

Goals and Tactics of European Allies: Tactics towards the Warsaw Summit

The case of Germany

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Introduction

This study seeks to grasp and qualify Germany's negotiation tactics in the course of the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and tries to establish how they were applied along the lines of German strategic objectives and national interest. For all NATO members, there were several issues to be discussed and agreed upon during the Warsaw Summit. However, presumably the two most prominent threats to the alliance were thought to be the so-called Islamic State and Russian foreign policy. The former had become a real problem not only in the Middle East and North Africa (Levant), but also in the northern hemisphere. Terrorist attacks linked to the Islamic State movement had started to spread all over Europe and across the Atlantic. Not only threats of a kinetic nature were the issue, but also the spread of ideology through virtual means and the media.

Through the 2014 annexation of Crimea, through acts of hybrid warfare including propaganda operations or 'little green men' in Ukraine, or through clandestine interference with US and other western elections on the one hand, but moreover also through seemingly opposing NATO policy towards Russia on the other, the atmosphere between East and West had already become a concern in the recent past; it became so difficult in fact, that some described it as the 'New Cold War'. What did that all mean for future NATO policy and its member states? And what did that mean for Germany in particular?

Section One of this paper establishes the German goals toward the Warsaw Summit in general. It looks at the domestic parliamentary debate around national objectives and the respective political positions toward it. At this stage, it was far from clear in the German parliament what goals would be brought forward during the summit. To this day, Germany's internal political landscape is shaped and influenced by her past, i.e. mostly World War Two. As a consequence, Germany today sees herself as a coalition partner in many regards, and also as a nation in pursuit of peaceful, diplomatic means wherever possible. However, despite ongoing disputes among German political parties, there seems to have been a shift in general attitude and policy toward the use of military means in foreign and security policy. This can already be detected on the national policy level.

Section Two analyzes to what degree Germany managed to influence the overall outcome of the Warsaw Summit, i.e. how much the Summit outcomes overlap with the original German objectives, which also includes the discussion around NATO's *Enhanced Forward Presence* in eastern Europe and the German contribution. That said, this paper very much refers to relevant geo-political settings as a pre-condition for member-states when considering their contributions, and explains how far Germany

is, for example, not in the position to directly oppose the Kremlin the way others can do or desire to do. The underlying question in this paper is how ‘success’ is defined and in fact measured in the NATO context from the national viewpoint.

Finally, Section Three will shed light on the methodology through which Germany pursued her goals during the Warsaw Summit. Here, not the ‘If’ is the element of the discussion, but the ‘How’. It will be established in how far there can ever be a ‘German Way’ of diplomacy, and moreover what may be necessary to make the German government opt for rare non-diplomatic means of foreign policy such as the deployment of troops or the establishment of NATO-specific cyber-security capabilities as a lead-nation.

Having analyzed and carved-out the above aspects, the paper will end with a conclusion that is seeking to provide an ultimate answer to the relevant underlying questions. It will also point out a possibility for Germany to act – or re-act – in the case of a possible but not very probable escalation of conflict with Russia. Ultimately, it will be established how Germany sees herself vis-à-vis others in the context of the theoretical framework of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ allies.

1. What Goal did Germany Have toward the Warsaw Summit?

Today, Germany sees herself as a very European nation in every sense of the word¹. That is, geographically as well as politically. In order to understand the German position within and around NATO, this underlying principle must be remembered at all times. One of the legacies of German history is the deep understanding for the need to work and exist in alliances; to have common goals and ideals; to fostering peace and economic prosperity. Just as any other nation, Germany has a strong, genuine national interest, which can be described as a somewhat timeless element in any governmental practice: safety and security for people and infrastructure, economic growth and prosperity². However, in the case of Germany, that interest is traditionally pursued in line with the wider perspective of continental Europe. The particular German policy during the Euro-Crisis as well as the on-going migrant-crisis are good examples of the fact that Germany sees herself as one of the major driving forces behind the European idea³.

It is interesting to see that, despite the above, there was much fundamental debate in the German Parliament around the general goals and the German contribution to NATO before the Warsaw Summit⁴.

¹ Financial Times, *Schultz puts Europe at the heart of German election campaign*, 25 June 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/c4635a3c-599f-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220> (accessed 11 November 2017).

² On the debate around ‘modern’ German national interest, see Leithner, Anika, *Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory and National Interest* (Michigan: First Forum Press 2009), pp. 5-9.

³ Financial Times, *Schultz puts Europe at the heart of German election campaign*, 25 June 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/c4635a3c-599f-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220> (accessed 11 November 2017); Abbott, Kenneth W., Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, No 1 (February 1998), pp. 3.32.

⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, *Merkel verteidigt stärkere Nato-Präsenz im Osten*, 7 Juli 2016,

There was considerable unity regarding the fact that Germany needed to be part of the coalition; however, the overall NATO goals set forth already in 2014 during the Wales Summit were highly disputed. Basically, the conservatives around Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed with the current NATO goals and policy anyway, while the left-wing of the German *Bundestag* argued that the current NATO policy of *Enhanced Forward Presence*⁵ in Eastern Europe was not in compliance with democratic values and objectives in the first place⁶. A number of asymmetric threats such as counter-terrorism as well as cyber-attacks, organized crime, migration and a number of conventional threats were discussed during that debate, but at the very heart of it was in fact Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its implications on the security of Europe as well as for the wider NATO strategy.

To be precise, the basic debate revolved around whether Germany should support NATO's general opposition toward Russia⁷. There was concern among the left-wing parties that the German government could find itself supporting an illegal and immoral NATO expansion to the east, something that, according to their interpretation, was not in compliance with the German Constitution and the German Criminal Code⁸. This, so the argument went, must not be forgotten when contemplating NATO's objectives. In fact, NATO would be the main aggressor in this scenario, not Russia.

The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, however, argued with the support of Merkel that NATO's core purpose was defense, not aggression, and that an expansion towards the East was not the point. NATO would see itself as a defense coalition, and Germany should show loyalty toward its partners. In her parliamentary speech, the Chancellor furthermore emphasized the importance for Germany to support NATO's *Readiness Action Plan* as well as its two general Strategic Directions East and South⁹. A strong source for solidarity with member states and potential members could be seen in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Chancellor went on, referring to Collective Self-Defense in the

<https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw27-de-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel/433580> (accessed 11 November 2017); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, *Merkel verteidigt Abschreckung gegen Russland*, 7 July 2016, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/vor-dem-warschauer-nato-gipfel-merkel-verteidigt-abschreckung-gegen-russland-14328560.html> (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁵ See NATO, SHAPE, *Boosting NATO's presence in east and southeast*, 11 August 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁶ See Deutscher Bundestag, *Kleine Anfrage NATO-Gipfel in Warschau am 8. Und 9. Juli 2016*, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/087/1808788.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁷ For a Russian Order of Battle assessment, see Defense Intelligence Agency, *Russian Military Power – Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 2017*, <http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁸ See Article 26 of the German Constitution; furthermore § 80 Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code).

⁹ See Deutscher Bundestag, *Merkel verteidigt stärkere Nato-Präsenz im Osten*, 7. Juli 2016, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw27-de-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel/433580> (accessed 11 November 2016).

manner of the United Nations Charter's Article 51¹⁰. The major step to be taken in Warsaw, Merkel made clear, was to move 'from reassurance to deterrence' with regard to Russia¹¹. However, she furthermore stressed, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty did not mean that there should not be any application of soft-power and diplomacy. The best forum for the latter would be the 2002 NATO-Russia Council, which would make an excellent platform for constructive diplomatic negotiations¹². It was disappointing, according to Merkel, however, that Russia was not willing to make use of this opportunity shortly before the Warsaw Summit. In any event, Germany should show high interest and initiative in pursuing diplomacy (including the further support of the Minsk-Agreement) and deterrence. In both regards, the Chancellor said, German visibility and credibility within NATO should be regarded as highly important¹³.

From the German viewpoint, NATO is one of the guarantors of peace in Europe. According to statements from the Conservatives in the *Bundestag*, the protection of democracy is one of, if not the most important drivers of common security policy. Russia had violated international law per se but also the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act¹⁴. However, the establishment and maintenance of peace in Europe would only work with Russian consent, not if Russia stood in opposition. This statement symbolizes the political will to embark on and follow the double-edged approach: pursuing one's objectives through diplomatic and military means at the same time.

Military deployments are traditionally a touchy subject in the German Parliament. In the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, Conservatives including Merkel pressed for Germany's pro-active engagement in the *Enhanced Forward Presence* and the promotion of the German contribution during the summit, in particular through the deployment and leadership of at least one battalion in Lithuania as well as

¹⁰ Article 51 UN-Charter defines self-defense as: '*Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*', see United Nations Codification Divisions Publication, Repertory of Practice of United Nations, <http://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml> (accessed 11 November 2017).

¹¹ See Deutscher Bundestag, *Merkel verteidigt stärkere Nato-Präsenz im Osten*, 7. Juli 2016, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw27-de-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel/433580> (accessed 11 November 2016).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ On considerations around the benefit of coalitions, see Abbott, Kenneth W., Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, No 1 (February 1998), pp. 3.32.

¹⁴ See NATO, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

through fostering and supporting strategic missile defense in Eastern Europe¹⁵. This initiative was heavily opposed by the left-wing and green party, who argued that the German government would go down the wrong route and show weakness vis-à-vis the dominant United States (i.e. they referred to Germany as the ‘weaker ally’).

This dissenting opinion was formalized by the green party (Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen) according to the regulations of the *Bundestag* in the form of a draft resolution dated July 5, 2016 and to be voted on by all parties¹⁶. The result would be a non-binding yet very strong recommendation to the government to change its current course. Such a resolution is one of the strongest political means of formal influence in the *Bundestag*. A thorough look at the particular document reveals the basic criticism in detail. There is a total of eight recommendations from the opposition to the German government:

1. Initiate a return to the practice of the 2002 NATO-Russia Council.
2. Advocate a halt of the strategic missile defense program in eastern Europe.
3. Pay due regard to interests of east European NATO members through enhanced air-policing in the Baltic.
4. Reject a continuous stationing of NATO troops in East-European states.
5. Reject NATO-deployment in Aegean and promote civil rescue attempts to tackle the migrant crisis.
6. Promote a halt to arms-trade with conflict parties such as Saudi Arabia or Ukraine.
7. Make clear that Georgia, Ukraine and Moldavia should not become member states in the near future; reject the demand to spend 2% GDP on defense but invest more in development, which also includes the above states.
8. Oppose the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Germany and support the OSCE arms control initiative¹⁷.

The resolution did not manage to get the majority. It was therefore rejected and annulled. This meant that the German government could go ahead with the goals for the Warsaw Summit set forth by

¹⁵ See Deutscher Bundestag, *Merkel verteidigt stärkere Nato-Präsenz im Osten*, 7. Juli 2016, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw27-de-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel/433580> (accessed 11 November 2016); see also Reuters, 31 January 2017, *Germany sends tanks to Lithuania for NATO mission*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-germany/germany-sends-tanks-to-lithuania-for-nato-mission-idUSKBN15F1IH> (accessed 11 November 2017); on Ballistic Missile Defense in Eastern Europe, see Karako, Thomas, *Looking East: European Air and Missile Defence after Warsaw – Toward an Integrated Air and Missile Defense for Europe*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 July 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/looking-east-european-air-and-missile-defense-after-warsaw> (accessed 11 November 2017).

¹⁶ Deutscher Bundestag, *Kleine Anfrage NATO-Gipfel in Warschau am 8. Und 9. Juli 2016*, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/087/1808788.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2017), see in particular pp. 2, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Chancellor Angela Merkel¹⁸. After all, these were in summary:

1. Show clear solidarity with the NATO Alliance on all accounts.
2. Support NATO Strategic Direction East and South, in particular troop stationing in the Baltic States and Poland according to the Enhanced Forward Presence concept.
3. Pursue the 2% GDP objective on the national level.
4. Promote diplomatic solutions parallel to the above.
5. The German government was prepared to carry these goals to Warsaw.

2. To What Degree did Germany Succeed to Reflect Their Request on the Decision?

(1) The Outcome of the 2016 Summit

NATO itself is the best source for documents on the summit¹⁹. A thorough analysis of these documents reveals that the basic and most important one for the purpose of this paper is the *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*. This is a joint statement issued by the Heads of State in the aftermath of the summit on July 9, 2016²⁰. It summarizes all agreements and statements, and sets forth the implementation of current goals. In doing so, it refers to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept as the basic guidance and strategic directive in the early twenty-first century²¹.

With a length of 139 paragraphs, the *Warsaw Summit Communiqué* is an impressive summary of the ultimate joint decisions taken as a result of the consultations. It is noteworthy that much of it is on Russia and refers to the latter's actions in 2014, but it also refers to other threats such as cyber, the so-called Islamic State and the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean. In particular, it builds on and makes reference to the *Readiness Action Plan* – where the German initiative played a crucial role - set forth as a result of the 2014 summit in Wales²².

The *Readiness Action Plan* 'ensures the Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges from the east and the south. (...) It is the most significant reinforcement of NATO's

¹⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, *Merkel verteidigt stärkere Nato-Präsenz im Osten*, 7 Juli 2016, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw27-de-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel/433580> (accessed 11 November 2017); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, *Merkel verteidigt Abschreckung gegen Russland*, 7 July 2016, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/vordem-warschauer-nato-gipfel-merkel-verteidigt-abschreckung-gegen-russland-14328560.html> (accessed 11 November 2017).

¹⁹ See NATO, *Warsaw NATO Summit 2016: Key Documents*, <https://nato.usmission.gov/key-documents-nato-summit-2016> (accessed 11 November 2017).

²⁰ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 22 August 2017).

²¹ See NATO, *Strategic Concept*, 19 November 2010, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_82705.htm (accessed 11 November 2017); NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

²² NATO, *Readiness Action Plan*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm (accessed 23 August 2017).

collective defense since the end of the Cold War²³. Its main purpose is to strengthen the defense of NATO's most vulnerable members on the so-called eastern flank. This will be done through two basic forms of measures, *Assurance Measures* as well as *Adaptation Measures*. The former is addressing all operational domains, i.e. sea, air, land and cyber. It involves maritime and air policing in the Baltic region, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as NATO ground troops in eastern Europe for training and exercises. It explicitly states that these measures are in direct response to Russian aggression and the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula²⁴. The *Adaption Measures*, on the other hand, involve long-term changes to NATO's command and organizational structure, and are meant as an institutional response to current threats. There are four basic elements, *Enhanced Response Force*; *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force*; *Force Integration Units*; as well as *High Readiness Multinational Headquarters*²⁵. They need not be explained in detail at this stage; it is important to realize in this context however, that, compared to the *Adaption Measures*, the purpose of the *Assurance Measures* is to be an explicit tool (i.e. maneuvers, exercises and the general temporary deployment of troops) to assure eastern member states of the NATO presence in the region, as well as to deter any Russian attempt of aggression.

During the ground-breaking 2014 summit in Wales, Germany explicitly offered to act as (rotating) lead nation of the *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force*²⁶. In 2015 defense ministers agreed to have the *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force* operational by the 2016 summit. The German initiative to act as lead nation was re-emphasized in Warsaw, while the implementation of the *Readiness Action Plan* was multilaterally agreed. Together with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Poland, Germany started actively promoting this initiative. What followed were several exercises and decisions further fostering the overall objective, for example the exercise *Noble Jump*²⁷ on June 9, 2015, or the defense ministers' decision to speed up and improve decision-making processes, which also included the strengthening of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)²⁸.

The *Warsaw Summit Communiqué* furthermore makes clear that everything agreed during the summit is not in contradiction with the 1997 *NATO-Russia Founding Act*. This agreement between NATO and the Russian Federation states that Russia, from a NATO perspective, is not seen as an enemy, and that NATO has no intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of its new members in the

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ For a summary on the Wales Summit, see NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

²⁷ For further information on 'Noble Jump', see NATO Joint Force Command Naples, *Noble Jump 17*, <https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/exercises/noble-jump> (accessed 11 November 2017).

²⁸ Ibid.

East. Both parties also commit to upholding and maintaining diplomatic negotiations first and foremost²⁹.

Furthermore, the *Warsaw Summit Communiqué* states unmistakably that the greatest responsibility of all is to protect and defend its territory and populations against any attack. This includes nuclear as well as conventional, i.e. non-nuclear deterrence and defense, which also refers to cyber-security³⁰. This is a somewhat timeless statement since it refers to NATO's core purpose, however, current considerations and initiatives are based on the 2010 Lisbon Summit agreement on NATO Ballistic Missile Defense, in accordance with related US initiatives³¹. According to NATO doctrine, this complements the NATO nuclear deterrent.

A remarkable step decided upon in Warsaw was closer cooperation with the European Union on all levels. Such had existed before but in 2016 it was stressed for the first time that NATO welcomes all European Union defense and security initiatives as such, emphasizing the fact that a strong European Union will be beneficial for NATO³².

Although not analyzed here in its entirety for reasons of capacity, in summary it can be stated that the outcome of the 2016 summit is quite remarkable; it namely represents the implementation and pursuit of some very straightforward strategies and measures, marking a shift in NATO policy, by making clear that there is open opposition to the Kremlin's policies and actions. Together with the 2014 summit in Wales, this means that NATO is reacting – and adjusting – to its strategic environment. From the viewpoint of institutional culture and adaptability, apart from the desired political effect, this is most important and in fact vital for NATO to survive.

(2) German Politico-Strategic Directive and Objectives: The German White Paper

Issued by the German Government in 2016, the White Paper represents the highest political and strategic guidance on the national level and sets forth the German security policy framework³³. It is noteworthy

²⁹ See NATO, *NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

³⁰ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*.

³¹ See NATO, *Lisbon Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 November 2010*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

³² In this context, see Abbott, Kenneth W., Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, No 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32.

³³ The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 20 June 2016, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/start/grundlagen/weissbuch!/ut/p/z1/hY9BD4IwDIV_Ddd1gSjoDQ-ihhATVgAXM7QOzNzInGD89c54MtHYU_v69eUVGJTAFO9bwW2rFZdurth4P4vSTepPfH-znFEaJ5kfhOEiSLYUdID8Q5hb0x8VU8hRQeU8wt8el8iBAZMCKge77sx7fiedNlaiJfzwSgtVw9VR4lof4rewAiakrt9vxKoOlG4AkNGnIzTm6s7a5Tj3p0GAYitBYSyRE9-u2i0VcL5QcI3WUeZdmof6RYPAFWFIL0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00

in this context, that, compared to other nations such as the United States, Germany does not use the term ‘grand strategy’ when dealing with or promoting the overall direction³⁴. Yet, as one can learn from the scholarly study of strategy as a subject, it is less about theory but much about doing, which very much reflects the German perspective, following the tradition of great strategists such as Clausewitz or von Moltke.

The German White Paper consists of two main parts. One is dedicated to German security policy, and the other is dealing with present and future doctrine of the German Armed Forces *Bundeswehr*. Looking at the three different levels, political, strategic and tactical, it is the political level that matters most at this stage. In order to analyze later on how Germany is negotiating and pursuing her goals, it is important to understand Germany’s self-perception, i.e. look at how Germany sees herself politically and assesses her role in the strategic environment.

According to the White Paper, the key elements of German security policy are:

- Germany’s role in the world and approach to security;
- Germany’s values and security interests.

From an internal viewpoint, Germany’s role in the world is directly linked to her past. This is reflected in the German Constitution as well as in everyday political practice. The German national interest comprises of economic growth, prosperity and security. To avoid the excesses of the past, current German policy adheres to a coalition approach as much as possible³⁵. In that sense, Germany sees herself very much at the heart of Europe, with which political and strategic interests naturally overlap. When it comes to German defense and security, which are also aligned with European Union initiatives, it is important to remember that the German rearmament in the 1950s took place parallel to being integrated into NATO and agreeing to its strategy and goals. This is a very important element in today’s German mind-set, namely that the *Bundeswehr* as it exists today has from its very first day been working towards NATO policy and objectives.

Furthermore, both aspects, Germany’s past and NATO’s goals, are traditionally linked to the United States. In the German understanding, much gratitude must still go to the United States for the political and economic support after the Second World War. The United States are therefore mentioned in the White Paper as ‘the great ally’³⁶.

[AGN2377H3GU5](#) (accessed 11 November 2017).

³⁴ A very useful introduction to Grand Strategy can be found in Murray, Williamson, Thoughts on Grand Strategy, in Murray, Williamson / Hart Simmer, Richard / Lacey, James, ed., *The Shaping of Grand Strategy – Policy, Diplomacy, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), pp. 1-33.

³⁵ Abbott, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations.

³⁶ The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 20 June 2016,

http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/start/grundlagen/weissbuch!/ut/p/z1/hY9BD4IwDIV_Ddd1gSjoDQ-

According to the White Paper, Germany's values and security interests refer to the German Constitution first of all, but also very explicitly to international law and human rights³⁷. Security interests lie in the protection of citizens and territorial integrity; in the maintenance of an international rules-based order and world trade; in the promotion of responsible handling of limited resources; in European integration, as well as in consolidating the transatlantic leadership. It is also emphasized that Germany values the reliability of her partners, and states that Germany cannot achieve her goals without being part of a coalition, however, at the same time 'the ability to respond in an international – and particularly European and transatlantic context is based on a clear national position³⁸.'

(3) Germany's Role in the North Atlantic Alliance

Building on the above, the White Paper then dedicates its own section to the relationship between Germany and NATO, and Germany's role in the North Atlantic Alliance in particular. Points of reference for the German relationship with NATO are the basic elements of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

By incorporating these elements into the White Paper, including the actual wording, i.e. projecting them to the national level, the German government demonstrates its intent to align itself with three fundamental courses of action: collective self-defense, international crisis management, and cooperative security.

(4) Collective Self-Defense

Germany refers its own defense policy and strategic directive to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and of the Article 51 UN Charter. It is important to note for the assessment of the German position that the White Paper makes very clear the reciprocal effect of this agreement. Firstly, it is stated that Germany can rely on her allies, and specifically on the United States, in case it is facing an armed attack. Secondly, and this is the remarkable detail, her allies can rely on Germany in the same case, regardless where the

[ihhATVGAXM7QOzNzInGD89c54MtHYU_v69eUVGJTAFO9bwW2rFZdurth4P4vSTepPff-znFEaJ5kfhOEiSLYUdID8Q5hb0x8VU8hRQeU8wt8eI8iBAZMCKge77sx7fiedNlaiJfzwSgtVw9VR4lof4rewAiakrt9vxKoOlGHM4AkNGnIzTm6s7a5Tj3p0GAYitBYSyRE9-u2i0VcL5QcI3WUeZdmof6RYPAFWFIL0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3GU5](http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/start/grundlagen/weissbuch!/ut/p/z1/hY9BD4IwDIV_Ddd1gSjoDQ-ihhATVGAXM7QOzNzInGD89c54MtHYU_v69eUVGJTAFO9bwW2rFZdurth4P4vSTepPff-znFEaJ5kfhOEiSLYUdID8Q5hb0x8VU8hRQeU8wt8eI8iBAZMCKge77sx7fiedNlaiJfzwSgtVw9VR4lof4rewAiakrt9vxKoOlGHM4AkNGnIzTm6s7a5Tj3p0GAYitBYSyRE9-u2i0VcL5QcI3WUeZdmof6RYPAFWFIL0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3GU5) (accessed 11 November 2017).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ See The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 20 June 2016, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/start/grundlagen/weissbuch!/ut/p/z1/hY9BD4IwDIV_Ddd1gSjoDQ-ihhATVGAXM7QOzNzInGD89c54MtHYU_v69eUVGJTAFO9bwW2rFZdurth4P4vSTepPff-znFEaJ5kfhOEiSLYUdID8Q5hb0x8VU8hRQeU8wt8eI8iBAZMCKge77sx7fiedNlaiJfzwSgtVw9VR4lof4rewAiakrt9vxKoOlGHM4AkNGnIzTm6s7a5Tj3p0GAYitBYSyRE9-u2i0VcL5QcI3WUeZdmof6RYPAFWFIL0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3GU5 (accessed 11 November 2017).

attack has its origin and against who it is directed. For the first time in history, the German wording sounds almost like a guarantee – pointing out the above, namely that origin and direction of the attack only play a secondary role³⁹. Taking into account the German past, this almost ‘blind’ guarantee is a novel in German defense policy.

(5) International Crisis Management

The prevention and management of crises has seemingly moved into the focus of the so-called international community⁴⁰. To a large extent, prevention means capacity building in critical regions and countries, and Germany sees herself as one of the providers of that. Stabilizing operations such as in Afghanistan or in the Balkans show the alliance’s long-term investment efforts already, however, it is one of the main political and operational priorities to engage with friendly local entities on the ground in order to enable a long-lasting stabilization process from within. It is in this context that the White Paper mentions Germany’s enhanced role. This role is related to the *Defence Capacity Building Initiative*, a German initiative that found its way into the NATO strategy.

Based on the German *Ertüchtigungsinitiative*, which basically means ‘training initiative’ this concept aims to train and equip local and regional stakeholders in order to enable them to increasingly take over responsibility for security on the ground. At the heart of this initiative lies the export of security along the lines of the basic notion of national and regional security.

(6) Cooperative Security

Immediately related to the above and also related to what has been said about the German self-perception in general, the German White Paper furthermore stresses Germany’s engagement in the notion of cooperative security. According to this concept, permanent regional security for NATO-members can only be achieved by cooperation and collation with others. According to the German understanding in particular, this partnership approach should apply to both existing and potential members of NATO. Relating to the ‘Partnership for Peace’ concept, this idea very much involves former Warsaw Pact members. Most remarkably, according to the White Paper, this also includes the Russian Federation itself. It is mentioned that Germany was a driving force in the creation of the 1997 *NATO-Russia*

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

*Founding Act*⁴¹ as well as in the establishment of the 2002 *NATO-Russia Council*⁴². Based on the principle of cooperation, Germany will hold on to the objectives set forth in both founding documents. In reference to this, the White Paper is very much aware that Russia's doctrine declares NATO as an enemy. It is therefore necessary to opt for a three-fold approach: credible deterrence, defense and diplomatic means. Another important outcome of the cooperation principle is the mutual support towards arms control and counter-proliferation.

(7) Strengthening NATO's European Pillar

According to the White Paper, the responsibility of European states within NATO is increasing. As one of the drivers of Europe and the European Union, not least because of her geostrategic positioning, it is stated that Germany should play a primary role as intermediary. This, so the White Paper states, also goes along with the internally agreed target of a national defense spending of 2% GDP and creates a clear responsibility for all members. In order to help coordinate which nation is willing and able to contribute what, Germany has designed the so-called *Framework Nations Concept*. The intention of this concept introduced to NATO in 2013 is to create an internal mechanism for European states to cooperate with NATO more effectively by the creation and development of multinational units. The desired benefit is that member states can plug their capabilities into NATO entities according to the overall objective and agreed national contributions. This is naturally relative to the respective capabilities. The *Framework Nations Concept* encompasses all aspects of military operations, from logistical support to medical supply to war-fighting capability. In particular, it has the following mid- to long-term objectives:

- More efficient force structures,
- Stable cooperation between the Allies,
- Appropriate multinational capability development⁴³.

⁴¹ See NATO, *NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 24 August 2017); The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 20 June 2016, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/start/grundlagen/weissbuch!/ut/p/z1/hY9BD4IwDIV_Ddd1gSjoDQ-ihhATVGAXM7QOzNzInGD89c54MtHYU_v69eUVGJTAFO9bwW2rFZdurth4P4vSTepPfH-znFEaJ5kfhOEiSLYUdID8Q5hb0x8VU8hRQeU8wt8eI8iBAZMCKge77sx7fiedNlaiJfzwSgtVw9VR4lof4rewAiaKrt9vxKoOIgHM4AkNGnIzTm6s7a5Tj3p0GAYitBYSyRE9-u2i0VcL5QcI3WUeZdmof6RYPAFWFIL0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3GU5 (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁴² For further information see NATO, *The NATO-Russia Council*, 16 June 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50091.htm (accessed 11 November 2017).

⁴³ The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 20 June 2016.

The White Paper stresses that by applying this concept it will serve all stakeholders, which, from the German point of view, is ideal.

(8) Germany and Enhanced Forward Presence

Before the above is compared to NATO's objectives in order to measure German success or failure to achieve her goals during the Warsaw Summit, the second, more operational approach of the German White Paper toward defense and security will be explained. This matters because it immediately relates to the German national contribution to NATO's *Enhanced Forward Presence* as a tactical outcome of the political decision-making process.

The second part of the White Paper is dedicated to Germany's armed forces, the *Bundeswehr*. It looks at the constitutional situation, at strategic directive and doctrine. It is important to emphasize that the paper specifically stresses the present and future strategic direction of the *Bundeswehr*, a considerable part of which is dedicated to multinationalism, coalition policy and joint operations. At the core of German defense planning lies the capability to operate as an integrated nation, which requires technical knowledge and adaptability. But how can this be achieved? For the *Bundeswehr* this means two things: first, basic capabilities and doctrine have to be established and maintained on the national level in order to defend Germany as a nation, her citizens and interests; second, the *Bundeswehr* as a system (general equipment, technology, human resources, planning) has to be able to plan and work in a coalition and literally be plugged in to other nation's armies, or, alternatively, receive other nations' contributions. This concept is at the heart of today's and tomorrow's German defense planning and armament. Ideally, an army should be equipped and prepared for any operation possible, which means it should have all-round capabilities available at all times. In reality, however, the ideal situation is being hampered by budgetary constraints. This, as will be seen, is an issue for Germany as for any other member nation.

Together with the genuine task of defending Germany in the realm of homeland security, reference is made to remaining pro-actively committed to the objectives laid down in the NATO Strategic Concept. It is noteworthy that the German White Paper specifically mentions hybrid warfare as a threat to the coalition in this context, and makes clear that Germany will seek to counter this threat by national contributions to NATO and EU. As an overall approach, the White Paper makes clear that today's *Bundeswehr* is subject to two main parameters, multinationalism and integration⁴⁴.

In particular, Germany seeks to:

- 'work towards shifting the focus in NATO more towards the relationship between expenditure and performance in the areas of personnel, equipment and capability development;

⁴⁴ Ibid, 6.1., p. 96.

- continue to make substantial contributions to strengthening NATO in the field of deterrence and collective defense. This includes assuming responsibility on a rotational basis as the lead nation for mobile and rapidly deployable forces (for example within the context of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force), commitment as part of reassurance measures as well as enhanced forward presence, the German contribution to NATO missile defense, nuclear sharing, and sustainable contributions in accordance with NATO planning goals. Of equal importance, we will maintain the flexibility of national forces in order to provide the capabilities needed to perform crisis management tasks;
- promote in NATO a dual approach to Russia consisting of credible deterrence and defense capability as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue and attempts at cooperative security;
- increase European capability development and the interlinking of European armed forces by means of the Framework Nations Concept in order to strengthen NATO's European pillar. In this context, Germany is prepared to pave the way and assume a wide range of responsibilities as the framework nation. At the same time, Germany will provide its partners with key capabilities in a sustainable manner;
- develop proposals to support our Eastern partners in building capabilities and increasing interoperability by refining the originally German-American Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET);
- generate synergies with NATO through the harmonization of force planning processes and intensified joint exercise activities, and intensify cooperation particularly in countering cyber and hybrid threats and in the area of strategic communication and support NATO's partnership initiatives and instruments, including in its southern neighborhood, in particular in order to strengthen interoperability and to use NATO's expertise in establishing security structures⁴⁵.

With that, Germany and the *Bundeswehr* show remarkable commitment to NATO's strategic objectives. However, it remains to be seen what consequence this has operationally, and to what extent Germany ultimately succeeded in negotiating her goals in Warsaw between July 8-9 2016.

(9) German Success in Warsaw 2016?

In a press-statement of July 8, 2016 during the summit, Chancellor Merkel stated that everything so far had gone in accordance with German interests. Specifically, the NATO members had agreed on further implementation of the *Enhanced Forward Presence*, and in this case Germany's role as a *Framework Nation* in Lithuania, along with the Benelux states, France and Norway. This was in line with the

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 69-70.

German policy and strategy, represented through the White Paper and through parliamentary debate. Analysis shows that all objectives set forth in both NATO summits, Wales and most of all Warsaw, were met by German interests. Yet, the outcome has to be looked at critically.

As established above, the German approach is based on two major pillars, national security and coalition operations. It should be noted in this context that the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept had already been incorporated in the drafting process of the 2016 German White Paper. Hence, uni- and multinational perspectives and objectives naturally overlap. This holds particularly true for the *Readiness Action Plan* (i.e. *Assurance* and *Adoption Measures*), as well as steps and measures regarding cyber security. It is highly important from the German point of view to keep close ties with the EU, which has also been reflected in the Warsaw Summit.

On July 9, 2016, one day after Chancellor Merkel's remark, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated on behalf of the German government, that, in summary, the 2016 summit had been a success for Germany⁴⁶. He specifically made clear the following in line with the German objectives:

- it had been communicated well to the eastern members and friends of NATO that the coalition greatly cares about them;
- defense capabilities and initiatives (i.e. policy) had been strengthened but there was no desire for another Cold War;
- mutual understanding and fostering of a proactive dialogue with Russia, and its implementation during the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels on 13th July 2016.

Steinmeier specifically pointed out three major German successes in Warsaw:

- Germany had achieved that the coalition would dedicate itself to the effective and therefore successful use of the NATO-Russia Council;
- Germany had furthermore managed to achieve the official statement that the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence initiative was not meant against Russia⁴⁷;
- that Germany played an important role in the negotiations between the EU and NATO.

Germany had officially succeeded in Warsaw. This positive summary was also reflected by other politicians and the media. It can be established at this point that the 2016 summit turned out to be a success for the German government, and that the national goals had been achieved.

However, a very important caveat in this context must not be overlooked, and it will also play a

⁴⁶ German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, statement of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 9th July 2016, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2016/160709_BM_NATO_Gipfel_Warschau.html (accessed 03 November 2017).

⁴⁷ See NATO, *NATO Ballistic Missile Defence*, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-bmd-en.pdf (accessed 03 November 2017).

major role in the next chapter when German negotiation methods are being analyzed: Germany is not entirely free in its choice of policy and strategy when it comes to the implementation of NATO goals towards Russia. One may think that this goes back to the German Constitution as described above, but there is another, non-legal and in some respects much more powerful reason: the German economy heavily relies on Russian gas supplies. According to statistics published by The Economist in June 2017, 34% of the European gas supplies come from Russia⁴⁸. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, the German gas demand in 2016 was ninety-five billion cubic metres, only 6% of which are supplied by the German national energy industry⁴⁹. Based on bilateral agreements, Russia frequently supplies about 40% of the overall German demand. This fact has serious implications on the overall German political stance toward Russia. It also heavily affects the German stance toward Ukraine, because currently (i.e. in the year 2017) the main supply pipeline runs through Ukraine and Poland. Hence, the German government cannot afford to take an unmistakably hard stance on the ‘eastern flank’ such as other nations, say the United States or the United Kingdom. Instead, the German government finds itself in the dilemma of having to support NATO objectives on the one hand, and ensuring the continuous flow of gas supplies for its population on the other.

Looking at this condition through the lens of defense and security, it can be seen as the explanation for the fact that Germany, different to other nations, has a very particular interest in fostering diplomatic efforts as happened during the Warsaw Summit in 2016. An interest that goes beyond promoting peace exclusively. In fact, this interest is the explanation for a certain reluctance in criticizing Russian foreign policy too harshly even though lately the German government has been seeking to support the NATO strategy more pro-actively. On top of this comes the fact that Germany and Russia are planning a direct gas pipeline called ‘North Stream 2’ between the two countries across the Baltic seabed, avoiding Ukraine and Poland⁵⁰. Despite the political turmoil around the annexation of Crimea, both governments show great interest in pursuing this project, which is meant to finish in 2019.

3. What Kind of Negotiation Tactics did Berlin Adopt and Which Ones Were Successful?

After having established that, overall, the 2016 summit can be described as a success for Germany and that the national goals could be achieved and are reflected by the overall outcome, this chapter now looks at the ‘How’⁵¹. In doing so it seeks to establish ‘the German way’ in negotiating the above-

⁴⁸ The Economist, *Germany’s Russian gas pipeline smells funny to America*, , 22nd of June 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21723822-angela-merkel-says-nord-stream-2-no-ones-business-germanys-germanys-russian-gas-pipeline> (accessed 03 November 2017).

⁴⁹ *Natural Gas Supply in Germany*, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Energy/gas-erdgasversorgung-in-deutschland.html> (accessed 03 November 2017).

⁵⁰ See company website, <https://www.nord-stream2.com> (accessed 16 November 2017).

⁵¹ Very useful elaborations on negotiating with ‘weaker’ allies can be found in Maria Nilaus Tarp / Jens Ole Bach Hansen, *Size and Influence – How small states influence policy making in multilateral*

mentioned national objectives with the other NATO partners. As with all other member states, Germany has an official national representative to NATO, behind whom stands a whole staff of military and civilian personnel. This entity enjoys full diplomatic status just like an embassy and consists of eight branches or sections: Political Affairs; Defense Policy and Planning; Materiel, Information Technology and Equipment; Defence Budget and Security Investment; Press and Public Affairs; Language Services; Administration⁵².

It is important to realize how the different offices or sections work together, as well as how the German national interest is ultimately brought to the table, and how it is being pursued and orchestrated in the international arena. In this regard, the Political Affairs Branch plays the most prominent role: ‘The Political Affairs Branch advises the Permanent Representative on matters of foreign and security policy and represents the German Government on policy committees which prepare the decisions to be made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The main topics are NATO operations, partnerships with non-NATO countries and responses to the new security challenges⁵³.’

This means that, in close co-operation with the other sections, the Political Affairs Branch is the direct link to the NAC; it is the direct channel from the German government to the alliance⁵⁴. However, the Defense Policy and Planning Branch can be seen as equally important: ‘it helps draw up politico-military advice and recommendations for the North Atlantic Council to decide on. The subject matter here includes the future alignment of the Alliance’s defence posture, the military capabilities required for the core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, as well as associated specialist topics like air defence, missile defence and nuclear policy. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) is particularly significant. In that forum, military advice from the NATO Military Committee and the two Strategic Commanders – the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) – is assessed for the North Atlantic Council from a politico-military perspective⁵⁵.’

Although every section of the German office has its purpose, it can be said that the above two make ‘the muscle and the brain’.

However, the ‘muscle’ and the ‘brain’ need an effective toolbox to achieve their objectives, which refers to classic diplomatic skills and the art of getting one’s way. Looking at how Germany has achieved her objectives in 2016, it can be filtered out that there were three underlying steps:

arenas, DIIS Working Paper 2013: 11, pp.9-22.

⁵² NATO, *Permanent Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*,

http://www.nato.diplo.de/Vertretung/nato/en/01/011_20Branches_20and_20section/_01_20Branches_20and_20Sections.html (accessed 03 November 2017).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

- Introduce an initiative (i.e. objective);
- Evaluate and review the process;
- Respond to the overall outcome in pursuit of the objective.

It can be said that the ‘German way’ in this regard means the application of diplomatic skills and soft power in all three stages of the above-mentioned process. When an initiative is being introduced to the allies, this is usually done through round-tables, draft papers, workshops or lobbying. It is noteworthy that particularly the latter mostly takes place outside the official NATO arena. Off-the-record negotiations are a classic tactic in diplomacy⁵⁶. The key intention is to get another nation on board, to convince them of the benefit of an idea. Comparing herself to other states through political self-perception, Germany is not the strongest nation, but not the weakest either. Keeping in mind what has been established before, namely that out of her history, the German understanding of successful policy is immediately related to coalition thinking, the 2016 approach when introducing policy initiatives was to make clear (and to use as strong argument) that there would be benefit for the alliance too. That is, not only for NATO itself but most of all for its member states individually. The accurate and appropriate negotiation tactic here as in many such cases is to make clear and communicate that the German initiative will be mutually beneficial⁵⁷.

Once an initiative has been introduced to the other allies through the range of means available and is being considered in close consultation with the respective governments, the second stage is entered, which is the evaluation and review process. In this phase, it will be observed by the German delegation how the process is working and whether there is any progress. This is simply measured through the different kinds of feedback and official or less official replies to the German representative and his staff. This phase should not be seen as static or passive, but it means that the project is in flux. As soon as the feedback does not go as planned, another move can be made to promote the original initiative. However, what comes first is the consideration whether a change of tactics would be appropriate; whether anything can be improved and adjusted compared to before. This stage very much refers to an internal review on what steps to take next in order to steer the respective member state into the right direction and get them to agree.

Once this has been decided, the third stage is entered, which involves responses to the previous feedback. This stage is linked to specific negotiation tactics and a thorough review on which of them will be the appropriate to maintain. It can be said that besides ‘traditional’ negotiations, this stage also involves intense lobbying in- and outside the NATO arena. In most cases, this will be an exclusively bilateral approach. The seven known tactics when dealing with an ally are:

- be a loyal ally;

⁵⁶ See for example Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York/London/Toronto/Sydney: Simon Schuster 1995).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

- affirming their request legitimate;
- threat to withhold support;
- blackmail of the weak (or threat to collapse, or threat to defect);
- warning to decrease the credibility as an alliance leader (i.e. discredit);
- insisting in consultations;
- forming a ‘coalition of the weak’ as opposition⁵⁸.

These tactics imply a deliberate choice of strategic direction, i.e. are a pointer towards the respective national perspective.

What makes a tactic appropriate – and effective – depends on the relationship and dynamics of power vis-à-vis the other party⁵⁹. From an academic perspective, this should be put in relation to the teachings of strategy: it will be a process of inter-dependent decision-making, because every action will cause a re-action on the other side and will influence the other side’s thinking. Since NATO should be looked at as a living object⁶⁰ with all its dynamics and nuances, it cannot be presumed that one and the same tactic will work for all NATO members if Germany wants to achieve her objectives on a broad scale and seek to ensure that things are going according to her will. This means that the German delegation must be two things most of all, consistent in the pursuit of their goals, and flexible in their response to a single member nation. Negotiating with the collective member states in a big forum, however, will only make a relatively small portion on the way to success.

In the run-up of and during the 2016 summit, Germany applied different tactics to different member states. She did not apply one and the same tactic to all. This can be seen through analysis of the political statements during the summit and the overall way how the objectives were addressed vis-à-vis different members. Germany also had an official position in the overall forum, however, when it came to pursuing the respective goals, the German delegation had to make plenty of use of the above repertoire. It is interesting to observe that when it came to the United States, Germany treated them as a strong, important ally. As mentioned above, here again German history plays a role. In this regard, Germany can be described as either a loyal ally or at least affirming the United States’ policy as legitimate. In case of disagreement, Germany has never been in the position to threaten the United States with the withdrawal of support for several reasons⁶¹. Two of them are the above-mentioned dependency on

⁵⁸ A very useful analysis of the relationship and dynamics between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states in international diplomacy can be found in Handel, Michael I., *Weak States in the International System* (Routledge: New York 1990).

⁵⁹ See also in this context Pressman, Jeremy, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (London: Cornell University Press 2012).

⁶⁰ See in this context Duffield, John, What are international institutions? *International Studies Review* 9, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 1-22.

⁶¹ An example for the withdrawal of German support of an American-led campaign is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Germany found the cause illegitimate and then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder publicly announced that Germany will not take part. However, the major difference being that this was not a

Russian resources, and the fact that the German military heavily relies on United States' capabilities such as air-lifting assets, sea-going platforms in some cases, but also intelligence and logistics. There is almost no German military operation without the United States' support of some sort. For Germany, the United States are an indispensable strategic partner despite occasional political differences.

Dealing with France, for example Germany saw herself in a different position. As part of the 'southern flank', France was in the opinion that too much emphasis was given to Russia and the east, whereas the migration issue in the Mediterranean should play a bigger role⁶². Playing a significant part in the migrant crisis but also wanting to pursue her policy towards Russia, and having to ensure that there was enough room for diplomatic means to deal with Vladimir Putin, Germany needed to respect the French view but also make clear that the migrants as well as terrorism from the Middle East and North Africa were not the only problem. This meant to affirm the French views legitimate, but also push for a different direction.

Quite different to that, Germany was furthermore in the position to address weaker states such as the new East-European members in a much more powerful manner. Most if not all of them see Germany as the driving force behind continental Europe and together with France also as one of the drivers of NATO, at least politically. They know that without German support including consent to and support of German initiatives within NATO, there is not much hope to have a voice, let alone the backing of a potential Article 5 operation⁶³. Hence, in Warsaw, Germany did show political support for them, but from the viewpoint of negotiation tactics, there was not much need to compromise apart from stressing that the stationing of troops on the Eastern flank should not be a permanent measure. Still, the German approach was to strive for unity, which is why she saw no need in politically pressuring the smaller member states in any significant way. In the context of negotiation tactics, the overall German approach ranged in the top two of the above categories. For the weaker states, the German lead was, among other initiatives, the implementation of the *Reassurance Measures* in the eastern flank, and significant promotion of the *Very High Readiness Task Force*.

Conclusion

It can be established that Germany managed to achieve her goals in Warsaw by the successful application of a number of negotiation tactics. As has been established, she found herself in a unique

NATO-led operation but the so-called 'Coalition of the Willing'. Insofar, Germany's denial happened in a bilateral context and not before the NAC.

⁶² See in this context Keller, Patrick, *Divided by geography? NATO's internal debate about the eastern and southern flanks*, in Friis, Karsten, ed., *NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century – An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit* (Routledge: London/New York 2017), pp. 52-62.

⁶³ It can be argued at this point, that any Article 5 scenario is mostly a political decision rather than a legal obligation. This is a typical situation where politics and international law merge and it is not quite clear which is driving which. That is to be seen as a weakness but a given and very natural condition.

and difficult position. The dilemma around Russia and the dependence on natural resources still pose a serious caveat when dealing with Crimea and the Kremlin's policy. This dilemma leads to a stretch between national versus Alliance interests. As seen, Germany agrees with the overall NATO position that the annexation of Crimea has violated international law and that Russian hybrid warfare is a serious threat to the West. This view is even reflected by the German White Paper; but while depending on Russian resources, Germany cannot afford to take a too straightforward stance such as the United States or the United Kingdom may do. This means that Germany will continue to insist on diplomatic means parallel to the stationing of troops in eastern Europe.

But there is another, even more dangerous risk: in the unlikely but not impossible event of escalation, Germany will – despite her current efforts – very likely be facing the fact that one of the first things the Kremlin will do is cut-off the energy supply to the West⁶⁴. For Germany, this poses the ultimate worst-case scenario despite substantial energy reserves. However, in Warsaw this risk seemed to have been pushed aside since the escalation of conflict seemed something nobody really thought probable. In the case of an escalation, however, Germany's negotiation tactics vis-à-vis those allies she currently rates strong ones could change since due to economic and geo-strategic reasoning she does not have an interest in maintaining even a low-level conflict.

On the contrary, German political will seems to greatly support NATO's current strategy, and the fact that she is part of a strong coalition seems to overrule all other concerns. This fact was an underlying element during all negotiations in Warsaw and represents a political stretch.

As an overall condition to which all negotiating parties should be subject to, it can be finally said that the above negotiation tactics do work. They did work in Warsaw and they will work elsewhere. However, they are always relative to one's objectives and to the other parties' views. For the first time in the history of united Germany, the government has argued in favour of and pushed for the stationing of troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent against Russia. This has been an extraordinary step. It becomes clear that the German government has decided so for two reasons: first, to actually deter Russia for reasons of national security and international stability; second, to be looked upon as a loyal ally by the 'strong', and as a leading ally by the 'weak'. For Germany, a good standing in NATO proves strategically and politically immensely important.

In summary and despite the significant geo-political challenges, Germany did well in influencing NATO policy 'from top to bottom' and 'from bottom to top' during the Warsaw Summit, applying what can almost be described as 'German virtues': strategic patience and consistency. Proven effective in Warsaw, Germany is likely to hold on to this strategy in the future⁶⁵. However, despite her energy-

⁶⁴ For more – fictitious – scenarios, see Shireff, Richard, *War with Russia 2017* (Coronett: London 2016).

⁶⁵ On the future of NATO as a whole, see James M. Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 51, February 2010; on an International Relations framework, see

related caveats, Germany seems to largely agree with the NATO policy that Russia overall is posing a threat to the West.

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