

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

May 2011



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This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of May 2011.

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Intelligence Summary in May 2011

Maritime Security: On the 1st, Somali pirates released an Indonesian-flagged bulk cargo carrier owned by the Indonesian shipping company, MV *Sinar Kudus*. The vessel was seized in the Arabian Sea on March 16 and had been used as the mother-ship of the pirates ever since. According to an announcement of the Indonesian military, after making sure no more pirates were still on the ship, a special joint military squad of the Indonesian military force pursued the groups, killing four pirates in an exchange of gunfire. Media reported the ransom between \$3 million and \$4.5 million was paid. In addition, on the 25th, Somali pirates freed a Syrian owned and Togo-flagged bulk carrier MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* (24,022 DWT). According to a Somali pirates, the ransom of \$2.5million was dropped on the ship by aircraft on the morning of the 25th. Meanwhile, on the 24th, the Somali government seized two aircraft carrying a \$3.6 million ransom payment to Somali pirates in order to free hostages. Sources said the ransom payment was intended for pirates holding the Chinese-owned cargo ship *Yuan Xiang* (22,356DWT), which pirates seized on November 12, 2010.

On the 6th, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) in conjunction with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) have collaborated to develop an integrated maritime monitoring service (MARSURV) to allow EUNAVFOR to track merchant vessels in the High Risk Area off the coast of Somalia. The MARSURV was developed to fuse multiple sources of ship specific information in a real time environment. MARSURV will greatly enhance the ability of counter-piracy forces to manage and assess the risk to thousands of merchant vessels transiting across this high risk area for piracy.

On the 20th, the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO) has approved interim guidance on the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships transiting the high-risk piracy area off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean at its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) session in London from May 11 to 20, 2011. According to the IMO, the MSC approved "Interim Guidance to ship-owners, ship operators, and shipmasters" and "Interim Recommendations for flag States" regarding the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships. According to an estimate of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, around 20% of ships sailing in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will carry armed guards by 2013. At present 12% of vessels have armed guards on board.

The Indian government has decided to allow deployment of armed guards on board Indian cargo vessels sailing on the pirate-infested waters of the Indian Ocean, a top government official said on the 24th. Nevertheless, the government is not in favor of allowing private security guards on board national flag-carriers. On the other hand, Thailand will put four members of its armed guard units aboard each Thai merchant vessel to provide protection until it travels out of the piracy-prone sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden. The armed guard units are sent from the two naval

vessels to be deployed to the Gulf of Aden under its renewed anti-piracy mission set to start in July this year.

According to deputy director of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), more than 1,000 people will join the CMS staff by the end of 2011, increasing the total number to at least 10,000. Additionally, although the CMS has about 300 marine surveillance ships and 10 planes at present, another 36 inspection ships will join the surveillance fleet in the coming five years.

Military Developments: Contributing an article entitled “An Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter” to a US Web paper - China Brief dated May 6, Ph.D. Carlo Kopp, an analyst with the Air Power Australia think-tank, is making an initial assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter. Kopp expresses his feeling of considerable anxiety that a mature production J-20 with fully developed stealth and supersonic cruise capability would qualify as a “game changer” in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the 13th, the Philippine navy received a *Hamilton* class cutter from the US Coast Guard. The Philippine navy is to use this multi-mission vessel during search and rescue missions, maritime security patrols, and maritime law enforcement.

On the 19th, the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) adopted a joint declaration. Taking up the issues in the South China Sea (SCS), the joint declaration reaffirmed ASEAN member states' commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 and to work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) that would further promote peace and stability in the region. It reaffirmed also the importance of freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea.

Russia's MiG aircraft maker delivered a batch of five MiG-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters, a flight training simulator and other technical equipment to the Indian navy the last time, the company said on the 30th. These fighters will be based at an airfield in the state of Goa on India's west coast until the *Admiral Gorshkov* joins the Navy under the name of INS *Vikramaditya* in early 2013. The *Vikramaditya* is expected to carry up to 24 MiG-29K/KUB fighters.

In the topic, we carried two articles on China's aircraft carrier *Varyag* (*Shilang*) from China and Taiwan and its recent images.

Maritime Boundaries: On the 23rd, the office of the President of the Philippines (Palace) issued a statement, clarifying that the Reed Bank area is not part of the disputed territories in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, [often referred as Spratly Islands,] as it is within the territorial boundaries of the Philippines.

Diplomacy and International Relations: The Myanmar's newspaper, *The Irrawaddy* dated the 25th, reports on China's recent, strategic interest in Myanmar when Thein Sein embarks on May 26 on his first official visit to China as Burma's new president with a three-day trip to Beijing. Regarding the strategic interest, the article is pointing out that the Chinese government is

attempting to shift from its longstanding “One-Ocean” policy to a “Two-Ocean” strategy taking in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. Hence, its Indian Ocean allies, Burma and Pakistan, are keys to this strategy.

On the 29th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam held a press conference regarding the incident in which a Chinese marine surveillance vessel cut the exploration cables of *Binh Minh 02* seismic vessel of Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN) on the 26th while it was conducting seismic survey in the continental shelf of Viet Nam. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga made the statement as follows: China’s acts infringe upon sovereignty and exclusive rights within the Vietnamese continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Vietnam asks China to cease and refrain from recurrence of acts and to compensate for the damages caused to Viet Nam.

According to Pakistan's defense minister Ahmad Mukhtar, China has agreed to take over operation of the strategically positioned but underused port of Gwadar, and that Islamabad would like the Chinese to build a base there for the Pakistani navy. Mr. Mukhtar made the announcement after accompanying Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on a visit to China on May 17 -20. On the other hand, in an interview on the 24th, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson said he heard nothing about such an offer. Gwadar Port is situated in the strategically important position which controls the gate of the Hormuz Strait. At present, the port seems to be situated in an unfavorable position for fulfilling the sufficient harbor capabilities. Although further details about the fact over the announcement of Defense Minister are unclear, as to suspicions of Pakistan and China, OPRF has carried in the topics in this monthly report a few articles which may be beneficial to understanding Chinese deployment to the Indian Ocean.

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: The container-freight division of the Maersk Line, the Danish big shipping company, has recently announced to increase the fee on each 40-foot container shipped through risky waters to \$200–\$500 from \$100–\$400.

According to an announcement of the Australia’s shipbuilding company, Austral, on the 18th, Austral’s largest catamaran built to date, the 113 meter *Leonora Christina*, was recently handed over to her owners, Danish company Færgen (formerly Nordic Ferry Services). The vessel is expected to commence operations in mid-June 2011. The *Leonora Christina* has the seating for 1,400 passengers and a total capacity of a maximum of 357 cars, with the ability to operate at speeds of up to 40 knots.

On the 20th, Royal Dutch Shell announced plans for the construction of the Prelude Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) Project, the world’s first FLNG facility. Shell plans to moor the Prelude FLNG some 200 kilometers off the Australian Coast at the Prelude gas field for 25 years.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: On the 6th, Australia’s Environment Minister (EM) Tony Burke announced that the federal government has declared some 538,000 square kilometers of Australia’s south-west oceans as marine protected areas.

Intelligence Assessment: The April 2011 issue of *Proceedings* Magazine published by the U.S. Naval Institute has carried two articles which are interesting from the standpoint of deliberating on the trends of Chinese Naval Power. One of these articles entitled “When Land Powers Look Seaward” is co-authored by three experts - Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and Carnes Lord. The other one entitled “Mao’s Active Defense Turning Offensive” is co-authored by two experts - James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. In the Intelligence Assessment column in this monthly report the OPRF has taken up these articles, making some reviews and comments. Author is Masami Kawamura, Rear Admiral of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) (Retired).

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

May 1 “Somali pirates release Indonesian vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, May 1, AP, May 3 and The Jakarta Post, May 5, 2011)

On the 1st, Somali pirates released an Indonesian-flagged bulk cargo carrier owned by the Indonesian shipping company, MV *Sinar Kudus*. The vessel was seized in the Arabian Sea on March 16 and had been used as the mother-ship of the pirates ever since. According to an announcement of the Indonesian military, after making sure no more pirates were still on the ship, a special joint military squad of the Indonesian military force pursued the groups, killing four pirates in an exchange of gunfire. Media reported the ransom between \$3 million and \$4.5 million was paid.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, Somali pirates released an Indonesian-flagged bulk cargo carrier owned by the Indonesian shipping company, MV *Sinar Kudus*. The vessel was seized in the Arabian Sea on March 16 on way to Rotterdam via the Suez Canal from Canal Pamala in West Sulawesi, carrying 8,300 tons of ferronickel (worth an estimated Rp 1.5 trillion (US\$174 million). The vessel had been used as the mother-ship of the pirates ever since. According to an announcement of the Indonesian military, having received a ransom on the 1st, about 35 pirates left the vessel. Twenty Indonesian crew members are safe. Making sure no more pirates were still on the ship, a special joint military squad of the Indonesian military force pursued the groups, killing four pirates in an exchange of gunfire. The Indonesian military refused to discuss the ransom, which media reported was between \$3 million and \$4.5 million.

Refer to the article: MV SINAR KUDUS released from Pirate Control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/05/mv-sinar-kudus-released-from-pirate-control/>

Indonesian army kills 4 pirates; 20 hostages freed

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hEuNMsq95M_6UB6R44Gj5pWYRTPw?docId=a9da0c48bd684dbd9fe6bae6b3748f58

Sinar Kudus to dock today in Oman, crew to fly home

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/04/sinar-kudus-dock-today-oman-crew-fly-home.html>

May 2 “CMS to strengthen sea surveillance capabilities” (English.Eastday.com, May 2, 2011)

According to deputy director of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), more than 1,000 people will join the CMS staff by the end of 2011, increasing the total number to at least 10,000. Additionally, although the CMS has about 300 marine surveillance ships and 10 planes at present, another 36 inspection ships will join the surveillance fleet in the coming five years.

An outline of the article: According to deputy director of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), more than 1,000 people will join the CMS staff by the end of 2011, increasing the total number to

at least 10,000. Although the CMS has about 300 marine surveillance ships, including 30 ships rated over 1,000 tons and 10 planes, including four helicopters to monitor marine affairs at present, 36 inspection ships will additionally join the surveillance fleet in the coming five years. Deputy Director (DP) said China will carry out regular sea patrols more frequently to strengthen law enforcement in Chinese related waters to safeguard the country's marine rights. According to DP, 12 inspection ships were added and six new branches were built in Haikou, Hainan province, and Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha islands.

Refer to the article: Maritime surveillance forces will expand

<http://english.eastday.com/e/110502/u1a5868072.html>

May 3 “Spain sentenced Somali pirates to 439 years” (CNN, May 3, 2011)

On the 3rd, a Spanish court sentenced each of two Somalia men of piracy to 436 years. They took over a Spanish fishing vessel, FV *Alakrana*, on October 2, 2009 and held its 36 crew members for 47 days until they were released on November 17.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, a Spanish court convicted two Somalia men of piracy who took over a Spanish fishing vessel, FV *Alakrana*, on October 2, 2009 and held its 36 crew members for 47 days until they were released on November 17. The two pirates were convicted with a sentence of 11 years for each count of piracy to 36 crew-members, or 396 years. In addition, the defendants were convicted on three other counts, including armed robbery, which boosted the overall sentence to 436 years. However, according to a legal official, the likely maximum that could be served for such convictions is about 30 years.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates get 439-year sentences

<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/05/03/spain.pirates.convicted/?hpt=T2>

May 4 “Indian govt rules out talk with Somali pirates” (The Economic Times, May 4, 2011)

On the 4th, the Indian government ruled out at an Inter-Ministerial Group holding talks with Somali pirates who are holding 46 Indians, and decided to “wait and watch” as ship owners continue to negotiate the release of the hostages.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, the Indian government ruled out holding talks with Somali pirates who are holding 46 Indians, and decided to “wait and watch” as ship owners continue to negotiate the release of the hostages. The decision was taken at an Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) that the government would “wait and watch for the outcome of negotiations between pirates and ship owners for release of Indian crew still held captive including seven hostages of Indian freighter MV *Asphalt Venture*.” At present, 46 Indians are in captivity on board four vessels, including above-mentioned seven aboard freighter MV *Asphalt Venture* whose case remains unsettled.

Refer to the article: Govt rules out talks with pirates

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/govtrulesouttalkswithpirates/article_show/8163405.cms

Note : Regarding the release of MV *Asphalt Venture*, refer to the OPRF MARINT April, 2011, 1.1 Maritime Security.

May 5 “India, US, Turkish navies foils hijack of Chinese-flagged vessel” (The Hindu, May 7, and Defence Web, May 11, 2011)

On the 5th, a Panamanian-flagged bulk-carrier owned by the Chinese shipping company, MV *Full City* was boarded by seven pirates some 450 nautical miles off Mumbai, India. The *Full City* sent a distress signal, and her 24 crew locked themselves in a secure space, known as a 'citadel'. Patrolling in the vicinity, an Indian maritime patrol aircraft Tu-142 located the vessel, and observed a pirate mother ship next to the merchant vessel and an empty skiff alongside. The plane warned the pirates, on radio, to leave immediately. Leaving the merchant ship, the pirates fled in their skiff to the mother ship. Boarding the merchant vessel, the special force of the Turkish navy confirmed that the pirates had left the vessel. Additionally, the US Navy warship found the mother ship of pirates, seized paraphernalia on the dhow, and destroyed the skiff under tow.

An outline of the article: On the 5th, a Panamanian-flagged bulk-carrier owned by the Chinese shipping company, MV *Full City*, was boarded by seven pirates some 450 nautical miles off Mumbai, India. The *Full City* sent a distress signal, and her 24 crew locked themselves in a secure space, known as a 'citadel'. Upon receipt of a distress call from the Panamanian-flagged *Full City*, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) passed the information to U.S. 5th Fleet. Patrolling in the vicinity, an Indian maritime patrol aircraft Tu-142 located the vessel, and observed a pirate mother ship next to the merchant vessel and an empty skiff alongside. The aircraft passed information on the position of vessels. Flying over the merchant ship several times, the plane warned the pirates, on radio, to leave immediately. The pirates left the merchant ship and fled in their skiff to the mother ship. The U.S. Navy's guided missile cruiser USS *Bunker Hill* and aircraft carrier USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70) were the closest naval vessels to the *Full City* and set course to the scene. The Turkish frigate *Giresun* also responded to the situation. The special force of the Turkish Navy boarded the vessel and confirmed the departure of pirates and safety of the crew. A helicopter of USS *Bunker Hill* found a dhow which was believed to be the mother-ship. Stopping the dhow by warning shots, a visit board, search and seizure team from *Bunker Hill* boarded the suspected pirate dhow. The team found and seized paraphernalia on the dhow, including weapons, excessive fuel and other equipment, and destroyed the skiff under tow.

Refer to the article: Navy foils piracy bid on Chinese merchant vessel

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1997243.ece>

Anti-piracy forces thwart pirate attacks

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15320:anti-piracy-forces-thwart-pirate-attacks&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106

Navy foils piracy bid on Chinese merchant vessel

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1997243.ece>

May 6 “EU NAVFOR develops monitoring service to track ships off Somalia” Flt” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, May 6, 2011)

On the 6th, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) in conjunction with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) have collaborated to develop an integrated maritime monitoring service (MARSURV) to allow EUNAVFOR to track merchant vessels in the High Risk Area off the coast of Somalia. The MARSURV was developed to fuse multiple sources of ship specific information in a real time environment. MARSURV will greatly enhance the ability of counter-piracy forces to manage and assess the risk to thousands of merchant vessels transiting across this high risk area for piracy.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) in conjunction with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) have collaborated to develop an integrated maritime monitoring service (MARSURV) to allow EUNAVFOR to track merchant vessels in the High Risk Area off the coast of Somalia. This monitoring service has been designed to fuse multiple sources of ship specific information (MSCHOA registration and UKMTO reporting information) and positional data (Long Range Information Tracking – LRIT and SATELLITE AIS) in a real time environment. MARSURV will greatly enhance the ability of counter-piracy forces to manage and assess the risk to thousands of merchant vessels transiting across this huge area. EUNAVFOR and EMSA continue to work closely with the IMO whose efforts in establishing the ‘IMO Anti-Piracy LRIT Distribution Facility’ have been essential in developing this project and is the foundation on which this service has been built.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR / EMSA collaboration results in significantly increased ability to track merchant vessels in fight against piracy.

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/05/eu-navfor-ems-collaboration-results-in-significantly-increase-d-ability-to-track-merchant-vessels-in-fight-against-piracy/>



Example of MARSURV display

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, May 6, 2011

May 8 “Russia sends task force to protect shipping off Somali coast” (RIA Novosti, May 13, 2011)

On the 8th, Russia sent a task force led by Northern Fleet's destroyer *Severomorsk* to waters off Somalia, the Russian Defense Ministry said. The task force will start escorting commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden and off the “Horn of Africa” in the first half of June.

An outline of the article: On the 8th, Russia sent a task force led by Northern Fleet's destroyer *Severomorsk* to waters off Somalia, the Russian Defense Ministry said. The task force will start escorting commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden and off the “Horn of Africa” in the first half of June. The Russian Navy has maintained a presence off the Somali coast since October 2008, with warships operating on a rotation basis. The latest Russian anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden was carried out by a Pacific Fleet's task force, which ended on April 17,

Refer to the article: Russia sends destroyer to protect shipping off Somali coast

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110513/163999082.html

May 9 “China’s 7th naval escort squadron returns home from Somali waters” (Xinhua, May 9, 2011)

On the 9th, the missile frigates *Zhoushan* and *Xuzhou* of the seventh escort force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy to Somali returned home to a naval base in the Zhoushan Islands in eastern China.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, the missile frigates *Zhoushan* and *Xuzhou* of the seventh task force of Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy to Somalia returned home to a naval base in the Zhoushan Islands in eastern China. After departing from the naval base on November 2, 2010, two vessels escorted 578 vessels to protect them from pirates during its 189-day mission in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. During this period, the team was also dispatched to Libya to accomplish the mission of evacuating Chinese citizens from that country. The *Qiandaohu*, a supply ship previously with the 7th escort force, continues its mission with the 8th escort force.

Refer to the article: China's 7th naval escort squad returns home from Somali waters

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/09/c_13866153.htm

May 12 “Danish Navy captures pirate mother-ship to free Iranian hostages” (Live Leak, May 12, 2011)

According to the Danish Royal Navy, on the 12th, the Danish Navy's command and support ship HMS *Esbern Snar* belonging to the NATO fleet arrested a mother-ship of the suspected pirates and boarded it off the Somali coast. Forty-four people were on the pirate mother ship. Of them, 16 were Iranian hostages and 28 were suspected pirates. Following the gunfight, four suspected pirates were killed, and 10 others were wounded. The Iranian hostages were freed and the 24 suspected pirates were detained on the *Esbern Snare*.

An outline of the article: According to the Danish Royal Navy, on the 12th, the Danish Navy's command and support ship HMS *Esbern Snar* belonging to the NATO fleet responded to a firefight with the mother-ship upon its action by the suspected pirates while patrolling off the Somali coast. After the firefight, the crew could see weapons being thrown overboard from the suspected mother ship, and there were signs of the pirates surrendering. Taking control of the mother-ship, the *Esben Snar* boarded the vessel. Forty-four people were on the mother-ship. Of them, 16 were Iranian hostages and 28 suspected pirates. Following the gunfight, four suspected pirates were killed. In addition, 10 others were wounded. The four suspected pirates [who were killed] were buried at sea in accordance with NATO procedures with regards to Muslim traditions. The Iranian hostages were freed and the 24 suspected pirates were detained on the *Esbern Snare*.

Refer to the article: Danish Navy frees 16 Iranians from suspected Somali pirate ship

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=43e_1305569272



Pirate mother ship after the surrender

Source: Royal Danish Navy

May 16 “Somali pirates use hijacked vessel as mother-ship” (Marine Log, May 17, 2011)

According to an alert issued by on the NATO Shipping Center on May 16, it is estimated that Somali pirates are using a hijacked bulk carrier, MV *Eagle*, as a mother ship.

An outline of the article: According to an alert issued by on the NATO Shipping Center on May, it is estimated that Somali pirates are using a hijacked bulk carrier, MV *Eagle*, as a mother ship. The report says, as of 16 May, the vessel was observed in a position of 07 17 N 053 26 E in the Indian Ocean. The bulk carrier MV *Eagle* (52,163 DWT), which is Cypriot flagged and Greek owned, was attacked in the Gulf of Aden on January 17. She has a crew of 24 Filipinos.

Refer to the article: NATO suspects hijacked bulker is pirate mother ship

http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=842:2011may00170&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=107



MV *Eagle*

Source: Marine Log, May 17, 2011

May 17 “Thai navy to put armed guard on Thai merchant ships traveling in Gulf of Aden” (The Bangkok Post, May 17, 2011)

Thailand will put four members of its armed guard units aboard each Thai merchant vessel to provide protection until it travels out of the piracy-prone sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden. The armed guard units are sent from the two naval vessels to be deployed to the Gulf of Aden under its renewed anti-piracy mission set to start in July this year.

An outline of the article: According to a Thai daily newspaper, *The Bangkok Post* dated May 17, the Thai navy is planning to deploy armed guards aboard Thai cargo vessels traveling in the Gulf of Aden under its renewed anti-piracy mission set to start in July this year. The newspaper reports that, during the three months of the mission starting this July, the 60-armed guards who are selected from Sea-air-land (Seal) special warfare units and recon servicemen of the Royal Thai Marine Corps will work in parallel with the two vessels on an anti-piracy mission (with 369 sailors) composed of the off-shore patrol vessel HTMS *Narathiwat* and the replenishment ship HTMS *Similan* (which is dispatched the second time following the mission in September 2010). The armed guard unit will put four of its members aboard each Thai vessel to provide protection until it travels out of the piracy-prone sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden.

Refer to the article:

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/237371/navy-to-put-guards-on-thai-cargo-ships>

May 20 “IMO endorses use of private armed guard on board commercial vessels” (IMO, Press Briefing: May 20, and BBC News, May 22, 2011)

On the 20th, the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO) has approved interim guidance on the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships transiting the high-risk piracy area off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean at its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) session in London from May 11 to 20, 2011.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO) has approved interim guidance on the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships transiting the high-risk piracy area off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean at its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) session in London from May 11 to 20, 2011. According to the IMO, the MSC approved “Interim Guidance to ship-owners, ship operators, and shipmasters” and “Interim Recommendations for flag States” regarding the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships. The guidance to ship-owners notes that flag State jurisdiction and any laws and regulations imposed by the flag State concerning the use of private security companies apply to their vessels. Port and coastal States’ laws may also apply to such vessels. The guidance notes that the use of PCASP should not be considered as an alternative to the Best Management Practices (BMP) to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea area and other protective measures. Placing armed guards on board as a means to secure and protect the vessel and its crew should only be considered after a risk assessment has been carried out.

According to BBC News dated the 22nd, at present, about one in 10 ships off the Somali coast already carry armed guards. But observers say this number is likely to rise now that the IMO has endorsed the interim guideline.

Refer to the article: Interim guidance on use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships agreed by IMO Maritime Safety meeting

<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/27-MSC-89-piracy.aspx>

Piracy: IMO endorses use of armed guards on ships

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13486015>

【Related Story】

“Around 20% of merchant vessels have civilian armed guards by 2013” (Defence Web, May 20, 2011)

According to an estimate of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, around 20% of ships sailing in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will carry armed guards by 2013. At present 12% of vessels have armed guards on board.

An outline of the article: According to an estimate of the Security Association for the Maritime

Industry, around 20% of ships sailing in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will carry armed guards by 2013. At present 12% of vessels have armed guards on board. The Chairman of the London-based International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) said: "ICS has had to acknowledge that the decision to engage armed guards, whether military or private, is a decision to be made by the ship operator after due consideration of all of the risks, and subject to the approval of the vessel's flag state and insurers." According to a public relations representative of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, ship-owners are paying around US\$100 million a year to have three to five security guards on board. He said that there are between 50 and 80 four-person security teams on ships at any one time. The ICS estimates that global economic loss caused by piracy costs the global economy between US\$7-12 billion a year.

Refer to the article: 20% of ships in pirate-prone waters will have armed guards by 2013

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15512:20-of-ships-in-pirate-prone-waters-will-have-armed-guards-by-2013&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106

May 20 "Malaysia to strengthen maritime security off Saba State" (Daily Express, May 21, 2011)

On the 20th, the Royal Malaysian Navy and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance the security off Sabah waters.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the Royal Malaysian Navy and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance the security off Sabah waters. According to Naval Region II Commander, the signing of the MoU Action Plan could help improve the safety and security of vessels that dock at the Kota Kinabalu Naval Base. It could also provide guidelines on ways to handle emergency situations.

Refer to the article: Better maritime security with MMEA-RMN deal

<http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/print.cfm?NewsID=78030>

May 24 "India allows deployment of armed guards on board cargo vessels" (The Hindu Business Line.com, May 24, 2011)

The Indian government has decided to allow deployment of armed guards on board Indian cargo vessels sailing on the pirate-infested waters of the Indian Ocean, a top government official said on the 24th. Nevertheless, the government is not in favor of allowing private security guards on board national flag-carriers.

An outline of the article: The Indian government has decided to allow deployment of armed guards on board Indian cargo vessels sailing on the pirate-infested waters of the Indian Ocean, a top government official said on the 24th. Detailed guidelines on the number of guards that each vessel can have will be issued shortly, he said. At present, the proposal under consideration is to seek retired navy officers as armed guards, and each vessel can have a group of five armed personnel – one officer and four others. The shipping companies have to bear the cost of hiring the guards. Nevertheless, the government is not in favor of allowing private security guards on board

national flag-carriers.

Refer to the article: Govt to deploy armed guards on board cargo vessels

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/logistics/article2045593.ece?homepage=true>

May 25 “Denmark, Seychelles sign agreement to deliver pirate suspects” (Monster and Critics, May 25, 2011)

On the 25th, Denmark concluded a bilateral treaty with the Seychelles to make it possible for suspected pirates [apprehended by Danish forces] to be put on trial in the Indian Ocean nation.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, Denmark decided a series of important measures aimed at combating piracy. One of the planks in the government's strategy was a bilateral treaty with the Seychelles to make it possible for suspected pirates apprehended by Danish forces to be put on trial in the Indian Ocean nation.

Refer to the article: Denmark adopts anti-piracy measures

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1641378.php/Denmark-adopts-anti-piracy-measures

May 25 “Somali pirates release Syrian vessel” (Reuters, May 26, 2011)

On the 25th, Somali pirates freed a Syrian owned and Togo-flagged bulk carrier MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* (24,022 DWT). The ransom of \$2.5 million was dropped on the ship by aircraft on the morning of the 25th, said a Somali pirate. Meanwhile, the Somali government seized two aircraft on the 24th carrying a \$3.6 million ransom payment to Somali pirates in order to free hostages. Sources said the ransom payment was intended for pirates holding the Chinese-owned cargo ship *Yuan Xiang* (22,356DWT), which pirates seized on November 12, 2010.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, Somali pirates freed a Syrian owned and Togo-flagged bulk carrier MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* (24,022 DWT). The ransom of \$2.5 million was dropped on the ship by aircraft on the morning of the 25th, said a Somali pirate. MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* was taken by pirates on January 20 in the North Arabian Sea, approximately 330 nautical miles southeast of the Omani port of Salalah. The vessel is crewed by 22 Syrians and three Egyptians. Meanwhile, the Somali government seized two aircraft on the 24th carrying a \$3.6 million ransom payment to Somali pirates in order to free hostages. Sources said the ransom payment was intended for pirates holding the Chinese-owned cargo ship *Yuan Xiang* (22,356DWT), which pirates seized on November 12, 2010.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates say release Syria ship after ransom

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/somalia-piracy-idUKLDE74O1JS20110526?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews>

May 30 “Armed robbery incident in SCS” (ReCAAP, Incident Report, May 30, 2011)

According to ReCAAP, a Singapore-registered tanker MT *Dong Jiang* was boarded by six robbers in the middle of the night of the 30th, while it was underway off Pulau Bintan (Indonesia)

at approximately 30 nm east of Horsburgh Lighthouse. (ReCAAP: The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) The robbers stole cash and other valuables before they escaped. This is the second incident reported in the area since January 2011. The first incident occurred on April 3, 2011.

An outline of the article: According to ReCAAP, in the middle of the night of the 30th, a Singapore-registered tanker MT *Dong Jiang* was boarded by six robbers while it was underway off Pulau Bintan (Indonesia) at approximately 30 nm east of Horsburgh Lighthouse. (ReCAAP: The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) The robbers stole cash and other valuables before they escaped. The vessel was en route from Tanjung Pelapas, Malaysia to Balongan, Indonesia at the time of the incident. The crew was not injured. This is the second incident reported in the area since January 2011. The first incident occurred on April 3, 2011.

Refer to the article: ReCAAP Incident Report: 12/2011

[http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Latest%20IA/12-11%20Dong%20Jiang%20\(30%20May%2011\).pdf](http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Latest%20IA/12-11%20Dong%20Jiang%20(30%20May%2011).pdf)

May 31 “NATO information: Somali pirates uses hijacked vessel as mother boat” (The NATO Shipping Centre, May 31, 2011)

According to an alert issued by on the NATO Shipping Center (NATO SC), it is estimated that Somali pirates are using two vessels they hijacked – bulk carrier MV *Eagle* and bulk cargo vessel MV *Orna* as “mother-ships.” According to the report, as of May 16, the MV *Eagle* was moving in position 07 17N 053 26E, course 260 /speed 7kts in the Indian Ocean. Regarding information on a position of the *Orna* as of May 31, the vessel was moving in position 12 17 N 062 43 E course 022/ speed 8 kts. MV *Eagle* and MV *Orna* were hijacked on January 17, 2010 and December 20, 2010, respectively.

An outline of the article: According to an alert issued by the NATO Shipping Center (NATO SC) on May 16, it is estimated that Somali pirates are using the hijacked bulk carrier MV *Eagle* as a “mother ship.” According to the report, as for information on its position as of May 16, the MV *Eagle* was moving in position 07 17N 053 26E, course 260 /speed 7kts. The MV *Eagle* (52,163 DWT), which is Cypriot flagged and Greek owned, was attacked in the Gulf of Aden on January 17. The bulk carrier has 24 crews.

According to another alert issued by NATO SC on the 31st, it is estimated that Somali pirates are using the hijacked bulk cargo vessel, MV *Orna*, as a mother-ship. As of May 31, the bulk cargo vessel was moving in the vicinity of Madagascar in position 12 17 N 062 43 E course 022/ speed 8 kts. The Panamanian-flagged, UAE owned bulk cargo vessel, MV *Orna* (27,915 tons), was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean, approximately 400 nautical miles North East of the Seychelles on December 20, 2010. The *Orna* has a total of 19 crewmembers.

Refer to the article: SOMALIA PIRACY UPDATE 31st MAY 2011

http://www.shipping.nato.int/CounterPir/copy_of_copy_of_SOMALIPIR

http://www.shipping.nato.int/CounterPir/OldWarning/2011May166/file/_WFS/May%202011%200%28166-186%29.pdf



MV Eagle

Source: Marine Log, May 17, 2011



MV Orna

Source: NATO Shipping Centre

1.2 Military Developments

May 6 “Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter: Australian analyst” (China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, May 6, 2011)

Contributing an article entitled “An Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter” to a US Web paper - China Brief dated May 6, Ph.D. Carlo Kopp, an analyst with the Air Power Australia think-tank, is making an initial assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter. Ph.D. Carlo Kops expresses his feeling of considerable anxiety that a mature production J-20 with fully developed stealth and supersonic cruise capability would qualify as a “game changer” in the Asia-Pacific region.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article entitled “An Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter” to a US Web paper - China Brief dated May 6, Ph.D. Carlo Kopp, an analyst with the Air Power Australia think-tank, is making an initial assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter. Ph.D. Carlo Kopp expresses his feeling of considerable anxiety that a mature production J-20 with fully developed stealth and supersonic cruise capability would qualify as a “game changer” in the Asia-Pacific region, discussing his major points as follows:

- (1) The maiden test flight in January 2011 of China's J-20 stealth fighter prototype is an important strategic milestone in several different respects. The J-20 is the first combat aircraft developed by China that qualifies as “state of the art” by Western measures. It also shows that China has mastered “stealth shaping” technology — the essential prerequisite for developing stealth aircraft. Once fully developed, the J-20 has the potential to alter the regional balance in the Asian air power strategic game, by rendering nearly all regional air defense systems ineffective.
- (2) The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has yet to disclose any of the intended performance parameters of this fighter aircraft, or its intended avionics systems and weapons fit, but analysts are left with one choice only, which is to apply analytical criteria such as size, shape and configuration. As a result, the J-20 is a large fighter, in the size class of the United States F/FB-111 family of aircraft. This in turn indicates an empty weight in the 40,000 – 50,000 lb

class, depending on construction technique used in the design, and an internal fuel load of up to 35,000 lb. Moreover, this yields subsonic combat radius figures in the 1,000 – 1,500 nautical mile class, subject to the thrust specific fuel consumption of the production engine in subsonic cruise.

- (3) The available data supports the proposition that the J-20, once fully developed, will be a high performance stealth aircraft, arguably capable of competing in most cardinal performance parameters (i.e. speed, altitude, stealth, agility) with the United States F-22A Raptor, and superior in most if not all cardinal performance parameters against the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. If the engines deliver 40,000 – 50,000 lb class thrust performance, the J-20 will be viable as an air combat fighter, air defense interceptor and deep strike fighter. If thrust performance falls below this benchmark, the aircraft would lack the agility for close air combat, but still be very effective as an interceptor or bomber. The only fighters deployed in the Pacific Rim with the raw performance to reliably intercept a supersonic J-20 are the F-22A Raptor and Russian MiG-31 Foxhound.
- (4) There can be no doubt at this time that a mature production J-20 with fully developed stealth and supersonic cruise capability would qualify as a “game changer” in the Asia-Pacific region. The J-20's combination of stealth and supersonic cruise—the cardinal design feature of the F-22A Raptor—provides the capability to defeat nearly all extant Integrated Air Defense Systems. If flown on fuel efficient subsonic cruise profiles, the J-20 will be able to reach targets at ranges of around 1,000 nautical miles without aerial refueling tanker support. The J-20 will thus be able to comfortably reach any target within China's “First Island Chain,” un-refueled. With modest aerial refueling support, the J-20 will be able to reach most targets situated along China's “Second Island Chain,” including the strategically critical Guam facilities. The strategic choices available to the United States and its allies for dealing with the J-20 are very limited. The United States and its Pacific Rim allies’ strategic advantage in conventional air power may eventually face a difficult challenge.

Refer to the article: An Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=37903&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=e8e6871008ae4529a7ac7ec9d2deac3a



J-20 Radius

Source: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 8, The Jamestown Foundation, May 6, 2011

May 13 “Philippine Navy receives large patrol ship from US” (INQUIRER.net, May 17, 2011)

On the 13th, the Philippine navy received a Hamilton class cutter from the US Coast Guard. The Philippine navy is to use this multi-mission vessel during search and rescue missions, maritime security patrols, and maritime law enforcement.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, the Philippine navy received a Hamilton class cutter from the US Coast Guard. The cutter was transferred at the turnover ceremony at the Coast Guard Island base in Alameda, California. The Hamilton class cutter was the largest class of ship in the US Coast Guard until replaced by the National Security Cutter. The Philippine navy is to use this multi-mission vessel during search and rescue missions, maritime security patrols, and maritime law enforcement.

According to the Philippine Daily Newspaper, *The Manila Times* dated the 25th, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is planning to acquire two more large Hamilton-class patrol crafts.

Refer to the article: Philippine Navy obtains new ship from US

<http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20110517-337022/Philippine-Navy-obtains-new-ship-from-US>



USCGC Hamilton

Source: US Coast Guard

May 19 “ASEAN Defense Chiefs push for joint declaration on SCS” (ASEAN HP, May 19, and The Jakarta Post, May 20, 2011)

On the 19th, the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) adopted a joint declaration. Taking up the issues in the South China Sea (SCS), the joint declaration reaffirmed ASEAN member states’ commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 and to work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) that would further promote peace and stability in the region. It reaffirmed also the importance of freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 19th, the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) adopted a joint declaration. Taking up the issues in the South China Sea (SCS), the joint declaration reaffirmed ASEAN member states’ commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 and to work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) that would further promote peace and stability in the region. It reaffirmed also the importance of freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea. A special assistant to the Indonesian Defense Minister said, “This is the first time the South China Sea issue has been raised by the defense ministries. It was previously considered a sensitive issue and was avoided.”

Additionally, the joint declaration adopted the Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network, which seeks to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping among all ASEAN Member States including cooperation to facilitate and utilize existing national peacekeeping centers and others.

After the ADMM, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro and Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guang Lie had approximate two-hour-long bilateral meeting. After the meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guang Lie refused an interview. But Purnomo said in the interview that there was no problem discussing South China Sea issues or negative response from China to an ASEAN defense ministers’ joint statement (although Gen. Liang Guang Lie may not have read it).

Refer to the article: Defense Chiefs Push for South China Sea Rules

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/20/defense-chiefs-push-south-china-sea-rules.html>

China Plays Down Severity of South China Sea Issues

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/20/china-plays-down-severity-south-china-sea-issues.html>

As for the joint declaration, refer to:

<http://www.aseansec.org/26304.htm>

May 20 “Indonesia, China plan coordinated patrols in SCS” (The Jakarta Post, May 23, 2011)

On the 20th, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said that Indonesia and China were planning to conduct coordinated patrols in the South China Sea (SCS) to prevent illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen in Indonesian waters. Indonesia has already established similar joint committees with the US and Malaysia. Indonesia has already been engaged in coordinated patrols with Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, India and Australia.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said at a dinner to welcome visiting Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guang Lie that Indonesia and China were planning to conduct coordinated patrols in the South China Sea (SCS) to prevent illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen in Indonesian waters. According to Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, two countries will establish a joint committee which will serve as a legal platform for a range of defense cooperation, including coordinated patrols.” Defense Minister said: “Under a coordinated patrol, if those fishing vessels are found to cross the border accidentally, we will inform them to leave. I’ve ordered Deputy Defense Minister to draft an agreement with Chinese Ambassador for the establishment of the joint committee.” Indonesia has already established similar joint committees with the US and Malaysia. Indonesia has already been engaged in coordinated patrols with Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, India and Australia. On the other hand, China also offered to conduct coordinated patrols with ASEAN member states to escort merchant vessels from the region through the Gulf of Aden as part of joint anti-piracy efforts. Purnomo welcomed the offer, but did not disclose whether Indonesia would accept it.

Refer to the article: Indonesia, China Plan Coordinated Sea Patrols

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/23/indonesia-china-plan-coordinated-sea-patrols.html>

May 20 “Asian nations to strengthen ASW capability to counter China’s growing submarine force” (Aviation Week, May 20, 2011)

Concerns over China’s growing submarine fleet are leading Asian nations to strengthen anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Asian nations are regarding it an imminent task to strengthen ASW capability, as China’s submarine capability is increasing.

An outline of the article: Concerns over China’s growing submarine fleet are leading Asian

nations to strengthen anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Asian nations are regarding it an imminent task to strengthen ASW capability, as China's submarine capability is increasing. For example, although the Malaysian Navy uses six Westland Super Lynx helicopters for ASW, it is planning to purchase ASW helicopters that have long range and endurance, a senior official from the navy says. He has declined to name the helicopters in the running. But it is understood that the candidates are the Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R and the Agusta Westland AW159. The AW101, a much larger ASW helicopter powered by three engines, is out of the Malaysia competition because it is too big for Malaysia's ships.

South Korea also uses Super Lynx helicopters for ASW missions, but it is also considering buying the MH-60R. Agusta Westland also is in the running. In the next couple of months South Korea is expected to decide whether it will seek to buy the helicopters from overseas or go for a locally developed product.

Although Indonesia's navy has no ASW helicopters at present, it is regarded to buy some in few years. The navy plans to station the ASW helicopters on its Sigma 9113-class corvettes.

According to a Thai Navy official, Thai Navy, meanwhile, plans to purchase ASW upgrade kits for its Sikorsky S-70-7 helicopters. Thailand bought six of the helicopter in the late 1990s, but to save money it never purchased the ASW kits, which include dipping sonar.

According to Lockheed Martin, Singapore had issued a letter requesting information on the P-3C aircraft. If Singapore purchases the P-3, it is likely to get a similar configuration to the P-3Cs that Taiwan is getting from 2012 onward.

Refer to the article: Asians Look To Counter Chinese Submarines

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/05/20/03.xml&headline=Asians%20Look%20To%20Counter%20Chinese%20Submarines

May 30 "Russia delivers 5 carrier-based fighters to India" (RIA Novosti, May 31, 2011)

Russia's MiG aircraft maker delivered a batch of five MiG-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters, a flight training simulator and other technical equipment to the Indian navy the last time, the company said on the 30th. These fighters will be based at an airfield in the state of Goa on India's west coast until the *Admiral Gorshkov* joins the Navy under the name of INS *Vikramaditya* in early 2013. The *Vikramaditya* is expected to carry up to 24 MiG-29K/KUB fighters.

An outline of the article: Russia's MiG aircraft maker delivered a batch of five MiG-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters, a flight training simulator and other technical equipment to the Indian navy the last time, the company said on the 30th. India and Russia signed a contract stipulating the supply of 12 single-seat MiG-29Ks and four two-seat MiG-29KUBs to India in January 2004. The contract is part of a \$1.5-billion deal to deliver the aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov*, and India's first four MiG-29Ks and MiG-29KUBs officially entered service in February 2010. Moreover, in March 2010, Russia and India signed a \$1.5-billion contract on the supplies of 29 additional MiG-29K Fulcrum-D carrier-based fighter jets to New Delhi. The fighters will be based at an airfield in the state of Goa on India's west coast until the *Admiral Gorshkov* joins the Navy

under the name of INS *Vikramaditya* in early 2013. The *Vikramaditya* is expected to carry up to 24 MiG-29K/KUB fighters.

Refer to the article: Russia delivers another batch of naval fighters to India

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110531/164329503.html

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Recent Status on China's Aircraft Carrier Shi Lang

Following is an introduction to two articles on China's Aircraft Carrier *Shi Lang* issued in Singapore and Taiwan with recent pictures:

1. "China's New Aircraft Carriers: Shape of Things to Come?" (RSIS Commentaries, No. 74/2011 dated May 6, 2011)

The Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Commentaries, No 14 dated May 6 issued by the RSIS, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, carried an article entitled "China's New Aircraft Carriers: Shape of Things to Come?" written jointly by Richard A. Bitzinger, a Senior Fellow at the RSIS, and Paul T. Mitchell, a Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Canada. Regarding China's acquisition of the first aircraft carrier, two authors mention that it could presage the rise of a carrier-based Chinese navy, which has significant implications for the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

A synopsis of the article is as follows:

- (1) China may soon get its first aircraft carrier. The former Soviet carrier *Varyag* could, as early as the year of 2011, take to the sea as the largest and grandest ship in the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). While PLAN is on its way to being a carrier-based navy, it will not happen easily or anytime soon.
- (2) In mid-2005 the Chinese moved the *Varyag* to a dry dock at the Dalian shipyard in northeast China, where it was painted PLAN grey and its flight deck repaired. Subsequently, engines and electrical systems have been reinstalled and its bridge reconstructed. At the moment, China still lacks carrier-capable aircraft. The PLAN is reportedly interested in the Su-33 fighter jet, which is flown off Russia's lone remaining carrier, the *Admiral Kusnetzov*. Rumors abound that it may buy up to 50 Su-33s from Russia or that it has already acquired a couple from Ukraine and is in the process of reverse-engineering the aircraft.
- (3) The *Varyag* will likely be used more as a research and training platform for future Chinese carrier designs and crews, rather than as a fully functioning carrier. China is expected to begin construction of several indigenous carriers. At one time, the authoritative Jane's Information Group speculated that the PLAN could build up to six aircraft carriers, commissioning the first by the middle of this decade.
- (4) Possessing an aircraft carrier, however, does not automatically translate into being a carrier-based navy. For one thing, it could be 15 to 20 years before China could have a full fleet of four to six Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs). Moreover, few things are more challenging than carrier operations. Landing an aircraft on a carrier deck is one of the most stressful aspects of flight operations, which is a highly dangerous work.
- (5) A carrier is a "system-of-systems" in itself. Carriers typically have several different aircraft types aboard in a "carrier air wing". A US carrier air wing has four separate fighter

squadrons, an electronic warfare squadron, a squadron of anti-submarine and search-and-rescue helicopters, an early warning squadron, and a cargo aircraft detachment. Moreover, so-called “cyclic operations”— the continuous launch and recovery of air missions over the space of a day – requires the careful orchestration of men and machines, all of which requires continuous practice to even begin to approach any degree of proficiency. Not only does this require a large shore-based training institution, but also a commitment to regular sea-based exercising. Consequently, it is doubtful that the PLAN will attempt to duplicate the complexity of a US aircraft carrier. For one thing, the *Varyag* uses a “ski-jump” design, which obviates the need for complicated catapults; on the other hand, this greatly reduces the number of aircraft it can carry (the *Kusnetsov* carries only a dozen or so fighters), and how many it can operate at any one time. Additionally, these fighter aircraft have to sacrifice weapons loads and fuel in order to take off, greatly limiting their firepower and range of operations.

- (6) Despite these challenges, the PLAN is obviously intent on becoming a carrier-based navy. If the last decade has shown us anything about the Chinese military, it is its resolve and determination to build up its armed forces. China continues to plow considerable resources into military modernization – most recently by boosting its defense budget by 12.7 percent, to US\$91.5 billion. If China does succeed in acquiring not just one aircraft carrier, but a fleet of aircraft carriers, it would constitute a revolutionary turn of events in terms of expanding Chinese military power. That, in turn, could greatly alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

Refer to the article *China’s New Aircraft Carrier: Shape of Things to Come ?*

<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0742011.pdf>

2. “China’s new aircraft carrier changes strategic map”, (The *Taipei Times*, May 2, 2011

The Taiwanese newspaper, The *Taipei Times* dated May 2, carried an analytical article entitled “China’s new aircraft carrier changes strategic map” which reports that it may be years before China will acquire aircraft carriers and keep them in operational readiness as a carrier vessel battle group (CVBG). However, the article warns that the time will eventually come when Chinese aircraft carrier has the potential to be a game changer, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) Reports in April that China’s first aircraft carrier could embark on its maiden voyage sometime in 2011, added to speculation that the Chinese navy’s first carrier-based aircraft could be operational by 2015, point to the high likelihood that Taiwan’s security dilemma is about to become even more complex. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, April 2011, 1.2 Military Developments.)
- (2) The aircraft carrier *Varyag* (which report claims will be renamed “*Shi Lang*” by PLNA) still lacks some of its more high-tech features, such as phased array radars and surface-to-air missiles, and those features are unlikely to be fully installed when the carrier sets out on its first journey. PLAN pilots also have very little experience with the hazardous takeoffs and landings on an aircraft carrier, and those aircraft — such as the Russian-made Sukhoi-33 and

China's J-15 Flying Shark, which unconfirmed reports claim is nearing completion — have yet to prove their combat effectiveness. All of this means that the *Varyag* is unlikely to serve as an actual combat platform for a few years. However, that time will come and unless Taiwan, regional powers and the region's sole guarantor of security, the US, react accordingly, when that time does come, it has the potential to be a game changer.

(3) The *Taipei Times* discusses the comments of the respective experts on the China's aircraft carrier, the gist of which is as follows:

a. James Holmes, associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College

It makes sense China would be working on an air wing as well as an aircraft carrier. If the J-15 is indeed fully ready to go by 2015, that will probably coincide with when the ship is fully ready to go. It will be a while before the *Varyag* is fully ready for service. Going out on sea trials is the beginning of the road, not the end. Getting all of the ship's systems in working condition is quite another. In particular, there are the high perils in launching and recovering aircraft at sea. The *Varyag* would predominantly be used for training purposes. Regarding the impact of the *Varyag* on Taiwan's security, a carrier would certainly impose a new threat axis on Taipei and compel it to think about defending its eastern seas and skies, as well as around the western periphery, a direction it did not have to worry about previously. However, Taiwan lies within range of so much land-based PLA weaponry and aircraft and so many seagoing assets that a single carrier group would make little difference except at the margins. Over the longer term, as more carriers enter the fleet and PLAN pilots become more proficient, then that might change. According to various reports, China is believed to be building its own nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, some of which could be deployed around 2020. The PLAN has reportedly shown great interest in smaller carriers, such as the French-built Clemenceau-class. PLAN conventional carriers would likely operate mainly in the South China Sea, helping uphold Beijing's territorial claims there and continuing to refine carrier operations until nuclear-powered carriers enter the fleet. If Beijing goes down that road, nuclear propulsion would liberate the PLAN for operations farther from home, most likely in the Indian Ocean basin, while easing the need for foreign bases somewhat.

b. Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College

The immediate strategic impact of a Chinese aircraft carrier will be minimal. The Chinese still seem to be engaging in a fleet experimentation process, figuring out what would work best for them. They still need to settle on a satisfactory ship design, which they seem to be nearing, and proceed with serial production. Then, putting a flotilla together centered around the carrier and integrating the pieces into an organic combat unit will be the next challenge. This will take time. Moreover, potential PLAN losses and the attendant public relations setbacks as pilots experiment with carrier-based operations would likely compel Beijing to call for a go-slow approach to minimize risks.

c. **Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington**

Of course, what makes an aircraft carrier a potent combat platform at sea is predominantly the aircraft it carries. If reports from earlier last week are true that the J-15 is nearing completion, its entry sometime near 2015 could spell trouble not just for Taiwan, but the region as a whole. The big news regarding the J-15 is that when it first deploys, the PLAN's first aircraft carrier will have a fighter that is competitive-to-superior to the US-made Boeing F/A-18E/F, the expected US Navy workhorse fighter. Once the PLAN works up and deploys its first carrier air wings, the US Navy will not be able to automatically guarantee maritime air superiority on a plane-versus-plane measurement. Sustained efforts by the PLA to target the US Navy's networks could quickly undermine that superiority. If the PLA can defeat electronic support platforms, which is what ostensibly gives the US Navy an edge on the PLAN, the F/A-18 pilot will be in a lonely fight rather fast. As a guarantor of security for Taiwan and a reassuring source of stability in the Asia-Pacific, the US will have to react proactively to the twin introduction of a Chinese aircraft carrier and PLAN combat aircraft or its credibility and ability to maintain peace in the region will suffer. If the US Navy does not commit to the development of a combat aircraft with all-around superiority to the J-15, it will be conceding to China a level of strategic risk and uncertainty not seen since the air battles of the Korean War. The consequences of such strategic concessions would include diminished deterrence of Chinese military aggression and new political doubts about the viability of US military alliance guarantees.

Refer to the article: ANALYSIS: China's new aircraft carrier changes strategic map
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/05/02/2003502214/1>



A Chinese J-15 Flying Shark is seen in this undated photo on a Chinese Web site. Once it is operational, China's aircraft carrier is expected to carry this aircraft

Source: The Taipei Times, May 2, 2011

3. Latest images of *Varyag*

Below are the latest images of the *Varyag* spread on the website - The Rising Sea Dragon in Asia (LAST UPDATE: May 19, 2011) - by Jeff Head, a member of the US Naval Institute. Jeff Head estimates that outfitting of weapon systems and radar sensors has been completed and the

Chinese Navy (PLAN) will launch the *Varyag* in the 2011-2012 timeframe and begin trials and training for her use as an operational aircraft carrier with a wing of either SU-33 aircraft or perhaps a modernized J11 carrier-capable derivative of their own manufacture.

Refer to the article: *Varyag Transformation: Final outfitting of weapons systems and radar sensors*

<http://www.freewebs.com/jeffhead/redseadragon/varyagtransform.htm>



2011 Port Bow images show an FN-3000N missile system outfitted, the APAR and the Sea Eagle Radar can also be seen




2011 Starboard Quarter images show a Type-1030 30mm CIWS & an FN-3000N missile system outfitted, the APAR & Sea Eagle Radar are also seen.



ShiLang in 2011 with heat from propulsion units showing

PLAN Shi Lang (Former Russian Varyag) Weapons and Sensor Outfitting 2011



1.3 Maritime Boundaries

May 23 “The Philippines has sovereignty over Reed Bank: Palace” (The Philippine Star, May 23, 2011)

On the 23rd, the office of the President of the Philippines (Palace) issued a statement, clarifying that the Reed Bank area is not part of the disputed territories in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, [often referred as Spratly Islands,] as it is within the territorial boundaries of the Philippines.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, the office of the President of the Philippines (Palace) issued a statement, clarifying that the Reed Bank area is not part of the disputed territories in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, [often referred as Spratly Islands,] as it is within the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. According to a statement, Reed Bank is part of the Western Palawan section. The Palace issued the statement after reports came out that the government has suspended the conduct of seismic undertakings in Reed Bank, pending resolutions from among the claimants of the area, including Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China.

Refer to the article: Palace: Reed Bank not subject to negotiation

<http://www.philstar.com/nation/article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=689037>



Palace says that Reed Bank oil basin is not part of the disputed Spratly Islands but of the province of Palawan.

Source: The Philippine Star, May 23, 2011

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

May 23 “Philippine president meets with Chinese defense minister” (People’s Daily Online, May 24, 2011)

On the 23rd, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III met with visiting Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the office of the president (Palace), expressing that the Philippine side is satisfied with the development of defense relations between the two countries.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III met with visiting Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the office of the president (Palace). Aquino said that China is an important neighbor of the Philippines, expressing that the Philippine side is satisfied with the development of defense relations of the two countries. In addition, Aquino expressed the hope that they could strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the two armed forces, and promote all-round development of relations between the two countries to contribute to regional safety and stability. Expressing the satisfaction with sound development of defense relations between the two countries, Liang stressed a policy goal that China is willing to enhance strategic mutual trust between the two countries.

Refer to the article: Philippine president meets Chinese defense minister

<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7389068.html>

May 25 “China expects to keep naval presence in Myanmar: Burmese newspaper” (Irrawaddy, May 25, 2011)

The Myanmar’s newspaper, *The Irrawaddy* dated the 25th, reports on China’s recent, strategic interest in Myanmar when Thein Sein embarks on 26 May on his first official visit to China as Burma's new president with a three-day trip to Beijing. Regarding the strategic interest, the article is pointing out that the Chinese government is attempting to shift from its longstanding “One-Ocean” policy to a “Two-Ocean” strategy taking in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. Hence, its Indian Ocean allies, Burma and Pakistan, are keys to this strategy.

An outline of the article: The Myanmar’s newspaper, *The Irrawaddy* dated the 25th, reports on China’s recent, strategic interest in Myanmar when Thein Sein embarks on May 26 on his first official visit to China as Burma's new president with a three-day trip to Beijing, the gist of which is as follows:

- (1) According to official sources of Myanmar, Chinese officials have repeatedly raised the issue of mobilizing its naval forces in Burmese territorial waters in recent months amid the superpower's increasing interests in the country, most notably the Sino-Burmese oil and gas pipelines, and the Chinese navy's activities in the Indian Ocean, particularly patrolling against Somali pirates. “Chinese officials are not suggesting a Chinese navy base in Burma, but having the permission to dock their warships at Burma's ports while they are patrolling

the Indian Ocean and Somalia,” said a source who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The issue is still under discussion.” However, Burmese military sources have said they believe that China is more concerned about protecting the strategic port of Kyaukpyu, a multi-billion project that Beijing financed.

- (2) After the pipelines are finished in 2013, they are expected to have the capacity to transfer to Yunnan Province more than 80 percent of China’s imported oil from the Middle East and Africa, as well as Chinese-purchased natural gas from Burma’s Shwe Gas Field. Shwe Field was discovered in 2004 and is likely to be operational by 2013. It is currently Burma’s largest gas reserve with an estimated 7.0 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Burmese regime chose to sell the natural gas from Shwe Offshore Field to China. The pipeline project includes upgrading the airport on Ramree Island where Kyaukpyu is located. Residents of Ramree Island said that they have seen not only Chinese workers, but also Chinese military personnel in recent years on the island.
- (3) Chinese interests include the protection of oil tankers. Beijing has sent warships to Somali waters in the past two years—a maneuver that marked the superpower’s the first ever naval mobilization outside the Pacific Ocean. Returning from a counter-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean in August 2010, two warships, the *Guangzhou* and the *Chaohu*, docked at Thilawa Port, near Yangon.
- (4) Beijing’s development of naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean region not only involves Burma, but another key ally, Pakistan. It is reported that Pakistan’s Defense Minister said recently that Islamabad had offered China the port of Gwadar on its western coastline to build a naval base and maintain a regular presence there. According to Chinese experts, the Chinese government is attempting to shift from its longstanding “One-Ocean” policy to a “Two-Ocean” strategy taking in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. Its Indian Ocean allies, Burma and Pakistan, are keys to this ambition, they say. In a 2009 report on the Sino-Burmese relationship, Chinese scholars Li Chenyang and Lye Liang wrote: “Hence, a core objective of China’s policy towards Myanmar is to establish a strategic network of road, rail and air transport from Yunnan Province in the southwest through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean and also to construct water, oil and gas pipelines.”

Refer to the article: Thein Sein Tackles Chinese Navy Issue

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21361



Pipelines between Myanmar and Yunnan Province, China

Source: C. S. Kuppuswamy, "MYANMAR: President Thein Sein's Visit to China," South Asia Analysis Group, May 31, 2011

【Related Story 1】

“Myanmar to allow Chinese naval vessels’ port visits” (China Defense Mashup, May 28, 2011)

Myanmar's president Thein Sein is in Beijing discussing a plan to allow the Chinese naval vessels to dock in Myanmar ports and get direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

An outline of the article: Myanmar's president Thein Sein is in Beijing discussing a plan to allow the Chinese naval vessels to dock in Myanmar ports and get direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Thein Sein will have to consider New Delhi's apprehensions about China's naval expansion in its neighborhood before acceding to Beijing's request, sources said. However, it may be difficult for Thein Sein to refuse Beijing's request. Myanmar needs to placate China because it is seeking additional Chinese investments in the energy and infrastructure sectors that include a plan to lay a road running parallel to the ongoing oil and gas pipelines projects.

Refer to the article: Chinese navy to be allowed to dock in Myanmar ports

<http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/chinese-navy-to-be-allowed-to-dock-in-myanmar-ports.html>

【Related Story 2】

“China gives new loan to Myanmar” (Shanghai Daily, May 28, 2011)

On the 27th, Myanmar's President Thein Sein and China's President Hu Jintao signed nine agreements, including a cooperation framework agreement for a US\$765 million line of credit from China Development Bank to Myanmar's Ministry of Taxation and Finance. Thein Sein was on a visit to China.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, Myanmar's President Thein Sein and China's President Hu Jintao signed nine agreements, including a cooperation framework agreement for a US\$765 million line of credit from China Development Bank to Myanmar's Ministry of Taxation and Finance. The agreement will ensure the smooth progress of oil and gas pipelines being built across Myanmar into Yunnan Province, southwest China. Thein Sein was on a visit to China.

Refer to the article: China, Myanmar seal friendship

<http://mobile.shanghaidaily.com/article/?id=472886>

May 29 “Vietnam protests against China’s infringement of sovereignty” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, June 1, 2011)

On the 29th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam held a press conference regarding the incident in which a Chinese marine surveillance vessel cut the exploration cables of *Binh Minh 02* seismic vessel of Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN) on the 26th while it was conducting seismic survey in the continental shelf of Viet Nam. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga made the statement as follows: China's acts infringe upon sovereignty and exclusive rights within the Vietnamese continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Vietnam asks China to cease and refrain from recurrence of acts and to compensate for the damages caused to Viet Nam.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam held a press conference regarding the incident in which a Chinese marine surveillance vessel cut the exploration cables of *Binh Minh 02* seismic vessel of Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN) on the 26th while it was conducting seismic survey in the continental shelf of Viet Nam. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga made the following statement:

- (1) Viet Nam is resolutely opposed to the China's act that damaged and hindered the Viet Nam's normal survey and exploration activities within the Vietnamese continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), inflicting severe damages on Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN). The Chinese act is a serious violation of the sovereign and jurisdiction rights of Viet Nam to its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, runs counter to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), goes against the spirit and literature of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed between ASEAN and China in 2002 and the common perception of senior leaders of the two countries. Viet Nam asks China to immediately cease and refrain from recurrence of acts that infringe upon Viet Nam's sovereign and jurisdiction rights to its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone and to compensate for the damages caused to Viet Nam.
- (2) On the 28th, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson stated: “The oil and gas operations conducted by Viet Nam have undermined China's interests and jurisdictional rights in the South China Sea and violated the consensus both countries have reached on the South China Sea issue.” Concerning this statement by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga mentions there are a number of points that need to be clarified as follows: (a) The area where Viet Nam conducted

exploration activities situated entirely in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the 200-nautical mile continental shelf of Viet Nam in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is neither a disputed area nor is it an area managed by China. (b) Viet Nam always complies with the common perception of senior leaders of the two countries that all disputes be resolved through peaceful measures and acts that further complicate the situation be avoided. It is the China's act that goes against the common perception of senior leaders of the two countries. (c) While China calls for addressing related disputes through peaceful measures, it is its own acts that are complicating the situation in the East Sea (South China Sea).

- (3) Concerning the question on whether China is nurturing an intension to turn the East Sea (South China Sea) into its "home pond" by asserting the nine-dash line claim, Committee of Viet Nam Nguyen Duy Chien responded: "China's nine-dash line in the East Sea is completely legally groundless and is in contrary to the 1982 UNCLOS to which China is a party. The claim encroaches on the EEZ's and the continental shelves of many regional countries, including Viet Nam, and thus it is rejected by many countries. China's attempt to realize this claim is in fact escalating tensions in the region."

Refer to the article: Press Conference on Chinese marine surveillance vessel's cutting exploration cable of PetroViet Nam Seismic Vessel

http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110530220030#AWQU41U4kxof

🎨 Topic 🎨

Current Situation of Gwadar Port: Expectations of Pakistan and China

According to Pakistan's defense minister Ahmad Mukhtar, China has agreed to take over operation of the strategically positioned but underused port of Gwadar, and that Islamabad would like the Chinese to build a base there for the Pakistani navy. Mr. Mukhtar made the announcement after accompanying Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on a visit to China on May 17 -20. Ahmad Mukhtar gave no clear timetable on the possible change at Gwadar, on Pakistan's western coast, which has been currently managed by a Singaporean government company, the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), after concluding the 40-year operational contract with Pakistan. Nor has PSA issued any statement. (The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011) On the other hand, in an interview on the 24th, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson said he heard nothing about such an offer. (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Regular Press Conference on May 24, 2011)

Gwadar Port is situated in the strategically important position which controls the gate of the Hormuz Strait. At present, the port seems to be situated in an unfavorable position for fulfilling the sufficient harbor capabilities. (The Nation, May 11, 2011) Although further details about the fact over the announcement of Pakistan's defense minister are unclear, OPRF would like to present a few articles which might be beneficial to understanding Chinese deployment to the Indian Ocean about suspicions of Pakistan and China. In addition, please refer to the item II in the intelligence assessment in this monthly report.



Source: The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011

May 25 “Pakistan’s premier’ visit to China; Expectations of 2 nations” (The Financial Times, May 25 2011)

David Pilling, a columnist with the *Financial Times* (FT), contributed to FT dated the 25th an article entitled “China’s master-class in schmoozing Pakistan,” analyzing about expectations of two nations over the visit of Pakistani prime minister to China. Pilling is pointing out: It is a commonplace belief in Islamabad that, sooner or later, U.S. withdrawal will leave Pakistan alone once more in a volatile and violent neighborhood; and Pakistan could become the first strategically pivotal country to move from the US to the Chinese camp, but that may not suit Beijing, which remains wary of getting sucked too deeply into world affairs.

An outline of the article: David Pilling, a columnist with the *Financial Times* (FT), contributed to FT dated the 25th an article entitled “China’s master-class in schmoozing Pakistan,” analyzing about expectations of two nations over the visit of Pakistani prime minister to China. Pilling is pointing out the expectations of Pakistan and China over the visit of Pakistani prime minister, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) Pakistan likes to call China an “all-weather friend.” The implication is clear: the US is a fair-weather one. Many Pakistanis have never forgiven the US for abandoning it after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1989. But it is a commonplace belief in Islamabad that, sooner or later, U.S. withdrawal will leave Pakistan alone once more in a volatile and violent neighborhood. Those fears may be coming true.
- (2) China, by contrast, has treated Pakistan as a truly, cooperative partner. In Beijing, Mr Gilani asked China to take over the operation of Gwadar port, suggesting it could be upgraded to a naval base for Chinese use. This is something new. Aside from pariah states, such as North Korea and Burma, few countries have considered China powerful enough to play off against the US. Now Pakistan is intimating that China, as well as being the economic partner of choice, may be a more reliable security partner too.
- (3) Of course, Islamabad may simply be bluffing. It could be cozying up to China in order to frighten the US into continuing to send aid. Either way, Washington has an agonizing choice. Pakistan could become the first strategically pivotal country to move from the US to the Chinese camp. Oddly enough, that may not suit Beijing, which remains wary of getting sucked too deeply into world affairs.

Refer to the article: China’s master-class in schmoozing Pakistan

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cac10ffe-8701-11e0-92df-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1NyV7lvW9>

May 26 “China-Pakistan Relations: Beijing’s expectations” (The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2011)

Contributing an article entitled “China Breeds Chaos” to the U.S. newspaper, the *Wall Street Journal* on the 26th, Dan Blumenthal, a resident fellow at a U.S. think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), is pointing out: China and Pakistan have found the death of the al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, an opportune time to solidify a relationship that has a distinct

anti-American odor. While Pakistan wants to play the “China card,” China wants to further its narrow national interests, no matter the broader consequences.

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- (1) China's Pakistan policy has three objectives. First, Beijing sees Islamabad as a way to distract India from its great-power aspirations. An India concerned about a Pakistan threat is an India that cannot compete with China. Second, China wants to get into the great-power maritime game by operating ports throughout the Indian Ocean. Chinese projection of maritime power in the Indian Ocean can pose a threat to Indian and American naval mastery. Third, China wants help from Pakistan in keeping Islamic radicals from entering its Western province of Xinjiang.
- (2) From a point of view of such a China's policy toward Pakistan, China is simply advancing its narrow national interests. But China's very concept of its national interest is the problem at hand. China's pursuit of narrow interests is the equivalent of taking a wrecking ball to the current international order. Indeed, the international order the United States promotes and maintains benefits all those who want to join it. China's Pakistan diplomacy offers a glimpse of one possible future in international politics. Beijing is clearly building up its power to challenge Washington's dominance and frustrate its goals, but it doesn't provide a responsible alternative to U.S. primacy. Should China succeed in undermining American aims, the world will not face a choice between Chinese or American leadership. Rather, Chinese behavior is leading to a choice between order and chaos.

Refer to the article: China Breeds Chaos

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576344971111459988.html>

May 27 “Chinese expectations over Gwadar: Kaplan’s comments” (Foreign Policy, May 27, 2011)

Contributing an article entitled “China's Port in Pakistan?” to Foreign Policy (Net edition) on the 27th, Robert D. Kaplan, a senior fellow at the U.S. think-tank, the Center for a New American Security, has made his assessment of a background in that China is cautious about accepting the Pakistan's offer of building naval base in Gwadar. Author believes such caution comes not from a lack of geopolitical ambition regarding Gwadar, but from the present security situation in Pakistan,

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is cautious about accepting the Pakistan's offer of building naval base in Gwadar. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) Gwadar is where dreams clash with reality. The Chinese have already invested \$200 million in building a modern port in Gwadar. It can be imagined that China is interested in further participation in Gwadar. China faces what has been called a "Malacca dilemma." Thus, China has been engaged in port-building projects in Pakistan and Burma, which, someday, may be linked by roads and energy pipelines directly to China. Besides offering an alternative route for energy supplies, such new ports will be the 21st-century equivalent of 19th-century British coaling stations for China's budding maritime empire spanning the Indian Ocean. Once China has developed a blue-water navy that protects its sea lines of communications, it will require port access along the global energy interstate that is the Indian Ocean. For Pakistan's part, a robust Chinese presence at Gwadar would serve to check India's own strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages Beijing against New Delhi.
- (2) The problem is that these are all long-range plans -- and dreams. They conflict with messy ground-level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, I heard Ethnic Baluchi rebel leaders tell me that they would never permit roads and pipelines to be built there, until their grievances with the Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad were settled. The security situation is indeed fraught with peril. The Chinese know this. They know that a pipeline network from Gwadar into Central Asia and China must await the political stabilization of Afghanistan -- and Pakistan, too. Until such a day, Gwadar, while a potentially useful coaling station for a budding Chinese navy, constitutes, in essence, a road to nowhere.
- (3) The Chinese may be as frustrated and aghast at the dysfunction of the Pakistani state as are the Americans. Yes, they built the port, with hopes of using it someday. But it seems from their latest statements that they have reservations for the moment. Such Chinese caution, I believe, comes not from a lack of geopolitical ambition regarding Gwadar, but from the present security situation in Pakistan,
- (4) Just as the Pakistanis want to use China as a bulwark against India, China -- while not shying away from strategic competition with India -- must at the same time be careful not to unduly antagonize India. For China is building or upgrading ports not only in Pakistan and Burma, but in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, too. It is unclear exactly what China intends for these Indian Ocean ports -- China's so-called "String of Pearls." India already feels surrounded by China and has greatly enlarged its own naval base at Karwar, in the country's south, partly in response to Chinese construction work in Gwadar. Given that India and China may soon constitute the world's largest bilateral trading relationship, China must tread carefully. After all, it has always claimed to its neighbors that its rise is benevolent and non-hegemonic. Indeed, Gwadar is important: not for what it is today, but for what it will indicate about Beijing's intentions in the coming years and decades.

Refer to the article: China's Port in Pakistan?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/chinas_port_in_pakistan

May 27 “Suspicious about China’s militarization of ‘Pearls’ along Indian Coast: Australian expert” (The Australian, May 27, 2011)

Ashley Town, a Research Associate in an Australian think-tank, The International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, contributed an article entitled “Few reasons to fear China’s ‘pearls’” to the Australian newspaper, *The Australian* on the 27th. Regarding the so-called China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, author is pointing out he has deep-suspicious about many observers’ views that China is projection naval power in order to challenge the United States by militarizing the commercial ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.

An outline of the article: Ashley Town, a Research Associate in an Australian think-tank, The International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, contributed an article entitled “Few reasons to fear China’s ‘pearls’” to the Australian newspaper, *The Australian* on the 27th. Regarding the so-called China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, author has deep-suspicious about many observers’ views that China is projection naval power in order to challenge the United States by militarizing the commercial ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The gist of his article is as follows.

- (1) While Chinese has invested in construction of commercial “pearls” in South Asia, there is no evidence to suggest these have a military dimension. All are usual container ports designed to connect maritime supply chains which runs from the Indian Ocean to Southwest Asia. Beijing’s strategic interests to the west of Singapore appear more concerned with energy security than naval power. China’s main maritime objective is to secure its hydrocarbon lifeline. A string of South Asian shipping hubs is worthy of reducing Beijing’s reliance on the Malacca Strait “chokepoint.”
- (2) Of course, any deep-water port can also harbor warships. It is thus true that the maritime infrastructure will provide a series of useful footholds for naval vessels to rest, refuel and possibly refit. Yet Beijing has no monopoly of access to these ports. It seems farfetched that these ports could one day become robust naval bases. Transforming soft commercial ports into hard naval bases is no simple task. To militarize the Indian Ocean facilities, Beijing would require local air defense capabilities, munitions storage units, mine-clearing assets and a permanent military footprint. These costly renovations would probably exceed the technical, logistical and expeditionary capabilities of the Chinese military for a decade or more. Such bases would also be extremely vulnerable to attack. While the Indian Ocean is littered with US and Indian forces -- super-carrier strike groups, nuclear submarines, sophisticated warships and pre-positioned airpower -- China’s strategic presence is relatively insignificant.
- (3) China’s blue-water fleet remains a work in progress. Its ability to sustain far-flung naval bases would be handicapped by distance and its military’s cumbersome internal command structure. This means that Beijing would find it almost impossible to defend any “string of pearls” in the unlikely event of a shooting war with the US or India. While bases would offer useful strategic reach in peacetime, their viability during a conflict would be far from

assured. The Indian Ocean power balance remains overwhelmingly in favor of an Indo-US partnership. Situated at the heart of the Persian Gulf, the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is better placed than any other player to regulate the flow of Middle Eastern oil. As long as Chinese policymakers are unable to alter this reality, they're likely to think twice about militarizing any "pearls."

Refer to the article: Few reasons to fear China's 'pearls'

<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/PublicationPop.asp?pid=1596>

1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

May 7 “Danish Maersk’s raises container fee” (The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2011)

The container-freight division of the Maersk Line, the Danish big shipping company, has recently announced to increase the fee on each 40-foot container shipped through risky waters to \$200–\$500 from \$100–\$400.

An outline of the article: The container-freight division of the Maersk Line, the Danish big shipping company, has recently announced to increase the fee on each 40-foot container shipped through risky waters to \$200–\$500 from \$100–\$400. The Maersk estimated that anti-piracy costs of the company will rise to \$200 million in 2011 from \$100 million 2010. Maersk Line's approximately 2,000 vessels annually trip through pirate-ridden waters off the Horn of Africa,

Refer to the article: Piracy Spurs Maersk to Raise Fee

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859304576309581808055872.html>

May 18 “Australia’s Austral delivers largest catamaran to Danish shipping company” (Austal, Media Release, May 18, 2011)

According to an announcement of the Australia’s shipbuilding company, Austral, on the 18th, Austral’s largest catamaran built to date, the 113 meter *Leonora Christina*, was recently handed over to her owners, Danish company Færgen (formerly Nordic Ferry Services). The vessel is expected to commence operations in mid-June 2011. The *Leonora Christina* has the seating for 1,400 passengers and a total capacity of a maximum of 357 cars, with the ability to operate at speeds of up to 40 knots.

An outline of the article: According to an announcement of the Australia’s shipbuilding company, Austral, on the 18th, Austral’s largest catamaran built to date, the 113 meter *Leonora Christina*, was recently handed over to her owners, Danish company Færgen (formerly Nordic Ferry Services). Austral was awarded the contract to build *Leonora Christina* in April 2009. After the 22-day voyage for a transfer from Western Australia to Denmark along with a crew of 12, the vessel is expected to commence operations in mid-June 2011. The *Leonora Christina* has the seating for 1,400 passengers and a total capacity of a maximum of 357 cars, with the ability to operate at speeds of up to 40 knots.

Refer to the article: Danish Company Takes Delivery of Austal's Largest Catamaran

<http://www.austal.com/index.cfm?objectid=00B97ED1-65BF-EBC1-2F8BCB6538D51E81>



MV Leonora Christina

Source: Austal HP

May 20 “Shell announces Floating Liquefied Natural Gas project” (gCaptain, May 20, and Sell HP, May 20, 2011)

On the 20th, Royal Dutch Shell announced plans for the construction of the Prelude Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) Project, the world’s first FLNG facility. Shell plans to moor the Prelude FLNG some 200 kilometers off the Australian Coast at the Prelude gas field for 25 years.


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Refer to the article: Shell’s Prelude FLNG: The Largest, Most Impressive Floating Object Ever To Be Constructed

<http://gcaptain.com/shells-prelude-flng-largest?25880>

A revolution in natural gas production

http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/our_strategy/major_projects_2/prelude_flng/revolution_natural_gas_production/



The Prelude FLNG

Source: Shell HP

1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others

May 6 “Australia designates SW oceans as Corner Marine Reserve” (International Business Times, May 6, 2011)

On the 6th, Australia’s Environment Minister (EM) Tony Burke announced that the federal government has declared some 538,000 square kilometers of Australia’s south-west oceans as marine protected areas.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, Australia’s Environment Minister (EM) Tony Burke announced that the federal government has declared some 538,000 square kilometers of Australia’s south-west oceans as marine protected areas. This means, all fishing activities in the protected zones are prohibited. According to the EM, the government is planning to declare eight new protected areas across the vast south-west oceans, including a large stretch from Esperance to Augusta, to be known as the South-West Corner Marine Reserve.

Refer to the article: Australia moves to protect vast south-west oceans

<http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/141935/20110506/south-west-ocean-australia-marine-ecology-ecosystem-wild-life.htm>

2. Intelligence Assessment

Review on Two Articles in the April 2011 issue of *Proceedings*

The April 2011 issue of *Proceedings* Magazine published by the U.S. Naval Institute has carried two articles which are interesting from the standpoint of deliberating on the trends of Chinese Naval Power. One of these articles entitled “When Land Powers Look Seaward” is co-authored by three experts - Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and Carnes Lord. The other one entitled “Mao’s Active Defense Turning Offensive” is co-authored by two experts - James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. In the Intelligence Assessment column in this monthly report the OPRF has taken up these articles, making some reviews and comments.

I . “When Land Powers Look Seaward”

This article entitled “When Land Powers Look Seaward”¹ is discussing as a theme how a traditional continental power will be transformed into a maritime power. Moreover, the gist of its argument is that, while pointing out a historical fact that transformation from the continental nations to maritime nations has been attempted frequently since ancient times, the authors suggest that China can find a lesson from these histories by giving the Ancient Persians as a rare successful example. In short, expecting in part that China will undergo a transformation into a maritime nation, this article, additionally, seems to reveal even the points of welcoming it. This article has a peculiarity in that it is taking China’s undergoing transformation to a maritime nation in the midst of a large trend of history positively to such a degree that can be said to be favorable. The article is very interesting for us to read. It is a natural consequence, considering that the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) of the U.S. Naval War College, to which the authors belong, takes the position that “China and the United States are strategic partners as well as competitors.”² Furthermore, this conclusion also leads to the “Global Maritime Partnership Initiative” which was advocated by then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Michael Mullen who currently serves as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and which

¹ Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, “When Land Powers Look Seaward” *Proceedings Magazine*, Apr 1, 2011, Vol. 137.

<http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-04/when-land-powers-look-seaward>

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² Robert C. (Barney) Rubel, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies U.S. Naval War College, mentions in the foreword in the *China Maritime Studies Number 1*: “China and the United States are strategic partners as well as competitors.”

http://www.usnwc.edu/Research/Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMS1_Collins-Grubb.aspx

may be taken as a consistent philosophy of the U.S. authorities concerned based on the present “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-power.” The key of my reviews and comments on this article is focused simply on this one point. Meanwhile, from the standpoint of Japan which is distinctly located between two strategic partners of the United States and China, competing with China [for the rights] in the maritime regions and confronting Beijing about national interests, I can’t help thinking that my suspicions about the positive conclusion of this article have not really been dispelled. Consequently, I would like to present an abridged translation in Japanese from the original text of the article first, and then give my suspicions about the conclusion above-mentioned.

1. Abridged translation of the article

A continental-to-maritime transformation has been attempted frequently through the ages, but only rarely with success. The past offers lessons to a navally expanding China. As European naval powers decline rapidly and the U.S. Navy diminishes quantitatively, China is going to sea. This ends a great historical trend that began six centuries ago, in which China withdrew inward and European naval expansion spread Western influence worldwide.

Now, for the first time in history, a robust and enduring debate pervades Beijing: Is China a continental power, a maritime power, or both? To what extent will its persisting political and strategic geography and the continentalist strategic culture it helped to form constrain its development as a maritime power?

(1) Historical Insights

The ancient Persians lacked a maritime tradition, but their leaders were open to new ideas. Initially viewing the sea as a barrier, they came to see it as a communications highway and developed extensive naval experience. By devoting major financial resources, they were subsequently able to build the first truly substantial navy in history. The scale and economic dynamism of these efforts suggest parallels to China. The Ottoman Empire had significant resources but also insuperable continentalist limitations. As time passed, the center of naval competition moved into the Atlantic and beyond during the modern era. During this period, several major continental powers made earnest attempts at maritime transformation, with limited success.

France, for example, made four major attempts at maritime transformation and failed each time. Weakness and disorganization in the central government were chronic problems; anti-commercial and anti-imperial attitudes were widespread among the elite; a weak financial system hobbled naval construction and supply; and relations between the navy and the army were consistently poor or nonexistent.

The French case may be particularly relevant to China. It suggests that internal consolidation is a prerequisite for maritime focus. Like France, China enjoys good ports and ready access to the sea, but also an inland capital and a system of inland waterways that lessened the nation’s dependence on seagoing commerce. Like France, China has three relatively distinct maritime

frontiers, and a history of suboptimal coordination between fleets stationed in each, facilitating defeat in battle. Both nations share a history of fitful naval development together with skepticism or outright hostility toward naval power or maritime expansion among important elements of their elites. The most compelling explanation for that continentalism: long-standing elite preoccupation with threats to—or opportunities afforded by—the land frontier.

Imperial Germany's access to the oceans was handicapped by chokepoints controlled by unfriendly powers. Unlike Russia, Germany overextended itself by attempting to use naval transformation to obviate, not complement, land power. The navy simply could not compensate for Germany's two-front continental challenge. The German case has several parallels to China, and one major difference. Both had ancient maritime traditions, but were geopolitical latecomers. Both used comprehensive (economic, technological, and educational) means to assist maritime transformation. At the center was government-led industrialization supported by a capitalist maritime economy. But thus far, drawing in part on historical lessons, China has avoided precipitating disastrous great-power war.

(2) China's Historical Experience

Historians have exaggerated Chinese neglect of the sea. The Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) had Hangzhou, a seaport on the Yangtze River, as its capital. Large shipyards supported a significant naval force, which the Mongols inherited when their Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) overthrew the Song. The Mongols launched (albeit unsuccessfully) the largest amphibious operations of the Middle Ages—against Japan, Vietnam, and Java. In the 1300s, the Chinese made cutting-edge innovations in shipbuilding and naval armaments, and invented the magnetic compass.

The Ming Dynasty had a strong naval element from start to finish. The peak of Ming maritime accomplishment came with the seven voyages of eunuch admiral Zheng He (1405–33). These voyages nurtured trade, (re)opened relations with tributary kingdoms, demonstrated hard and soft power, and brought the Ming flag through the Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and East Africa. But Zheng's costly voyages brought few tangible benefits to the empire, the imperial bureaucracy opposed them as risky and wasteful, and he made just one voyage after Emperor Yongle's death. In the 1500s, harsh but unevenly enforced imperial edicts discouraged long-distance maritime commerce and drove Chinese and foreign merchants into piracy. Though still a formidable sea power in aggregate capabilities and trade, Ming China lost its lead in the ocean.

Qing China's (1644–1912) geo-strategic orientation was the subject of major debate between Li Hongzhang, head of the Beiyang Navy; and Zuo Zongtang, leader of the expeditionary force to recover Xinjiang. The Qing chose land power, and both General Li and the nation suffered the consequences. In addition to existing internal political problems, the Qing was suddenly confronted with the threat of rising British, French, and Japanese naval power in Asia. Qing China proved incapable of meeting the maritime challenge posed by the modern navies of the Western powers. In the First Opium War (1839–42), a British fleet penetrating to the heart of

China's riverine network threatened to shut down the country's internal commerce, thus forcing the regime to sue for peace; Britain acquired Hong Kong. In the 1880s, defeat of China's nascent fleet at the hands of the French sealed the end of its traditional influence in Indochina. By the last decade of the century, in spite of their acquisition of significant naval capabilities, the Chinese proved no match for their rapidly modernizing island neighbor and suffered humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, leading to the loss of Taiwan and to a Japanese protectorate in Korea. In addition, pressed by the Russians from the north, the imperial court was forced to accede to rising demands for commercial and territorial concessions. In 1905, China suffered terribly but without recourse as the Russo-Japanese War was waged on its land territory and in nearby waters.

All of these developments would fatally weaken the foundations of the dynasty and indeed the legitimacy of the empire itself. The fall of the Qing in 1911 led to a long period of internal instability. Qing China's maritime defeats thus stemmed from its failure to wholeheartedly embrace Western naval techniques following the first Opium War—in sharp contrast to its rival Japan.

(3) China's Land-centric Cold War

During the Cold War, China's naval development was constrained by U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia and later by internal policy debacles and deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. China's navy primarily supported ground forces, and did not even have its own strategy until around 1988. The outlook of Chinese Communist Party elites was formed by the experience of land warfare; few of the party's leading commanders knew anything about naval warfare or the advanced technologies critical to modern naval (or air) combat.

Chinese involvement in the Korean War diverted resources and the leadership's attention to ground combat. The border war against India in 1962 was another example of Maoist China's continental focus. What progress Beijing was able to make in building up a modern navy virtually from scratch was only possible with technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union, which ended in 1960.

It became clear in the course of the 1960s that the greatest security threat to China was in fact that posed by the Soviet Union itself. In 1969, the two nuclear-armed communist powers carried on a series of border skirmishes in Siberia that might well have sparked a larger conflict (the Soviets at this time appear to have contemplated a preemptive attack on China's nuclear forces and facilities). By the end of the Cold War, both countries maintained substantial conventional forces along their common border. Given the severe underdevelopment of the Chinese economy, China's military resources were sharply constrained; and its ground forces had to be accorded top priority.

A third factor was Beijing's functional entente with the United States during this period, which may have allowed the People's Republic to take a more relaxed view of the not inconsiderable potential threat posed by the Soviet Navy in Asian waters than might otherwise have been the case.

(4) China's turning a Corner at Last...

Looking to the Deng Xiaoping era and beyond, then, is China finally overcoming its historical difficulties to achieve enduring maritime development? China's commercial maritime trajectory suggests that this may indeed be the case. It is led by an exceedingly dynamic commercial maritime and shipbuilding sector, which is in turn creating ample synergies for naval development—thereby offering a sound basis for transformation that was frequently lacking in other land powers that went to sea.

Unlike the shipbuilding industries of such land powers as Germany and Russia, China's is driven by the “pull” of commercial interests rather than the “push” of the state. China is gradually surpassing South Korea as the world's foremost shipbuilder in gross tonnage, and commands roughly 50 percent of the world market by that metric. But China is still far from emulating such great maritime powers as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States—all of which dominated all levels of commercial shipbuilding in their rise to global power. To reach this level, China would have to increase not only its market share, but also its personnel quality and innovation ability—although the globalization of the shipbuilding industry offers new opportunities for technological progress.

For the first time in centuries, China is developing a truly operational modern navy, the product of three decades of favorable conditions. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China no longer faced an existential threat on its inner Asian frontier. Instead, its primary security concerns were clearly in the process of shifting to the maritime domain. In the first instance, territorial disputes in offshore waters with various regional states assumed increasing salience, beginning with the PRC's clash with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in 1974. Second, the evolution of Taiwan's domestic politics in a democratic direction was threatening to move the Republic of China away from its long-standing “One China” policy toward de facto and even de jure independence. At the same time, the apparent willingness of the United States to act as Taiwan's protector, particularly, during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis forced China to face the eventual prospect of engaging the U.S. Navy in a conflict in East Asian waters. Finally, the rapid growth of China's economy made comprehensive modernization of China's naval forces a feasible objective of Chinese Communist military policy for the first time ever.

(5) Geography Lessons for Continental Power

Studying the attempts of China and other continental powers to go to sea offers enduring lessons.

First, they are geography matters—even amid technological advances. “Continentalist” powers have generally been disadvantaged by their geographic situation. The more severely disadvantaged powers have sometimes engaged in ambitious strategic projects designed to change the stubborn facts of geography in their favor (China built the Great Wall, the Grand Canal, and Three Gorges Dam, and is now constructing an oil pipeline through Burma). China has reasonable ocean access in many respects, but retains unsettled maritime claims with all its

maritime neighbors. It remains hemmed in by “island chains.”

Second, maritime transformation is a difficult and treacherous process that no modern land power has fully accomplished. The only cases in the entire historical record of successful and enduring maritime transformations are Persia and Rome. Even in those cases, however, the empires retained their original continentalist imprint—“once a land power, always a land power”—at least to some extent. It would be difficult to argue that a maritime transformation was fully realized. The Persians never really used their navy as an offensive instrument; The Romans were also slow to establish permanent fleets and a regime of maritime policing.

Third, the geo-strategic outlook of great powers is shaped not only by geography proper but by economic factors. The aggregate wealth created by natural resources and production sustains a certain level of population, which, in combination with financial resources and industrial technology, translates into military capability. As the ancient Persians were the first to demonstrate, large revenues can buy large navies. China has the resources, and increasingly the technology, to make such an investment. Unlike the Soviet Union or other continentalist predecessors, China truly has comprehensive national power, with a strong economic component. Its measured, long-term approach to naval development is economically rational. The question is whether acquisition of such capabilities by China would in fact be wise given other pressing demands as well as possible adverse international repercussions.

A fourth critical factor is a state’s strategic outlook. This is shaped by international and domestic considerations, primarily regime survival. It is frequently difficult for states to balance and prioritize strategic objectives when they pose multiple and potentially conflicting challenges. In China’s case, an ongoing continentalist preoccupation with internal stability is increasingly balanced by concern for economic development and great-power status to erase the “Century of Humiliation” and return China to its rightful position.

Fifth, leadership is perhaps the most critical factor enabling (or frustrating) maritime transformations. It enabled Zheng He, and frustrated Qing reformers. Admiral Liu Huaqing, with Deng’s support, directed a gradual but limited rise in the PLA Navy’s status. China’s leadership clearly appreciates Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas concerning commerce protection and the importance of sea lines of communication. The overall climate of opinion in China today is more favorable to maritime transformation than at any time in its long history. But countervailing factors remain.

(6) Rare Example of Successful Transformation?

A successful transformation ultimately is shaped by naval strategy and operational art. Continental powers typically cannot match maritime powers, and employ a different approach. The Ottomans used amphibious and littoral-warfare operations to seize offshore islands in the Mediterranean. This parallels China’s own campaigns (1949–55) that expelled the Nationalists from all offshore islands save Taiwan, the Penghus, Jinmen, and Mazu. Chinese short/medium-range ballistic-missile development (e.g., of the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile) represents in part an updated version of this approach—“using the land to control the sea.” China

has ongoing limitations that give its naval development unique Chinese characteristics, but they are no longer fatal to it. Chinese naval warfare may look very different from that of the United States, but may be no less successful when applied to China's own situation. The experience of land powers that have previously attempted to become sea powers has generally been negative. China is thus sailing into a strategic headwind. Yet China is clearly going to sea.

Beijing enjoys several advantages that its predecessors have generally lacked: (a) A robust maritime economy; (b) A dynamic shipbuilding industry; (c) Settled borders with nearly all its continental neighbors; (d) A leadership that supports maritime development as a natural phenomenon and does not attempt to "decree" it.

China has very likely turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable—if not singular—event in the history of the last two millennia. China will have learned the lessons of history, but will not have been condemned to repeat them.

2. Comments: Suspicions about positive conclusion

As afore-mentioned, this article has a peculiarity in that it is taking China's undergoing transformation to a maritime nation in the midst of a large trend of history positively to such a degree that can be said to be favorable. However, from the standpoint of Japan, I can't help thinking that my suspicions about the positive conclusion of this article have not really been dispelled. Consequently, I would like to comment on this article by presenting some of my suspicions as follows:

- (1) Is it more likely that the development of maritime economy in China will influence on national regime itself by increasing the economic disparity between the coastal parts and internal parts and setting off democratization of entire nation among others, rather than promoting transformation to maritime nation?
- (2) The process and real status of China's practical control in the South China Sea linked with strengthening of naval powers as well as words and deeds concerning the maritime interests in the East China Sea are giving antipathy and wariness to the neighboring nations. Is it possible that China will be accepted by the neighboring nations as a maritime nation by wiping them away from now on?
- (3) China, which highly evaluates the theory in "*The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783*" by Alfred Thayer Mahan, may be practically acquiring three tines of Mahanian trident --"Production and Commerce," "Shipping," and "Colonies." The problem is the third element of "colonies" which is, to say in contemporary words, the "acquisition of overseas bases" for production, commerce and shipping maritime transport. Namely, it includes an access to emerging nations in Africa, Central and South Americas and others which China is now implementing, the establishment of relations with Myanmar (Burma) through the construction of oil pipelines, practical control of the South China Sea, and securing of the "Ring of Pearls." These are connected with so-called the new colonialism, imperialism, or hegemony, which can't be possibly accepted by international community.

- (4) Perhaps, we may have no objection to three cases of geographical conditions and one case of population among six criteria which, Mahan says, will impact upon sea power. However, as for the remaining two cases, so-called, the national character of recognition of and enthusiasm for oceans, as well as the political nature of government which will implement the national policy for utilizing oceans, they may have been created in a relatively short period of time under the dictatorship of a single political party. In short, from the impact of the “Taiwan-Strait Crisis,” then Commander of the PLA Navy Liu Huaqing pushed on with the development of a powerful navy with his strong leadership as an ambitious national policy under the great support of Deng Xiaoping (then Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission). Ironically, it is because China is an undemocratic state under one-party dictatorship that transformation to a maritime nation has been accelerated in a relatively short time. Nevertheless, it is extremely suspicious whether or not China can continue it in the international community which aims to bring about free and safe utilization of the oceans to all people, even after Beijing has transformed itself into a maritime nation.

(By Masami Kawamura, Rear Admiral of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force <Retired>)

II. “Mao’s ‘Active Defense’ is turning offensive”

This article entitled “Mao’s Active Defense Turning Offensive”³ is discussing that the “active defense” of Mao Zedong is turning into offensive one, based on the fact of recent Chinese naval deployment to the Indian Ocean.

What is unique here is that authors are discussing by applying the concepts of interior and exterior lines of operations. Since the 19th century at least China has been fighting with a posture of interior lines operations because of inferior military force. Today, China, which has become a great power both economically and militarily, is advancing into the Indian Ocean for the first time since a great voyage of Zheng He (1371-1433) six centuries ago. Looking from the relative relations with India which is positioned in its geographical center, authors say China is located along interior lines. Moreover, although I have deleted my own narration from the gist, showing examples in war history about the severity of exterior lines of operations which require thorough concentration of resources and time, authors are casting suspicions on whether or not China is able to implement a strategy of exterior lines. Additionally, what may be able to wipe away this suspicion is said to be an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) which can be fired from any place in the vicinity of the Chinese national borders by operating its launchers flexibly.

³ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Mao’s Active Defense Turning Offensive” Proceedings Magazine, Apr 1, 2011, Vol. 137 <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-04/maos-active-defense-turning-offensive>

1. Synopsis of article

(1) Forward deployment to the Indian Ocean

Although hot eyes of Chinese power are directed toward the Indian Ocean, history tells why China is attaching greater importance to South Asia as its urgent strategic option. China is building naval presence in the Indian Ocean which is an important sea-lane for importing the resources which support the rapid development of Chinese economy. In so doing, it is venturing into unmarked territory, assuming an offensive stance unprecedented in modern Chinese history.

Since the Opium Wars of the 1840s, the premise of China's strategy has been that China would face the battles as a weak belligerent nation in any conflicts. Chinese forces resort to the defensive so they can buy the time they need to turn the tables and prosecute a devastating counteroffensive. Indeed, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong founded his strategy of "active defense"—the concept that inspires and lends its name to China's near-seas defense strategy—on this axiom of its contemporary statecraft. Changing circumstances have modified Mao's insight. No longer is China necessarily the weaker antagonist when it engages foreign competitors.

However, taking the offensive across great distances represents a departure for Beijing as it attempts to repeal the long "century of humiliation" that began with the Opium Wars. To mount a serious forward presence in South Asia, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) must approach the region along "exterior lines," overcoming convoluted geography, competing requirements in China's "near seas," and opposition from an India that occupies the "interior position" in the Indian Ocean, with all the advantages that go to the defender holding its own ground. In short, a forward deployment to the Indian Ocean is becoming conceivable for Chinese rulers for the first time since the Ming Dynasty six centuries ago. To all appearances, Beijing understands the magnitude of such a project, its perils, and potential for lost opportunities in East Asia. Should China's leadership siphon off forces to the Indian Ocean, that is, it must accept greater risk in regional trouble spots like the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. The remoteness of the Indian Ocean, coupled with unfinished business close to home, will apply a brake on Chinese strategy. On the other hand, advances in military technology—in particular an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) purportedly capable of striking throughout the China seas and into the Indian Ocean basin—promise to ease such constraints. If the PLA Navy can rely on shore-based fire support over vast distances, naval commanders might get by with fewer resources, not only in China's near seas but in remote theaters like South Asia. The capacity to mount an economy-of-force deployment backed by long-range fire support would reduce risk in the near seas—making the decision easier for Beijing to send the ships forth. While technology is not everything, it does carry strategic import.

(2) Interior lines, exterior lines

Strategic geography helps illuminate the promise and perils an Indian Ocean presence holds for China. Milan Vego relates the concepts of interior and exterior lines—concepts derived from land warfare—to the sea. Explains Vego: Interior lines in general allow concentration of one's

forces against one part of the enemy force, while holding the other in check with a force distinctly inferior in strength.

China is accustomed to operating along interior lines. During the 1920s, Mao's Red Army confronted a series of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns through which Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army drove the Chinese Communist Party to the brink of extinction. Japan invaded the mainland during the 1930s, also along exterior lines. The United States and its allies prosecuted a successful "containment" strategy during the Cold War, using naval and air forces based along the offshore island chain to impede Chinese and Soviet naval movement. Since then the United States has preserved its strategic position through its alliance with Japan and bases on Pacific islands such as Guam and Hawaii. Now, as before, China holds the central position with all the advantages it entails, notably nearby bases and forces, agile movement in space, and short lines of communication aided by vastly improved national highways and railways. If the interior position offers the advantages Vego spotlights, how can an exterior power prevail?

(3) The Indian Ocean as China's Exterior Lines

In the Indian Ocean, China is located on the exterior lines in its relative relation with India which is located in its geographical center. China must succeed in strategy of exterior lines in order to deploy its own power to the Indian Ocean, where the Indians live, occupy the central position, and have their own ambitions for the sea.

First of all, China must project meaningful military power into the Indian Ocean. It must accumulate enough sea power in the region—manifest in oceangoing forces and forward bases—to convince observers that the PLA has achieved superiority over India within India's natural sphere of primacy. And to complicate matters, Beijing must pull this off in strategic surroundings where the United States has pledged to stage "credible combat power," both in the Western Pacific, where China remains on interior lines and can concentrate in space, and in the Indian Ocean, where China must concentrate in time to get its way. Grasping this, Chinese analysts are wary of the U.S. military presence in Diego Garcia, from which the United States can radiate naval and air power throughout the region.

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz urged commanders to strike at the enemy "center of gravity" repeatedly, landing "blow after blow" against this "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." However, like all rules, his rule of concentrated effort has an exception: The principle of aiming everything at the enemy's center of gravity admits of only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally rewarding. But we must repeat that only decisive superiority can justify diverting strength without risking too much in the principal theater [his emphasis].

Think about it. Which of China's near seas constitutes the principal theater in Clausewitzian parlance? Does China stand to gain anything in the Indian Ocean that qualifies as exceptionally rewarding? And does the PLA hold decisive superiority in any—let alone all—of the East Asian theaters? Whether Beijing can spare forces for South Asia depends on how it answers these questions.

(4) Effectiveness of ASBMs

Technology could offset the “Clausewitzian dilemmas” besetting Chinese strategists. Successive Defense Department reports on “Chinese Military Power” contain a map showing which seas would fall within range of ASBMs with a maximum effective firing range of just less than 1,250 miles, assuming mobile launchers were stationed all along China’s land frontiers. From border sites, Chinese Second Artillery Corps (SAC) could target ships under way throughout the entire Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, and Strait of Malacca. Moreover, they could strike throughout the Bay of Bengal along the Indian east coast. They could even reach into the northern Arabian Sea. In a sense, arid, landlocked provinces like Tibet and Xinjiang now form part of China’s maritime frontier. From there, the PLA could loft ASBMs toward adversary fleets. Similarly, an operational ASBM would enable the PLA Second Artillery Corps to deliver fire support across massive swaths of maritime Asia, defending PLA Navy task forces—a Chinese fortress fleet—against stronger competitors.

Should Beijing opt to erect a base network in South Asia, furthermore, ASBMs—particularly if forward-deployed to the region, expanding their threat envelope even more—would let the PLA defend these bases against the Indian Navy, the U.S. Navy, or some other antagonist. Chinese naval forces could do more with less, even while operating far from home on exterior lines. Mobile ASBM batteries positioned in southwestern China, then, would let the PLA mount a flanking action to offset difficult strategic geography. Imaginative use of ASBMs with forward-deployed PLA Navy submarines and surface ships would ease the strain of projecting power into the Indian Ocean, helping Beijing fulfill its goal of effective naval suasion for scholar Edward Luttwak.

Consequently, Beijing, it appears, is laying the groundwork for a standing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. An ASBM thus promises to lower the operational barrier to entry into the Indian Ocean, holding down the perceived cost of exterior-line operations there and making such a presence plausible in Clausewitzian cost/benefit terms. No longer must Beijing fear sacrificing interests along its periphery for the sake of geographically remote—yet economically acute—interests in the Indian Ocean. Because such a forward deployment would depend so heavily on a panoply of missile technologies, however, it would be vulnerable to Indian or American countermeasures that blunt the ASBM’s effectiveness.

The likely outcome is a seesaw dynamic between offense and defense, challenge and reply in maritime Asia. Just as the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Aegis combat system swung the pendulum toward the Fleet during the 1980s, restoring the potential of the offensive, technological progress now threatens to revolutionize shore fire support in favor of the defender. It’s up to scientists, engineers, and tacticians to start swinging the pendulum back toward the U.S. Navy and its allies.

2. Comments:

- (1) The concepts of interior and exterior lines are relative. If we look at the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean from the relative relation with India, China is positioned on the exterior (offensive) line. But, if we look at the Indian Ocean from the relative relations with the

United States Armed Forces which regards the Indian Ocean as an area of responsibility (AOR), it could be said that the United States Armed Forces is positioned on the exterior line while China is positioned on the interior defensive) line.

- (2) So-called China's "String of Pearls" could be regarded as strategic bases (exterior line points). Of them, a naval base in Myanmar and Gwadar Port which Pakistan is reported to have asked China to use it as a naval base are geographically connected with Chinese borders through Tibet Autonomous Area and Xinjan Uighur Autonomous Area, respectively. They could be China's interior lines from the relations between the United States and China in the Indian Ocean.
- (3) In order to put the Indian Ocean Theater under the shooting range of the ASBM, it is essential to deploy mobile artillery force units to Tibet Autonomous Area and Xinjan Uighur Autonomous Area. Additionally, these two autonomous regions in the neighborhood of national borders of Myanmar and Pakistan, which have naval bases available to China as mentioned in the preceding Mo. 2 item, are, in a sense, extremely vital areas which can have influence over Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.
- (4) The article says: "If China realize highly accurate, long range ASBMs, China may have a fortress fleet." But it mentions nothing about the U.S. Navy that can threaten the fortress fleet or the submarine warfare capabilities of the allied navies.
- (5) The article mentions no further than that, as China's deployment to the Indian Ocean depends largely on the ASBM technology, it is weak to the countermeasure of India and the United States which are able to neutralize its effectiveness. They are discussing nothing about the concrete matters. And now, turning to the East Asian theater, how is the reality? In particular, regarding the countermeasures against the ASBMs which can be taken by Japan, they will include strengthening of BMD systems, as well as operations by using the submarines which are hard to be targeted (ASW) are considered. As a matter of course, Chinese counter-measures against them would be ASW. In this ASW, measures by using not only surface vessels and/or aircraft but also mines can be expected. As a more conclusive objectives, it will be for the purpose of increasing flexibility in the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities. Moreover, as the roles to be performed by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and countermine warfare will be added.

(By Masami Kawamura, Rear Admiral of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force <Retired>)

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