Asian Voices:
Promoting Dialogue Between the US and Asia

States, Societies and Civilizations: Interpreting September 11 for East Asia and the World

by

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Amitav Acharya: Thanks, John, for this very kind introduction. Good evening. I am going to be brief since we have two other speakers who will have their own views on this subject and who are very distinguished commentators on this topic. So, in the interest of having a discussion I’ll try to finish my presentation before the thirty minutes is up.

I’m going to make a very simple and direct argument about the impact of September 11 for security and international relations in Southeast Asia in particular, but Asia in general. And the argument is that the most far reaching long-term and serious impact of September 11 for Asian and Southeast Asian security order would be in the realm of politics, not geo-politics, our culture. What I mean by that is the argument that in the relations between states and their people, of state society relations, it is in that arena that the impact of September 11 will be most crucially felt and not in the relations between states or civilizations.

Now, I’m going to argue this point by looking briefly at first the impact of September 11 on inter-state or inter-regional relations and then moving onto the relationship between states and societies.

Inter-State Relations in Southeast Asia

Just as a way of a little background, what was the situation in the region and the security situation in the region before September 11? We had the Asian economic crisis and its lingering implications since mid-1997 and those implications included financial and economic downturn in many countries in the region, domestic instability that resulted from that, especially in Indonesia, dramatic major upheavals.

We also had a weakening of regional institutions as states were scrambling to find any solution, any approach, to this crisis that could help them find a way out of it and not necessarily always looking into institutions, regional institutions like ASEAN or ARF for those solutions. We also had some tension and uncertainty in great power relations, especially the relations between the U.S. and China; the spy plane incident, and a lot of concern with the new administration in the United States, which is seemingly more anti-China than its predecessor. There would be a phase of renewed tension and even hostility in the U.S.-China relations.

Now, in terms of domestic politics, the political change in Indonesia in some respects was positive in the sense that proponents of democracy who believe that democracy provides the long-term answer to regional security were happy about it. But at the same time the process of democratization in Indonesia was far from peaceful, at least internally. And regional unity, especially relations between key ASEAN members, Singapore and Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, had hit a new low, probably the lowest point since the formation of ASEAN in 1967. So we had no shortage of problems to start with, especially since 1997, but September 11 was actually in some ways more far-reaching, more dramatic, partly because nobody expected it.

Now what I mean by nobody expected it, nobody expected such a major attack within the United States targeting the symbols, the very symbols, of American economic and military power. If you ask somebody that this is going to happen I bet there wouldn’t be not anybody who could say that, oh yeah, this is what we had predicted. I may forgive him for
that, because this was unexpected. But that is not to say that terrorism was not anticipated.

Growing Concern of Terrorism among National Governments

There was a growing concern and sense of terrorism among national governments. I mean whether you call it terrorism or extremism or fundamentalism. In Malaysia there was concern with religious revivalism, fundamentalism, and more specifically a few weeks before September 11 Singapore Minister Lee Kuan Yew had expressed concern about the rise of Islamic extremism. He didn’t call it terrorism, but Islamic extremism, in the neighboring parts of Singapore.

There was a sense of that, but nothing as dramatic was expected. Then came September 11. Now what happens to inter-state relations in Southeast Asia, but also in Asia generally, it will be difficult to isolate Southeast Asia as a distinctive region in assessing the implications of September 11 because a lot of this was linked to the broader security dynamic.

Winners and Losers after September 11

Now, you may be interested to know that in the wake of September 11 in some of the regional debates about it, there’s a lot of talk about who was the winner and who was the loser, who were the winners and losers of this. And we have people, our geo-political analysts talking about okay, America is the winner, China is the loser.

And let me just briefly touch on that debate and discuss. The United States is seen as a winner in many ways because it got a lot of sympathy and support from the regional countries. Now, whether it will last or not is different, but at that point of time most countries rallied behind the United States and at least expressed sympathy and some provided even logistical and political diplomatic support. That included a lot of the Muslim countries in the world and hence, it is very hard to accept that this was, at least in the immediate aftermath of September 11, that there was a clash of civilizations actually taking place.

The United States also managed to use the opportunity whether deliberately or the opportunity presented itself to strengthen its defense relations with other countries, especially in the Philippines, where it was invited back to operate in the southern part of the Philippines, provide training facilities and training for Filipino troops. And in Central Asia the United States secured access rights in a lot of the Central Asian Republics.

In that sense, the United States . . . well, of course, it had won the war, at least the initial war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Contrary to predictions by some analysts who have said that this will be a long drawn out war, it’s a war without a target. It’s a war where Afghans have a history of humiliating foreign invaders. So the U.S. has no chance, but the war took barely a month and the victory over the Taliban of that particular target was quite decisive and the war provided an overwhelming demonstration of American firepower, much more so than Iraq in 1991 or Kosovo a couple of years earlier.

Now, the same pundits have said that Japan was a winner because Japan managed to push through legislation that will allow its navy to operate in support of American warships and American military operations in Afghanistan and the protest from China and Korea this time was much milder. So this was a good opportunity for Japan to actually do what it wanted to do anyway, and extend its military reach and bypass another political constraint.

Russia is seen as a winner partly because nobody is going to complain too much about its policy towards Chechnya, not the least Americans. There was a seeming understanding about what Russia is doing to protect itself from terrorists in kind of problematic areas
such as Chechnya. And Russia also played a role in Afghanistan, especially in the way it tried to dash back to the Kabul airport after Americans and the Northern Alliance had ousted the Taliban. So Russia must have gained something.

India is seen as another winner because, first of all, it was one of the first countries to offer logistics facilities to the U.S. and Americans are keen to take it up. But then Pakistan, of course, provided the same kind of logistical facilities, but being closer to the target area it was more useful to the U.S. But India has deepened its defense relationship with the United States. It has got considerable influence over the new Afghan government and that strengthens India’s hand vis-à-vis Pakistan. India has got American understanding on terrorism, its own fight against the Kashmir militants and also it gives India a useful counter to its strategic relationship vis-à-vis China.

Now, one could say were there countries in ASEAN, anybody is there a winner in ASEAN on this? I mean whether Singapore, Malaysia could be considered a winner? Or Indonesia for that matter? Indonesia got something out of it. President Megawati was one of the first leaders to visit the White House, in fact the first leader of the Muslim nation to come to the White House and openly declare support for the U.S., although she retracted went she back home, but at least she got promises of American aid and American understanding for her political problems.

Now Malaysia, of course, got nothing out of the U.S. directly. But I don’t think it’ll be too far-fetched to say that the war on terrorism and this September 11 did help the government of Malaysia, especially Prime Minister Mahathir, to strengthen his hand against, first, the terrorists or the fundamentalists that he was trying to fight, but also domestically against his political rivals. This is a controversial thing to say in Malaysia, but I think I am prepared to argue this.

China Cast as Both Winner and Loser

In terms of losers, now this is controversial, because China has been cast both as a winner and a loser. China was a winner because, the logic goes, that the Taiwanese who are in the back-burner and Americans actually appreciate it, the early Chinese declaration of support, of sympathy for the U.S., and support for its war against terrorism. Though the Chinese support was conditional, but at least it was forthcoming and that took some of the steam away from the tensions created over the Taiwan issue.

However, people say that . . . I mean I’m trying to sort of summarize one part of the debate that is going on in the region about who was a winner, who was a loser, and on the minus side for China. Of course it has a large American military presence on its western front in the Central Asian Republics where China has been painstakingly trying to build strategic relationship in the form of the Shanghai Six.

China also . . . Pakistan is less dependent on China than before because Pakistan has moved towards the United States and China is not very happy that Japan has managed to use this as an opportunity to deploy its navy, extend the reach of its navy. Also, the relative gains, strategic gains, made by India are probably not welcome news to China. Whether China will turn out to be a winner or loser will depend on a number of factors, but at the moment let’s assume that it has probably gone to the minus side.

One other factor about China that really is worrying the Chinese strategists is the nature of the American victory in Afghanistan. The Chinese are very worried about the American military as firepower in Iraq and also in Kosovo. But this time this is way much more than what either . . . the technological power of the United States. And the demonstration of high-tech weaponry and the ability to strike targets with precision from long distances is so
overwhelming that a lot of Chinese strategists are not only worried about it. But they’re also rethinking about how long it will take them to actually achieve a minimum level of parity with the United States. And that is a matter of great concern in China.

Pakistan, of course, was kind of a loser because it lost its big ally in the Taliban in Afghanistan and it has to really find a way of developing a long-term relationship with the United States.

Now this debate about winners and losers is interesting, but it’s not really entirely helpful. There are two problems with this debate. One is that it’s too soon to say who is actually winning and losing the long-term, whether the wins and losses are going to hold over a long period of time. And this applies to the United States as well as any other country and that will have an impact on the perceptions of the U.S. in the regional countries.

**Potential Problems for U.S. Foreign Policy**

For example, you know, the suicide bombers in Palestine in Ramallah and other parts of Israel are actually taking over from the sense of the Taliban and creating life difficult, they have created more problems for the United States in some ways than the Taliban did in Afghanistan. The Americans have not captured bin Laden yet. We don’t know that he’s alive or dead, he’s still out at large. And there is a possibility that the U.S. could get bogged down in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan if it doesn’t pull out, doesn’t have a timetable for withdrawal.

The United States received considerable sympathy and support from all over the world, from Southeast Asia or Asia generally. But the countries and governments who supported the U.S. are either under pressure from their own population, Philippines being a good example. And if American policy towards the Middle East conflict is not creative and constructive and is not sensitive to the concerns of countries around the region, then the U.S. political gains could unravel.

In fact, in a dramatic way the suicide bombers of Israel have proven what bin Laden was trying to say, that the Palestine issue has to be considered as a root cause of this terrorist conflict. Initially, it didn’t seem like that because we thought they were using the Palestine case as a way of getting sympathy and as an excuse, but we can see that there is a link and terrorism is not divisible that you have an Afghanistan problem and a Palestine problem. And the sequence there is quite dramatic.

But, having said all that, the second problem why this winner and loser debate is not very helpful is because the wins and losses sometimes cancel each other out. There are now some gains for the U.S., some losses and for each country there are gains and losses. And, generally, if you look at the overall picture of regional security in East Asia or Southeast Asia, some of the implications of September 11 are negative and some of the implications are quite positive.

**Overall Picture of Regional Security in Asia**

I can give you a couple of examples. I mean, for example, our China-Japan relations according to some analysts, like Robyn Lim for example, that she says that the relations between China and Japan have become much more tense and there is a growing strategic tension between the two countries.

Well, I don’t know that that’s actually true, but even if it is we also have a lessening of tension in the U.S.-China relations or U.S.-Russia relations, so in some ways it cancels each other out. Inter-Southeast Asian relations, yes, there is greater tension between Singapore and Indonesia about some comments that Singapore’s government made about Indonesia not being enough to control its own terrorists.
But, at the same time, there is also increased intelligence sharing among the five ASEAN countries, original ASEAN members. So then, you know, the problems and the gains, the positive and the negative factors cancel each other out. The United States in some ways has far more clout as a conflict manager on South Asia than ever before because for the first time both India and Pakistan are sort of willing to listen to the Americans much more than ever before.

So American clout has increased in relation to both the countries and that gives the United States a unique position to control any escalation of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as we saw recently when the U.S. stepped in to help diffuse a very tense situation between India and Pakistan. But, at the same time, the American presence in the region, American air force to wage war on terrorism in the Philippines are sometimes a potential liability for the governments of those countries.

So, what I’m trying to say is that if we look into all the implications, positive and negative implications, of September 11, they don’t really . . . I mean they cancel each other out. There’s not really that much dramatic change in the fundamental geo-political real orientation of the region, as one might have expected. And that then brings me to the second part of my talk which is that the real impact of this is going to be in the relationship within states, between governments and the peoples of state society relations.

**Governments Behaved in Accordance With National Interests**

Now, one of the generalizations I can make about September 11 and the immediate response of countries in Southeast Asia or Asia generally is that governments behaved like governments, the states behaved like states and not as civilizations. They behaved in accordance with national interests, whether they’re going to gain some American aid or help their own war against terrorism, or sometimes in deference to principles which is supportive of that interest.

For example, when two countries recognize that the U.S. strike on Taliban was consistent with Article 51 and the right of self-defense of countries under the UN Charter, they were behaving in accordance with the principle, which is well established in international relations. And, to this day, lawyers have questioned that, but governments have not seriously questioned the American invoking of the right of self-defense against the Taliban.

So it’s very interesting. It’s either your interest or principles that form the basis of your response to September 11, and that means that we’re not talking about states behaving like from a religious, primordial sort of cultural or civilization standpoint. However, when you look at how people behaved, you find that people behaved more like . . . less like their own governments and there was actually greater divergence between states and their own people than between states. The states are far more united in response to September 11 than states and their own peoples, and I say that partly because you see, all right, let me make a few arguments about this.

That’s why I will end up saying that September 11 could have its most far-reaching impact on state-society relations. Now the first is that if you look at the September 11 . . . the perpetrators of September. Now many of them are not only angry about the U.S., but actually angry against their own governments and those . . . there are what, sixteen or seventeen are from Saudi Arabia, and the one from Egypt, Mohammed Atta is on the record for saying that to German friends that he is actually quite . . . he hates the government of Hosni Mubarak as much as the United States and also because the U.S. supports the authoritarian regimes.

Now in Southeast Asia, some of the anger against the United States actually masks anger
against governments of these countries and this brings me to a very interesting part of the debate that’s going on in the region about democracy and democratic governance and its relationships with terrorism.

**Relationship between Democratic Governance and Terrorism**

There are two issues here. One is that does absence of democracy, the lack of democracy, can we regard this as a root cause of terrorism? And, second, are democratic states less able to respond to terrorism than authoritarian states? There are two parts of the debate, and I’ve followed this a bit carefully and let me just share my thoughts with you. After September 11, a group of Southeast Asian intellectual and political leaders that included Anwar Ibrahim, Surin Pitsuwan, Farish Noor from Malaysia, Irman Lanti who is from Indonesia who was working in Singapore as a visiting fellow with my Institute, they argued that at least Anwar and Sudan wrote articles, and Farish Noor, articles saying that part of the root cause of terrorism is lack of democracy, that because Southeast Asia . . . our Southeast Asian societies are not democracies, they are more prone to terrorism.

And I can quote from Farish Noor who says that “it is the absence of democratic culture and practices in the Muslim world in general that leads to the rise of self-proclaimed leaders like the mullahs of Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and our own mullahs, Osama wannabes here in Malaysia, and as long as a sense of political awareness and understanding of democracy is not instilled in the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims the world over, we will all remain hostage to a bunch of bigoted fanatics who claim to speak, act and think on our behalf without us knowing so.”

Surin Pitsuwan made a similar argument. He said that “if we have democracy then the problem of terrorism can be more manageable.” He said that, “as we pursue our aspirations of democracy we know that we shall be able to be free to practice our faith fully on an equal basis with others who also have their own religious path and rituals sacred to them.”

Anwar Ibrahim, of course, made a much more direct point about this, and he said that “Osama bin Laden and his prodigies are the children of desperation. They come from countries where political struggle through peaceful means is futile. In many Muslim countries, political dissent is simply illegal.” Now this is one view, that if you don’t have democracy you bait terrorism.

Now the answer to that, the other side of the argument, is that democracy doesn’t preempt terrorism. In fact, some of the biggest targets or terrorists are democracies, the United States, Israel, India. So, just being a democracy doesn’t mean that you can root out terrorism. Well, I mean, you can look at the debate. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that not only the perpetrators of September 11 came from authoritarian states, but also they were venting part of their anger against their own governments as much as they were doing against the United States.

By the way, Osama bin Laden once thought, actually was full of sympathy and praise for the United States. I met somebody in Paris recently who had met Osama three times and he recalled one of his conversations where he said “America is a God-loving country and it’s really helping us because the U.S. is providing support to the muhajadeen in Afghanistan under the Soviet occupation.” So he was actually full of admiration in the 80s for the United States.

**Link between Authoritarianism and Anti-Americanism**

There’s another very interesting link between authoritarianism and anti-Americanism. The Middle Eastern governments who actually are pro-U.S. routinely permit anti-American propaganda in their media. In fact, sometimes
encourage anti-American propaganda against the U.S. in the media on the Palestine issue so as to divert attention from their own oppressive rule. If you read Arabic newspapers, the translations of it, you’ll find this is very common.

I used to do that at one point of time when I was working on U.S. Policy in the Middle East. I was quite surprised that in countries like Saudi Arabia some of the most damning rhetoric against the U.S. comes from countries where the media is totally controlled by the government. So this is a way of diverting attention from their own repressive rule, so there could be a link as between authoritarianism and anti-Americanism despite the irony that the United States supports these regimes.

Democracies’ Ability to Manage Terrorism

Now, the second issue I talked about in relation to this was that are democracies better able to manage terrorism and respond to terrorism? And this has become an issue in Southeast Asia. While Indonesia responded very angrily to Lee Kuan Yew’s comment about Indonesia not doing enough to arrest suspected terrorists and the Indonesians basically said that Singapore is an authoritarian state so it can do whatever it wants to do to its terrorists. We are a democracy and we can’t simply go out and arrest whoever we want. And also, Indonesia doesn’t have an internal security act, hasn’t replaced the Suharto law that was repealed after his downfall, but it’s easier for Singapore and Malaysia to arrest whoever they wanted because of the internal security act.

Now this becomes part of the debate about democracy and authoritarianism and the response to terrorism. In the Philippines, which is a democracy, but finds it very difficult to actually pursue effective counter-terrorist policy in conjunction with American help because of anti-American sentiments among its people and that being a function of democracy. So it is interesting, therefore, to look into whether democracy is helpful or a hindrance in responding to terrorism.

There are other arguments we can make, but I just want to bring that to the table. The next signpost of why state society relations are important in understanding September 11 is the attitude, changing attitude, towards human rights and the self determination norm, which is a major norm of the post-cold war international security order.

Now there’s a tendency in the region to view any internal security problem as something to do with terrorism, so there’s a compilation of traits that are . . . doesn’t matter who did what for what cause, you know, they’re all terrorists, they’re all part of this homeland security framework.

And there is also a compilation between tactics and the cause. If your tactics are terrorist, your cause must be bad and, therefore, you cannot really separate the two. I’m going to give you an example. China, when it responded to September 11, of course expressed sympathy for the United States, but at least some Chinese commentators said that the U.S. will also understand that China has its own terrorist problem in places like Xinjiang and Tibet and Taiwan. Now, if you read very carefully, they’re not talking about terrorism per se, but they are bracketing terrorism, extremism and separatism, but in one phrase. Now, you don’t . . . Tibetans have no record of terrorism against China unless I don’t know something about it, but the compilation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is, in some ways, a counter-terrorist alliance, has actually taken the same position.

We are again — terrorism, separatism, extremism. Now everything gets lumped together and that is a complicating factor when you try to address problems of self-determination, demands for self-determination, and also the learning effort from America’s policies towards Afghan prisoners in Cuba. I mean Asians like to talk about
double standards in policies of countries like the United States, the West, on human rights. And when you have an administration at least initially that decided to deny the prisoners of war rights to the Afghan prisoners in Cuba, now that is going to empower those in Asia because that look . . . the West is hypocritical so it has no right, it loses its moral high ground to talk, lecture us on human rights. Now that is going to complicate life for those who demand freedom and non-governmental organizations and complicate state-society relations.

Redefinition of Security

Finally, I want to talk about the redefinition of security. Before September 11 there was actually an incremental move towards non-traditional security issues and human security issues. In fact, the doctrine of human security had found surprising acceptance in Asia where people thought maybe the region will not be hospitable, countries like Thailand, Japan and Malaysia increasingly warming towards security doctrine that puts people rather than states or governments at the core of the security framework.

Now we have a shift from human security to homeland security and the homeland security can mean anything. Of course, we have a sudden type of homeland security in the United States and I think in Asia there is some sort of a demonstration affect. Singapore has its own homeland security doctrine. One of the most significant statements made by the Defense Minister of Singapore after September 11 is that “the traditional distinction between internal and external threats no longer holds. We cannot separate internal from external. We have to treat everything in the same plane.” And Singapore adopted its own homeland security doctrine which basically calls for inter-Asian coordination in responding to threats of not only terrorism, but what is broadly defined as low-intensity conflicts.

Now in the case of some of the forward thinking going on about the future of war in the U.S., you might have heard about this concept of networks, that some people are pushing for. Well, basically, you sense us in your home, in your department stores, in your laundry, in the car park, and try to sort of monitor the activities of people who are either suspected or non-suspected. In fact, it doesn’t make any distinction between suspected and unsuspected people. It’s just you monitor everything so that you may catch the terrorist.

And now that kind of thing also is going to complicate state-society relations not only in the United States, but in all of Asia. In fact, I see that the gap between security concepts in the West and in the so-called East is going to narrow. In the Cold War period and even more recently we should think that the Western countries look after external threats, the developing countries look after internal security threats. But now that distinction is gone and countries are learning from each other.

Now, someone like me, that is very scary and although one could understand that terrorism is a threat that has to be fought, but where do you draw the distinction between a genuine fighting of terrorism and attempt to control the lives of people. So this is where I want to stop because I think I have taken more than I wanted to take and I have esteemed colleagues who would like to speak their own mind.

Thank you.

**John Ikenberry:** Thank you very much. Fred, do you want to start? You were going to exit earlier, so we’ll give you the floor now.

**Frederick Brown:** Well, I found Amitav’s presentation extraordinarily interesting. Let me say that I’m a booster of Professor Acharya as a writer. We use his book in one of the courses we teach at SAIS, so I’ve boosted your income by at least twenty paperback books. We didn’t buy the hardback I’m sorry...
to say. We really appreciate your book on *Constructing a Security Community in South-east Asia and ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, very good book. So, let me give you credit for that.

**Winners and Losers in Asia after September 11**

Let me make a few comments in the context of your major points if I may. First of all, with regard to, you did the winners and the losers in Asia. Let me just make a few comments on that. It seems to me that China very definitely is a winner and a loser. Certainly on the winning side it seems to me the Americans’ posture with regard to the international effort against international terrorism is very helpful to China with regard to Xinjiang and other minority problems, separatist problems that might be lumped by the Chinese under the heading of international terrorism. So definitely that is a plus.

You mentioned in passing the question of the American presence in Central Asia. It seems to me that is very important. It seems to me that is something that in the future, assuming the United States maintains its military relationships with the states in Central Asia, that is going to be a considerable concern to China, so I think that is a very definite long-term minus.

With regard to the Philippines I think it was a coup on the part of President Arroyo to be one of the very first people to call President Bush after 9/11. Clearly that was a coup and here they go into the relationship between the states and their own societies, clearly this was a very big help to Ms. Arroyo.

There is a minority in the Philippines that is against any kind of American military presence returning to the Philippines, but I think the clear majority is in favor of the policy she has adopted and so I think this is really a coup in terms of her relationship with her own polity.

You didn’t mention Thailand. It seems to me there is not much in the way of a plus for Thailand in the events of 9/11. Thaksin goofed, I think, in his initial response to the terrorist acts by declaring Thailand as being neutral. I’ve heard explanations of why he did that in terms of the difficulty in the Thai language of translating neutral into Thai. I’m not sure that’s a really very good explanation given the fact that most of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has attended Oxford or Cambridge and what have you. But Thailand tried to recoup and tried to explain its position, but I think there’s a lingering unhappiness of the United States with regard to Thailand’s reluctance to support its long-time ally. So I think Thailand is a loser and I think we should note that.

Singapore and Malaysia, you have covered that quite fully. It seems to me that the use of the internal security acts in both countries is a very useful tool for the government. Singapore, I think, has had a very rude awakening if it needed one given the fact that there were seven bombs planned of the intensity or the magnitude of the Oklahoma City bomb, seven that were planned by the al Qaeda cell that was operating in Singapore. So this is, I think, very important.

**U.S. Hurt by Its Middle East Policy**

Let me turn now to some of the other points that you have made. I would like to advance the thesis that with regard to the United States, in the context of the anti-international terrorist effort, it seems to me the United States, despite the quick victory in Afghanistan and despite some of the support that it has received and some of the prestige if you want by reason of its military accomplishments, is still badly hurt by its failure to criticize adequately Israeli policy with regard to Palestine.

And I think the turnaround today, some of you may have seen the statements made by
President Bush and by some of the announcements that the United States appears to be modifying that. I’m not sure that is going to go far enough to really undo the long-term damage that has been created by the support of the United States for the Sharon government and the fact that the United States appears no longer to be an honest broker in search of a compromise solution to the Palestinian situation.

But I think more important than that is the image of indecision and division within the Bush administration that has, it seems to me, shaken the confidence of many of our friends around the world. I think that is very damaging and I think over the long term this is going to hurt the American ability to address, as I say, the second part of the war if there is one with regard to Iraq.

And this brings up the question, it seems to me, of the United States as a UNIPOL, most powerful country in the world, whether or not the Bush administration, unless there is clearly a move in the direction of shall we say a more Colin Powell approach or a multilateral approach, I think it’s very difficult for the United States to be able to sustain the conduct of its current policy with regard to international terrorism as long as it adopts, as it keeps this policy which tends to be inadequately responsive to the opinions of its allies and of its friends.

So I think the whole question is does the American public over the long term have the stomach for the existence of the United States as a UNIPOL, as a country which has enough power to do what it wants to do in the world arena with relatively less support from its friends and allies. So I think that’s a real question that we have to ask ourselves. The impact of the American position vis-à-vis the Palestinian question and Israel policy. I know it’s a very sensitive one in the American political arena, but I think it’s one that really has to be addressed. I found very interesting your story about the person that you met who had quoted bin Laden as saying he thought the United States was really a wonderful country for having supported the mujahadeen.

Acharya: God-loving country.

Brown: God-loving country. Well, either this betrays a certain naivete, it seems to me, on the part of Mr. bin Laden that we were doing that for completely altruistic purposes given the fact that the Cold War was going full steam ahead at the time. I think I will stop there and be glad to discuss . . .

Question of Homeland Security

Let me add one more point. I’m sorry. The question of homeland security. It seems to me this also is something that deserves a good bit of attention. In the United States there is already a very clear move towards, under Governor Ridge, of consolidating many of the elements of the domestic security apparatuses under one hat. There’s even talk of creating a commander-in-chief for the United States and I think this demonstrates one of the points that you’ve made very well, the unity of foreign and domestic policy. All things are connected now in this new post-9/11 world to have such things as those little flight training schools in Florida becoming the incubators of really massive acts of international terrorism, so I think this has really changed the whole scene with regard to state-society relations. So I’ll stop there.

Suzaina Kadir: Thanks. I really liked the central thesis I think that Amitav clearly laid out for us, and that is that the more serious impact in terms of the long-term impact of September 11, I think, is on the issue of politics and state-society relations in the sense that it has actually had an opposite effect and let me try to explain what this means. After September 11 I think what you see emerge was a potential, a tremendous potential I think, for the United States, the major powers, various states in many ways to actually refocus their attention on the dynamics of state-society
relations. Especially I make special reference to those states or those countries with Muslim populations whether they be majority Muslim population or minority Muslim populations.

And what I mean by drawing attention is that at least refocusing on some of the very intricate problems that have actually emerged and evolved and in many ways taken various forms and transformed itself through the various stages. Not just in the Middle East, but also in various parts of the world including Southeast Asia.

But I think what will eventually happen or what we’re seeing emerging in the reactions after September 11 is to a large extent, I suppose, understandable is that it had the opposite impact, which is that instead of drawing attention to the dynamics and by studying dynamics in terms of the complexities what it has actually done is try and simplify it and actually draw the world’s attention from some of these complex issues that have actually been there and have always been there.

Worsening of State-Society Relations

And I think that what we’re going to see in the long term is a much more, I suppose, much more dangerous situation in a sense that these kind of state-society dynamics are actually going to worsen or the potential is for it to worsen and I think that Amitav highlighted that in his talk, that in terms of discussing the winners and the losers and discussing about this disjuncture in terms of how states are perceiving various conceptions of security and how the various communities within the states are actually going to be impacted and how they are going to react. And, in other words, however we may want to define terrorism it’s actually going to be a long-term problem because you don’t get essentially to the root causes and these root causes have been there for some time.

When I think about September 11 and I think about Southeast Asia in particular and we look at whatever has evolved, what I see is actually a homogenizing effect. This occurred, actually, immediately after, especially in the months immediately after and this was, I think, reflected by the U.S. position of you are either for or you’re against. And this led to a very basic disjuncture in the sense of grouping people into two camps, whether they be states or they be societies or communities within the states.

This homogenizing or universalizing effect, I think, is very, very dangerous because it’s not just simply about being for or against the war against terrorism. But it also puts people in very simplistic camps in terms of what type of states you are and also what type of societies or communities you are, including what type of Muslim community you are. And that is, you are either in some sense perceived as means to a moderate Muslim community and therefore you are for the war in Afghanistan and you are supportive of the U.S. position or you are then pushed into a radical camp, broadly defined, for opposing to that. And this I think, again, detracts attention from what are the dynamics that are on the ground. So I think it takes away that perspective which is potentially, in the long term, extremely dangerous.

Islam in Southeast Asia

Let me just talk about Islam and Islam in Southeast Asia and then get to what I mean in terms of some of these problems. If you look at . . . if we isolate in Southeast Asia alone, not considering West Asia, not considering the Middle East, Islamic dynamics are so very complex. So the whole notion, the whole dynamic, in some sense, of universalizing it is extremely problematic.

It’s diverse and it’s extremely complex in the sense of looking at these communities as to whether they, for example, represent majority communities or minority communities, whether what are the types of relations that have evolved in terms of their relations with
the state. You have the relations in terms of issues such as socio-economic rights, issues, which Amitav talked about in terms of freedom and human rights, but then there are also issues pertaining to whether there are communities, which actually may want to be ... may want to secede from the state.

And again, this whole entire push towards the universalization ends up putting all of these communities into very strict categories and detracts our attention really on what are the dynamics on the ground. The issue of the complexities on the ground in terms of Islam in Southeast Asia, and this gets us back to the whole framework of the state-society relations which Amitav I think is trying to push for in the paper, is that you need to be able to desegregate actually both, not just at the level of the state, but also at the level of the society and therefore to understand how these various communities have emerged and how they are interacting with the state. And the problems that we have seen actually take on or ... it’s not something that have emerged only in post-September 11.

I mean these are communities that have interacted with the state prior to September 11. They have, in fact, had to interact with the state from the point of independence and many of these are, in some sense, very new states and they are, in fact, negotiating their position, and again here the negative impact in terms of September 11 is that because you end up seeing the universalization it actually detracts from understanding some of these negotiated processes.

And it is true and showing that this negotiated process can proceed and therefore the rights of this community is upheld, vis-à-vis the state and also vis-à-vis each other, that you can actually proceed onwards towards dealing with problems like terrorism. It also allows you to deal with other problems such as arm insurgence, which I’m not sure we want to include under the label of terrorism, but again, because of this sort of universalizing effect, you see notions of arm insurgence, separatist movements, the sort of broader rubric of terrorism, and this does not solve the problem.

It just worsens the problem I think in the long run, specifically for Southeast Asia and precisely because you end up simplifying the issue substantially. And I think that this is something that has to be addressed and what’s fascinating about Amitav’s thesis is that I think this is about the first time that we are seeing at least some attention being drawn to this dynamic on the ground.

And I think it’s not specific to Southeast Asia. It’s actually something that’s going to matter for East Asia, including China, because China will have to deal with its Muslim minorities. It’s also something that has to be grappled with substantially in South Asia and West Asia, especially with regards to Pakistan, for example.

So my major comment with regards to the presentation was generally obviously I agree with the thesis and I think that obviously a lot more attention has to be done, at least a lot of attention has to be brought to this dynamic in looking at state societies. But what I fear essentially from what I’m seeing is that the opposite effect is what we’re seeing.

Now with the specific questions that I have for Amitav in particular, and, again, it goes to the argument that you brought up in the early part of your presentation with regard to winners and losers, I wasn’t sure that you made any clear reference to how you perceive Pakistan. Other words, I think, if I’m not mistaken you mentioned that Pakistan was a loser?

**Acharya:** Not me, but that’s how it is perceived.

**Kadir:** Right. And I would question that, whether really Pakistan has been the loser out of the post-sort of September 11 scenario because it has its potential to be a loser in
terms of its state-society dynamic and I think that was the point that you had brought up.

**Pakistan Emerges as a Winner**

In terms of trying to reconfigure the position of the state, vis-à-vis some of the Muslim communities within Pakistan, but certainly it has strengthened the regime substantially and in that sense Pakistan has emerged as a substantial winner. Its position, vis-à-vis India, was especially immediately post-September 11 was extremely strengthened and, of course, I think in the long run this will be a problem.

Again, it goes back to the issue of state-society because the situation within Pakistan, I think, is fairly unstable. Various groups are grappling. The position of the regime having been strengthened by its close alliance with the U.S. has led, of course, to the further radicalization on the ground in terms of the Islamic communities and it’s already at a fairly radical stage.

**Mahathir's Regime Strengthened**

I don’t know whether you mentioned Singapore. I think you mentioned Singapore in relation to Malaysia. And I think most people would argue that in terms of Malaysia and in terms of Mahathir, it would seem that September 11 would have strengthened his position or his regime substantially, and I think that we can generally agree with the argument.

In the case of Singapore, the invocation of the ISD (Internal Security Department), the arrest, in some sense, in a way it has . . . for the Singapore regime in a sense it comes out as a winner because it strengthens its position, vis-à-vis the United States. It also is in line with generally the Singapore position of insuring that the U.S. would be present within the region, which at some point there was a feeling that the U.S. would be less involved.

**Singapore Not a Clear-Cut Winner**

But I think that actually, again, in a long-run scenario, it may not be a clear-cut winner because I think that what it has done for Singapore is actually to raise some very serious problems precisely because of its close alliance with the U.S. on this issue. And because there’s a Muslim minority in Singapore and also because Singapore is dealing with two neighboring states where you’re dealing with Muslim majorities. So Singapore . . . the sensitivity of the issue has become substantially amplified for Singapore in the post-September 11 scenario, and I think therefore sort of the clear imagery of winner and loser is not so clear-cut in the case of Singapore.

So, I’ll stop here.

**Q&A**

**Ikenberry**: Great, thank you very much. Why don’t we open it up to questions, comments, and we’ll let our speakers respond and weave in their comments to each other as we go forward.

**Questioner**: Hi, I’m from the Fund for Peace. At one point there was great concern that the United States would be, under this administration, would not be engaged with the world. Is there any concern now that the United States will be very engaged with the world much too heavy-handedly? And I’d like to hear I guess from all three.

**Ikenberry**: Fred, you want to start?

**Brown**: Yeah. I think there’s genuine concern. You know, it’s a shame that it took 9/11 to bring home the rather fundamental point to this administration. It took 9/11 to bring home to the Bush administration the fact of life, that as UNIPOL you need a certain amount of sustenance nonetheless, and that you have to have not only allies, but friends. And in order to exist, in order to make your policies
coherent and have your policies have reach. So I think it’s unfortunate that it took 9/11 to bring that home.

Now the question is how long will that last and under what conditions will it last? Will it be, as you say, heavy-handed? I don’t want to predict. I would like to think that our democracy and our way of government is flexible enough and that the American people are mature enough so that we can adapt to this new situation and maintain a multilateral world view of what it takes to be the most powerful country in the world.

So, I guess I’m hopeful that our system will adapt and make it possible for the administration to see the wisdom of continuing on as a genuinely cooperative world power. I do hope so, but there are elections coming up and who knows what it will be necessary for the administration to feel it has to do to gain support from one part of our electorate or another. So, it’s a question. I personally am hopeful that we will be able to adapt.

Southeast Asia Concerned With U.S. Policy

Kadir: I think from the perspective of Southeast Asia there’s obviously tremendous concern about how the U.S. is proceeding in terms of its policy with regards to this war on terrorism. There are worries that the U.S. is essentially going to act alone and without regard basically. Certainly in the U.S. involvement, for example, and its entry, re-entry, into the Philippines, there are mounting concerns of the extent to which that will simply be a base for the United States for further operations in other parts of Southeast Asia. And this raises concerns on the part of the various communities within this region.

So it has the potentially to be fairly divisive within the region in terms of the general approach, I think, to whether there is a need for the U.S. presence and the extent to which that presence needs to be. And I think that there never was consensus before and I think what we are going to see emerging soon is further division on this issue, especially with the states within that particular region that I’m looking at. Certainly because of the Muslim populations in this part of the world, the fear is that the target will be on various Muslim groups raises some very serious questions as to how the U.S. will behave and whether it will act entirely alone without regard for the kind of sensitivities that you are going to see in this particular part of the world.

Acharya: Well, that pretty much takes care of my comments.

Questioner: I am from the U.S.-Japan Research. I’d like to ask in terms of globalization you talked about a borderless society, borderless relations, whether this 9/11 brought our keen awareness of this borderless world. Will it be disappearing or is it going to become more intensified? I’m just curious about that in terms of the future in our perception of the world and the country and in the society, mainly ethnic entities. I wonder if you could comment on this. I really appreciate it.

Acharya: In fact, in the paper that I am going to publish on this, and which was the basis of this talk, you can watch out for a book called World in Collision: Terror in the Future of Global Order, published by St. Martin’s Press in June and edited by Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. And I got a chapter, as a lot of other people, and actually a passage that exactly addresses your question.

I may come to regret what I have written on this because I could be proven completely wrong, but the passage ends like the power balance between globalization and government has shifted and may be shifting in favor of government. The reason why I say that is because before September 11 we had a lot of talk about the powerless state, the withering away of the state, borderless walls, but you look at some of the things that have happened, the question of immigration.
States Are Fighting Globalization

Now, states are fighting back. They are re-imposing border controls and I mean Thailand is a good example. After September 11, the Thai government reduced dramatically the number of countries whose nationals were allowed into Thailand without visas, from something like 100 to about now only about 15 or 20 countries have that privilege. And look at ... in order to counter the financial lifeline to the street and cut the financial lifeline of terrorists, governments are imposing a lot of controls on financial transactions and finance as we know is the biggest agent of globalization on the borderless world.

The U.S.-Canada border used to be considered as the longest undefended border in the world. No longer so. There are actually now troops positioned in some parts of the U.S., so we should talk about the security community of borderless walls and I think I’d retract at least in one case. And the states are fighting back in a variety of ways. Although they cannot reverse the process of globalization is something maybe I would regret what I said in this piece. I was asked to think provocatively in my writing, but I think the idea for borderless walls, which is not very definitive in the first place, is now even more suspect in the wake of September 11.

Ikenberry: Other comments?

Questioner: I am from SAIS. Very interesting discussion. This is a question directed to Dr. Acharya and the other speakers as well. I’m curious about the impact of 9/11 on ASEAN as a regional organization. There are some analysts who are suggesting that this is actually helping to strengthen ASEAN. Would you comment on this?

ASEAN Countries Cooperating on Multilateral Basis

Acharya: Well, on the plus side one of the things that happened after September 11 was that the Defense Intelligence Chiefs of five ASEAN countries actually got together for the first time on a multilateral basis, but in a strange way that is very hopeful because ASEAN actually was created on the basis of intelligence sharing against common insur-gence at close national boundaries and, of course, there’s a lot of intelligence sharing that goes on that others do know about. So that’s a plus.

I mean we talk about looking for a common thread. I mean September 11 does create a common ... it shows how interdependent Southeast Asia is. You know, you have terrorists, not only al Qaeda terrorists in the Philippines and Filipinos going to the Middle East, but actually there is some evidence now that suspected terrorists from Malaysia and Indonesia also went to the Philippines for training and there are plans to do this. So there is a regional pattern to terrorism. It’s not just a national problem, and so one would expect that that sense would actually create some unity in ASEAN.

But what has really happened is that there are, because of this controversy about Indonesia that ASEAN is seemingly seen as being weak, because Indonesia’s reluctance, how some people say absolute refusal, to arrest some of the suspected terrorists has created some sense that Indonesia is not playing ball and Indonesians have their own reason for it. One, I say that they don’t really have the legal instrument for this, but secondly, they’re also too busy doing their own various other things. I mean terrorism is one of the problems in Indonesia, but it’s not that big a problem compared to what else is out there in Aceh and Malukus and the whole question of uncertainty at a time of democratization.

Perception of ASEAN in Disarray

So, but because they are pushed into a corner and they react very negatively and that creates the perception of ASEAN in disarray, and it’s not a very good sign for regional organization.
But whether ASEAN could actually recover is ... in the long term I think this issue for terrorism is going to be taken up in the governments, not only within ASEAN, but also within the ASEAN regional forum, and some ASEAN countries are reassured that Americans are re-engaged in the region. And that’s plus as far as security of some states.

But, at the moment I think ASEAN’s gold card is uneven. I mean it’s not a big plus. If Indonesia would have . . . there’s no really country leading this campaign against terrorism. Everybody is doing their own things. There is the common basis for action, but it’s not institutionalized quite yet. On the other hand, there are differences because of different political systems in different countries.

**ASEAN Cannot Produce Common Basis for Action**

**Kadir:** Actually, just an additional point to Amitav’s last point actually, I think that the part of why they can’t produce a common basis for action is precisely because in this particular brand of terrorism or this particular targeting of the enemy, the enemy involves a particular religion that, you know, that belongs to substantial numbers of people within ASEAN and I think that the state-society dynamics that Amitav is talking about for some of these countries is actually different if you compare between the ASEAN countries.

And I think that, you know, if you look at with regards to the sort of target enemy before for Asean, which was communism, it was a lot easier. Here, the dynamics of the interaction and the exchanges and the negotiations between state and society. For some of the countries, Indonesia in particular or Malaysia, not just at the level of the society, but also at the level of the state occurs in quite a different dynamic, for example, of course compared to Singapore. So I think that this raises a lot of complexities and for ASEAN to come out with a common basis with regards to this I think is going to be extremely difficult.

**Brown:** I would be very pessimistic about the possibility of ASEAN somehow coming up with a grand master plan that would fit all sizes. I just don’t think that’s in the works. As Amitav had said, there’s a lot of coordination with regard to intelligence and information sharing that’s been the case and that will continue. It’ll be maybe heightened. But this is an effort on the part of each individual country to protect itself in a cooperative way. And I think the state and its relationship with its own society is going to be the governing factor, it’s going to be the state survival, state maintenance, that is going to be the prime consideration.

So, I don’t see ASEAN even over a longer term becoming a more coherent unit even if you could imagine Indonesia emerging from its current funk. It’s just difficult for me to imagine that.

**Questioner:** I am from Interpress Service. Just a comment and a question. It seems that this issue now with the Middle East is clearly, well, with Israel and Palestine, is clearly an indication of this blurring of the line between terrorism and national liberation movements that you were talking about. And it seems like it’s a severe political crisis because Bush has been pushed by Sharon to paint it as anti-terrorism when it’s clearly, in the eyes of most of the world I think, is not. And it’s very confusing to the American people and Bush is in trouble because of it.

But my question has to do with this issue of borderless worlds, only those in the world who cover transportation like I do might know this. But one of the aspects of this that’s kind of interesting of the new security apparatus is that American officials in the customs agency and other agencies that guard our borders are saying well, our borders are no longer secure, therefore we can’t talk about American borders.

We have to push the borders back to the countries where the goods originated and
where the people originate. And they’re pushing policies very strenuously in certain organizations like International Maritime Organization, which is part of the United Nations, to have a whole different kind of inspection procedure for, say, shipping containers that move from, you know, say Singapore to the United States or Holland to the United States and actually adopting . . . and there’s laws that have been passed that are going to be, you know, going through Congress this spring, that are going to require, you know, inspections of American . . . by American inspectors going to foreign ports, inspecting their ports, getting security assessments and this kind of thing.

You know, the countries are going to have to deal with their own sovereignty issues here and I’m sure it’s going to extend to other areas. But I’m wondering where you think the response of countries in your region might . . . already, for example, there are Canadian inspectors in U.S. ports and U.S. inspectors in Canadian ports and they want to expand this to, say, the ten largest ports and I’m sure it’s going to go much beyond that. So, it’s kind of an interesting dynamic.

Idea of Borderless Walls Has Changed

Acharya: Well, this is an insight that I could really use to advance my . . . augment that the idea of borderless walls has changed. Instead of less control, we have actually interlocking control where in some ways it goes against the principle of sovereignty, but in another way it actually especially state reasserting itself against non-state actors and in a way that entrenches state power.

So this is a good example and I think it’s bound to create a certain amount of resentment. The United States could do this with Canada because Canada is a like-minded state, but trying to do that in other countries, although some dramatic things have happened. American troops arresting terrorists in Pakistan is quite dramatic, but how many of such arrests can the Pakistani government allow without being thrown out of office? You know, it remains to be seen. So this could become one of the factors in the security calculus after September 11, the extent to which the United States demands access to the national jurisdiction of states and wants to impose its doctrine of homeland security on other countries.

“The Next World Order”

Ikenberry: On that issue there’s an article in the last New Yorker by Nicholas Lemmon that is called “The Next World Order,” which talks about the Bush doctrine and it gets at this issue of states that don’t behave correctly in various ways, either because they oppress their own people or they allow terrorism to occur inside . . . terrorists to congregate within their own territory, in the words of one State Department official, lose the rights that come with sovereignty. And then it opens up the legitimacy of the United States with some coalition of countries intervening one way or another.

This is laying the groundwork for Iraq in some ways. And while the United Nations’ charter allows for states to act offensively or proactively to protect their . . . to act against attacks on them, the Bush doctrine entails going beyond that and actually acting not in response to a threat, but actually anticipating a threat which, again, is even more creative in thinking about the rights of intervention.

So this . . . but what’s paradoxical about it is that it is very interventionist in transgressing sovereignty when there are these sorts of threats or proto threats out there. But as Amitav has said it also is very much a kind of return of the importance of states and borders, protecting borders, governments acting as sovereign act entities, states are responsible for what goes on within their territory, reasserting the obligations of statehood, in fact. And that’s a very realist, very state-centered perspective, and I think that the burden of your remarks are very persuasive.
I don’t think that you’ll have to regret the chapter you wrote for that book. Let me just ask if there’s any last question before we wrap up. Please?

**Questioner:** In terms of winners and losers it seems to me that the real losers on the side of human right issues, especially for minorities, do you think is it going for a short-term or long-term issue? And the second question, I think you didn’t touch much about the civilization perspective and this issue.

**Acharya:** I actually have an article in *The Herald Tribune* which might have got me . . . well, it probably will get me expelled from Malaysia next time I go there.

Because there were two editorials in response to this and this was . . . one in the largest Malaysian newspaper, and then there was one in another newspaper Malaysia. Both of them said I do not . . . I know nothing about Malaysia, which may be true actually, and that I imputed that the Mahathir government used September 11 to bolster its domestic position. Well, that was really a minor part of this article in *The Herald Tribune*.

**States Behave as States, Not as Civilizations**

What I was really arguing was basically against the class of civilization nations and I argued that states behaved as states and not as civilizations, that they put their national interest and the principles of international relations which are modern and which protect the national interest ahead of civilization moralities. And I give an example of this. And I thought this was perhaps more of a class within a civilization in the sense that there are actually different versions of Islam and different battles for the soul of Islam even in countries that have gone through Islam transformation, Malaysia and Indonesia, then between civilizations.

Now, to me that would be actually a compliment to a government, which they are saying that governments acted as rational actors. But obviously the newspapers in Malaysia didn’t see it that way and I was quite . . . almost caused a minor difficulty because I work for an institute in Singapore which is partly funded by the Singapore government. And, so this was a minor crisis.

But I believe that the September 11, as I said in the paper, and the U.S. response to it marks the defeat of the “class of civilization” thesis put forth by Samuel Huntington. As if proof was needed, this was another proof. I would like to actually, John, if you don’t mind, we have some very distinguished people in the audience, such as Zakaria Ahmad, and maybe they have something to say about Malaysia or whether Thailand is a winner or loser. I mean nobody could say it more effectively than them.

Could I ask for a little comment from them? Do you have anything to say? In my defense I hope.

**Zakaria:** Well, I actually have quite a lot of questions as you made your presentation and since you work for IDSS and, as you say, is funded by the . . . funded partly by the Singapore government. There is a perception in Malaysia that it is funded fully by donations by the Singapore government and works as another arm of the Singapore government.

I think one of the problems of September 11, at least as seen in Malaysia I think, is Singapore has taken the opportunity to nab so-called Islamic terrorists. It causes problems, I think, for the Singapore Malay community and it brings back to this question that Suzaina was talking about, about the questions on the ground in terms of the state and its relations with the society. I think it’s widened the gulf between the Singapore government and the Islamics.

It is compounded by several other issues as well. As you know, headscarf, so-called headscarf controversy and, you know, seen
as a whole at least in Malaysia, it’s seen as an opportunity, a wonderful opportunity, exploited, for the Singapore government to repress even further the Malay Muslim community of Singapore.

And that is also related to another problem, which I think also is faced by a country like the United States, which is the perception is growing that every Muslim is a potential terrorist or Islam is, you know, terrorism. And I think that the statements have been made, that the world is against Islam and this, again, as you know, goes on in Israel and Palestine, you know, brings up this whole perception.

And I’m just wondering whether, and this question is asked in terms of the cooperation between the ASEAN countries, whether or not there’s been enough thinking by the defense and the foreign policy . . . the various foreign ministries within ASEAN, about the vast implications of this kind of what I think is the perception, because I think, you know, it has to be addressed at some particular point in time.

It goes way beyond what you are saying. From those of us who study strategic studies, I was just wondering because you’re trying to deal with some of those issues you talk about are very intriguing about whether or not if states become, you know, support terrorism, whether or not states . . . whether it’s authoritarianism, or lack of democracy breeds terrorism.

I wonder, in fact, there’s a larger question here. We are dealing with in Southeast Asia especially, with some governments which are very strong and then the level of the society’s integration, right? Whether or not they are weak or strong societies, was this a weak or strong government? I think Lawrence Friedman had an article before which dealt with the problem of Iraq, something to do with the weak state/strong state thesis. I wonder if it is something that’s, you know, that’s appealing to you as a construct that needs to be further investigated.

Thank you.

Acharya: To offer you a couple of initial qualifications Zak, the Singapore government funds all institutions of higher learning in Singapore, just as I believe the Malaysian government funds all universities in Malaysia, and I speak as a private citizen. I’m not even a Singaporean-born nor a resident. I’m a foreigner. I guess only in a country like Singapore that you can get a job in an institute without having to becoming a permanent resident, so, and I have, unlike you, have no privy to any secret information or intelligence sharing, so you probably know a lot more than I do. I try not to even think about that because I think we can do pretty serious and interesting research without knowing the intelligence briefs.

Singapore: Classic Example of Security Dilemma

But the substantial point that you made is a good one. The way I see about Singapore’s predicament, it’s like the classic example of security dilemma and especially in a domestic context, you try to make yourself more secure by offering facilities to the U.S., then you become more insecure from within but because you invite reprisals. I mean in the international relations theory, which is a good place to turn to if you want to avoid political controversy, we have a term for that, the security dilemma.

And also Singapore also has to learn that having a national defense policy like which is best for deterrence is based on a lot of support from the U.S., based on the balance of power without regionalism, regional identity, makes you like an Israel where you have no original identity. And I actually had a debate with a diplomat in Paris, we were actually part of a panel where he said basically that the U.S. balance of power is what protects the region.
And I said exactly the same thing. It didn’t protect Israel either because you have to have . . . that’s why my book is titled *Quest for Identity*, one of my books, because you have to have an original identity to make yourself secure. If you don’t have that no amount of deterrence, no amount of homeland security is going to protect any country, but least a country which is small and security dilemma operates. I don’t have to go beyond IR theory to explain that.

So, I also wanted to say, Suzaina made a very interesting point in her comments about whether Singapore was a winner or loser in the long term. I actually thought the Singapore government was caught by surprise by September 11. I mean, although, people like Mr. Lee had warned about Islamic fundamentalism in the region, but I think the extent of this discovery was quite a surprise, and I think I believe that. I mean I actually was one of the people who thought that terrorism is not an issue in Southeast Asia and I’m completely wrong about that.

But I was quite surprised. Unless we have a massive fabrication of everything that happened, and it’s the same, and Singapore’s problem is not unique. You have similar problems in Malaysia and the Philippines. So quite aside from the domestic handling of the Malay Muslim issue, which I think a lot of Singaporeans are very concerned about, there is also a dimension that was transnational, that was not just domestic.

However, if this is not handled properly it becomes a domestic issue in the long term. And I completely agree with Suzaina who knows more about this than I do, about that if this could become a liability, and this is why my central thesis that the ultimate impact of September 11 is going to be on state-society relations. That’s what is going to decide politics, not geo-politics.

**Ikenberry:** Well, on that note I think we will draw the evening to a close. I hope you would join with me in thanking our panelists for a very stimulating evening. (End)
About the Panelists

**Main Speaker**

**Dr. Amitav Acharya** is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also holds a professorship. His academic appointments include Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto, Fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center and Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Policy Program at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Acharya is also a member of the Eminent Persons/Expert Group of the ASEAN Regional Forum. He has served on various panels, including as expert adviser to the Japan Forum on the International Relations’ 1995 project on Asia Pacific security cooperation and the Council on Foreign Relations’ Study Group on China. Dr. Acharya received a Ph.D. from Murdoch University, Australia. His recent publications include *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (2001), *ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (2001) and *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia* (2000).

**Discussants**

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