Asian Voices :

Promoting Dialogue Between the US and Asia

Memory Wars:

Politics of War Remembrance in Japan

by

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Fujiwara Kiichi: Thank you, it's such a wonderful feeling to be here, I'm very happy and honored to be invited by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. I'm especially happy because this is Washington, DC, just a block away from the Air and Space Museum, and this is very special for me. I was at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1995, when I was there, there was this exhibit of the Enola Gay. And some of you may be aware of the kind of public debate that surrounded the exhibit.

Controversy over Enola Gay Exhibit

I'm not here to make a political statement, but there was something very interesting for me. During this debate, which eventually led to the resignation of the director of the museum, if I'm not mistaken, there was an argument in Japan saying that the Americans do not know what happened. They are not sure about the truth. The reasons why American soldiers or ex-soldiers or senators are responding to the Enola Gay exhibit is because they are not told about the historical truth.

There was a very familiar ring to this argument, for this is almost identical to the argument that I have been hearing in Singapore or the Philippines. I started my work in Southeast Asian Studies, where the argument goes that the Japanese are not told about the truth and it is high time that the Japanese learned and faced the truth.

There's something related to that as well, because the argument goes that the government has been hiding the truth. According to this argument, the Japanese public were saying that the American government is hiding the truth about Hiroshima to the citizens. Therefore, it is the responsibility for the American government to change that policy. This is again almost identical to what I have heard in Manila and Jakarta and Singapore. The argument goes that the Japanese government is hiding the truth from the public.

Debate on War Memories

I'm not very sure about what historical truth means, but here there is a debate about war memories or memories of war. It became so interesting to me that I wrote a book about it, comparing three sets of war remembrance: one in the United States, one in Japan and one in Singapore, where in all these cases, there was this renewal of war remembrance with certain political implications attached to it that grew in the recent years.

Before going into more abstract discussion, I want to relate to you some more personal experiences. During this Enola Gay exhibit, I was there, I went there. I cannot say that I was very happy to watch the plane. Having said that, it was a very interesting experience for me. An aged American person, a grandfather perhaps, was telling his grandchild, I think, about what he was doing during the war. He was very happy, partly because his grandchildren were listening very carefully in a sincere manner to his statements. He was telling them how he beat up the Japanese during the war.

I wasn't really upset about this; that's not the point. The point is that this was the first time I learned that the dropping of the atomic bomb was something to rejoice about. Not because he was a sadistic person at all. The dropping of the atomic bomb was the end of World War II, that meant he didn't have to die anymore and the bad guys gave up in the war. This was so totally different from what I had been thinking or what I was used to thinking about

World War II, that this crush of memory, in a very personal sense, was important to me.

Chinese Reaction to Japanese Actions

There was another story. This relates to a Chinese person, actually he was in my class. This Chinese student was very upset to find out that Japanese soldiers who went to China and who killed people had graves, tombstones. This was quite revolting for him, for murderers having graves and tombstones. It was something he could not accept. Japanese soldiers were killers for him, and killers having graves was something he could not understand.

In fact, he's not the only Chinese to show such reaction to those graves of Japanese soldiers. However, there was one remarkable Chinese writer, a Singaporean actually, who showed a very different reaction to this. He, like many Chinese, found a grave of a Japanese soldier who fought in China. He found out that this soldier died in Hunan, a Chinese province, and that's where this writer, Kuo Pao Kun came from. Kuo Pao Kun now writes in Singapore, but actually he came from mainland China.

Japanese Soldiers Portrayed as Human Beings in Play

Instead of being upset about this experience, instead of being angry about those Japanese soldiers having graves and tombstones, he started to think about it. He realized that he never thought that a Japanese soldier, a killer, could also be a human being. From this experience he wrote a marvelous play titled *The Spirits*. I think it's one of the best plays that he wrote. In this play, no character is designated or has any name but it's quite obvious that all these were Japanese who died during the war. In the play, all those Japanese characters share a certain loss; they have lost something in their involvement in the war. The characters include the general, the women, many kinds of people from the Japanese population. To all of them, war is depicted not as a savage act of killing people but their own personal losses. A very strong reaction greeted Kuo Pao Kun, because in his play the Japanese were like human beings. However, right now I think it's fair to say that *The Spirits* is one of the best plays that Kuo Pao Kun has written and highly regarded as such.

This made me feel a bit ashamed, actually. Kuo Pao Kun is my very good friend, but if he could transcend national boundaries and think about war memories from a broader perspective – he's one who comes from the ones who were killed in the war – then I thought that it might be important for me to examine the various kinds of war memory that may have emanated from the war. So that was the starting point of what I have been doing.

Strong Reactions to Discussion of War Memories

Any discussion about war memories will involve two very strong and central reactions. One argument would be that it's a very simple matter, the Japanese are not facing the fact of invasion. So the only thing that should take place would be the Japanese to face the facts and the truth. There's much to be said about this view. In many ways I agree with this view.

Having said that, there are still are certain questions that might pop up in your mind. For one thing, the Japanese not facing the facts of the war. Does this Japan mean the government or the Japanese public in general, as if it has the same mind? But also there is another question. How did the Japanese, government or otherwise, perceive the war? If you have forgotten about the war, then what kind of story did they believe in, what kind of narrative did they believe as related to the war? That's a story that I will try to tell tonight.

Conservatives Criticize Leftist View of War

There will be another reaction from the Japanese side, mainly conservative, I believe,

who would argue that this war memory issue is actually a fabrication of the leftists and those anti-government personnel in Japan. The kind of people who just can't like anything about Japan and keep on pronouncing their own propaganda war, denouncing whatever the Japanese government did during the past and the present, and in effect because they have low support in the domestic society, they are now widely voicing their views to the Chinese or the Koreans to gain support from the Koreans or Chinese, so that their views would prevail. The argument goes that it is essentially a leftist anti-government thought.

I do not take this view, but unfortunately, to my view, quite a large number of people in Japan do support this line of reasoning. Although there is something to be said about this view in the sense that any discussion about the war was essentially limited to a liberal, elitist, intellectual environment, unfortunately to which I may be part of. When it comes to actual intergovernmental relations, the conservative ruling party in Japan was quite happy to forget about the war at all, especially since they had a formed nice alliance with the United States, which was essentially an alliance of strange bedfellows due to Cold War geopolitics.

Therefore, if you check the intergovernmental relationship between U.S. and Japan, you essentially won't find anything about the war. Any discussion denouncing the war would be limited to what you find in campuses, what you find in those more intellectual journals and the like.

The trouble about war memory in Japan is that there was this long and steady decline of such secular liberal elitist intelligentsia, in Japanese political thought. We see now a revival of a far more crude kind of nationalism in our soil. So to that extent they're right. I don't agree with their definition about the left, because for one thing I was never a communist. Calling me a leftist would be too much of an honor. But according to their view of their own glorification of the Japanese past, anybody who argued against Japan would be taken as leftist. That itself shows the impact of war memories in Japan.

Past Events Influence Contemporary International Relations

Let me move this into some broader questions, three questions for this. For one thing, the past and the experiences of the past have become more important in the international relations of today. I'm not making any smart comments about it. Take the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo. Of course, we have difficulties, and some people might even say that China is a potential security threat to Japan.

Some people do agree to that. But nevertheless, we understand that Beijing is essentially a status quo power right now. There are difficulties to which we do not agree with Beijing, especially about Taiwan, but nevertheless I think it is quite safe to say that Beijing is now operating its foreign policy essentially not as an adventurous power but as a status quo power. Because that point is well-taken into account in Tokyo, there's really not that much serious conflict with Beijing at the moment, not in geopolitics.

However, when it comes to issues related to the war and war memories of Japan, you see a totally different situation. When it comes to, say, Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni shrine, which commemorates Japanese soldiers including war criminals, there is an immediate reaction from Beijing that such action cannot be tolerated.

In fact, it is not too much to say that our relationship with Beijing has been rocked more by the war, the past, rather than contestation or geopolitics in the present. So the natural question is, why? The war ended more than half a century ago, and nevertheless the conflict of the past has become much more important than what we have in the present.

Nationalization Question

The second question that may be related to this, is what I might call very briefly a nationalization question, a nationalization question not in the sense of nationalization of industries or anything but discussing history of terms of ethnic nations.

A case in point would be discussion about war responsibilities. China has been discussing about Japanese war responsibility in terms of the responsibility for political elites and the government. The argument was that the Japanese people, under the rule of a fascist regime or imperialist regime, were not really responsible for the war but were the victims. There was quite a lot of hypocrisy in this argument and many Chinese did not really accept that view, but this being the predominant view, there was no way that they could express anger to the individual Japanese soldiers who killed their families, friends, everybody.

Continuing Chinese Resentment against Japanese People

However, if you take a look at the bulletin boards in the Internet written by Chinese, you can see that the discussion is not against the Japanese government but the Japanese nation and the Japanese individuals. The argument is not the responsibility of the Japanese government but individual Japanese as being evil.

The trouble is that we see an almost mirror image of this in Japan. It is even more ridiculous because in the bulletin boards in the Internet you will find all those racist remarks about Koreans or the Chinese, arguing that the Koreans or the Chinese are fabricating history. It's not the Korean or Chinese government but the Korean and Chinese people are our enemies.

Whether we should really take seriously those hideous remarks that are expressed in the Internet is another story. But it does seem quite obvious that the debate about war responsibility and war crimes is no longer that of something that is played at the inter-governmental level but more at an inter-societal level.

The interesting thing is that the more Asian countries move toward formal democracy, and even if not toward formal democracy, become much more pluralized than before, there has been a larger voice against Japanese war crimes. These are not against the Japanese government but Japanese individuals who took the actual action and also the Japanese people who are living right now who are keeping their silence about it. Therefore this inter-state, intergovernmental war memory dispute has now reached an intersocietal level, with all its new implications for Asian politics.

I use the word nation here, and this relates to a new kind of reading of history. It would be rather unfair to blame the Chinese on this point, because nationalization of history is moving much more strongly in Japan, which I will discuss later. But I will start this discussion by taking the Chinese case.

Missing Information in Nationalist Movements

There is a huge museum near the Marco Polo Bridge in the suburbs of Beijing, which is about war resistance against the Japanese. Many Japanese right-wingers have been rather upset about this museum. Myself not being part of them, I do not follow their argument, but I do find a certain invention of history is taking place in that museum. The invention of history there is not the invention of Japanese war crimes, which is blatantly obvious, that is not the point.

The point is that the civil war in China was almost totally missing from that museum. You see a network of Chinese supporting the war against Japanese on a huge map. Anybody who did study in Southeast Asia would immediately realize that those opposed were

actually not support for the Communist Party but the support that went to Kuomintang. Kuomintang being included in a national resistance against Japanese is something very new.

Although there was an alliance with the Kuomintang, which was not long-lasting but it remained up to a certain point after liberation or revolution, whichever word you want to use, the alliance with Kuomintang was somehow totally dismissed from Chinese history. There was a more Marxist reading of history. Then it moved steadily toward a more nationalist reading of history where the war was not a war between the imperialist power and the revolutionary powers but a war against Japanese and a national Chinese unified front.

When it comes to the nationalization of history in Japan, it is so easy to pinpoint the rather ridiculous chauvinist individuals. But instead I want to take an example of a very strange museum, the Showakan. Showakan is a strange place. Showakan is a museum that was made by Nihon Izokukai, being one of the most right-wing, most conservative movements in Japan that represents the families of those soldiers who died during the war. Nihon Izokukai by far in the political spectrum of Japan would definitely belong to the right.

Nihon Izokukai wanted to bring a new museum to carry on their own political agenda. The trouble was they were asking for some government funds. Because they were asking for government funds, their museum started a huge controversy. The liberals argued that this museum would be taken, would be used to forward some of the more chauvinistic readings of history in Japan and we should stop it. On the other hand, Nihon Izokukai were arguing, people were arguing, that the left, the reds, the liberals, those guys are trying to snatch away their own reading of history from the public.

I shouldn't go into the details of this debate. What I wanted to talk to you about is about the actual museum that took place. This debate was so intense that there was no way the government could decide which is which. There was no way the government could say yes to the Nihon Izokukai kind of chauvinistic reading of history and there was no way they could agree to a more liberal reading of history as well. So therefore, what is exhibited in Showakan is what virtually all Japanese can agree about, about the war.

This is a very strange museum because if you go there you find almost nothing about the war, nothing at all. There's no soldiers; there's no battlefields, there's no glorification, there's no accusation about the soldiers, there's no soldiers at all. As a matter of fact, when it comes to soldiers, there's not even a male represented in the museum. What you see in that museum is women and children during the war and how they suffered during the air raids.

The museum is even careful not to show who was dropping the bombs on Japan. So in effect, everything that relates to the war is totally cut away from that museum and what remains is a very long story about Japanese suffering during the war. The reason why I call this nationalist reading of history is precisely because this was at the core of Japanese war memories in Japan, that the Japanese suffered during the war, disregarding what they did abroad.

I think I've used up so much of my time, but the bulk of the arguments start from here. If anybody is interested in the talk I can e-mail you my paper. So I'll try to be very brief here.

Transformation of Japan to Pacifism

In Japan after the war there was a total transformation from a militarist nation to a kind of born-again pacifist. After defeat, instead of the military and the war symbol, the peace symbol took over virtually all of the country. Therefore, many observers have read some hypocrisy in this sudden outburst of pacifism. Ian Buruma, who I believe was

one of the speakers here, was one of the very strong writers arguing against such hypocrisies of pacifism, which he argued was only a lid that hides Japanese war crimes. There's quite a lot to be said about this view.

Nationalism Based on Civil Society

Having said that, I do not think it was simply a kind of manipulation of public sentiment, like what Ian Buruma discusses. I think here there was a major shift of nationalism from the one that combined the state and society to the one that is based on civil society. The kind of nationalism that you find during the war years was the one that each individual would only have certain meaning to live if that person is a part of this nation. This magic word "nation" somehow worked as a glue that pushed the state and society together. If there is an opposite liberal reading of nationalism, it's here.

The war however showed that the government or the state failed to bring their promises of glory. In fact, the state only brought about misery and defeat to the public. One of the very good books written on the subject would be John Dowers, *Embracing Defeat*. I don't think I want to tell anything about it because I'm so jealous about it, he writes so well.

During this period right after the war the Japanese public, instead of identifying themselves to the state, developed this identification among themselves as the victims of war. This, of course, is a very easy way out for many Japanese who were actually heavily engaged in combat. There was no way that all those individuals could be devoid of war responsibility.

Having said that, it is quite true that the number of soldiers who were sent in the theaters were always limited to those Japanese who suffered in the mainland. So therefore it was very easy for the public to jump to this argument that we are the ones who suffered. We, as being the ones who suffered from the war, should never let the war happen again. Instead of state-society nationalism, we see an emergence or kind of civil society nationalism in Japan, with all these limits and hypocrisies.

Hiroshima as a Symbol of Japanese Victimhood

I don't think I have much time to discuss about Hiroshima here, but suffice it to say that Hiroshima emerged as a symbol that unites these Japanese victimhood, the shared victimization feeling. Hiroshima was really not that much talked about up until the mid-1950s. It might sound very strange to you, but Hiroshima was not that important even to the Japanese. For one thing, there was a censorship during the American occupation that banned any discussion about Hiroshima.

The other thing is that the Japanese did not pay much attention to Hiroshima but paid more attention to the air raids in Tokyo, Osaka, many major cities. It is worthwhile to remember that those people who died in Tokyo or Osaka, if you add them up, actually exceeds those people who died in Hiroshima.

However, in the mid-1950s there was a renewal of a threat of nuclear war. Your Secretary of State Dulles had announced a strategy of massive retaliation in January 1954. There was this nuclear test in the Bikini Atolls, which affected Japanese fishing vessel, the Dai-Go Fukuryu Maru, caught in radioactivity-related diseases to her crew, if not to the tuna fish.

This started kind of a panicky situation. It's hard to tell this to an American audience who may be more accustomed to the new *Godzilla* movie, the Hollywood *Godzilla* movie. Here I'm talking about the old *Godzilla* movie, which was made in 1954, the hit movie of 1954. The *Godzilla* movie, this you can call this as an anti-nuke movie in many ways. This *Godzilla* is a product of a nuclear test. That *Godzilla* razed Tokyo Bay

just like these bombers, the B-29 bombers raided Tokyo. In fact, the image of *Godzilla* somehow overlapped with the image of air raids during the war.

The shared fear of a nuclear war in the future was actually pretty much intense, because they just had suffered from air raids only ten years before. There was a kind of a popular symbolism that puts Hiroshima at the center and argued that the Japanese are the victims of the war emerged in Japan. I believe this was much stronger than those adhering to communism or leftists or whatever. It is not leftist, it is more of a nationalist positivism with all its limits and hypocrisies.

So the discussion about war memories in Japan is the rise and demise of these Hiroshima memories. This was very strong. What used to be a parochial memory in this forgotten city of Hiroshima became a national monument in the late 1950s. Throughout the 1960s, Hiroshima retained such an important role in Japanese war memories. It was easy to talk about Hiroshima because we were not responsible about it. It was so easy to talk about Hiroshima because the Japanese were assumed to be victims. It was also easy because it worked against future wars. But it did not really talk about what the Japanese government should do.

Lack of Discussion about Nanjing

However, when Tokyo started to normalize our ties with Beijing, a Chinese view toward the situation started to emerge. In early 1970s, Honda Katsuichi, an *Asahi* ace reporter, started his serialized report about the Nanjing atrocities. In fact, there's been quite some time since anybody talked about Nanjing atrocities for – to use a very crude language – Nanjing was their China, not our China. Nanjing was Kuomintang and not the suffering of the regions occupied by the Chinese Communist Party. So therefore the Nanjing atrocities, after the Tokyo trials, were not that much talked about.

But when Honda Katsuichi started to discuss about the Nanjing atrocities in the *Asahi Shimbun*, there was an immediate, negative, hostile reaction from the readers. The argument is that we should put the past to rest, we should not remember about it.

What good does it do to excavate those things from underground? Ever since then, war memories in Japan started to become a much more divisive issue, rather than an issue that could rely on nationalism as a unifier.

I grew up during this period. I was pretty much upset and surprised to find out that not everybody agreed about Japanese war crimes in China. It was totally okay to talk about Hiroshima anyway, but if you talk about China this was a different issue. When it came to China, in part the argument was that the Chinese government is somehow using this to squeeze more aid from Japan, and therefore it is essentially a Chinese Communist plot that works on the defamation of the Japanese nationalist history.

During this Japanese war crime debate, a more chauvinistic reading of history became much more popular in Japan that remains to this day. The argument that the Chinese or Koreans are distorting our history and that the leftists in our society are somehow using this issue for their own benefit, has remained to this day.

When it comes to the Hiroshima movement, it is quite obvious that the Socialist Party and the Communist Party were struggling to take the initiative in the movement. So it's true that there was a very strong leftist element here. But it is not quite right to argue that it was a leftist movement, because the Communist Party or the Socialist Party never really did have much support in Japan anyway. It is far more accurate to argue that those opposition parties, with their limited constituencies, capitalized on this war issue and the emotionally charged peace issue to rally support for them.

The trouble is that such political utility has started to decline in the 1970s to the 1980s. Faced with charges about Japanese war crimes in China and for that matter Southeast Asia, peace, instead of becoming an issue that the opposition party could utilize, became far more dangerous. It's worthwhile to note that the conservative members within the opposition parties were actually not that different from the conservative politicians that rule Japan up to this day.

History Issue Became an International Issue

Slowly, the history issue became an international issue. When the opposition started to drop this peace symbol from their support, the history issue, as it is now called in Japan, the *rekishi mondai*, became an issue with China and Korea, especially after 1982. The trouble is the South Koreans were always angry about it, but the Japanese kept on neglecting it.

When the Chinese joined this movement against Japanese fabrication, suddenly it became an international issue. In 1982, there was criticism from the Chinese government about the Japanese history textbooks which disregard Japanese atrocities in Nanjing. After 1982, there started a roll of disputes between China and Japan. To cut a long story short, the Koreans are more angry about the Japanese textbooks than the Chinese, and the Chinese are more angry about the Yasukuni shrine and our prime minister's visit to the shrine.

During this process, not only is it the case that the public became more aware about the actual situation in China and the kind of atrocity that took place during the Japanese occupation in China – I should also add quickly that Nanjing was not the only atrocity. In fact, if I may so, Nanjing was not *the* atrocity. The thing got far worse after 1941, because the Chinese theater was actually occupied by the Japanese military without much resources. The resources came to the war against the United States. Therefore, Japanese soldiers in China had to further exploit the Chinese and the story became even more hideous and cruel. This story came to be known. At the same time, this story became a more liberal intelligentsia, ivory tower kind of thing that did not have much appeal in the civil society.

Unifying Effect of Speaking against Nanjing

I do not think that the masses or the mainstream Japanese society support a position of the right-wing people. Having said that, precisely because they have such a vocal opposition in the Japanese society at the moment, it has kind of a unifying effect where we say something against Nanjing.

The argument would go that there are disagreements about this Nanjing case so we should drop it from our subject. We have extreme viewpoints so therefore we should not discuss about it. The actual impact of such chauvinistic reading of history was not that the public is accepting it, but because of such polarization of opinion the matter itself is dropped from public debate.

Throughout this course, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remained quite quiet toward the discussion about war responsibility. Hiroshima was pretty stubborn. The Hiroshima people argued that any discussion about war crimes is about the past. Hiroshima carries the message against future nuclear wars. So they didn't pay much attention to Japanese war crimes. Nagasaki was a different case.

We used to talk of those angry people in Hiroshima, the anger of Hiroshima and the prayer of Nagasaki. Nagasaki peace movement was essentially Christian in nature. Nagasaki being a port city that was open during the *Tokugawa Shogunate* was far more cosmopolitan. So they were the first to discuss about Korean suffering from the A-bomb in Nagasaki and they were much more accommodating to the accusation about hypocrisy.

But with the end of the Cold War, with a reduced threat perception about a future nuclear war taking place in Japan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki's role in Japanese war memory has somehow declined.

I don't think I have time to discuss about the decline of secular liberal political ideology in Japan. If I have time I can go on and on about that, because in many ways it's a story about, not me, but a group of people that I grew up with. But essentially, this is something quite similar to what we find in, for example, India or Mexico, where there was a ruling conservative party and still the academia was far more liberal and also isolated from the body politic. Such isolated liberal intelligentsia became even less and less important in public life.

So there you are. This was a story of a very strange kind of war memory that took place in Japan, a war memory that sees the Japanese as the victim of war and not the aggressors. Precisely because of it, it could bring the national element together at the social level and not as a marriage of the state and society. I'm not really eager to revive the claims of the Hiroshima pacifists, for their historical role I believe is over.

It is time that we face the fact of Japanese war crimes in the war. Having said that, the trouble is with the decline of this Hiroshima-type intelligentsia we are now observing the revival of a far more chauvinistic, crude kind of nationalism. Thank you.

Steve Clemons: I very much enjoyed Dr. Fujiwara's comments and agree with much of what he said. I have a couple of nuanced differences. I thought what I might do in the few minutes I have is – we've got a great crowd here with people who have written far more than most of us have on this subject. Specifically Mr. Miura of the *Asahi*, who's made this sort of one of his professional avocations, to talk about the question of how Japan should reconcile its past with its present and future. But let me throw out some things that I think are possibly provocative and we should think about.

Tradeoffs of Economic Interests for Security Interests

I had my own touchpoints with this issue. It started from a variety of sources. One, I'd like to acknowledge Eric Gangloff. We sat around at a coffee shop one time. Eric is the executive director of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. He knew that for some time I had always been quite interested in the question of historical tradeoffs between Japan and the United States when it came to U.S. forfeiture of certain economic interests to retain or maximize security interests.

But to say that in a room was so taboo, was so put down for so long, particularly in the mid-'80s and on into the '90s, that one didn't have to go too far to find publicly available material. But sort of institutionalized American academic and public policy institutions were quite animated in opposition to that sort of simple view, which many of us take as conventional wisdom today, or increasingly so.

The Friendship Commission had been long involved in trying to both expose Japan and Japanese institutions to such institutions here as the Freedom of Information Act. And at the same time trying to use our own declassification and FOIA process to go back and look at the history and look at the specific deals. Enough time had elapsed and we had enough institutional embeddedness about transparency in our own history in the United States that we should be able to go back and check some of this stuff out.

There is a publication published by the Department of State that I'm sure Matt knows about called the *Foreign Relations Volume of the United States*. In 1996 and 1997, there was a pretty vicious debate among the historians that oversee the publication of that official government volume, which by law

must be the most accurate assessment of American history and American foreign policy based on all available and declassified information. And all information had to be declassified, in this case, thirty years after the occurrence of that fact.

This particular committee that was overseeing the Japan volume threatened to publish the volume in all white pages, because they were not getting either State Department or CIA cooperation in providing the documentation required by law under that statute to produce that volume. In the end, that *Foreign Relations Volume* published in 1997 was published for the first time in our history with a disclaimer that said this volume is being published virtually illegally. The Department of State is violating the code and this is not a true and accurate version of American history.

American's Own Historical Memory Problem

So the war memory problem, or at least the historical memory problem, is not one that Japan holds a monopoly on. I think it's important to remember that. I think that we have been – if you want to compare with Dr. Fujiwara's comments about Hiroshima and the embedded views that have grown up around that, it almost reminds one of Thomas Kuhn and large apparatuses that we invest in and build. And how hard it is to tear these down over time, either based on empirical evidence or over changes in shared perception about things.

The United States similarity is Vietnam. Not talking about moral position on where anybody may be in Vietnam, nonetheless there is a very big investment of U.S. intellectuals and public policy institutions in the way in which to read America's Vietnam experience. A fellow at my institution, Michael Lind, went back after the Soviet archives became available. And much of this empirical evidence became accessed through the Wilson Center, began saying that many of the things that some of the people on the right and conservatives had been saying about Ho Chi Minh and relations with Mao and the Soviets and others in that experience was in fact true.

So he wrote a book called *Vietnam: The Necessary War*, which wasn't necessarily an affirmation of the need to be in Vietnam but was looking at this other issue. It was made a New York Times Notable Book but he was attacked ferociously by those people who were so vested in a particular version of history that they wanted to remain, in my view, fairly blind to the empirical evidence.

So Eric Gangloff funded a project that I had the opportunity to help run and direct that commissioned some historians to go back and look at the declassified material and information on U.S.-Japan relations in the economic and political realms, security realms, since 1960.

Role of the Nixon Center

Fortunately, as I got deeper and deeper into this, I found my own – John Ikenberry mentioned that I had been at the Nixon Center. The Nixon Center was an interesting institution which sort of grew out of the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace, to which it is still connected. Some of you I met when I came to Washington to open that center. Richard Nixon was still alive but he was soon not to be when we put this together and I think he knew that. They didn't want to just have a library.

Many people don't realize that the Nixon Archives do not exist at the Nixon Library. They are in the National Archives, and it has a lot to do with Watergate and the history of documents. But the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace is privately supported and the documents don't exist.

So when we were launching the Nixon Center, you have a lot of questions asked. We know Nixon isn't going to be around long so we

need to have other of the Nixon groupies around. We need Henry Kissinger to be part of this.

Henry Kissinger is one of the shrewdest negotiators you'll ever meet. Why would Henry Kissinger want to be around a place called the Nixon Center, not the Kissinger Center? One reason has to do with Kissinger's investment in his own historical persona. What threatens that? The records do, the archives do, the tapes do, the material that goes back to that period of time and says, here's what Henry Kissinger really did or here's what Nixon may have said privately about Henry Kissinger. This was Kissinger's biggest worry.

Part of American History Manipulated by Needs of a Few People

So our leverage over Henry Kissinger to make him fall in love and be at all the events that I was organizing for the Nixon Center, was on behalf of the Nixon estate, the Nixon institution and library, is to negotiate with the government to delay as long as possible the release of the documentation of the tapes. It's very important, and I'm admitting this publicly, to realize that there was not historical transparency there, there still isn't to this day to the degree. Here's a very important part of American history that was hidden and manipulated by the needs of a few people.

I've learned since I've gotten into this question of historical memory, particularly with Japan – some of you may have read an article that I had in the New York Times last September that had to do with some articles of a secret – I would say a relatively secret – deal done on the eve of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty by John Foster Dulles. It was language that was exchanged between then Prime Minister of Japan Shigeru Yoshida and the Dutch foreign minister Dirk Stikker.

I would argue that that language at least makes gray the previously black and white distinction about the ability of Allied citizens to sue Japanese private firms for this issue. We can discuss that later if you're interested.

U.S. Deals to Promote Certain Version of History

The most important thing about that kind of material that I was able to come by is that it gave me firsthand insight into the fact that there may be other deals that the United States did to preserve or promote a version of history, and also the institutionalized side, the vast investment by both American political and Japanese political and financial institutions in preserving past issues. But I learned from this experience that there's kind of a market for public opinion. It behaves like a market.

If you are an investor in Enron and you learn some bad information about Enron that wasn't previously known, Enron stock plummets. The same thing happens when it comes to transparency in government, that once the decision of people in government to hide or not disclose important information to its citizenry, it sits there and lurks beneath the surface, waiting to come and create the shock it's going to have.

You end up creating – you have to reconcile – at some point it will be reconciled. I think that's why we have certain transparency laws in the United States. But at some point, despite the particular foreign policy decisions which governments make to hide deals done, to get certain objectives met, is that there will be a price paid for that at some point in the future.

I think that's what we've seen in the POW cases, I think that's what Fujiwara-san articulates quite nicely in his comments. There is a very clear market effect. It's one of the things, as in any investment, that I don't understand that given our now increasing experience with the drama and tragedy of these issues, that there isn't greater diversification of the portfolio.

Great Heroes in Japan

I'm not looking, and I recently spoke in San Francisco to a group largely of Chinese Americans and Korean Americans about this subject. I was on the podium with Iris Chang, they didn't come to see me, they came to hear about the *Rape of Nanjing* and all of the debate about that. I said, the other experience I've seen in Japan is that there are great heroes in Japan. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni and others, they are worried about these lawsuits about POW suits.

But I have met people in each one of those institutions that wants to do the right thing. There's debate about what the right thing is. I've met people from the foreign ministry who have clandestinely attended my meetings and snuck up to me and said, we really agree with the general principle you're saying. I've met people in the press corps who themselves are trying very hard in Japan, I meet NGOs, I meet women who are translating the historical record of one of the POWs that's led in this lawsuit.

There's great numbers of heroes, they may not be institutionally empowered, but there are a great number of heroes that have been trying to raise these issues. It is no longer a U.S. versus Japan issue, as much as many people would like it to seem so.

Individual Support to Raise Issue of POW's

When my article came out in September, and I'll inoculate myself from that in a moment, because – let me tell you about the State Department. It's on record now in other places so I can quote it. Tom Pickering and Stu Eizenstat, two people who have been senior State Department officials, both e-mailed me right after the article came out and said, good for you. Because internally in the State Department, while both may argue the legal impact of the letters that were disclosed, they do think that the issue itself is very important.

The European desk guys and even the Japan desk guys, I can't go into a great deal of detail there, but there was a lot of clapping for the idea of beginning to expose more of this, from the institution that institutionally is dead-set against the article. But privately throughout the institution there's a great deal of support and a rejection of the notion, I think, that these issues are better left buried than dug up, because there's a consequence to that.

At State it's been the legal affairs division. I just got back from Japan three days ago, was with Howard Baker and Dick Christianson, both of whom were defending the San Francisco Peace Treaty and said we believe it's the letter of the law. But by the way, if it fails in the court, we can't do anything for you, Japan. And by the way, that's not really the issue is it? The issue is really one about how does a state or a nation deal with history.

Japan Must Confront POW Issue Without Foreign Pressure

A couple of very brief other comments. One, when I spoke in San Francisco to the group of Asian Americans and others, because someone asked me, what would be the best outcome in the POW lawsuits against the Japanese? It seems to me that where the POWs would lose in the California courts, lose in the federal courts and keep appealing and go all the way up and it would go back and forth all the way up to the Supreme Court, and at the Supreme Court level lose. Then Japan would turn around the next day and do something for the POWs and set up the foundation. Why? Because it's not healthy for anyone, nor the Japanese, for Japan to begin creating foundations or a better architecture for dealing with historical memory as a result of external foreign pressure. We in the United States or the Koreans or Chinese will never fundamentally trust Japan at a greater level if it secured that outcome through pressure. It's got to come endogenously.

So how do you do that? One way is I think you've got to find these heroes and people

who actually are thinking alternatively. Taro Kono, a young LDP, brash, provocative member, son of the foreign minister, grandson of the other famous Kono, just gave his father a liver, he's sort of riding high on these issues. He took this issue and went to the chief cabinet secretary in Japan and went to folks at Mitsui and said, what can we do to try and solve this? That's the way in which I think these have to happen.

Let me finish with one comment. In Germany, I had the opportunity to go with Stu Eizenstat to something called the Victor Klemperer Awards. The Victor Klemperer Awards were put together by Dresdner Bank. They were a competition, they said to students we'll send you to London or we'll put you on a trip or we'll give you some prizes or money or something, if you will come up with contemporary ways to deal with the question of social tolerance. They had 20,000 submissions from students in classes or individually throughout Germany. They had Otto Schilly, the interior minister, they had half of the German press corps at the event. It was an extraordinarily moving event.

I thought to myself, what if Mitsubishi did this in Japan? I couldn't imagine. If you talk to Japanese firms, they say, you don't understand the schools, you don't understand the teachers unions, you don't understand this institution and that institution. But I would say that the risks that Dresdner Bank took in instituting these Klemperer Awards were not dissimilar in many ways from the kind of risks that an institution of that sort would have in Japan.

It doesn't have to be about war memory, because what do you do when that is created? If you develop internally a way for people to come out and talk about history and social tolerance domestically, you take a lot of wind out of the sails of other people, and what is history anyway? Dr. Fujiwara said, it's a debate. It's an ongoing debate. I think the degree to which Japan develops an architecture by which it can more actively debate that, it takes the wind out of the sails of those on the outside who would otherwise use these issues for leverage.

The only point of real disagreement I have with Mr. Fujiwara is on the Japan-China side. He argues that comments about the past are becoming more important in contemporary relations. That could be true, but I believe that one of the issues is that history in my mind seems to be becoming a tool to manage contemporary aspirations between states. I don't believe that the China-Japan relationship nor the aspirations of Korea are that dissimilar. What we have to worry about is history being manipulated and driven as a tool in that process.

Nations Can Be Reckless With History

The reason that nations can be reckless and I think sometimes irresponsible with history is because of the very peculiar and odd relationship of the United States to this region. The question of America's role in the region and America's peculiar role in Japan, in picking political winners and losers, in burying much of that debate, is so important, because those people who want to see a healthy U.S.-Japan relationship continue are very fearful that once this box gets opened that that will somehow cause irreparable damage in the U.S.-Japan relationship. When I say that the longer they keep that box closed, they will do possibly irreparable damage and drive that chauvinistic and I think inevitably anti-American attitude in Japan and the region far further.

So we have to figure out, how do we develop a way of injecting health and transparency and returning to principles of what we have and moving away from the inertia that we had in the U.S.-Japan relationship in the past, as something much more constructive. Thank you.

Matt Palmer: I'd like to thank both Dr. Fujiwara and Mr. Clemons for their com-

ments, I enjoyed them both very much. The government guy has always got to come up and be kind of the wet blanket, so if I might start with the wet blanket comment, because I don't think John made this clear up front. I'm here in my personal capacity and not as a representative of the United States government. What I have to say reflects my own views and they're off the record and not for attribution. Let's just say the United States government has no position on most of what we're talking about here tonight.

U.S. Government is Not the Keeper of History

In fact, it would be wildly inappropriate for the United States government to have a position or view on much of what it is we're discussing here. The United States government is not the keeper of history. It's not the keeper of an official United States history. In some ways, I think this is one of the things that's at issue here and one of the things that might in fact separate the way that the American public and the Japanese public relate to questions of memory and history.

It is reflected in areas that are as simple as educational structures and systems. I taught school in Japan for a number of years. On any given day, everyone in Japan, with every student in the same grade was on the same page of the same textbook, textbooks that had been approved by the federal government. You don't find that in the United States, you find quite a wide range of source material that's used in history classes, a wide range of views and opinions that are expressed by high school history teachers or college professors.

I'll share one of my own personal stories from my time teaching high school in Kobe. That was a field trip, *ensoku*,that we took to Mitsui, we went to corporate headquarters. I can't remember what town they're in now, but it was about a two-hour bus ride from Kobe, which may mean we were in the suburbs of Kobe. There was in the main hall a timeline reflecting the history of the Mitsui company and everything that Mitsui had done from the time that Mr. Mitsui, I believe, was peddling light bulbs in the 19th century, beginning of the 20th century, all the way through today. It was in five-year increments with pictures and accompanying text and whatnot.

It came to the years 1940-1945. The picture that went along with it was of a formal ball with people dancing and eating. The little caption, in both Japanese and English, said that in this period Mr. Mitsui threw many parties for his employees. That was all they wanted to make of those years. Everyone understood why this was being done and why it was something that the corporation would choose not to address. They let them get away with it.

Unresolved Legacy Issues from World War II

In any event, as someone who works now on issues related to the relationship between the United States and Japan, one of the things that strikes me and strikes me sometimes quite profoundly, as I'm engaging with Japanese officials or officials from elsewhere in Asia, is the extent to which many of the issues that I would consider front-burner issues in Japan's international relations are legacy issues from the Second World War.

You can look at the issue of the Yasukuni, as Professor Fujiwara mentioned, you can look at the textbook issue, you can look at issues of Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations and Article IX. You can look at issues related to Okinawa, you can look at the Northern Territories, you can look at the issue of reparations to North Korea stemming from the period of occupation. These are essentially unresolved legacy issues from the war.

As a diplomat, my focus is inclined toward the future rather than toward the past. At one point I was training to be a historian and then very quickly got out and joined the diplomatic

service. I found the future to be much more comforting, in many ways, than the past. As Japan is plotting its own future and shaping its role not just in the region but as a global leader, it's going to have to find a way to come to terms with these issues and with its neighbors in regard to these issues.

Chinese and South Korean Attitude of War Accountability Changing

I agreed with an awful lot of what Professor Fujiwara had to say. There were maybe a few areas in which I would have some subtle disagreements or different perspectives. One of the things that I was struck by was his comments regarding the way in which the attitudes of citizens in China or South Korea have been changing from wanting to hold the government of Japan accountable for what happened during the Second World War to wanting to hold specific individuals accountable for specific crimes. I think there is perhaps an even more worrisome and disturbing aspect of this, which is a desire to hold not specific individuals accountable for specific crimes but to hold Japan as an abstraction accountable, to hold the Japanese people as a collective body accountable.

I think that's perhaps even more worrisome and more disturbing, particularly since my experience has been, and I'd be interested in your comments on this, professor, that these feelings are more strongly held among younger people in China and South Korea than they are among people who actually experienced for themselves the Second World War firsthand. That's something that I think is actually quite significant, particularly for the future and the future of Tokyo's relations with China, with South Korea.

I'd also be interested, professor, if you could comment on the role that SCAP and the occupation forces played in shaping or not shaping and allowing to develop in its own natural way without outside influence, the sense of victimhood and the sense of identity that was formed among the populace in Japan in the immediate postwar period. I am only halfway through John Dowers' book. I'm finding it quite fascinating and the argumentation, I think, really quite effective.

One of the interesting things about it is that Americans and the occupation force figure in Dowers' narrative almost not at all. His is a story of how the Japanese related to each other and among themselves and how they developed their own postwar culture that seemed to be without very much influence or direction from the occupying powers. I wonder, in your view, is that a deliberate choice, was that the right choice? What were the consequences for Japan at the time and what are the consequences for Japan today?

In thinking about your observations regarding the Enola Gay exhibit in 1995, I remember that quite well myself. One of the things that I find striking about it in relation to the way that the United States deals with memory issues, vis the way that I would argue Japan deals with issues of memory, particularly as relate to the Second World War, is the intensity of the debate: the unwillingness of the government as a collective body really to pronounce itself one way or the other.

It's this intensity of debate that I think has been missing in Japan. If you look at the issue, for example, of Nanjing and what did or did not happen and who was responsible for what and what the obligation that Japan may or may not have as a result of that are. But the lack of debate in Japan is something I find really quite striking.

New Understanding of Article IX

The one exception to this in my experience has been the question of Article IX. When I was first in Japan fifteen years ago, this is something that people didn't really even discuss. It wasn't open for debate, it wasn't open for discussion, it was holy writ. I believe that's been changing, particularly over the last

five or ten years. And that a new understanding of Article IX and a new understanding of the role that Japan as a global power should be playing in the world, and how that can be accommodated with respect for Article IX, is something that's evolving. Evolving in terms of Japanese political culture and evolving not just in terms of elite culture but in terms of public consciousness.

That would be a brief run-through of my reactions. I hope we can open it up to debate and conversation.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: I think what we'll do now, as I promised, is let our audience have a few words, short questions, comments. Identify who you are and what your affiliation is. Then we'll let our speaker react to them and maybe weave in his comments about the discussant comments in due course.

Questioner: I'm a private consultant, retired foreign service. Generally, trying to decide what history is, in most countries history at best is a story of a nation. In terms of its real role in politics in any country, you're probably looking at people's historical understanding that goes no farther than a high school education. Most of the voters in any country, any democratic country, the U.S. and Japan to use the example tonight, are going to be motivated by what they learned in the high schools.

High School Students Have Narrow View of World

I'm not so sure that American high schools are any better than Japanese high schools in coming up with a story of their nation that's any more flexible, any more introspective in terms of how America interacts with the world. For the most part, in my brief experience since I've retired working with high school students, they have a very narrow view of the world, even narrower than when I was in high school forty-five years ago.

How do we get past that? Is it possible that maybe somehow historical arguments have to be taken over by historians and gotten away from the political leadership, in Japan, in China, in Korea and in the United States? For the most part, as Matt's pointed out, the U.S. has tried to back away from this. Perhaps we need to see more of that in Japan rather than trying to get the Japanese government more involved in settling the relationships with other countries on historical issues.

Various Functions of History

Fujiwara: I'm not sure I can answer the question, history being a narrative of a nation. To cut a huge topic in very short, there are various functions of history. One function would be more of a professional fact-finding, what actually took place, who did what and that kind of thing. On the other hand, there's a question of identity and meaning, where do we come from, where we are.

That essentially was the question about historical education in Japan. There was a huge debate about it. If you take a look at the Japanese textbooks, you can see that it's a mixture of a whole variety of viewpoints about Japan, which does really focus into one view. There is no agreed consensus on what the Japanese nation is or was. We still suffer from that.

Within this intellectual vacuum, so to say, there's this argument that we should reclaim our glorious national past and we should talk about a narrative nation as a great nation. The trouble is that I disagree with that argument, but I can't come up with a simple solution to that. History is far more complicated to me than these people seem to think.

That's not a good answer, but it's the best I can do.

Questioner: I too was taken up by the proposition that history and antagonism is much more directed at the nation than at the

government. I guess I'm not sure whether you can make that distinction, especially in China where you have nationalism as in fact a key basis for governance or legitimacy.

In Japan too, I'm not sure that you can make that distinction. If you can in fact, what does it mean? What is the implication of that distinction for international relations within, say, China and Japan and Korea?

Distinction of Japanese Attitude toward the West and East

The second point is on the victimization, victimhood. It seems to me that at one point Japanese were looking at themselves as victims of American aggression, Hiroshima and so forth, but they felt fairly comfortable in acknowledging the aggression in China. There was a separation in terms of attitude toward the United States and the West and towards China and Korea. Has that distinction disappeared?

Fujiwara: A simple answer to the last question would be that that distinction is still very much here. It's still very much here. It's also kind of interesting because when Chinese or Korean scholars making arguments against Japanese aggression usually, if not always – a Japanese academic would be very carefully listening to them. While if the same argument comes from an American scholar, the reaction could be different. It's as if our war toward China or Korea was a war of invasion, while the war with the United States was a war between two powers and therefore there's nothing wrong about that. There's a kind of a dualist thinking going on. I think that remains to this day.

About the state-society thing, the reason why I picked Singapore in my book and not China was because of that. Singapore, you have a very successful communist party ruling there, so to say. There is very strong control of the civil society. Having said that, there's much more plurality of discussion. In Singapore you can see that the state narrative of the war, which is about all of the nation that suffered, including all ethnic groups, during Japanese occupation is quite different from what the Chinese are saying.

The Chinese are saying that we suffered during the war and not the Malays or the Indians. The fact of the matter is that the Japanese used Malays and Indians to actually oppress the Chinese. This ethnic diversity is somehow becoming a political issue for the government, so therefore they have to work on the official reading vis-à-vis an ethnic and more social reading.

Disagreement over Truth

There are several points that you can take the discrepancies between the state reading of war memories and the social reading of history, although you are perfectly right that you cannot make a distinction that much easily. However, when it comes to China I would very strongly argue that it is not simply a manipulation of the Chinese Communist Party. This is an argument that has been put forward by many Japanese, that the Chinese do not know the truth.

I don't know what the kind of truth is. But the argument is that if the Chinese come to know the truth, they will learn that the Japanese have been liberating China from foreign domination, from themselves perhaps, and not killing people there. The argument goes that the Chinese Communist Party is fooling the public and so forth.

I don't think that is the case at all. If you take Chinese reaction to Koizumi last year, you can easily see that the Communist Party and all the party cadres were so eager to control the outputs of public opinion against the Japanese. They have to work on a secular stable relationship with Tokyo, that's far more important to them. Therefore, in many circumstances you can see a kind of discrepancy between a social reading of war

memory and a public anger, and a more secular pragmatic state approach to it. These two things may go hand in hand together, but sometimes they don't.

Questioner: Thank you, Steve, for your comments. I bring one question away from this evening, and one that never occurred to me before. Professor Fujiwara, you spoke about Japanese interests, various interests involved in the production of this narrative of war memory in Japan. Then our two commentators spoke in a rather different way about U.S. interests in applying pressure to various aspects of Japanese domestic policy one way or the other, to carry out its own foreign policy interests, dealing mainly with Cold War issues.

I guess the question I bring away with me is, what role did these interests of American foreign policy have in the shaping of Japanese war memories? Never occurred to me before to think that in fact U.S. interests may have had some role, if not a major role, in shaping the debate both about Nanjing and about Hiroshima. We've never talked about that and I would love to think about that.

Fujiwara: First of all, I would be very much glad if you called me Kiichi instead of Professor Fujiwara. It sounds like one of those ridiculous mandarins. I'm not that old actually.

The role of the United States is an interesting one. This is something that Matt said, and I'm going to call him Matt because if you keep calling me Professor Fujiwara I'm going to call you Guru Palmer.

Palmer: Actually, that's an attractive offer.

Japan Was Strange Bedfellow in Cold War Alliance With U.S.

Fujiwara: Okay, Guru Palmer. It's an interesting issue because the official argument is that with the introduction of the Cold War in Asia, the Japanese started to defend liberal ideas vis-à-vis American Cold War interests and so forth. That's the official intellectual liberal reading of what has been discussed. This somehow relates to what Steve said actually, because Japan was in many ways a kind of strange bedfellow of a Cold War alliance with the United States and many of the allies that America found in Japan.

I don't blame them so much, because in many ways it was inevitable. Kishi was a very capable officer. Many of these were also war criminals. If you wanted to run a successful occupation, you just needed these pragmatic, practical war criminals in your government. There was just no way to do it.

There were arguments within the occupation forces that you should not rely on those people with dubious reputations. As time went by, the occupation became far more pragmatic. This is not my field, so I'm just mimicking what my colleagues and others have discussed about it. But when the American occupation of Japan became less New Deal and more pragmatic and more based on geopolitics, the Japanese public took the American principles of occupation, which started from a very liberal, enlightened idea, against them – arguing that the Americans are not following such ideas as the constitution. After all, it was made by the Americans, but it was used against the Americans to forward one's own interests.

In a way, this is identical to the discourse of colonialism and anti-colonialism. The nationalist forces are using the arguments put forward by secular colonial administration against their liberal ideas. So therefore, the strange thing is that those who are arguing against Cold War policies of the United States and also against American occupation, were actually talking something very similar to American liberalism. That ran against the actual geopolitical interests of the United States.

Clemons: If I may – I think that is such a fundamental issue and it's very hard to

disentangle. I think that it's interesting. A lot of people who have gotten into this historical memory debate; there's a sort of circuit of people who have been long interested in these issues. But there hasn't been a lot of external either appreciation or understanding of how much is actually built up to try to create transparency in the United States. Therefore when you look at the degree to which some institutions have gone to evade that, like in my view the State Department about this particular country at that particular time, is fairly astounding.

Case of Ozaki Hotsumi

But you can go before the war, it's very interesting. I think there are two very interesting cases that we should look at historically. One is, before the end of the war there was a famous spy, a co-conspirator with Richard Sorge in Japan named Ozaki Hotsumi. Ozaki was an adviser, was a China expert and was a close adviser to Prince Konoe. He was caught and was executed, I think in 1944. Had he stayed on a little while longer, it would have been interesting to see how Japan would have dealt with him, because at the time of militarist, some people say fascist Japan, imperial Japan, the natural antithesis to that among many intellectuals was a communist Japan. You had a lot of those sympathizers in the United States that saw things in such Manichean ways.

So in many ways he was a Japanese nationalist who saw the salvation of his country as being the opposite of the ruling class. His advice to Konoe and the establishment was to drive militaristic aggression in China as far as it would go. Why? Because he knew that would empower communist revolution in China that would in fact infect and take Japan over the edge itself. It was probably SCAP which prevented that kind of thing, because his formulation worked in the eyes of many historians. I bet that we have quite a bit on Mr. Sorge and Hotsumi and how we felt about this and what really drove the rape of Nanking.

Purging of Ichido Hatoyama

The second is the purging of Ichido Hatoyama, which I am now learning more about. But the fact that Hatoyama was not liked by the liberals in SCAP was because he had expressed his opposition to communism. But then he wasn't liked by the conservatives because of his sort of natural facility for creating political parties and he had greater facility within the system, which he demonstrated the creation of the LDP in 1955.

But the decision to purge him and knock him out of power on the day on which he was elected and would have ascended to the prime ministership, I think had a huge cost on Japanese civil society and sent the message that America was going to pick Japan's winners and losers, politically. Essentially the byproduct of that and what was set into motion has to this day, as Kiichi said, simply not been undone.

And Yoshida became Japan's Kissinger in many ways. I have great respect for Yoshida but let's demystify him for a moment. He was a relatively unknown foreign minister bureaucrat who had the opportunity of his life, came in and he created a great persona. America had a lot vested, despite our own competition with his interests, in Yoshida's success. This is the stuff that's taboo to talk about among many historians. But there should be vast amounts of material available. The great tragedy is, we had so much material from Japan, we returned about 90 percent of the archival material we took from Japan to the Japanese with the agreement, informal, that we would have continued access to it. No one has access to it today.

America Lacked Interest in Japan Specialists

Palmer: If I could throw in one other thought here. One of the things that I find very interesting about the way the occupation structured itself from the very top, from the very beginning in Japan, was their absolute and

utter lack of interest in Japan specialists.

The United States had gone to great lengths during the course of the war to build up a cadre of expertise on Japan as such. When time came to first define, create and implement occupation policies, these people were not welcome. I think that from the very beginning the message that was being given, not just to the Americans but to the Japanese in a sense, is that we are uninterested in Japan's past. What we're interested in is Japan's future.

I won't defend that decision, because I think in many ways it's a shortsighted decision not to take advantage of the expertise that had been built up so painfully at such cost. But I do think that from the very beginning, that there was an understanding that U.S. national interest was going to shape what Japan was to become. In part, that means how Japan remembers.

Questioner: I grew up in Japan at this time in the '50s and '60s. Just one short memory. I remember going to movies when I was a kid and always having these newsreels about the hard-working Japanese firemen and always showing scenes of Tokyo burning. This was something burned in my own memory, because I remember these sort of heroic scenes of Japanese firemen during this bombing. I remember seeing these newsreels numerous times before movies.

My question, Kiichi, has to do with what you said about Nagasaki and the Christian influence there, because there's clearly a big difference between how the bombings are described and remembered in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In the early 1970s, the Japanese United Churches, issued what to me is something that really hasn't been picked up very much.

Statement of Wartime Guilt by Japanese Christians

It was a statement of wartime guilt of Japanese Christians toward the people of China and Korea. I think this was sort of an unprecedented kind of statement of humility and also we share in the guilt because the Japanese churches were united under the Japanese government supervision and they say they took part in the aggression against the Asians.

After that, Japanese churches became very much in solidarity with the people in Korea, South Korea, struggling against Pak Jung Hee dictatorship and in China. This was kind of a turning point I think for certain aspects of Japanese. That kind of thing has never happened here really, taking guilt for, say, Vietnam, something like that.

My question, it's difficult to ask a direct question on this. But it's a mixture of what's been discussed before. This happened during the Vietnam War, Japanese feeling very much opposed to the U.S. war in Vietnam and Japan's role in it. So I think that had something to do with it. But is there a need for before Japanese take a stand against what happened in the war to be somehow outside of the nationalism that's present in Japan? Or is there a need for an exogenous event like Vietnam to happen before that happens? How does this come to be?

Fujiwara: Thank you, that's an excellent point. There are several reasons for that church statement. One of the causes was that there was much more attention to Japanese war crimes in China. It started from Honda Katsuichi but it went on and on and on.

The other thing was that Christians in Japan are essentially an outsider in the society. They're such a minority and they're quite isolated. They're also highly intelligent, they usually have received higher education. Therefore they have this very strong sense of solidarity and also more exposure to liberal ideas. It wasn't that difficult for them to assume responsibility for collaboration with the wartime authorities. So though I believe that major groups within the church actually

strongly argued against it and it was a very divisive issue even then.

However, I would also like to use this opportunity to somehow relate about what the Japanese public comes into this picture. I'm not really sure on the compensation issue, I haven't done much research on this so I really can't say anything with authority about it. But what could be important is how the Japanese public will react to it. Many Japanese intellectuals would argue that although I do think that the Japanese were the aggressors during the war, if you push Japan too much then the public will react in a negative manner and that would stimulate some chauvinism in Japan. It is theoretically very possible.

It's very difficult to say how the body politic, the Japanese majority, would actually react. However, there was a very good case in 1993 when Hosokawa became the prime minister of Japan, the first non-LDP prime minister in some time. Hosokawa issued a statement about Japanese war responsibility. I believe this is one of the very few exceptional cases where the prime minister really meant an apology.

Japanese Public Endorsed Hosokawa's Statement of War Responsibility

But I must say, the point is not that he made an apology here. The point is that the public endorsed him. Right after Hosokawa's statement, his popularity rose several points, in two digits, instead of declining.

So facing war crimes was actually a highly popular issue among Japanese public. Whether a huge amount of litigation and compensation would be acceptable to the Japanese public opinion may be another matter. But maybe we shouldn't assume that the Japanese public is far more nationalistic than the intellectuals are. In fact, I suspect that the major bulk of the so-called right-wing chauvinist movement is actually coming from the intelligentsia and not from the real body politic, which is much more middle of the road.

Questioner: I would like to ask about the relationship between the nationalism with the social conditions of respective countries, for example the immaturity of democracy. In each of these three countries mentioned in the discussion, I think we have some views that the rise of Japanese nationalism is some kind of reflection of pent-up emotions in contemporary Japan, where economy and the politics and all these things are in a mess and they are losing a sense of direction.

Also, in case of China, I think there are some discussions that after the appeal or the value of communism as laws, now the Chinese Communist Party is using this past in which they fought against Japanese militarism as a tool of legitimacy for the control and monopoly of power. Also there is some discussion about the Korean case, that if Korea really reached some kind of democracy and economic prosperity with Japan, they would not find the relationship with Japan so difficult.

Do you think there is some kind of realm for these kind of discussions in terms of social conditions for each country?

Fujiwara: My short answer would be yes. There is definite correlation between a sense of social stability and the rise of nationalism. I do think that there are chauvinistic reading of history in China and Korea as well. It might need some courage to say this, but I do think that some of the arguments are pretty exaggerated. The trouble is that it started from us. We were the ones, all the fabrication and the simplified view came from Japan. That ignites nationalist reaction. So if there is anything, I think we have the responsibility to stop it first of all.

SCAP Was the Lobotomizer of Japan

Clemons: The core question, I think, in terms of this. Oftentimes in these forums, nation-

alism itself is dealt with as a dirty word, it's something we should all fear or resent. I think it really needs to be the opposite case. If you look at SCAP, what was SCAP in a way? SCAP was designed to give Japan in many ways a lobotomy. It was the lobotomizer of Japan as we knew it, we tried to change Japan. There's a lot of arguments about whether that succeeded or not, but it was a lobotomizing surgical operation.

Much of the institutional apparatus that evolved from that activity and the political winners and losers that were set, and I would say granted, for the next fifty years, lost their legitimacy in many senses when the Cold War ended. It's taken some time for that to come apart and come undone. In a sense, people who tend to think about power politics or the position of nations sometimes forget about the amazing corrosive influence of time, that time itself just corrodes appreciation of these issues.

Japan Should Evolve Different Strains of Nationalism

Frankly, I'm one who despite occasionally being out with a provocative idea now and then, and some Japanese friends of mine say that they're not in agreement, I feel very much like the Japanese nationalists. The best thing for Japan today would be to evolve different strains of nationalism. What would happen then, Japan would come to terms much more with its sense of identity, its sense of interest, the cases where it's going to be with the United States, when it isn't going to be with the United States, that is a nation that we can trust.

We'll know when you'll really be with us and when you really won't be with us. Your newspaper and also the *Yomiuri*, the *Yomiuri's* been involved in this incredibly interesting debate about constitutional revision, which I think is so important, and been at it for a long time.

So this is happening. But the only ones I think who seem to be unaware about this bubbling up of new variants of nationalism in Japan tend to be in Washington, who seem to just ignore or tend to create a kind of conventional wisdom that sort of posts that nationalism is bad, wrong and we need to fear it, when in fact I think the real question is – well, I think we have very little influence over it.

But what I hope is that we don't take steps that help generate the most strident and disconcerting forms of nationalism. I think there are lots of very competing senses of identity and nationalism in Japan today. Frankly, I look at that as an optimistic thing and a good thing that hasn't been part of this debate much.

Palmer: Nationalism itself is kind of a slippery concept. There's a sense that there's some kind of broad spectrum that runs from healthy patriotism to destructive nationalism. Defining the point at which love of country shades over into something that is darker and more destructive and taps into some of the more twisted or aggressive aspects of humanity, it's hard to define that point.

I don't think there is anything at all wrong with people wanting to have an agreed flag or agreed national anthem and that is somehow ipso facto a product of aggressive or negative nationalism. There are, as Steve said, many different kinds of nationalism, ways that it manifests itself in terms of support for particular policies or a particular worldview. Finding the right balance is not something you do once and stop. It's something that a society does as part of an ongoing process and it's evolving literally.

Inertia is Best Situation for U.S. Interests in Japan

Clemons: But one last thing. The United States and the heavy presence of American identity interwoven with Japanese identity is a real problem that has to be sorted out. It's very hard for American policymakers, who want all the benefits of a continued super-ally in the Pacific, to disentangle itself from the past.

Inertia is the best thing for our interests in Japan.

What I argue is that if the United States doesn't take enlightened steps to distance ourselves from this debate significantly, then we ourselves become the point of legitimacy in Japan's future dominant nationalism. It's going to be around the pivot points of where Japan is with the United States, either for or against or lots of other measures that we can use, that it's going to be fundamental to defining the Japan that I think is emerging. So we need to get smarter about this.

Ikenberry: Kiichi, you have the last word.

Fujiwara: I won't end this remark with a discussion about nationalism. It will take too much time and it will just need a full discussion really. The trouble about all those debates about war memory is that the actors are justifying their arguments on the basis of the prejudice of the other side.

The other side is wrong, so we are right. This kind of parochialism was always there in any account of culture. Because war is such a tremendously tragic experience, this aids to this justification of one's belonging and also a very strong mistrust against the prejudice of others.

I grew up in the United States. It was pretty tough, words like "watch it, Tojo" were heard. When I grew up and brought my family here, I was afraid that the same might take place. The surprising thing was that my daughter didn't experience that at all. Not a thing like that. She came back to Japan being a friend of the United States. Such small personal experiences can go a long way in forming your own perception toward the other. There's nothing wrong about nationalism, but there's quite a lot of things wrong about prejudice. Thank you very much.

Ikenberry: Thank you very much. Please join me in thanking our panelists. Consider this part one of a discussion, because as the discussion proceeded there were a lot of issues that are worthy of further debate. Thank you very much and we look forward to seeing you again soon. (End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Fujiwara Kiichi is Professor of International Politics at the University of Tokyo. He has become one of Japan's prominent political scientists and has extensively studied Japan's relations with its neighbors. Dr. Fujiwara has been a visiting scholar at SAIS and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He also was a research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies in Tokyo and received a Fulbright scholarship to study at Yale University. Dr. Fujiwara received a B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo. He has published *After the Terror*, editor (2002), *Remembering the War (Senso wo Kioku suru*, 2001), and *The Twentieth Century Global System*, editor (*Niju-seiki Shisutemu*, 1997-98).

Discussants

Mr. Steven Clemons is Executive Vice President of the New America Foundation. Previously he served as executive vice president of the Economic Strategy Institute and senior policy advisor for economic and international affairs to U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman. Mr. Clemons was also the first executive director of the Nixon Center, a public policy center linked to the Richard Nixon Library. In addition, he was executive director of the Japan America Society of Southern California, and in 1983 he co-founded the Japan Policy Research Institute. Mr. Clemons received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles. He writes and speaks frequently on domestic and international economic policy matters, and on U.S.-Japan and Asia Pacific economic and security issues.

Mr. Matt Palmer is a career Foreign Service Officer and a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State where he works primarily on Asian and European security issues. Prior to joining policy planning, Mr. Palmer was the desk officer for Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict and the deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the Kosovo peace talks in France. He also served at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, including a year as special assistant to the United States permanent representative, Ambassador Madeline K. Albright, and at the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia during the Bosnian war. He has also lectured on U.S. foreign policy as an adjunct professor at New York University. Mr. Palmer holds an M.A. in Japanese studies from the University of Michigan and a B.A. in East Asian studies from Wesleyan University.

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice in World Affairs at Georgetown University. Additionally, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2001), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).