

**Lecture by the Ambassador of Afghanistan to Japan,  
H.E. Mr. Haron Amin  
Regional Dimensions to the War on Terror  
Venue: Sasakawa Peace Foundation  
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(Chano) Thank you very much for attending this lecture by His Excellency, Ambassador Haron Amin, Ambassador from Afghanistan. My name is Chano and I represent Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Let me introduce you to the program. I'm going to ask our Chairman, Mr. Hanyu, to say a few words of greetings, and after that we will have Ambassador Amin to give his lecture entitled– regional dimensions to the war on terror. After that we are going to ask Mr. Tanaka from the Japan Energy Foundation to give his comments for about 10 minutes, and Ambassador Amin and Mr. Tanaka will be engaged in a 20 minute discussion together, and then we will have a coffee break together and question and answers from the floor. Now I would like to call upon Mr. Hanyu, Chairman of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation to say a few words of greetings.

(Hanyu) Thank you very much for your participation today. One of the reasons why we decided to hold this seminar at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, is at the end of July we had a very sad murder of a Japanese volunteer worker in Afghanistan, and there has been quite heated debate and discussion in Japan about the way how the Japanese contribution to world peace should take place. Furthermore, following the sudden resignation of PM Fukuda and the prospect of a Lower House election, the Japanese politics becomes rather fluid. Now attention is being paid to the future of special measures law on terrorism and the question of whether or not the Japanese government will succeed in extending the refueling mission of the self defense army in the Indian Sea. Given this backdrop, we thought this was a very opportune time to discuss Japan's contribution to the reconstruction processes in Afghanistan and planned this program. And His Excellency Ambassador Amin has kindly agreed with us, thus today's event was realized. Ambassador Amin is highly knowledgeable about the relationship between Japan and Afghanistan, and has written a book on this issue. We believe that in his lecture the Ambassador will also touch upon the future relations between Japan and Afghanistan. Lastly, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Japan for their efforts to prepare for this lecture, as well as to Mr. Tanaka for sparing his time to be with us today. I hope that we will have an active discussion on these important topics of reconstruction of Afghanistan, and future Afghan-Japan relationship.

(Chano) Now I'd like to call upon His Excellency Ambassador Haron Amin to give his lecture, but before that please look at his brief CV on the second page of your handout. His Excellency is still quite young, but after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, he went to Europe and then to the United States, and he participated in the anti Soviet movement under the general Massoud. After that he also participated in the Ministry of Defense to fight against the Taliban. In 1995 he became the chief of staffs at the Deputy Foreign Minister's office in Afghanistan, and since then he has represented Afghanistan at the United Nations. Since 2002 he became the Minister at the Embassy of Afghanistan in the United States, and in 2004 he was assigned to be the Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of Afghanistan here in Japan. As Hanyu mentioned, his Excellency is very well versed in Japanese culture, and this book called "The two countries of the rising sun in Asia" is one of the books that he wrote. We can distribute a copy of this book to all the participants here, thanks to the generous donation of the Embassy of Afghanistan. Thank you. Your Excellency please.

(H.E. Haron Amin) Mr. Chairman Hanyu, Executive Director Chano, Mr. Tanaka, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

It is with great pleasure that I speak to you on the complexities of Afghan and South Asian security situations today and, seizing this moment, I would like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation for providing this opportunity. At the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad just six days ago, a time when restaurants were filled with diners breaking their fast during the holy month of Ramadhan, a large truck rammed the front security gate as a suicide bomber then detonated a small explosive. It was four minutes later that an estimated 600kg of military-grade explosives, artillery and mortar shells exploded, leaving a vast crater some 30ft deep and 50ft wide. The reprehensible attack, the largest of its kind and also the deadliest ever in Islamabad, left more than 300 killed or wounded. A group named Fedayaan Islam has lately claimed responsibility. The Marriott bombing took place on the one year anniversary of Osama bin Laden's call on Pakistani Muslims to unleash a holy war against the government, and just hours after President Zardari made his first address to Parliament less than a mile away. In his speech, the President had stated that, "we must root out terrorism and extremism where and whenever they may rear their ugly heads...I ask of the government that it should be firm in its resolve to not allow the use of its soil carrying out terrorist activities against any foreign country." The Marriot bombing also comes at a time when the talk of a fundamental shift in the war on terror is heard in every major world capital, particularly those with military deployments to Afghanistan. Why the shift of resources from Iraq to Afghanistan and a sudden focus on Pakistan now, what it entails and where this shift will leave us in the years to come form the

basis for this presentation.

The deterioration of the security situation or, for that matter, the rising challenge over stabilizing Afghanistan may be a primary reason for this shift. The Afghan security situation deteriorated to such an extent that on July 14, 2008, the Afghan Council of Ministers issued a statement, in protest over the Pakistani military intelligence's links to terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan. "The people of Afghanistan and the international community have come to the reality that Pakistan intelligence institutions and its army have become the largest center for breeding and exporting terrorism and extremism to the world and particularly to Afghanistan," read the statement. The Council's grievances as listed in the statement included, but were not limited to, the following: the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7 with 50 dead including the Indian Military Attaché; the June 13 Qandahar prison break in which some 1,200 inmates including 350 Taliban and their commanders captured since 2001 were set free; and the April 27 assassination attempt on President Karzai during the Victory over the Soviet Union Parade which left an MP, a tribal chief and a boy dead and 10 wounded. Simultaneous to the Afghan Ministers' statement, there appeared a series of credible media reports around the world which unraveled disturbing facts about the Pakistani military intelligence (ISI). These reports serve as further testimony to the need for a shift.

An article entitled "The War in Pakistan" published on September 14 in the Washington Post shockingly revealed: "For more than six years, the Bush administration has relied on Pakistan's government and army to combat Taliban and al-Qaeda networks based in the country's tribal territories along the border with Afghanistan. The result has been the strengthening of both networks in the rugged and virtually lawless region; a steady increase in Taliban assaults on U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan." Newsweek's September 13, 2008 article entitled "Pakistan's Dangerous Double Game" says that the Taliban enjoy freedom of movement and access to information via Pakistani military and the ISI. According to Taliban commander Mullah Nasrullah's account, "safe passage" is arranged for Taliban militants through a presumed Pakistani army officer or ISI agent. Nasrullah claims to travel frequently between Afghanistan and Pakistan to secure support from Sirajuddin Haqqani, the main Taliban leader for insurgency in eastern Afghanistan, who is linked to the assassination attempt on President Karzai. The article discloses that the Pakistani military spokesperson Maj. General Athar Abbas reportedly did not deny possible ISI-Taliban connections.

To further uncover the duplicitous role played by the Pakistani military, Dexter Filkins of the New York Times Magazine in his September 6 article stated that: "For years, the survival of Pakistan's military and civilian leaders has depended on a double game: assuring the United States that they were vigorously repressing Islamic militants - and in some cases actually doing so - while simultaneously tolerating and assisting the same militants. From the anti-Soviet

fighters of the 1980s and the Taliban of the 1990s to the homegrown militants of today, Pakistan's leaders have been both public enemies and private friends.” Pakistan's game has rested on two premises: that the country's leaders could keep the militants under control and that they could keep the United States sufficiently placated to keep the money and weapons flowing. According to American officials and counterterrorism experts, even al-Qaeda has rebuilt itself and is using sanctuaries inside the tribal areas to plan attacks against the United States and Europe.” Even the signing of peace deals between the Pakistani military and the Taliban (2005, 2006, and Feb 20 and March 24 ‘08) over the past few years have aimed to destabilize Afghanistan. According to a draft of the peace agreement signed between the famed Pakistani militant leader Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistani military, the former agreed to refrain from attacking the Pakistan state, “in return for freedom to cross the border” (The Times, Sept. 8, 08). In the New York Times on July 14, 2008, Kathy Gannon cites information from Pakistani military and European intelligence officials, stating “in early June, 2008 about 300 fighters from jihadist groups converged in the same city that serves as headquarters to the Pakistani army, the second such gathering this year.” The groups included the al-Qaida- linked Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. ISI support for the Taliban includes arranging training, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions directly providing combat support, as most famously reported in the November 2001 incident where allied forces came into conflict with 8,000 combined Taliban and Pakistani ISI forces. Since 2001, in order to contain the Taliban, Pakistan has received \$10billion in assistance from the US alone. Dexter Filkin’s story mentioned above unveils a sad reality: “Late in June, to great fanfare, the Pakistani military began what it described as a decisive offensive to rout the Taliban from Khyber Agency, one of seven tribal areas that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Reporters were kept away, but footage on Pakistani television showed troops advancing behind trucks and troop carriers. A few days into the military operation, the photographer Lynsey Addario and I, dressed in traditional clothes and with a posse of gunmen protecting us, rode into Khyber Agency. “Entry by Foreigners Prohibited Beyond This Point,” the sign said on the way in. After a couple of hours, traveling down a mostly empty road, it struck me: There was no evidence, anywhere, of the military operation that had made the news. There were no Pakistani soldiers, no trucks, no tanks. Nothing. After a couple of miles, we turned off the road and headed down a sandy path toward a high-walled compound guarded by young men with guns. We had come to our destination: Takya, the home village of Haji Namdar, a Taliban commander who had taken control of a large swath of Khyber Agency. We walked into the compound's main building. In a corner, on the floor, sat Namdar - Taliban chieftain, enforcer of Islamic law, usurper of the Pakistani government and trainer and facilitator of

suicide bombers in Afghanistan. Why, I asked him, aren't the Pakistani forces coming after you?

"The government cannot do anything to us, because we are fighting the holy war," he said. "We are fighting the foreigners - it is our obligation. They are killing innocent people."

"The army comes in and they fire at empty buildings. It is a drama - it is just to entertain."

"Entertain whom?" I asked.

"America," he said.

Experts have warned that unless drastic measures are taken, major threats will emanate from the tribal areas of Pakistan. According to Bruce Hoffman, a professor of security studies at Georgetown University in Washington, "since 2004, six major terrorist plots against Europe or the United States - including the successful suicide attacks in London that killed 52 people in July 2005 - have been traced back to Pakistan's tribal areas." These journalists and experts weren't the only ones pointing fingers at the rising militancy in Pakistan, the inadequate and at times non-existent measures taken by the government, and the insurgency's negative impact on the stabilization attempt in Afghanistan.

Beginning in 2008, there have been intelligence and official assessments calling for a fundamental revision in the war on terror. It was purely out of frustration that President Bush decided to authorize Special Operations forces in Afghanistan to go after militants in Pakistan's lawless border region. On June 28, the President went so far as to declare Pakistan as the next president's biggest challenge. "We have a sort of friendly government that sort of cooperates and sort of doesn't." Presidential candidate John McCain was quoted as saying, "A special focus of our regional strategy must be Pakistan, where terrorists today enjoy sanctuary." (July 28, 2008: Time Mag). Meanwhile, the Democratic candidate Barack Obama had already declared that "there are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again." Obama continued, "If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf will not act, we will" (official website Aug 1). The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, admitted earlier this month that America and its allies were "running out of time" to save Afghanistan and there is a need for "a new, more comprehensive military strategy that covers both sides of that border." Even as far back as two months ago, he had stated, "the bottom line is this: we are seeing a greater number of insurgents and foreign fighters flowing across the border with Pakistan unmolested and unhindered. This movement needs to stop." And just this week, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during his speech before the Senate Armed Services Committee that a victory over terrorism in Afghanistan was impossible as long as Taliban and al-Qaida guerrillas were hiding at their bases in Pakistan. "Until the insurgency is deprived of safe havens, insecurity and violence will persist," Gates said. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer in a speech on 18 Sept. 2008 stated that “success in Afghanistan also means stepping up our political engagement with its neighbours, notably Pakistan.” NATO officials reported a 50% increase in cross-border attacks in May alone after an agreement with militants called for the Pakistani military to withdraw from the militant-held areas and release their cohorts from prison. Furthermore, ISAF spokesperson and Canadian Brig. Gen. Richard Blanchette was quoted as saying in regards to Pakistani-based militants, “We do have hints that al-Qaeda provides training to some insurgents on the other side of the border....Because it's close, it would be very reasonable to believe that this could have been an influence of outside training.” (September 20, 2008The Globe and Mail GRAEME SMITH)

The outside training began with the 1978 Communist coup and intensified with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ending a peaceful era that had existed since 1868. The level of the multifaceted disruption was far reaching for at least two reasons: 1. Afghans delivered the first and final defeat of the Soviet Empire, hence, shattering the myth of Soviet invincibility. As a result, 10 percent of the population perished and 70 percent of the country was reduced to rubble. 2. Afghans were naive to think that the so-called ‘freedom-loving world,’ would never abandon them given they were promised everything in order to defeat the Soviets. Then the sudden Soviet withdrawal of 1989 followed by the Negative Symmetry left Afghanistan vulnerable to a regional power struggle, with Pakistan gaining the upper hand. Pakistani generals embarked on a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity of seeking ‘strategic depth’ by virtue of deep engagement in Afghanistan to overcome the country’s vulnerability vis-à-vis India by virtue of sustained hostility. Two factors validated Pakistan's belief in this: 1. that the United States and every anti-Soviet country supported Pakistan in helping the Afghans; 2. that at no apparent cost to itself, Islamabad would be able to play a major role in the geo-politics of Central and the greater West Asia by extending its South Asia location. A major component of that strategy to date is the utility of religious and militant groups, whether against Afghanistan or India. And naturally, the madrassas or religious schools have been established to partially serve that purpose, today numbering between 10,000 to 30,000. It was with the rise of the Communists in Afghanistan that a massive proliferation of madrassas in Pakistan – mostly funded by Gulf countries – along the Afghan border was undertaken. These were set up by two powerful Pakistani parties: Jamaat Islami Pakistan (JIP), and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan (JUIP). At the time, both had great influence over the Pakistani army and connections with a large group of Islamic activist groups globally. An important fact to note was that during the Soviet invasion virtually every Afghan affiliated with the war against the Soviets attended these madrassas. Throughout the 1980s, almost 1/3 of the entire Afghan population or roughly 6 million Afghans, mostly from the Pashtun-dominated provinces along the long border, sought refuge in Pakistan, where all male members attended the madrassas. The

incentives offered were great: free food, room and board, and a monthly salary to support their families who had no other means. Most of the original Taliban have their roots in madrassas organized by the JUIP, as does the supreme head of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Later, links were created between the madrassas, the Taliban and numerous circles within the Pakistani government and the military. The ISI or the military intelligence also had its own agenda by supporting the fanatics both within the Islamist as well as traditionalist Muslims but with a clear view of advancing Pakistani strategic interests. In the fratricidal wars of 1990s, the ISI first backed the fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and later the Taliban, who upon taking control of Afghanistan, quickly set up numerous madrassas. Together with their al-Qaeda guests, the Taliban subjugated the Afghan people to conditions so harsh that humanity had only experienced during the past century's major wars. It was their al-Qaeda guests who staged the terrorist incidents of 9/11 in 2001.

The events of 9/11 in New York and DC resulted in the United States forcing out the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But long before US or coalition troops set foot on Afghan soil, Afghans suffered greatly under these terrorists and sadly in the name of Islam. While we are thankful to the US, NATO and coalition partners for liberating us, Afghans are still victims of terror and need continued support. In general, terrorists do not discriminate between their victims as we have seen in attacks on New York, Madrid, Bali, Istanbul, Casablanca, London, Karachi, and Qandahar. And we should never associate terrorists with a single community or a specific faith. As a multifaceted phenomenon often conditioned by its environment, terrorism requires a sincere, united, determined and principled international campaign against both its symptoms and sources. That campaign must equally oppose and combat those who continue to use terror as a means of national policy whether internally or externally. As far as the Pakistani military is concerned, we hope that all sub-entities, including the military intelligence will sever their ties with the militants and terrorists and cease to utilize them for advancing foreign policy objectives. Further, we would like the military to destroy all terrorist camps and breeding grounds at once. Moreover, we would like the military to not allow hit-and-run operations inside Afghanistan by terrorists and militants, which have caused a steady increase in national and international casualties, both military and civilian. In fact, if the past mistakes afford a lesson, then strengthening civilian rule is the best option for Pakistan. We also see it as imperative that madrassas – as they are currently organized in Pakistan – be either fundamentally reformed or shut down as these centers for hatred provide the Taliban with a sustained recruitment pool of foot-soldiers. In the meantime, the international community and coalition partners need to support the civilian government in Pakistan through effective dialogue and continued military assistance in its campaign against terror with a substantial economic aid package to improve ordinary lives along the border. It is these steps that will help stabilize both Pakistan and

Afghanistan, but which need the shift spoken of.

So what is the shift and what will it mean for us in our part of the world? Many say that this shift is partly in response to growing US frustration with what it sees as Pakistan's ambivalence in fighting pro-Taliban militants operating along the border with Afghanistan and its concern about peace deals that Islamabad has been signing with some of the radical groups in FATA. The rhetoric on the shift in the war on terror since the year's beginning involves two premises:

1. A shift in resources away from Iraq and into Afghanistan. In fact, US presidential candidate Barak Obama was among the first who raised and supported such a shift, and President Bush has approved an additional 8,000 soldiers to be stationed in Afghanistan early next year, although the General in charge of Afghan affairs has asked for 15,000. This week, the White House has also tasked a group of senior advisers to outline a series of detailed recommendations on security, counterterrorism, political and development issues in Afghanistan with a consideration on the security and economic conditions in Pakistan as well. Past recommendations have come under question as violence has increased by 30 percent in 2008.

2. A shift in geographical focus from Afghanistan to the border areas inside Pakistan. The US administration has been supportive of such a shift the last few weeks. Today, many senior officials now believe that Pakistan's tribal areas are at the center of the fight against terrorism more so than Iraq, or even Afghanistan. This shift was given serious attention by the international media when, on the seventh anniversary of 9/11, it emerged that President Bush had secretly authorized US special forces to conduct ground operations inside Pakistan without Islamabad's approval. Meanwhile, changes inside Afghanistan announced by the administration included doubling the size of the Afghan army, restructuring the US military command and stationing more intelligence officers on the ground.

The Afghan and Pakistani reactions to such a shift have been, of course, quite different. President Zardari, labeling the fight against terrorists as Pakistan's war, has asked US troops to stay away and leave the Pakistani forces to the job. Meanwhile, Pakistani media has also been critical of such a shift, believing that the US paradigm shift in its 'war on terror' will deteriorate the situation in the region. They suggest that the US has failed to notice the democratic change in Pakistan and that the US should support the civilian government. Maybe it was because of Pakistani sensitivity that as recent as this past Monday, Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak during his official trip to the Pentagon spoke of a possible joint force, which would include Americans: "We should have a combined joint task force of coalition, Afghans and Pakistanis to be able to operate on the both sides of the border," Wardak said. That proposal is under review by both Islamabad as well as Washington. Meanwhile, President Karzai welcomes such a shift saying that he had been pushing for such a change in focus for years to help tackle the Taliban



insurgency at its root.

For the seven years preceding 9/11, beginning with the 1994 Taliban take over of Qandahar Province, we had been preaching that the Taliban and al-Qaeda threat was no less than communism. Sadly, it had to take the tragic events of 9/11 for many to reach a common perspective. Since 2001, we have said that the Taliban are not a national phenomenon but rather a regional threat. Regrettably, the number of coalition casualties in Afghanistan had to surpass those in Iraq for this realization to take hold. We hope this time, given the desire and the will, the resources and the strategy in place to advance along the right path, that we will be in a much better place in another seven years. Let us be clear: the only option against militants and al-Qaeda is elimination. Enlightening them is only feasible when they are locked up. Neither appeasement or accommodation, nor legitimization or integration will bear long-term fruit. However, as long as they lay down their arms and accept the supreme law of the land, we will embrace them as our own. We believe that terrorists see their ultimate defeat in the prosperity of the Afghan people. But that prosperity will not be attainable unless we fuel this fundamental shift in the war on terror. One major question raised by the skeptics of the shift is “whose war is this?” While no one doubts the implication of the rising casualties and measures to reverse it, some caution on how far the international coalition ought to go in hunting down al-Qaeda and militants along the border inside Pakistan. We all have to be clear that the war on terror is no one nation’s war but rather a global war which requires universal solidarity. For those who lack the resources or desire in waging this war, we must encourage them to solicit support. As for those who are afraid of the militants and terrorists, we must help them see that clearly appeasement is not a solution. And finally, for those who out of convenience or strategic interest seek an alliance with terrorists, it would be a mistake in the short-run and self-destructive in the long-run. Let it be known that the war on terror is the best example of a zero-sum game, in which either we enjoy our God-given rights or are hunted down by a group of anathematic men, ready to kill in God’s name. Both the Afghan and the Pakistani presidents as well as our committed partners are this time on the same page. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not have to exist in perpetual opposition. Our countries are not only bound by a common border, but we also share many common characteristics such as language, religion, history and culture. We welcome a strong civilian government in Pakistan that can stand next to a strengthened Afghanistan, both relying on one another as protectors of peace, partners against terror and on a complementary voyage towards regional development. And finally but not least importantly, I would like to share my thoughts on the Japanese role in the war on terror. As Prime Minister Taro Aso stated in his speech before the UN General Assembly (this morning Tokyo time), Japan seeks to proactively participate in the fight against terrorism. An OEF-MIO member, Japan’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean is a solid step, but more needs to be done.

Japanese ought to know that last year's pullout of the Maritime Interdiction Operation in the Indian Ocean was only welcomed by militants and al-Qaeda. In addition, Japan should also leverage its non-Muslim, non-Christian heritage as well as its economic position to support the pro-democratic, civilian government in Pakistan and encourage all institutions, including the military, to stop using militants to disrupt development efforts in Afghanistan, including the killing of Mr. Ito. The most challenging difficulties with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration as well as Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups initiatives – financed mostly by Japan as a substantial donor for the Afghan reconstruction – are related to the insurgency from across the border. In this globalized world, when the only option ahead is to stick to the collective conscience, no country can afford to choose isolation due to domestic politics. For certainly, terrorists will only interpret that isolation as appeasement. Thank you.

(Chano) Thank you very much Ambassador Amin. Now we would like to ask Dr. Tanaka, the Director of the Middle East Research Center, to make a few comments. Please Mr. Tanaka.

(Tanaka) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

As H.E. Mr. Amin has talked about the comprehensive situation of the region, especially with regards to the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, I would just like to talk about a few points which I noticed, including a few things that Ambassador didn't touch upon in his lecture.

I have comments on four major areas. The first is the current situation of security in Afghanistan. The second is the activities of so-called terrorists, like the Taliban and other groups. The third point I want to talk about is the progress of the war on terror. The fourth point is Japan's role and involvement in this war on terror. Let's look at security in Afghanistan first. Ambassador Amin gave us a few examples in his lecture, such as the terrorist attack on the Indian Embassy and the prison break in Kandahar. From January this year, there have been incidents in places like Kabul and Kandahar where security should have been especially tight, and this indicates serious deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. The very first incident that took place this year was the shooting in Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14, which preceded the trend of worsening security throughout this year. How to improve the situation is the next issue, and that is related to what is happening in Afghanistan, involving ISAF/NATO, the multi forces, the Afghan military and the police.

What I am concerned about is that currently within Afghanistan there are approximately 70,000 foreign army personnel– including ISAF, NATO, and the American soldiers joining OEF. This is the largest number ever since October 2001. Furthermore, considering the current American policy as well as NATO's tentative target, we predict that this number will certainly

increase. The increase of the number of foreign army personnel means and suggests that the situation has become worse than before. When the whole project of reconstruction started in Afghanistan, especially after the war, a so called “light-footed approach” was applied and the policy was to put forward reconstruction under the initiative of Afghan people themselves, and to make sure that foreign aid and participation did not become conspicuous. In other words, the foreign aid should encourage Afghani people to help themselves through their own efforts. But as we can see, the current 70,000-strong military presence in Afghanistan shows that this “light-footed approach” was a failure once again. Why do I say “again”? Because in the 1990s when Afghanistan disrupted the communist regime, the international community took this approach, and the result was an internal conflict and the upsurge of the Taliban - both of which led to the events of September 11. So it can be said that international community has taken very dangerous approaches since the 1990s.

The second point I would like to mention is the activities of the current terrorists. What I am very concerned about is the so-called Taliban of today. They have the name “Taliban”, but those categorized under the name of the Taliban are diversified today. Of course they are not just one or two people, and their groups are present at many places, but it seems that they are not necessarily acting under an integrated command. Sometimes they act independently. Those who had no relationship with the Taliban of the 1990s call themselves Taliban nowadays. They are different from the former Taliban, which was mobilized by some kind of ideology. Gangs, bandits, robbers, these kinds of groups of “rogues” also call themselves “Taliban”, or maybe it is we who are describing them as “Taliban”. What I am concerned about is that by putting all these diverse groups into the category of “Taliban”, discussions on what do we have to do to fight against these so-called terrorist groups have become rather out of focus and as a result, efforts borne of these discussions are rendered ineffective. These radical groups can be found in areas such as the North-West Frontier Province or Federally Administered Tribal Area FATA, but if we look back 7 years ago, when September 11 took place, the generals of Al-Qaeda in these areas of Pakistan or in Afghanistan were already the second generation. They were already different from Mujahadeen, or Afghan Arabs who fought against the Soviet Union in the 80s and the 90s and founded bases in these areas. Now, another 7 or 8 years later, what we see today is the 2.5<sup>th</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> generation, who are completely different from the initial Taliban, and, even though they might be acting under the command of other organizations, they call themselves Al-Qaeda or Taliban.

The bombing at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad was a great shock to me. But what I am worried about is that this is an area where security should have been strict and also the period and the hour when we should expect the most strict security measures to be taken. Of course the people who attacked the Marriott Hotel shall never be forgiven. But what made them attack the Marriott Hotel is, and this is only a guess, but, I think that information has leaked out from, or

there is some kind of element or link with radical groups within, the military of Pakistan or the security forces of Pakistan. We cannot help but consider these possibilities.

I'd like to move on to my third topic, the progress of the war on terror. What is happening now suggests that we must focus our attention on Pakistan and guarantee the stability of the region, or we must implement some kind of intervention.

The Ambassador talked about Haqqani, and, as he mentioned, the target of the recent US air-raid by unmanned aircraft was said to be Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father of Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of the most influential commanders of Taliban, and they can no longer conceal the fact that he is in Pakistan, or that he is trying to go across the border to command attacks from Pakistan side.

We feel that during the past seven years of the war on terror, the international community led by the United States has never tried to get to the root causes of terrorism but has tried just to remedy the parts where the phenomena are visible. Of course in the future, the areas of Pakistan which host the terrorist organizations and the nests of the Taliban - the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and the Northern Territory - must be dealt with very firmly. The biggest challenge of today is how the international community and especially NATO can address this situation. The NATO member countries are now discussing whether or not to increase their forces in Afghanistan. In February and March I was in Afghanistan with NATO staff. What they say is that of course danger is an issue, but basically for NATO to decide whether to send troops to Afghanistan depends on the question of how much their problems can be solved by sending forces into Afghanistan. For Europe, the Afghan issue is more about narcotics than terrorism. A vast amount of narcotics from Afghanistan are pouring into Europe and the rationale the NATO governments use to explain their policy is that to suppress the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan they need to send troops there. But when we look at what happened in the past seven years or the current situation, it is very clear that the amount of narcotics coming from Afghanistan has not decreased and prices are not going up, as there is a plentiful supply coming out of the country. They send troops to that country and the soldiers of their own country are being killed, but the flow of narcotics just continues. There then arises the question as to the effectiveness of their governments' policies. This is what is happening in the major capitals of the European countries. This is the biggest problem now and the divide of opinion within the European countries and international community will certainly benefit terrorists or Taliban who attempt to worsen or destabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

What then is the role of Japan in this whole scenario? Ambassador H.E. Amin just mentioned and praised Japan's role and contribution to the Marine Interdiction Operation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF-MIO). But what I am worried about, apart from the question of whether or not this OEF-MIO is legally justifiable, is that this is not an operation which aims to

contribute directly toward the stabilization or reconstruction of Afghanistan. We in Japan, especially the Japanese media, discuss this OEF-MIO in the context of Afghan reconstruction or stabilization, and have become self satisfied with the idea that Japan, with the involvement of the Self Defense Force, contributes enough. But this is not the case, as even without MIO the situation of Afghanistan will neither worsen nor improve, as it has nothing to do with MIO. For example, the MIO operation, not oil supplying activities, is taking mostly near Yemen and the Somalian ocean, and activities in the Indian Ocean are carried out far away from the Indian subcontinent. What does that mean? Well, Afghanistan has no sea, thus the center of MIO's activities has shifted far away to Pakistan, located to the south of Afghanistan, and to the Arabian Sea outside of these two countries. Hence, I think that what is happening in Afghanistan is not closely linked with MIO.

Furthermore there is another problem, namely, that of Japanese law regarding sending replenishment vessels to these areas. Since the issue is very universal, discussing the measures to combat terrorism, it is a problem that this is only made possible by temporary legislation. Since if we realize terrorism is a threat to our civilization as a whole, the involvement in the war on terrorism should not be prescribed by time-limited law. In that respect I feel a big discrepancy. Therefore, I think it is important for Japan to make a direct contribution toward Afghanistan, or toward the stabilization of Afghan situation. What we should be careful about is that OEF-MIO is not everything. We should not conclude our discussion saying that OEF-MIO is a sufficient contribution to Afghanistan. Thank you very much for your attention.

(Chano) Thank you very much. I'd like to call upon H. E. Ambassador to come back again to the front to engage in a discussion with Dr. Tanaka. Based on two presentations, we would like to ask Dr. Tanaka to engage in a discussion with His Excellency.

(Dr. Tanaka) I'm not quite sure how it went through the translation, but I have a little bit of doubt on this Japanese contribution to the OEF-MIO. I do not rule out the importance of it, but when it comes to the domestic community and the domestic audience, how it is explained towards the Japanese society, I have grievances that this is not the actual causes that is mentioned. Sometimes it is explained as though we have to guard the oil tankers that come up on the Persian Gulf and go through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and of course that is very important and vital for our economy as well. But for that reason we could do other things. It's not only the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean that is vulnerable to piracy or any other disturbing activities, but when our Government tries to preach or to sell their opinion towards the public that the OEF-MIO needs to be continued, they just bring in this idea of maintaining security through the so-called sea lane. And also the idea of bringing other issues like the piracy

which happens in our open Somalia and the Gulf of Aden actually has to be dealt with of course, but that is not the only location that we have to get ourselves involved. I think we need to have more intense discussions and have more concrete ideas how we could continue or we could promote the idea of OEF-MIO. I would just like to ask your opinion about this.

(H.E. Haron Amin) As the Afghan representative it's not up to me to dictate the rules of Japanese politics. We would want Japan to do what its public desires, and what the Japan public desires of course speaks for the country of Japan. And as far as that is concerned, I think having Japan as a partner in the war on terror is very very significant. The Afghan campaign began on two pillars at the same time – one was the security component which is the stabilization factor and the other one is the redevelopment of Afghanistan. Both are equally important, and in fact each compliments the other component and for Japan being the second largest economy, living in democracy, free market economy and so on and so forth, beliefs fundamentally of the first world. And therefore Japan must play a role in Afghanistan. It also has traditional relations with Afghanistan from ancient times, during the Soviet invasion of course Japan was a huge partner and evacuation of the refugees and so on and so forth. The issue of contribution towards the war on terror should not become an issue on domestic political debates in Japan, or it should not be victimized because of the orientation of political parties here in Japan. That is point number 1. So from the Afghan perspective and from the international coalition's perspective, I think Japan has to stay with the war on terror and be a contributing partner.

Now here is where I have a problem with. Last year, if you recall, when Japan pulled its Indian Ocean mission, the only people that welcomed that decision at the time were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and some Taliban leaders. They were the first ones. And so they in fact took it as a blessing that Japan had withdrawn from amongst the good guys and somehow it was discouraging for doing the right thing vis-a-vis the bad guys. And God forbid for this to happen again. What I am suggesting as a citizen of the world to Japan is, come up with the option first and then get rid of the current options, meaning that yes the political discernment absolutely requires time, it requires debate, it requires all these things, so you need to do that first – have the option and lay it on the table so that at least Japan's name will be a part of the partners within this coalition rather than a decision that would somehow send a sign of appeasement or some kind of encouragement to the Taliban Al-Qaeda groups.

(Dr. Tanaka) Thank you Ambassador, that brings me to another question. You mentioned about Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his fellows like the Taliban who had actually welcomed the decision of Japanese vessel leaving from the Indian Ocean. I wonder why? I never thought that they

ever had the idea that we were there. I think the whole issue started from here, Tokyo, when this issue of whether to continue or discontinue our operations there had been widely publicized throughout the world and eventually reached the ears of Gulbuddin rather than they knowing from the beginning that we were there.

(H.E. Haron Amin) The important thing is that the statement that comes from Hekmatyar. And it was not pro-Japan, and that it was in a way contributing to the bad guys. In leaving that alone I think the important part is or the important component is that Japan has to continue its path with the partners in the coalition. And in fact we believe that in so many ways that we can learn from the examples in Japan and I think the Japanese contribution can take different forms. But that is not up to us, it is up to the Japanese lawmakers, political parties, various organizations to sit down and discuss actively and then decide exactly what the best menu will be.

(Dr. Tanaka) I have another question. It was a very interesting notion that you were describing about what is happening in Pakistan. I have a doubt about this. I have no love for General Musharraf and I'm not a pro-military person, so I can say that a fully-installed Democratic Government in Pakistan would be good for their people and also for the region. But when it comes to reality and when you have so many rove elements within the Pakistani military component, would it be possible for civilian government like Mr. Zardari and Mr. Giuliani's government to be able to have actual control over their military which actually would be working behind.

(H.E. Haron Amin) I think that from an analysis perspective we can have our doubts. But I think that politics is very tangent and we have to see exactly what is happening on the ground. What are the two options that Pakistan has had since its inception – either ruled by civilian rulers, or it has basically gone back to having Generals determining its destiny. And I think that what the military has done in the past has been very counter-productive both domestically and regionally, and that it is virtuous for us to say that for the first time here it has a chance for the new President, the civilian government, I think by 70% or so, that President Zardari got the votes, and that he is recognizing with the problem in Pakistan. And the realization of the President is very significant and coincides with what? – coincides with a partner in Afghanistan; coincides with military components in Afghanistan actively seeking the same thing. We all know the roots, we all know the causes, we all want to make the proper recommendations and then it's a matter of action that we all do it together. I think the only point of contention so far for the last maybe one week or so, is whether the United States has the right to go inside Pakistan or not, or whether they should go, whether it's going to exacerbate or make the

situation easier. I think that's about the only point of contention. On the rest, I think NATO, the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the same picture. President Karzai was never invited to inauguration ceremonies of former Presidents, but he was invited to President Zardari's inauguration ceremony in Pakistan. And let us not forget, President Zardari himself is a victim of terror. His wife, Benazir Bhutto was killed, and his appeal to the United Nations General Assembly in his speech he has drawn a very dramatic story of basically being personally a victim of terror and wanting to do something about it. It takes time. If your question is whether I should be cautiously optimistic individual, I think that point will be taken, but we really don't have a lot of choice. We have to do what is right and we have to go with the civilian rule in Pakistan because otherwise it's a perpetual and vicious cycle of again the military becoming bigger and smaller and bigger and smaller, and at the end it's the military and it has its own objectives.

(Chano) I'd like to invite questions from the floor, and if there are any questions, please raise your hand. Please give me your name and affiliation before you ask your questions.

(Question) Excellency, Mr. Kazuya Ito's incident is what I would like to ask you about. What is the progress of the investigation concerning his death. We hear that the Afghanistan's Intelligence has also been involved, but what has been found out?

(H.E. Haron Amin) As far as Mr. Ito's death, of course we have expressed our condolence to the family. It is a very sad reality, and we hope that it won't recur in Afghanistan. Having said that there are specific facts, investigation is still continuing, but what our authorities have concluded thus far are very very clear. Mr. Ito was killed by the efforts of 4 individuals. One individual, Adil Shah is in custody. That individual is a citizen of Pakistan. He attended the Muhammadijah-madrassa in Peshawar, and the others were also part of the same Muhammadijah-madrassa. This is a fact. The head of the Muhammadijah-madrassa had in fact given the money and had said to kill a Japanese. This has also been substantiated. The information that we have also based on this Muhammadijah-madrassa is that our intelligence last year, out of cooperation with the Pakistani intelligence, mentioned to them that we have grievance from this madrassa that there are a lot of students who were being dispatched into Afghanistan, so we would like you to shut down this madrassa. That madrassa was not only shut down, in fact it received more funding and more support from the ISI. And there is also according to Adil Shah's testimony that he had received also instructions from the ISI and the leader of the madrassa to kill a Japanese. These are some of the statements that have come from Mr. Adil Shah. The evidence is still being gathered. We are still after the three other individuals. We hope that



we can illuminate Japanese audience at a future juncture. But this is what we have now.

(Chano) Thank you very much. The next question is to the gentleman sitting on the left hand side of the room.

(Question) Excellency, A few days back, Asahi Shimbun conducted an interview with Adil Shah. What he disclosed to the journalist from Asahi Shimbun was that he is an Afghan and an Afghan refugee in Pakistan. His father is an Afghan refugee, so he came back and he did it to get the money. So this news has been published in Japan. What is your view?

(H.E. Haron Amin) I mentioned that we are still waiting for three additional individuals, but whether he has attended that school, that is an established fact. The fact that that school is in Peshawar, that is an established fact. The fact that that school is operating and sending people to Afghanistan, these are established facts. And I don't want to speculate on in-between but those are the facts. We are still waiting for three other individuals and we hope that we could be further illuminated. Yes, he is just one individual, and he had said two contradictory statements - one time one thing and another time another. But where he has attended, whom he is affiliated with, when they came, a lot of those stories it all leads to one specific direction.

(Chano) Thank you very much. Yes, at the back of the room please.

(Question) Your Excellency, thank you very much for your lecture. As I listen to you I feel sadder and more depressed, but I have two questions to you Ambassador. There was a proposal from Mr. Waldock, to form the joint task force. But before the US take the initiatives, isn't it possible for Afghanistan to take a step further and start a joint project together with Pakistan, for cooperative development in the border area? The second question is about FATA developments. Among the lessons and experiences of Afghan reconstruction, are there any of those that could be made useful for the development of FATA area? Can you answer to these questions?

(H.E. Haron Amin) Sure. The proposal by the Defense Minister of joint operations units at the Pentagon was so fresh that even surprised President Karzai who was at that time in New York. So this is actually a theory in the making, no one has objected as of yet. I think everyone is considering the merits behind such a force. It has actually received a lot of positive attention, so let us hope that something like this could be done because at times it is a matter of time and logistics and action that determines who escapes or doesn't escape from the battlefields,

particularly the Taliban and Al-Qaida crossing back and forth between the border areas. So I think that in the near future developments can ascertain exactly which way this will go.

The second point is very well taken. Looking at some of the trends in the FATA areas, for example the illiteracy rates, 3% of women have access to education, it is predominantly an independent area, roughly four million population, seven agencies. You've got literacy rate amongst the men is maybe about 19% and amongst the women maybe is less than 3%. These are some of the trends, and yes if one can look at these things, there could be some modalities from within Afghanistan that could be replicated maybe as specific samples and done in Pakistan. But I think beyond that what is significant is this. That the international community has to really step up and understand that this problem cannot go away by guns alone, that we need regional development, that there is need for reforming the madrasas. But when you reform the madrasas, it requires books, it requires classrooms, so on and so forth, so we need resources. And the development of both sides of the border is equally significant, so not to have the focus in Afghanistan but to have the focus regionally. I think that towards this maybe our allies ought to spend some more funding towards Pakistan. I think that local ownership is very significant, of course guiding them on specific things. But in a natural to give a reply to your questions, yes, lessons can be learned from Afghanistan and replicated in Pakistan, and I'd say that there are also probably good examples on that side of the border that could be taken and replicated in Afghanistan. Or it could be mutually newly projects that could be done and then disseminated and proliferated on both sides.

(Chano) Thank you very much.

(Question) Your Excellency, I have actually two questions to you. First one is, you mentioned something from that, it's about probable expansion of Japanese aid to their anti-terrorist coalition. I think there were several quotes, for example from the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Fukuda, and also from the General Secretary, Mr. Machimura, about some prospects of expanding the way Japanese is involved in this coalition not only Indian Ocean. So I wanted to ask you in this respect how do the Afghan government think about this probable expansion, so do you expect Japanese to take part in any operations in Afghanistan territory or some other aids and what will you prefer to get from Japan. This is the first question.

And the second one is about the resolution which was taken by the Security Council. In September there was the resolution no. 1833, and it says that the Security Council is recognizing the efforts on their international forces about their minimizing the risks to their citizens, to their casualties among just ordinary people, so that it's very important to keep the ordinary people from this war. So what do you think about this and I'm not sure whether there was some

Japanese official reaction on this matter, so if you know some official reaction to that. Thank you.

(H.E. Haron Amin) Thank you. As far as the expansion of the mission is concerned, I think that what we have done is that we've had an active dialogue with our Japanese partners here in Tokyo, and we've actually put all of the options on the table. There has been discussion. It's a matter of choice, it's a completely domestic issue for the Japanese, and I think that as a result of active debates, interactive exchanges in final discernment on the right path to do and to take in Afghanistan, knowing full that Japan's role as part of the coalition is paramount, this has to take place by the Japanese and amongst the Japanese. What shape it will take, we don't know. As far as the question asking whether we welcome an expansion, that we do. And I think it applies to not only Afghanistan but all of the partnership in the war on terror involved, and we would like Japan to play a more prominent role in the Indian Ocean mission.

On the second question, the Afghan government's position on collateral damage and loss of life in property is very clear. We are against it, we want it to stop, we want our international partners to take precautionary measures to make sure that loss of life cannot happen again. It has gone on for too long. From 2001 to 2004 so we could understand it and as of now, and that's why we are asking now to activate the Afghan air force, and we are also as reported during my speech, we are talking about doubling the Afghan army size. And even the President recently mentioned that we don't expect the international coalition to remain in Afghanistan until eternity, and that we would want them to one day leave Afghanistan. Having stated that we hope that the partners in the war on terror can take extreme and precautionary measures to make sure that this continued loss of life, killing of Afghans that in fact is turning Afghans who are pro the International Coalition, pro the government, and turning them into enemies, not necessarily taking active combat with Taliban, but into individuals that still stage rise against the government. This is unacceptable and we hope this will diminish.

(Chano) There is another hand up on the other side of the room I think.

(Question) I'd like to ask questions to the Ambassador as well as to Dr. Tanaka. First, Your Excellency, about the security in Afghanistan, I want to ask for your comments. In Iraq, student groups such as sons of Iraq, have been formed and I understand that the security has improved as a result of the formation of these new groups in Iraq. But some people say this is not possible and, this approach cannot be introduced in Afghanistan. What do you think about their opinion?

To Dr. Tanaka, about the Self Defense Forces and their OEF and Maritime Interdiction

Operation, you said that this is not going to contribute directly to Afghanistan. Then what is Japan supposed to do? I mean what Japan can do to contribute to Afghanistan. Please give me your personal comments.

(H.E. Haron Amin) Beginning in 2005, the President of Afghanistan well out of customs in the past, also tried to replicate the same kind of thing and an auxiliary force was formed. But the problem became compounded, because on the one hand we were trying to push for the disarmament of groups, and at the same time we were arming auxiliary police. One country like Japan was questioning exactly what is the merit behind this policy if you are telling us to spend money to disarm so many others, and then to basically re-arm groups in the south would cause groups in the north to say that we are from a different ethnic group and we don't want to lay down our arms. So it became complicated but at a time it did help a great deal against Taliban insurgencies. We had to form some auxiliary police and it did help with community works, community security, and communities to actually become active against the Taliban. But if the question is, is it a solution? I think not.

(Dr. Tanaka) Regarding your question, I think we just have to continue our discussion on what we should do in the future. I heard the new Prime Minister mentioned in his speech in New York that the issue of the right of collective self-defense or collective security should be taken up again. But anyway, in my opinion, during the past two decades many issues have been left unsolved. At the time of the Gulf crisis or the Gulf war, these issues were not dealt with properly, then were neglected again during the 90's, then finally in 2001 after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack we came up with this time-limited legislation, but that's not really an ultimate solution, and we haven't discussed what Japan should really do. I think that's the major problem here. To give you an extreme example, the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces, or Air Force, well I don't think the Maritime Forces can go because there is no sea in Afghanistan, but if the Ground or Air Forces were going to Afghanistan as part of ISAF or OEF, then of course the legal problems, especially that of the Constitution have to be solved, and that requires a lot of discussion. However, so far, the necessary debates have not yet taken place, and only immediate problems have been discussed, without the fundamental issues being solved. I think that's the basic problem. And the question of whether or not we are going to be involved in Afghanistan, and when I say involved, I mean the SDF's involvement, that needs to be discussed, and we have to make a judgment or decision. Furthermore, at one time, I felt that it was significant for Japan to be involved in PRT, but I have changed my mind now. My reasons are twofold. Under the present situation it's very difficult to find spaces where SDF can be active in Afghanistan. Of course there is the difficulty with the legal aspect, but aside

from that, there is a problem in reality. Secondly, I've seen some of the PRT activities in Afghanistan, but they are very diverse, and I don't know which model is the best model, or which model functions the best. It's hard to judge. It's very, very opaque. I think some of their activities are detrimental, although maybe this is a problem on the Afghan side. I mean these PRT activities might somehow kill the Afghan's self-help efforts. We go from the outside, we're there for a limited period of time, of course we help, but ultimately the Afghan people need to manage and build their country by themselves. If people involved temporarily in Afghanistan encourage Afghan's self-help efforts that is OK, but in reality in some respects they may be eliminating the Afghans' independent efforts. This is not something that I saw with my own eyes, but if we look at the regions where the U.S. implemented PRT, it seems that they become more destabilized afterwards. For example, in Ghazni there was an abduction incident last year. A Korean group was taken hostage there even though that was an area where the U.S. started PRT activities quite early and actively, and they had advertised the results as successful on their website, but now some people even say that the money they distributed may have gone to the Taliban or to other armed forces. So I'm rather doubtful about the very dangerous involvement of PRT in that area.

(Chano) Thank you very much.

(H.E. Haron Amin) I think that overall the stabilization campaign in Afghanistan given where the country was, it has paid off. The effort by the international community in so many ways has improved Afghan lives. Today a lot of Afghans are in school, improvement in life has taken place, per capita income has risen, people's standards have really moved up, on so many levels people are happier – in fact more than 70% prospects and thoughts about the future are optimistic. This is the result of the International Engagement of Afghanistan. As part of that campaign PRT is everything else included. On the issue of Japanese participation, I think that as long as Japan is limited when it comes to the issue, or as long as Japan has an issue with taking casualties in any part of the world including Afghanistan, this will be very problematic in the sense that other options would be very limited. I think we have to look at exactly where this country is, and then make recommendations. The only concern that I have as the representative of Afghanistan is: for Japan to pull out and start this huge debate that may take months or years, and in the meantime will leave coalitions stranded, Afghans hopeless and encouraging the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, this would be a very disastrous situation. I think that yes, have the debate, discern on things, have all the political parties, come up with a solution, and replace the current venue with a new solution. I think that would be the best. Otherwise no situation is an ideal situation. No choice at times is an ideal choice. But having Japan as

part of the coalition is a definite and ideal choice, and I think it's very important for the coalition to have Japan in this war on terrorism.

(Chano) I think there is another person in the back raising his hand.

(Question) I have an additional question with regards to the assassination of the Japanese NGO member. Pakistan ISI ordered his killing, or that's one contention. Well, killing Mr. Ito, what was the purpose or what was the advantage to Pakistani ISI for killing Mr. Ito. Also, the madrasa that the 4 people went to, please describe and elaborate what kind of school or madrasa that was.

(H.E. Haron Amin) The madrasa that he went to, all its preaches is that killing and causing mayhem in Afghanistan is a good thing in a nutshell. Okay. That is the kind of madrasa and like that a lot exist. But as far as what is the motivation behind killing Mr. Ito. Let us for a moment step out of Mr. Ito being a Japanese and consider that he is an international citizen. During my speech I mentioned of dozens of incidents taking place – American lives are being lost, Afghan lives being lost, Australian lives being lost, international lives being lost. And the trend was very clear, the direction of my speech was very clear, and I was trying to prove one point – that for as long as institutions, whether in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, use whatever groups for a means of a dance in foreign policy, that's the problem. And that's a problem. Of course the trend of the killing continues because it involves an ambush here and an ambush there, Americans here, engineers there, Iranians there Turkish drivers there. The trend is clear that Al-Qaeda and Taliban want to cause mayhem, disrupt life, and for as long as they have supporters from outside who condone that behavior, who support than in that behavior, this is problematic. Mr. Ito was just such an international citizen. Now I don't want to go beyond that and speculate exactly say that in Japan yes there is a huge debate and did it have something to do with the debate. I think that would be too speculative, and I don't want to go into that. Thank you.

(Chano) I think it's time, but is there someone who wants to ask a question. If not. Well I think there is just one last question from the audience.

(Question) In your speech Your Excellency, you said that we must never accommodate the Taliban and that we must never engage in any kind of appeasement with the Taliban. But I felt that maybe appeasement or accommodation might be a solution to this anti-terrorist war. I would like to ask your Excellency again whether accommodation or appeasement is something

that we must never ever engage in with the Taliban. The other point is, if we are not going to have a dialogue with the Taliban, or if this war goes on without any dialogue with the Taliban, then how this war would actually bring a resolution to us.

(H.E. Haron Amin) My speech was very clear, and the fact that I was saying militants and those that are willing to kill in God's name, there is absolutely no appeasement or accommodation for them. But as far as Taliban are concerned, we have hundreds and thousands of them. Hundreds of their leaders are living in Kabul right now, in fact they are being invited and even consulted by President in Kabul. We have no problem in engaging them in dialogues but given that they have to accept two things – renounce war as a means of advancement of their cost; and accept the supreme law of the land. If they accept these two things, I mean if they say for example, woman's rights, and they don't agree with that, what are we going to do. Accept them and get rid of the women in Afghanistan. So the options are very clear and I think that the constitution is very very clear and specifically providing rights for everyone, and any political orientation can exist in Afghanistan in opposition but it doesn't have to be armed. Now on the issue of reconciliation, the President has a committee within the Parliament that has looked into the issue of reconciliation. We've already brought thousands of Taliban into the mainstream politics of Afghanistan. The issue is with the militants who are willing to kill other lives and in God's name but for a political purpose. That is where I think that appeasement or accommodation won't work.

(Chano) Thank you very much. It is the time and we would like to therefore close today's seminar. I would like to thank Your Excellency once more for his wonderful lecture and to Professor Tanaka for his comments and being part of the dialogue.

(the end of seminar)