang J-15) and 24 helicopters. The carrier is fitted with a "ski jump" ramp rather than the catapult used by U.S. carriers. The carrier's smaller size and ramp greatly reduces the number of aircraft it can carry and

how many it can operate at any one time. Additionally, in order to take off, the fighters will carry lighter payloads and less fuel, greatly limiting their firepower and range of operations. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng stated that the ex-*Varyag* will be used for “scientific research, experiment and training.” Indeed, the carrier may not be well-suited to combat, but it will give China the opportunity to train sailors and pilots in aircraft carrier operations. Mastering the challenges of operating, defending, and maintaining a carrier, as well as a possible accompanying carrier task force, will take at least a decade.

Q3: How many carriers is China building, and for what missions might they be used?

A3: China is reportedly already building at least one if not two indigenous aircraft carriers, which are likely to be deployed over the next 15 years. At July 11 press briefing, General Chen Bingde stated that no official decision had been made on how many carriers will be built. Experts have suggested that China would need at least three carriers for effective power projection. The missions for which China might use aircraft carriers remain unclear. Rather than seek to replicate U.S. naval strategy and operations, the PLAN is more likely to develop a limited power-projection capability that enhances China’s ability to defend its regional interests; to protect expanding overseas interests; to perform nontraditional security missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-piracy, noncombatant evacuation, antiterrorism peacekeeping operations, crisis response, and military diplomacy; and to demonstrate international responsibility.

Q4: Do China’s aircraft carrier ambitions pose a threat to the United States and its friends and allies?

A4: Even after the ex-*Varyag* is fully operational, it is widely acknowledged that a lone, obsolete aircraft carrier has limited use militarily. The main functions in the near term will be to enhance China’s national prestige, provide personnel training, and conduct military diplomacy. The political impact of the carrier’s deployment will be potentially far greater, however. China’s neighbors, many of which are increasingly anxious about China’s military modernization and willingness to flex its muscles in disputed waters, are worried that a carrier will provide China with additional means to project power from its coastline. It will likely reinforce ongoing efforts by many regional countries to shore up their own capabilities. Vietnam and the Philippines are already ramping up their sea defense capabilities through greater military cooperation with the United States and procurement of new platforms to bolster their ability to defend their claims.

Refer to the article: Is China’s Aircraft Carrier a Threat to U.S. Interests?

<http://csis.org/publication/chinas-aircraft-carrier-threat-us-interests>

## 6. China’s carrier, its aims and anticipated missions (The Diplomat, August 11, 2011)

Tokyo-based online magazine, The Diplomat, carried an article titled “Decoding China’s Aircraft Carrier” by an independent journalist, Trefor Moss, on 13th. In reply to questions from

The Diplomat, Moss is pointing out that, in order to understand the Chinese aircraft carrier we should judge it from two-side views – the symbolic and the purposive.

An outline of the article: Tokyo-based online magazine, The Diplomat, carried an article titled “Decoding China’s Aircraft Carrier” by a free journalist, Trefor Moss, on 13th. In reply to questions from The Diplomat, Moss mentioned that, in order to understand the Chinese aircraft carrier we should judge it from two-side views – the symbolic and the purposive, the gist of which is as follows.

Q1: When is an aircraft carrier not an aircraft carrier?

A1: The answer could be: when it is Chinese. The first aircraft carrier in People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) history has to be understood on two different levels: the symbolic and the purposive. Symbolically, the launching of the carrier is another installment in the narrative of China’s achievement of great-power status. It belongs in the same bracket as the Three Gorges Dam, the Qingdao-Haiwan sea bridge and high-speed rail: mega-projects that demonstrate China’s technological prowess and boundless capacity to accomplish whatever it sets its mind to (even if, before too long, the dams crack and the trains crash). The carrier’s military symbolism is also immensely powerful. In truth, the PLA’s most successful modernization programs haven’t been conventional platforms like warships so much as asymmetric weapons – systems that aim to subvert the enemy’s strengths rather than counter them with like-for-like solutions. Anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-satellite systems and cyber warfare all fit into this category. Aircraft carriers most certainly don’t. However, the general public has no idea what asymmetric weapons are; they are esoteric concepts that don’t capture the imagination. On the other hand, aircraft carriers are part of the widely understood lexicon of hard power. People appreciate that a country with an aircraft carrier is part of an elite and powerful club – and that’s precisely the message that the Chinese government wants the carrier to convey both to its domestic and foreign audiences. It’s a comprehensible metaphor for China’s arrival, and something to keep the nationalists sweet. The ship has great economic symbolism as well. Just as China was launching its carrier, the United States was announcing that it was trimming the size of its carrier fleet in order to save money. It was the perfect moment for the Xinhua news agency to chide has-been America for spending reckless amounts on defense so that it could ‘meddle’ internationally while ‘paying no heed to whether the economy can support this.’ The message was that only China, sitting pretty atop \$2 trillion in reserves, now has the fiscal right to build these military luxuries.

Q2: What is China’s first carrier actually capable of?

A2: China’s own declaration that the ship is ‘obsolete’ and ‘for training purposes’ is probably fairly accurate. Naval analysts Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins have described the ex-*Varyag* – widely reported to have been renamed *Shi Lang* – as a ‘starter carrier,’ and it’s hard to imagine it ever being used as a weapon of war. This is a ship with training wheels for a navy that has never operated a carrier before. The first major milestone, after confirming that the



ship itself functions, will be equipping the carrier with its air arm of naval J-15 fighters, which are themselves unproven and still in development. But training pilots to fly off carriers will be a long and costly exercise. The risk of losing pilots is regarded to be high.

Q3: How will China develop its carrier fleet thereafter?

A3: This is unknown. China is rumored to be constructing two new indigenous carriers at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai, though this hasn't been confirmed, and to be targeting a 2015 launch. This assumes that Chinese ship-builders are able to overcome the problems of constructing this particularly complex type of ship (it took five years just to refurbish *Varyag*). The design of the new carriers will face a great deal of problems over their capabilities, not least their size, whether they are nuclear or conventionally powered, and whether they have ski ramps or catapults. On the other hand, developing doctrine for the carriers will be less of a challenge, Dean Cheng at U.S. think tank, the Heritage Foundation reckons. "This aircraft carrier has been in refurbishment at least five years, so they've been thinking about doctrine for a long time," said Chen. China might be expected to build these first two indigenous carriers and then pause, as it hasn't historically constructed large series of naval vessels (except small patrol and attack craft). However, Stacy Pedrozo, of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that China intends to use aircraft carriers to help 'put an end to US military dominance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans' in the 2020 to 2040 timeframe, and achieving this would seem to require the construction of several additional carriers, working on the principle that you need three carriers to keep one continually at sea. In a recent congressional report, naval affairs analyst Ronald O'Rourke suggests that China could build as many six in total.

Q4: What peace-time applications would a fleet of Chinese carriers have?

A4: China will use its carriers as bearers of diplomatic signals, both friendly and unfriendly. They will be used for high-impact port calls and humanitarian/disaster-relief missions. They will also be called upon to express Beijing's dissatisfaction. They could also be deployed to bolster China's presence in the disputed territories of the South China Sea, especially as long as the PLA Air Force's range is limited by its lack of air-to-air refueling capability.

Q5: And what are the war-time applications?

A5: The carrier would be a sitting duck in a conflict,' suggests a US naval analyst, speaking on background. 'The prestige value is its serious function.' There is therefore a real possibility that China has no intention of ever using its carriers as war-fighting assets, since to risk losing one would be a significant blow to national prestige. The deep water of the South China Sea, ideal for submarines, would be an unforgiving operational environment for a Chinese carrier in war-time, unless China significantly advances its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, masters highly complex naval air operations and develops a range of other protective systems and escort operations.

Q6: Do Chinese carriers alter the balance in the Taiwan Strait?

A6: China already has over 1,300 missiles in place with which to strike the island. So it's hard to see how a Chinese aircraft carrier changes the calculus. In fact, the carriers are probably the clearest indication of post-Taiwan thinking that the PLA has demonstrated to date. Still, Taiwan reacted to the launch of Shi Lang by trumpeting its new Hsiung Feng III anti-ship cruise missile, complete with a picture of the weapon dispatching a Chinese carrier. (Please refer to the picture.) Yet this was only a PR exercise – Taipei knows that the PLA's missiles, not its new ship, are the real threat.

Q7: What are the implications for the South China Sea?

A7: The possession of aircraft carriers undermines China's argument that its defense strategy is purely defensive in nature. As a power-projection asset, an aircraft carrier has no defensive application, and this fact hasn't been lost on China's neighbors. Vietnam, for example, is investing in six Russian Kilo-class submarines in direct response to PLAN modernization (though not aircraft carriers specifically) – mainly because it disbelieves China's statements of benign intent. China has never articulated what its aircraft carriers are for, and until it does so its neighbors – already sensitive about perceived acts of aggression in the disputed zones of the South China Sea – will continue to wonder whether Chinese power is about to be projected in their direction. China's aircraft carriers, far from being the anachronistic conventional weapons they seem, could therefore prove to be the most impressive asymmetric weapons that China has developed so far: warships that pack an almighty diplomatic punch – raising esteem at home and commanding respect abroad – but which aren't designed for battle. Meanwhile, the United States and others will expend a huge amount of energy over the next few years trying to figure out if this is really the case.

Refer to the article: Decoding China's Aircraft Carrier

<http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/13/decoding-china%e2%80%99s-aircraft-carrier/>



Taiwan's indigenous Hsiung Feng III missile is propped against the backdrop of a billboard depicting a missile-riddled aircraft carrier, closely resembling China's carrier *Varyag*, during a media preview of the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology show in Taipei.

Source: The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2011

## II Reference information

### 1. Comparison between Chinese aircraft carrier and U.S. aircraft carrier



Source: The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2011

## 2. Photograph during trial cruise



Source: Alert 5.com, August 17, 2011



Source: Alert 5.com, August 17, 2011



Source: Shnghaiist.com, August 12, 2011



*Varyag* and training ship No.88 return to Dalian Port

Source: China Net, August 16, 2011

## 1.3 Maritime Boundaries


### August 1 “Philippines constructing 'star shell' on Patag Island” (PhilStar.com, August 1, 2011)

The Philippines Navy’s construction battalion is building a star shell-like structure on Patag Island in the Spratlys, construction of which is now nearing completion. The building is a second star shell-like structure which is intended to shelter and protect troops guarding and securing the country’s island. Patag Island is the sixth largest among the nine islands being occupied by Filipino troops in the West Philippine Sea (the South China Sea).

An outline of the article: The Philippines Navy’s 3rd Naval Mobile Construction Battalion is building a star shell-like structure on Patag Island in the Spratlys, construction of which is now nearing completion. According to the the PN’s Naval Construction Brigade, the construction of the structure was started in late May, which is a second star shell-like structure on Patag Island in the Spratlys, which is intended to shelter and protect troops guarding and securing the country’s island. Once completed, Patag Island, the sixth largest among the nine islands being occupied by Filipino troops in the West Philippine Sea, will complement another star shell facility constructed by the Navy for the troops deployed in the area. At present, a 25-man strong Seabees groups are still in Patag Island building the structure, using pre-fabricated materials brought in by the Navy’s vessels from Cavite. The island is considered highly strategic, as it is located within the vicinity of Recto Bank where local and foreign partners have been conducting oil drilling exploration operations. Recto Bank, which is within the country’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEC), is believed to be sitting on huge natural gas and oil deposits. The AFP has also programmed the repair and rehabilitation of the airfield in the Pag-Asa Island, the biggest island in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), to be able to accommodate C-130 military planes and other civilian aircraft.

Refer to the article: Navy Seabees constructing 'starshell' on Patag Island

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=711791&publicationSubCategoryId=63>



Source: Spratly Islands CIA WFB Map.png

**【Related article】**

**“China protests at Philippine’s shelter” (Radio Free Asia, August 3, 2011)**

In a signed article of the People's Daily dated the 2nd, China slammed the Philippines for constructing a military structure, saying the action is a serious violation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002.

An outline of the article: In a signed article of the People's Daily dated the 2nd, China slammed the Philippines for constructing a military structure, saying “This action is a serious violation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea.” The article in the People’s Daily said proposals by the Philippines at a recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations security forum (ARF) to make the disputed area into “a zone of peace, freedom, friendship and cooperation,” were “just a trick.” “The move of the Philippine side in violating the DOC and undermining future cooperation should be strictly restrained,” it added.

Refer to the article: Anger Over Naval Shelter

<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/shelter-08022011105818.html>

**August 1 “U.S., Vietnam, establish formal military medical partnership” (U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Public Affairs, August 3, 2011)**

On the 1st, the United States and Vietnam initialed the agreement on military medical partnership between the two countries.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, the United States and Vietnam initialed the agreement on military medical partnership between the two countries. The medical area is one of the key areas of military cooperation that former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Minister of Defense Phung Quang Thanh agreed to pursue in October 2010.

Refer to the article: U.S., Vietnam Establish Formal Military Medical Partnership  
[http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=61899&page=2](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=61899&page=2)

**August 5 “Secretary Del Rosario Says China’s 9-Dash Line is “Crux of The Problem: Philippine FAS” (The Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of The Philippines, Press Release, August, 5, 2011)**

On the 5th, in the forum on The Spratly Islands Issue: Perspectives and Policy Responses held at the Ateneo de Manila University, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary (FAS) Albert F. del Rosario said that Chinas' 9-dash line claim to the whole of the West Philippine Sea (WPS or South China Sea) is the “crux of the problem” that poses a stumbling bloc to the resolution of disputes in the WPS, on the basis of international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS.

An outline of the article: In the forum on The Spratly Islands Issue: Perspectives and Policy Responses held on the 5th at the Ateneo de Manila University, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary (FAS) Albert F. del Rosario said that Chinas' 9-dash line claim to the whole of the West Philippine Sea (WPS or South China Sea) is the “crux of the problem” that poses a stumbling bloc to the resolution of disputes in the WPS, on the basis of international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS. The gist of his presentation is as follows:

- (1) The Philippines has invited China to join us in seeking recourse to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or other dispute settlement mechanisms. The Philippines contends that the 9-dash claim of China is, to put it plainly, illegal. It is arbitrary and bereft of any basis or validity under international law, specifically the UNCLOS.
- (2) When the Philippines protested against China's several acts of intrusions before the United Nations, China's response was no such intrusions occurred since China has full sovereign rights over the whole WPS due to its 9-dash line claim. Such intrusions happened within 85 nautical miles from the nearest Philippine island of Palawan, well within our country's 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and where the Philippines exercises full sovereign rights, as provided by UNLCOS. If left unchallenged, China's baseless 9-dash line claim over the entire West Philippine Sea would not only adversely affect our sovereign rights and jurisdiction but could as well potentially threaten the freedom of navigation. The 9-dash line claim, nine years after the adoption of the DOC, presents a game changer.

Refer to the article: Secretary Del Rosario Says China’s 9-Dash Line is “Crux of The Problem” in WPS, Proposes "Preventive Diplomacy” Solutions

<http://dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/3533-secretary-del-rosario-says-china-s-9-dash-line-is-crux-of-the-problem-in-wps-proposes-qpreventive-diplomacy-solutions>



**August 8 “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense: Views of U.S., Philippine experts” (Backgrounder, No.2593, The Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011)**

Professor Renato C. De Castro, Ph. D., in the International Studies Department at De La Salle University (Manila) and Walter Lohman, Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, issued a long article titled “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense” in Backgrounder, No.259, at The Heritage Foundation on the 8th. An awareness of the issues by these authors in this article is that recent events in the South China Sea illustrate once again the urgent need for the Philippines to shift its focus from internal security to maritime defense with an eye to Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Authors are putting forward several proposals in order that the U.S. can assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ challenging transition from internal security to territorial and maritime defense.

An outline of the article: Professor Renato C. De Castro, Ph. D., in the International Studies Department at De La Salle University (Manila) and Walter Lohman, Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, issued a long article titled “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense” in Backgrounder, No.259, at The Heritage Foundation on the 8th. An awareness of the issues by these authors in this article is that recent events in the South China Sea illustrate once again the urgent need for the Philippines to shift its focus from internal security to maritime defense with an eye to Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Mentioning in detail the recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), and others, authors say that the U.S. can assist the the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ s challenging transition from internal security to territorial and maritime defense, putting forward several proposals as follows.

- (1) Engaging with the Philippine Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the current state of the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), and even the Long-Term AFP Capability Development Program, the Pentagon and the Pacific Command with the Department of National Defense/AFP should review the implementation and planned phasing of these three reform initiatives with an eye to meeting Manila’s compressed time frame and ever more acute need. Regarding U.S. Security assistance, its status should be reviewed and strengthened in order to achieve an appropriate balance between ISO/Counter-Terrorism to Territorial/Maritime Defense. Since September 11 U. S. military assistance to AFP has been directed for strengthening counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, but from now on it should be directed for strengthening territorial and maritime security with specific focus on the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Navy (PN).
- (2) The United States can encourage other U.S. allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia to extend military and security assistance to the Philippines. Washington can form an ad hoc committee of U.S. East Asian allies in Washington to coordinate these countries’ military and even economic assistance to the Philippines.

- (3) Although such policies will enable the Philippines to confront an aggressive China in the South China Sea, in the final analysis, the Philippines' territorial defense posture is predicated on U.S. resolve and capability to assert itself as a Pacific nation and to remain the predominant power in the Pacific. This entails the Pentagon, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and the U.S. Navy undertaking the following measures:
- (a) The U. S. Navy should increase ship and aircraft visits in the Philippines. The U.S. Navy should have more joint exercises with the PN and the PAF in the near future.
  - (b) Develop Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) in the Philippines. Since 2005 the Pentagon has established temporary and small forward operating bases (FOBs) in the southern Philippines. CSLs are heavy infrastructure bases located inside an allied country's existing military facilities that can accommodate U.S. forces for training and combat deployments. They can be outfitted with supplies and equipment and linked with large and heavy infrastructure bases in other allied countries. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force can look into the possibility of establishing CSLs in a number of AFP bases, such as Fort Magsaysay, Camp O'Donnell, Crow Valley, and Clark Air Field for the U.S. Air Force, and Sangley Point Naval Base, Cubi Point, and some PN and PAF facilities in the Palawan.
  - (c) Explore Subic Freeport. Consistent with the continued predominant commercial role for the port, there may be new alliance applications for Subic. Among the possibilities: berthing a U.S. carrier, joint maritime surveillance and sharing of associated intelligence, home-porting hospital ships for humanitarian purposes, storage of ordinance, and aircraft maintenance.
  - (d) Reiterate the application of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty's security guarantee to Philippine military ships and planes and "public vessels" deployed in the Pacific, to include the South China Sea. In the face of increasing maritime confrontations in the South China Sea between Philippine and Chinese forces, Washington should be clear with the Chinese on this matter. Thus, any attack on Philippine sea vessels and planes in the South China Sea will be deemed "dangerous to its America's own peace and safety."

Refer to the article: U.S.-Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense

[https://thf\\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2593.pdf](https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2593.pdf)

### **August 13 "Vietnamese officials visit US aircraft carrier" (U.S. 7th Feet News, Aug 15, 2011)**

Having visited Thailand on July 6-11, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) welcomed aboard top Vietnamese government officials off southern Vietnam, as the ship transited through the South China Sea on August 13.

An outline of the article: Having visited Thailand on July 6-11, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) welcomed aboard top Vietnamese government officials off southern Vietnam, as the ship transited through the South China Sea on August 13. The group was guided into the ship and was given the opportunity to observe steam catapult-assisted launches and arrested landings from the flight deck. "Even though we were on board for a very

short time, I think we've gained a better understanding of an American aircraft carrier and how it works," said Chief Executive, People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City Vo Van Luan, Head of the Vietnamese delegation. "We look forward to more cooperation between the Vietnamese and U.S. Navies to maintain peace and stability in the Western Pacific and South China Sea," echoed Van Luan.

Refer to the article: USS George Washington Welcomes aboard Vietnamese Visitors  
<http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/08-august/021.htm>

### **August 22 "Vietnam receives Russian-made frigate" (Thanh Nien News.com, August 23, 2011)**

On the 22nd, the Vietnamese navy received the second unit of the Russian-built *Gepard 3.9* class guided missile frigate, *King Ly Thai To*.

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, the Vietnamese navy received the second unit of the Russian-built *Gepard 3.9* class guided missile frigate, *King Ly Thai To*. Vietnam had received the first unit of the *Gepard 3.9* class guide missile frigate, *King Dinh Tien Hoang*, in March this year. The Russian-made *Gepard 3.9* class guided missile frigate is one of the most advanced in the Southeast Asia. At a ceremony Rear Admiral of the Vietnamese Navy Nguyen Van Hien said the frigates marked a new progress in the Navy's process of enhancing its capacity to protect the nation's sovereignty.

Refer to the article: Vietnam receives Russian-made warship  
<http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20110823121453.aspx>



*Ly Thai To*, the second *Gepard 3.9* class frigate that was delivered to Vietnam on August 22.

Source: Thanh Nien News.com, August 23, 2011

### **August 23 "PN latest naval vessel delivered to Manila" (Phil Star.com, August 24, 2011)**

On the 23rd, RP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the latest warship that the Philippine Navy (PN) had bought from the United States, was delivered to Manila. Philippine President Aquino-III said at the ceremony, "The arrival of the ship represents the beginning of modernization of the Philippine Armed Force, and symbolizes new capabilities to protect the national interests and fight, if necessary."

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, RP *Gregorio del Pilar*, the latest warship that the Philippine Navy (PN) had bought from the United States, was delivered to Manila. The RP *Gregorio del Pilar*, a decommissioned US Coast Guard cutter USCGC *Hamilton*, has two gas turbine engine and two diesel engines. It has maximum speed of 26 knots. Ninety-five officers and crew had three weeks to deliver it to the homeport. U.S. Navy's destroyer USS *Fitzgerald* and two *Hamilton* class cutters of the U.S. Coast Guard accompanied the *BRP Gregorio del Pilar*. During three-week-voyage officers and men of the PN learned seamanship. Philippine President Aquino-III said at the ceremony, "The arrival of the ship represents the beginning of modernization of the Philippine Armed Force, and symbolizes new capabilities to protect the national interests and fight, if necessary." The *BRP Gregorio del Pilar* will be deployed to protect the country's interests in the Spratly islands, and will be tasked to patrol the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including "service contract area" where oil and gas explorations are held.

Refer to the article: Submarine for Navy? Now bares AFP shop list

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=719947&publicationSubCategoryId=63>



*BRP Gregorio del Pilar*

Source: Navy Times, August 23, 2011

### **【Related article】**

**“67-year-old ship scrawls on through PH seas” (The Manila Times, August 25, 2011)**

The Philippine Navy (PN) flag officer in command has said that the 68-year old flagship *Rajah Humabon* will continue to remain in active service.

An outline of the article: The Philippine Navy (PN) flag officer in command, Rear Admiral Alexander Pama, has said that the 68-year old flagship *Rajah Humabon* is still capable of providing internal security and of protecting the country's territorial integrity, and PN has no plans of turning it into a museum or what.

Refer to the article: 67-year-old ship scrawls on through PH seas

<http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/nation/5473-67-year-old-ship-scrawls-on-through-ph-seas>



BRP *Rajah Humabon*

Source: The Manila Times, August 25, 2011

### **August 30 “Chinese confronts Indian navy vessel in SCS in July” (Financial Times, August 30, 2011)**

According to the British newspaper, *Financial Times*, August 30, while the Indian navy’s amphibious assault ship, INS *Airavat*, was sailing in the vicinity of waters 45 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast considered to be within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Indian ship was given warning that the vessel was violating the territorial waters by the Chinese navy. It is said that the INS *Airavat* could not see any ship or aircraft, and proceeded on its journey. It is the first such encounter between the two countries’ navies in the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: According to the British newspaper, *Financial Times*, August 30, while the Indian navy’s amphibious assault ship, INS *Airavat*, was sailing in the vicinity of waters 45 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast considered to be within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Indian ship was given warning that the vessel was violating the territorial waters by the Chinese navy. The gist of the article is as follows.

- (1) According to a spokesman of the Indian foreign ministry, while the Indian navy’s amphibious assault ship, INS *Airavat*, was sailing in the vicinity of waters 45 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast considered to be within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Indian ship was contacted on open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the ‘Chinese Navy’ stating that ‘you are entering Chinese waters.’ INS *Airavat* was asked to inform the name and present position. It is reported that, as the *Airavat* could not see any ship or aircraft, she proceeded on its journey. The Indian ship was traveling from the southwestern Vietnamese port of Nha Trang to the northern city of Hai Phong.
- (2) It is the first such encounter between the two countries’ navies in the South China Sea. “Any navy in the world has full freedom to transit through these waters or high seas,” stressed one Indian official familiar with the encounter. “For any country to proclaim ownership or question the right to passage by any other nation is unacceptable.” On the other hand, Vietnam’s foreign ministry acknowledged that the INS *Airavat* visited the country from July 19-22, but said it had no information about the incident.

Refer to the article: China confronts Indian navy vessel

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/883003ec-d3f6-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1XJg8SFyx>



INS *Airavat*

Source: Financial Times, Aug 30, 2011

## 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

### August 25 “Thai energy group urges government to revive sea-demarcation talks with Cambodia” (The Bangkok Post, August 25, 2011)

Thai energy planners are eager for the revival of talks with Cambodia on the oil-rich overlapping claims area (OCA) between the two countries. The issue of revenue sharing is a stumbling block for negotiations between both sides.

An outline of the article: Thai energy planners are eager for the revival of talks with Cambodia on the oil-rich overlapping claims area (OCA) between the two countries. The OCA is a 27,000-square-metre offshore area estimated to contain 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and unknown quantities of condensate and oil. The OCA is defined by the Cambodian claim of 1972 (western boundary line) and the Thai claim of 1973 (eastern boundary line), as well as the 1991 Cambodian-Vietnam maritime border (southern boundary). Cambodia and Thailand signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2001 under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration. They agreed in principle that a joint development regime could be established over the southern two-thirds of the claims area, while the northern third could be developed once the maritime border was delineated. Agreements on overlapping claims were almost reached when the 2006 coup toppled the Thaksin government. Bangkok cancelled this agreement in 2009 in protest over Thaksin's appointment as an economic adviser to Cambodia.

The issue of revenue sharing is a stumbling block for negotiations between both sides. Cambodia proposes dividing the disputed area in a checkerboard fashion, creating at least 14 different blocks, with revenue and management shared equally. But the main Thai counterproposal is that the disputed area be divided into three strips running north-south, with the revenue from the central area to be shared equally. In the absence of firm data on reserves in the OCA since exploration has yet to be allowed, energy experts have indicated it makes intuitive sense that most of the exploitable reserves are located toward the Thai side of the OCA. This is

because the Pattani basin, the oilfield containing most of the offshore oil and gas reserves in undisputed Thai waters, extends into the OCA.

Refer to the article: Talks urged for disputed oil zone

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/253345/talks-urged-for-disputed-oil-zone>



Source: The Bangkok Post, August 25, 2011

### **August 30 “India detects Chinese spy ship in Gulf of Bengal” (NDTV.com, August 30, 2011)**

India detected a Chinese spy ship disguised as a fishing trawler in the Indian Ocean a few months ago. In order to avoid the Indian Navy tail, the Chinese Ship moved toward Sri Lanka and docked at the Colombo. Inquiries by the Indian security agencies revealed that ship as many as 22 Laboratories on board. Based on information, the Chinese ship was mapping the Indian Ocean and picking up crucial Bathymetric data. Other Laboratories on board the ship were designed to collect data on the currents of the Indian Ocean, the temperature at various depths and also very crucially, underwater obstructions and obstacles.

An outline of the article: India detected a Chinese spy ship disguised as a fishing trawler in the Indian Ocean a few months ago. By the time ship figured in the Indian radars, it had operated already for about 22 days and was positioned off the coast of Little Anadaman – an area which is strategically sensitive and crucial. Immediately after detection an Indian Navy Ship was sent after it. However, since the Chinese ship was in international waters, no punitive action could be taken against it. The Indian Naval ship, instead, tailed the Chinese ship sending out a clear message that India was aware of its actual mission. In order to avoid the Indian Navy tail, the Chinese Ship moved towards Sri Lanka and docked at the Colombo. Inquiries by the Indian

security agencies revealed that ship as many as 22 Laboratories on board.

A report sent up to government, which NDTV has access to, claims that the Chinese ship was mapping the Indian Ocean and picking up crucial Bathymetric data. Other Laboratories on board the ship were designed to collect data on the currents of the Indian Ocean, the temperature at various depths and also very crucially, underwater obstructions and obstacles. Bathymetric data is crucial for submarine and Carrier based operations. Information about ocean currents, on the other hand, is crucial if torpedoes are to be used.

According to India's assessment, China will be able to carry out an aircraft carrier based operations by 2017. Although China doesn't have an operational aircraft carrier yet, the collection of data from the Indian Ocean is regarded to be designed toward this. There is another worry to India. Whenever India conducts test launches of missiles from Wheeler Islands off the Orissa, several Chinese fishing trawlers appear near the islands. Indian security agencies estimate that fishing trawlers are most likely monitoring the Indian missile test launches and collecting telemetric data of the missile.

Refer to the article: China ship with 22 labs spied on India

<http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/china-ship-with-22-labs-spied-on-india-130174>



Chinese spy ship disguised as a fishing trawler

Source: Zee News.com, August 31, 2011

## 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

### August 4 “Vietnam to commence vessel traffic service shortly” (VOV News, Aug 5, 2011)

In Vietnam a vessel traffic services system (VTS) applying automatic identification system (AIS) is expected to be introduced one after another at seaports nationwide, firstly at national and international ones. The first system is expected to be operational soon.

An outline of the article: In Vietnam a vessel traffic services system (VTS) applying automatic identification system (AIS) is expected to be introduced one after another at seaports nationwide,



firstly at national and international ones. The first system is expected to be operational soon. An official from the Vietnam Maritime Administration said at a symposium within the framework of the International Conference on Advanced Technologies for Communications, in Da Nang city, from August 2-4. It is necessary to invest in building a modern management system to manage vessel flows in and out of seaports, he stressed, adding that the development of seaports is the top priority in the country's economic development policy. Vietnam now has 49 small and large ports with about 266 wharfs across the country.

Refer to the article: Intelligent maritime transport system adopted

<http://english.vov.vn/Home/Intelligent-maritime-transport-system-adopted/20118/128985.vov>

### **August 12 “Sri Lanka, China sign BOT contract” (News Now, August, 17, 2011)**

On the 12th, Sri Lankan government entered into a US\$500 million Build Operate Transfer (BOT) agreement with China Merchants Holdings to upgrade Colombo South Container Terminal. The project is expected to take two phases, with Phase I to be ready for operation by early 2013.

An outline of the article: On the 12th, Sri Lankan government entered into a US\$500 million Build Operate Transfer (BOT) agreement with China Merchants Holdings to upgrade Colombo South Container Terminal. The contract which took place in Shenzhen is Sri Lanka's single largest private-sector foreign investment project. The terminal comprises a total quay length of 1,200 m and a depot land area of 58 hectares, with water depth of 18m. The project is expected to take two phases, with Phase I to be ready for operation by early 2013. Pursuant to the BOT Agreement, China International Container Terminal (CICT), the operating company, is a joint venture established between China Merchants Holdings International, Aitken Spence Plc and Sri Lanka Ports Authority for the design, construction and management of the Colombo South Terminal. China Merchant holds 55% of CICT while Aitken Spence Plc holds 30% and SLPA, 15%.

Refer to the article: SL enter BOT agreement with China

<http://www.newsnw.lk/business/product-launch/276-sl-enter-bot-agreement-with-china>

### **August 13 “Pakistan seeks more China's help in Gwadar port development” (iNews One, August 14, 2011)**

Pakistan is expecting Chinese assistance in developing the Gwadar port. On the 13th, Khan said Pakistan is expecting further Chinese assistance in development plan which will cover rail, road, air connectivity, besides telecommunication network, which Pakistan will welcome.

An outline of the article: According to Pakistan's Ambassador to China Masood Khan, Pakistan is expecting Chinese assistance in developing the Gwadar port. On the 13th, Khan said Pakistan is expecting further Chinese assistance in development plan which will cover rail, road, air connectivity, besides telecommunication network, which Pakistan will welcome. According to the ambassador, the Gwadar port needs to develop its supporting infrastructure. If such network becomes fully operational from Gwadar to Beijing through Urmqi, it will give China alternative choices for trade with the Middle East and Europe. Kahn said Pakistan is looking for more

investment in Pakistan from China, and Pakistan will help China build a bridge to the Middle East and West Europe.

Refer to the article: Pakistan seeks China's help in Gwadar port development

<http://www.inewsone.com/2011/08/14/pakistan-seeks-chinas-help-in-gwadar-port-development/68767>

### **August 30 “India tightens rules for aging ships” (The Journal of Commerce, August 30, 2011)**

The Indian government will review rules for vessels older than 25 years before they are allowed to sail in Indian territorial waters. The new conditions require that all ships be classed by classification societies that are a “full member” of the International Association of Classification Societies; ships carry adequate insurance to cover potential costs of wreck removal or cleanup from oil spills; and a local agent be appointed to represent the ship-owner/shipping company.

An outline of the article: The Indian government will review rules for vessels older than 25 years before they are allowed to sail in Indian territorial waters. The move follows a series of marine accidents along the Indian coast in recent months, causing massive oil spills and others. The new conditions require that all ships be classed by classification societies that are a “full member” of the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS); ships carry adequate insurance to cover potential costs of wreck removal or cleanup from oil spills; and a local agent be appointed to represent the ship-owner/shipping company. “The Indian agent should notify the port authority and the customs collector at least 48 hours prior to arrival of the ship about the details of the ship including insurance,” India Shipping Minister G.K. Vasan said. He said there are about 93 Indian-flag ships that are over 25 years old, but the new rules will have no impact on them. That’s because they are classed by the Indian Register of Shipping, a full member of IACSI. Meanwhile, the Gujarat Maritime Board issued a decree banning ships older than 25 years from entering its ports.

Refer to the article: India Tightens Rules for Aging Ships

<http://www.joc.com/container-shipping/india-tightens-rules-aging-ships>

## **1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others**

### **August 15 “Indonesia enacts new law; Philippine tuna industry suffers new blow” (Asia Correspondent, August 15, 2011)**

The new fishing regulation enacted by the Indonesian government to take effect December 2011 will virtually ban all Philippine fishing vessels and Filipino fishermen from catching tuna in Indonesian waters and shipping them out to General Santos City and other cities in Mindanao. Tuna production is one of the top dollar earners of Mindanao with annual export proceeds hovering around US\$280 million.

An outline of the article: In June 2011, the Indonesian government enacted new fishing regulations. The regulations virtually ban all Philippine fishing vessels and Filipino fishermen from catching tuna in Indonesian waters and shipping them out to General Santos City and other cities in Mindanao. Under the new rules which take effect December 2011, foreign companies that will engage in fishing in Indonesia must also have processing facilities there. Foreign investments in Indonesian fishing industry are also limited to fishing vessels with gross ship tonnage of over 60. Below that, they are prohibited from fishing in Indonesian waters. The Indonesian government also set a five-year timetable to reduce foreign crew of fishing vessels from 50 percent during the first year to 10 per cent on the fifth year. By the sixth year, all foreign fishing vessels operating in Indonesia must all be manned by Indonesians. Foreign fishing companies are also “mandated to transfer technology” to their Indonesian employees.

Indonesia lies in the middle of the tuna migratory path which stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Sulawesi Sea and ends up near the Philippine’s Sulu Sea. The Sulawesi Sea has become a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishers over the last few decades after changing weather and climatic conditions coupled with over-fishing saw dramatic decline of tuna stocks in Philippine waters. In 2006, the Philippines’ 500,000 metric tons of tuna catch was ranked fourth in world tuna production but dropped to seventh in 2008 as production went down by 22 percent. Tuna production is one of the top dollar earners of Mindanao with annual export proceeds hovering around US\$280 million.

Refer to the article: Philippine tuna industry suffers new blow

<http://asiancorrespondent.com/62491/philippine-tuna-industry-sinking-further/>

## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### Strategic environment in East Asian waters and issues of the South China Sea

#### 1. Overview of the South China Sea

##### (1) Geographical features and importance


The South China Sea is, so-called, a Mediterranean Sea in Southeast Asia which is close to China and Taiwan to the north, Vietnam to the west, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei from the southwest to the south, and the Philippines to the east, where more than 200 islands, rocks, and atolls are located.

Regarding the international straits that become an entrance of the South China Sea, counterclockwise from north, there are the Taiwan Strait, the Malacca and Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Makassar Strait, and the Bashi Strait. The South China Sea is, as the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and East Asia, a place of strategic importance for maritime communications which supports the global economy, where one half of the world's oil tankers transit, and the hub-ports for container ships such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Kaohsiung are located. As shown in the Figure 1 below, In case the South China Sea was stopped for navigation, vessels sailing from the Indian Ocean could not transit the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It is because passing through the Malacca Straits inevitably means entering the South China Sea. As usual, the vessels that used to pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits into East Asian waters may have to take another route of either passing through the Lombok-Makassar Straits into the Philippine Sea or going around south of Australia into the South Pacific. Considering the crude oil tankers from the Middle East to Japan, if the route is changed to the Lombok Straits, the leg – the distance covered by a ship - will increase by three more days, which necessitates to supplement about 15 more tankers, and in case of detouring south of Australia, the leg will increase by about two weeks more, and there is a tentative calculation that it necessitates about 80 tankers to be supplemented.<sup>1</sup> Infringement on free navigation in the South China Sea caused an extremely serious situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Kazumine Akimoto, "Security Environment in the Eurasia Blue Belt and Proposed Responses", *Maritime Affairs*, Maritime Foundation India, May, 2008.

Figure 1: Chokepoints in Southeast Asia



Source: Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, Cooperation with the Centre for naval Analyses, October 1996.

On the other hand, the South China Sea is rich in natural resources. As seabed natural resources, it is reported that there are deposits of 30 billion barrels of crude oil, 200 trillions cubic feet of natural gas. There are plenty of biological resources and fish of high-quality, including Albacore tuna and others are living in the sea.

Figure 2: Map of natural resources in the South China Sea



Source: Global Security.org

## (2) Cause of conflicts in the South China Sea

There are conflicts between the states over the territorial rights of the islands, exclusive economic zones and demarcation of borders in the continental shelves. The typical one of them is Spratly Islands, over which Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan are claiming their territorial rights. While China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim their territorial rights over all of the islands, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim their right over part of the islands, confronting severely one another.

Figure 3: Status of control of Spratlys Islands by countries claiming territorial rights

Country/Area	Number of islands whose territorial right are claimed	Number of islands occupied	Number of personnel deployed
Brunei	1	0	0
China	7	7	900~1,000
Malaysia	16	5	230~330
Philippines	53	9	60~70
Taiwan	1	1	500~700
Vietnam	21	21	900~1,000

Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, Philippines, 2009

The number of islands over which respective nations claims their territorial rights, the number of islands they are occupying, and number of personnel who are deployed to these islands are as shown in Figure 3:

Regarding the status of control, at present, Vietnam occupies the highest number of the islands, which totals 21. About 1,000 personnel are reportedly deployed there. Next is the Philippines, which stations about 60-70 personnel. China occupies seven islands, where about 1,000 personnel are deployed. Malaysia deploys more or less 300 personnel in five islands, and China deploys about 600 personnel on an island. Brunei has no island to be practically controlled.

In the South China Sea, in addition to Spratlys Islands, there are the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, the Macclefield Bank and others.

The Paracel Islands is composed of small reefs, which is said to be too hard for living. After a former suzerain state, France, left, China and South Vietnam (then) deployed their armed forces there respectively. Although two nations were confronting each other about territorial rights over the islands, the Chinese military force dispelled the Vietnamese force in the lat years of the Vietnamese War in 1974. Ever since, China has been actually controlling the islands. While the Chinese forces continue to station in the islands, both Vietnam and Taiwan have been claiming their territorial rights over the islands. As for Pratas Islands, Taiwan is practically controlling the islands. There are three coral reefs, of which two are not recognized as the islands, as they sink in waters during full moon tide-hours. Taiwan is designating it as a national park, naming it as "Pratas Atolls National Park."

As for Macclefield Bank groups, the Philippines is occupying one of them, Scarborough Reef (Chinese name: Huanyan Dao), by having the naval vessel stranded on the reefs, and the rest of them is just a reef. As for the islets in the South China Sea, the Japanese military force occupied them temporarily during the Second World War as the “Shinnan Islands,” but it is unknown which islands were included in the “Shinnan Islands” for lack of records.

The issue of territorial rights over these islands causes conflicts over an acquisition and development rights of biological and non-biological resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental and continental shelf, baselines of which are defined from these islands. For instance, over the fishery operations, there was an incident in which the vessels of the Chinese navy and the maritime border coast guards (maritime police) forced the Vietnamese fishery boats operating there to leave the waters in the Gulf of Tonking in June 2009. In addition, there was another explosive situation incident off Laut Island in Natuna Islands, Indonesia in June 2010, in which Indonesian navy vessel captured Chinese fishery boats for illegal fishing. Against this capture a large type of Chinese surveillance ship warned the Indonesian naval vessel: “Unless you release the Chinese vessel, I will attack you,” against which the Indonesian naval vessel prepared for fighting back.

Furthermore, in July, a Chinese surveillance vessel operated in the vicinity of the Mischief Reef under the pretext of protecting fishery in the South China Sea, against which the Philippines and Vietnam held a protest respectively. Over the development of the continental shelf, in September 2011 Vietnam announced an agreement with India on joint development of natural gas and oil in the mining area under waters which had been claimed by Vietnam as its continental shelf, against which China protested and claimed that the sea floor is under the control of China.

### **(3) Pictures of confrontation: China and ASEAN countries**

At present, disputes over islands in the South China Sea have produced the pictures of confrontation between China and the ASEAN countries, which has a scene of being influenced by China’s diplomatic postures against the ASEAN countries. Beijing’s diplomatic postures against the ASEAN countries are regarded by the repetition of coercion and conciliation. Chinese response after armed occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974 is as shown in Figure 2.

In 1972 when North Vietnam made a full-scale of invasion, China occupied the Paracel Islands, whose territorial right is claimed by Vietnam, by using force. This was a new beginning of use of force between the States over the islands in the South China Sea after World War II. After the end of the Vietnamese War the navy of the former Soviet Union was deployed to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and, responding to it, the United States strengthened its military bases in the Philippines. In the 1980s when the Cold War was getting fierce, except a battle between the naval vessels of China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, the South China Sea remained stable under the intense situation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As the Cold War was over, having been liberated from the threat of the Soviet Union, China began to adopt a strong posture toward the territorial issues in the South China Sea. China

adopted “The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” in 1992. Clarifying its territorial rights and jurisdiction over the China’s surrounding waters, including the South China Sea, China showed its strong posture of establishing fortress in the Mischief Reef over which the Philippine is claiming its territorial right, as well as protesting against the development of seabed resources by Vietnam. Incidentally, it was in 1992 before these incidents when the U.S. military forces withdrew from the naval facilities at Subic Bay and the Clark Air Force base. Additionally, during this period China refused to enter into negotiations in a multilateral framework with the ASEAN, taking the position that a territorial dispute is a bilateral issue.

However, at the end of 1990s China turned to a flexible posture and agreed to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Hereinafter DoC) with ASEAN. Subsequently, China had an agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam on joint development of natural resources in the disputed maritime areas. There are many analyses that a series of these activities are part of diplomatic policy for mitigating the theory of Chinese threats by the Beijing government.

Figure 4: Changes of China’s diplomatic posture in the East China Sea issues

\* Era of use of force a

Year 1974~1998

1974:Attacked and occupied the Paracel islands whose territorial rights are claimed by Vietnam.

1988:Exchanged battle with Vietnam over the territorial rights of the Spratlys Islands with naval vessels.

1992:Adopted “The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,” in which territorial rights of the islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea are described.

(In this year, the U.S. military forces withdrew from the Philippines.)

1995 ~ 1998:Occupied the Mischief Reefs over which the Philippines is claiming its territorial right. China insisted on holding bilateral talks, not multilateral ones, concerning the issue on the territorial rights over the islands. During this period dispute over fishery, exploration and exploitation of seabed resources occurred frequently.

\* Changes to flexible postures

Year 1999~2006

1999:Took diplomatic posture of accepting dialogue with ASEAN countries.

2002:Signed declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China with ASEAN countries.

2005:Agreed to joint development of natural resources in the conflict areas with the Philippines and Vietnam.



\* Return to strong postures

Year 2007~Present

2007: Increased patrols in the South China Sea by Chinese naval vessels.

2009: Protested strongly against “Application for Extension of limits of outer line of the Continental Shelf” by Vietnam and Malaysia.

2011: Cut cables for exploration of Vietnamese oil and gas research vessel.

China obstructed Philippine oil exploration vessel.

China built iron-poles and set buoys on the island whose territorial right is claimed by the Philippines. (After that, the Philippines armed forces dismantled them.)

As shown in Figure 4, after 2007 China returned to taking strong postures in the disputes in the South China Sea. Patrol by naval vessels in the South China Sea increased, and China issued strong protesting statements against the “Philippines Archipelagic Baselines Law” in March 2009, and the “Application for Extension of limits of outer line of the Continental Shelf” by Vietnam and Malaysia in May 2009. China’s growing economy and naval power are noted in the background of Chinese change of postures. An expert has called it “Creeping assertiveness” or “Growing assertiveness.” On the contrary, flexible postures were also noted. In particular, China agreed to the “Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)” with ASEAN countries in July 2011.

**(4) China’s “Nine Dash Line”**

Drawing “Nine Dash Line” and “U-shaped line” in the South China Sea, China insists on having special rights inside these lines. “Nine Dash Line” (U-shaped line) first appeared in the map made by China’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 1947. In fact, in this map there were 11 dots (two in Gulf of Tonkin), and in the beginning it was “11 Dash Line.” Maps of China and Taiwan are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5-1: Taiwan’s “Nine (11) Dash Line”




Figure 5-2: China’s Nine Dash Line”



Regarding the meaning of “Nine Dash Line,” although both China’s government and Taiwan government do not make it clear, according the words of Chinese scholars and others, following four interpretations are considered to exist.

- (1) Islands inside are Chinese territory
- (2) From the related history, China has rights to develop.
- (3) It is China’s “Historical Area”
- (4) It is a traditional sea border.

On the other hand, China’s claim of territorial rights in the South China Sea is connected with so-called “Great Development of Western Part,” which is viewed to be for the purpose of China’s economic development and expansion of employment. According to China National Maritime Bureau, the ratio of maritime industry occupied in China’s gross domestic product (GDP) as of year 2008 is 9.87% , which continues to grow to 13.17% in 2015 and is expected to reach 15.84% in 2020. <sup>2</sup> The rise of ration occupied in GNP in the maritime industrial area is considered by some circles to be based on the expected analysis of the development in the South China Sea.

The official use of “Nine Dash Line” by Chinese government is said to have been adopted when Beijing made a protest against the joint application by Malaysia and Vietnam which was delivered to the UN Commission of the Continental Shelf on May 6, 2009. China is said to have used “Nine Dash Line” as its theory in the statement dated May 7, 2009. Additionally, “Nine Dash

<sup>2</sup> China Institute for Maritime Affairs (CIMA), *China’s Ocean Development Report 2010*

Line” is described in the map of the China’s national Measuring Mapping Bureau.<sup>3</sup> This “Nine Dash Line” encloses about 80% of the South China Sea. If island there are used as a base line, almost entire areas of the South China Sea become China’s EEZ.

## **2. Strategic importance of the South China Sea**

### **(1) South China Sea as Fortress of Sea-power**

The article titled “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea” carried in the *SAIS Review* of the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University discusses: “For China, the South China Sea is a Caribbean Sea for the United States, and China will expand its sea-power by using it as its foothold,” comparing Chinese advances into oceans with the theory of Alfred T. Mahan.<sup>4</sup> Mahan pleaded an importance of sea-power for the United States as a maritime nation. In the beginning, Mahan pleaded an importance of building defense posture in the Caribbean Sea to deter the intervention from the Old Continent. Gradually, for the United States, the Caribbean Sea became the defense area against the Old Continent as well as the fortress for venturing into the world’s Seas simultaneously. The United States that grasped sea-power in the Caribbean Sea opened the Panama Canal as the next step to secure the mouth of an exit to the Pacific Ocean. The Caribbean Sea is a departing point of the American global power. China has the East China Sea and the South China Sea as the exit into the outer Ocean. But a Mahan would try to control the South China Sea from geo-strategic point, because, in case of the East China Sea the exit to the Pacific Ocean is blocked by the Japanese Nansei (Southwest) Islands, and the American Armed Force is deployed in Okinawa. If China could make the South China Sea as its EEZ to establish sea-power, it would overturn the American naval strategy in East Asia form the basis.

### **(2) Strategic picture of the South China Sea**

At present, there are strategic picture of confrontation and cooperation among three parties of China, the United States and ASEAN countries. Territorial rights over islands among the South China Sea nations, including China and disputes over border demarcation of the maritime areas under national control, are creating a structure of confrontation of “China” versus “ASEAN countries” as tackling for the solution of them. As aforementioned, although China is changing its diplomatic postures regarding the conflicts in the South China Sea, at present, Beijing is insisting on a settlement not by multinational talks but by bilateral talks between the nations concerned. Against this, other South China Sea nations are avoiding the bilateral talks with a relatively greater nation of China, and wishes for a multilateral frame-work of ASEAN.


Regarding an enclosure of the South China Sea by China and high profile obstructions against the vessels of conflicting nations over the islands and the sea, the United States is urging China to correct it with the principle of “freedom of navigation.” “Freedom of navigation” sponsored by the United States has the greatest aim of securing the freedom of navigation in the South China

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.tianditu.cn/map/index.jsp>

<sup>4</sup> “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea”, *SAIS Review*, 2006.

Sea for the U.S. naval vessels and others. As aforementioned, the South China Sea is an extremely important area not only for maritime transportation but also for geo-political and strategic significance. It is necessary for the United States to secure the naval activities in these waters. Here is anticipated an appearance of a diagram of military competition between the access-denial of the U.S. Military Forces by China and “freedom of navigation” by the U. Military Forces. Not before long, the South China Sea may become a place of competing for sea-control<sup>5</sup> between China and the United States.

Looking at the diagram of China versus the United States, the ASEAN countries are, in general, showing a posture of taking side with the United States. The United States is also providing the Philippines and Vietnam that are competing with China in the South China Sea with assistance of improving capacity building. These relations between China and the ASEAN countries are shown in the Figure 6.



### 3. Strategy of Chinese Navy

#### (1) China’s First and Second Island Chains

The first and second island chains that are said to show China’s accesses to western Pacific in stage is originally an anti-communism defense line, so-called “Acheson-line” by the then U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, during the early stage in the Cold War. In China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) there are tendencies which say that the first and the second lines were created by the U.S. Armed Forces to deter Chinese navy from exiting into the Pacific Ocean.

Even though, it is certain that China has a policy of securing the operational capabilities within the first island chain by 2010, and later advancing to the second lines. We cannot help saying that the first and second island chains are the product of mutual interaction of strategies of the United States and China. Figure 7 shows the first and second island chains shown in the Annual Report to the congress on the Military Power of the Peoples’ Republic of China. The first island chain is shown in connection with “Nine-stage War” (U-shaped Line). The first and second

<sup>5</sup> Sea Control is to control the specific area so as to be able to use it to its own advantage.

island chains are not only an anti-access line to the access of U.S. military power for China, as well as advance line to the Pacific and blockade line of the Chinese naval power for the United States.

Figure 7: First Island Chain & Second Island Chain




Source : US DOD, Military and Security Developments involving the PRC 2011

## (2) Chinese naval force goes beyond the first island chain

Naval vessels of the PLA navy are gradually deployed to the western Pacific Ocean. Figure 6 show its status. In 2008 the Chinese navy began to advance to the Pacific Ocean routinely. Operations on a large scale have ever been noted as follows.

- (1) In October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels passed through the Tsugaru Straits into the Pacific, went south, entered the East China Sea through the Nansei Islands and returned to its homeport. In next month of November four Chinese naval vessels passed through the channel between Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto) and Miyakojima into the Pacific.
- (2) In June 2009, it was confirmed that five naval vessels passed through the channel between Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto) and Miyakojima [into the Pacific] and operated northeast of Okinotori islands.
- (3) In March 2010, six naval vessels passed through the channel between Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto) and Miyakojima into the Pacific, and in the next April, 10 naval vessels passed through the channel between Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto) island and Miyakojima and operated west of Okinotori islands.
- (4) In March 2011, 11 naval vessels passed through Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto) and Miyakojima and it was confirmed that the task group operated off the Philippines. Regarding these activities, there is information that a Japanese reporter was told by Chinese government official that China had planned to operate from March to April in the beginning, but the plan was reportedly postponed, taking the East Japan Great Earthquake into consideration.

Figure 8: Deployment of PLA navy to the western Pacific



Source: Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2011*

While the Chinese fleet was operating in the western Pacific beyond the first island chain in March and April 2010, around that time, the exercise on a large scale by the Chinese navy has also been conducted in the South China Sea. It can be estimated that the deployment to the western Pacific and the exercise in the South China, involving China's three fleets, had been based on a series of one scenario. Considering a series of these activities, China is assessed to have obtained the capabilities of deploying naval forces in the western Pacific beyond the first island chain in 2011.

Well, although it was in October 2008 that the Chinese navy advanced to the western Pacific, and four years before that year, in October 2004, there was an incident, in which Han-class nuclear attack submarine of the Chinese navy violated the Japanese territorial sea off Ishigaki Island. At that time there was a speculation whether or not the submarine intentionally violated the Japanese territorial waters, or merely it was because of a navigational error, or avoiding trail by the Japanese defense ships. There was quite opposite information that flotilla commander that commands the submarine was punished or the captain of the submarine was promoted on the contrary. After four years later, the fleet is deployed, after passing north of the Ishigaki Island, through the channel between Miyakojima and Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Honto). The problem is the route of the submarine under the waters. When the fleet passed the channel in

2010, a submarine took the same route, surfacing. In 2011, it is considered that the submarine entered the Pacific side, and sailed submerged. Where did the submarine pass by? Anyway, it is certain that the incident in 2004 may have exerted great influence upon the operational concept of the Chinese navy.

Figure 9: The channel between Miyakojima and Okinawa Main Island



### (3) Anti-access and Area-Denial Defense Strategy

The United States is pointing out that China is adopting Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Strategy and intends to eliminate the military of not only the United States but also other nations. For instance, they mention that China has a fortress base in the Hainan Island, from which the submarines can be deployed submerged, information that the anti-ship missiles targeting the aircraft carriers are under development, and construction of the aircraft carriers, and others. As indicators of supporting China’s A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea, there were an incident of interrupting a surveillance ship belonging to the U.S. Navy, remarks to U.S. government official that “The South China Sea is of core interest to China,” and others.

During the Col War, the Soviet Union made the Sea of Okhotsk a “sanctuary” and an area of launching missiles against the U.S. mainland. The Soviets used to make the Sea of Okhotsk an exclusive area to defend their strategic submarines with surface platforms, including the VTOL aircraft carriers. The United States called it “Bastion.” Well then, is the South China Sea is a Sea of Okhotsk for China?

Can the aircraft carrier converted from ex-Soviet-made carrier play a role of bastion defense in the South China Sea? At present, the missiles range of Chinese strategic submarines is too short to reach the U.S. mainland. Can we say just as the Sea of Okhotsk is for the Soviets, so the South China Sea is for China? It may be different. Rather, it may be more appropriate to judge that the South China Sea for China is the same as the Caribbean Sea for the United States. If so, it is considered that the Chinese navy will be deployed to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, gaining a foothold in the South China Sea. In May 2010, China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo says at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2010, “The Asia-Pacific is

immense enough for two nations to have interests.”

#### 4. U.S. Response

##### (1) Involvement by insisting on “Freedom of Navigation”

Regarding the conflicts over sovereignty in the South China Sea, the United States is taking the position of a third party, as Washington believes that the territorial issues are the matters to be solved by each Party concerned, Nevertheless, the United States has come to show alertness to high-handed activities by the Chinese naval vessels and others in the South China Sea since around 2009, and has come to check on China in the international conference and others, insisting on the “freedom of navigation.” Below is a series of remarks and others.

- (a) In July 2009, Senator Jim Webb testified at the public hearing at the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that “only the United States has power to address an imbalance which China is taking in the region.”
- (b) In July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said at an interview after the conference of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Cabinet Meeting: “Freedom of Navigation, free access to maritime commons in Asia, and observation of international rules in the South China Sea are national interests of the United States.” In addition, Clinton supported the multinational tackling of the South China Sea issues.
- (c) In September 2010, President Barack Obama stressed “freedom of navigation” to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.
- (d) In January 2011, the US Defense Department Report: *US National Military Strategy* carries in it that “US is worried about Chinese claim of sovereignty in the South China Sea.”
- (e) In June 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Michael Gates said at the Meeting at Shangri-La, “I bet 100 dollars. In the coming five years there will be no change to American influence.”

Note: At the Shangri-La conference in 2011 Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie said, “We should not have alliance competing against the third party.” “China is the country that aims peaceful developments. In the South China issue we observe “Declaration of Code of Conducts” in the South China Sea.” “The South China Sea issues are generally stable.”

- (f) In June 2011, at the Japan-US dialogue (2+2) two nations agreed to: Security environment is Asia-Pacific Region is more than ever unstable; urge China to observe international code of conducts; ask China to be open and opaque.
- (g) In June 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said at the US-China Asia Pacific Meeting insisted on the “Freedom of Navigation” in the South China Sea.
- (h) In June 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed “Freedom of navigation is the US national interests” and “peaceful solution of territorial issues” at the bilateral meeting between Philippines Foreign Minister and U.S. counterpart.



- (i) In June 2011, US Senate blamed China for the South China Sea issues and adopted a resolution calling for peaceful settlement of the conflicts unanimously.

## (2) Support capacity building in the South China Sea nations

In parallel with insistence of “freedom of navigation,” the United States is making assistance of capacity building active through joint exercise and providing equipment to the countries in the South China Sea which have disputes with China.

The recent, major activities are as follows.

- (a) August 2010: Conducted joint exercise with the Vietnamese navy in the South China Sea.
- (b) August 2010: Conducted joint exercise with Philippine navy in the Sulu Sea.
- (c) July 2011: Conducted joint exercise with the Vietnamese navy.
- (d) July 2011: Provided the Philippine navy with the newest cutter of the US Coast Guard, which arrived in Manila in August.

China is showing a conciliatory attitude to the multilateral talks before the U.S. posture of participation, and the response of ASEAN countries. ASEAN and China held senior official-level meetings and agreed to the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC. Furthermore, in the meeting China is proposing to hold symposium on marine science research, environmental protection, safety of navigation, and search and rescue and an establishment of special committee on combating crime beyond the national borders. In addition, Beijing agreed to relaxation of tension in the South China Sea. However, there are many analyses that such Chinese postures are likely to weaken the relations between the United States and ASEAN countries.


## (4) Military Strategy

Carrying an illustration in its annual report: “PLA and *Military and Security Developments involving the People Republic of China 2010, Aug., 2011*,”<sup>6</sup> the U.S. Defense Department reports: China’s A2/AD capabilities are aiming to limit or regulate enemy’s access to outer edge of China, including the west Pacific, and it will be able to tackle the enemy surface combatants in the area beyond 1,000 nautical miles from the coast with various weapon systems of anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines, surface ships, and maritime aircraft. An expansion of operational range of air and naval and air force to strengthen China’s A2/AD capabilities will create a structure of challenging the US forward deployment and power projection capabilities in the western Pacific, and it further make military balance in the area unstable, emphasizing the need of response. ”

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report To Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People Republic of China 2011*

Figure 10: China's A2/AD capabilities




Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report To Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People Republic of China 2011

As an operational concept to stand against China's A2/AD, the US Department of Defense mentions an establishment of "a joint air-sea battle concept" in the QDR2010. Regarding "a joint air-sea battle concept," the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010 announced: "In order to defeat adversaries which are challenging the freedom of U.S. activities and are equipped with sophisticated A2/AD capabilities, the United States will study operations of air and naval forces that attain joint capabilities covering air, sea, ground, cosmos and cyber space." In order to attain the goal, defense build-up program lists the major item as follows: They are to: (a) expand long range strike capabilities; (b) strengthen subsurface operational response capabilities (including the development of an unmanned underwater vehicle); (c) increase resilience and quick response capabilities of forward-deployed force and base infrastructure; (d) assure access to space and use of space assets; (e) enhance the robustness of C4ISR capabilities; (f) Defeat enemy's sensors and engagement systems; and (g) Enhance the presence and responsiveness the U. S. forces abroad; among others.

Regarding "a joint air-sea battle concept," a US think tank, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has issue a report titled "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept." As shown in the Figure 11, as to the aims of "A air-sea battle concept," based on the geophysical factors of the western Pacific, this report mentions: (a) preserving a stable military balance in East Asia during peace and war; (b) showing effective intervention

capability of US military forces to deny enemy' quick victory in conflicts; (c) strengthening the reliability of the commitment of the US military forces, advising the US military forces on strengthening defense capabilities against the ballistic missiles as well as implementing the defense buildup program in the QDR2010. In addition, the report is expecting Japan to strengthen its defense posture, in particular, air defense, antimissile defense capabilities. Furthermore, the report is advocating the need to strengthen anti-submarine activities under the cooperation of the US Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force inside the first island chain and the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands as well as along the Luzon Strait.

Figure 11: Geographical Factors in western Pacific Theater




Source: CSBA, AirSea Battle Briefing Slide, May 18,2010

## 5. Security in East Asian Waters

### (1) Balance of Power

At present, there are several balancers in East Asia. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN Member Countries are shouldering the role of the Resident Balancers. In East Asian area, China, Japan, and Russia are Regional Balancers. If East Asia and South Asia are taken as a whole, India and Australia are added as Regional Balances. The United States has bases in Japan and South Korea, and also has defense agreements with the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia, which makes it a Regional Balancer as well as an Offshore Balancer. Summing up these balancers, power balance in East Asia is as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 12: Power Balance in East Asia



Contributing an article titled “Billiards in the South China Sea”<sup>7</sup> to the US newspaper, *Wall Street Journal*, on July 30, 2011, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at the U.S. think tank, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), is pointing out on it that the United States is playing a game which is different from that of China. Although China is knocking out the countries in the South China Sea one by one like the other billiard balls off the table, the United States is challenging Beijing with a game of “Anti-Access” versus “Free Access.”

This comment is right to the point. China has no idea of participating in the American game, and is only dropping the South China Sea nations in the hole at present. Should the United States challenge China to play another game to prevent South China Sea nations from being knocked out from the South China Sea? U.S. assistance of promoting capabilities to the South China Sea nations will be, as a result, what helps these countries not be knocked out from billiards game.

However, it would be difficult for the United States alone to help all South China Sea nations improve their capabilities. A gap of national power between China and other South China Sea nations is so big. If situation goes at the current pace, billiards will ends in one-sided game of China. For Japan, if the South China Sea should become an excessively exclusive zone, it would be against the Japanese national interests from the viewpoint of stable sea transportation. Additionally, considering that the situation in the South China Sea will have not a little influence on the security environment in the East China Sea, Japan should support promoting capabilities of the ASEAN countries in cooperation with the United States, Australia, and India, if possible.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Auslin, “Billiards in the South China Sea,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 30, 2011.

## **(2) East China Sea linked to South China Sea and Defense of Japan**

Japan is not a Party that is involved in the issue over territorial right in the South China. However, looking from a diagram of security, armed conflicts in the South China Sea will influence the East China Sea, and in case it is an armed conflict involving the United States and China, it will inevitably involve Japan. Regarding the South China Sea issue, Japan cannot stay as an outsider.

Historically, the strategic structure of East Asia can be said to have been formed by an “attack and defense” by a land power of Asian side and a maritime power from the Pacific side. The maritime power from the Pacific side is the United States, and a rise of America was born in the history of access from the Pacific Ocean to the “World Island” called by Sir Halford John Mackinder, that is, to the Eurasian continent. Now, China, whose nationalism is now rising, is confronting as a land power from Asian side, while acquiring sea-power. From the South China Sea and the East China to the western Pacific, a structure, in which both American Sea-power and Chinese Sea-power are competing with each other, is being formulated. Taking this situation as the largest matter of concern, Japan should be prepared for having defense capabilities. It is necessary for Japan to stabilize the security environment and to create the situation that will meet the Japanese national interests jointly with the United States as an ally, Australia and others, as well as cooperatively with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The United States has not yet made concrete concept clear, regarding “A joint air-sea battle concept.” In the background, there seems to be problems of forward deployed base. As for the U.S. forward-deployed bases, within the United States there are opinion that America should emphasize Guam and Oceania more than U.S. military bases in Japan. Judging from the military reasonableness, including threats from China’s land-based missiles and others, there may be some ideas that forward deployment to the South Pacific is more appropriate, which means, as the letters are read, to make America Offshore Balancer. If so, does it make “the theory of dividing the Pacific between China and the US” be realized, as China is said to have proposed the Commander of the US Forces, Pacific? Strategic idea is needed for the settlement of the issue on American military base in Okinawa. Also, looking from the US side, it is pointed out that there are lots of unknown factors, including to what extent the ASEAN countries will cooperate in the armed conflicts that will be staged in the South China Sea, and how far Jan can take the joint actions.

## **6. Policy for stabilization of security environment in the South China Sea**

As aforementioned, the problems in the South China Sea are the security issues in East Asia, including Japan. In order to stabilize the security of the South China Sea, an approach from three directions is necessary as follows:

### **(1) Stabilization of balance of power**

Although there are several balancers in the South China Sea, power balance has been

unstable, with a rise of China. Keeping the United States as a Regional Balancer, it is important to prevent power balance turning fluid. For that purpose, Japan should tackle continuation of U.S. military bases in Japan, as well as improving their functions. It will be a strategy based on China's realism, that is, a hedge strategy to an enlarged strategy and strategy for acquisition of resources. Stabilization of power balance in the South China Sea under joint cooperation of Japan and the United States will make the Japan-US Security Treaty a public fund in the area in a true meaning.

**(2) The promotion of confidence-building**

Although there is the "Code of Conduct" in 2002, measures of preventing maritime collisions, agreements of promoting military transparency, and others are not yet existing. In this situation it is difficult for the "freedom of navigation" by the United States to be accepted by China. Additionally, regarding yes or no of military activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), two parties will not make mutual concessions. Firstly, it would be necessary for China and the United States to tackle multinational measures for preventing collisions at sea.

**(3) Building measures and improvement of the capabilities of the nations in the South China**

In order to stabilize security in the South China Sea, it is fundamental that ASEAN countries will play the roles of Resident Balancers. For that purpose, it is necessary to have the power to stand up to Chinese pressure. For that purpose, it is necessary for the United States and Japan to provide the South China Sea nations with assistance to build the capabilities.

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