

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## June 2011



### CONTENTS

#### Intelligence Summary in May 2011

##### 1. Information Digest

- 1.1 Maritime Security
- 1.2 Military Developments
- 1.3 South China Sea-related Events
- 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations
- 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors
- 1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others

##### 2. Intelligence Assessment

Overview of Emergency Rescue and Relief Operations by U.S. Forces against Great East Japan Earthquake in Northeastern and Eastern parts of Japan: “Operation Tomodachi” (March 11 ~ April 30, 2011)

This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of June 2011.

Publisher: Masahiro Akiyama

Staff writers:

Kazumine Akimoto, Takehisa Imaizumi, Masami Kawamura, Aki Mori, Wakana Mukai,  
Eiji Sakai, Daisuke Sekine, Takehisa Tomomori, Hideshi Ueno, Yuko Takada

---

All rights reserved.

This report, or parts thereof, must not be produced in any form without permission in writing of the publisher.

## Intelligence Summary in June 2011

**Maritime Security:** According to the Indian newspaper dated the 4th, India has recently intensified its maritime security in the southern Indian coast in a bid to prevent Sri Lankan fishermen illegally entering the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The measures follow the commencement of operations of the Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) adopted by the Indian Navy at its three Naval Commands as well as in Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The Danish government has launched a new strategy for measures against piracy until 2014. Under this strategy, Denmark dispatches naval vessels and maritime aircraft for a short time periodically until 2014, and contributes to strengthening coast guard functions in Somalia and surrounding countries.

On the 16th, Dutch parliament agreed with Defense Minister that the Dutch navy will be allowed to fight pirates on Somali territory. Defense Minister guarantees, however, that the Dutch won't be involved in the fight against terrorism that is currently being fought in Somalia.

As for piracy incidents in June, there were hijackings due to monsoon season. On the other hand, four vessels which had been under the control of Somali pirates were released.

**Military Developments:** On the 2nd, Hans M. Kristensen, a Fellow at the US Federation of American Scientists, released photographs of two China's new *Jin*-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) anchoring at Xiaopingdao naval base in the suburbs of Dalian.

On the 3rd, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie held bilateral talks in Singapore, and confirmed that two countries were making progress in re-establishing good military-to-military relations. Pentagon Press Secretary said the meeting was productive and cordial. He added: "In the talks, overall the meeting focused more on areas of agreement rather than disagreement. Of course, areas of disagreement were raised, but they were sort of acknowledged and moved on from."

According to Defense News dated the 13th, the U.S. Navy faces a fundamental dilemma: It needs more submarines, but the overall defense budget required to build those submarines is lacking. How should it square this circle? According to researchers at the American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (AEI), the answer is that the Navy should procure a fleet of diesel-powered subs. Not only are diesels cheaper than nuclear-powered subs, but they have the advantage of being better platforms for many of the tasks the Navy faces today.

The U.S. newspaper, *The New York Times* dated the 15th, has carried the views of U.S. experts concerned that one of the Chinese Navy's main goals in modernizing the fleet is to operate in an area where the United States currently has naval supremacy -- the waters of the western Pacific that lie beyond Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, what is commonly known as the "first island chain."

On the 17th, France and Russia signed an agreement for Paris to supply Moscow with two

*Mistral* class helicopter carriers in a 1.2 billion euro (\$1.52 billion) deal. Two nations had already agreed to build two more *Mistrals* in Russia.

The 10th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, was held in Singapore on June 4-5, and U.S. Secretary of States Robert Michael Gates, Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, and Defense Minister of PRC General Liang Guanglie delivered their speeches, the gist of which is discussed in the topic 1.

In an exclusive interview with the Hong Kong Commercial Daily on the 7th, the chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chen Bingde has confirmed that China's first aircraft carrier is under construction. However, an official from the PLA also added that he would not respond to questions concerning the aircraft carrier before it completes construction. This is the first time the PLA has officially acknowledged the existence of a Chinese aircraft carrier. In addition, Qi Jianguo, assistant to the chief of the general staff of the PLA, said to the paper that "the significance of owning aircraft carrier is a symbol as a great power that China has to experience on its path of going to the world, citing the examples of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council that have already owned aircraft carriers. Major articles on the Chinese aircraft carrier have been discussed in the topic 2.

**South China Sea-related Events:** Starting with this monthly report, OPRF has decided to change the previous column of "Maritime Boundaries" into "South China Sea-related Events" in consideration of the trend that the South China Sea is becoming the most important security issue in East Asia, taking up all events concerning the South China Sea in this revised column.

On the 1st, the Philippine government said it had sought an explanation from the Chinese embassy in Manila on what Chinese navy ships and a marine surveillance vessel were doing in May inside the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. According to Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Rosario, the Chinese ships reportedly unloaded building materials, erected an undetermined number of posts, and placed a buoy near the breaker of the Amy Douglas Bank off western Palawan Island which was well inside the Philippines' EEZ on May 21 and 24.

Contributing an article titled "Beijing turns up heat in S. China Sea" to the Singaporean newspaper, *The Straits Times* dated the 6th, Michael Richardson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies based in Singapore, says that, in view of China that sees the South China Sea (SCS) as strategically and economically important, and appears to be increasingly determined to strengthen the presence and control in areas of the SCS, the writer is regarding with interest whether or not the United States will guarantee the Philippines the security under the treaty in such a situation. In addition, the writer mentions that, although strategic ambiguity serves as the best assurance of regional stability, if it is seen in Beijing as a sign of US weakness, it may embolden China to continue its assertive policy in the South China Sea.

On the 9th, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jianchao warned Asian neighbors to stop searching for oil near the Spratly Islands and vowed again to assert its sovereignty in the

South China Sea. Chinese Ambassador said China has not started to drill for oil there and warned others to stop any oil exploration in the area without Beijing's permission.

On the 13th, Philippine President's office said it was renaming the South China Sea as the "West Philippine Sea."

On the 15th, the Philippine newspaper, *The Philippine Star*, reports that, according to documents obtained by News 5, China gradually developed its facilities on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands – making it an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

On the 15th, the Philippine navy said it had removed foreign markers installed on three reefs and banks in disputed areas of the South China Sea (SCS). According to Philippine navy spokesman, the posts had only numbers on them. The markers were on Boxall Reef in the Spratly Islands, and in the nearby Amy Douglas Bank and Reed Bank, all of which are in waters of the SCS claimed by the Philippines and China.

On the 17th, China said that its maritime defense forces recently staged three days and nights of exercises in the South China Sea. According to the Chinese official newspaper *People's Daily*, the drills involved a total of 14 patrol boats, landing craft and submarine hunting boats, along with two military aircraft. It said the exercises were aimed at refining anti-submarine, replenishment and island defense capabilities in order to better respond to any future sudden crisis. Additionally, on the 15th one of its largest maritime patrol ships set off at the Gaolan port in Zhuhai, south China's Guangdong Province, on a first-ever visit to Singapore, a voyage in which it will transit the South China Sea. On the 20th, on the occasion of the visit of Chinese maritime surveillance vessel *Haixun 31* to Singapore, the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman issued a statement, in which he said it is in China's own interests to clarify its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) with more precision regarding the current ambiguity as to their extent.

The Vietnam People's Navy and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China have commenced the 11th two-day joint patrol in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf on the 19th. Two patrol boats of respective navies participated in the exercise, with a journey of more than 300 nautical miles along the delimited waters that border Vietnam and China in the Tonkin Gulf.

On the 22nd, during his visit to the United States, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario talked with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. At a press interview after the meeting, regarding the South China Sea, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said: (1) The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea; and (2) The United States remains committed to peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said: (1) We are prepared to do what is necessary to stand up to any aggressive action in our backyard; and (2) We adhere to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and are working towards the eventual adoption of a code of conduct. On the 28th, navies from the United States and the Philippines kicked off an 11-day (lasting until July 8) joint exercise dubbed the 17th Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). The exercise was held in the Sulu Sea east of Palawan. The at-sea phase of the exercise

focuses on developing maritime security capabilities.

On the 27th, blaming China for South China Sea (SCS) issues, the U.S. Senate has unanimously approved a resolution introduced by Senator Jim Webb, saying the issue should be resolved peacefully through a multilateral effort.

On the 30th, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at a US think tank- the American Enterprise Institute, has contributed the article titled “Billiards in the South China Sea” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal*. Auslin mentions that, although China is playing billiards in the South China Sea, America is playing some version of Capture the Flag, and trying to keep Beijing from capturing the flag of regional hegemony. Based on this fact, the best way forward for the United States is to recognize China's game, start playing it and then rig the table. Washington should seek to expand the billiard table by putting more balls into play.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** Contributing an article titled “Pakistan's Black Pearl” to a bimonthly American magazine, *Foreign Policy* dated on June 3, Urmila Venugopalan, a former Asia editor at a British monthly journal on military intelligence, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, has pointed out that, in light of overall indications, China's interest in Gwadar port may have been decreasing and in the foreseeable future the focus of China's maritime strategy will continue to be focused on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** Having taken almost 250 days since it set sail from Monaco in September 2010, the 31-meter solar-powered yacht, *SY Turnor* (60 tons), arrived at the shores of Brisbane, Australia. Propelled by nothing but rays from the sun, the yacht is making its first cruise around the globe as a solar-powered boat.

**Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others:** On the 16th, Bangladesh signed a production-sharing contract with American energy giant ConocoPhillips to explore for gas in the virtually unexplored deep waters of the Bay of Bengal. ConocoPhillips says it wants to start exploring two areas covering 5,158 square kilometers as soon as possible, and it needs to conduct seismic surveys in two blocks with water depth of 1 to 1.5 kilometers.

**Intelligence Assessment:** In order to support the relief-activities by the Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel, fire-fighting team members, policemen, and citizen-volunteers among others in the Great East Japan Earthquake which occurred on Friday, March 11, 2011, the United States Military Forces dispatched approximately 20,000 personnel, 22 ships and 140 aircraft, which had been unprecedented in the past as the rescue relief activities. The relief activities by the U.S. military forces dubbed “Operation Tomodachi” (hereinafter, Operation Tomodachi) revealed a quick response right after the earthquake disaster, demonstrated outstanding capabilities in respective disaster-hit areas, and its voluntary service gave a deep impression on not only the victims who suffered serious damage but many Japanese people. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the Operation Tomodachi made other foreign nations recognize the depth and reliance on

the ties of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as the power of the forward-deployed U.S. Military Forces. This corner gives an overview of the Operation Tomodachi covering from its initial move to the end of April when the operation was tentatively terminated, and adds some comments.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### June 1 “SA, Mozambique sign MOU on joint patrols” (Times Live, June 1, 2011)

On the 1st, Mozambique's and South Africa (SA)'s defense ministers have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which aims to see both countries co-operating on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, with particular emphasis on piracy in the Mozambique Channel.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, Mozambique's and South Africa (SA)'s defense ministers have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which aims to see both countries co-operating on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, with particular emphasis on piracy in the Mozambique Channel. Two nations will conduct joint training, sharing of information, intelligence, and others.

Refer to the article: SA, Mozambique sign piracy MOU

<http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/article1097349.ece/SA-Mozambique-sign-piracy-MOU>

### June 4 “Indian Navy beefs up maritime security off southern coast” (Haveeru Online, June 4, 2011)

The India has recently intensified its maritime security in the southern Indian coast in a bid to prevent Sri Lankan fishermen illegally entering the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The measures follow the commencement of operations of the Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) adopted by the Indian Navy at its three Naval Commands as well as in Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

An outline of the article: India has recently intensified its maritime security in the southern coastal area. The decision comes due to the reports of Sri Lankan fishermen poaching in Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Indian fishermen doing the same in Sri Lankan EEZ. The measures follow the commencement of operations of the Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) adopted by the Indian Navy at its Western (Mumbai), Eastern (Visakhapatnam) and Southern (Kochi) Naval Commands and Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Port Blair). The JOC is manned by Naval and Coast Guard teams with the assistance of the Indian state Marine Police, Customs, Intelligence Bureau and Port Authorities. Coastal security related to operations is coordinated from the JOCs. According to the Sri Lankan fishery ministry, 88 fishermen and 17 trawlers are under Indian custody for allegedly fishing in the Indian EEZ, and Sri Lanka is continuing its negotiations with India to seek the release of its fishermen and trawlers held under Indian custody.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy beefs up maritime security in the south to ward off Sri Lankan fishermen

<http://www.haveeru.com.mv/english/details/36686>



### **June 7 “Somali pirates free Chinese vessel” (Reuters, June 8, 2011)**

On the 7th, Somali pirates freed a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel owned by the Chinese shipping company, MV *Yuan Xiang* (22,365DWT). The vessel with its 29-strong Chinese crew was hijacked on November 12, 2010 in the Arabian Sea, closer to India.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, Somali pirates freed a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel owned by the Chinese shipping company, MV *Yuan Xiang* (22,365DWT). The vessel with its 29-strong Chinese crew was hijacked on November 12, 2010 in the Arabian Sea, closer to India. A pirate said to the Reuters that, although ransom was paid, the amount of it was unknown. (According to the Reuters dated May 24, the Somali government seized two aircraft carrying a \$3.6 million ransom payment to Somali pirates in order to free hostages. Sources said the money was a ransom for a release of the MV *Yuan Xiang*.)

Refer to the article: Somali pirates release Chinese-owned cargo vessel

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/somalia-piracy-china-idUSLDE75701W20110608>

### **June 7 “Danish govt launches new antipiracy strategy” (Baird Marine, June 7, 2011)**

The Danish government has launched a new strategy for measures against piracy until 2014. Under this strategy, Denmark dispatches naval vessels and maritime aircraft for a short time periodically until 2014, and contributes to strengthening coast guard functions in Somalia and surrounding countries.

An outline of the article: The Danish government has launched a new strategy for measures against piracy until 2014. The purpose of the new strategy is to contribute to making the waters off the “Horn of Africa” and in the Indian Ocean safe and navigable for Danish and international shipping. Under this strategy, Denmark dispatches naval vessels and maritime aircraft of the air force for a short time periodically until 2014, and contributes to strengthening prison capacity in Somaliland and Puntland as well as coast guard functions in Somalia and surrounding countries.

Refer to the article: Denmark outlines new piracy strategy

[http://www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=10361:denmark-outlines-new-piracy-strategy&catid=73&Itemid=65](http://www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10361:denmark-outlines-new-piracy-strategy&catid=73&Itemid=65)

### **June 10 “German warship sinks pirate skiffs” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, June 14, 2011)**

On the morning of the 10th, the EU NAVFOR German navy’s frigate FGS *Niedersachsen* detected a suspected Pirate Action Group (PAG) which consisted of a fishing dhow and two attack skiffs [under tow by the dhow] while conducting a routine patrol in the Southern Somali Basin. Considering the possibility that the hostages are on board the dhow, the warship disrupted only the two skiffs under tow by a dhow.

An outline of the article: On the morning of June 10, the EU NAVFOR German navy’s frigate FGS *Niedersachsen* detected a suspected Pirate Action Group (PAG) which consisted of a fishing dhow and two attack skiffs under tow by the dhow while conducting a routine patrol in the Southern Somali Basin. Although a dhow was seen carrying small arms and rocket propelled

grenades (RPG's) on board, the German warship decided to disrupt only the two skiffs under tow by the dhow only, considering the possibility that the hostages are on board the dhow. The Dhow changed course and made its way back toward Somalia.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR Warship Sinks Pirate Skiffs

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/06/eu-navfor-warship-sinks-pirate-skiffs/>

### **June 11 “Somali pirates free Kuwaiti oil tanker” (VOA News, June 12, and Shiptalk, June 14, 2011)**

On the 11th, Somali pirates have released a Kuwaiti oil tanker, MV *Zirku* (105,846DWT). A ransom of \$12 million is said to have been paid to the pirates to release the ship. The 29-member crew is doing okay.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, Somali pirates have released a Kuwaiti oil tanker, MV *Zirku* (105,846DWT). The 29-member crew is said to be doing okay. The oil tanker was captured in the Gulf of Aden while sailing to Singapore from Sudan.

A piracy watchdog group says the pirates were paid a ransom of \$12 million to release the ship. However, according to the Shiptalk dated the 14th, the ransom fell well short of the widely-quoted figure. According to the source, it is believed that the *Zirku* ransom probably comes somewhere between the \$11.5m paid for “*Irene SL*” and the \$9.5m paid for South Korean VLCC “*Samho Dream*” last year. Experts believe that the days of the \$1m-\$1.5m ransoms appear to be over and today the range is more likely to be around \$4m-\$4.5m, with tankers attracting the highest rates. While negotiations are important, the real push should be to reduce the time of the hijack, time is money and there is a moral imperative to get the crew out before the torture starts.

Refer to the article: Somali Pirates Free Kuwaiti Oil Tanker After Ransom

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Somali-Pirates-Free-Kuwaiti-Oil-Tanker-After-Ransom--123714964.html>

False Claims

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=9050>

### **June 14 “Somali pirates free Panamanian-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, June 17, and The Nation, June 19, 2011)**

On the 14th, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel owned by the Egyptian shipping company, the MV *Suez* (17,300DWT). Having been released, the ship was sinking due to rough weather about 80 miles off Oman's southern port of Salalah. The Egyptian owner of the ship instructed the crew to abandon the ship. The cargo vessel's crew was shifted to the Pakistani navy's frigate PNS *Babur* which had been escorting the *Suez* to save lives.

An outline of the article: On the 14th, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel owned by the Egyptian shipping company, the MV *Suez* (17,300DWT). The vessel was pirated on August 2, 2010 in the Gulf of Aden. The MV *Suez* has a crew of 23. Having been released, the ship was sinking due to rough weather about 80 miles off Oman's southern port of Salalah. The Egyptian owner of the ship instructed the crew to abandon the ship. The cargo

vessel's crew was shifted to the Pakistani navy's frigate PNS *Babur* which had been escorting the *Suez* to save lives after Pakistani Chief of Naval Staff ordered the arrangements.

Refer to the article: MV SUEZ released from pirate control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/06/mv-suez-released-from-pirate-control-2/>

MV Suez crew shifted to PNS Babur; ship sinking

<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/19-June-2011/MV-Suez-crew-shifted-to-PNS-Babur-ship-sinking>

### **June 16 “Somali pirates free German ship” (Reuters, June 17, 2011)**

On the 16th, Somali pirates have freed an Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship owned by the German shipping company, MV *Susan K* (4,464DWT). The cargo vessel was pirated on April 8, 2011, 200 nautical miles North East of Salalah, Oman. MV *Susan K* has a crew of 10 Ukrainians and Filipinos. One of the pirates said they had taken \$5.7 million in ransom.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Somali pirates have freed an Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship owned by the German shipping company, MV *Susan K* (4,464DWT). The cargo vessel was pirated on April 8, 2011, 200 nautical miles North East of Salalah, Oman. MV *Susan K* has a crew of 10 Ukrainians and Filipinos. One of the pirates said they had taken \$5.7 million in ransom. Andrew Mwangura, maritime editor of The Somalia Report, said the ransom had been paid in the Kenyan port city of Mombasa, but he could not confirm the sum.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates free German ship after ransom paid

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE75G01L20110617>

### **June 16 “Netherlands to approve anti-piracy measures on Somali territory” (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, June 16, 2011)**

On the 16th, Dutch parliament agreed with Defense Minister that the Dutch navy will be allowed to fight pirates on Somali territory. Defense Minister guarantees, however, that the Dutch won't be involved in the fight against terrorism that is currently being fought in Somalia.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, a majority in Dutch parliament agreed with Defense Minister (DM) Hans Hillen that the anti-piracy effort has to be upgraded. Thereby, the Dutch navy will be allowed to fight pirates on Somali territory. DM guarantees, however, that the Dutch won't be involved in the fight against terrorism that is currently being fought in Somalia. According to DM, it is not a necessity to do so since the attacks will only be preventive, so Dutch ministry will not inform the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in the event of a strike on land. In addition, the people living near the coast of Somalia won't be affected at all. In the next few years the Netherlands will deploy several navy vessels and one submarine off the coast of Somalia.

Refer to the article: Dutch parliament wants to tackle pirates ashore

<http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/dutch-parliament-wants-tackle-pirates-ashore>

## 1.2 Military Developments

### June 2 “U.S. PACFLT Commander cites importance of forward presence” (American Forces Press Service, June 3, 2011)

On the 2nd, during the conference in Washington, D.C., Navy Adm. Patrick M. Walsh, the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, emphasized the importance of the forward presence of the U.S. armed forces, in response to the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, during the fifth annual conference of the U.S. think tank, the Center for a New American Security, Navy Adm. Patrick M. Walsh emphasized the importance of the forward presence of the U.S. armed forces, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) Within hours, the United States was able to launch Operation Tomodachi, its military support mission, deploying ships from Yokosuka Naval Base, soldiers from Camp Zama, Marines from Okinawa and airmen from Yokota Air Base. Working side by side with their Japanese counterparts and other international contributors, they have been continuing humanitarian assistance and complex operations to date. “Operation Tomodachi” evidently showed what the forward-deployment force which has established quick response capability and cooperative coordination can do. Additionally, the quick response taken immediately after a North Korean artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 was in the same nature. The forces that are in the region are available within hours after the attack. U.S.-South Korean naval cooperation and the series of exercises following the attack gave an unmistakable message to North Korea that such provocations won’t be tolerated.
- (2) Even relatively minor incidents have the potential to escalate in the blink of an eye, which shows the “strategic uncertainty” of the Asia-Pacific region. There was an example in September, in which a Chinese fisherman collided with two Japanese coast guard cutters in disputed waters in the East China Sea. Tensions heightened between the two major East Asian powers, with both sides pointing fingers at the other. Similar scenarios easily could play out in many other disputed islands and waters throughout the region, threatening stability.

Refer to the article: Fleet Commander Cites Importance of Forward Presence

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64185>

### June 2 “Chinese Jin-SSBN getting ready?” (Federation of American Scientists, June 2, 2011)

Hans M. Kristensen, a Fellow at the US Federation of American Scientists, released photographs of two China’s new *Jin*-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s) anchoring at Xiaopingdao naval base in the suburbs of Dalian.

An outline of the article: Hans M. Kristensen, a Fellow at the US Federation of American Scientists, released photographs of two China’s new *Jin*-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s) anchoring at Xiaopingdao naval base in the suburbs of Dalian. Regarding

the photographs, Kristensen mentions as follows:

- (1) The Xiaopingdao naval base is used to outfit submarines for ballistic missile flight tests. This raises a question if the *Jin*-class is finally reaching a point of operational readiness. Nevertheless, the submarines are unlikely to become operational in the sense that U.S. missile submarines are operational when they sail on patrols. Chinese ballistic missile submarines have never sailed on a deterrent patrol or deployed with nuclear weapons on board. The nuclear weapons are stored on land in facilities controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The Chinese military only has a limited capability to communicate with the submarines while at sea.
- (2) It is possible that the two submarines are the same two boats that have been seen fitting out at the Huludao shipyard for the past several years. One submarine was also seen at Jianggezhuang naval base on the satellite photographs taken in August 2010. Additionally, a *Jin*-class SSBN was seen at Xiaopingdao in March 2009 and at Sanya in Hainan Island in February 2009, while it was at anchor, on satellite photographs.
- (3) Although it is unclear how China intends to utilize the *Jin*-class submarines once they become operational, they are unlikely to be deployed with nuclear weapons on board in peacetime like U.S. missile submarines. Deploying nuclear weapons on *Jin*-class submarines at sea in a crisis where they would be exposed to U.S. attack submarines seems like a strange strategy given China's obsession with protecting the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces. The *Jin*-class SSBN force seems more like a prestige project – something China has to have as a big military power. Whether it makes sense is another matter.

Refer to the article: Chinese Jin-SSBNs Getting Ready?

<http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/jin2011.php>



Two of China's new *Jin*-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were photographed at Xiaopingdao in late-March 2011, possibly in preparation for missile test launches

Source: <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/images/jin2011.jpg>

### **June 3 “U.S., Chinese military leaders note progress on military ties” (American Forces Press Service, June 3, 2011)**

On the 3rd, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie held bilateral talks in Singapore, and confirmed that two countries were making progress in re-establishing good military-to-military relations. Pentagon Press Secretary said the meeting was productive and cordial. He added: “In the talks, overall the meeting focused more on areas of agreement rather than disagreement. Of course, areas of disagreement were raised, but they were sort of acknowledged and moved on from.”

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie held bilateral talks in Singapore, and confirmed that two countries were making progress in re-establishing good military-to-military relations. The Chinese suspended contacts with the U.S. military in 2009 in retaliation for the United States providing defensive weapons to Taiwan. Gates and Liang continued discussions that began in January 2011 when the secretary visited Beijing. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao call military-to-military contacts between the two nations “an underdeveloped” part of the broader relationship between the United States and China.

In the talks, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he believes the U.S.-Chinese military relationship is now on a more positive trajectory. “Going forward, the U.S. and China must do more to work together on issues where we have common strategic interest -- piracy, disaster relief and North Korea,” he added. The secretary said the two countries agree in many areas, but that it is especially important that leaders continue to work together in areas where there is disagreement. The meeting was productive and cordial, said Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell. “I think overall the meeting focused more on areas of agreement rather than disagreement. Of course, areas of disagreement were raised, but they were sort of acknowledged and moved on from.” Liang recognized the efforts Gates has made to advance the military-to-military relationship, Morrell said. “Liang noted that the Chinese side appreciated Secretary Gates’ efforts, and that without his personal efforts, the progress that has been achieved over the past year would not have been possible,” Morrell said. Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie did raise issues they are concerned with, including arms sales to Taiwan, a “hyping” of the Chinese military threat and reconnaissance operations off China’s coast, said a senior defense official speaking on background. Liang did bring up the Strategic Security Dialogue put in place following the January meetings, the official said, adding that U.S. officials were encouraged that the Chinese see this as a beneficial forum for discussion.

Refer to the article: U.S., Chinese Leaders Note Progress on Military Ties

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64179>

### **June 13 “US Navy needs diesel submarines” (Defense News, June 13, 2011)**

The U.S. Navy faces a fundamental dilemma: It needs more submarines, but the overall defense budget required to build those submarines is lacking. How should it square this circle? According to researchers at the American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (AEI), the

answer is that the Navy should procure a fleet of diesel-powered subs. Not only are diesels cheaper than nuclear-powered subs, but they have the advantage of being better platforms for many of the tasks the Navy faces today.

An outline of the article: According to Gary J. Schmitt and Richard Cleary, researchers at the American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (AEI), the U.S. Navy faces a fundamental dilemma: It needs more submarines, but the overall defense budget required to build those submarines is lacking. How should it square this circle? The answer is that the Navy should procure a fleet of diesel-powered subs, the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) The demand for attack submarines is both quantitative and qualitative. Over the past two decades, for example, China has added more than 40 new submarines. Although they are not equivalent to ours, they still need to be tracked - and that takes numbers. Meanwhile, the list of actual and potential submarine missions, including close-in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, special operations, and blockade and mining, continues to grow. These growing operational demands are coupled with the exigencies of new undersea requirements. In addition to the deep-sea dives and prolonged blue-water missions that became the staple of submarine operations during the Cold War, there are a number of scenarios today that are focused on the littoral areas, the green water within 100 miles of land, be they in the strait of Hormuz or Malacca, off the shores of Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
- (2) It is these missions that often favor diesel submarines. Diesel subs are smaller, stealthier and more maneuverable in tight spaces than nuclear submarines. For example, unlike a nuclear submarine's power plant, a diesel's primary engine can be turned off when submerged, reducing noise emission. Indeed, unlike a nuclear-powered submarine, a modern diesel can hide on the ocean's floor, deadly silent, while monitoring whatever passes over and around it. And with the advent of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology, today's diesel subs can remain submerged for weeks at a time. When deployed to bases in the Far East or Middle East, the range and reach of today's AIP-equipped diesels would put them well within striking distance of critical choke points. And, using the recent sale price of Germany's Type 212 subs to Turkey as a point of reference - approximately \$500 million versus the \$2 billion for a Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine - the Navy would be able to ramp up submarine production without breaking the bank.
- (3) The U.S. Navy is not ignorant of the advantages of diesel subs. Time and again, American naval crews have struggled to detect their diesel-electric "foes" at sea. Building diesel submarines in the U.S. has other advantages as well. There is a growing global market for diesel submarines among allies and partners and it's work U.S. shipyards certainly could use. In addition, having diesels in the fleet provides an in-house training tool for anti-submarine warfare efforts against other nations' diesels. It is useful to remember that Russia and China have successfully incorporated both diesel and nuclear submarines into their force structure. Of course, the U.S. Navy has been dead set against building anything but nuclear-powered submarines for a half-century now. The new excuse for not building diesels is the claim that the missions that diesels might usefully perform can be handled with unmanned underwater

vehicles (UUVs). But while UUVs are a promising idea, significant questions pertaining to speed, payload, sensors and communication remain.

Refer to the article: U.S. Navy Needs Diesel Submarines

<http://www.aei.org/article/103715>

### **June 15 “Chinese Navy’s reaches far, heightening tension in waters around” (The New York Times, June 15, 2011)**

The U.S. newspaper, *The New York Times* dated the 15th, has carried the views of U.S. experts concerned that one of the Chinese Navy’s main goals in modernizing the fleet is to operate in an area where the United States currently has naval supremacy -- the waters of the western Pacific that lie beyond Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, what is commonly known as the “first island chain.”

An outline of the article: The U.S. newspaper, *The New York Times* dated the 15th has carried an article of its correspondent in Qingdao, China, which reports that the activities of the Chinese Navy in the open-ocean are escalating tensions in the surrounding waters, the gist of which is as follows:

- (1) The photographs of Chinese warships speeding between Japanese islands in the Pacific for drills in early July were circulated quickly, increasing what Japanese defense minister called “serious concern.” On the other hand, recently, in the South China Sea Vietnam and the Philippines are repeating the small skirmishes with China, escalating tensions in these waters. These events in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea reflect a new and potentially volatile pattern which is apt to develop into new and potential conflicts. As the Chinese Navy which has been modernized rapidly is expanding its reaching scope in the ocean, it is not easy for the neighboring nations to track the Chinese naval vessels, including naval and surveillance boats, fisheries law enforcement ships and fishing skiffs. Pushing back hard over anything would be deemed aggressive. In recent weeks Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan have voiced concerns or made formal complaints over Chinese nautical movements. Some nations have deployed ships or aircraft to disputed waters. The United States, the dominant military force in the Pacific, is watching closely and has sought to bolster its alliances in the region.
- (2) The growing confidence of the Chinese Navy is on open display. Here in the port of Qingdao, they held an impressive naval review in 2009. At a coastal city, Dalian the navy has been rebuilding an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier, the *Varyag*, which is expected to be operational this year. According to American officials, one of the Chinese Navy’s main goals in modernizing is to operate in an area where the United States currently has naval supremacy -- the waters of the western Pacific that lie beyond Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, what is commonly known as the “first island chain.” Lyle Goldstein, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the United States Naval War College, said: “At one level, this is the new ‘normal.’ “This is especially true with respect to the group of Chinese P.L.A. navy ships going through the ‘first island chain’ to conduct a medium-sized exercise.” Such exercises will become much



more regular and likely grander, he added, “especially, once China adds a carrier to the mix.” The Chinese Defense Ministry said last week that the Chinese ships spotted between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako were in compliance with international law. Their purpose was to conduct a “regular exercise” that was “in accordance with the annual plan” of the Chinese military, the ministry said.

Refer to the article: China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling the Region

[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15china.html?\\_r=1&ref=chinaJune](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15china.html?_r=1&ref=chinaJune)

### **June 15 “The 10th SEACAT Exercise kicked off” (US Pacific Fleet News, June 17, 2011)**

On the 15th, the 10th annual Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT) maritime security exercise was commenced. SEACAT is a 10-day at-sea exercise designed to enhance maritime information sharing and the coordination of maritime security responses in the region.

An outline of the article: On the 15th, the 10th annual Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT) maritime security exercise was commenced. SEACAT is a 10-day at-sea exercise designed to enhance maritime information sharing and the coordination of maritime security responses in the region. Liaison officers from the participating nations of the U.S. and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, operating from the Multinational Operations and Exercise Center (MOEC) at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, will coordinate ship tracking, help coordinate their own country’s boarding operation, and hand off the ship to a neighboring country as the ship departs their country’s waters. During the exercise, USNS *Pecos* (T-AO 197), USS *Chung-Hoon* (DDG 93) and USNS *Safeguard* (T-ARS 50) will serve as simulated “vessels of interest.” During actual boardings of the designated vessels of interest by participating navies, U.S. Navy crewmembers of simulated “vessels of interest” will witness the boarding techniques of their counterparts, and then share their own best practices. SEACAT, which began in 2002, is a model of how navies can cooperate and work together to address issues of shared concern, including piracy, smuggling and other transnational crimes at sea.

Refer to the article: U.S. Navy Joins Southeast Asian Partners In Counter-Terrorism Exercise

[http://www.cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2011/jun/jun17\\_SEACAT.shtml](http://www.cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2011/jun/jun17_SEACAT.shtml)

### **June 17 “Russia, France sign deal on buying 2 French-made amphibious ships” (Reuters, June 17, 2011)**

On the 17th, France and Russia signed an agreement for Paris to supply Moscow with two *Mistral* class helicopter carriers in a 1.2 billion euro (\$1.52 billion) deal. Two nations had already agreed to build two more *Mistrals* in Russia.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, France and Russia signed an agreement for Paris to supply Moscow with two *Mistral* class helicopter carriers in a 1.2 billion euro (\$1.52 billion) deal. The contract is Moscow’s first major foreign arms purchase in the two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union. The two *Mistrals* are to be made in France. Two nations had already agreed to build

two more *Mistrals* in Russia. President Dmitry Medvedev oversaw the signing ceremony in St. Petersburg, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy welcomed the deal in a statement released by his office. Meanwhile, as the purchase caused concern among some NATO members, Russia has tried to ease NATO fears by announcing plans to deploy the vessels in the Pacific. The *Mistral*-class ships are able to carry up to 16 helicopters, such as Russia's Ka-50/52 choppers. Their landing barges and hovercraft allow vehicles, tanks and soldiers to be deployed to shore.

Refer to the article: Russia, France sign Mistral helicopter carrier deal

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/russia-france-mistral-idUSLDE75G1K520110617>



*Mistral* class helicopter carrier

Source: RIA Novosti, June 20, 2011

## 🎧🎧 **Topic 1** 🎧🎧

The gist of speeches of U.S. Secretary of States Robert Michael Gates, Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, and Defense Minister of PRC Liang Guanglie at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit

The 10th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, was held in Singapore on 4-5 June, and U.S. Secretary of States Robert Michael Gates, Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, and Defense Minister of PRC General Liang Guanglie delivered their speeches, the gist of which is as follows.

### **1. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Michael Gates**

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Michael Gates made his speech at the session titled "Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific," the gist of which is as follows. Main questions and answers are added at the end of this article.

- (1) America's commitments in Asia are enduring and consistent even in times of transition and change. It will remain consistent under the new administration, and I believe the same will hold true with respect to US defense policy under Leon Panetta, who was nominated as my successor. America's engagement in Asia has fostered the economic growth and stability of the region. I spoke about these: (a) free and open commerce; (b) a just international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law; (c) open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and now cyberspace; and (d) the principle of resolving conflict without the use of force.
- (2) The commitment and presence of the US as a Pacific nation has been one of relatively few constants amidst the furious changes in this region over the past half-century. But, as this region has changed, America has always shown the flexibility not only to maintain our presence in the Asia-Pacific, but to enhance it by updating relationships, developing new capabilities, and transforming our defense posture to meet the challenges of the day. In Singapore, we are strengthening our bilateral defence relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement and pursuing more operational engagement, most notably by deploying US Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore.
- (3) Maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting ongoing challenges to regional stability and prosperity. The US position on maritime security remains clear. We have a national interest in freedom of navigation, in unimpeded economic development and commerce, and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain and rights of access to it. By working together in appropriate regional and multilateral forums and adhering to principles that we believe are of benefit to all in the region, we can ensure that all

share equal and open access to international waterways.

- (4) We will continue to maintain and enhance our traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific region through efforts such as these, but we believe that US presence, and the associated impact and influences, should not solely be measured in terms of conventional metrics, or boots on the ground. In the coming years, the US military is going to be increasing its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts with multiple countries throughout the region. These types of activities not only broaden and deepen our relationships with friends and allies; they help build partner capacity to address regional challenges. The US Navy and Air Force have been concerned about anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) scenarios for some time. These two military services are working together to develop a new concept of operations – called Air-Sea Battle – to ensure that America’s military will continue to be able to deploy, move, and strike over great distances in defense of our allies and vital interests.

These programs will ensure that we will continue to meet our commitments as a 21st-century Asia-Pacific nation, with appropriate forces, posture and presence.

Refer to the article:

<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/first-plenary-session/dr-robert-gates/>

#### **Q&A, Dr Robert M Gates, Secretary of Defense, United States**

<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/first-plenary-session/qa/>

Q1: When will the US accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)?

A1: That is a question probably better addressed to the US Senate than to me. I will tell you this: the Law of the Sea treaty has no more ardent supporter in the US government than the US Navy. Our position from the Department of Defense, and especially, I would say, from the navy, is that the sooner we accede, the better off we and this region will be.

Q2: What type of burden- or operation-sharing templates would you suggest for your key allies in this region, including the Japanese, Koreans and Australians, as you look to the next 10-20 years?

A2: I can assure you that, in a time of economic duress, Congress are willing to support our forward presence. But they will want to ensure that the terms of this presence are equitable and that the financial interests of the American people are being looked at as well. These are continuing discussions between our friends and us and, I think that people should expect this area of the relationships to come under further scrutiny in the time ahead.

Q3: How will you propose constructively to address Chinese positions on aerial access, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the little waters south of Hainan Island? And how could that objective of US policy be addressed constructively with Chinese concerns?

A3: As a rule of conduct, and in order to settle these issues through international rules, I think the underlying principles I addressed in my speech should apply not just to the US and China, but to all states. There has been progress made at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in terms of a code of conduct in the waters of this region. If people could reach agreement on that, it would be applied to a lot of these situations. This is an area where ASEAN has taken the lead. There is a 2002 code that could provide the basis for that kind of a dialogue. The key here is to get these relationships and the rules, if you will, ironed out in a way that is agreed to by all parties and that provides a peaceful mechanism for resolving these disputes without increasing tensions.

Q4: Just in May, Chinese patrol ships reportedly cut a cable of a PetroVietnam ship. There have also been some structures that have recently been established on reefs in the Philippines, exclusive economic zones by China. Could you address those issues, your concerns and how [you] think that they can be addressed so that they do not escalate to broader tensions and conflict?

A4: The answer to this question relates very closely to the answer to the previous question. There are some mechanisms out there that we believe can be used to resolve these issues. They need to be resolved peacefully and within the framework of international law. Finding a mechanism for adjudicating conflicting disputes seems to me to be one of the institutional challenges confronting the entire region. We will be significantly engaged in and supportive of that process, but the reality is it needs the engagement of all the principal players out here as well.

Q5: What is the exact meaning of the United States' national interest in the South China Sea and what is its position on the joint development between the littoral states of the South China Sea?

A5: I believe that I have answered this question in the respect that I think that there are mechanisms for resolving the issues relating to the South China Sea. I think that there are opportunities to strengthen those mechanisms. I think that the key here is that the United States' interest is in ensuring that these conflicts and competing claims are resolved in a peaceful way and in accordance with international law. That is the position that we will continue to take.

Q6: In 2010 the disputes in the South China Sea and other maritime areas in this region have increased. Everybody has been fairly sanguine about China, but even some of China's friends are now starting to say that it is undermining its theory of a peaceful rise. Do you agree with that?

A6: I do not think that it has risen to that level yet. I think that we should not lose any time in trying to strengthen these mechanisms that I have been talking about in dealing with competing claims in the South China Sea. The key is to find some kind of multilateral

mechanism that can be used to resolve these issues.

Q7: One major problem with these relations, in addition to United States arms sales to Taiwan, is United States intelligence and military activities in the Chinese vicinity. While the United States may take access to every part of the world for granted, from a Chinese perspective, especially given the isometric relationship of the power, sometimes China may find United States activities intimidating and intrusive. As a major military power, could the United States sometimes exercise self-constraint in seeking its global military presence and access?

A7: First of all, I would say that United States activities are completely consistent with international law and with freedom of navigation and skies; we are respectful of territorial limits. The key here begins with one word, and that is transparency. The more transparent nations are in terms of what they are doing, what their intentions are and what their programs are, and then, in many instances, the less need there is for us to unilaterally attempt to figure that out on our own.

Q8: Under the situation in which American defense expenses is down and China's defense expenses up, the geopolitical chemistry of this region will be expected to change. Five years from now, with the perception that American influence will be declining, what do you do to reassure countries in this region that things will actually remain the same five or ten years from now?

A8: I have a very simple answer. I will bet you \$100 that five years from now, United States influence in this region is as strong if not stronger than it is today.

Refer to the article: Full text of questions and answers;

<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/first-plenary-session/qa/>

## 2. Toshimi Kitazawa, Minister of Defense, Japan

Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa made the speech titled "New Military Doctrines and Capabilities in Asia" at the Shangri-La Dialogue, in which he spoke about the Japan's revised National Defense Program Guidelines, as well as the response of the Japanese Government following the Great East Japan Earthquake while expressing his thanks for the assistance given by the nations concerned. The gist of his speech is as follows.

(1) In the new Defense Guidelines, in order to cope with the multilateral and complex nature of security issues as a fundamental goal of the defense force, Japan calls for a policy of building a dynamic defense force by focusing more on the operations of the Self Defense Force (SDF) without relying on the previous concept of the "Basic Defense Power." It is the concept of achieving national security of our country by using the SDF positively, as usual, while emphasizing the "deployment" of the defense force, leaving away from the concept which has emphasized the effectiveness of deterrence through the simple existence of a defense force.

- (2) The response to the massive earthquake was extremely difficult in nature, requiring a tremendous manpower for the disaster relief operations in the affected region, as well as a specialized response team for the nuclear disaster. The SDF swiftly established a joint command center and mobilized a force of more than 100,000 personnel. The SDF's capabilities were fully exerted during this period when the SDF was speedily dispatched in such a large-scale disaster relief, while it continued to undertake a number of other regular operations such as warning and surveillance, and scrambles. This clearly shows what the new Guidelines propose as "dynamic defense force" is in the right direction.
- (3) I would like to say a few words on the significance of the Shangri-la dialogue as a forum for multilateral discussion. The new National Defense Program Guidelines emphasize the importance of promoting multifaceted security cooperation through the deepening of our relationship with the United States, and the promotion of networks for bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. The recent earthquake really has made us realize once again the relationships of trust we have with many countries. I believe that it is important to promote further dialogue with the international community in order to strengthen and maintain these relationships of trust. For it is through such dialogue that we can confirm our shared rules and values. The largest principle supporting world peace and global economic activities are values like human rights and equality, rules of the free trade framework and international law such as freedom of navigation, which were established by continuous and repeated national practices. When we share our understanding of rules and values like these, we build everlasting relationships of trust as true friends.

Refer to the article: Full text of the speech by Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa (in English and Japanese):

<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/second-plenary-session/toshimi-kitazawa/>

(In Japanese; Information on website of the Ministry of Defense, Japan)

<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/06/04a.html>

### **3. General Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defense, China**

General Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defense, China, made the speech titled "China's International Security Cooperation," the gist of which is as follows.

- (1) At present, in general, the security environment in Asia-Pacific region is stable. At the same time, on the other hand, Asia Pacific is also faced with multiple security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional. As we enter into the second decade of the 21st century, it is a shared responsibility for us all to create an enabling environment for long-lasting peace and common prosperity in Asia Pacific.
- (2) China would like to maintain the following four principles in order to promote security cooperation with respective nations:
- (a) In accordance with the principle of mutual respect and equality, China should accommodate each other's core interest and major concerns.

- (b) In the principle of mutual understanding and trust, China should fully understand each other's strategic intentions. The greater roles played by emerging countries in regional and international affairs represent opportunities rather than threats for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. A new era calls for a new way of thinking. Zero-sum assumption and cold war mentality in the security arena stand contrast to the trend of today. If we ignore the concrete facts, make assumptions or distortions on others' strategic intentions purely based on differences in ideology and social system, we risk creating adversaries. Trust starts with engagement. Countries should, on the basis of respect and equality, enhance dialogue and communication extensively, and read each other's strategic intentions rationally and objectively. Only so can we stay prepared mentally for security cooperation.
- (c) It is important to share the interests, and we should not engage in any alliance targeting a third party. Asia-Pacific is the shared home for all people in the region. In this context, working together and helping each other is in the interest of all. Meanwhile, security challenges in the region remain complicated and diversified. Hence no regional security could be achieved by any single country alone or through wishful thinking only. Security can only be achieved through collaboration.
- (d) In the principle of openness, inclusiveness, solidarity and cooperation, we welcome all nations' contribution to the security in Asia Pacific.
- (3) The path of peaceful development of China is by no means an expedient but a strategic choice based on a range of factors: the general trend of social development of the mankind, China's own conditions, its traditional values and its commitment to a harmonious world. This path is fundamentally different from the path of colonial expansion that some countries used to take historically. This is a path that links China with the rest of the world through their common interests. It is a path that ensures an enduring win-win result eventually shared by all nations. China unwaveringly adheres to a defense policy defensive in nature, and adopts the policy of forging friendly and good-neighborly relations. China is contributing to defending peace and stability in the surrounding areas through security cooperation, promoting mutual reliance with other nations and common benefits and accomplishing its own international responsibilities and duties. China will never seek hegemony or military expansion in its sphere of influence.
- (4) China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. In 2002, China and ASEAN countries signed Declaration on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea, which acknowledged the settlement of the territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly involved. Also in this declaration, it was reaffirmed that the freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea shall be respected according to universally recognized principles of international law. At present, the general situation in the South China Sea remains stable. China has been actively keeping dialogues and consultations with ASEAN countries in implementing the Declaration.

Refer to the article: Full text (in English)



<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/general-liang-guanglie-english/>

(in Chinese)

<http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/fourth-plenary-session-general-liang-guanglie/>

 **Topic 2** **Commentary on China's aircraft carrier in June**

In an exclusive interview with *The Hong Kong Commercial Daily* on the 7th, the chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chen Bingde has confirmed that China's first aircraft carrier is under construction. However, an official from the PLA also added that he would not respond to questions concerning the aircraft carrier before it completes construction. This is the first time the PLA has officially acknowledged the existence of a Chinese aircraft carrier. In addition, Qi Jianguo, assistant to the chief of the general staff of the PLA, said to the paper that “the significance of owning aircraft carrier is a symbol as a great power that China has to experience on its path of going to the world, citing the examples of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council that have already owned aircraft carriers. (*Global Times*, June 8, and *The Hong Kong Commercial Daily News*, June 7, 2011)

The following is the major commentary on China's aircraft carrier noted in June.

**1. “Aircraft carrier – symbol of China's growing naval power” (BBC News, June 8, 2011)**

On the 8th, regarding the China's first aircraft carrier which seems to be almost ready for departure from the dock-site in the Dalian Port, BBC News reports it is a clear indication that shows a Chinese navy's ambition and a shift of power that may come eventually.

An outline of the article: On the 8th, regarding the China's first aircraft carrier which everyone can see from the Ikea, the superstore in Dalian, and seems to be almost ready for departure from the dock-site in the Dalian Port, BBC News reports the main points as follows:


- (1) This huge aircraft carrier is a symbol of China's growing naval power. A retired general of People's Liberation Army (PLA), Xu Guangyu says: “The aircraft carrier is a symbol of China's naval power. China should be, at least, at the same level as other UN Security Council members that own aircraft carriers. General Xu Gungyu now advises China's government on its military modernization program of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). “It's also a symbol of deterrence,” adds Gen Xu, “So it's normal for us to want a carrier. I actually think it's strange if China doesn't have one.” He adds that the development of the Chinese armed forces is connected with the development of Chinese economy. Gen Xu says: “There are vital shipping routes in Asia, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and both sides of the Pacific that we need to protect. So our military strength needs to match the range of our economic and diplomatic activity.” Reports claim it will be named the *Shi Lang*, after the Chinese admiral who conquered Taiwan in the 17th Century. When it is commissioned, the carrier will mark a significant leap forward for China's navy. Rick Fisher, a senior analyst at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a US think tank, says it has big ambitions. “The aircraft carrier is part of China's fulfillment of its 2004 historic mission that the People's Liberation Army will increasingly defend the Communist Party's interests outside of China,” he says. Fisher adds: “By the 2020s China wants a military that will be globally deployable and will be

able to challenge American interests where they need to be challenged.”

(2) China's military is generally believed to be 20 years behind America's in its development. But in its rapid expansion, China is focusing on weapons designed to blunt US military power. Beijing has invested heavily in submarines. It is believed to be close to deploying the world's first “carrier-killer” ballistic missile, designed to sink aircraft carriers while they are maneuvering at sea up to 1,500km offshore, and it is building its own stealth fighter aircraft along with advanced carrier-based aircraft built from Russian designs. All of these can target US bases, US ships and US carriers in Asia. They will make it much more dangerous for US carrier fleets to operate close to China's coast, pushing them out further offshore. In any future conflict they could make it much harder for the US to operate as freely as it would like. That in turn opens up more room for China to flex its own military muscles in Asia. Having an aircraft carrier will then enable China to project power further than it has before. So looking on with concern are Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, who all have territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. And Taiwan, Korea and Japan that look to the US for their security may start to question how much America can really protect them in future. This may, one day, undermine US security guarantees and its influence in the region. There is much work to do before China's aircraft carriers become a potent force. But, sitting in the port in Dalian, the carrier is a clear sign of China's naval ambitions and the shift of power that is likely to bring.

Refer to the article: Aircraft carrier symbol of China's naval ambitions

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13693495>



Source: BBC News, June 8, 2011

## 2. "Aircraft carrier: Mission for time being (China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue.1, The Jamestown Foundation, June 17, 2011)

Aaron Shraberg, Fellow at the US think tank, Defense Geospatial Intelligence (DGI) Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, has contributed the articles titled "Near-Term Missions for China's Maiden Aircraft Carrier" to the Web Journal, China Brief, on the 17th. In the article, Shraberg mentions that, although we have to wait for several years before the Chinese aircraft carrier becomes operational, China watchers and military experts will continue to monitor the maiden carrier, a dream no longer deferred, to better understand the PLAN's real capabilities, and China's expectations for this and any future carriers.

An outline of the article: Contributing the articles titled "Near-Term Missions for China's Maiden Aircraft Carrier" to the Web Journal, China Brief, on the 17th, Aaron Shraberg, Fellow at the US think tank, Defense Geospatial Intelligence (DGI) Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, describes the missions of the Chinese aircraft carrier for the being, the gist of which is as follows:

- (1) As China's maiden aircraft carrier nears its sea trials one question that evades analysts' minds is why China is building a carrier. For many of the carrier's potential missions: from "recovering" Taiwan; to "solving" the Paracel, Spratly and Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands disputes; to "safeguarding" China's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), a fully operational carrier is considered logistically unattainable, at least in the near term. While several of the above missions may figure into a long-term strategic calculus, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) must first undergo an extensive period of trials, testing and training before the ship is mission-ready to the extent that it will be useful for China's most vexing regional and international flashpoints. Yet, the meaning the Chinese officials, experts, press and even everyday Chinese people assign to an aircraft carrier seems to imply otherwise. For instance, a Chinese newspaper reports that a major general stated: "for China to own a carrier is normal...an aircraft carrier is a symbol of the power of a great nation." The carrier is described by a PLA Air Force Colonel as "a silent deterrent against hegemony" and a "symbol." Citing the United States' use of an aircraft carrier to face successive post-World War II crises, an article from the official Xinhua News Agency states that an aircraft carrier is the embodiment of a kind of "discourse power," and American hegemony is inseparably linked to the aircraft carrier." Furthermore, one Global Times reader went so far as to say: "I can endure being poor, but I cannot endure that China does not have an aircraft carrier"
- (2) Examining the usefulness and challenges involved in different possible missions of the carrier will help to clarify what the carrier will actually be able to accomplish. Some major Chinese news sources say "the carrier is a key link in China's ability to fight and win a local war under the conditions, in which information is vital." The Taiwan Strait, the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands disputes present three possible local flashpoints that may see the use of a carrier.
  - (a) Regarding a Taiwan Strait scenario, Western analysts have pointed out that a carrier "would have little role in a near-term Taiwan scenario ... as land based PLA Air Force

(PLAAF) and Naval Aviation aircraft could probably handle all of the required air operations across the narrow Taiwan Strait.” Furthermore, the introduction of modern precision weaponry further obviates the need for an aircraft carrier force in the Taiwan Strait scenario. Yet, other analysts have pointed out that “a carrier force operating east of Taiwan could attack the island’s air defense forces on two fronts if the PLA were able to coordinate carrier-based attacks with shore-based attacks from the mainland.” Nevertheless, in order for this to happen, joint-operations capabilities are a prerequisite, which are unattainable in the near term.

- (b) For the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, a carrier “will provide China with sustainable air cover for the long-range power projection needed to seize and hold disputed territory.” However, carrying out these missions is largely dependent on air power at sea. Pilots will have to initially undergo a prolonged period of training before they can take off and land with any confidence. Naval experts note that in order for China’s carrier to present any formidable challenge, it must integrate a battle-group, which customarily includes at least one frigate, one destroyer, a supply ship, and submarine support. A carrier without a well-trained crew, supporting vessels and the critical coordination that goes with it can be a floating target. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper acknowledges China’s challenges in the development of joint operation capabilities, calling for an increasing focus on “enhancing integrated support capabilities.” As China completes its carrier, an increase in submarine purchases by Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore advances China’s regional neighbors’ “sea-denial” capabilities. Moreover, some countries in the region already constructed airstrips, including a 1,200m Taiwan-occupied runway built on Itu Aba, another 1,350m runway built by Malaysia, and another 1,000m runway on a Philippines-occupied reef. These factors all temper the regional force projection power of a carrier.
- (c) For the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands dispute, a carrier—both defensive and offensive in nature—would be effective as a psychological deterrent. But it risks sailing China into a maritime conflict with a formidable naval force beyond its own, namely Japan and the United States. Any Chinese or U.S. naval expert grounded in reality will say that a near-term conflict involving a Chinese carrier would be unfavorable to any future Chinese force projection scenarios beyond the first island chain.
- (3) China’s deployment of convoys to the Gulf of Aden/ Horn of Africa as an anti-piracy naval fleet have made the Chinese navy more aware of its limitations in performing naval operations far from China’s shores. For instance, the absence of basing arrangements to support the PLA Navy’s far sea missions will continue to challenge China’s long range missions. Yet, these missions may offer a preview of the type of mission a Chinese carrier could effectively carry out in the near term, maybe within the next 10 years. China’s anti-piracy missions, for example “escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia,” are mentioned in China’s 2010 Defense White Paper as included in military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW also includes Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions both regionally and outside Asia. China’s use of the carrier to support Humanitarian

Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions both regionally and outside Asia, also an achievable near-term mission for the carrier, would integrate China's carrier into the international system in a benign fashion. In the near term, the PLAN might also utilize the carrier for foreign port visits. As experts are pointing out, PLA military diplomacy has been utilized as a vehicle for furthering the Party-State's strategic national objectives. Port visits allow China to "show the flag," impress the people of each port the carrier visits and further military-to-military exchange.

- (4) The real weight of the carrier program on the balance of power in Asia is several years coming, at the earliest after the carrier completes its initial sea trials and its airmen are trained. During this time, developing joint-operation capabilities and maintenance for the ship and its air-wing will cost China more time and money. Meanwhile, to China's neighbors, the carrier's presence is clear and present. A recent rise in "sea denial" strategies by Southeast Asian nations, perhaps in response to China's attempt at "sea control" as symbolized in the maiden carrier, is evidenced by an increase in submarine purchases by Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Thus, the actual mission-effectiveness of a carrier decreases, especially for China's most vexing regional flashpoints, as the region responds. Meanwhile, China's maiden carrier is being outpaced in the face of new U.S. technologies such as jet-powered killer drones. Against this dynamic backdrop, a "70-year dream" is now coming true. Yet, the massive investment in time, technology, talent and money means that a lot is riding on the carrier. China watchers and military experts will continue to monitor the maiden carrier, a dream no longer deferred, to better understand the PLAN's real capabilities, and China's expectations for this and any future carriers.

Refer to the article: Near-Term Missions for China's Maiden Aircraft Carrier by Aaron Shraberg

[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=38069&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=c483075834de91ea310e5f9f111493c3](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38069&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=c483075834de91ea310e5f9f111493c3)

### 3. "China's maritime fortress: Comments of experts" (The Hindustan Times, June 18, 2011)

On the 18th, carrying the article titled "China's fortress on waterline," the Indian newspaper, *The Hindustan Times*, describes in it the comments of experts on China's first aircraft carrier.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, carrying the article titled "China's fortress on waterline," the Indian newspaper, *The Hindustan Times*, describes in it the comments of experts on China's first aircraft carrier, as follows:

- (1) Hu Shisheng, one of Beijing's government advisers on oceanic strategy at the state-run China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, says one carrier is not enough. Hu estimates that China needs minimum nine carriers including three in operation, and over a dozen in future. "Outsiders should get accustomed to China's rise. As a global power, we should be able to give a security guarantee to our neighbors," Hu said, listing North Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar which has a coastline only along the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, Mohan Malik, a strategist at the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, said: "The

Chinese acquisition of a few aircraft carriers would be the realization of dreams to operate in the Pacific and Indian ocean. It will also enable China to provide security to North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran and others.”

- (2) This warship will first be deployed only for trials and training. But China’s rising naval assertiveness in disputed waters since the last two years is already making its rivals like Japan, Vietnam and Philippines warily edge closer to the US. Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, Assistant Chief of General Staff of PLA, recently said that China needs an aircraft carrier as a status symbol comparable to permanent members of the UN Security Council and to face the “complex maritime problems” in the southern and eastern sea and Taiwan straits. China insists that its military modernization is for defensive purposes and that its carrier will not enter others’ territorial waters. However, strategist Li Bin at Tsinghua University recently told the nationalist Global Times that it’s ‘hard to say that the aircraft carrier will never go to territories outside China’.
- (3) Aforementioned Malik says that, for now, China’s ambition does not match its reality and capability. “For a decade or so, Beijing will not have more than two aircraft carriers and that won’t be enough for 24/7 global coverage,” said Malik. “Needless to say, China’s drive to build a large ocean-going naval fleet will lead to the emergence of a like-minded coalition of maritime powers to counter the Chinese navy.” China’s PLA chief recently admitted being 20 years behind the US military. “I feel very sad after visiting the US because I feel and know how poor our equipments are and how underdeveloped we remain,” General Chen Bingde was quoted saying on a visit to Washington.

Refer to the article: China’s fortress on water

<http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/world/China-s-fortress-on-water/Article1-711053.aspx>

### 1.3 South China Sea-related Events

#### **June 1 “Manila seeks Beijing’s explanation for territorial intrusion” (Reuters, June 1, 2011)**

On the 1st, the Philippine government said it had sought an explanation from the Chinese embassy in Manila on what Chinese navy ships and a marine surveillance vessel were doing in May inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, the Philippine government said it had sought an explanation from the Chinese embassy in Manila on what Chinese navy ships and a marine surveillance vessel were doing in May inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. According to Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Rosario, the Chinese ships reportedly unloaded building materials, erected an undetermined number of posts, and placed a buoy near the breaker of the Amy Douglas Bank off western Palawan island which was well inside the Philippines’ EEZ on May 21 and 24. Rosario said any construction would be a “clear violation” of a code of conduct agreement between China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2002.

Refer to the article: Manila says China intrudes in South China Sea territory

<http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/06/01/idINIndia-57425620110601>

#### **【Related Article】**

#### **“China should be responsible for explanation: RP Prof. Banlaoi” (News Break, June 2, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “A Mischief Reef in the making?” to the Philippine newspaper dated the 2nd, Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) said in it that China should be responsible for giving an explanation for the incident over Amy Douglas Bank, a gist of which is as follows: (1) China’s current behavior in the South China Sea is a litmus test of its self-proclaimed policy of “peaceful development”; (2) China’s growing assertive behavior in the South China Sea is giving the world a message that Beijing is becoming more of a “revisionist power” than of a “status quo power”; and (3) The reported incident in the May Douglas Bank, if proven accurate, is not only an assault against the Philippines but also an assault against a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) which China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed in 2002. If China wants to correct this impression, it has to make its own people accountable for the Douglas Bank Incident, which, otherwise, can be a Mischief Reef\* in the making.

An outline of the article: Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) said that China should be responsible for giving an explanation for the incident over Amy Douglas Bank, a gist of which is as follows.

(1) While Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie was enjoying his “goodwill” visit to the Philippines on May 21-25 to “improve” Philippines-China relations, the Philippine military



discovered in the same period some Chinese ships unloading construction materials near the unoccupied, but still Philippine controlled, Amy Douglas Bank. Based on the report of the Philippine military, China has erected an undetermined number of posts, and placed a buoy near the breaker of the Amy Douglas Bank. To date, the Chinese government has not yet verified the said incident. But it continues to claim sovereignty of all the islands, islets, reefs, shoals, banks and even rocks in the South China Sea. The Philippine government asserts that Amy Douglas Bank falls within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

- (2) The Amy Douglas Bank incident is just part of the renewed security tension in the South China Sea. The tension started in 2008 when China declared the Vietnamese-claimed Sansha City as an integral part of the Hainan Province. Since then, China has deployed several patrol ships in the South China Sea to defend what it calls an integral part of its “internal waters,” based on the “Nine-Dash Line” Map. Now that China has regained its strength, Beijing has now all the wherewithal to implement its own diplomacy and national security policy in the South China Sea. In 2011, the South China Sea was declared as part of China’s “core interests” at par with Taiwan and Tibet.
- (3) China’s current behavior in the South China Sea is a litmus test of its self-proclaimed policy of “peaceful development.” China’s growing assertive behavior in the South China Sea is giving the world a message that Beijing is becoming more of a “revisionist power” than of a “status quo power.” If China continues to display its growing assertive behavior, its neighbors will view it as an utter expression of aggressiveness. The reported incident in the May Douglas Bank, if proven accurate, is not only an assault against the Philippines but also an assault against a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) which China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed in 2002. This incident occurred at the same time when Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie was visiting the Philippines, which has created an impression that while China is talking “sweet” in house of its neighbors, it is acting “bitter” at the backyard. If China wants to correct this impression, it has to make its own people accountable for the Douglas Bank Incident. Otherwise, the Douglas Bank Incident can be a Mischief Reef\* in the making.

Refer to the article: A Mischief Reef in the making?

<http://www.newsbreak.ph/2011/06/02/a-mischief-reef-in-the-making/>

Note\*: China occupied the Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines in February 1995 and began to erect the building. It was at the end of 1992 when the U.S. military forces withdraw from the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines overlooking the South China Sea. Although there is no direct, casual relationship between these two incidents to be proved, it is assumed that a withdrawal of U.S. military forces should have relieved the psychological burden on Chinese activities. Afterwards, the Philippines concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States in February 1998, thereby resurrected formally the military cooperation between the United States and the Philippines.



Mischief Reef at the present

Source: China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 13, the Jamestown Foundation, June 24, 2009


### **June 6 “Does U.S. ensure security to RP?: Dispute over territorial sovereignty in SCS” (The Straits Times, June 6, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “Beijing turns up heat in S. China Sea” to the Singaporean newspaper, *The Straits Times* dated the 6th, Michael Richardson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies based in Singapore, says that, in view of China that sees the South China Sea (SCS) as strategically and economically important, and appears to be increasingly determined to strengthen the presence and control in areas of the SCS, the writer is regarding with interest whether or not the United States will guarantee the Philippines the security under the treaty in such a situation. In addition, the writer mentions that, although strategic ambiguity serves as the best assurance of regional stability, if it is seen in Beijing as a sign of US weakness, it may embolden China to continue its assertive policy in the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Beijing turns up heat in S. China Sea” to the Singaporean newspaper, *The Straits Times* dated the 6th, Michael Richardson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies based in Singapore, says that, in view of China that sees the South China Sea (SCS) as strategically and economically important, and appears to be increasingly determined to strengthen the presence and control in areas of the SCS, the writer is regarding with interest whether or not the United States will guarantee the Philippines the security under the treaty in such a situation, a gist of which is as follows:

- (1) Until recently, Manila has been notably reluctant to risk even a diplomatic confrontation with Beijing, knowing how weak its bargaining position is and fearing reprisals from the world's second largest economy. But while China may see the Philippines as the softest target among rival major claimants in the South China Sea, it must also factor in the US reaction. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States; Vietnam and Malaysia are not. Admiral Robert Willard, head of the US Pacific Command, said in Kuala Lumpur last week that he was concerned at rising tensions between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea, which he described as a “very strategic and important area to all of us.”

- (2) Manila's claim to the widely-scattered Spratlys, which it calls the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), includes 54 atolls, reefs and shoals and overlaps the claims of China, Taiwan, Vietnam and Malaysia. The shallow Reed Bank, about 100 kilometers west of the Philippines' Palawan Island, is part of the KIG. It is regarded by both Manila and Beijing as a highly prospective offshore zone for oil and gas. Further north, the Philippines, China and Taiwan contest another widely scattered group of atolls, reefs and shoals, which Beijing calls the Zongsha Archipelago. The Zongsha Archipelago also includes triangular-shaped Scarborough Reef\*. It is the biggest atoll in the South China Sea, with a circumference of 46 kilometers. Just 215 kilometers west of the main Philippine island of Luzon, Scarborough Reef has the potential to become a Chinese naval anchorage and forward base. There is an international waterway nearby. Over 300 ships pass the vicinity of the reef each day.
- (3) When Japan and China clashed last September over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, the US made clear that its mutual security treaty with Japan covered the Japanese-administered islands. Will Washington give similar reassurance to Manila and under what circumstances would it apply? Admiral Willard told a US Congressional committee in April that the US-Philippine alliance, underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, "remains important to US strategy in the Asia-Pacific." He said that China's increasing engagement in Southeast Asia presented two notable challenges to America. One was that Chinese activity, "in many cases, is aimed at supplanting US influence." The other was Beijing's "expansive claims to, and growing assertiveness in, the South China Sea..."
- (4) The US security treaty with the Philippines was signed in 1951, years before Manila lodged its claim to the Spratly Islands in 1978 and Scarborough Reef in 1997. Moreover, the treaty refers only to an armed attack on either country "in the Pacific area," not in the South China Sea. In addition, there is no automatic mutual defense obligation. Sometimes strategic ambiguity serves as the best assurance of regional stability. However, if it is seen in Beijing as a sign of US weakness, it may embolden China to continue its assertive policy in the South China Sea. Refer to the article: Beijing turns up heat in S. China Sea  
<http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=3819>



Note\*: Concerning the Scarborough Reef, the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law (Republic Act No. 9522) (hereafter the law) signed by Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on March 10, 2009 excludes the Scarborough Reef and Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) from the archipelago, but treats these as part of a “regime of islands” stipulated in Article 121 in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, Article 2 in the law specifies Philippine sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal and KIG. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, March 2009, 1.3 Diplomacy and International Relations.)

### **【Related Article】**

#### **“Philippine navy’s flag ship begins SCS patrol” (Inquirer.net, June 18, 2011)**

On the 16th, the Philippine navy dispatched the flagship BRP *Rajah Humabon* to conduct patrols in waters along Scarborough Reef in the West Philippine Sea, also called the South China Sea (SCS).

An outline of the article: On the 16th, the Philippine navy dispatched the flagship BRP *Rajah Humabon* to conduct patrols in waters along Scarborough Reef in the West Philippine Sea, also called the South China Sea (SCS). BRP *Rajah Humabon* is the country’s biggest warship (1,300 tons in full displacement) which was built during World War II and has been described as “the last World War II-era destroyer escort/frigate in active service.” On the 17th, President Benigno Aquino III insisted the Philippines won’t be bullied by China in their territorial spat and that Beijing should stop intruding into waters claimed by Manila. On the other hand, the Department of National Defense (Philippines) mentions the deployment of the *Rajah Humabon* is not a countermeasure to a decision by China to dispatch its largest maritime patrol ship, the *Haixun-31*, to Singapore on 15th in a voyage during which it will pass through the West Philippine Sea.

Refer to the article: Philippines flexes naval muscle

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/15808/philippines-flexes-naval-muscle>



**BIGGEST, OLDEST AND ONLY WARSHIP** The Philippine Navy flagship BRP *Rajah Humabon* (PF 11)

Source: [Inquirer.net](http://Inquirer.net), June 18, 2011

### **June 9 “China warns neighbors to stop oil search in Spratlys” (The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2011)**

On the 9th, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jianchao warned Asian neighbors to stop searching for oil near the Spratly Islands and vowed again to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea. Chinese Ambassador said China has not started to drill for oil there and warned others to stop any oil exploration in the area without Beijing's permission.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jianchao warned Asian neighbors to stop searching for oil near the Spratly Islands and vowed again to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea. Chinese Ambassador said China has not started to drill for oil there and warned others to stop any oil exploration in the area without Beijing's permission. Asked what would happen if countries defy China, Liu said that Beijing would assert its right over the disputed region diplomatically. “We will never use force unless we are attacked,” he said. On the other hand, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga said in a press briefing on the 9th that a Chinese fishing boat supported by two patrol vessels that morning damaged the exploration cable of the seismic survey boat operated by state-owned PetroVietnam. She said the actions of the Chinese boats were “completely premeditated” and “seriously violating Vietnam's sovereign rights.” The similar incident came just two weeks ago, and, Hanoi says, both incidents occurred well within the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In addition, the Philippines announced that a Chinese navy vessel allegedly fired February 25 to scare away Filipino fishermen from Jackson Atoll, which is claimed by Manila and relatively close to the Philippine shore. The Manila government also accused two Chinese patrol boats of harassing a Philippine oil exploration ship on March 2 into leaving a vast area called the Reed Bank. “That's part of our exercise of jurisdiction. It's not harassment,” Liu said. President Benigno Aquino III's spokesperson countered on the 9th that the Philippines would firmly assert its territorial claims “at every opportunity and in a manner befitting a free, sovereign nation.” He added that Manila would take a “multilateral approach” — in contrast to China's position of

bilateral negotiations—to resolve the disputes. Regarding questions about whether the United States could participate in solving the disputes, David Carden, Washington's ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, said in May in Manila that the nations concerned with the dispute (Spratly claimants) need to create a strong regional mechanism to tackle the dispute, and that the US could help. Liu, however, said the US is not a party to the disputes and China would talk only with those countries that were.

Refer to the article: China Warns Neighbors: Stop Oil Search in Spratlys

[http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art\\_id=21466](http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21466)

### **June 11 “Manila appealed China to refrain from inflammatory statement” (The Philippine Star, June 11, 2011)**

On the 11th, Philippine presidential office appealed to China to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements that could start a counter-productive word war and to stop intruding into the West Philippine Sea, as well as the disputed Spratly Islands.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, Philippine presidential office appealed to China to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements that could start a counter-productive word war and to stop intruding into the West Philippine Sea, as well as the disputed Spratly Islands. Presidential spokesman said, “The government has stated the Philippines’ position on the territorial issues in the West Philippine Sea. We call on all parties to refrain from inflammatory statements that would make it more difficult to reach a mutually agreeable solution.” According to presidential spokesman, the Department of National Defense (DND) would undertake measures to protect Philippine territorial waters from incursions, especially in the Reed Bank in Western Palawan. He said the Spratlys issue was taken up during a security cluster meeting in Malacanang and the DND and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) were tasked to resolve the matter. The DFA is proposing to transform the South China Sea from an area of dispute to a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C). Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario has stressed that a rules-based regime is a requisite for securing peace and stability in the region, and offers a specific framework for the resolution of differences and the pursuit of cooperation in the form of the ZoPFF/C. Del Rosario said the disputed features could be transformed into a Joint Cooperation Area for joint development and the establishment of a marine protected area for biodiversity conservation under ZoPFF/C.

Refer to the article: 'Word war won't solve disputes'

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=695012&publicationSubCategoryId=>

### **June 13 “Manila renames South China Sea as ‘West Philippine Sea’” (Channel News Asia, June 14, 2011)**

On the 13th, Philippine President’s office said it was renaming the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.”

An outline of the article: On the 13th, Philippine President’s office said it was renaming the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Presidential spokesman said the foreign affairs

and defense departments recently began using the term West Philippine Sea instead of the South China Sea, and Philippine President Benigno Aquino had decided to follow suit. Presidential spokesman said, “Vietnam calls it East Sea, so it is but natural for us to call it West Philippine Sea.” The area of water to the east of the island nation is already known as the Philippine Sea, so that the new name threatens possible confusion over the western part of that sea. Philippine foreign department spokesman said his agency had first publicly referred to the “West Philippine Sea” on June 1, but even before that had used the term in communications with China.

Refer to the article: Manila renames South China Sea as 'West Philippine Sea'

[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\\_asiapacific/view/1134971/1/.html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1134971/1/.html)

### **June 13 “Vietnamese navy holds live-fire drill”(Asia One, AFP, June 13, 2011)**

On the 13th, Vietnam held live-fire drill in the tense South China Sea. According to a Vietnamese navy’s spokesman, the live-fire exercise, lasting about four hours, took place about 40 kilometers off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, Vietnam held live-fire drill in the tense South China Sea. According to a Vietnamese navy’s spokesman, the live-fire exercise, lasting about four hours, took place about 40 kilometers off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam. The exercise zone is about 250 kilometers from the Paracel Islands and almost 1,000 kilometers from the Spratlys. Although Vietnam's foreign ministry described it as routine annual training, analysts are worried that the drill has raised temperatures in the South China Sea. For instance, Ian Storey, a regional security analyst with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, regards that the exercise is designed to send China a message that Vietnam refuses to be pushed around. He added, “I think the Chinese will react very badly to this.” Ralph Cossa, president of Pacific Forum CSIS, showed his anxiety, saying, “No one wants a war but the possibility of some shots being fired in anger or of some ships running into other ships has increased.” Cossa estimates that all sides will ensure that any escalation will “not get out of control.”

Refer to the article: Vietnam holds live-fire drill amid China tensions

<http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20110613-283868.html>

### **June 13 “Vietnam’s PM signs order on exemption from military service” (Channel News Asia, June 15, 2011)**

Vietnamese Prime Minister (PM) Quan Doi Nhan has signed on the 13th an order on exemption from military service, the official Vietnamese army newspaper reported on the 14th. The decree is not a mobilization order but clarifies who will be exempt from military service in the event of war. It will take effect on August 1.

An outline of the article: Vietnamese Prime Minister (PM) Quan Doi Nhan has signed on the 13th an order on exemption from military service, the official army newspaper reported on the 14th. The decree is not a mobilization order but clarifies who will be exempt from military service in the event of war, including key government officials and men with no siblings. It will take effect on August 1. On the same day of the 13th when PM signed the document, Vietnam's navy

conducted live-fire artillery training. Hanoi is sending a message to China that “Vietnam has significantly upped the ante in the dispute in the South China Sea,” said Ian Storey, a security analyst with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.

Refer to the article: Vietnam signs military order amid tensions

[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\\_asiapacific/view/1135109/1/.html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1135109/1/.html)

### **June 14 “China has to curb its temper: Michael Auslin” (The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “Turbulent Waters in the South China Sea” to the U.S. Newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated the 14th, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at the U.S. think tank, American Enterprise Institute, mentions in it that China will have to learn to curb its demands and its temper. On the other hand, Auslin says the U.S. has no choice other than to keep up its current security commitments and to maintain support for standards of reasonable behavior, even as it continues to engage China.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Turbulent Waters in the South China Sea” to the U.S. Newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated the 14th, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at the U.S. think tank, American Enterprise Institute, mentions in it that China will have to learn to curb its demands and its temper, a gist of which is as follows:

- (1) Beijing recently warned Vietnam and the Philippines not to explore for oil in disputed waters that China claims. In late May Chinese naval patrol craft allegedly cut the surveying cable of a Vietnamese seismic research boat, which was protested by Vietnam. Manila's recent grievances against China are similarly severe. The Philippine government claims that China has harassed its exploration vessels, illegally unloaded supplies to build an oil rig in disputed waters and sent fighter jets into its airspace. Since a very public criticism by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum last year, Beijing tamped down its behavior. Now such patience has worn thin, and China is back to threatening its neighbors. The world should be worried that China feels no qualms about using its growing military power to resolve disputes to its satisfaction. As its national power and military capabilities increase, China seems less willing to concede any of its expansive maritime claims.
- (2) Beijing has been testing Washington's resolve for the past decade. Asian nations and the United States have yet to figure out how to respond to China's assertiveness against peaceful neighbors. Getting the response right is important for at least three reasons.
  - (a) Most importantly, China is, whether by design or not, creating the conditions under which its neighbors feel no choice but to conform to its demands regardless of their own national interests. If such behavior becomes the norm, then China will have significantly, perhaps fundamentally, changed the nature of Asian regional politics. This will provide it with unlimited leeway to make other demands, some of which may seem fanciful now, such as vetoing maritime development plans or interfering with freedom of navigation. Once such a tipping point is reached, it will be difficult if not impossible to easily return to more



cooperative multilateral patterns of behavior.

- (b) The more that China gets away with intimidating or interfering with its neighbors, the more the result is to increase the slow destabilization of the region and to make it much harder for liberal nations to agree to play by international rules. This will further put pressure on the U.S. to maintain its role as a credible defender of stability at a time when its own resources are becoming more stretched.
- (c) Finally, as Vietnam's response to China's bullying shows, smaller nations may not always take such intimidation lying down. The potential of saber-rattling and even clashes will increase, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned this month at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
- (3) China's actions already are resulting in an arms race in the broader Indo-Pacific region. All this makes the American role more important even as it becomes more difficult. Distrust and fear of China notwithstanding, few Asian nations yet want to be seen as balancing against China on the side of the U.S. Many of Washington's allies are also forecasting flat or declining overall defense budgets in the future.
- (4) In short, the U.S. has no choice other than to keep up its current security commitments and to maintain support for standards of reasonable behavior, even as it continues to engage China. The global economy, including China's, depends on a stable and growing Asia. Yet the trends of recent years call into question assumptions about Asia's peaceful future. The waters of this continent are becoming more turbulent. If China wants to be respected as a great power, it will have to learn to curb its demands—and its temper.

Refer to the article: Turbulent Waters in the South China Sea

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303714704576383203107741540.html>

### **June 14 “China warns against third party’s meddling in SCS issues” (The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2011)**

On the 14th, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China would seek to resolve territorial disputes in the South China (SCS) with its neighbors bilaterally, and warned other countries to stay out of meddling. Prior to this speech, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines pledged U.S. support for the Philippines.

An outline of the article: On the 14th, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China would seek to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) with its neighbors bilaterally, and warned other countries to stay out of meddling. Without naming any countries, spokesman criticized specific countries for harming China's sovereign and maritime rights, and trying to enlarge the SCS issue to make it more complicated. In addition, the spokesman stressed, “China is protecting its legitimate rights, not infringing on other countries' rights.” Prior to this speech, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Harry Thomas pledged support for the Philippines in a speech at the launch of the Philippines' national renewable-energy program. Ambassador said, “I want to assure you that on all sectors, we, the United States, are with the Philippines.” He added: “The Philippines and the United States are strategic treaty allies. We are partners. We

will continue to consult and work with each other on all issues including the SCS.” Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said he was happy with the ambassador's assurances and stated that the U.S. military presence ensures freedom of navigation and deters aggression in disputed territories in the SCS. On the other hand, on the 14th, a U.S. embassy spokesman in Beijing reiterated the stated U.S. policy that it doesn't take sides in regional territory disputes, while also indicating the U.S. would support its allies in the region.

Refer to the article: Beijing Warns Against Sea Meddling

[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304665904576385234220024592.html?mod=WSJ\\_World\\_LEFTSecondNews](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304665904576385234220024592.html?mod=WSJ_World_LEFTSecondNews)

### **June 15“China making Woody Island unsinkable carrier” (The Philippine Star, June 15, 2011)**


On the 15th, the Philippine newspaper, *The Philippine Star*, reports that, according to documents obtained by News5, China gradually developed its facilities on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands – making it an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

An outline of the article: On the 15th, the Philippine newspaper, *The Philippine Star*, reports that, according to documents obtained by News 5, China gradually developed its facilities on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands – making it an unsinkable aircraft carrier. *The Philippine Star* reports that the runway on Woody Island has been extended and hangars and fuel depots have been constructed, which enable China to base and deploy its latest generation of multi-role fighters.

Documents obtained by News 5 show that China is estimated to have stationed eight aircraft variants on Woody Island. The warplanes – which include the Sukhoi-27 Flanker fighter-bomber and J-7 Airguard close support aircraft, which is China’s version of the Russian MIG21 Fishbed – have no trouble reaching the Spratlys as the disputed area is well within their operational radius. However, the Sukhoi-30MKK Flanker G can cover the whole island of Luzon, including Metro Manila. The Flanker G is a long-range multi-role supersonic fighter with an operational radius of 1,620 nautical miles but can extend up to 2,800 nautical miles with in-flight refueling.

Refer to the article: China has air superiority

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=696267&publicationSubCategoryId=63>



Paracel Islands and Woody Island

Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ParacelIslands.png>

Google photograph

**June 15 “Manila removes foreign markers in SCS conflict area” (Channel News Asia, June 15, 2011)**

On the 15th, the Philippine navy said it had removed foreign markers installed on three reefs and banks in disputed areas of the South China Sea (SCS). According to Philippine navy spokesman, the posts had only numbers on them. The markers were on Boxall Reef in the Spratly Islands, and in the nearby Amy Douglas Bank and Reed Bank, all of which are in waters of the SCS claimed by the Philippines and China.

An outline of the article: On the 15th, the Philippines said its navy had removed foreign markers installed on three reefs and banks in disputed areas of the South China Sea (SCS). According to the spokesman, the removal of the wooden posts took place in May, just before the government formally protested over alleged incursions by the Chinese navy in Filipino territorial waters. These markers were not installed by our government or our military. They were installed by a foreign country, so the Philippines dismantled them because they were within the Philippine territory. The spokesman said. “They did not have a 'Made in China' label or anything,” adding the posts had only numbers on them. The markers were on Boxall Reef in the Spratly Islands, and in the nearby Amy Douglas Bank and Reed Bank, all of which are claimed by the Philippines and China. The Philippines’ foreign department declined to comment on the naval action.

Refer to the article: Philippines pulls markers from disputed waters

[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\\_asiapacific/view/1135238/1/.html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1135238/1/.html)

### **June 16 “China to drastically boost maritime surveillance capabilities” (VOA News, June 16, 2011)**

The China Maritime Surveillance Forces will add 16 aircraft and 350 vessels by 2015, and boost its current 9,000-member personnel to 15,000 by 2020.

An outline of the article: The Chinese English newspaper, The China Daily, says the China Maritime Surveillance Forces will add 16 aircraft and 350 vessels by 2015, and boost its current 9,000-member personnel to 15,000 by 2020. The number of vessels will increase to 520 by 2020.

Refer to the article: China to Boost Maritime Patrol Forces

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/China-to-Boost-Maritime-Patrol-Forces--124062564.html>

### **June 17 “Chinese Navy stages military drills in South China Sea” (The Philippine Star, June 17, 2011)**

On the 17th, China said that its maritime defense forces recently staged three days and nights of exercises in the South China Sea. According to the Chinese official newspaper *People's Daily*, the drills involved a total of 14 patrol boats, landing craft and submarine hunting boats, along with two military aircraft. It said the exercises were aimed at refining anti-submarine, replenishment and island defense capabilities in order to better respond to any future sudden crisis. Additionally, on the 15th one of its largest maritime patrol ships set off at the Gaolan port in Zhuhai, south China's Guangdong Province, on a first-ever visit to Singapore, a voyage in which it will transit the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, China said that its maritime defense forces recently staged three days and nights of exercises in the South China Sea. According to the Chinese official newspaper *People's Daily*, the drills involved a total of 14 patrol boats, landing craft and submarine hunting boats, along with two military aircraft. It said the exercises were aimed at refining anti-submarine, replenishment and island defense capabilities in order to better respond to any future sudden crisis. *The People's Daily* said naval forces participated alongside units from nominally civilian agencies that are tasked with overseeing China's interests at sea. The paper did not say exactly when or where the exercises took place, although a graphic accompanying the story implied they were held near the Spratly Islands. In addition, the military's official newspaper *Liberation Army Daily* reported that an exercise was held on June 6 in which amphibious vehicles — most likely tanks — were successfully offloaded from ships onto a South China Sea island. No other details were given, and it was unclear whether the exercise was among those the Together with the report on this exercise, *The People's Daily* reported that on the 15th one of its largest maritime patrol ships set off at the Gaolan port in Zhuhai, south China's Guangdong Province, on a first-ever visit to Singapore, a voyage in which it will transit the South China Sea. The *Haixun-31* (3,000-ton, helicopter equipped) was due to stay in the Southeast Asian city-state for two weeks of exchanges on search and rescue, anti-piracy and port management operations.



In this photo released by China's Xinhua News agency on June 15, the *Haixun-31* sets off at the Gaolan port in Zhuhai, south China's Guangdong Province.

Refer to the article: China stages military drills in South China Sea

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=697156&publicationSubCategoryId=63>

### 【Related Article】

#### “Singapore urges China to clarify its claims in SCS” (Foreign Ministry, Singapore, June 20, 2011)

On the 20th, on the occasion of the visit of Chinese maritime surveillance vessel *Haixun 31* to Singapore, the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman issued a statement, in which he said it is in China's own interests to clarify its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) with more precision regarding the current ambiguity as to their extent.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, on the occasion of the visit of Chinese maritime surveillance vessel *Haixun 31* to Singapore, the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman has made a statement as follows:

- (1) Singapore is not a claimant state and takes no position on the merits or otherwise of the various claims in the South China Sea (SCS). But as a major trading nation, Singapore has a critical interest in anything affecting freedom of navigation in all international sea lanes, including those in the SCS.
- (2) We have repeatedly said that we think it is in China's own interests to clarify its claims in the SCS with more precision as the current ambiguity as to their extent has caused serious concerns in the international maritime community. The recent incidents have heightened these concerns and raise serious questions in relation to the interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
- (3) Scores of vessels from many countries, including naval vessels, call at Singapore every day without arousing the slightest excitement. This is precisely why this port call in Singapore by the *Haixun 31* has provoked such interest. It is our hope that parties to the disputes in the SCS will act with restraint to create conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of these disputes.

Refer to the article: MFA Spokesman's Comments in responses to media queries on the visit of Chinese maritime surveillance vessel *Haixun 31* to Singapore

<http://www.mfa.gov.sg/>

## **June 17 “Taiwan denies military deployment to Taiping Island, Spratly” (The China Post, June 18, 2011)**

On the 17th, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said that it has no plans to deploy its military forces on Taiping Island in the Spratly archipelago. An MND statement rebutted as “groundless” media reports that it is planning to send *Hai-Ou* class missile boats and M41A3 tanks to support Coast Guard Administration (CGA) personnel stationed on Taiping Island in the area.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said that it has no plans to deploy its military forces on Taiping Island in the Spratly archipelago. An MND statement rebutted as “groundless” media reports that it is planning to send *Hai-Ou* class missile boats and M41A3 tanks to support Coast Guard Administration (CGA) personnel stationed on Taiping Island in the area. Since the last marines pulled out of Taiping Island in 1999, CGA took over responsibility for manning the island, and the MND provides CGA personnel with weapons and logistical support. The MND said the CGA personnel on the island are equal to the marines in terms of their combat skills.

Refer to the article: MND denies Spratly deployment reports

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2011/06/18/306675/MND-denies.htm>

## **June 17 “Taiwan regards ‘freedom of navigation’ important to SCS issues’ (China Brief, Vol.11, Issue.11, The Jamestown Foundation, June 17, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “Taiwan Pivots in the South China Sea” to the US Web journal- China Brief dated the 17th, Russell Hsiao, Chief Editor of the journal, is pointing out that Ma government in Taiwan appear to be emphasizing support for the principle of “freedom of navigation” along strategic sea lanes in the South China Sea, which could have important implications for cross-Strait relations.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Taiwan Pivots in the South China Sea” to the US Web journal- China Brief dated the 17th, Russell Hsiao, Chief Editor of the journal, says Ma government in Taiwan appear to be emphasizing support for the principle of “freedom of navigation” along strategic sea lanes in the South China Sea, which could have important implications for cross-Strait relations. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) The latest escalation of tensions in the South China Sea has introduced new dynamics in the increasingly complex cross-Strait equation. Taiwan (Republic of China) and China (People’s Republic of China) both legally claim sovereign rights over the Spratly archipelago in the form of a U-shaped line based on the same assertion that they are historically Chinese waters. Yet, against the backdrop of increased Chinese assertiveness over territorial disputes in the South China and East China Sea in recent years, Ma government in Taiwan appear to be emphasizing support for the principle of “freedom of navigation” along strategic sea lanes in the South China Sea.
- (2) The Ma government’s emphasis on the “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea is a

subtle but significant departure from the administration's low-key approach and could have important implications for cross-Strait relations. Indeed, in spite of the growing tensions and conflict in the South China Sea, since President Ma came into office in 2008, Taiwan had been relatively quiet about the South China Sea. This led some observers to suspect that the Ma administration was leaning too much toward China. If, in fact, the Ma administration intends to draw a distinction between Taiwan's and China's interpretation of its territorial claim, it would demonstrate Taiwan as an independent claimant to the dispute. This will likely cause more friction between Taiwan and China over competing maritime claims. Amid growing concerns about his administration's increasing tilt toward China, Ma's shift may be seen as a sign of reassurance by the current government to regional neighbors and the United States that it will maintain a balance while still pursuing cross-Strait rapprochement.

Refer to the article: Taiwan Pivots in the South China Sea

[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5btt\\_news%5d=38067&tx\\_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=b82c5e4665167be7186e90886b9a9069](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=38067&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=b82c5e4665167be7186e90886b9a9069)

### **June 17 “US, Vietnam hold security dialogue” (The US Department of State, June 17, 2011)**

On the 17th, the fourth annual U.S.-Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue was held in Washington, D.C. In the conference, in addition to bilateral relations, recent events in the South China Sea were discussed.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, the fourth annual U.S.-Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue was held in Washington, D.C. In the conference Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro from US side and Standing Vice Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh from Vietnamese side met to discuss bilateral and regional security issues. The joint statement released after the conference mentions the South China Sea issue as follows:

- (1) Both sides discussed recent developments in the South China Sea. The two sides acknowledged that, as for (a), the maintenance of peace, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is in the common interests of the international community, and that, as for (b), all territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved through a collaborative, diplomatic process without coercion or the use of force.
- (2) The two sides noted territorial and accompanying maritime claims should be in conformity with recognized principles of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and encouraged the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct.

Refer to the article: U.S.-Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166479.htm>

## **June 19 “China, Vietnam conduct joint patrol in Tonkin Gulf” (China Defense Mashup, June 21, 2011)**

The Vietnam People’s Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China have commenced the 11th two-day joint patrol in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf on the 19th. Two patrol boats of respective navies participated in the exercise, with a journey of more than 300 nautical miles along the delimited waters that border Vietnam and China in the Tonkin Gulf.

An outline of the article: The Vietnam People’s Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China have commenced the 11th two-day joint patrol in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf on the 19th. Two patrol boats of respective navies participated in the exercise, with a journey of more than 300 nautical miles along the delimited waters that border Vietnam and China in the Tonkin Gulf. The patrol was intended to maintain security and order at sea, supervise fishing vessels’ activities and ensure that the Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf and the Agreement on Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf signed between the Vietnamese and Chinese Governments was being carried out. The patrol also aimed to stabilize normal production activities of the two countries’ fishermen in the Tonkin Gulf, to share experiences between the two navies and promote the friendship between the two navies, armies and peoples.

Refer to the article: Vietnam, China conduct joint patrol in Tonkin Gulf

<http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/vietnam-china-conduct-joint-patrol-in-tonkin-gulf.html>

## **June 23 “Remarks after US-RP foreign ministers’ meeting” (US Department of State HP, June 23, 2011)**

On the 22nd, during his visit to the United States, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario talked with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. At a press interview after the meeting, regarding the South China Sea, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said: (a) The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea; and (b) The United States remains committed to peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said: (a) We are prepared to do what is necessary to stand up to any aggressive action in our backyard; and (b) We adhere to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and are working towards the eventual adoption of a code of conduct.

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, during his visit to the United States, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario talked with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. At a press interview after the meeting two secretaries mentioned the South China Sea issues, the gist of which is as follows:

(1) US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

- (a) The Philippines and the United States are longstanding allies, and we are committed to honoring our mutual obligations of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, whose 60th anniversary we are celebrating this year. As I have said many times before, the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and



unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea. We share these interests not only with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members but with other maritime nations in the broader international community. The United States does not take sides on territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, but we oppose the use of force or the threat of force to advance the claims of any party.

(b) We believe governments should pursue their territorial claims and the accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with customary international law, as reflected also in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States supports the 2002 ASEAN China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and we encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct.

(2) Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario

(a) We agreed that a strong alliance between the Philippines and the US, anchored firmly on shared democratic ideals and vision, contributes significantly to the maintenance of the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. While we are a small country, we are prepared to do what is necessary to stand up to any aggressive action in our backyard. The Philippines has made clear its position on the issue: to maintain a peaceful environment which allows for the economic development of the area.

(b) I have discussed with Secretary Clinton our proposal for a rules-based regime in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. We adhere to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and are working towards the eventual adoption of a code of conduct. We have used the existing diplomatic channels to register our concern over China's aggressive action. We will continue to commit our own resources towards the development of the necessary capabilities to protect our national borders and ensure freedom of navigation and the unimpeded flow of commerce.

Refer to the article: Remarks with Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario after Their Meeting

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/166868.htm>

### **【Related Article】**

#### **“Emerging US-China cold war in SCS” (The Philippine Star, June 24, 2011)**

Contributing an article titled “Emerging cold war in the Spratlys” to the Philippine newspaper, *The Philippine Star* dated the 22nd, Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi of the Philippine Institute for Peace mentioned that, regarding the meeting of US and Philippines Foreign Secretaries, a cold war between the United States and China is emerging over the Spratly group of islands and the Philippines will be inevitably involved in it.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “Emerging cold war in the Spratlys” to the Philippine newspaper, *The Philippine Star* dated the 22nd, Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi of the Philippine Institute for Peace mentioned that, regarding the meeting of US and Philippines Foreign Secretaries, a cold war between the United States and China is emerging over the Spratly group of islands and the Philippines will be inevitably involved in it. The following is the

gist of the article:

- (1) A cold war is a situation where at least two major powers are involved in a security tension and subdued military hostility short of an actual military battle. Conflicts are expressed through proxy wars, military coalitions, propaganda, espionage, and even trade competitions. This situation is now emerging between the US and China in the contested Spratly group of islands.
- (2) Indications of an emerging cold war in the Spratly started to manifest in March 2009 when USNS *Impeccable*, a US research vessel, was involved in an incident of harassment. The emerging cold war between the US and China on the Spratly issue is also manifested in the exchange of words between the two powers in various international forums like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and various meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) involving the two powers. The US exclaims that the US has a national security interest in the South China Sea, where all ships can enjoy free or innocent passage. China, on the other hand, asserts that the South China Sea forms part of its core interests at par with Taiwan and Tibet. Beijing, which says that it remains committed to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts, wants the US out of the South China Sea Disputes. But the US reiterates its willingness to get involved in the peaceful management of disputes in the Spratly while assuring its allies in the region of US military assistance.
- (3) The Philippines is now inevitably involved in an emerging cold war between the US and China in the Spratly. As an American ally, the Philippines is apparently on the side of the US in this emerging situation. But will the Philippine government allow itself to get involved in a proxy war between the US and China when the cold war in the Spratly reaches its peak? This situation is something that all sovereign states have to prevent to happen.

Refer to the article: Emerging cold war in the Spratlys

<http://www.philstar.com/ArticlePrinterFriendly.aspx?articleId=699467>

### **June 27 “U.S. Senate adopts resolution blaming China for SCS issue” (UPI, June 28, 2011)**

On the 27th, blaming China for South China Sea (SCS) issues, the U.S. Senate has unanimously approved a resolution introduced by Senator Jim Webb, saying the issue should be resolved peacefully through a multilateral effort.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, blaming China for South China Sea (SCS) issues, the U.S. Senate has unanimously approved a resolution, saying the issue should be resolved peacefully through a multilateral effort. The resolution was introduced by Senator Jim Webb, D-Va., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. “A growing number of nations around the SCS are now voicing serious concerns about China's pattern of intimidation. These nations include Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as countries such as Singapore that do not have a stake in the territorial disputes,” said Webb, stressing the need for a multilateral approach to resolve the disputes in a peaceful manner, respecting the sovereignty of all claimants. In addition, Webb said the United States has a clear “strategic

interest” in such a multilateral approach, which would ensure open access to international waters and air space, and promote adherence to international law.

Refer to the article: U.S. Senate calls for peace in South China Sea

[http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/US/2011/06/28/US-Senate-calls-for-peace-in-South-China-Sea/UPI-26391309259598/](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/06/28/US-Senate-calls-for-peace-in-South-China-Sea/UPI-26391309259598/)

### **June 28 “US, Philippines kick off joint exercises” (Xinhua, June 28, 2011)**

On the 28th, navies from the United States and the Philippines kicked off an 11-day (lasting until July 8) joint exercise dubbed the 17th Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). The exercise was held in the Sulu Sea east of Palawan. The at-sea phase of the exercise focuses on developing maritime security capabilities.

An outline of the article: On the 28th, navies from the United States and the Philippines kicked off an 11-day (until July 8) joint exercise dubbed the 17th Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). The exercise was held in the Sulu Sea east of Palawan. Guided missile destroyers USS *Chung-Hoon*, USS *Howard* and the diving and salvage ship USNS *Safeguard* are the U.S. Navy's centerpieces for the exercise. In addition to the three ships, other participants include P-3C Orion aircraft, SH-60 Seahawk aircraft, U.S. Navy Seabees, a U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team, U.S. Navy Mobile Security Squadron, U.S. Navy Riverine Forces and Medical Support personnel. On the Philippine side, patrol ships BRP *Pangasinan* and BRP *Rizal* are dedicated for the exercise. The at-sea phase of the exercise focuses on developing maritime security capabilities in areas such as maritime interdiction, information sharing, combined operations at sea, patrol operations, gunnery exercises, as well as anti-piracy and anti-smuggling exercises.

Refer to the article: U.S., Philippine navies kick off 11-day joint exercise

[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/28/c\\_13954433.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/28/c_13954433.htm)

### **June 30 “Billiards in the South China Sea: Michael Auslin” (The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2011)**

On the 30th, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at a US think tank- the American Enterprise Institute, has contributed the article titled “Billiards in the South China Sea” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal*. Auslin mentions that, although China is playing billiards in the South China Sea, America is playing some version of Capture the Flag, and trying to keep Beijing from capturing the flag of regional hegemony. Based on this fact, the best way forward for the United States is to recognize China's game, start playing it and then rig the table. Washington should seek to expand the billiard table by putting more balls into play.

An outline of the article: On the 30th, Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies at a US think tank- the American Enterprise Institute, has contributed the article titled “Billiards in the South China Sea” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal*. Auslin mentions that, although China is playing billiards in the South China Sea, America is playing some version of Capture the Flag, and trying to keep Beijing from capturing the flag of regional hegemony. Based on this fact,

the best way forward for the United States is to recognize China's game, start playing it and then rig the table. Washington should seek to expand the billiard table by putting more balls into play. Key points of the article are as follows:

- (1) China is playing billiards in the South China Sea. For Beijing, the goal is to knock the other billiard balls off the table, leaving itself in control. America, on the other hand, is playing some version of Capture the Flag, and is trying to keep Beijing from capturing the flag of regional hegemony. American policy makers need to recognize they're playing a different game from the Chinese and adjust their strategy.
- (2) Observers have two different interpretations of what the Chinese challenge actually is. Many in Washington believe that China threatens freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, thereby potentially harming U.S. national interests, including uncontested passage of U.S. Navy ships, the free flow of global economic trade and maritime lifelines to U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea. By contrast, many in Southeast Asia believe that the issue is one of control over territorial resources. By some estimates, the region holds as much as 30 billion barrels of oil and over 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. While dozens of oil fields are already being explored, it is the ability to control future exploration and exploitation of such resources that is driving China's behavior.
- (3) China's territorial claims can be most effectively exercised by having the capability both to move anywhere in the region's waters (already achieved) as well as to prevent other nations from navigating freely. There is little reason to believe that Beijing has any thought (let alone the ability) to seriously hamper regional navigation; such blatantly aggressive moves would be immediately challenged by the U.S. Navy. Yet, making clear its ability to do so can result in political pressure being put on smaller nations to surrender or modify their territorial claims and to curb their legitimate maritime activities. It certainly resembles the tactics of the billiard table. Beijing targets the billiard balls of its neighbors, trying to knock them off the table one by one.
- (4) In response, Southeast Asian countries have started clamoring for the U.S. to intervene. But the U.S. answer isn't so easy. If Washington pushes too hard and asks Southeast Asian nations to significantly increase joint maritime activities, it will likely find that Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta and the rest fear making China an enemy even more than they fear China acting as a bully. Too little response by the Americans, however, will convince the smaller nations that they might have no choice but to accede to China's wishes.
- (5) The best way forward is to recognize China's game, start playing it and then rig the table. Washington should seek to expand the billiard table by putting more balls into play. India has just announced plans to increase naval patrols in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie at the Indian Ocean entrance to the Malacca Strait. Japan has made a strategic shift to focus on its "southwestern island wall" stretching from Kyushu to just north of Taiwan. Australia will be modernizing and doubling its submarine fleet over the next decade. Then Washington should induce these partners to play a bigger role near disputed waters through greater engagement with Southeast Asian nations. Further, U.S. and allied ships should shadow

Chinese vessels when they start to approach contested territory and move quickly to areas where incidents have occurred. More broadly, Washington's goal, executed through Hawaii-based Pacific Command, should be to create a more active maritime community of interests in the Indo-Pacific arc and to counter Chinese moves where they occur. U.S. Senator Jim Webb has warned of a coming “Munich moment” in Asia. Whether it wants to or not, the United States will have to start nudging some billiard balls around the table.

Refer to the article: Billiards in the South China Sea

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450604576417500592116010.html>

Note: Appearing on the US television, NBC's “Meet the Press,” on the 26th, U.S. Senator, Jim Webb mentioned “Munich moment” in the South China Sea which is extremely important to the U.S. strategic interests. Webb evoked growing concerns that the Chinese are taking a more aggressive approach toward encroaching on the sovereignty of its neighbors, something that, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Germans under Hitler began doing. (Fulls Church News-Press.com, June 29, 2011)

## 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

### June 3 “Gwadar Port and China’s expectations” (Foreign Policy, June 3, 2011)

Contributing an article titled “Pakistan's Black Pearl” to a bimonthly American magazine, *Foreign Policy* dated on June 3, Urmila Venugopalan, a former Asia editor at a British monthly journal on military intelligence, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, has pointed out that, in light of overall indications, China’s interest in Gwadar port may have been decreasing and in the foreseeable future the focus of China’s maritime strategy will continue to be focused on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

An outline of the article: After visiting China in company with Pakistani Prime Minister on a visit to China on May 17- 20, and, upon returning to Islamabad, the Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar said that Beijing had agreed to take over operation of Gwadar port in Baluchistan, and, that he had invited the Chinese to build a naval base there. On the other hand, China promptly denied them. Regarding expectations between China and Pakistan over Gwadar Port, the OPRF has reported them as a topic in the sector of 1. 4 Diplomacy & International Relations in the MARINT Monthly Report, May 2011.

Contributing an article titled “Pakistan's Black Pearl” to a bimonthly American magazine, *Foreign Policy* dated on June 3, Urmila Venugopalan, a former Asia editor at a British monthly journal on military intelligence, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, estimates that China’s interest in Gwadar port may have been decreasing, a gist of his article is as follows:

(1) A naval base in Pakistan would be without doubt a strategic asset for China.

However, having become operational shortly after the Chinese completed the first phase of

development in 2007, the port only received its first commercial cargo ship almost two years later, in July 2009. It has not seen much use since. In addition, planned second phase of (again Chinese-led) development has yet to begin, which is caused by an already tense security situation in Baluchistan where the port is located.

- (2) It would seem that both financial and diplomatic considerations are likely to discourage China from deepening its involvement in Gwadar. These same factors make it doubly unlikely that Beijing would seek a military presence there. The undefined but presumably substantial cost of establishing a naval base in an unstable part of a volatile country is one obvious deterrent. Such a financial commitment would in turn necessitate an open-ended political commitment, one that China's traditionally circumspect strategists would not undertake lightly.
- (3) Motivating their caution is Beijing's wariness of adding new sources of tension in Sino-U.S. relations. The Pentagon, already unnerved by China's rising military expenditures and its emerging naval dominance of the South China Sea, would not look on benignly were the People's Liberation Army Navy to drop anchor in Gwadar.
- (4) Might China someday seek a naval presence in Gwadar to protect its vital energy supply lines and possibly challenge Indian naval domination? It is perhaps with this eventuality in mind that China built the port in the first place. All indications, however, are that the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea will remain the focal points of Chinese maritime strategy for the foreseeable future.

Refer to the article: Pakistan's Black Pearl

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/03/pakistan\\_s\\_black\\_pearl](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/03/pakistan_s_black_pearl)JUNE

## 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors


### June 6 “Solar-powered yacht makes half-way around earth voyage” (CNN, June 3, 2011)

Having taken almost 250 days since it set sail from Monaco in September 2010, the 31-meter solar-powered yacht, SY *Turnor* (60 tons), arrived at the shores of Brisbane, Australia. Propelled by nothing but rays from the sun, the yacht is making its first cruise around the globe as a solar-powered boat.

An outline of the article: Having taken almost 250 days since it set sail from Monaco in September 2010, the 31-meter solar-powered yacht, SY *Turnor* (60 tons), arrived at the shores of Brisbane, Australia. Propelled by nothing but rays from the sun, the yacht is making its first cruise around the globe as a solar-powered boat. “So far everything has gone according to plan,” said the Swiss-born skipper. “By making it this far we've already demonstrated the huge potential for high-performance solar mobility.” The yacht, which is dotted with over 536 square meters of photovoltaic panels, can sail for up to five nights without direct sunlight, supported by reserves stored in the world's largest rechargeable lithium battery. According to the skipper, one of his

greatest fears was that they would run out of battery in the middle of the ocean. Luckily, the skipper is proud to reveal that the battery has never dipped below 20%. The \$16 million vessel is a “catamaran,” which travels at an average speed of just 7.5 knots.

Refer to the article: World's largest solar-powered yacht reaches milestone in record voyage  
[http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/06/03/solar.powered.boat.australia/index.html?hpt=hp\\_c2](http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/06/03/solar.powered.boat.australia/index.html?hpt=hp_c2)



*SY Turanor*

Source: <http://www.planetsolar.org/>

## **1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others**

### **June 16 “US energy giant, Bangladesh sign contract for gas development in Bay of Bengal” (The Washington Post, June 16, 2011)**

On the 16th, Bangladesh signed a production-sharing contract with American energy giant ConocoPhillips to explore for gas in the virtually unexplored deep waters of the Bay of Bengal. ConocoPhillips says it wants to start exploring two areas covering 5,158 square kilometers as soon as possible, and it needs to conduct seismic surveys in two blocks with water depth of 1 to 1.5 kilometers.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Bangladesh signed a production-sharing contract with American energy giant ConocoPhillips to explore for gas in the virtually unexplored deep waters of the Bay of Bengal. The deal is the Houston, Texas-based company’s first investment in Bangladesh, a growing economy that is struggling to meet growing demand for gas for its industries. Meanwhile, Bangladesh is seeking new sources of gas. Currently, Sangu gas field, operated by Australia’s Santos, is the country’s lone operating offshore gas field. ConocoPhillips says it wants to start exploring two areas covering 5,158 square kilometers as soon as possible, and it needs to conduct seismic surveys in two blocks with water depth of 1 to 1.5 kilometers. A local group is protesting against the deal. The government says two gas fields are not involved in the disputed waters in Bay of Bengal.

Refer to the article: ConocoPhillips, Bangladesh sign contract to explore for gas in deep waters of Bay of Bengal

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/conocophillips-bangladesh-sign-contract-to-explore-for-gas-in-deep-waters-of-bay-of-bengal/2011/06/16/AGFQx2WH\\_story.html?nl\\_headlines](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/conocophillips-bangladesh-sign-contract-to-explore-for-gas-in-deep-waters-of-bay-of-bengal/2011/06/16/AGFQx2WH_story.html?nl_headlines)



## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### **Overview of Emergency Rescue and Relief Operations by U.S. Forces against Great East Japan Earthquake in Northeastern and Eastern parts of Japan: “Operation Tomodachi” (March 11 – 30 April 30, 2011)**

In order to support the relief-activities by the Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel, fire-fighting team members, policemen, and citizen-volunteers among others in the Great East Japan Earthquake which occurred on Friday, March 11, 2011, the United States Military Forces dispatched approximately 20,000 personnel, 22 ships and 140 aircraft, which had been unprecedented in the past as the rescue relief activities. The relief activities by the U.S. military forces dubbed “Operation Tomodachi” (hereinafter, Operation Tomodachi) revealed a quick response right after the earthquake disaster, demonstrated outstanding capabilities in respective disaster-hit areas, and its voluntary service gave a deep impression on not only the victims who suffered serious damage but many Japanese people. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the Operation Tomodachi made other foreign nations recognize the depth and reliance on the ties of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as the power of the forward-deployed U.S. Military Forces.

This corner gives an overview of the Operation Tomodachi covering from its initial move to the end of April when the operation was tentatively terminated, and adds some comments. All photographs inserted have been excerpted from the website of the U.S. Defense Department.

#### **1. U.S. posture toward Great East Japan Earthquake**

##### **(1) Statement of U.S. President Barack Obama**

On the morning of March 11, at the local time, five hours and thirty minutes later after the occurrence of disaster, U.S. President Barack Obama issued a statement at the White House, which says: “Michelle and I send our deepest condolences to the people of Japan, particularly those who have lost loved ones in the earthquake and tsunamis. The United States stands ready to help the Japanese people in this time of great trial. The friendship and alliance between our two nations is unshakeable, and only strengthens our resolve to stand with the people of Japan as they overcome this tragedy.”

Furthermore, at a press interview on the afternoon of that day President Obama said: “Japan is, of course, one of our strongest and closest allies. Speaking with Prime Minister Naoto Kan, I offered our Japanese friends whatever assistance is needed. We currently have an aircraft carrier in Japan, and another is on its way. We also have a ship en route to the Marianas Islands to assist as needed.”

## (2) First operational posture of U.S. military forces

Although the Japanese government has not yet requested help, U.S. forces are being readied in case such a request comes, making efforts to assess the situation right after the occurrence of the earthquake.

The Dock Landing Ship USS *Tortuga*, at anchor in Sasebo, Japan, has completed readiness for leaving for the disaster areas as early as on the evening of the 11th. The Amphibious Assault Ship USS *Essex*, with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which arrived in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, has also been ready to depart for Japan on the evening of the 11th. The Command Ship USS *Blue Ridge*, the flag ship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, in Singapore, was preparing to depart on the 12th. The USS *Ronald Reagan* carrier strike group, at sea in the western Pacific on its way to Korea, has changed its course to Japan.

Additionally, some 11 civil aircraft which were difficult to land at Narita Air Port due to earthquake were allowed to land at Yokota Air Base and more than 500 passengers were provided with food and water.

## (3) Rescue operations by U.S. military forces kicked off

### March 13

Arriving off Sendai, the USS *Ronald Reagan* carrier strike group commenced an airlift of relief supplies to affected areas in cooperation with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The aircraft carrier Reagan also conducted fuel supply to aircraft of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF). Moreover, in case of the U.S. Forces, five destroyers and one cruiser are conducting search and rescue operations at sea, and the helicopters based in Naval Air Facility Atsugi and Yokota Air Base and the helicopters which moved from Marine Corps Air Station Futema to Atsugi have commenced search and rescue operations as well as transportation of relief supplies. Also, on the same day, it was confirmed that Global Hawks of the U.S. Military Forces that had flown from Guam flew over the Pacific Ocean off northeast of Japan.

Additionally, the U.S. 7th Fleet Command Ship USS *Blue Ridge* and the Amphibious Assault Ship USS *Essex* are steaming towards Japan, which means a total of nine U.S. naval vessels are to be involved in rescue operations.

On the 12th, one day before the U.S. military forces commenced support operations, U.S. Ambassador to Japan John V. Roos said in a statement to the media: "Because of the longstanding and close working relationship between the U.S. military and its Japanese counterparts on a daily basis, the United States military is well versed in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the affected regions."

Up to this time, Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa to dispatch 100,000 Self-Defense Force personnel for rescuing victims, which is a posture exceeding the number of 50,000 – 60,000 personnel dispatched during the Hanshin-Awaji Big Earthquake in 1995. On this day the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was conducting rescue operations with 58 vessels.

The US military forces dispatched more than 10,000 personnel with the aircraft carrier

*Abraham Lincoln* during the earthquake off Sumatra and big tsunami in 2004, and sent the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, hospital ship Comfort and others during Haiti earthquake in 2010. The number of the US military forces involved in rescue operations during the Great East Japan Earthquake exceeded in scale those of the earthquakes off Sumatra and Haiti.

Lt. Gen Burt Field, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, said at a press interview, “A total of fifty thousand of officers and men stationed in Japan are participating in the support operations.”

## **2. Development of Operations Tomodachi**


Following is Operation Tomodachi shown in order of each date:

### **May 14**

The disaster-relief activity by the US military for the Great East Japan Earthquake was named Operation Tomodachi. The Japanese Defense Ministry and the Japanese Self-Defense Force established a joint task force commanded by the Commander of the Northeastern Army of the Ground Self-Defense Force by May 14. It was for the first time that joint task force was established for disaster relief mission. The joint task force is the defense force that has been dispatched for conducting disaster-relief activities on the scene, and the directives from the center to the defense force on the scene were executed through the joint chief of staff.

The coordination between the disaster-relief activities by the Self-Defense Force and Operation Tomodachi by the U.S. military forces was conducted through the coordination between “Japan-U.S. Joint Command Coordination Center” of the Joint Staff Office and the “U.S. Forces’ Joint Support Force Headquarters (initially dubbed “Disaster-relief Measures Headquarters”) which was set up at the headquarters of Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, based in Yokota Air Base. Additionally, “Japan-U.S Joint Coordination Center” was set up in the headquarters of the Northeastern Army (Joint Task Force Command) in Sendai, where coordination between Japan and U.S. in the region was conducted. Twenty Self-Defense personnel and 15 U.S. military officers were dispatched to the “Japan-U.S. Joint Command Coordination Center” of the Joint Staff Office, and 10 Self-Defense personnel were dispatched to the “U.S. Forces’ Joint Support Force Headquarters. Forty-five Self-Defense Force personnel and 50 U.S. Forces members were assigned to “Japan-U.S Joint Coordination Center” in Sendai.

In the beginning, Commander of the Joint Task Force of Operation Tomodachi was Commander of the U.S. Force, Japan, who was later relieved by Adm. Patrick Walsh, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet.



**March 15**

Deployed off east of Honshu Island, the U.S. aircraft carrier *Ronal Reagan* was on a mission of transporting supplies to the affected areas, and continued to launch aircraft, which were scouring

the sea for homes and vehicles and other items swept into the ocean. Other U.S. naval vessels and P-3C patrol aircraft searched for persons who were lost at sea. At this time, the U.S. forces deployed eight naval vessels and five more vessels were on way to the scene.

On this day, the U.S. forces decided to open the forward operational points in Yamagata Airport, Sendai Airport and Hanamaki Airport.



The dock-landing ship USS *Tortuga*, loaded with two heavy lift helicopters, entered the Tomakomai port, where it is preparing for transporting Ground Self Defense personnel and vehicles to northern part of Honshu. The amphibious assault ship USS *Essex*, which carries a 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the Seventh Fleet Command Ship USS *Blue Ridge* are heading for the disaster scene.

On this day, the U.S. Forces, Japan, provided two fire trucks to deal with Fukushima nuclear plants, to be handled by Japanese crews. But there was no direct U.S. military involvement in the response. Furthermore, as some Navy airmen and sailors participating in relief missions off the USS Ronald Reagan have been exposed to radiation that leaked from these plants, they've since moved the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from the downwind area of that Fukushima Plant.

### March 16

Two U.S. Force's C-130 transport aircraft commenced to transport relief supplies. The U.S. Forces, Japan, decided to dispatch 2,500 marines stationed in Okinawa to the scene. Up to this day, aircraft on board the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and transport aircraft have already carried 30 tons of relief supplies to the stricken area. Departing from Tomakomai port, the dock-landing ship USS *Tortuga* carried 300 Ground Self-Defense personnel and 90 vehicles to Ohminato Port. The amphibious assault ship USS *Essex*, with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard, entered the Japan Sea to commence support from Japan's west coast. This is due to concerns about radiation levels closer to the Fukushima reactor site. This position allowed access to undamaged roads to deliver relief supplies. The 31st Marine Marine Expeditionary Unit was engaged in the re-opening of the Sendai airport. The Seventh Fleet Command Ship Blue Ridge was due to enter Okinawa on the 17th to load personnel and was to sail to the scene.

### March 17

On this day, at a press interview U.S. President Obama said: “The U.S. military, which has helped to ensure the security of Japan for decades, is working around the clock. Already, we’ve distributed thousands of pounds of food and water. We’ve also deployed some of our leading experts to help contain the damage at Japan’s nuclear reactors.” Furthermore, president said: “We have an alliance that was forged more than a half century ago, and strengthened by shared interests and democratic values.” He added: “Our people share ties of family, ties of culture, and ties of commerce. Our troops have served to protect Japan’s shores, and our citizens have found opportunity and friendship in Japan’s cities and towns.” President Obama showed his recognition about the strong bonds with Japan.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has authorized up to \$35 million in initial Defense Department funds for humanitarian aid to Japan. The funding is in addition to \$8 million in total planned aid to Japan from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Adm. Robert Willard, commander, U.S. Pacific Command, requested the Pentagon for dispatching a special force of 450 experts to respond to nuclear plant accidents. Moreover, on this day, nine experts in NBC weapons of the Northern Force Command arrived in Japan, as it had been decided beforehand. Nine experts were placed under the Commander, US Forces Japan. The team will provide technical advice on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and hazardous material, as well as medical and logistical support.

On the other hand, the support by U.S. naval vessels including the aircraft carrier *Ronald Reagan* continued. Delivery of supplies of bottled water and others to the stricken areas by helicopters exceeded a total of 40 tons to date.



At a regular press interview of Pentagon, Adm. Robert Willard, commander, U.S. Pacific Command, explained about the outline and answered the questions on the telephone from Hawaii, as follows: “We’re currently engaged in what we believe is one of the biggest natural and man-made disasters that we’ll face in our lifetime. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are responding earthquake, tsunami, and the consequent nuclear reactor accidents, and the U.S. Forces that support them are also engaged in the difficult operations.” “The United States PACOM has Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, Special Operations Command all engaged in

direct support to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and we're providing in some cases direct support to Gen. Ryoichi Oriki and his forces that are also helping mitigate the reactor accidents that have occurred.”

Q: Is there any feeling that -- have US offers for assistance been turned down by the Japanese government?

A: We have and continue to offer assistance in a variety of ways to help the Japanese mitigate the challenge that they're experiencing with their nuclear reactors. In some cases, they are only able to assess our offers because, at the end of the day, it has to be integrated into the many other efforts that are ongoing by many agencies in Japan, by the vendor obviously. And the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have only begun in earnest an effort in support of that, and my operations are in support of them. So we have given the Self-Defense Force supporting measures of areas in which we believe we can help, and we're also seeking additional ideas on unique technologies.

Q: Is the coordination with the Self Defense Force going smoothly?

A: Coordination with the Joint Chief of Staff goes smoothly from a long period of relationship. Regarding relief activity on ground, Commander of Northeastern Army of the Ground Self-Defense Force is Joint Task Commander of Ground, Maritime, and Air, and the U.S. Army dispatched is taking joint procedures in the command post which is the as that of the U.S. Army. The Japanese Self Defense Force and U.S. military forces are allies which are versed to the best in coordination. We are outstanding in coordination, as we have been periodically conducting joint exercises for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We also have mutual interchangeability and interoperability of equipment.

Q: Does the communication with the Japanese government go smoothly?

A: There were points to have it improved. We have, you know, a language barrier in this case.

### March 19

The U.S. government offered the Japanese government free provision of four large size of water discharging equipment for cooling nuclear reactors. They induce sea water to operate 24 hours.

### March 21

Adm. Adm. Robert Willard, commander, U.S. Pacific Command, has arrived in Japan. Commander said, “A team of 450 nuclear experts are standing by in preparation for arrival in Japan. It depends on Japanese side whether or not they will accept our offer.” The expert group belongs to CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) disaster control reaction force under the U.S. Northern Command (Norcom).

As of March 21, 31 U.S. naval vessels are deployed to water around the stricken areas and

approximately 130 aircraft are on a mission.

### March 22

Regarding response to the accidents of Fukushima nuclear plants, Gen. Ariki, Joint Chief of Staff and Adm. Walsh, Commander of the Pacific Fleet had a talk, and agreed to strengthen posture of information exchanges.

### March 23

Since the operations were commenced, the U.S. military forces have deployed 18,280 personnel, 20 ships and 140 aircraft. Apart from “Joint Coordination Center” at the headquarters of the Northeast Army, liaison officers have been dispatched to the defense ship Hyuga and aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan respectively.



### March 24

Commander Task Force 76 (CTF 76) conducted diving operations in Hachinohe investigating the harbor area. The dock-landing ship USS *Tortuga* will work with Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and local authorities to clear the ports at Hachinohe, Miyako, Kamaishi, Ofonato, and Sendai from debris and other navigational hazards.

As of March 24, U.S. service members have delivered 1,707,815 gallons of water, 172 tons of food, 10 tons of medical supplies and 34 tons of other relief supplies.





### March 25

Two U.S. forces' fuel barges which can accommodate 1,100 tons of fresh water being towed by the JMSDF ship left Yokosuka naval base. They will be used to support cooling efforts at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Up to this date, the Third Marine Expeditionary Force conducted 450 helicopter flights, transporting 129,000 pounds of water and 4,200 pounds of food to the stricken areas.

### March 27

Up to this time, the Self Defense Force has dispatched 106,900 personnel-nearly a half of total fixed number, 539 aircraft, and 53 ships, while the U.S. Forces has dispatched 18,000 personnel from four Services of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, 140 aircraft and 22 ships. This is a posture of rescue relief and rehabilitation that the world has never experienced in the past.

The commander of Operation Tomodachi was changed from Air Force Lieutenant General Field, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, to Admiral Walsh, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Three hundred of U.S. Forces personnel were assigned to the Joint Support Force in Yokota Air Base.

USS *Essex* Amphibious Readiness Group under 31 Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa conducted an amphibious re-supply of Oshima Island off the coast of Kesenuma, which had been isolated by earthquake and tsunami. The *Essex* launched two Landing Craft Units (LCUs) carrying a commercial electrical utility vehicle, a water supply vehicle, a fuel truck, and others, and conducted humanitarian support.

On this day, a Japanese reporter who was sent to cover Operation Tomodachi carries an article as follows:

(Quote) Showing us an emblem on which is written "Friends, Let's cheer up!" embroidered around his right arm, Navy Commander Perera Shiru (Japanese phonetic) (Age 43) of the ASW helicopter squadron of the Carrier Air Wing 5 who received at the Misawa Air Facility said, "I'm proud to be of help to Japanese people. There may be a little we can do, but when we take supplies to stricken area, they give us smiles." Core-force of relief activities consists of the Marine Corps and Navy, with 18,280 personnel, 19 ships and approximately 140 aircraft which are carrying

supplies to the stricken areas. On the airport runways where it snows, military personnel are working hard to clear the runway of snow. If transport aircraft and helicopters shuttling between the landing ships off the coast and land cannot land and take off, delivery of relief supplies will be delayed. Petty Officer First Class Shunsuke Kamieda (Age 34) of the helicopter ASW Squadron said, "I cannot find out any fit words to express how much I'm grateful. American soldiers and Japanese people are of the same mind." When snow stopped around five o'clock in the afternoon, we departed from Misawa Air Base to the dock-landing ship USS *Tortuga* in the offing by helicopter. On the *Tortuga* more than 500 marines were on a mission of transporting relief supplies. (Unquote)



### March 30

In the Miyagi Prefecture-run Ishinomaki Technical High School in the Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, 50 soldiers from Marine Corps, Army, Navy and Air Force of the U.S. Armed Forces and 40 personnel from Ground-Self Defense Force mopped together to clean the muddy school building with its students. The Japanese newspapers report this scene as follows:

(Quote) U.S. soldiers scattered over the campus with cleaning equipment and got rid of the mud, communicating in a gesture with the Self-Defense personnel. There was a scene of their giving a helping hand with a smile of confirming "OK?" to students who lost their balance on the muddy floor. Marine 1st Lt. Sean McMahon said, "We are impressed with your indomitable spirit of trying to stand up (from disaster). We are very glad to help one another while staying in Japan." On behalf 140 teaching staff and students, Principal Hideki Oguro thanked them in English, saying "We will never forget your kindness." American forces are planning to get rid of the brick and mud at five elementary schools in Ishinomaki City from now on. (Unquote)

### March 31

On this day, Operation Tomodachi has shifted its weight to harbor clearance, and maritime clean-up. Underwater disposal team of the dock-landing ship USS *Tortuga* and another vessel conducted additional survey and obstacle identification at the port of Miyako.

On this day, U.S. Forces has decided to dispatch an initial team the Marines' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) of approximately 140 members. They will engage in decontamination of the stricken area and medical care in cooperation with the Self Defense Force.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has approved dispatching the Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The CBIRF is an organization established in 1996 in response to Tokyo Subway Sarin Incident (in 1995). Belonging to the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response (CCMARF) under the U.S. Northern Command, CBIRF is on a mission to counter the nuclear attack, terrorist attack on nuclear power plants, biological and chemical weapons and initial countermeasures to nuclear power incidents. It also has other missions including rescue of personnel from the highly contaminated area in cooperation with hospitals and local governments and decontamination in disaster-hit area.

As of March 31, 16 ships, 130 aircraft and 12,935 personnel are engaged in Operation Tomodachi. Since Operation was commenced, the U.S. Seventh Fleet provided 250 tons of relief supplies.

#### April 1

The *Tortuga* which had been engaged in relief activities in Miyako until the middle of April moved to Oshima to start salvage and port clean-up. The governments of Japan and the United States commenced coordination to shift the weight of Operation Tomodachi from the search and rescue to countering the incident of nuclear power plants. Manpower to be involved in operation was reduced to approximately 5,000.

#### April 2

Four ships, helicopters and P-3C of the U.S. 7th Fleet conducted search for those who are missing at sea off east of Honshu island. In addition, barges provided 500,000 gallons of fresh water.

#### April 4

Today, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa boarded the U.S. aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan to thank U.S. service members for their help.



Defense Minister Kitazawa said: "The entire Japanese people are deeply moved and encouraged by scenes of U.S. military members working hard in support of relief efforts. Those in

Japan and the United States are true tomodachi. ... They share basic values such as democracy and respect for human rights.” Faced with such a disaster, Kitazawa said, “in no time like the present do I feel so strongly about our friendship with the United States. Your support is a testament of our enduring bond for more than half a century. Japan, with your continuous cooperation, is determined to launch a full-scale effort to overcome these challenges ahead of us.”

#### April 5

The U.S. government conveyed the Japanese side that the expenditure of Operation Tomodachi was 80 million dollars at the maximum. The upper limit of the first budget was upped to 3.3 times.

By this day, 150 personnel of the Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) arrived at Yokota Air Force Base.

#### April 6

On this day, Marine Corps personnel finished operations of clearing up the debris in Oshima, an isolated island in Kesenuma City, Miyagi Prefecture. A total of 330 Marine Corps personnel were involved. Shower-bath was installed in the island.



#### April 21

On this day, Adm. Robert Willard, commander, U.S. Pacific Command, said, so far 20 thousand personnel, 22 ships and 140 aircraft transported to provide 189 tons of food, two million gallons of fresh waters, and 87 tons of relief supplies.

### 3. Achievements of Operation Tomodachi as of April 30

On April 30, the U.S. Defense Department announced on the achievements of Operation Tomodachi as follows:

- (1) Participating force; About 20 thousand personnel, 22 ships, 140 aircraft
- (2) Humanitarian assistance, Disaster relief mission; Following missions were accomplished:
  - Searching for those missing, watching obstacles and others at sea
  - Transporting and provision of food (189 tons), fresh water (7,729 tons), and fuel, packaged

meals, clothing, medical supplies and others (87 tons)

- For countering nuclear power plant accidents, provided two fire engines, 100 anti-radiation protection kits, 150 CBIRF members (All CBIRF members returned home in the week beginning on April 24.)
- Rehabilitation work of Senadai Airport, Oshima, Hachinoe Port, Miyako Port, and Getting rid of the brick and mud at elementary schools in Ishinomaki City

#### 4. Comments

- (1) Since the Democratic Party took the power in Japan, the Japan-U.S. relations continued to be shaken with wrapping-up of the refueling mission by the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean, an issue of base relocation for Air Station Futema, and comments by former U.S. State Department Director of Japanese Affairs in the United States Kevin Meyer to the effect that “The Okinawan people have the ability to deceive and extort the players” among others. There are some articles which mention that Operation Tomodachi will improve the Japan-U.S. relations or it will give us an opportunity of having the Japanese people recognize anew the significance of U.S. military bases in Japan. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the attitudes of the personnel who were involved in Operation Tomodachi on the scene looked so sincere that they gave the Self-Defense personnel who worked with them or residents in the areas hit by disaster a feeling of gratitude and a deep impression. No word can be found that mentions the necessity of U.S. military bases in Japan by citing an example of Operation Tomodachi on the websites of the U.S. Defense Department or the U.S. 7th Fleet or in the statements of officials of the U.S. government and military forces among others. On the contrary, it seems to be taken as if they were trying to refrain from discussing the contributions made by the Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa. It is in the side of the Japanese that we should strongly realize again the significance of forward deployment of U.S. Forces and Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- (2) It is not only Japan that recognized anew the power of the U.S. Military Forces from Operation Tomodachi. It has also shown, without doubt, a high level of quick reaction capabilities of the forward deployed U.S. Military Forces in peace time and in the emergency to Russia, China, and the Southeast Asian nations among others. On this occasion, we should spread broadly an idea of positioning the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a public asset in the region.
- (3) The Japanese Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Military Forces are well versed in joint activities through cooperative joint exercises based on the guidelines for defense cooperation between Japan and the United States and operations and others of cooperative coordinating centers. In addition, two parties are training themselves in cooperative action procedures in the large scale of disasters through the multilateral exercise of “Pacific Partnership.” It is considered that there were many parts in which an accumulation of these experiences may have been revitalized in “Operation Tomodachi.” If there had been points for reflection from a mistake or a situation beyond assumption, it is believed that they would be assets for developing cooperative action capabilities further. However, the center of gravity in

Japan-U.S. Alliance is guaranteeing the national security in case of crisis to the end, and we should avoid the excessive reliance on the role in peace time including dispatching the Self-Defense Force during a large scale of natural disasters.

- (4) We should learn and can learn from the United States how the crisis control of the government is in the national crisis whether it is in an emergency or in peace time, especially promptness and concrete countermeasures among others in the crisis control.
- (5) Also regarding the counter-measures to the nuclear power plant accidents, it is considered that, in future, we should think about further why the U.S. Military Forces is committed to them to such an extent, in particular, about its inevitability and U.S. strategic expectation for a continued analysis.

(By Kazumine AKIMOTO)



# **Ocean Policy Research Foundation**

3F, Kaiyo Senpaku Bldg., 15-16 Toranomom 1-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan  
TEL.81-3-3502-1828 FAX.81-3-3502-2033

The "Ship & Ocean Foundation" is operating under the name of "Ocean Policy Research Foundation"