

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

September 2010



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Review of “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing”

This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of September 2010.

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Intelligence Summary in September 2010

Maritime Security: On the 8th, US Marines boarded and seized a German vessel hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. The recovery operation by the marine assault team took about an hour, but there were no injuries among the marines and the crew. It is the first time the US Marines have released a vessels seized by the pirates.

On the 10th, two Thai navy ships – the offshore patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* and the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* - left Sattahip naval base in the Gulf of Thailand for waters off Somalia. In the 98-day operation 351 crew members and the unit of 20 navy's SEALs will be involved. The budget for the mission has been set at 270 million baht (approx. 50 million yen).

On the 16th, China and Taiwan marked a historical first by launching a joint search and rescue exercise in the waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island of Fujian province. Involving more than 400 participants, 14 search & rescue vessels, and three helicopters, the land-sea-air drill featured a scenario in which two vessels collided in waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island of Fujian province.

The British newspaper, *The Independent* dated 28 September carried an article that Insurers and the global shipping industry are studying to establish 'private navy' comprising about 20 patrol vessels with armed guards on board to complement the potential of the naval escort vessels dispatched from several nations to waters off Somalia.

On the 8th, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) released a special report on pirate incidents on the rise off the islands of Anambas, Natura and Mangkaiin the South China Sea titled "ReCAAP ISC, Special Report on Situation off Pulau Anambas and Pulau Mangkai." An outline of the report is carried as a "topic" in this monthly report.

Military Developments: The United States IMINT & Analysis Web site recently released the Google-Earth satellite images which show a new airport is nearing completion in Huludao in Liaoning Province in China. The new airport, which is located 28 kilometers southwest of Huludao, has been under construction in April 2009 – June 2010. The airport could become the first one for the parking of Chinese J-15 carrier aircraft.

The Chinese navy's indigenous hospital ship "*Peace Ark 2010* (和諧使命 2010)" reached the Gulf of Aden on Sep. 15. The "*Peace Ark*" will provide two-day medical services for Chinese sailors in the sixth Chinese naval escort flotilla. Thereafter, the ship will travel to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and Bangladesh, and provide medical treatment and medical services for locals.

On the 20th, the U. S. Air Force remotely piloted aircraft, the RQ-4 Global Hawks, were deployed to Guam. Three Global Hawks are planned to be deployed in Guam eventually. The remaining two are scheduled to arrive later this year and at the beginning of 2011.

On the 27th, the U.S. and South Korea navies kicked off five-day joint anti-submarine warfare exercises in the waters west of the Korean peninsula. The recent joint exercises are the second in

a series following a large scale of exercises conducted in the Japan Sea in late July.

According to RIA Novosti dated September 28, Russia's newest strategic nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN), the *Borey* class *Yury Dolgoruky*, has completed sea trials in the White Sea and returned to its base in northern Russia. The boat is now ready for final inspection by a state commission before it enters service with the Russian Navy. Three other *Borey* class SSBNs, the *Alexander Nevsky*, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, and *Svyatitel Nikolai* are in different stages of completion. Russia is planning to build eight of these subs by 2015.

Maritime Boundaries: On the 12th, Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Najib Razak called for a better mechanism to resolve maritime border issues with Indonesia. The two sides have agreed to hold meetings in October and in November 2010 to resolve the border issue, with discussions covering zones in areas such as the Sulawesi Sea and the South China Sea.

On the 21st, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced it was pushing through with the plan to develop Pag-Asa Island under its control, which is part of the Spratly Islands, into a tourist spot.

Diplomacy and International Relations: Andrew Krepinevich, President of the U.S. think tank, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, contributed an article titled "China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific" to the U.S. Newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated 11 September. In the article, mentioning that the threat of 'Finlandization' has revived in the western Pacific, Krepinevich discusses that Washington's longstanding allies and friends in the Western Pacific want a stable military balance in the region that will encourage Beijing to pursue its goals according to accepted international norms of behavior. For if the military balance between the U.S. and China continues to deteriorate, they may have no choice but to follow Finland's Cold War example.

Daniel Blumenthal, a fellow at the US think tank based in Washington D. C., the American Enterprise Institute for Public research (AEI), contributed an article titled "Washington take note: The era of great power politics is far from over in Asia" to the US journal, *Foreign Policy* dated the 24th. In this article he mentions that the United States should bear in mind that the age of power politics has not ended in Asia and discusses the major points as follows: (1) The diplomatic task of the United States with respect to Japan is to help shake Tokyo out of stagnation, and to help Japan become a more coherent and powerful strategic actor. (2) The task of the United States at hand is to manage the growing Sino-U.S. security competition.

Robert D. Kaplan, a national correspondent for *The Atlantic* magazine and a senior fellow at the U S think tank based in Washington D. C., the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), contributed an article titled "While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power" to the US newspaper, *The Washington Post* dated the 26th. In the article Kaplan discusses that the greatest geopolitical development that has occurred largely beneath the radar of our Middle East-focused media over the past decade has been the rise of Chinese sea power. That is why the degree to which the United States can shift its focus from the Middle East to East Asia will decide its future

prospects as a great power.

In the “Column” in this report the OPRF carried an article titled “Is a ‘low profile policy’ (韬光养晦: *taoguangyang*) collapsing ?”: Viewed from the South China Sea and Collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard patrol boats” by Aki Mori, Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Political Science, Law Department, Doshisha University, and Fellow of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF).

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: According to the Singaporean newspaper, *The Straits Times* dated September 8, India is planning to build a transshipment port at South Bay on Great Nicobar island of Nicobar Islands. The Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands is located to control the passage through the Malacca Straits. When completed, transshipment hub could be of both commercial and strategic significance to South-east Asia as well as rival ports in Sri Lanka. Current planning provides for a berthing facility of a modest 3.2 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent unit, a basic container measurement used in shipping) by 2015, rising to 7.4 million TEUs by 2020.

According to the Indian newspaper, *The Times of India* dated September 17, The Sri Lankan government recently made a contract to build a new deep-water container terminal in Colombo port with a consortium consisting of China Merchant Holdings International and Aitken Spence. The terminal will be built by the same company that built the Hambantota port complex -- China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) and Sino Hydro Corporation.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: Regarding the China’s release of the manned submersible “Jiaolong” reaching a depth 3,759 meters and flag planting on the seafloor of the South China Sea on August 26, the U.S. daily newspaper, *The New York Times* dated August 26 pointed out an outline of the report as follows. The paper carried the article that the recent experiment of the submersible research vessel is a show of China’s bravado to the exploration of parts of the deep seabed, which are rich in oil, minerals and other resources.

Intelligence Assessment: In the summer quarterly of *The Naval War College Review*, Summer 2010, Vol. 63, No. 3, issued by the US Naval War College, Toshi Yoshihara, an associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, carried an article titled “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing.” The author summarizes this article, based on his reviews of the works issued in China and interviews with military personnel of the People’s of the Liberation Army (PLA) and military analysts. This article analyzes that China has an intention of striking first the U. S. military bases in Japan with ballistic missiles, urging Japan and the United States to take necessary counter-measures. This monthly report reviews and comments on this article in Intelligence Assessment.

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

September 8 “US Marines capture ship hijacked by pirates” (BBC News, September 9, 2010)

On the 8th, US Marines boarded and seized a German vessel hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. The recovery operation by the marine assault team took about an hour, but there were no injuries among the marines and the crew. It is the first time the US Marines have released a vessels seized by the pirates.

An outline of the article: According to the US Fifth Fleet, on the 8th, US Marines boarded and seized a German vessel hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. Navy officials told a container ship operated by the German shipping company (Antigua and Barbuda-flagged), M/V *Magellan Star* (8,000DWT), was boarded and hijacked by nine Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia on the 8th. A distress call from the *Magellan Star* was relayed from the Turkish frigate TCG *Gokceada* of the CTF-151, a multinational anti-piracy force, in the vicinity to the US Navy amphibious transport dock USS *Dubuque*, whose marine assault team was launched to board the pirate boat. Meanwhile, after searching the vessel for three hours, the pirates were unable to locate the 11 crew, according to the ship's German owners, Quadrant. The pirates then phoned the shipping company in Hamburg to ask where the crew members were hidden. “They were told the crew was on holiday,”said a spokesman of the company. “They then asked how to switch the engines back on, but were told they were broken.” The 11 crew, comprising two Russians, two Poles, and seven Filipinos, spent the time hidden away in a small, cramped safe room whose entrance was not immediately obvious. The recovery operation by the marine assault team took about an hour, but there were no injuries among the marines and the crew. Nine pirate suspects were taken into custody. Their fate has yet to be determined. It is the first time the US Marines have released a vessels seized by the pirates.

Refer to the article on the Web site: US Marines capture ship hijacked by pirates off Somalia
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11250785>



US Marines overpowered nine pirates who had captured MV *Magellan Star* (left)

Source: BBC News, September 9, 2010

September 9 “Somali pirates release Bulgarian vessel” (BBC News, September 9, 2010)

On the 9th, a group of Somali pirates released the Bulgarian-flagged chemical tanker MT *Pinega*. The tanker was hijacked about 160km east of the Yemeni port of Aden on May 11. Her 15 Bulgarian crew members are in good health.

An outline of the article: According to the Bulgarian foreign ministry, a group of Somali pirates released the Bulgarian-flagged chemical tanker MT *Pinega* on the 9th. The tanker was hijacked about 160km east of the Yemeni port of Aden on May 11. Her 15 Bulgarian crew members are in good health. According to Ecoterra International, an organization monitoring piracy, at least 23 foreign vessels with more than 411 crew members are currently held by pirates. In the year 2009 there were more than 200 attacks by Somali pirates - including 68 successful hijackings - and ransoms believed to exceed \$50m in total were paid, the organization said.

Refer to the article on the Web site: An Bulgarian-flagged ship released
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11250785>



The Bulgarian chemical tanker *Panega* was released by Somali pirates on September 9

Source: BBC News, September 9, 2010

September 10 “Thai navy sends vessels off Somalia” (The Bangkok Post, September 11, 2010)

On the 10th, two Thai navy ships – the offshore patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* and the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* - left Sattahip naval base in the Gulf of Thailand for waters off Somalia. In the 98-day operation 351 crew members and the unit of 20 navy's SEALs will be involved. The budget for the mission has been set at 270 million baht (approx. 50 million yen).

An outline of the article: On the 10th, two Thai navy ships – the offshore patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* and the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* - left Sattahip naval base in the Gulf of Thailand for waters off Somalia. During the mission of the 98-day operation the navy ships are to protect up to 60 Thai-related ships that pass through the Gulf of Aden annually and Thai fishing vessels in those waters. The flotilla comprises a total of 351 crew members, and the unit of 20 navy's SEALs will be part of the flotilla involved in the mission. The ships are expected to take 17 days to reach the Gulf of Aden, and they are expected to return about Dec 12. The budget for the mission has been set at 270 million baht (approx. 50 million yen). Navy personnel will receive a daily allowance of 2,100 baht (approx. 5,800 yen) each for the mission. (The HTMS *Similan* is a

logistics support vessel built in China in 1996. The HTMS *Pattani* is an offshore patrol vessel built in China in 2005.) At present, 28 countries are involved in counter-piracy operations off Somalia.

According to the Thai Ship-owners' Association, there were 32 attacks on Thai ships in 2009. In the latest incident which occurred on April 18, three fishing boats were hijacked by pirates.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Armed task force sets sail on security mission

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/195695/hunt-begins-for-somali-pirates>

THE MISSION

- **PERSONNEL:** 351 navy officers plus 20 officers from the marine special warfare task force who will be stationed at the international task force based in the Middle East.
- **HELICOPTERS:** 2
- **MISSION DURATION:** 98 days (Sept 10-Dec 12)
- **BUDGET:** 270 million baht

HTMS PATTANI
 TYPE: Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)
 BUILDER: China State Shipbuilding Corporation
 FULL LOAD: 1,440 tonnes
 DIMENSIONS: 95.5m x 11.6m
 WEAPONRY: OTO Melara Super Rapid gun, Oerlikon GAM-CO01 gun, 12.7mm gun; helicopter deck and hangar.

HTMS SIMILAN
 TYPE: Replenishment ship
 BUILDER: China State Shipbuilding Corporation
 FULL LOAD: 22,000 tonnes
 DIMENSIONS: 171.4m x 24.6m
 WEAPONRY: Four 20mm guns; helicopter deck and hangar.

There have been a number of attacks by Somali pirates against Thai ships in the Gulf of Aden over the past five years. Some key incidents are as follows:

- March 16, 2005: Three Somali naval officers who were hired to guard the Thai fishing vessel *Sirichai Nava* hijacked the ship and demanded a ransom of \$800,000 (24.8 million baht). A combined US-UK naval task force in the Gulf of Aden intercepted the hijacked ship two days later and arrested the three suspects. The relatives of the suspects assisted revenge by kidnapping staff of *Sirichai Fishery Co.*, which owned the ship. Negotiations took place to exchange the hostages and prisoners.
- May 11, 2005: A Thai ship with 26 crew and loaded with sugar was heading from Brazil to Yemen when it was captured by pirates.
- Aug 14, 2008: The Thai cargo ship, the *MV Thor Star*, with 28 Thai crew members on board, owned by listed firm Thoresen Thai Agencies, was hijacked.
- Nov 13, 2008: Somali pirates seized the Thai fishing vessel *Ekawat Nava 5* with 15 crew heading from Oman to Yemen. An Indian Navy frigate nearby went looking for the ship. After the pirates were seen with weapons, the frigate opened fire at and sank the ship. Fourteen crew went missing and are presumed dead while one survived.
- Oct 28, 2008: The Thai Union 3 fishing vessel with a crew of 23 was hijacked and a \$3 million ransom demanded.
- April 20, 2010: Three Thai fishing vessels, the *Pran Talay 11, 12 and 14* with a total of 77 crew members, were hijacked. Negotiations are ongoing.

Dispatch of Thai navy off Somalia & major pirate attacks on Thai-related vessels in the past five years

Source: The Bangkok Post, September 11, 2010

【Related Story】

“Thai warships to be deployed to Gulf of Aden” (Channel 6 News Online, September 28, 2010)

On the 28th, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain announced that two vessels from the Royal Thai Navy will be deployed to the Gulf of Aden to join the counter-piracy mission.

During their 98-day deployment, the two vessels will conduct counter-piracy operations with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151).

An outline of the article: On the 28th, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain announced that two vessels from the Royal Thai Navy will be deployed to the Gulf of Aden to join the counter-piracy mission. Eight officers from the Royal Thai Navy have already arrived at CMF headquarters in preparation for the deployment of the expeditionary combatants. During their 98-day deployment, the two vessels will conduct counter-piracy operations with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151). Before the Thai navy is dispatched, a four-member team from Coalition Communications based at Naval Support Activity Bahrain was sent to Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand to provide technical assistance and training associated with installing and operating communication equipment and networking capability in order to be integrated into the CTF-151. Four members are sailing with the Thai vessels.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Two Thai vessels join Combined Maritime Forces in counter-piracy mission

<http://channel6news.com/2010/09/two-thai-vessels-join-combined-maritime-forces-in-counter-piracy-mission/>

September 11 “China’s 5th Naval taskforce returns home” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, September 12 and September 21, 2010)

After accomplishing their escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast, the “*Guangzhou*” warship and the “*Chaohu*” warship of the 5th Chinese naval escort taskforce returned to their motherland on September 11. The 5th Chinese naval escort taskforce carried out escort for 588 Chinese and foreign merchant ships. The taskforce also held meetings and exchanges with the naval units of the CTF-151, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in succession, and conducted a maritime joint exercise with the escort taskforce of the ROK.

An outline of the article: After accomplishing their escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast, the “*Guangzhou*” warship and the “*Chaohu*” warship of the 5th Chinese naval escort taskforce returned to their motherland on September 11. Attending a ceremony to welcome the taskforce, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Xiao Xinnian, Political Commissar of the South Sea Fleet Huang Jiaxiang and Commander of the South Sea Fleet Su Zhiqian expressed their appreciation to the personnel of the taskforce for accomplishing the mission. According to the PLA Daily, the 5th Chinese naval escort taskforce carried out escort for 588 Chinese and foreign merchant ships. The taskforce also held meetings and exchanges with the naval units of the CTF-151, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in succession, and conducted a maritime joint exercise with the escort taskforce of the ROK. On the 20th, Political Commissar of the South Sea Fleet Huang Jiaxiang commended the task force for successfully accomplishing the various military missions, including the longest cruise, escort of the highest number of the vessels, the highest number of port visits to foreign countries, which were highly appreciated at home and abroad. Moreover, on their homeward voyage, the “*Guangzhou*” warship and the “*Chaohu*” warship of the 5th Chinese naval escort

taskforce visited Egypt, Italy, Greece and Myanmar at the invitation of the four countries and berthed at the dock of Singapore.

Refer to the article on the Web sites: Original text in Chinese:

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/12/content_38304.htm

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/21/content_38963.htm

September 14 “Somali pirates possibly using hijacked VLCC as mother boat” (Platts, September 15, 2010)

A very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) which is owned by South Korea's Samho Shipping Corp, MT *Samho Dream* (319,000DWT), which was seized by Somali pirates, could be used by its hijackers as a mother ship, the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) warned on the 14th. The PRC also warned ships to keep away from the VLCC.

An outline of the article: A very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) which is owned by South Korea's Samho Shipping Corp, MT *Samho Dream* (319,000DWT), which was seized by Somali pirates, could be used by its hijackers as a mother ship, the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) warned on the 14th. The PRC also warned ships to keep away from the VLCC. In an advisory sent to ship captains, the PRC advisory said: “On the morning of September 14, MT *Samho Dream* was sighted heading east and 80 nautical miles from Somali coast. The tanker may be used to conduct pirate mother ship operations to attack other vessels.” “All vessels are advised to keep clear of MT *Samho Dream* and report her position to the center,” said the PRC. The tanker was taken by the pirates in the Indian Ocean on April 4 while moving two million barrels of crude from the Iraqi port of Basra to the US Gulf Coast. The value of the cargo is estimated at \$170 million. MT *Sambo Dream* had 24 crew members. According to the South Korea's Samho Shipping Corp., it was still in talks with the hijackers. But they are demanding a ransom of \$20 million, and negotiations have a rough road ahead over the ransom amount.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Hijacked S Korea VLCC Samho Dream turned into pirates' mother ship

<http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/HeadlineNews/Oil/8955385/>

【Related Story】

“Reason for move remains mystery” (Eagle Speak, September 18, 2010)

At the present time, the very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) MT *Samho Dream* is said to be a short distance off the coast of Garacad in the semi-autonomous Puntland region.

An outline of the article: At the present time, the very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) MT *Samho Dream* is said to be a short distance off the coast of Garacad in the semi-autonomous Puntland region. The reason for its move from the town of Hobyo some way south of this spot remains shrouded in mystery.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Samho Dream ‘off Garacad’:

<http://www.eaglespeak.us/2010/09/somali-pirates-vlcc-mother-ship-just.html>



Travel Route

Source: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_E-QOnTGFX_o/TJSe9B8ttAI/AAAAAAAAAKYM/sKJZaruISZ8/s1600/nm.jpg

September 16 “China, Taiwan launch 1st joint sea rescue drill” (The China Daily, September 17, 2010)

On the 16th, China and Taiwan marked a historical first by launching a joint search and rescue exercise in the waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island of Fujian province. Involving more than 400 participants, 14 search & rescue vessels, and three helicopters, the land-sea-air drill featured a scenario in which two vessels collided in waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island of Fujian province.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, China and Taiwan marked a historical first by launching a joint search and rescue exercise in the waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island of Fujian province. Involving more than 400 participants, 14 search & rescue vessels, and three helicopters, the land-sea-air drill featured a scenario in which two vessels collided in waters between the port city of Xiamen and the Kinmen Island. The exercise aimed to test the abilities of emergency response and communication, maritime search and medical personnel to safeguard transport in the Taiwan Straits.

Mainland participants included the China maritime Search and Rescue Center (CMSRC), the Association for Shipping Across the Straits and Xiamen city government. Participants from Taiwan included the Chinese Search and Rescue Association and the government of Kinmen County.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Mainland, Taiwan launch joint sea rescue drill

<http://english.eastday.com/e/100917/u1a5452182.html>



A "rescuer" is lowered by a helicopter's winch cable during a maritime search and rescue drill near Xiamen, Fujian province, on September 16.

Source: <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2010-09-16/1125611088.html>

September 17 “French warship intercept pirate group” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, September 18, 2010)

On the 17th, finding a Pirate Action Group (PAG) comprising six boats off the coast of Somalia, the flagship of EU NAVFOR, FS *De Grasse*, captured four boats off the coast of Somalia and prevented them from attacking merchant vessels.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, finding a Pirate Action Group (PAG) comprising six boats off the coast of Somalia, the flagship of EU NAVFOR, FS *De Grasse*, captured four boats of the and prevented them from attacking merchant vessels. On the previous day of the 16th, while conducting a routine patrol, the helicopter from FS *De Grasse* spotted on a beach suspicious boats loaded with ladders, fuel tanks and others, indicating the imminent departure to sea of a PGP. On the morning of the 17th, the helicopter from FS *De Grasse* relocated this same group at sea. The PGP was comprised of several skiffs and a whaler; a boat of larger size and often used as a refueling asset. In total, twelve suspected pirates and four boats (three skiffs and one whaler) were intercepted by the boarding team of FS *De Grasse*. Two further skiffs fled the scene. The French navy released 12 pirate suspects, as none of the pirates were caught in the act of piracy. But one whaler and one skiff were destroyed.

Refer to the article on the Web site: EU NAVFOR Flagship FS DE GRASSE disrupts Pirate Action Group

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/eu-navfor-flagship-fs-de-grasse-disrupts-pirate-action-group/>



The whaler intercepted by EU NAVFOR was used as a logistical asset for the five skiffs

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, September 18, 2010

【Related Article】

“Spanish warship captures pirate group” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, September 23, 2010)

On the 22nd, finding a pirate action group comprising one whaler and two skiffs only 500 meters from the Somali coast, EU NAVFOR Spanish navy’s frigate SPS *Galicia* captured it and prevented acts of piracy from happening.

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, finding a pirate action group comprising one whaler and two skiffs only 500 meters from the Somali coast, EU NAVFOR Spanish navy’s frigate SPS *Galicia* captured it and prevented acts of piracy from happening. The whaler and skiffs carried 11 pirate suspects and all pirate paraphernalia indicating they were preparing to conduct acts of piracy off the coasts: fuel drums, ladders, weapons and ammunition. As none of these suspects were caught in an act of piracy, they were released. However, the whaler and one skiff were destroyed.

Refer to the article on the Web site: The Spanish warship GALICIA disrupts a pirate action group off the Somali coasts.

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/the-spanish-warship-%e2%80%9cgalicia%e2%80%9d-disrupts-a-pirate-action-group-off-the-somali-coasts/>

September 25 “Panama-flagged ship lost contact in IO; heading for Somalia” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, September 25, 2010)

In the early hours of the 25th, the Panama-flagged cargo ship MV *Lugela* operated by the Greek shipping company sent a distress alert in the Indian Ocean (IO), approximately 900 nautical miles East of Eyl, Somalia. A short while later, the vessel altered course to sail toward the Somali coast.

An outline of the article: In the early hours of the 25th, the Panama-flagged cargo ship MV *Lugela* (4,281DWT) chartered by the Greek shipping company sent a distress alert to its Greek operator. The vessel was in the Indian Ocean (IO), approximately 900 nautical miles East of Eyl, Somalia. A short while later, the vessel altered course to sail toward the Somali coast. There has been no contact with the ship throughout this incident. After having transited through the Gulf of Aden, the MV *Lugela* was sailing in direction of Republic of Mauritius with a cargo of steel bars and wires. MV *Lugela* has a crew of 12, all Ukrainian.

Refer to the article on the Web site: MV LUGELA pirated in the Somali Basin

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/mv-lugela-pirated-in-the-somali-basin/>



MV *Lugela*

Source: <http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/mv-lugela-pirated-in-the-somali-basin/>

September 28 “UAE to provide armed escort to tankers in home waters” (Shiptalk, September 29, 2010)

On the 28th, a security official of the United Arab Emirate (UAE) has said they are willing to escort oil tankers traveling in the capital’s waters if they are requested to provide escort.

An outline of the article: On the 28th, a security official of the United Arab Emirate (UAE) has said they are willing to escort oil tankers traveling in the capital’s waters if they are requested to provide escort. The Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA) which are tasked with protecting the capital’s major facilities says, if tankers of any nationalities feel threatened [by a potential attack] and make a request for security measures to the authority, the CNIA could provide better protection to ships. On 28 July, there was an incident in which the tanker of the Shosen Mitsui, MT *M Star*, had its hull damaged in the Hormuz Straits. But, according to the CNIA, there has been no increase in such requests since the July accident. In addition, an operational officer of the CNIA said the July incident occurred outside the territorial waters of the UAE.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Armed Escort

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=5958>

September 28 “Marine Insurance firm studying ‘private navy’ for anti-piracy” (The Independent, September 28, 2010)

The British newspaper *The Independent* dated September 28 carried an article that Insurers and the global shipping industry are studying to establish ‘private navy’ comprising about 20

patrol vessels with armed guards on board to complement the potential of the naval escort vessels dispatched from several nations to waters off Somalia.

An outline of the article: The British newspaper, *The Independent* dated September 28 carried an article that Insurers and the global shipping industry are studying to establish 'private navy' to complement the potential of the naval escort vessels dispatched from several nations to waters off Somalia. The gist of the report is as follows.

- (1) A leading London insurer is pushing ahead with radical proposals to create a 'private navy' of about 20 patrol boats crewed by armed guards to complement the potential of the naval escort vessels dispatched from several nations to waters off Somalia.
- (2) The 'private navy' would have set-up costs of around £10m, which would be funded by insurers and shipping companies in return for a reduction on the anti-piracy insurance premiums, which average around £50,000 per voyage and can reach £300,000 for a very large crude oil carrier (VLCC).
- (3) Major obstacles remain before the 'private navy' can set sail, such as the legal status of a private force and its relationship with the NATO-controlled naval fleet. Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT), which insures 14 percent of the world's commercial shipping fleet, said: "The 'private navy' would work under the direct control of the military with clear rules of engagement valid under international law." Major shipping companies and key insurers are keen to proceed with the plan. Part of shipping companies already has armed teams on board vessels. The establishment of the 'private navy' funded by the shipping industries and insurers is unique departure and evidence of strong determination there that more needs to be done to counter piracy. A source at one major shipping organization stressed: Although the proposal was "viable," it was vital it did not lead to a down-scaling of the international military force.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Insurance firms plan private navy to take on Somali pirates

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/insurance-firms-plan-private-navy-to-take-on-somali-pirates-2091298.html>

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/08/mv-suez-hijacked-in-the-gulf-of-aden/>

September 29 "Panama-flagged ship pirated in Somali Basin" (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, September 29, 2010)

On the 29th, the Panama-flagged asphalt carrier MV *Asphalt Venture* (3,884DWT) was confirmed to be pirated in the Somali Basin, approximately 100 nautical miles South-East of Dar es Salaam in the Somali Basin.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, the Panama-flagged asphalt carrier MV *Asphalt Venture* (3,884DWT) was confirmed to be pirated in the Somali Basin, approximately 100 nautical miles South-East of Dar es Salaam in the Somali Basin. The vessel had made a sudden, unplanned deviation to its course to Durban in the Republic of South Africa, turning back toward the Somali coast, and then failed to respond to repeated radio calls. MV *Asphalt Venture* has a crew of 15, all Indian.

Refer to the article on the Web site: MV ASPHALT VENTURE pirated in Somali Basin
<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/mv-asphalt-venture-pirated-in-somali-basin/>



MV Asphalt Venture

Source: <http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/mv-asphalt-venture-pirated-in-somali-basin/>

September 29 “Italian warship frees Iranian-flagged dhow” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, September 29, 2010)

On the 29th, the EU NAVFOR Italian ship ITS *Libeccio* freed an Iranian-flagged pirated dhow which had been hijacked by the pirate group. There were 10 pirates and seven crew members in the dhow.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, the EU NAVFOR Italian ship ITS *Libeccio* freed an Iranian-flagged pirated dhow which had been hijacked by the pirate group. The dhow was located off Tanzania on the 28th by an EU NAVFOR French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA). The French MPRA located the dhow towing a whaler (large boat) and two skiffs, indicating that it had possibly been pirated. The MPRA maintained surveillance until ITS *Libeccio* arrived in the area and launched her helicopter to investigate [the dhow]. Warning shots were fired from the helicopter in an attempt to stop the dhow. The dhow initially refused to stop and was shadowed overnight by ITS *Libeccio*. The pirates finally agreed to surrender on the morning of the 29th. There were 10 pirates and seven crew members in the dhow.

Refer to the article on the Web site: EU NAVFOR Italian ship ITS LIBECCIO frees pirated dhow off Tanzania

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/eu-navfor-italian-ship-its-libeccio-frees-pirated-dhow-off-tanzania/>

🔍 Topic 🔍

Piracy off the Islands of Anambas, Natuna and Mangkai in the South China Sea:
From the ReCAAP Special Report

On September 9, the Information Sharing Center (ISC) of the ReCAAP released a special report on the pirate incidents on the rise off the Pulau (Island) Anambas, Pulau Anambas and Pulau Mangkai in the South China Sea titled “ReCAAP ISC, Special Report on Situation Update off the Islands of Anambas, Natuna and Mangkai (Hereafter the report). Below is an outline of the report.

1. Status and Characteristics of Incidents off the islands of Anambas and Mangkai

Regarding the status of the incidents in the vicinity of the islands of Anambas and Mangkai, compared to the previous three years, there has been a drastic increase in 2010. By September 5, a total of 16 incidents (including one attempted case) were reported. Particularly, between August 16 and September 5 there were nine incidents, which were more than a half of the total. (There was one attempted case.) (refer to map)

Looking at the status of the incidents in the waters near Island of Anambas in the previous three years, the number increased gradually to two incidents in 2008 and 11 incidents in 2009.


The 16 incidents (including one attempted case) reported by September 5 occurred in the waters between 11 miles and 53 miles from the lighthouse in Mangkai island. Looking at the incidents by the time-frame, there were four incidents at 2030-0000, 0000-0200, and 0200-0430, respectively.

Regarding the nine actual incidents noted between August 16 and September 5, the following features were noted.

- (1) All incidents occurred while the ships targeted by pirates were steaming in the recommended corridor. As for the number of pirates in a group involved in each incident, eight incidents were caused by a group of eight pirates, and one incident by a group of four pirates. The pirates used speed boats (wooden boats equipped with an outboard motor), and in some incidents they boarded the ship from the rear part of the hull by using the rope with “grapnel.” The pirates usually used knives to threaten the crew. In the three incidents they were armed with guns and knives, but they did not fire the gun. (Of 15 actual incidents by September 5, there were one incident by a group of four members, nine incidents by a group of six members, one incident by a group of four members, nine incidents by a group six members, one incident by a group of seven members, three incidents by a group eight members, and one group with 12 members. There was one attempted incident by a group of six members.
- (2) After boarding the ship, pirates proceeded to the bridge and threatened the ship officers and others to have them guide to ship-master’s and crew’s cabins, where the pirates usually took crew’s personal belongings, namely, cash, mobile phones, cameras, laptops, wireless, etc. It was rare that the robbers inflict any harm on the crew, except three cases in which the crews

were harmed. Of nine incidents, two incidents were CAT-3 (Less Significant), and there was no CAT-1 (Very Significant). (Of 15 actual incidents reported by September 5, 13 incidents were CAT-2, and two incidents were CAT-3.)

- (3) Looking at the ships by type which were actually attacked by pirates, there were two chemical tankers (three of all 16 incidents), two oil tankers (two of all 16 incidents), one LNG tanker (one of 16 incidents), three bulk carriers (five of all 16 incidents; one attempted case), and one product tanker (two of all 16 incidents). Of all 16 incidents, apart from the types above-mentioned, two container ships were also attacked as targets.



CPA with Pulau Mangkai vis-à-vis Location of Incidents

Note: The chart shows the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) to Pulau Mangkai. The dotted line indicates the recommended route. (Special Report, p.6, p.19) The orange circle shows a CAT-2 incident. The blue circle shows a CAT-3 incident. The blue star shows an attempted incident. The three sets of letters in a green box indicate from top to down the ship's name, date of accident, and time of accident.

Source: http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_E-QOnTGFX_o/TI-CKRfYgMI/AAAAAAAAAKWM/RHh0rfJbcDg/s1600/ReCAAP-SCS-Attack-map.jpg

(ReCAAP ISC, Special Report on Situation off Pulau Anambas and Pulau Mangkai, p.19)

2. Recommendations to ship owners, shipping companies, masters of ships and crews

In consideration of the heightened piracy/sea robber activity off the islands of Anambas and Mangkai, the [special] report mentions the recommendations of the ReCAAP ISC to ship owners, shipping companies, masters of ships and crews, an outline of which is as follows.

- (1) Vessels transiting through the vicinity of the islands of Anambas and Mangkai are advised to adopt adequate anti-boarding measure – especially at the quarters. Enhanced watch-keeping is also recommended in the aft sector/otherwise blind sector to enable early detection. CCTV camera to monitor activities on the poop deck is also effective.
- (2) The ship masters and crews are advised to secure the safety of the bridge, engine-room, and crew's cabin.
- (3) Early detection of a possible boarding is the most effective deterrent measures. In addition, the crew should be adequately exercised on anti-piracy/sea robbery measures and the Best Management Practices.
- (4) As most of incidents have occurred in the waters between 11 miles and 53 miles from the lighthouse in Mangkai island, the ship masters shall steam, staying away at the maximum distance from the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) to Mangkai island. (Refer to map)

1.2 Military Developments

September 1 “Huludao new airport possibly for carrier aircraft in China’s Liaoning Province” (Global Military News & Report, September 1, 2010)

The United States IMINT & Analysis Web site recently released the Google-Earth satellite images which show a new airport is nearing completion in Huludao in Liaoning Province in China. The new airport, which is located 28 kilometers southwest of Huludao, has been under construction in April 2009 – June 2010. The airport could become the first one for the parking of Chinese J-15 carrier aircraft.

An outline of the article: The United States IMINT & Analysis Web site recently released the Google-Earth satellite images which show a new airport is nearing completion in Huludao in Liaoning Province in China. The new airport, which is located 28 kilometers southwest of Huludao, has been under construction in April 2009 - June 2010. According to this picture, the majority of the airport facilities and runway which is still in construction, but its overall layout has been formed. The airport could become the first one for the parking of Chinese J-15 carrier aircraft. J-15 is a Chinese-made Su-27K (Flanker-D) derived machine. J-15 proto-type allegedly conducted the first test flight on 31 August 2009. The slope to be used as a carrier-based aviation is under construction in the airport. Additionally, there are 24 separate aircraft bunkers, which indicate that the aircraft wing may be composed of 12 or 24. The location of naval base deep in the surface waters of Pohai Bay allows hidden flight training at sea.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Huludao new airport could be used for parking of J-15 carrier aircraft

<http://www.global-military.com/huludao-new-airport-could-be-used-for-parking-of-j-15-carrier-aircraft.html>



Source: <http://www.global-military.com/huludao-new-airport-could-be-used-for-parking-of-j-15-carrier-aircraft.html/huludao-naval-base-satellite-images>

September 3 -20 “Chinese Navy Training Squadron visits South Pacific, Oceania” (Xinhua, September 4, 11, 20, and PLA Daily, September 19, 2010)

On March 3-20, the Chinese training squadron composed of the training vessel, *Zhenghe*, and the missile frigate, *Mian Yang*, visited the South Pacific and Oceania.

An outline of the article: On March 3-20, the Chinese training squadron composed of the training vessel, *Zhenghe*, and the missile frigate, *Mian Yang*, arrived in Tonga after visiting Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. On the 11th, the training squadron arrived at Auckland in New Zealand. During the four-day visit the Chinese training squadron had study-exchange with New Zealand navy at the maritime safety training center. Additionally, on the 15th, the Chinese navy had the maritime maneuvering exercise with New Zealand navy. The training squadron arrived in Sydney, Australia, on the 20th.

Refer to the article on the Web sites:

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-09/04/content_4190620.htm

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-09/04/content_4190620.htm

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-09/12/content_4192823.htm

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-09/21/content_4195341.htm

September 15 “PLA Navy’s hospital ship arrives in Gulf of Aden” (Xinhua, September 15, 2010)

On September 6, Chinese Navy’s hospital ship “*Peace Ark*” left the port of Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province on the first 87-day-long overseas mission called “Harmonious Mission 2010.” On September 15, the “*Peace Ark*” arrived in the Gulf of Aden. The “*Peace Ark*” will carry out the two-day medical treatment of the servicepersons of the Chinese 6th escort taskforce. After that, the “*Peace Ark*” will give the doctor’s round of visits to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh.

An outline of the article: On September 6, after leaving the port of Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province on the first 87-day-long overseas mission called “Harmonious Mission 2010,” the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s indigenous hospital ship “*Peace Ark*” arrived in the Gulf of Aden with a total voyage of more than 15,000 nautical miles on September 15. The “*Peace Ark*” will carry out the two-day medical treatment of the servicepersons of the Chinese 6th escort taskforce. After that, the “*Peace Ark*” will give the doctor’s round of visits to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. The “*Peace Ark*” is the first 10,000-ton class hospital ship in the world which was indigenously developed and built in China, A total of 428 persons, including the medical staff, are on board. According to the PLA Daily, the “*Peace Ark*” conducted the first open-ocean underway replenishment (UNREP) in the Indian Ocean. After conduction UNREP to the 5th escort taskforce which was on way home after completing the anti-piracy mission, the supply vessel “*Poyanhu*” conducted UNREP to “*Peace Ark*,” steaming side by side. On September 13, “*Peace Ark*” conducted take-off and landing training of an indigenous medical rescue helicopter. According to the PLA Daily, operational training of the helicopter was conducted by aviation units of the North Sea Fleet. Reportedly, it was the first take-off and landing training in the Indian Ocean.

Refer to the article on the Web site: China's hospital ship arrives in Gulf of Aden

<http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/?p=6805>

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/07/content_37940.htm

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/09/content_38035.htm

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/15/content_38512.htm

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-09/16/content_38600.htm



Chinese navy hospital ship "Peace Ark"

Source: http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2010-09/16/content_20946141.htm#p=6&r=0.24679910902868646

September 20 "USAF remotely piloted aircraft deployed to Guam" (U.S. Air Force News, September 20, 2010)

On the 20th, the U. S. Air Force remotely piloted aircraft, the RQ-4 Global Hawks, were deployed to Guam. Three Global Hawks are planned to be deployed in Guam eventually. Eventually, three Global Hawks are planned to be deployed. The remaining two are scheduled to arrive later this year and at the beginning of 2011.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the U. S. Air Force remotely piloted aircraft, the RQ-4 Global Hawks, were deployed to Guam. During the ceremony on the same day, Gen. Gary North, the PACAF commander, said: "Having an (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capability within the Pacific greatly enhances Air Force operational intelligence capabilities to meet mission requirements. In addition, the Global Hawk will enhance the U.S. and its partners' ability to effectively address regional challenges, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, terrorism and piracy." The Global Hawks can reach altitudes of 19km — well above the range of most defensive weapons — and can stay in the air for more than 32 hours at a time. It is capable of providing near real-time, high-altitude, long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance imagery. Eventually, three Global Hawks are planned to be deployed. The remaining two are scheduled to arrive later this year and at the beginning of 2011.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Global Hawk arrives in Guam

<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123222761>



RQ-4 Global Hawk

Source: <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/090304-F-3192B-401.jpg>

September 23 “Chinese, Australian navies hold joint military exercise in YS” (PLA Daily, September 19, and Global Times, September 25, 2010)

On the 23rd, The Australian navy’s frigate FFH-152 HMAS *Waramanga* (FFH-152) conducted a joint naval exercise with the Chinese guided missile frigate “*Luoyang*” in the Yellow Sea (YS). Two navies conducted formation communication, joint maritime search and rescue, bombardment, and others in the joint exercise.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, The Australian navy’s frigate FFH-152 HMAS *Waramanga* (FFH-152) conducted a joint naval exercise with the Chinese guided missile frigate “*Luoyang*” in the Yellow Sea (YS). Two navies conducted formation communication, joint maritime search and rescue, bombardment, and others in the YS. A China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson said, “The two ships conducted live-firing drills which had been rare as the joint exercises involving Chinese navy. Additionally, Chinese naval training squadron visited Australia during the same period, and the first simultaneous communications between the two countries were commenced.” HMAS *Waramanga* arrived in Qingtao on the 18th with 182 officers and men onboard to start 13-day goodwill visit.

Refer to the article on the Web sites:

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-09/19/content_4194898.htm

<http://military.globaltimes.cn/china/2010-09/576735.html>

September 27 “US, South Korean Navies kick off ASW EX in Yellow Sea” (American Forces Press Service, September 28, 2010)

On the 27th, the U.S. and South Korea navies kicked off five-day joint anti-submarine warfare exercises in the waters west of the Korean peninsula. The recent joint exercises are the second in a series following a large scale of exercises conducted in the Japan Sea in late July.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, the U.S. and South Korea navies kicked off five-day joint anti-submarine warfare exercises in the waters west of the Korean peninsula. The recent joint exercises are the second in a series following a large scale of exercises conducted in the Japan Sea in late July. From U. S. side, in addition to USS *John S. McCain* and USS *Fitzgerald*, both

guided-missile destroyers forward-deployed to Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan, Military Sealift Command's ocean surveillance ship USNS *Victorious*, a fast-attack submarine, and P-3C Orion aircraft from Patrol Squadron 9 from Hawaii are participating in the exercise, U.S. Forces Korea officials reported. From South Korean side, two destroyers, a fast frigate, a patrol craft, P-3C aircraft and a submarine are participating in the exercise. Officials emphasized that the exercises are defensive in nature and designed to improve interoperability within the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Anti-Sub Exercises Send Deterrence Message to North Korea

<http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=61048>

September 28 “Russia's newest SSBN completes sea trials” (RIA Novosti, September 28, 2010)

Russia's newest strategic nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN), the *Borey* class *Yury Dolgoruky*, has completed sea trials in the White Sea and returned to its base in northern Russia, the Sevmash shipyard said. The boat is now ready for final inspection by a state commission before it enters service with the Russian Navy. Three other *Borey* class SSBNs, the *Alexander Nevsky*, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, and *Svyatitel Nikolai* (St. Nicholas) are in different stages of completion. Russia is planning to build eight of these subs by 2015.

An outline of the article: Russia's newest strategic nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN), the *Borey* class *Yury Dolgoruky*, has completed sea trials in the White Sea and returned to its base in northern Russia, the Sevmash shipyard said. The trials were part of the manufacturer Sevmash's tests and the boat is now ready for final inspection by a state commission before it enters service with the Russian Navy. “All the submarine's systems performed well, and the problems revealed during previous tests have been resolved,” Sevmash said. The *Yury Dolgoruky* is 170 meters long, has a hull diameter of 13 meters, a crew of 107, including 55 officers, a maximum depth of 450 meters and a submerged speed of about 29 knots. It can carry up to 16 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and torpedoes. Construction costs totaled some \$713 m, including \$280 m for research and development. Three other *Borey* class SSBNs, the *Alexander Nevsky*, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, and *Svyatitel Nikolai* are in different stages of completion. Russia is planning to build eight of these subs by 2015. Fourth-generation *Borey* class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to constitute the core of Russia's modern strategic submarine fleet.

The submarine's entry into service could be delayed however by a series of setbacks in the development of the troubled Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Refer to the article on the Web site: Russia's newest nuclear sub completes sea trials

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100928/160742528.html

1.3 Maritime Boundaries

September 12 “Malaysian PM calls for mechanism to resolve spats with Indonesia” (The Straits Times, September 13, 2010)

On the 12th, Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Najib Razak called for a better mechanism to resolve maritime border issues with Indonesia. The two sides have agreed to hold meetings next month and in November to resolve the border issue, with discussions covering zones in areas such as the Sulawesi Sea and the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 12th, Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Najib Razak called for a better mechanism to resolve maritime border issues with Indonesia. Tensions between the two neighbors on maritime border issues flared up, triggered by the detention of Malaysian fishermen and Indonesian officials in disputed waters, leading to protests by demonstrators who staged outside the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta. In this incident, all have now been released. The two sides have agreed to hold meetings next month and in November to resolve the border issue, with discussions covering zones in areas such as the Sulawesi Sea and the South China Sea.


Refer to the article on the Web site: Najib calls for mechanism to resolve spats with Indonesia
www.straitstimes.com/Asia/Malaysia/Story/STIStory_577869.html

September 21 “RP renovates Pag-Asa Island of Spratly” (VERA Files, September 21, 2010)

On the 21st, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced it was pushing through with the plan to develop Pag-Asa Island under its control, which is part of the Spratly Islands, into a tourist spot.

An outline of the article: On the 21st, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced it was pushing through with the plan to develop Pag-Asa Island under its control, which is part of the Spratly Islands, into a tourist spot. According to an AFP spokesman, major repairs are necessary for the airstrip and the pier due to poor maintenance, longstanding neglect and deterioration. Navy Flag Officer in Command said repairs are underway smoothly, and supply missions to the island by the navy had to be done monthly now, compared to the previous quarterly. China made a protest against the Philippine foreign ministry about the plan through its ambassador to Manila.

Refer to the article on the Web site: RP faces new tensions with China over Spratly
<http://verafiles.org/main/focus/rp-faces-new-tensions-with-china-over-spratly/>



Pag-Asa Island, part of the Spratly group

Source: <http://www.ellentordesillas.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/pag-asa-spratlys.jpg>

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

September 1 “Growing precautions against China: CINCPAC” (National Review Online, September 1, 2010)

Michael Auslin, a resident scholar at the U. S. think tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), contributed an article on his visit to the U. S. Pacific Command based in Hawaii to the *National Review Online* dated September 1. Auslin points out in his article that, while reconciled views about China are disappearing, and cautious views about China are rising in the U. S. Pacific Command, a surrounding situation, including shrinking defense budgets, remains severe in order to implement the countermeasures.

An outline of the article: Michael Auslin, a resident scholar at the U. S. think tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), contributed an article on his visit to the U. S. Pacific Command based in Hawaii to the *National Review Online* dated September 1. Auslin mentions in his article that, while reconciled views about China are disappearing, cautious views about China are rising in the U. S. Pacific Command, an outline of which is as follows:

- (1) How the Obama administration shapes its Pacific strategy and manages relations with China will serve as a test of determining whether the United States retains its dominant position as a stabilizing force in the region. In Hawaii, there is a recognition that America is at a crossroads in deciding how it will play its role as the guarantor of regional stability. However, with a decline in funds, a surrounding situation is getting severe, as some U. S. congressmen have recently been questioning why the U.S. continues to base troops in Japan.
- (2) The future budget environment is making it harder to maintain U. S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For those who are forward deployed in the Pacific, “U. S. presence” is more

than a description of how they operate. Such presence is crucial to creating pro-U.S. sentiment and alignments, especially given China's dramatic increase in diplomatic and economic activity across the region. However, defense budgets and ship-building funds are cut, and, already, steaming time and flight hours are down, although officials avoid providing specifics.

- (3) Of significant concern to the leaders of the U. S. Pacific Command are China's attempts to buy influence among Pacific island nations and gain special treatment for its interests through enticing trade agreements and liberal spending. With a decline in both fleet and discretionary funds, officials both at the Pentagon and at Pacific Command believe that defending U.S. interests and water space against these Chinese incursions must be done increasingly through nontraditional approaches, such as partnership building, confidence building, and infrastructure support and training for less developed nations. Yet budget cuts are making even that difficult.
- (4) Hence the feeling in Hawaii that Secretary Clinton's statement* on the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July represents a potential turning point. Yet no one, either here or in Washington, is quite sure how the U.S. will back up her words, an uncertainty shared by our Asian friends and partners.

Refer to the article on the Web site: China: The View from Hawaii

<http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/245280/china-view-hawaii-michael-auslin>

Note*: On July 23, 2010, at the annual U. S.–Asian post-meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed, “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” (Refer to OPRF Monthly Report, July 2010, 1. 4. Diplomacy and International Relation.)

September 11 “China's ‘Finlandization’ Strategy in the Pacific” (The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2010)

Andrew Krepinevich, President of the U.S. think tank, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, contributed an article titled “China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific” to the U.S. Newspaper: *The Wall Street Journal* dated September 11. In the article, mentioning that the threat of ‘Finlandization’ has revived in the western Pacific, Krepinevich discusses that Washington's longstanding allies and friends in the Western Pacific want a stable military balance in the region that will encourage Beijing to pursue its goals according to accepted international norms of behavior. But they realize the U.S. must take the lead to preserve it, and soon. For if the military balance between the U.S. and China continues to deteriorate, they may have no choice but to follow Finland's Cold War example.

An outline of the article: Andrew Krepinevich, President of the U.S. think tank, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, contributed an article titled “China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific” to the U.S. Newspaper: *The Wall Street Journal* dated September 11. In the article Krepinevich mentions that, although the Soviet Union never successfully “Finlandized” Europe, the threat has returned from China, which is now trying to do the same in

the Western Pacific.

An outline of the article is as follows.

- (1) A country's military strategy offers a window into its intentions, and China is clearly seeking to make effect a gradual but decisive shift in the Chinese-U.S. military balance. China's goal is to stop the U.S. from protecting its longstanding interests in the region—and to draw Washington's democratic allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan into its orbit.
- (2) China's military buildup centers on a set of capabilities, called “Assassin's Mace” (狼牙棒 ‘Shasou Jian’ in Chinese) by the Chinese, which is designed to exploit surprise. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) sees the U.S. military's battle networks—which rely heavily on satellites and the Internet to identify targets, coordinate attacks, guide “smart bombs” and more—as its Achilles' heel. The Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite missile in 2007 and have reportedly used lasers to dazzle (or temporarily blind) U.S. satellites. For years the U.S. military has been under increasingly frequent cyber attacks originating in China.
- (3) The Chinese buildup also involves developing so-called anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The PLA is developing and fielding large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of overwhelming U.S. and allied missile defenses and striking these air bases with a high degree of accuracy. The PLA's area-denial capabilities focus on restricting the U.S. Navy's freedom of action out to the “second island chain,” a line that extends from China's coast as far east as Guam. East Asian waters are gradually becoming a “no-man's land” for American warships and forward-based aircraft, while U.S. satellites are becoming sitting ducks and the Pentagon's digital backbone is increasingly endangered.
- (4) China's “Assassin's Mace” approach cannot be justified as a counter to any U.S. military buildup. American forces in the Western Pacific are significantly smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War. China's buildup, then—its “peaceful rise,” as Beijing calls it—is best explained as a strategy of Finlandization. Such a strategy fits China's outlook, which is epitomized in Sun Tzu's famous observation that “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” At a recent international summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi bluntly dismissed Singapore's concerns over Beijing's expanding territorial claims, stating that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact.”
- (5) While Washington's Asian allies look to it for leadership, the Obama administration has (like its predecessor) taken China's professed good intentions at face value. Things have gotten so bad that in the Pentagon some now refer to China as “Voldemort,” the evil wizard from the Harry Potter series who is often referred to as “he who must not be named.” The “Voldemort Effect” is seen in the Defense Department's recently published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR2010), which cites the growing threat posed by anti-access and area-denial capabilities. But China—the country with the most formidable and threatening forces, by far—is not mentioned at all.
- (6) Washington's longstanding allies and friends in the Western Pacific want a stable military balance in the region that will encourage Beijing to pursue its goals according to accepted

international norms of behavior. But they realize the U.S. must take the lead to preserve it, and soon. For if the military balance between the U.S. and China continues to deteriorate, they may have no choice but to follow Finland's Cold War example.

Refer to the article on the Web site: China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704164904575421753851404076.html>

September 24 “Blumenthal, Fellow of AIE: The era of great power politics is far from ending” (Foreign Policy, September 24, 2010)

Daniel Blumenthal, a fellow at the US think tank based in Washington D. C., the American Enterprise Institute for Public Research (AEI), contributed an article titled “Washington take note: The era of great power politics is far from over in Asia” to the US journal, *Foreign Policy* dated the 24th. In this article he mentions that the United States should bear in mind that the age of power politics has not ended in Asia and discusses the major points as follows: (1) The diplomatic task of the United States with respect to Japan is to help shake Tokyo out of stagnation, and to help Japan become a more coherent and powerful strategic actor. (2) The task of the United States at hand is to manage the growing Sino-U.S. security competition.

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- (1) The latest round of tension between Japan and China reveals the underlying instability in East Asia. The Senkaku islands incident reveals that Beijing is willing to use its increased economic strength as a tool of coercion, no matter the consequences, for its own standing in international markets. But that is not all it reveals. Indeed, this is one in a series of arguments and incidents between China and Japan over the last decade related to sovereignty, territory, rights to natural resources, and China's expanding maritime capabilities in and around Japan.
- (2) Therefore, the key factor in Asia's underlying instability, then, may not be the perception of China's rise relative to the United States' decline. Rather it may be China's rise relative to Japan's decline. Great power conflicts often begin when a once stronger country believes it is losing its relative position to a rival. This is a more accurate description of Japan's attitude toward China than of the U.S. attitude toward China. In addition to this perceived change in power position is the emotional aspect. These two countries harbor great reservoirs of mutual resentment and hatred, which may not drive their disputes but certainly makes them worse.
- (3) For Washington, the lesson is that the era of great power politics is far from over in Asia. Its finite diplomatic energy should be spent on the “high politics” among Asia's great powers -- issues of war and peace (or how to avoid the former and maintain the latter), rather than on the “low politics” of climate change and currency disputes.

(4) The U. S. diplomatic task with respect to Japan is to help shake Tokyo out of stagnation, and to help Japan become a more coherent and powerful strategic actor. Washington's future in Asia depends upon a rich, strategically active Japan. On the other hand, the U. S. diplomatic task with respect to China is not to paper over the many disagreements and clashing political objectives that characterize China-U.S. relations. The U. S. task at hand is to manage the growing Sino-U.S. security competition – a competition that increasingly appears to be about two very different visions for Asia -- so that rivalry does not lead to conflict.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Washington takes note: The era of great power politics is far from over in Asia

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/washington_take_note_the_era_of_great_power_politics_is_far_from_over_in_asia?hidecomments=yes

September 26 “R. Kaplan: While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power” (The Washington Post, September 26, 2010)

Robert D. Kaplan, a national correspondent for *The Atlantic* magazine and a senior fellow at the U S think tank based in Washington D. C., the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), contributed an article titled “While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power” to the US newspaper, *The Washington Post* dated the 26th. In the article Kaplan discusses that the greatest geopolitical development that has occurred largely beneath the radar of our Middle East-focused media over the past decade has been the rise of Chinese sea power. That is why the degree to which the United States can shift its focus from the Middle East to East Asia will decide its future prospects as a great power.

An outline of the article: Robert D. Kaplan, a national correspondent for *The Atlantic* magazine and a senior fellow at the U S think tank based in Washington D. C., The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), contributed an article titled “While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power” to the US newspaper, *The Washington Post* dated the 26th. In the article Kaplan mentions that the greatest geopolitical development that has occurred largely beneath the radar of our Middle East-focused media over the past decade has been the rise of Chinese sea power, an outline of which is as follows:

- (1) China has the world's second-largest naval service, after only the United States. Rather than purchase warships across the board, it is developing niche capacities in sub-surface warfare and missile technology designed to hit moving targets at sea. At some point, the U.S. Navy is likely to be denied unimpeded access to the waters off East Asia. And with 90 percent of commercial goods worldwide still transported by ship, sea control is critical.
- (2) The geographical heart of America's hard-power competition with China will be the South China Sea, through which passes a third of all commercial maritime traffic worldwide and half of the hydrocarbons destined for Japan, the Korean Peninsula and northeastern China. That sea grants Beijing access to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca. The United States and others consider the South China Sea an international waterway; China considers it a “core interest.” Much like when the Panama Canal was being dug, and the United States sought

domination of the Caribbean to be the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere, China seeks domination of the South China Sea to be the dominant power in much of the Eastern Hemisphere.

- (3) We underestimate the importance of what is occurring between China and Taiwan, at the northern end of the South China Sea. With 270 flights per week between the countries, and hundreds of missiles on the mainland targeting the island, China is quietly incorporating Taiwan into its dominion. Once it becomes clear, a few years or a decade hence, that the United States cannot credibly defend Taiwan, China will be able to redirect its naval energies beyond the first island chain in the Pacific from Japan south to Australia to the second island chain (Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) and in the opposite direction, to the Indian Ocean.
- (4) America's preoccupation with the Middle East suits China perfectly. Our military mission in Afghanistan diverts us from properly reacting to the Chinese naval challenge in East Asia. This budding empire is being built on our backs. It is through such asymmetry -- we pay far more to maintain what we have than it costs the Chinese to replace us -- that great powers rise and fall. That is why the degree to which the United States can shift its focus from the Middle East to East Asia will say much about our future prospects as a great power.

Refer to the article on the Web site: While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html>

Column

Is China's "Low profile policy (韬光养晦)" collapsing? : Viewed from the South China Sea and Collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard patrol boats

By Aki Mori

Facing the unprecedented international isolation after the Tiananmen Incident, Deng Xiaoping is said to have established a diplomatic policy of "Don't compete; save power without being noticed; stand on your own feet, and do what you should do." Deng called this serious posture of saving power without being noticed "Tao Guang Yan Hui" (Chinese: 韬光养晦、*toukuyoukai* in Japanese phonetic)*. (Note*: Tao Guang Yan Hui (韬光养晦): This phrase is explained as "to hide one's capacities and bide one's time." <The Chinese-English Dictionary, Beijing Foreign Language Institute, Printed in Hong Kong, 1979, p. 668.>)

However, this Chinese diplomatic policy in 2010 is evolving, staying away from reality of *taoguangyanghui* (韬光养晦). China has spread an allegation of making the South China Sea (SCS) Beijing's "core interests (核心利益)," demonstrated military presence by People's Liberation Army (PLA) against the US-Korea joint military exercises in the waters of East Asia. Moreover, in the incident of a collision of the Chinese fishing boat near the water of the Senkaku Islands, the Chinese government carried out a diplomacy of using its economic influence as a political pressure. China Sea (ECS) in the incident of the Japanese fishing boats which occurred in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.

Against these Chinese policies, the concerns of the international community are being intensified over how China, which has become strong, will be using its increased power. For instance, pointing out that China took a severe response to Japan on the occasion of the incident of a collision of the Chinese fishing boat as one of the examples, The Wall Street Journal (Net Edition) dated October 1 reported on the change of Beijing's diplomacy that "China's new assertiveness is more than a matter of provocation and petulance. It's also a new state of mind." The journal adds it shows: "Chinese regime has depended on the twin pillars of economic growth and nationalism for its legitimacy." As seen in the perspectives from abroad, an argument of "core interests," military presence in East Asia, and "Coercive policy against Japan in the incident of collision of a Chinese fishing boat" are regarded to reveal the changes of Chinese diplomacy.

Based upon the internal changes in China, Beijing's diplomacy is changing. This understanding may not be wide of the mark. David M. Lampton, one of the prominent Chinese researchers of the United States at Johns Hopkins University, pointed out that the deepening of Chinese self-confidence has surfaced as a less patient foreign policy, compared with what was noted in the past. In other words, Chinese people, and especially the younger generation as a central element, are less patient, as they see "the United States is not performing well and is, to some extent, dependent on China. They are thus less patient." In fact, President Cui Liru, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations explicitly answers why the Chinese foreign

policy is changing. That is, compared with 30 years ago, China has developed and its national needs have changed. He said, “The ways of diplomatic exchanges are different from those in the past.”

However, between the SCS and the incident of the collision of Chinese fishing boat around the the Senkaku Islands, the nature of the problem for the Chinese side and its reactions are different. In the former case, it is a denial of US intervention in the SCS for China, which should be a more serious matter of bearing in mind that the United States is regarded to be the “weight (重) of all focal points (重点)” in the Chinese diplomacy. During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in July 2010, in addition to a heated war of words between US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and [Chinese] Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the military presence was noted. The PLA staged the military exercises in the waters around the Yellow Sea and SCS to check a US intervention.

What happened to the incident of the collision of the fishing vessel? Regarding the Senkaku Islands which Japan has been practically controlling since 1895, except during a period from her surrender to the U. S. at the end of the World War II in 1945 to the U.S. reversion of the island to Japan in 1971, both China and Taiwan have disputed the territorial rights over the islands since 1970s.

From such a historic process, it has been a policy of the Japanese government that no bilateral matter exists as a territorial issue. However, for the Chinese government the islands are a territorial issue. In an address in the United Nations on September 29, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stressed, “China will not make any concession or compromise on the matters of securing the sovereign rights, unity and integrity of the territory.” When the Japan side decided to extend the detention of the captain of the Chinese fishing boat who had been arrested on suspicion of interference with a government official in the execution of his duties, the Chinese authorities, as Premier Wen Jiabao had said, placed four workers of Japanese construction company named Fujita Corp. under restraint in Shijiazhuang, and virtually suspended customs clearance of rare earth elements for the Japanese companies, imposing various pressure on Japan.

However, what was decisively different from the deployment in the SCS was the reaction of the PLA. Interestingly, on the occasion of the incident of the Chinese fishing boat, the PLA Daily reprinted the Xinhua news without adding its own comments. Regarding this case, Professor Keiichi Kawanaka of the Japan’s National Defense Academy mentioned that an involvement of the military in the incident of the collision of the Chinese fishing vessel was interpreted as thin, judging from information that PLA leaders, including Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, had been out of office at that time on a tour of inspecting the joint exercises in Kazakhstan.

Soon after the captain of the Chinese fishing boat was released, the author attended a conference held in Shanghai. At this session the officials of the PLA Navy looked as if they could not have helped hiding the irritation at the fact that an American involvement in the defense of the Senkaku Islands was confirmed as the result of the incident of the collision of the fishing boat. One of the officials said, “By arresting the captain of the Chinese fishing boat, the Japanese government has made the China-Japan relations deteriorated, and this problem has already

been worsening the security environment in East Asia. Although the United States has mentioned that the U. S. Security Treaty is applicable to this issue, it would be counterproductive for the peace and security in East Asia to express this point repeatedly.”

Apart from the SCS, in the incident of the collision of the fishing boat the PLA did not make a visible activities, and only a diplomatic pressure was exerted. Therefore, on the occasion of the incident of the collision of the Chinese fishing boat, the trio of the foreign ministry, Premier Wen Jiabao, and the PLA does not look like being in the same boat. Suppose the incident of the collision of the fishing boat was not a policy of the PLA, the PLA would be strongly discontent with the diplomatic authorities which brought about the result of U. S. involvement in the defense of the Senkaku Islands, wouldn't it?

Generally, the Chinese diplomacy is staying away from serious diplomatic policy. As some Chinese experts explain, it is said to be proved by the inherent changes that Chinese requirements to the world are changing in accordance with Chinese increasing national power. However, regarding the incident of the collision of the Chinese fishing boats, it seems to be unlikely that the PLA was positively involved in the incident, which is different from its reactions noted in the SCS. Based upon these indications, it is assessed that the Chinese government may not have abandoned the “low profile policy (韜光養晦)” as a monolith; but, instead of it, it may be tiding over the collapsing “low profile policy (韜光養晦),” which may be a shape that is much closer to the real situation.

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崔立如「關於“新時期美国問題研究”的幾点認識」『現代國際關係』（2010年第7期）、1-2頁。
『解放軍報』

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1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

September 8 “India planning transshipment hub on Nicobar” (The Straits Times, September 8, 2010)


India is planning to build a transshipment port at South Bay on Great Nicobar island of Nicobar Islands. The Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands is located to control the passage through the Malacca Straits. When completed, transshipment hub could be of both commercial and strategic significance to South-east Asia as well as rival ports in Sri Lanka. Current planning provides for a berthing facility of a modest 3.2 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent unit, a basic container measurement used in shipping) by 2015, rising to 7.4 million TEUs by 2020.

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The plans of building a transshipment port underline New Delhi's shifting priorities amid the rapid build-up of economic and military ties with South-east Asia. Thus far, the Andaman and Nicobar islands have lagged the development seen in some other states of the Indian mainland partly because of their remoteness, fragility of the ecosystems and strategic location. India administers the area from Port Blair, which is in the Lower Andaman group of islands. Port Blair is also home to India's first unified military command. Led by a three-star admiral, the command includes air, land and sea capabilities. 'For a long time, the thinking was that we should not have major investments in places where we have vital strategic installations,' said a senior Indian military officer. 'Now, that idea is changing. Economic development itself is an integral piece of strategy.'

Refer to the article on the Web site: Next big port of call: Nicobar?: India is planning transshipment hub to cater to eastern seaboard

<http://admpreview.straitstimes.com:90/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=8c4a2f71f5dea210VgnVCM100000430a0a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=21e0758920e39010VgnVCM1000000a35010aRCRD>



Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bay_of_Bengal_map.png

September 17 “China participates in development plan of Colombo port” (The Times of India, September 17, 2010)

The Sri Lankan government recently made a contract to build a new deep-water container terminal in Colombo port with a consortium consisting of China Merchant Holdings International and Aitken Spence. The terminal will be built by the same company that built the Hambantota port complex -- China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) and Sino Hydro Corporation.

An outline of the article: The Sri Lankan government recently made a contract to build a new deep-water container terminal in Colombo port with a consortium consisting of China Merchant Holdings International and Aitken Spence. The terminal will be built by the same company that built the Hambantota port complex -- China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) and Sino Hydro Corporation. No Indian company even bothered to bid for the project. After Hambantota went to the Chinese and Indian strategists saw it as part of Beijing's “string of pearls” strategy, it was believed that India would be more proactive when it came to strategic projects in its neighborhood, where more than mere economic interests are at stake. But for the ADB-funded Colombo Port project, there were no Indian entities participating in the bids, leaving the Chinese consortium as the sole bidder for the terminal. When it is expanded, the Colombo port will become bigger than most Indian ports combined. Sri Lanka is positioning itself as a South Asia hub.

Refer to the article on the Web site: China to build another port in Sri Lanka

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-to-build-another-port-in-Sri-Lanka/articleshow/6567958.cms>

1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others


September 12 “China exploring manned, research submergible: Show of bravado to deep seabed developments” (The New York Times, September 12, 2010)

Regarding the China’s release of the manned submergible “*Jiaolong*” reaching a depth 3,759 meters and flag planting on the seafloor of the South China Sea on August 26, the U.S. daily newspaper, *The New York Times* dated August 26 pointed out an outline of the report as follows. The paper carried the article that the recent experiment of the submergible research vessel is a show of China’s bravado to the exploration of parts of the deep seabed, which are rich in oil, minerals and other resources.

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- (1) The recent experiment of the manned submergible research vessel signaled Beijing’s intention to take the lead in exploring the deep seabed which is rich in oil and other mineral resources. Additionally, many of those resources happen to lie in areas where China has clashed repeatedly with its neighbors over territorial claims.
- (2) The global seabed is littered with oil and mineral nodules as well as many objects of intelligence value, including undersea cables, lost nuclear arms, sunken submarines and hundreds of warheads left over from missile tests. While a single small craft cannot reel in all these treasures, it does put China in an excellent position to go after them.
- (3) The manned submergible research vessel “*Jiaolong*” was completed after eight years of secretive development. “*Jiaolong*” is designed to go as deep as 7,000 meters, outperforming craft “all over the world,” which means it could be employed in 99.8% of the world’s oceans. Japan’s *Shinkai 6500* can go as deep as 6,500 meters. Russia, France and the United States lag further behind in the game of going deep.
- (4) According to an expert at the China Ship Scientific Research Center, China went on a global shopping spree to gather sophisticated gear for its submersible. From the United States, it bought advanced lights, cameras and manipulator arms. Forty percent of the craft’s equipment came from abroad. In 2005, five Chinese trainee pilots and one scientist participated in eight dives on *Alvin*, the deep-diving craft, which is run by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. China “bought time on *Alvin* to gain experience.” Although *Alvin* can go down only 4,500 meters, it has made thousands of dives and discoveries, and is widely seen among experts as highly productive and well run. One of the five Chinese trainees was a pilot on *Jiaolong* during its current sea trials.
- (5) Last year’s tests of “*Jiaolong*” went as deep as 1,000 meters, and this summer’s as deep as 3,759 meters. Next year “*Jiaolong*” is to dive to 5,000 meters and in 2012 reach its maximum depth.

Refer to the article on the Web site: China Explores a Frontier 2 Miles Deep
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/science/12deepsea.html?_r=1



The *Jiaolong* submersible planted a Chinese flag on the bottom of the South China Sea during a two-mile-deep dive in June.

Source: The New York Times, September 12, 2010



Left: *Alvin* has safely transported over 2,500 researchers on more than 4,400 dives to depths of 4,500 meters.

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, August 2, 2010
<http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=8422&tid=441&cid=82629&ct=61&article=19866>

Right: *Shinkai 6500*

Source: JAMSTEC HP
<http://www.jamstec.go.jp/j/about/equipment/ships/shinkai6500.html>

September 23 “Vietnam assembles marine jack-up oil drilling rig” (Viet Nam News, September 23, 2010)


The first 90m jack-up drilling rig of Petro-Vietnam is under construction in the Vietnam’s southern coastal city of Vung Tau. The rig is expected to be put into operation in mid-2012.

An outline of the article: After 12 months of construction, the keel laying was installed for the

first 90m jack-up drilling rig by Petro-Vietnam on the 23rd. The drilling rig is being built in the southern coastal city of Vung Tau by Petro Vietnam Drilling Platform Building Board in co-operation with the Petro-Vietnam Marine Shipyard Company (PV Shipyard). “This is a big opportunity for Viet Nam because it shows that we can manufacture a complicated jack-up drilling rig for the first time,” said Dinh La Thang, chairman of Petro-Vietnam. At present, there are around 677 sea drilling rigs around the world, and of those, 60 per cent are jack-up drilling rigs. With a total investment of US\$180 million, the rig is expected to be put into operation in mid-2012. This rig is considered to be a key national mechanical project. The technical consultancy and basic design providers are the US-based Le Tourneau Technology Inc. The rig's water depth was upgraded from 60m to 90m.

Refer to the article on the Web site: Work progresses on oil rig

<http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/Economy/203952/Work-progresses-on-oil-rig-.html>



Jack-up drilling rig

<http://www9.ocn.ne.jp/~petro/drillingoffshore.htm>

2. Intelligence Assessment

Review of “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing”

In the summer quarterly of *The Naval War College Review*, Summer 2010, Vol. 63, No. 3, issued by the US Naval War College, Toshi Yoshihara, an associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, carried an article titled “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing.”¹

The author summarizes this article, based on his reviews of the works issued in China and interviews with military personnel of the People’s of the Liberation Army (PLA) and military analysts. This article analyzes that China has an intention of striking first the U. S. military bases in Japan with ballistic missiles, urging Japan and the United States to take necessary counter-measures.

Reviewing this article, I will discuss some comments on it as follows.

1 . An outline of the article

Foreword

In recent years, at last, defense analysts in the United States have begun to revise their estimates of China’s missile capabilities. In the past, they rated Beijing’s ballistic missiles as inaccurate, and limited to only terrorizing civilian populations. Today, they have come to believe that China’s arsenal can inflict lethal harm on hostile armed forces and military bases overseas. A 2009 RAND monograph warns, “Massive ballistic-missile salvos launched against Taiwan’s air bases would hamper Taipei’s air superiority.” This represents a change from the first five decades of the China-Taiwan confrontation.

China’s first missile strike not only destroys Taiwan’s airpower utterly but also threatens Taipei’s maritime defense. It is contended in the United States that China could sink or severely damage Taiwan’s warships docked in ports with salvos of ballistic missiles. In addition, there is a warning that the China’s Second Artillery, Strategic missile command, is expanding its inventory both in quality and quantity, which would allow Beijing to determine first strikes.

Under these circumstances, there is evidence that China has turned its attention to Japan, home to the largest naval and air bases in the world. China has long worried about U. S. military bases in Japan which are used as a springboard in a cross-strait conflagration. In the past, China kept silent on U. S. military bases in Japan. Recently, however, some comments have been noted in some publications of the PLA that the missile attacks on Taiwan could also be applied to U.S. military bases in Japan. Some writings convey that the warning shots could compel Tokyo to limit the American use of military bases.

¹ Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing”, *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2010, Vol.63, No.3.

Analyzing the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers during the 1996 cross-strait crisis, China learned the lesson that it is necessary to neutralize the logistic bases of the aircraft carriers.

Chinese interest in U. S. forces in the region

During the 1996 cross-strait crisis the PLA realized it had difficulty in monitoring the movement of the aircraft carriers. Notably, however, the Yokosuka-based USS aircraft carrier Independence (CV 62) was the first carrier to arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Beijing's expectations that Washington would dispatch an aircraft carrier from Japan's forward-deployed base in a contingency over Taiwan.

Beyond Taiwan, other armed conflicts that could involve China and U.S. military intervention are considered to be:

- (1) Armed conflict with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea, and
- (2) The situation in which the conflicts over the maritime interests in the South China Sea threaten the freedom of navigation.

Additionally, Chinese leaders are extremely cautious about the so-called "Malacca dilemma" with which the United States controls the Malacca Strait in case of contingencies in the region.

China believes that, firstly, the U.S. naval vessels forward-deployed in Japan will respond to it in either case. As evidence, a former professor at Dalian Naval Academy cites, "The 'New Maritime Strategy'² in 2007 indicated that the United States could get the control of the ocean jointly with the allies or friendly nations, as required. The 'jointly' here means to have the allies in the region participate in the U. S. global strategy."

Chinese views about U. S. military bases in Japan

Some Chinese strategists point out that the U. S. government is regarding the "defense perimeter of the Pacific" logic elaborated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the early Cold War could be utilized as a line to encircle China or blockade the Chinese mainland. From geopolitical view-points, they see, with caution, that the Chinese mainland is encircled by the islands of nations allied with the United States, where powerful naval expeditionary forces are stationed.

Additionally, they, for example, describe U.S. basing architecture in Asia as a "three line configuration (三线配置)." The first line stretches in a sweeping arc from Japan and South Korea to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, forming a "zone of forward bases (前沿基地带)." This broad notion that the U.S. presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless, interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles. The second line connects Guam and Australia. The third (last) line of bases runs north from Hawaii through Midway to the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese pay such attention to the geographic structure of

² *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, United States.

American power in Asia is quite notable.

What is notable here is that the Chinese strategists are recognizing the U.S. military bases in Japan as the frontline northern anchor of the first island chain. *Modern Navy* (当代海軍), a monthly journal published by the Political Department of the People's Liberation Army Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire article to Japan's main naval bases, including Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Maizuru. Many Chinese strategists portray Yokosuka as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia. Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the Chinese. The U.S. transferred weapons from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. As more recent events, the Kitty Hawk Strike Group's deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably coincided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004 and 2008. Another Chinese expert opines, "Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese people." Some Chinese analysts conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub for the US Navy that tightly links the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

In addition, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based in Yokosuka could erode China's nuclear deterrent. Analysts see U. S. missile defense is structured by three layers of Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego, which would be positioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively. Some in China believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic missile deployed in China's interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost phase.

Analysts in China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yokosuka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain unavailable. A Chinese expert casts doubt on Guam as a potential candidate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of scale to service carriers.

Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo as a naval base closest to China. Two navies of the United States and Japan warn China to control the nexus of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and to blockade the Korea Strait. They analyze that without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii, and their in-depth deployment would not be maintained.



Chinese views about U.S. military bases in Japan

Source: Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing”, p.43.

U. S. bases in Japan and Chinese missile strategy

In the literature, *The Science of Military Strategy*, issued in China was carried an article which mentions that, to win, the PLA must seek to avoid or bypass the powerful field forces of the enemy while taking an indirect strategy of attacking enemy’s war system which includes the rear echelons, headquarters, command and control structures and others that support frontline units. In this article initially neutralizing enemy’s rear bases and terminating war potential are encouraged. In the Chinese doctrine there are some descriptions showing that China intends to target the U. S. forward presence in East Asia. Although it is not explicitly mentioned, they say it is reasonable to attack Yokosuka as a target. In “Intimidation Warfare,” an analyst proposes several missile tactics that could be employed to deter the hostile use of naval bases in time of crisis or war. Describing in detail the tactics of firing missiles as the warning shots near enemy’s territory, bases, and/or vessels, intimidating the enemy, and inducing the enemy to give up its fights, the literature calls this tactics a “pincer, close-in intimidation strike.” Recalling the Taiwan crisis in 1996, the Chinese government could fire single or multiple ballistic missiles frighteningly to pincer Yokosuka and intimidate leadership in Tokyo to stay neutral over Taiwan.

A Chinese analyst says that attacks on the base of the aircraft carriers would be extremely “opportune counterattacks” even after the carriers appeared in the vicinity of China.

Although it is difficult for the PLA to attack Japan with bombers and submarines, it can adopt the intimidation tactics by using the ballistic missiles from the long distance. The Chinese strategists have examined the strategies, doctrines and operational concepts for dissuading, disrupting, and denying the use of U. S. military bases along China’s periphery.

U.S. Bases in Japan and Chinese Missiles

The “Chinese Military Power 2010”³ is pointing out that, to threaten regional bases, logistics, and support infrastructure, China could employ short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBMs) and computer network attack (CAN). The DF-21 MRBMs could reach any location along the Japanese archipelago. The Pentagon estimates that there are sixty to eighty DF-21 missiles in the PLA’s inventory. The historical pattern of Chinese missile deployments since the Cold War suggests that the U. S. military bases in Japan have always been targets for nuclear strikes. In the 1960s the PLA extended the range of first nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the DF-2, to ensure that it could reach all American bases in Japan. And then, Beijing deployed the follow-on missiles, the DF-3, near the North Korean border to cover [targets on] the Japanese home islands Okinawa. If the Chinese government had a policy of not attacking non-nuclear third parties with nuclear warheads, it should not be surprising that Beijing would field conventional missiles for use against Japanese territory. Indeed, DF-21 may represent a far more accurate instrument than its predecessors of DF-2 and DF-3 did, and may offer China various options of attacking Japan, including a pin-point attacking option.

Analysis of Chinese missile doctrine

The Chinese missiles capabilities have been maintained, assuming all stages of the situation, including the crisis management, stability, escalation control, and war termination in the event of conflict. Nevertheless, there are the gaps in the doctrine, which offer reasons to worry about these complications.

First, in China, analysis of what kind of mechanism or chain of events the missile attacks will bring about is weak. It is oversimplifying the escalation excessively. In reality, even if China could succeed in pin-point attacks on supply bases, in the short term it would not have a direct impact on the operations of American Forces. If the US Navy surge additional aircraft carriers [into the scene], operations could be continued [unimpeded]. Easy predictions are lowering the ambitious threshold of first missile attacks in the Chinese military doctrine.

Second, the PLA attaches greater importance to the opening stages of a military campaign, thereby thinking they can seize the initiative of the war. The “Science of Second Artillery Campaign” asserts it is effective to strike the enemy’s logistic base with missiles of conventional warheads at the first opportunity unnoticed when the enemy is unprepared for combat. The

³ *Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010*, August 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense.

aircraft carriers anchored and at pier-side in port will be reasonable targets of attacks. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor before the start of the Pacific War is a real example. China seems to acknowledge the need of responding to the potential international backlash arising from its first strike. However, so long as we read the literature of the PLA, there is entirely no such description that it was discussed. Can the Chinese policy decision makers reject the options of the first strike presented to them by the PLA? The PLA seems to be overconfident enough to have the government obey them with military advantage. It seems to be derived from the lessons from the Taiwan contingency in 1996. In other words, they assess that the real missile firing was effective, against which the American aircraft carriers remained only being deployed. They seem to seriously believe that, if they can sink the aircraft carriers before it makes a sortie [from the base], a victory in the early stages will bring about a victory in war.

Third, escalation control will be a severe challenge for Beijing. Chinese writings exhibit an awareness of escalation problems associated with missile coercion. Analysts worry that misapplication of missile tactics could dramatically reshape the dynamics of the war, provoking greater exertions by the intervening power while widening the conflict, drawing in additional third parties.

Implications for Japan-US Alliance

It can be said that Japan and the United States need to build more complicated deterrence strategy because of China's theater strike capability. The action-reaction dynamic in United States-Japan-China triangle will be far less straightforward than that of the alliance's strategy to North Korea. The strategic structure in Northeast Asia will be decided by how China takes this area and what kind of action China will be taking. While the region in Southeast Asia is escalating to strengthen the conventional arms under the concept of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, how is China taking Northeast Asia? Even if China has the concept of using conventional warheads in the first strikes, the party that will be attacked would be hard-pressed to distinguish conventional missiles from nuclear-tipped missiles.

The fog and friction between the Japan and United States and China will make crisis control more complicated. Can the Japan-US Alliance neglect the possibility that the warheads fired are nuclear? Have they assumed the worst case scenario? Should the missile warhead be conventional, how the US military reaction should be? Could the U. S. make Japan agree to it? Could the Japan-US Alliance expand the war as far as the Chinese Continent? In case the United States made a decision which was against the will of Japan, would Japan continue to trust the United States? As a result, how will the Alliance be configured in quality?

Even if the missiles had conventional warheads, the attacks on other nations with the missiles, will make the region unstable, and put the nations into danger by misjudgment. The China's threatening doctrine with ballistic missiles would accelerate to make the regional security environment unstable. Isn't it necessary to reexamine the extended deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance? The Japan-US Alliance must suppose strategic environment under an ambiguous and highly tense situation that is different from what was in the past 20 years. Moreover, the

Japan-US Alliance should study the countermeasures against the China's intimidation strategy with the ballistic missiles from political and military perspectives.

2. Comments

The Art of War by Sun Tzu teaches "Meet with rightness, and win by deception." It tells you that you must face a battle by employing standard tactics, and you will win the battle by a surprise attack. Additionally, Sun Tzu says, "A senior soldier crushes deception first, then communications, and then, army. And finally, attack the fortress." At first, it teaches us to distract the enemy by deception, then, attack enemy's allies to split, and then beat enemy's field army. Sun Tzu persuades it is folly to attack the enemy's fortress in the beginning. There is a point of view that all of Chinese strategy is derived from Sun Tzu. There is an introduction that the [philosophical] treatises of Mao Zedong, including "On Guerrilla Warfare" and "On Protracted War," are nothing but the Art of War of Sun Tzu. The strategy of attacking the American bases in Japan first, surprisingly, as if it were to pincer by the ballistic missiles, making the American armed forces stop deployment, and urging Japan to leave alliance, is connected with "Crushing deception, and then communications." Moreover, attacking the US Navy's aircraft carriers at anchorage could be interpreted as, exactly, "After that, defeat army" and "win by deception."

Perhaps, there are various arguments on military or political suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of striking the U. S. military facilities in Japan. However, author of this article discusses that China is making detailed plans based upon rationality, but, generally speaking, a study of the developing situation is insufficient. Therefore, according to the author, should Beijing judge the plan to be effective, apprehensions remain that they will put it into practice.

It may be tactically effective to make the first attack before the U. S. forces enter the Chinese military territories. However, in China the analyses of the succeeding scenarios and reactions to them are too few. In short, there is a danger that they make actions, taking note of effectiveness only. In Japan which provides bases for the United States, it is considered that there may be a case of limiting the activities of the US military forces. But, on the contrary, there may be another case of asserting strongly a counter-attack by the American forces. Repercussions from international community may also be strong. Is China thinking to such an extent?

In the article of "How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015" which was introduced as an analysis in the "OPRF MARINT Monthly Report (December 2009)⁴ was shown a fantastic scenario that one day the aircraft carrier George Washington was suddenly hit and sunk by a Chinese anti-surface ballistic missile, while patrolling the East China Sea. There is written a scene where, utilizing the so-called "three battles (三戰)" after having sunk the aircraft carrier George Washington, China succeeded in silencing the international community to its policies as friends and suppressing the US retaliation.

There would be no objection to the fact that the U S naval base in Japan constitutes the greatest deterrent against China. Should the situation, in which the base would become a target

⁴ Refer to Intelligence Assessment, *OPRF MARINT Monthly Report*, December 2009

of the initial strike, arise, it would be necessary for both Japan and the United States to consider how both nations should respond to it, wouldn't it?

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