

**Asian Voices :**  
**Promoting Dialogue Between the US and Asia**  
*Assessing President Bush's East Asia Trip*

by

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**Jim Mann:** During the election year 2000, I heard regularly in Asia and sometimes in this country a prediction about the Bush administration's policies, and what they would be if President Bush were elected. It went something like this, "It doesn't matter what he says during the campaign because after all his policies will be like the last Bush administration. That whatever he says now doesn't really matter because his father and Brent Scowcroft will make sure that his policies are essentially the same."

And I continued to hear that right through all of last year. And this year, even right up to the eve of the president's trip, I heard after the axis of evil speech, "Well, don't worry, by the time he gets to Seoul he will not say anything like that. And we won't hear anymore of whatever the policies were behind the axis of evil." And I would suggest to you that this trip, if nothing else, ought to disabuse people of this sort of smug assumption, that this administration is like the last Bush administration, or that this president will in the end do exactly what his father would have done or Brent Scowcroft would have done.

Nevertheless, this myth persists. I think I heard a week after the trip, "Well, after he's reelected in 2004, then he'll end up with policies like the first Bush administration." So delusions persist. I think that this administration has different policies than the last Bush administration. We saw that on this trip.

## **Trip Upheld Status Quo**

To touch briefly on the trip, I found personally that there wasn't too much surprising from the

president in his stop in Japan. I wasn't particularly surprised that he expressed all kinds of satisfaction with Japan on the security side, and there were hints of some dissatisfaction on the economic side, but that dissatisfaction was pretty well muted. All of that is much as we would expect, I think.

Again, if you go back on policy toward Korea, if you go back to last spring there were reports that President Bush Sr. had passed on a letter or a memo from Don Gregg, the head of the Korea Society, expressing some concern about the new administration's Korean policy. And everybody said, "Ah, ha, there it is, and that's the end of any different policy on Korea." That, of course, turned out not to be true.

## **President Did not Retreat from Axis of Evil Statement**

So we do find that, while the president when out of his way to downplay any disagreements between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the trip, he did, in a low-keyed way, return to this line, for better or worse — the mention of evil. And didn't, in any way, retreat, that I could see, from the policies or hint of policies, since we don't know exactly what axis of evil means, in his State of the Union speech.

Most importantly in China, again, there were predictions after September 11 that September 11 represented a fundamental break for this administration and its policies towards China, that in some way the war on terrorism could be compared to the Cold War in providing the basis for a new strategic relationship between the United States and China. And while this

administration in China has been cooperating in the war on terrorism, I always thought the analogy was flawed. That China's position in the Cold War was far more central than the position it holds for the war on terrorism. And I really didn't feel that the administration had changed its policies that much.

### **Bush Administration Develops New China Policy**

And so we see on this trip, although he was only in Beijing for a couple of days, we see all kinds of signs of differences from the last administration or the last couple of administrations on China policy, where other presidents in public affirm the three communiqués between the United States and China. And where it appears, I believe, that President Bush may have done so in private, he won't mention the three communiqués in public. He refers to the Taiwan Relations Act. A very different cast to policy on Taiwan and the three communiqués than the public statements of the last administration.

You also have atmospherics, the fact that this president decided not to stay at Diaoyutai, a Chinese guest house, that somehow — and I was surprised that they did this, but somehow the president's team put out the word that in the hotel they were staying in they put up tents to shield documents from any intelligence gathering. Again, this goes more to atmospherics, this isn't entirely a change in the reality from previous administrations. I described in my book in the early '80s how Secretary of State Schultz and his team wore special masks to talk to one another in the state guest house. It's not a difference in reality as much as it's a difference in how relations between the United States and China are portrayed.

### **Influence of Reagan Administration on China Policy**

I think the dual mistake in assuming that this administration was going to follow what I

would call a Bush senior and Scowcroft line on China was twofold. First, it emphasizes personal relationships, but only some of the personal relationships. That this administration, as a whole, is equally influenced by the Reagan administration, by Secretary of State Schultz, and by others in the Reagan administration. And Secretary of State Schultz described his policy toward China as not over-emphasizing China with an American policy toward Asia, because by doing so, it would in some way, give greater bargaining power to China. I think that's a fairly good of description of the thinking of this administration.

And the memo to George Schultz laying out this concept, which you could find in my last book, was written by an adviser to Schultz named Paul Wolfowitz. So, the first mistake is, even if you look at this as a matter of relationships and *guanxi*, as people in China would put it, you're not looking at all the *guanxi*.

And second of all, you need to look at the ideas people express and take them seriously. I think this administration, with China and Korea, thinks about questions of leverage, thinks about, in terms of *real politic*, thinks of bargaining power, much as George Schultz did.

And having said all that, I'll conclude with this idea — that much as Ronald Reagan, after using this phrase "evil empire" with respect to the Soviet Union — three or four years later, was engaged in some intense and, to some extent, successful arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

I would raise the possibility that a lot of these policies of the first two years are to create the context and negotiating context for later dealings with China, and in different ways, North Korea. That it would not surprise me, after laying out this strong position on North Korea, for example, if after the next congressional elections in the United States, and more importantly, after the next

presidential election in South Korea, there may be some sort of negotiated settlement on missiles, missile exports and so on. One doesn't know.

And the same general idea, it would not surprise me if there's an awful lot of serious business done between the United States and China — not now, not this fall, as China is in the middle of a Party Congress, but over the next year or two after that, as the new Chinese leadership settles in. And I'll leave it there and take your questions later on.

**Miura Toshiaki:** Thank you very much for your kind introduction. It is my great pleasure to be a panelist on this forum, Asian Voices, and to be given the chance to exchange views with the distinguished members of the panel and the audience. I will first talk about the domestic politics of Japan, and then I will speak about the president's trip from that perspective. I have been stationed in Washington, D.C. since last April as a political correspondent, without any idea that I would turn out to be a wartime correspondent.

### **Koizumi Fever**

Before September 11, I covered only U.S. domestic politics and U.S.-Japan relations. I was a domestic political reporter in Tokyo for 13 years. Since the Takeshita administration, Japan has had 11 prime ministers since then. So I can easily imagine how much hope the Bush administration put in Koizumi when he was elected last year with a kind of Koizumi fever behind him.

He won enormous popularity, an 80% approval rate, which is amazing by Japanese standards. One U.S. government official told me that the high approval rate showed that the Japanese people have finally understood that they must be ready for structural reforms. Surely, Koizumi's popularity is his greatest political asset. But the once popular Koizumi has been losing that magical power recently.

### **Koizumi's Leadership Doubted**

His popularity plunged right after he fired the popular foreign minister, Ms. Tanaka. But is it not accurate to put the blame solely on her dismissal. A strong doubt about Koizumi's leadership already existed before that. People were beginning to question whether Koizumi had the guts to carry out his reform plans against the resistance forces in his own conservative party, who cling to the old vested interests. So, Tanaka's resignation, in my view, was just the catalyst that exposed the difficulties in Koizumi's leadership.

And it is against this backdrop that President Bush visited Tokyo. I think the United States had two purposes for that Japan part of the trip. First, Bush wanted to get a guarantee of support for the war against terrorism in its second phase. This was the same purpose for the other parts of the trip. Secondly, Bush wanted to be assured of Koizumi's determination to push through with economic reform plans. On these two points, I think the public face of the summit was very positive.

### **Display of Cooperation between Japan and the U.S.**

At a press conference on February 18, Prime Minister Koizumi said, "The expression of the axis of evil, I believe, reflects a firm result of President Bush and the United States against terrorism." And he promised continued support from Japan. And, on economic issues, Bush was very careful not to show any signs that the U.S. was exerting *gaiatsu* external pressures. He encouraged Koizumi to go through with a reform plan and promised to lend his support.

President Bush said, when he looked at me in the eye and told me that he is going to take necessary measures, I believe him, and I believe his intent. I think the press conference sounded almost like a confession, rather than opinions or evaluations. So, I think the security issue of the talk was used to cover up,

or at least divert attention from the more serious economic aspect of the bilateral relations. I think it was a success as far as it demonstrated the will of both governments to cooperate in the war against terrorism and to reform the Japanese economy.

### **Lukewarm Popular Support for War on Terrorism**

But it does not automatically guarantee future success or that Japan's promised support is going to be fully carried out. Since I'm a political correspondent, I will focus mainly on the political aspect. The question in the political arena is, how far Japan can go with the United States if America resorts to military action against Iraq. In spite of that cordial mood between the two leaders — and Koizumi's wholehearted support for President Bush, I think it is getting a little bit harder for the Japanese people to support a large-scale military operation in Iraq.

I observed a small but significant change in the tone of the Japanese media coverage and the public opinion toward the Bush administration's war efforts. The watershed was probably the State of the Union address in January when Bush used the term, "axis of evil." To Japanese ears, it sounded a little bit simplistic, too black and white. Some Japanese are already critical of Bush from the beginning of the war. Bush's rhetoric—"whether you're with us or against us"—sounded a little bit arrogant. But, on the whole, I think the Japanese people have supported the United States and President Bush because they basically sympathize with the American people and their plight after September 11.

But I think the phrase, "axis of evil," reminds the Japanese of Bush's unilateralist approach in the pre-September 11 world. We felt we are watching the same old Bush, who criticized the Kyoto Protocol and retreated from the comprehensive test ban treaty. The environment and nuclear disarmament are the most

sensitive topics in Japan, and you can easily get unpopular if you are seen to be opposing these two issues. I think we can observe a split, emerging between the Japanese view of the United States and their view of President Bush.

The Japanese are still backing America's war efforts against terrorism, but I think they are not so quite sure about Bush's handling of the war. I believe it is now a little bit difficult to convince the Japanese people of the necessity of the second phase of the war if it includes a large-scale, military operation against Iraq. So far, I think, Japanese have supported American efforts because they can see a clear link between September 11 and the terrorists in Afghanistan. But with Iraq, I don't think many Japanese will see it automatically as an extension of September 11. So even in a conservative camp, there are some politicians who are already expressing anxiety about that option.

### **Cordial Relationship between Bush and Koizumi**

So I think the domestic situation in Japan will be all the more difficult, ironically or paradoxically, because of the good relations between the good governments. I think rarely have we seen such a cordial relationship between the two top leaders. They did not play catch in Tokyo this time like they did at Camp David last summer, but that's great. It remains the same. They went together this time to a very casual restaurant in a very fashionable downtown area, and they're on good terms and friendly terms with each other.

And when they talk, they don't use notes. It's customary for the Japanese prime minister to just read notes prepared by bureaucrats, but Prime Minister Koizumi spoke his mind. And I think his frankness made it possible for the two leaders to connect with each other and really have a heart to heart. Some people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that maybe these two leaders are now approaching

the level of intimacy between Bush and British Prime Minister Blair.

And in addition, I think Bush's Japan team and security experts on the Japanese side, are the best matched probably in recent history. Some of them are old hands of the Reagan administration in the 1980s, when Japan closely cooperated with the United States during the last phase of the Cold War.

### **Political Risk of War with Iraq**

But I think we should bear in mind that all these strong points could become weak points if they fail to measure how far the Japanese public can go in their support of the second phase of the war. I think this gap between the government and the people could be fatal for Koizumi. We should not forget that his only power base, his popularity is being eroded, steadily eroded now. Koizumi might face a political crisis if the United States goes to war with Iraq and asks for Japan's support and, if Koizumi agrees, in spite of a strong opposition from public opinion and the Diet.

When we look back upon the history of U.S.-Japanese alliance, I think the intergovernmental relationship has almost always been good. It is only the domestic aspects of both countries that can cause problems in the relationship from time to time. And I think this might be a case in point — if the war escalates, and I think we cannot guarantee that Japan will offer continued support, I think the United States should not take Japan's continued support for granted. Because many Japanese would like to see the Bush administration adopt a little bit more multilateralistic approach. And I think the number of people, of such people, is bound to increase as new events unfold.

For example, the latest news about the Pentagon's secret plan to develop new nuclear weapons, which are better suited for hitting Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, I think this kind of news may worry many Japanese. And it

also brings up the thorny issue of nuclear arms. And on the Japanese side, I think politicians should express their anxiety and their thoughts more candidly. Internationally we have heard so much dissenting opinion from Europe, but there have been, I think, few negative voices heard from Japan.

I heard an interesting episode about an ex-U.S. government official. She was invited to a seminar in Tokyo last fall, and she was surprised during the question and answer session that there were so many Japanese with questions of America's handling of the war. During the session, one retiree from the foreign ministry commented, "I always support the United States, but the president's phrase 'whether you with us or against us' is going too far." This ex-U.S. government official had never heard this opinion from Japan, and she thought that most Japanese had been supporting the United States unconditionally.

I think it is important for Japan and the United States to agree on important principles and to have different voices about the details. I think it can broaden the American perspective, and I hope my voice can be one of those voices. You all remember the scene when President Bush spoke to the fire fighters at Ground Zero three days after the terrorist strike. A rescue worker shouted, "I can't hear you." Then President Bush took up the bullhorn and spoke the now historic phrase, "I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon." I found these words very moving, but I will find them more moving if it is not only American voices that are heard, but the voices of the international community as a whole, who stand together against terrorism. So I think, in this way, those who support terrorism will hear all of us better. Thank you for your kind attention.

**Shin Kyoungmin:** After one year passed, when Mr. Bush was inaugurated in Washington and we Koreans found that Korean voices and some Asian voices were not heard in the

hall of the White House, after the “aoe” (access of evil) remarks, we found that Bush’s attitude toward North Korea and his policy toward North Korea has not changed. We were greatly shocked to hear the “aoe” remarks. And at the first stage we didn’t know why those kind of remarks were uttered by his mouth, and we tried to get the reason why, and we concluded that there’s no new intelligence and no new evidence that North Korea made a serious mistake exporting or developing new weapons — missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear.

### **Opposition to “Axis of Evil” Remarks in Korea**

So, thanks to these remarks, the South Korea and U.S. summit talk attracted world media attention. And so many media mentioned that this kind of summit talk will be one of the toughest talks, so that was the reality we faced. There was confusing advice from every corner of the society in Korea. And one strong voice, the advice of Mr. President Kim Jong-il that stands against Mr. Bush strongly, and the other voice is to just accept Bush’s remarks as a political and international reality.

And in the summit talk, that was held in the Blue House in Seoul, President Kim took the middle road. He tried to persuade Mr. Bush to give up the expanded summit talks. Then he consumed almost two hours to try to explain the Korean reality and try to persuade that your remarks made some kind of chaos carrying out his Sunshine Policy. And we don’t know that he made a success, a great success or not, but anyway, we got a small success and persuaded him and his staff not to make remarks about the “axis of evil.” Originally we heard that Mr. Bush tried to make the “aoe” remarks one time during his stay in Korea. And after two hour talks with DJ and DJ’s staff, we received intelligence that Mr. Bush was going to make the “aoe” remarks during his stay, so they strongly opposed the intention to make such remarks.

And then anyway, Mr. Bush and his staff accepted our advice, and he just only mentioned one time during his visit to a museum showing the axes that the North Koreans used in the 1970s and remarks that North Korea is an evil country, an evil state, just one time during his stay. In that sense, President Kim and our country made a small success. But generally speaking, we failed to persuade Mr. Bush and his staff to change the course and to change his evaluation toward North Korea. And the other factors that impact Mr. Bush and his staff may be the strong anti-Americanism that’s shown on the street.

As a journalist and as a student of the U.S.-South Korean relationship for a long time, I personally never expected such a strong opposition on the street. And so many presidential candidates expressed a strong antagonism about Bush’s remarks and showed their regret and visited the U.S. embassy in Korea and conveyed their strong opposition.

And that may be it was the first time that the current presidential candidate in Korea showed disgusting remarks and conveyed their discontent toward the U.S. presidential remarks. That may be the first as I remember. And maybe, at least maybe, but one of the important factors may be the fighter sales that are imminent. And, as some of you may know, the U.S. government is trying to sell F15 fighters to Korea as the next generation fighter, even though the F15 is an old fighter.

But the U.S. government and the Boeing Company tried to persuade the South Korean government that this may be the good fighter to be used in the Korean peninsula. At this summit talk nobody mentioned, on either side, the fighter sale. But we understand that the fighter sale is one of the topics that lie behind the wall and under the table.

### **U.S. and South Korea Agree North Korea is an Evil Country**

And as I mentioned, we failed to persuade

Bush to change his attitude and his evaluation toward North Korea. His intentions remain the same, and it gives a great task to the Korean government and to the Korean people. We all agree — the U.S. and Korean governments and the cities — all agree that North Korea is an evil country. We, as Koreans, we are the same people, but we think that the North Korean government and the North Korean regime has a great problem in governing their country and in running their country for a long time, for over 50 years.

And they have been evil for many decades. We all understand, but the problem is North Korea is a very closed country for a long time, and they can't maintain their economic system and political system without help from other countries and outside input. That's the problem, that maybe it is a very unique country in the history of the world and in the history of the Korean peninsula. This is a very unique one, so nobody knows how to deal with such a country, so closed, and so independent, so autarchy a country.

And the other problem that comes out from that situation is how to minimize the danger that North Korea imposes and how to minimize and how to avoid the war in the Korean peninsula. That is the problem we are now facing all together. And some Korean experts mentioned that the senior Bush started the U.S.-North Korea dialogue 10 years ago when the nuclear crisis erupted at the time. And Mr. Clinton became the next president and in his first presidency he thought about the possible war in the Korean Peninsula, when North Korea declared it to be out of the NPT.

At that time, you may know the Korean history and Mr. Oberdofer described it in his books that Mr. Clinton and his staff thought that war in the Korean Peninsula will be the only solution to break that kind of development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. But anyway, Mr. Clinton and his staff changed the path and tried to engage North Korea to that and then reached an agreement in 1994, and

that created KEDO to provide two nuclear reactors in North Korea. And that project proceeded after that, and now... but that has many problems. So now Mr. President and his staff are attacking that sort of product should be stopped if North Korea does not abide by the rules that were set in 1994.

But, anyway, Bush's strategies and the evaluation toward North Korea has been the same after one year, after when he was elected and became president, and he repeatedly said that North Korean should be changed. And there's no dialogue and no aid, no subsidy toward North Korea. In this juncture, the September 11 attacks occurred, and there's a great change in U.S. world strategy and Bush's staff and Bush's White House mixed the world strategy with regional politics, that's very vivid in the Korean Peninsula. That is the background of Bush's "aoe" remarks, that mixture of a world strategy and regional politics in the Korean peninsula. We are very confused, and we are very surprised to hear that, there is a mixture of the world strategy and politics.

### **Military Response to Korean Situation**

And the problem is that this kind of crisis, this kind of situation that's loaded long in history, over 50 years, can be solved by the military. This kind of situation and this kind of closed country can be dealt with military measures, and if that kind of decision was made to counter the North Korean problems with military measures, then what kind of military measures can be taken? And as NPR reported a couple of days ago, some kind of nuclear measure can be applied in the Korean peninsula. We are very surprised to hear that sort of review was conducted by the Pentagon for a long time, for almost one year.

So the Korean people were very startled to hear that if the military measures were taken, what kind of fortune will you have in the Korean peninsula. We are very afraid to hear that Mr. Bush's remarks and Mr. Bush's



evaluation toward North Korea has not changed. And this year, we hear Bush's earlier remarks, but next year we have another danger because he does agree the framework became a critical juncture because of keeping to build the nuclear reactor, the key component will be delivered sometime next year or 2004, 2005.

So next year will be a more dangerous year, and 2004 will be a more dangerous year, so it will stand to remain very dangerous. And it will be a very unstable situation we'll be facing to many Korean people and the Korea peninsula itself. So we are very cautious, and we are paying greater attention toward Mr. Bush's "aoe" remarks. "Aoe" remarks are not just remarks that can be evaluated as a blob or just saying his evaluation, but it can be dealt with a striking measure like military or some economic and political ones. So we are very serious in that sense. Thank you.

**Zhang Xiangchen:** Thank you, Mr. Ikenberry. And I would also like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation for this opportunity.

President Bush made a very short visit to China last month. Obviously, within 30 hours he could not reach any substantial consensus with China's leaders on those world issues between China and the U.S. But this visit is still an important one. Both sides had the opportunity to reiterate their positions in the new international environment. And President Bush had an opportunity to meet China's leaders of new generations, and he had a very interesting dialogue with China's college students.

And history proved that to keep the contact of the leaders between China and the U.S. is necessary. Though they could not reach agreement or a consensus, the dialogue and communication, face to face, is important. During the terms of President Clinton, he had at least 10 opportunities to meet President Jiang Zemin. Personally, I think, President Bush is different from the visit of President Nixon 30 years ago.

Thirty years ago, China and the United States faced a common enemy — the expansion of the former Soviet Union, and now the common enemy disappeared, and the China-U.S. relationship becomes more complicated. Thirty years ago, President Nixon's mission was difficult. He needed to overcome the hostility of over more than a decade. What he needed most was courage. But now, because of the complicated relationship between China and the U.S., President Bush needs sophisticated insight and a balance of power.

### **Discussion of Controversial Issues**

During his visit, four controversial issues were touched upon: Taiwan, human rights, weapons proliferation, and trade. The Taiwan issue is the most sensitive issue in the China-U.S. relationship. During his speech at Tsinghua University, President Bush was asked twice about American-Taiwan policy. According to my understanding, since the end of the 1970s, the U.S. has been trying to get a balance between the three China-U.S. communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. By doing so, the U.S. is trying to encourage the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. This is a policy of strategy and bureaucracy.

But if this strategy is too ambiguous, that the U.S. is reluctant to reiterate this one China position, it will send a wrong signal, especially when Taiwan's pro-independence force is growing. Fortunately, President Bush made this important clarification towards the end of his speech in Tsinghua University. In terms of weapons of proliferation, there was no breakthrough and no new agreements were announced. It seems that in this area both sides need more negotiations. But if the general relationship between China and the U.S. can get stable, both sides could make some new progress like they did before.

Human rights continue to be an area of major difference. President Bush raised U.S. concerns again. According to me, it's a complicated issue and it's better not to put this issue

on the priorities of foreign policy. And it also should be cautious to link this human rights issue with other issues. There was a massive debate in the U.S. in 1993 to 1994 on the relationship between human rights and annual MFN (most favored nation) review of China.

President Clinton made the decision to link the two issues because he believed that the leverage of trade could not resolve the dispute between China and the U.S. on human rights. Trade is a less controversial issue now between China and the U.S. China, during the WTO last December got the permanent normal trade relations.

The last outstanding issue between the two countries, the annual MFN review was removed. And Premier Zhu Rongji attached good importance to the cooperation between China and the U.S. in economic areas during his breakfast with President Bush. And the closer economic relationship between China and the U.S. could lay an important foundation for the overall development of the two countries' relationship. Of course, it can only be part of this foundation.

### **Developing the Sino-U.S. Relationship**

The two countries need to explore a more broad foundation for the relationship. And even within this economic areas, there are differences between the two countries. For example, the trade deficit is a potential issue. Fortunately, now there are many Americans who believe that the trade deficit is because of the difference of the two country's economic structure. And the trade deficit can serve as an outside contribution to U.S. domestic economical development. And now we see a lot of concerns about compliance of the WTO agreement.

And as a trade policy official, I have no difficulty to repeat China's willingness to implement its commitments. But there have only been three months since China joined the WTO, and we will implement our commit-

ments according to the schedule in agreement in the next few years. So it's still too early to give an evaluation. President Bush's wishes were carried out during the anti-terrorist war. President Jiang Zemin expressed China's support to U.S. efforts in this regard.

So cooperation between China and the U.S. in the war of anti-terrorism is important. It could be a kind of political capital for the Chinese side. But this kind of cooperation is only a part of the security relationship between China and the U.S. And the Sino-U.S. security relationship goes beyond the scope and the lens of this cooperation and anti-terrorism.

### **More Consideration Would Benefit Relationship**

If I may sum up, one character of the China-U.S. relationship is consideration. It might not be possible for us to change this character ourselves because of the fundamental difference between China and the U.S. on the political and social systems. But both sides could reduce the frequency of this isolation. And President Bush indicated that, both sides are working in that direction. And the China-U.S. relationship could be relatively stable for sometime to come.

Thank you.

**John Ikenberry:** Maybe what we'll do is just let our panelists have a chance to make any comments they might have about their fellow colleague comments. In some ways, our comments about Japan and Korea were comments that suggested some frustration and certainly some limits of willingness to accommodate the United States in its hard line. Jim's comment was along the lines of what you see is what you get. That is to say, there is a kind of evolving position here that's not simply a facade, but is a stronger view.

I'm just wondering whether...and perhaps, in some sense, our last set of comments suggest that Sino-American relations may be, in fact,

quite stable and not veering off in one direction or the other.

Do any of our panelists want to respond to the others? Jim, do you want to react to any of the three presentations from your perspective?

**Mann:** Let me just make two points because I think this administration...I study them, I've covered them in the past, so this is my interpretation of their thinking. But this is in part to the reaction to the presentation on Korea. This administration operates with different assumptions, I think. One of the explanations about North Korea is that this is a regime, a government, which is an autarchy, and has and does operate independently on its own.

### **Bush Administration Believes North Korea Needs Outside Help**

And it struck me as I heard that, that this Bush administration, its policy is rooted in part on the idea that that's not necessarily true. I think its policy is based in part on the idea that North Korea needs help from the outside, that it was getting that help...that historically going back into the '50s, '60s, '70s, and '80s, it was independent but was getting help in different ways from the Soviet Union and China. That it now, in different ways, needs help from the United States, Japan and South Korea. And that it is not an autarchy.

And if I could put words in their mouths, if I could explain their thinking, what they don't say, I think it would be, "Look, this is a country that needs us, that needs our help. Why should we be running to North Korea." They don't say that, but I think that's part of their thinking.

And I don't think it's...despite the use of..."axis of evil," first of all, I think, they've disavowed "axis" at this point. There was a question after the "axis of evil" speech, "Is that rhetoric or is it policy?"

Well, I think it was policy in complicated ways

that had to do with terrorism and proliferation, whether the policy's right or wrong. It was a policy change — "axis" was rhetoric. No one seems to be able to defend that. I think they gave up trying within about 72 hours.

But part of the assumption is that, I think, that North Korea is not completely independent. And then secondly, and this is in general for their policies toward Asia, and to some extent, elsewhere. You've got to realize that, for better or worse, this administration thinks the status quo is not okay.

From the standpoint of different countries and different areas and different policies, for example, on the Korean peninsula, other people are happy with the status quo, this administration, in the aftermath of September 11, is not happy with the status and that's what the State of Union speech meant.

Thirdly, there's a general — and this goes to cultural differences, I think — in general, there's always a greater willingness on the part of the United States than people in Asia to openly espouse disagreements and not cover them up under the table. That's all the more true for this administration.

So, where people in Asia may think all conflict and all disagreement is bad, that's not certainly not an assumption that this administration shares, for better or worse. All I can do is explain the way I think they are thinking.

### **Q & A**

**Ikenberry:** If any other panelists want to make a comment before we open it up to the floor. Please identify yourself and your affiliation, then ask a question or make a comment.

**Questioner:** My question is for Jim. I wonder if you might comment on the fact that President Bush chose to go to China, despite the advice of his staff, and particularly, if you might want to comment on its implications for

the ongoing infighting that's going on within the administration over control of the directions for China policy.

**Mann:** Your understanding is different from mine. I'm not covering this administration minute in and minute out, but I never thought it was a realistic possibility that they would do this trip without going to China. And they may have been so low-level back-and-forth about this, but essentially this was a trip, as most people know, this was a trip that overall, was laid out for him to do in October. And when he didn't do it, he scaled back to simply going to APEC and Shanghai.

In fact, as some people within the administration laid out to me, they saw...this is how administrations think, they saw an open chunk of time in February, where the president had few commitments at home, where the Olympics were going on, all kinds of things in this country. It looked like a good time for him to do a foreign trip. And they said, where should he go?

Well, we've already done — and this gets into logistics, but it's the way administrations work — they had already done all the advance work for Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, so it was a relatively simple matter to lay back on this trip again, which they were committed to do again any way. I don't think that simply not going to Beijing was ever a realistic possibility; it's possible that some people may have said that. But I think at the top levels I think it was always on.

**Questioner:** I'd like to ask each one of you, this is a common thread, I think. I understand Koizumi and Bush get along well, however, the participation in the large scale war against terrorism, the Japanese may have some problems, internal politics, as Mr. Miura says. I wonder if Bush succeeded or not about Japanese Self-Defense Forces' participation in the war, and the reaction from Korea and China and what they see from Japan's deploying the forces.

This is the first time, I think, away from Japanese territory. So I was wondering whether if you have any reaction from Korea, if they are happy with the Japanese increasing the military power in terms of participation into the international scene or the Chinese, how they look at the Japanese military structure and influence into the future? I come from Okinawa, the military base is strong, so I'm curious how Bush's trip, if it calms down some kind of reaction from Okinawa as well, if Koizumi and Bush get along well. And see if you can comment on this from each of your positions. I'm sure the U.S. will be happy if Japan cooperates. I'm not sure of Korea and China.

**Miura:** I will first talk, because I'm from Japan and I only know the Japanese perspective, so I have nothing to say or nothing to comment about the reaction from Korea or China. But as far as Japan goes, I think there are two aspects of the question: the participation of the self-defense forces in this operation.

### **Many Japanese For Participation of Military in War against Terrorism**

I think the positive aspect is that a considerable part of the Japanese people thought this time that we should do something. Not just checkbook diplomacy, but we should show some participation of the personnel of the military in this operation to just show that we stand by the United States, and we're on the side fighting against terrorism.

It's very symbolic. I don't think actually this participation is really contributing to the military operation, but it's more so maybe American people can see that Japan is participating on the American side and fighting against terrorism. I think the symbolism is very important, not only for the Americans, but also for the Japanese, that we are responsible for this collaboration. I think this is a positive side of this military operation.

But I think, when we think about the Japanese constitution, which prohibits such kind of military operation, it may depend upon the interpretation of the Article 9. But I think, this time, I think the government has gone a little bit too far.

### **Koizumi Going Too Far**

I think an example in point is Prime Minister's Koizumi's remarks that...I can't remember correctly what he said in Japanese, so it may be rather tough to translate into English...but he thinks that there is some room between the preamble of the constitution, the Article 9. So he admits that this is not...he can do it not solely based on the interpretation of the successive administrations. Maybe he knew that he is now going a little bit too far.

But the important point, the most important problem about this whole debate is that there was very little substantial debate in the Diet. So I think this is a little bit of a crisis. I think it's very important for the Japanese people to understand the importance of the constitution.

If they think something necessarily should be done, but it could not be done within the context of the constitution, I think, the proper way is to think about the possibility of revising the constitution or to re-interpret the constitution. But people think maybe we don't have to do both things, maybe we can do in a more unambiguous way. I think it may be practical, but in the long run, I think, it is just postponing the real thing, the real problem that Japan might face in the future.

**Shin:** We Koreans just know very well that over 20 or 30 years the United States has a strong desire to encourage Japanese military participation in the Asian region, especially the cooperation between Japan and Korea in a military perspective. But I think, personally, it's not a constitutional problem. It is a problem of general resentment among people. Even though the U.S. has a very,

very strong desire to implement military cooperation between Japan and other Asian countries, there is a strong sentiment, a strong antagonism against the military of Japan coming again.

So, we see that, even though we are close allies with the United States, that there are a couple of things that we cannot help and take their advice. That maybe the Japanese and military cooperation with Korea will be one of the things, one of the items, that we cannot take advice.

**Ikenberry.** Mr. Zhang.

**Zhang:** China supported U.S. efforts of anti-terrorism because China has its own concerns of terrorism. But China still has its concerns, and it still has the concerns on the possible negative impact of this anti-terrorism. For example, the presence and attendance of the U.S. military force in Middle Eastern countries and also the increasing military participation of Japan in international affairs.

But because the priority of the foreign policy is to support the U.S. to carry out the anti-terrorist war, China took a low key on these secretive concerns. They took a "wait-and-see" policy to witness what's going on and then evaluate the impact.

**Ikenberry:** Do you have anything?

**Mann:** No, I don't have anything to add to that.

**Ikenberry:** Other questions?

**Questioner:** I just wanted to pick up on one of the themes that I felt extended across the panelists' remarks, and that's the damage that the "axis of evil" comment did to our relations with our allies. I think it was Miura-san that characterized it as a reemergence of U.S. unilateralism and significant concern that this caused among our allies.

And what I'd like the panelists to address is how to reverse this trend, how to build or rebuild an axis of good, a coalition among our allies. And how far can we take this, and how far do you think the countries will support the United States and what the United States must do to bring some of our allies back on board on our foreign policy?

### **Lack of American Consultation with Allies**

**Mann:** Well, that's a jump ball. It's a real good question because the part of the administration's policy that's a mystery to me, really inexplicable, is the lack of consultation with allies. It really just seems unnecessary, the fact that our allies have as much warning of this new...assuming that this was a change in a policy and not just rhetoric, and I think it was, I think most think it was. Our allies had about as much advance warning of this as they did of say, Kissinger's trip to China. And I find that amazing, and I don't quite understand it. And I don't think they've really explained that.

This part applies probably more to Europe than to Asia, but it seems to me that it was a logical leap that I can't understand, to go from, "Gee, it was really difficult and cumbersome for us to deal with our allies on military action in the Balkans," to, "We don't want to deal with them at all, really, on military action in Afghanistan." It seems to me that the Europeans had all sorts of interests in the Balkans that they wouldn't have had with Afghanistan, and that this could have been done. There's no explanation other than that this was an administration that was shocked and galvanized and really didn't want to take the time.

That may explain things for last October I have no explanation on the State of the Union. So your question is, what can be done. Well, we're seeing a smidgen of it with some of the consultations that are going on now. One has to assume that part of this is on what to do next. Or, depending on how you want to read

this, either what to do next or consulting on what they think they want to do in Iraq.

I don't think that quite does it. I think you can hear from the other panelists a sense of being entirely left out. In a way, they really weren't. If you go way back to September 11, 12, and 13, when you had people, you know Le Monde saying we are all Americans and tremendous American support, I don't understand it.

**Ikenberry:** Anybody else want to respond to that because this really goes to foreign assessments of how distinct this administration is and kind of its...we're among friends, so you can speak your mind.

**Shin:** I personally don't think that Bush will change his evaluation or his mind. The reason why some argue that the U.S. is an imperialistic country, at this time and at this juncture, maybe one reason is that the U.S. sometimes ignores the specific reality of every region, every region and every country has their own history and background and their culture.

And in the Korean peninsula we have a long traditional way, a unified country for a long time, and it became suddenly divided—south and north—by the decision of the United States, Soviet Union at that time in China. So we experienced that set of division over 50 years. There's a long history, and we share some culture, but we are divided for so long so we became a different country.

And as I mentioned, Mr. Jim Mann has a different perspective in the sense that we have a very strong desire in one way to be reunited, and in another sense, we are different countries for a long time, so we can be divided forever. And this situation will be good for us. That's a sort of mixture of evaluation and the sense at this moment.

The problem is President Kim's policy, so-called Sunshine Policy, is a right one or wrong one or a negative one or a positive one, so

Korean intellectuals agree that it is very historically a right one, but it is very difficult to implement, to take the consternation of some negative attitude among our people. So it is very difficult.

### **Korea Needs U.S. Help to Implement Sunshine Policy**

With or without the help of inside and outside, it cannot be implemented successfully. So we need the U.S. to decide to help very urgently, very earnestly. It is a very important factor to carry out, to carry out that policy.

But suddenly Mr. Bush came as the strong president of the United States and reversed all the logic and all the history and all the background all of a sudden. So we are watching now the demise of the so-called the Sunshine Policy in front of our very eyes. So we are very confused, and we are very surprised to watch that.

If I'm in a position to advise Mr. Bush and his staff, his immediate staff, very close staff, they should consider, should think about, should scrutinize the special circumstances that every region and the country has for a long time.

**Miura:** I think the rhetoric, the "axis of evil," has caused unnecessary confusion. And I think Bush has wasted a lot of political capital. I think there is a quite large reservoir of sympathy on the American side, particularly after September 11. I hope Bush would be wise to make most of it by building a coalition and keeping the coalition. But I think what's happening now is rather a kind of paradox.

I think the fact that the America...the only super power means that the American foreign policy is more and more influenced by its domestic concerns and domestic interests. This may be out of the focus of today's argument, but I'm really interested in what kind of factors, what kind of domestic factors, where right-way thinkers, were really just right. What kind of conservatism in the United

States is influencing Bush's foreign policy thinking.

I think it may be a rather interesting topic, and it's really a part of that when Bush has to deal with real difficulties and crisis in the international scene, he's always paying...my impression is, a large portion of his attention to the domestic side and lacking in the truly international perspective.

**Zhang:** Because China has a traditional relationship with North Korea, so from the perspective of Chinese government, China is not happy with this terminology used by the U.S. of "axis of evil." Of course, China also maintains a low key on this issue. Personally, I think, if the U.S. intention is to use this terminology to put pressure on North Korea, to deprive North Korea of its bargaining power in the negotiations, for example, the sales of weapons, the U.S. should evaluate the result of utilizing this terminology and to see the reactions from the island countries. If it proves not a successful policy, it should change. Maybe the first step is to deal on a different frequency of the utilizing of this terminology, as President Bush did in his Korean visit.

**Questioner:** I am from the Embassy of Japan. I have a question to Mr. Shin and Mr. Mann regarding the current and future policy of the administration regarding North Korea. According to Mr. Mann, the "axis of evil" statement was designed to put North Korea to the negotiation table. But it seems to me quite contradictory or perfunctory that the Bush administration invites North Korea to the negotiation table whereas it made a provoking statement as "axis of evil." So what would be the next step, either for the Bush administration or North Korea to take to proceed in making some arrangement? In other words, who is in the driver's seat?

### **U.S. Wants to Negotiate with North Korea in the Future**

**Mann:** Please, don't misunderstand what I

said. What I was trying to say was that this may be viewed as creating a context for some future negotiations. I don't think the intention is to negotiate now, or you have the offer that the United States is willing to talk to the North Koreans, but it's done in a way so that I don't think the North Koreans are going to accept anytime soon.

What I meant to suggest is that I would not rule out negotiations down the road, that it seems to me that they want to create a bargaining situation in which North Korea may realize, as time goes on, that its economy needs some kind of negotiation as much, or more than, than does the United States.

And in that context, I wouldn't assume, necessarily in their logic, that to say something provocative now gets in the way of negotiations. From their logic, it creates the context for the negotiations that they want. That's the best I can do with explaining their logic.

**Shin:** It is very difficult for all of us to predict North Korea's next stand. But it is very interesting to watch this time, after Mr. Bush's remarks, this time it's very interesting to watch North Korea's reaction. They reacted very harshly, criticizing Mr. Bush and the United States, but the intensity of their harshness became lower than we had expected. They put forward milder words and milder expressions.

We don't know why they reacted that way this time, but presumably they experienced a severe drought and the regime had let so many million people die without food, without drinking water, without food, medicine, and so many things that's necessary to survive. So they worked and experienced a severe poverty, the result of a very harsh fortune.

As Mr. Mann mentioned, they needed outside help. They felt that outside help and the cash dollar, especially dollar, they strongly want to have dollars and some kind of outside help,

subsidies. And they need electricity. The parties that can help are South Korea and the United States and Japan and China. They know that situation, that international situation very well, and they understand it very well, the power of the U.S. So, this time, it's very interesting to watch their milder reaction. So they want to talk, they want dialogue with anybody who can help them, it's the United States or it's South Korea, Japan, or any other countries or parties.

### **North Koreans Face Dilemma**

So that may be a good sign, but at the same time, we understand their sentiment. North Koreans are very self-conscious people, and they are people of pride. So the United States, Mr. Bush, repeatedly insulted their dear leader, their respected leader for many decades. So they cannot come to the table to have a dialogue with the United States, that's their dilemma they are now facing. So we don't know who will take the driving seat. But maybe, at this juncture, the U.S. is not their counterpart, maybe the probable counterpart may be South Koreans.

But the problem we are now having is that without U.S. help, U.S. consent, we cannot share a serious and sincere dialogue with North Korea, that's our dilemma we are now facing. So it is a very difficult situation to be solved right away, and we don't know. This is a very difficult mathematical problem, so we don't know. We need a genius who can solve this difficult mathematical problem. So maybe Bush is the first person who can solve this kind of difficult situation.

**Ikenberry:** We're coming to an end, but one more question here in the front row.

**Questioner:** I am from Vietnam. Prior to President Bush's trip to China, there are some predictions that one of the very important issues President Bush would raise to his Chinese counterparts, a kind of Chinese cooperation or understanding, if the U.S. were



to attack Iraq. And actually in the joint press conference in Beijing, when asked about how China would respond to the U.S. proposal for such kind of cooperation, President Jiang did not say anything. We all recall that.

So my question to Mr. Jim Mann and Mr. Zhang is that do you think China is willing to have some kind of offer in this area? And if there is, what offer China may have in cooperation with the U.S. in dealing with Iraq?

**Mann:** Well, I'm not sure. I can believe when vice president...let me start with the if, if this administration has decided or is thinking of military action against Iraq, and we don't know. I can believe that that would be a subject that Vice President Cheney may be raising on his trip to the Middle East. I don't see it as something that would be a major topic of discussion for Bush to have asked Jiang Zemin. I mean, in what way, he can't be expecting that China would help.

On the other hand, China is far enough away so that in direct and substantial ways, he wouldn't expect that it would oppose. I just don't think that this was a major subject of the discussions.

I believe that terrorism, in general, was a major subject of the discussions. And that Afghanistan and Pakistan probably were. But, personally, I'd be surprised if Iraq was a major subject of discussion or rather a request for help on Iraq was a major subject and discussion at the trip.

**Ikenberry:** Mr. Zhang?

**Zhang:** I agree with Jim. I don't think the possible military action against Iraq is a major topic between President Bush and President Jiang Zemin. And there is still no consensus between the U.S. and these alliance countries on this issue, so during his visit, I don't think it's a major topic.

**Mann:** The way I would phrase it is, they had enough to talk about as far as terrorism and enough to talk about with Afghanistan and just overall, and policy towards Pakistan and India...that would have been enough to take up quite a bit of the time, I think.

**Ikenberry:** On that note, I think we will draw to a close. I want to thank our panelists, and I would like to ask our audience to show their appreciation as well, as we thank you for coming as well. (End)

## About the Panelists

### Main Speakers

**Mr. Jim Mann** is a Senior Writer-in-Residence in the CSIS International Security Program. Before joining CSIS, he was a diplomatic correspondent and foreign affairs columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*. He was chief of the *Times* Beijing bureau from 1984 to 1987. Mr. Mann holds a B.A. from Harvard College and was a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of two books, *Beijing Jeep* (1989) and *About Face; A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon To Clinton* (1999). He continues to contribute to the *L.A. Times* and has also written for the *Atlantic Monthly*, the *New Republic* and the *Washington Post*.

**Mr. Miura Toshiaki** is a Washington Correspondent with the *Asahi Shimbun*. He has worked as a political correspondent, covering the Prime Minister's office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Agency, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Democratic Party of Japan. Mr. Miura received a B.A. in political science from Waseda University and an M.A. in public administration from the International Christian University, Tokyo. He co-authored the book *Fifty Years of the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (2001).

**Mr. Shin Kyoungmin** is a Correspondent with Munwha Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, D.C. He joined MBC-TV in 1980 as a reporter and covered various issues, including law, education, diplomacy, unification and North Korea. He also was an anchor on the morning and evening news. In 1999 Mr. Shin transferred to Washington D.C. as a correspondent. He has received a Washington congressional and journalism fellowship from the Asia Foundation and was a journalism fellow at Indiana University through the Samsung Journalism Foundation. Mr. Shin earned a B.A. in sociology from Seoul National University.

**Dr. Zhang Xiangchen** is a Visiting Scholar at the School for Advanced International Studies, the John Hopkins University. He was appointed Deputy Director General for WTO Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and Deputy Director General for the China WTO Notification and Enquiry Center before China officially joined the World Trade Organization. Dr. Zhang has a Ph.D. in international politics from Peking University, where he also holds the position of Secretary General for the Center on International Organizations. His publications include *Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization; the Political and Economic Dimensions* (2000).

### Moderator

**Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. He also was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).