

France and NATO Warsaw Summit 2016

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Introduction

France has been a member country of NATO since its establishment in 1949 but France has often taken a special stance in the transatlantic Alliance. France stepped out from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966 by President Charles de Gaulle until France returned back to this structure under Sarkozy administration in 2009. Gaullist vision of France sometimes let France take different stance in foreign and security policy from the United States, for example in the period of Charles de Gaulle and also over the Iraq war in 2000s.

France, as a member countries of NATO, can be characterised by some points, the first is, as mentioned above, that France has sometimes taken a special stance within the Alliance longing for "independence" of France and for more autonomous Europe in the transatlantic relations. The second is that France is one of the three nuclear powers in the Alliance, with the United States and the United Kingdom. The third is that France has high capability of military projection in and out of European region, as one of the two great military powers in Europe with the United Kingdom. The fourth is that France has security interest in Africa region, so called Southern flank of Alliance.

This paper's objective lies in trying to analyse France's position toward NATO especially French position vis-a-vis NATO Warsaw summit in July 2016, by outlining French current security and defence policy and by researching how France committed the NATO Warsaw summit through some documents and interviews.

1. French Security Policy after 2009

(1) French Coming Back to NATO

France returned to NATO's integrated military command in 2009, at the NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, precisely France returned back to the Defence Planning Committee in NATO¹. From the beginning of Sarkozy administration, President Sarkozy states intention to return back to integrated command structure². Sarkozy administration published "White paper on Defence and National Security (White paper 2008)" in 2008. French intention to return back to NATO's integrated military organisation was

¹ After returning back of France, The Defence Planning Committee was consolidated into the North Atlantic Council.

² At the beginning of Chirac administration, France tried to return to integrated military organization of NATO, France returned back to Military committee of NATO in 1995. But after that, this policy stopped especially Franco-American friction over the Iraq war.

mentioned in this white paper³.

Returning back to integrated command was a pragmatic choice for France. After the end of the Cold War, France committed almost all operations led by NATO, and France often felt demerits to be out of integrated military organisation in participating NATO's operations. Although there was opposition even in the governing party, on returning back to NATO's integrated strategic command structure by abandoning France's "independence"⁴, France's returning back to integrated military command was a consequence of strategic choice to keep the presence of France by acting positively within the Alliance, rather than by keeping symbolic "independence" out of the Alliance.

It can be also underlined that France expressed three reservations in returning back to NATO's integrated military organisations⁵. The first is full freedom and assessment by French political authorities on situations and decisions. The second is French nuclear independence, that is, France's nuclear assets and strategy of deterrence will remain outside the NATO. The third is freedom of decision regarding the commitment of French forces, that is, no French force will be placed permanently under NATO command in peacetime and France has freedom to decide to or not to participate each operation on NATO.

After returning back to the military organisation, France took a more active role in the Alliance. France got a post of commander of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). And France advanced security cooperation with the United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom concluded the Lancaster House Treaty in November 2010, which included comprehensive plans of defence cooperation, making a common intervention troop and shared aircraft carrier. In 2011, after Arab Spring, France took a political initiative with the United Kingdom in launching the operation in Libya, Operation Unified Protector (OUP), in the framework of NATO. It was humanitarian intervention based on the concept of "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)".

(2) French Security Policy in Hollande Administration

French security and defence policy slightly changed in Hollande administration (2012-2017). French defence and security policy in the period of Hollande administration shows mainly two features. The first is the interest to the defence and security cooperation in a European framework. The second is

³ *The French White paper on Defence and National Security* (English translated version of *Livre Blanc 2008*, pp.101-104, chapter5, Renovation the Transatlantic Partnership, Renewing relations between France and NATO

⁴ For example, M. Domminique de Villepin, former Foreign minister and Prime minister, opposed to France's returning back to integrated command structure of NATO, from traditional Gaullist stance. Concerning the discussion in the French National Assembly on this issue, see this; *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, Session Ordinaire de Séance de 2008-2009, 194e Séance, Coûpte Rendu du Intégral, 1^{er} Séance du mardi 17 mars 2008*. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.104

security commitment to Africa region, especially Sahel region.

As regard NATO, Hollande was not so active to commit NATO and his interest in security policy was directed to the EU (CSDP) rather than NATO. Hollande mentioned to review the policy of returning back to integrated command of NATO in light of French national interest in the presidential election campaign in 2012, but the policy of staying military organisation of NATO was not changed. In November 2012, a paper by Hubert Védrine, former French foreign minister, assessing French policy vis-a-vis NATO was submitted to President of the Republic⁶. This paper assessed the consequences of France's returning to integrated command structure of NATO considering French national interest and noted that France has no interest to leave it again.

Hollande was active to enhancing security cooperation in European framework, in the framework of the EU (CSDP). He mentioned sometime the words "*l'Europe de la défense*", meaning a Europe cooperating more closely in the field of security and defence policy. This idea was similar to the Gaullist approach, Hollande tried to enhancing the EU (CSDP) rather than NATO. For example, Hollande planned "Weimar plus" in 2012. This plan was to make a framework by five countries adding Italy and Spain into three countries of "Weimar triangle", France, Germany and Poland, and to make CSDP more active by these five countries. Hollande administration published the White Paper on Defence and National Security in 2013 (*Livre Blanc 2013*)⁷, it is also mentioned to enhancing CSDP in this White paper. France's intention to enhance defence cooperation in a European framework was also related to French strong interest to enhancing the European defence industry. France often propose enhancing European security cooperation including the cooperation in research and development of defence equipment and procurement.

The other character of the security and defence policy in the Hollande administration is active commitment vis-a-vis Africa region, especially Sahel region. French security policy in the period Hollande administration was preoccupied to the commitment to this region. It was a consequence of instability of this region after the Arab Spring, France is almost only country that has close historical and social relationship in this region and that has capability to conduct military intervention in this region.

France launched the military operation named the Operation Barkhane in 2012, in five countries in Sahel region, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Dispatching about 4,000 troops, the Operation Barkhane is currently the largest operation abroad of French forces⁸. France also took positive

⁶ Hubert Vedrine, *Rapport pour le President de la Repubilque Française sur les consequences du retour de la France Dans le Commandement intégré de l'OTAN, sur l'avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l'Europe de la défense*, November 2012, <https://otan.delegfrance.org/Le-rapport-Vedrine>

⁷ Concerning this white paper 2013, see this website of French ministry of Defence, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/memoire-et-culture/livre-blanc-2013>

⁸ As regard the operation Barkhane, see the website of Ministry of Defense,

role in the EU in launching military operations and civilian missions of CSDP in Africa region, for example EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel, etc. France is committing these CSDP operations/missions, and France carries out the military operation Barkhane in cooperation with CSDP operation and mission like EUTM Mali.

Since 2015, French security policy is also preoccupied by keeping internal security from threats of international terrorism. France had many terrorist attacks since 2015, *Charlie-Hebdo* affairs in January 2015, simultaneous terrorist attacks on the 13th November 2015 at Paris, terrorism in Nice on 14th July 2016, etc. French security policy was directed to keeping internal security and France increased drastically the troops committing internal security at Paris and many cities within the country, France is obliged to spare many resources of French forces into keeping internal security. France also took stronger commitment to Middle East region coping with ISIS, France launched Operation Chammal⁹, military operation in Syria and Iraq with about 1,200 troops.

2. France and NATO Warsaw Summit

(1) France and NATO Warsaw Summit, French Concerns

How did France commit in NATO Warsaw summit in July 2016? A report on evolution of the role of NATO by a bipartisan group of the commission of national defence and the armed forces the National Assembly members submitted to the National Assembly on 3rd February 2016¹⁰. In this report, How to prepare for Warsaw summit for France is also mentioned. Concerning what position France should take, this report mentions as below.

“It seems appropriate to seek these four parallel objectives as below in the perspective of Warsaw summit,

- Maintain the cohesion of the alliance, even though two geographic fronts can divide the allies; it weakens NATO and political and make it dangerous the military credibility of the Alliance.

- Seek to realise the action plan for reactivity decided in the summit in Newport. This summit of the Wales adopted a concept of collective defence in key-word of flexibility and reactivity. A country like France, capable the same time to deploy tanks to Poland, to conduct an operation against ISIS in Syria and in Iraq, to eliminate djhadist leader in Sahel to contribute stabilisation of the Central Africa, to conduct bombardment operation in Iraq and to deploy 10000 soldiers to protect its sensible site in its

<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/sahel/dossier-de-presentation-de-l-operation-barkhane/operation-barkhane>

⁹ As regard the operation Chammal, see the website of the Ministry of Defense,

<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/irak-syrie>

¹⁰ Presented by Gilbert le Bris et Philippe Vitel, *Rapport d'information, par la commission de la défense nationales et des forces armées, en conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'information sur l'évolution du rôle de l'OTAN*, february 2016, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i3472.pdf>

territory, necessarily reaffirm this concept in Warsaw summit...NATO cannot come back to a rigid posture by permanent positioning of forces, that set us thirty years ago.

- It is essential, in the context of Russo-Ukrainian crisis, that measures we take don't push to escalation with Russia, NATO must be, by its dissuasive posture, a part of solution, must not add the problem.

- It is necessary to watch over sustainability of decisions taken, in terms of human resource and finance. Because today threats are multiple, human resources military capacities and financial means of the Alliance are limited.¹¹

This bipartisan report shows French position toward NATO Warsaw summit typically. In this report, it can be regarded that, in Warsaw Summit, France would like to maintain the coherence of the alliance even though difference of geographic interests among member countries, and France would like to keep flexibility and reactivity of operation of the alliance and to avoid that alliance's commitment is focused rigidly to the Eastern flank, and France would like to avoid to provoke Russia.

After the summit, France reviewed Warsaw summit was successful in the point of that the Alliance kept the coherence to make a consensus even though difference of security concerns among member countries. As regard that NATO could have consensus to enhancing commitment toward the East, France think it is right and necessary decision to the alliance. On the other hand, there is also opinion within France that France should have tried more to orient NATO's interest a little bit more toward southern flank.

In Warsaw summit, France was especially interested in these three points, the first is nuclear issue, the second is NATO-EU relations and the third is cyber security. Especially nuclear issue and NATO-EU relations were very important issues for France.

(2) France and Nuclear Issue

France is one of the three nuclear powers in NATO, with the United States and the United Kingdom. France is not a member of NPG (Nuclear Planning Group) of NATO, even after returning back to integrated military structure in 2009. For France, nuclear capability is an ultimate option for defense its territory, and means that France keep to grasp its fate in his own hand. Nuclear issue is also one of the means for France to appeal that France is a major power in the international security affairs. France has taken the policy to operate the French nuclear power exclusively under French control and France has no intention to put its own nuclear power in a multilateral scheme of the Alliance, but French nuclear power makes a part of dissuasion capability of the Alliance.

Review of the nuclear policy in NATO began since just after Strategic Concept 2010. In May 2012, NATO adopted the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). This review concluded that

¹¹ Ibid., p.84 (translated in English by author)

nuclear in the alliance is still important for dissuasion and current mix of capabilities of NATO, nuclear, and conventional and missile defence, is appropriate¹².

While there was not so much mention on the nuclear issue in the Wales summit in 2014, the nuclear issue was mentioned much in Warsaw summit¹³. It is related to that nuclear issue was sometimes mentioned in the tension with Russia. In Warsaw summit communique, it is written as below,

“Allies' goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries¹⁴. ...”

Especially the words “The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute...” seems to be reflected the French “independent” nuclear policy.

Hollande regards French capability of nuclear dissuasion as still important option for defense of France. Hollande made a speech on French nuclear policy (*Politique nucléaire française*) on the 19th February 2015¹⁵. In this speech, Hollande announced new transparency measures and new figures of French nuclear arsenal, and saying “the time of nuclear dissuasion is not left behind”, he underlined the significance of nuclear dissuasion. Hollande also mentioned in this speech that France participates to nuclear strategic culture of the Alliance, although France is not a member of NPG of NATO¹⁶.

(3) France and NATO-EU Relations

¹² Concerning the DDPR, see this page in NATO website, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm

In the paragraph 31, it is written that “The review of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture has confirmed that NATO must have the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety of its populations and the security of its territory, which is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility. As outlined above, NATO has determined that, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound.”

¹³ Concerning NATO Warsaw Summit Communique, see this page in NATO website, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

¹⁴ Ibid., paragraph 53.

¹⁵ As regard this speech of *Politique nucléaire française*, see this website of French ministry of defence, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/352889/5043677/file/discours-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-deplacement-aupres-des-forces-aeriennes-strategiques-istres-3.pdf>

¹⁶ In the report to the National Assembly, it is written that “... France doesn’t participate the Nuclear Planning Group, she participates, in the discourse of the President of the Republic on 19 February 2015, to the nuclear strategic culture” p.85

Another point that France had an interest in Warsaw summit is the cooperation between NATO and the EU (CSDP). France has envisaged “*l’Europe de la defense*”, more coherent and more autonomous Europe in the field of security and defence policy. France has taken a strong initiative in the evolution of the EU’s own common security policy, since the beginning of ESDP, from the Franco-British summit at Saint-Malo in 1998. France tried to enhance ESDP so that ESDP could replace the function of NATO. Also within NATO, France has tried a reform of NATO since the end of the Cold War, in order to enhance the presence of European allies and to make the alliance more autonomous for European countries within the transatlantic alliance.

Since about 2008, however, relationship between NATO and the ESDP shifted to “complementarity” because of changes in international security situation. Some cases occurred that both of NATO and the EU operated in the same place and in the same time, like in Afghanistan (ISAF and EUPOL Afghanistan), and in Kosovo (KFOR and EULEX Kosovo), and these cases needed mutual cooperation of NATO and the EU. France’s decision of returning back to the military organisation of NATO also facilitated closer relationship between NATO and the EU.

In White Paper 2008, the word “complementarity” between NATO and the EU is noted. It is noted that “It is necessary to avoid two extremes here. One would see the European Union simply as the civil arm of NATO. The Union’s aims are obviously much larger than that... The other expects the European Union to take on the collective self-defense of its members. However, common defense is the prime function of NATO, as spelled out in the article 5 of the Treaty of Washington¹⁷.” “The European Union and NATO are thus complementary, and this strategic fit should be based on the two entities’ respective contributions¹⁸.”

After that, the word of “complementary” relationship between NATO and the EU, is often used also in documents of NATO. For example, in the Strategic Concept 2010, it is mentioned that, “For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these effort is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles supporting international peace and security...¹⁹”

Hollande administration was enthusiastic to enhance CSDP, and Hollande also proposed complementarity of NATO and the EU. In white paper 2013, it is mentioned on the NATO-EU relationship, that “NATO and the EU are not in competence, these two organizations are complementary²⁰...”

In also Warsaw summit, cooperation with the EU was mentioned in some paragraph. For

¹⁷ White paper 2008 (English version of Livre Blanc 2008), p.95

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ NATO Strategic Concept 2010, paragraph 32

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

²⁰ Livre blanc 2013, p.63

example, in paragraph 78, it is written that “Multinational and national initiatives provide an important contribution to capability development and our strengthened posture. NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's pooling and sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximizing cost-effectiveness.²¹”

France is very active to enhancing European security cooperation like CSDP and France is in the same time an important member of NATO with high capability of military projection. Complementary and mutually relationship between NATO and the EU is necessary for current French security and defence Policy.

3. France and NATO Warsaw Summit, Eastern and Southern Flanks

(1) France and EFP (Enhanced Forward Presence)

The biggest issue decided in NATO Warsaw summit was to launch the EFP, Enhanced Forward Presence, in the eastern flank. France dispatches about 300 troops in Estonia in the framework of EFP. In number of troops, French contribution to EFP is the fifth larger, after the United States (1,000 troops), the United Kingdom (800), Germany (450) and Canada (450)²². These four countries lead the group in each country, the United States in Poland, the United Kingdom in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania and Canada in Latvia, while France doesn't take a role such as a leading country. This French contribution is not relatively so much, considering French capability, and compared with other countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada.

This relatively less commitment to EFP by France is related to these two points, one is that France is not positive to provoke Russia, the other is that France's security interest is directed toward the southern flank of Europe, rather than the eastern flank.

As regard relationship between France and Russia, there is a history of good relations from Franco-Russian alliance in 19th century or from more before. Present Charles De Gaulle also tried the “*rapprochement*” with Russia in 1960s. In the current French political situation, it is also true that there are many pro-Russian politicians in French politics²³. France also never admits the Russian interventions in Crimea and Ukraine of course, but France is not positive to take a strong sanction against Russia and to escalate the tension with Russia, although France approves to take sanction itself against Russia. It is because that France doesn't feel the threat of Russia relatively compared with the central and eastern European countries.

²¹ NATO Warsaw summit communique, paragraph 78

²² According to the factsheets of EFP in the website of NATO, as of May 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf

²³ For example, in the presidential election 2017, many of major candidates were pro-Russian, regardless Right or Left, like M. Francois Fillon (the Republicans), Mme. Marine Le Pen (the National Front) and M. Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Left, *la France insoumise*).

Written also in the report to the National Assembly, France cautiously tried not to provoke Russia. Hollande said in the 8th July 2016, “NATO has no role at all to be saying what Europe’s relations with Russia should be. For France, Russia is a partner, not a threat”. France recognises the necessity to enhance the dissuasive commitment vis-a-vis Russia for the alliance, but France itself is not enthusiastic to commit it. It is because of relation with Russia, but the biggest reason is that France is currently preoccupied by military commitment in the Africa region.

(2) French Security Interest Toward Southern Flank

France recognises and understands the importance of enhancing dissuasive commitment toward Russia, and this idea is shared in the French government. France approves launching EFP by NATO and shares the objectives of this decision. But the biggest background of French relatively less commitment to EFP is French security and defence interest directing southward.

In Warsaw summit, Security concern toward southern flank is of course mentioned in the communique for some paragraphs²⁴, including instability in Syria, Iraq and Libya, counter-terrorism, etc., but further security commitment in North Africa and Middle East region by the Alliance did not decided concretely in Warsaw summit.

There is the slight difference between priority of NATO and priority of France in the security and defence policy. France recognises well that the current top priority for NATO is EFP, more dissuasive commitment on the eastern flank of Europe. But it is not the top priority for French security and defence Policy. France is currently preoccupied in the Africa region, the top priority in security and defence policy for France is the operation Barkhane in Sahel, and the second priority is the operation Chammal in Syria. Especially in Sahel region, France still has to continue the military commitment in this region because France is almost only country that has capability to make a military intervention and because France is almost only country that actually committing in this region. If France withdraws from this region and quits military intervention, this region will become more instable and catastrophe. France is preoccupied by the operation Barkhane and the operation Chammal, and also France is currently forced to spare more resources to keep internal security after terrorist attacks within France. It is true that France cannot afford to spare its resources and capability enough toward Eastern flank of Europe.

This stance of France is also recognised by central and eastern European countries. Some central

²⁴ In Warsaw summit communique, security concern to Middle East and North Africa is mentioned in paragraph 25-30. For example, in paragraph 25, it is noted “The continuing crises and instability across the Middle East and North Africa region, in particular in Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as the threat of terrorism and violent extremism across the region and beyond, demonstrate that the security of the region has direct implications for the security of NATO. In addition to the spill-over of conflict from failing and failed states, terrorism and violent extremism, we face other common transnational security threats and challenges, including trafficking of small arms and light weapons, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, and threats against maritime security and energy supply...”

and eastern European countries participate the operation Barkhane led by France, for example Lithuania, as a mutual cooperation among countries in the Alliance. It is interesting that such a mutual cooperation among NATO member countries is realised step by step beyond difference of security concern for each country.

Conclusion

France has taken an important and unique role in NATO. France is a nuclear power, and France has high military capability, and France has its own security concern in southern flank of Europe and France is actually committing the operations in Africa region. France's interest lies in southern flank, rather than eastern flank.

With changes of the international security situation, NATO is in the process of the transition from the period of broader expeditionary operations to the period of returning back to the collective defence. Warsaw summit in 2016 was the great step of this transition on deciding to launch a concrete dissuasive measure to the eastern flank of the alliance.

In Warsaw summit, although the negotiation itself is not yet open to public, French position vis-a-vis Warsaw summit and whether France could take or could not take what France want, seems to be analysed as below. The first point is nuclear issue. France sided with the United States in the point of enhancing nuclear deterrence capability of the alliance, and France succeeded to put the phrases of "independent nuclear strategic forces of the United Kingdom and France" and "separate centres of decision-making" in the communique. This seems to be apparently along French stance on nuclear policy.

The second is relationship between NATO and the EU. In also Warsaw summit communique, complementary relationship between NATO and the EU is noted. France has intention to develop both of NATO and the EU, although more positive on developing CSDP. Cooperative relationship between NATO and the EU is favourable for France.

The third point, the largest point in this summit, is France and EFP. France approved to launch EFP, although not so enthusiastically. French security concern is oriented to the southern flank, but for example, any action like that France tried to switch the alliance's commitment more southward with southern European countries was not found in the negotiation. France recognises the importance and necessity of EFP, although France makes relatively less commitment to it. France approves EFP itself, and on the other hand France is anxious about that the Alliance's commitment will be fixed rigidly toward the eastern flank of Europe in future, so France would like NATO to keep flexibility and reactivity, to keep room to commit also in southern flank in future in case of more instability in south regions, and France sometimes underline that the Warsaw summit communique covers mention all

threats of the alliance, not only in the eastern flank²⁵. It is difficult and not realistic to try to turn NATO's security concern toward the southern flank considering a current international security situation. Tasks of the eastern flank are very clear, dissuasion toward the Russia, but on the other hand tasks of the southern flank are so many and so ambiguous, stabilisation of Sahel region and other Africa regions, stabilization of the Middle East, international counter-terrorism, etc. This issue of the eastern and the southern flanks of the alliance will remain as a concern of French security policy. Warsaw summit made it clear the geopolitical difference of security concern and priority between NATO and France.

Emmanuel Macron became President of the Republic at the presidential election in 2017. President Macron's security and defence policy basically seems to follow that of Hollande²⁶, but Macron's security policy has some features.

The biggest feature is interest in European security cooperation. Although it is the same direction with President Hollande, but President Macron is much more enthusiastic than Hollande to make "*l'Europe de la défense*", to make further coherent and integrated European security and defence cooperation. He proposed common European troop for crisis intervention in his speech in September 2017 at Sorbonne²⁷. Macron is also in taking initiative to elaborate PESCO²⁸ (Permanent Structured Cooperation) in the EU, further integration in the security and defence policy in the EU. These initiatives may influence to NATO-EU relations in near future. Transatlantic defence cooperation is now difficult to predict by Trump administration in the United States, facing American low interest toward the transatlantic alliance, there are opinions suggesting to form some Europe's own collective defence framework. There is an opinion that this American stance is good opportunity to make "*l'Europe de la défense*" in France, as a country that longing for more autonomous Europe and more close cooperation within Europe in the field of security and defence policy.

French security and defence concern and priority directed to southern flank of Europe seems to continue at least in coming years considering security situation in Africa region and the Middle East region. France continues commitment to Sahel region and others, and coping with international terrorism in France will also need long term efforts. So difference of security priority between NATO and France still continues in the period of Macron administration. Even though the difference of security concerns,

²⁵ For example, the bill of finance 2017 on defence, it is mentioned that "At the Summit of the Alliance in Warsaw in July 2016, France set out to bring its messages in the spirit of cohesion and responsibility. Actually, NATO underlined the necessity of the flexibility of 360° facing to emerging challenges not only from the East but also from the South..." (translation in english by author) Ministère de déféense, *Projet de loi de finances 2017*, p.39, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/projet-de-loi-de-finances-2017>


²⁶ One of key person is M. Jean Yves Le Drian, Defense Minister under President Hollande (2012-2017) and current Foreign minister under President Macron.

²⁷ His speech on 26 September 2017 at University Sorbonne,

²⁸ Concerning PESCO, see this website of EEAS, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_19-10-2017_1.pdf

France will take an important role in NATO. France regards NATO as an important and efficient framework for international security. France’s important and unique role in NATO continues after the Warsaw summit.

Appendix: Deployment of French troop²⁹ (as of May 2017)



²⁹ Website of French Ministry of defence, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires