

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

April 2011



CONTENTS

Intelligence Summary in April 2011

1. Information Digest

- 1.1 Maritime Security
- 1.2 Military Developments
- 1.3 Maritime Boundaries
- 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations
- 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors
- 1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others

2. Intelligence Assessment

China's National Defense in 2010 - Review of diversity of modernization of military power

This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of April 2011.

Publisher: Masahiro Akiyama

Staff writers:

Kazumine Akimoto, Takehisa Imaizumi, Masami Kawamura, Aki Mori, Wakana Mukai,
Eiji Sakai, Daisuke Sekine, Takehisa Tomomori, Hideshi Ueno, Yuko Takada

All rights reserved.

This report, or parts thereof, must not be produced in any form without permission in writing of the publisher.

Intelligence Summary in April 2011

Maritime Security: According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), on the 1st, the first of three information-sharing centers (ISC's) on piracy has been commissioned in Mombasa, Kenya. The Mombasa ISC will operate on a 24-hour basis and covers extensive areas of the western Indian Ocean. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become the 18th signatory to sign the Djibouti Code of Conduct on the 18th.

In April there were four hijacking incidents. On the other hand, seven hijacked vessels were released. Of them, a Greek-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC) owned by the Greek shipping company, MV *Irene SL* (319,000-dwt), which was released by Somali pirates on the 7th was noteworthy. The ransom is said to be \$14 million. Regarding release of MV *Irene SL*, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) said in an announcement on the 8th: "The world's politicians don't realize the severity of this critical situation. How many ships need to be attacked? How much is enough for national governments to take real action?" Additionally, on the 15th, Somali pirates released the Panamanian-flagged general cargo ship MV *Asphalt Venture* (3,883DWT) which had been under pirate control for 199 days. Of its 15 Indian crew, eight were released, but the other seven are still being held. On the 16th, Somalia pirates said they would keep any Indian nationals until fellow pirates held by India are set free. On the 18th, in the context of this situation, the IMO reiterated its condemnation of all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and expressed its concern over the treatment of seafarers being held hostage by pirates. In particular, it condemned their use as "human shields."

On the other hand, release of the hijacked vessels by force and the suppression of the pirate action groups by the naval ships of the EU fleet, NATO fleet, and the CTF-151 were noted. These incidents totaled 12 cases. As one of the, on the 4th, a patrol plane (P-3C) of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) spotted two skiffs, approximately 70 nautical miles north of Somalia while patrolling the Gulf of Aden. The P-3C provided information to the naval vessels of other nations operating in the vicinity. The Turkish Navy's frigate contributed to NATO, TCG *Giresun*, arrived at the scene, arresting the nine pirate suspects and confiscating all the piracy paraphernalia, including arms and ammunition.

On the 11th, UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1976 (2011) to urgently consider the establishment of special Somali courts operating in the country, as well as the East African region.

Military Developments: On the 4th, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said the Russian Armed Forces will continue using a mixture of conscripts and contracted recruits for the next 10-15 years in the process of reforming its armed forces by shifting the focus away from a largely inefficient body of conscripted soldiers toward a smaller professional army.

On the 6th, high-resolution pictures of China's first aircraft carrier, the 67,500-tonne *Varyag*,

appeared on the Xinhua website, with captions saying “the vessel was almost finished and expected to sail in 2011.” It was the first time that official state media reported on the nation's first aircraft carrier project as well as indicating its construction progress at a shipyard in Dalian, Liaoning. In addition, naval experts have cautioned it is clear that China has been developing aircraft carrier capabilities independently within a few years ahead, which means that, as a next step, China is shaping a navy for global power projection. Assuming just one scenario, starting with Taiwan, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the China's aircraft carrier.

On the 8th, the U.S. Department of Defense updated the Unified Command Plan (UCP), a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. The noteworthy point at this time is a change of geographical boundaries of responsibility in the Arctic region, advocating for combat capabilities in the Arctic region as areas of responsibility for the Northern Command.

Ian Storey, a fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies based in Singapore, contributed an article entitled “Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay: Geopolitical power in play” to the Singaporean newspaper “*The Straits Times*” dated 16th. In the article, the author mentions that, with the Vietnam's opening of the Cam Ranh Bay to the foreign naval vessels, keeping China in mind, it is certain that the port-visits by U.S. naval vessels will increase, and the Cam Ranh Bay will play an important role under the geopolitical conflicts between the United States and china in the Asia-Pacific Region.

On the 25th, the Thai Defense Council approved a navy plan to buy six second-hand submarines from Germany for almost 8 billion baht (¥21.4 billion). The navy's choice is the U-206 A German-made submarines. If the procurement plan is approved by the cabinet, the navy is expected to have the submarines by September 2013. On the other hand, Indonesia launched the indigenous missile craft KRI *Churit-40* on the 25th.

On the 29th, South Korea launched a new 2,300-ton frigate, ROKS *Inchon*. The frigate is the first unit under the Frigate Experimental program. The Navy is seeking to secure some twenty 2,300-ton or 2,500-ton frigates by around 2020.

Maritime Boundaries: On the 14th, the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirmed reports that the country had filed a formal protest in the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) over China's so-called “nine-dash line” territorial claim over the entire South China Sea (SCS), by submitting a verbal note dated April 5. Countering a Philippine diplomatic protest at the United Nations, China sent a diplomatic note to the U.N. Secretary General on the 14th, in which Beijing said it has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly islands, asserting the contents of the Philippines' diplomatic note “are totally unacceptable to the Chinese Government.”

Diplomacy and International Relations: Thad W. Allen, the former commandant of the Coast Guard; Richard L. Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state; and John J. Hamre, the former deputy secretary of defense contributed opinions in an article entitled “Odd Man Out at Sea”

under joint signature to *The New York Times* on the 24th. In the article they mention that the United States has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, the United States, the world's leading maritime power, is at a military and economic disadvantage. Therefore, they are urging that the United States should ratify the convention immediately.

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: Myanmar Port Authority (MPA) will carry out the maintenance of the water course of the River of Yangon aimed at facilitating safety drive of foreign vessels ranging from 15,000 tons to 35,000 tons from the mouth of the river to the Yangon port and timely completion of freight-handling. On the 27th, China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding to complete the railway line, connecting a Myanmar border town to the planned deep-sea port it is building at Kyaukphyu, along with an ongoing pipeline project.

According to Malaysia's Deputy Transport Minister on the 22nd, Port Klang is expected to achieve at least a 10th place ranking among world's container terminal in the near future, surging in the handling of containers, with a 21.4 percent jump to 8.87 million TEU's from the 7.3 million in 2009.

On the 27th, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced that Turkey will build a new canal connecting the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea. According to the plan, Canal Istanbul would create a second channel that ultimately connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As for the plan, a study will take two years to determine the route of the canal, which is expected to be 45 to 50 kilometers long, 150 meters wide, and 25 meters deep.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: According to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China is aiming for oil & gas production of 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day by 2015 and 1 million boe per day by 2020 in deepwater areas of the South China. Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipyard has built the HYSY 981 drilling rig, which can drill in 3,000 m of water to a total well depth of 12,000 meters. The HYSY 981 deepwater rig gives China the physical capacity to drill virtually anywhere in the South China Sea apart from the deepest parts of the abyssal plain.

The Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fishery Ministry claims that Jakarta loses Rp9.4 trillion due to fish theft every year. Areas susceptible to fish thefts include the Natuna Sea, Arafura and northern Sulawesi. Indonesia only has 24 monitoring ships and only 17 are equipped with standard weaponry.

Intelligence Assessment: On March 31, China has released its national defense white paper entitled "China's National Defense in 2010," "2010年中国的国防" in the original text, which is translated into English as "China's National Defense in 2010" (hereafter, WP). The WP mentions: "Considering the second decade of the 21st century as strategically important opportunities for national development, China will persevere on the path of peaceful development, and pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature." In

addition, the WP stresses that China is making efforts to carry out military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as the United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations (PKO), counter-piracy operations off Somalia, emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and the protection of security among others, as well as promoting mutual confidence, arms control and disarmament. On the other hand, the WP says that it will realize economic development and national defense in a unified manner, the unified goal of building a prosperous country and a strong military. It also emphasizes to modernize the military forces by placing the highest priority on informationization. Although the WP lacks concrete explanation, analysis is made on whether or not the document has promoted transparency for making the international community convince it by explaining clearly the consistency between an idea and reality. For analysis, the text is based on the Chinese edition so as to aware of every nuance in the document as faithfully as possible. Author is Junichi Takeda, Senior Program Inspector, Program Inspection Bureau, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK).

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

April 1 “IMO opens ISC in Kenya” (gCaptain, April 1, 2011)

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), on the 1st, the first of three information-sharing centers (ISC's) on piracy has been commissioned in Mombasa, Kenya. The first ISC will facilitate practical measures to suppress piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

An outline of the article: According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), on the 1st, the first of three information-sharing centers (ISC's) on piracy has been commissioned in Mombasa, Kenya. The first ISC will facilitate practical measures to suppress piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Two additional centers have been set up Dar es Salam, Tanzania and San'a, Yemen. The Mombasa ISC will be co-housed with the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, which operates on a 24-hour basis and covers extensive areas of the western Indian Ocean. The Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Kenya will all report to the Mombasa ISC. The Mombasa ISC will exchange information concerning the movement of pirates with two other centers, as well as with the European Union Naval Force, the U.K. Maritime Trade Operations and the Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain.

Refer to the article: UN Maritime Agency Commissions Kenya Piracy Information Center
<http://gcaptain.com/maritime-agency-commissions-kenya?23538>

April 2 “Spanish navy delivers suspected pirates to Seychelles” (AFP, April 3, 2011)

On the 2nd, the Spanish navy handed over 11 suspected pirates to the Seychelles, who had been detained by the navy off the Seychelles on March 28.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, the Spanish navy handed over 11 suspected pirates to the Seychelles, who had been detained by the Spanish frigate *ESPS Canarias* - part of the European Union's Atalante anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean - off the Seychelles on March 28.

Refer to the article: Spanish navy delivers suspected pirates to Seychelles
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gSbsxUtdZb-qXsJAilsYWIDp9_dA?docId=CNG.0036c9560bca2e03ee429fb8f0b51538.d11

April 2 “Danish warship captures 15 pirate suspects” (The Copenhagen Post, April 11 and People’s Daily Online, April 12, 2011)

On the 2nd, the Danish Navy’s command and support ship HDMS *Esbern Snare* of the NATO fleet engaged in a firefight with a pirate mother-ship in the Gulf of Aden, capturing 15 pirate suspects. Items found on board the vessel, including 14 grenade launchers, 9 machine guns (AK-47s), 2 large boxes of ammunition for machine guns, 5 hand grenades, 6 ladders and 3 pirate attack boats (skiffs) with powerful outboard motors, were captured.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, the Danish Navy’s command and support ship HDMS

Esbern Snare of the NATO fleet engaged in a firefight with a pirate mother-ship in the Gulf of Aden, capturing 15 pirate suspects. According to the Dutch Navy, a helicopter aboard the warship stopped the mother-boat with warning shots. When the boarding team of the navy's special operations was launched to the mother-ship, it was fired upon by the mother-ship. The special operation team returned fire, and three pirate suspects were wounded in the firefight. Inspecting the mother-ship, the boarding team captures 15 pirate suspects, guarding 18 crew members who had been taken hostages (16 from Pakistan and two from Iran). The mother-ship was originally an Iranian fishing vessel. The Danish Navy said a cache of items were found on board the vessel, including 14 grenade launchers, 9 machine guns (AK-47s), 2 large boxes of ammunition for machine guns, 5 hand grenades, 6 ladders and 3 pirate attack boats (skiffs) with powerful outboard motors. It was an extremely powerful ship. Fifteen pirate suspects were put in detention on board the frigate, but 18 crew-members were returned to the fishing vessel as they wished. Additionally, the *Esbern Snare* arrested three pirate suspects on the 1st.

Refer to the article: Danish warship frees 18 pirate hostages

<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/international/89-international/51418-danish-warship-frees-18-pirate-hostages.html>

Danish warship frees 18 hostages after skirmish with pirates off Somalia coast

<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/7347286.html>



Source: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-U_8WAdycsnc/TaPZZe0EmuI/AAAAAAAAAK_Q/-J0CnosfYK4/s1600/Snare_225.jpg

April 2 “UAE Special Forces rescues ship hijacked by pirates” (The National, April 3, 2011)

On the 2nd, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Special Forces stormed a UAE-flagged bulk-carrier, the MV *Arrilah-I* (36,490DWT), owned by the Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company and the National Gas Shipping Company, rescuing the vessel which had been hijacked by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea on the 1st.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Special Forces stormed a UAE-flagged bulk-carrier, the MV *Arrilah-I* (36,490DWT), owned by the Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company and the National Gas Shipping Company, rescuing the vessel which had been hijacked by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea on the 1st. Special counter-terrorism units, with support from the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as the US Fifth Fleet, accomplished the

operations successfully. All crew members of *Arrilah-1* are safe. All pirates that have been detained will be handed over to the Ministry of Interior once they arrive in Dubai. When captured, the bulk carrier was en route from Australia to Jebel Ali, the UAE.

The headquarters of the UAE Armed Forces said the rescue showed the UAE's commitment to acting firmly in the face of piracy, adding that the country would not succumb to such threats. On 28 March, another UAE-flagged vessel was hijacked, which means the attack was the second on a UAE-flagged ship in recent days. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, March 2011, 1. 1 Maritime Security.)

Refer to the article: Special Forces rescue UAE ship from pirates

<http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/special-forces-rescue-uae-ship-from-pirates>



MV Arrilah-1

Source: The National, April 3, 2011

April 3 “Dutch warship captures 11 pirate suspects” (Allied Maritime Command HQ, Northwood, News, Release, April 3, 2011)

On the 3rd, the Dutch naval frigate HNLMS *Tromp* assigned to NATO spotted the pirated dhow heading for a known pirate camp, and arrested 10 Somali pirate suspects. Finding 16 crew members, two Somalis, and six Somali pirate suspects in the dhow, the boarding team of the *Tromp* assisted and detained them.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, the Dutch naval frigate HNLMS *Tromp* assigned to NATO spotted the pirated dhow heading for a known pirate camp. As the two rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB's) launched from the frigate closed to investigate, they were fired upon by the skiffs. Acting in self-defense, the HNLMS *Tromp* returned fire, and captured ten Somali pirate suspects. Additionally, finding 16 crew members, two Somalis, and six Somali pirate suspects in the dhow, the boarding team of the *Tromp* assisted and detained them. At the same time, a Malaysian-flagged merchant vessel - MV *Albedo*, which had been pirated on November 26, 2010, lifted anchor and steamed straight for the HNLMS *Tromp*. After some well-aimed warning shots across her bow from the *Tromp*, the *Albedo* returned to her anchorage. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: NATO Warship Rescues Crew From Armed Pirates

[http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/03%2004%2011%20NATOWarshipRescuesCrewFromArmedPirates%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/03%2004%2011%20NATOWarshipRescuesCrewFromArmedPirates%20(2).pdf)



Source: <http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XvzUtQiphS4/TZnb6EhKKJI/AAAAAAAAACIQ/sKoekxc207k/s1600/TROMPrhib.jpg>

April 3 “Spanish warship disrupts pirate whaler” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 4, 2011)

On the 3rd, the EU NAVFOR Spanish Navy’s frigate ESPS *Infanta Elena* identified and boarded a whaler 89 nautical miles south-east of Mombasa. The boarding team held two suspected pirates onboard together with significant numbers of fuel barrels, as well as other suspected pirate-related paraphernalia, all of which were seized. As there was insufficient evidence to secure a prosecution, the suspected pirates will be returned to Somalia.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, the EU NAVFOR Spanish Navy’s frigate ESPS *Infanta Elena* identified and boarded a whaler 89 nautical miles south-east of Mombasa. The boarding team held two suspected pirates onboard together with significant numbers of fuel barrels, as well as other suspected pirate-related paraphernalia, all of which were seized. The *Infanta Elena* destroyed the whaler. As there was insufficient evidence to secure a prosecution, the suspected pirates will be returned to Somalia.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR Warship Disrupts Suspected Pirate Whaler

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/eu-navfor-warship-disrupts-suspected-pirate-whaler/>



Boarding team stop suspecte pirate whaler

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 4, 2011

April 4 “JMSDF’s aircraft spots suspected ship; Turkish Navy captures 9 pirate suspects” (Ministry of Defense, Japan, April 5, and Bosphorus Naval News, April 6, 2011)

On the 4th, a patrol plane (P-3C) of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) spotted two skiffs, approximately 70 nautical miles north of Somalia while patrolling the Gulf of Aden. The P-3C provided information to the naval vessels of other nations operating in the vicinity. The Turkish Navy’s frigate contributed to NATO, TCG *Giresun*, arrived at the scene, arresting the nine pirate suspects and confiscating all the piracy paraphernalia, including arms and ammunition.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, a patrol plane (P-3C) of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) spotted two skiffs, approximately 70 nautical miles north of Somalia while patrolling the Gulf of Aden, the Turkish military reported. According to the Japanese Defense Ministry, five men with the objects which looked like fuel tanks and piracy paraphernalia were observed aboard one of the skiffs. There were four men aboard the other skiff. The P-3C provided information to the naval vessels of other nations operating in the vicinity. The Turkish Navy’s frigate contributed to NATO, TCG *Giresun*, arrived at the scene. The helicopter launched from the frigate made the skiffs stopped with warning shots. The Turkish Naval Special Forces boarded the skiffs, arresting the nine pirate suspects and confiscating all the piracy paraphernalia, including arms and ammunition. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: TCG Giresun Finds Two Pirate Skiffs And Arrests Pirates

<http://turkishnavy.net/2011/04/06/tcg-giresun-finds-two-pirate-skiffs-and-arrests-pirates/>

Japan’s Defense Ministry Homepage:

<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2011/04/05b.html>



Source: <http://turkishnavy.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/4q.jpg>

April 6 “Finn warship captures pirate mother-ship” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office , Press Release, April 6, 2011)

During the early morning of April 6, the EU NAVFOR Finnish minelayer FNS *Pohjanmaa* identified a suspected Pirate Action Group (PAG) consisting of a suspicious boat which might be a pirate mother-ship (dhow) and two attack skiffs approximately 250 NM South East of Salalah,

Oman. The boarding team from the *Pohjanmaa* confiscated a significant amount of suspected pirate-related paraphernalia in the dhow, holding 18 persons on board in custody.

An outline of the article: During the early morning of April 6, the EU NAVFOR Finnish minelayer FNS *Pohjanmaa* identified a suspected Pirate Action Group (PAG) consisting of a suspicious boat which might be a pirate mother-ship (dhow) and two attack skiffs approximately 250 NM South East of Salalah, Oman. Although PAG tried to flee the scene, the *Pohjanmaa* fired warning shots to stop the dhow. The boarding team from the *Pohjanmaa* confiscated a significant amount of suspected pirate-related paraphernalia in the dhow, holding 18 persons on board in custody for the investigation. Since the beginning of the operation in December 2008, EU NAVFOR has disrupted more than 80 Pirate Action Groups. Below is the scene at the time.

According to an announcement of the EU NAVFOR, FNS *Pohjanmaa* destroyed the dhow it had captured on the afternoon of the 9th. (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 11, 2011)

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR disrupts another suspected Pirate Action Group

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/eu-navfor-disrupts-another-suspected-pirate-action-group/Finnish>



Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 6, 2011

【Related Story】

“EU NAVFOR frees 18 pirate suspects” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 21, 2011)

On the 21st, EU NAVFOR released 18 suspected pirates that had been detained by the EU NAVFOR Finnish warship FNS *Pohjanmaa*, and returned them to Somalia. EU NAVFOR reached this decision after requests by EU NAVFOR to a number of states, who were considered to have an interest in the case of accepting them for prosecution, proved to be unsuccessful.

An outline of the article: On the 21st, EU NAVFOR released 18 suspected pirates that had been detained by the EU NAVFOR Finnish warship FNS *Pohjanmaa*, and returned them to Somalia. EU NAVFOR reached this decision after requests by EUNAVFOR to a number of states,

who were considered to have an interest in the case of accepting them for prosecution, proved to be unsuccessful. As EU NAVFOR has no authority to prosecute suspected pirates, it has to seek a State willing to prosecute them. On the other hand, as EU NAVFOR is not able to detain the pirates indefinitely (as this is in breach of the regulations of the European Convention on Human Rights), EU NAVFOR cannot help deciding to release the suspected pirates.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR Releases Suspected Pirates After Prosecution Attempts Prove Unsuccessful

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/eu-navfor-releases-suspected-pirates-after-prosecution-attempts-prove-unsuccessful/>

April 7 “Somali pirates free Greek-flagged VLCC” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 11, and others, 2011)

On the 7th, Somali pirates released a Greek-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC) owned by the Greek shipping company, MV *Irene SL* (319,000-dwt). The VLCC was hijacked approximately 350 nautical miles South East of Muscat in the North Arabian Sea on February 9. The ransom is said to be \$14 million.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, Somali pirates released a Greek-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC) owned by the Greek shipping company, MV *Irene SL* (319,000-dwt). The VLCC had been hijacked approximately 350 nautical miles South East of Muscat in the North Arabian Sea on February 9.

The ransom is said to be \$14 million. (Press TV, April 10)

As for release of MV *Irene SL*, according to an announcement of the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) on the 8th, the vessel was released after 58 days in captivity – especially after 12 days being used as a pirate mother-ship. All of 25 crew members (17 Filipinos, seven Greeks, and a Georgian national) are safe and in good health. Moreover, the gist of the announcement is mentioned as follows. (1) When seized, MV *Irene SL* was en route to the United States, transporting approximately 1.9 million barrels of crude oil cargo, which represented 20% of total U.S. daily crude oil imports, or 5% of total daily world seaborne oil supply. The systematic use of pirate mother-ships means that the Somali pirates’ outreach now extends right across the Indian Ocean. No ship in this area is safe from the risk of pirate attack. There is no alternative route any more for the 17 million barrels of oil a day that come out of the Gulf – 40% of the world’s oil supplies have to pass through the Indian Ocean; (2) The world’s politicians don’t realize the severity of this critical situation. How many ships need to be attacked? How many hostages taken, tortured and killed? How much is enough for national governments to take real action?

Refer to the article: MV IRENE SL Released from Pirate Control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/mv-irene-sl-released-from-pirate-control/>



MV Irene SL

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 11, 2011

April 8 “Somali pirates seize German vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 8, 2011)

On the early morning of April 8, the Antigua & Barbuda flagged cargo ship *MV Susan K* (4,464DWT) owned by the German shipping company was seized by Somali pirates approximately 200 nautical miles North-East of Salalah, Oman; a location only 35 nautical miles from the Omani coastline. The *Susan K* has a crew of 10, comprising 4 Ukraine and 6 Filipino.

An outline of the article: On the early morning of April 8, the Antigua & Barbuda flagged cargo ship *MV Susan K* (4,464DWT) owned by the German shipping company was seized by Somali pirates approximately 200 nautical miles North-East of Salalah, Oman; a location only 35 nautical miles from the Omani coastline. It is said that the vessel was attacked and boarded by at least 10 pirates. The *Susan K* has a crew of 10, comprising 4 Ukraine and 6 Filipino.

Refer to the article: *MV SUSAN K* pirated only 35 nautical miles from the Omani coastline

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/mv-susan-k-pirated-only-35-nautical-miles-from-the-omani-coastline/>



MV Susan K

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=1123593>

April 10 “US Navy’s warship detains 11 pirate suspects” (Commbined Maritime Forces, Press Release, April 11, 2011)

On the 10th, the USS *Mason* of the CTF-151 on an anti-piracy mission captured a mother-ship of pirates and detained 11 pirate suspects. The *Mason*’s boarding team searched the dhow, confiscating the weapons and other common piracy paraphernalia onboard, and protecting five

crew members.

An outline of the article: On the 10th, the USS *Mason* of the CTF-151 on an anti-piracy mission captured a mother-ship of pirates and detained 11 pirate suspects. According to the CTF-151, this mother-boat was a dhow (fishing boat), FV *Nasri*, which had been initially sighted in the Arabian Sea by an Australian Maritime Patrol Aircraft on the 9th, and to which the USS *Mason* in the vicinity had reacted. The *Mason*'s embarked helicopter located the *Nasri* early on the morning of April 10. The helicopter's crew saw 16 personnel, a motored skiff, a ladder and several oil barrels on board. Having stopped the skiff with the warning shots, the *Mason* sent a boarding team to search the dhow, confiscating the weapons and other common piracy paraphernalia onboard. They held 11 pirate suspects in custody, and protected five crew members, who were returned to FV *Nasri*. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: USS Mason Intercepts Pirate Mother-ship in Arabian Sea

<http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2011/04/11/uss-mason-intercepts-pirate-mother-ship-in-arabian-sea/>



Source: Combined Maritime Forces, Press Release, April 11, 2011

April 11 “Somali pirates release Thai ship” (Reuters, April 12, 2011)

On the 11th, Somali pirates released a Thai-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Thai shipping company, the Thor Nexus (20,377DWT), which they seized on Dec. 25, 2010. A \$5 million ransom is said to have been paid.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, Somali pirates released a Thai-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Thai shipping company, the Thor Nexus (20,377DWT), which they seized on December 25, 2010. The bulk carrier was hijacked 350 miles off Oman on her way to Bangladesh from Jebel Ali in the UAE. All crew members are Thais. According to the pirates who are said to have seized the vessel, they received a \$5 million ransom. The money was dropped from a light aircraft onto the ship.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates release Thai ship after ransom

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE73B0CS20110412>

April 11 “UNSC decides to establishment Somali Specialized Anti-Piracy Court” (ABC Live, April 12, 2011)

On the 11th, UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1976 (2011) to urgently consider the establishment of special Somali courts operating in the country, as well as the East African region.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1976 (2011) to urgently consider the establishment of special Somali courts operating in the country, as well as the East African region. In the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to propose modalities for such specialized courts within two months. The Council also reiterated its support to ongoing efforts by States in the development of anti-piracy laws, courts and detention facilities and requested the Secretary-General to take measures to support regional States in those endeavors. The Council urged both State and non-State actors affected by piracy, particularly the international shipping community, to provide support for such efforts through the related Trust Fund. It also urged all States to criminalize piracy, as well as profiting from and organizing it, under their domestic law.

Refer to the article: UNSC decides to Establishment Somali Specialized Anti-Piracy Court

<http://abclive.in/world/190-uns-c-decides-to-establishment-somali-specialized-anti-piracy-court.html>

As for UN resolution 1976 (2011), refer to the website as follows:

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/295/44/PDF/N1129544.pdf?OpenElement>

April 11 “Singapore deploys maritime patrol aircraft to Gulf of Aden” (MINDEF, Singapore, April 11, 2011)

On the 11th, Singapore has deployed a Fokker-50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (F-50 MPA) with 38 personnel of its Air Force (SAF) to support the counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. The deployment lasts for three months.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, Singapore has deployed a Fokker-50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (F-50 MPA) with 38 personnel of its Air Force (SAF) to support the counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. This is the first time that the F-50 MPA has been deployed, which lasts for three months. The F-50 MPA detachment will be based in Djibouti and operate under the ambit of multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) 151.

Refer to the article: SAF Deploys F-50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft to Gulf of Aden

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2011/apr/11apr11_nr.html

April 13 “Australian Navy rescues Yemeni fishermen” (The Department of Defence, Australia, April 15, 2011)

According to the Australian Defense Ministry, an Australian Navy’s frigate of the International Anti-piracy Force – CTF-151, HMAS *Stuart*, rescued three Yemeni fishermen who had been kept hostage by Somali pirates on the 13th.

An outline of the article: According to the Australian Defense Ministry, an Australian Navy’s

frigate of the International Anti-piracy Force – CTF-151, HMAS *Stuart*, rescued three Yemeni fishermen who had been kept hostage by Somali pirates on the 13th. Pirates attacked a Yemeni dhow (fishing vessel), FV *Al Shahar 75*, and held its crew as hostage in the Gulf of Aden about 20 days ago. As the HMAS *Stuart's* boarding party found and approached the *Al Shahar 75*, the pirates surrendered to the party without firing the shots. The boarding party put 15 pirate suspects into custody, and confiscated 11 AK-47 assault rifles with 16 magazines, a large quantity of small arms ammunition and a Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher with grenade, disposing over-board. The unarmed pirates were released in their skiff which had been towed by the dhow after being provided with adequate water, food, fuel and communication equipment to make the nearest land-fall off the Somalia coast. Below are the captured weapons and the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: Australian Navy rescues hostages from pirates

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/04/14/3191520.htm?section=justin>



Source: The Department of Defense, Australia, April 15, 2011

April 13 “Somali pirates release German ship” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 13, 2011)

On the 13th, Somali pirates released an Antigua & Barbudan-flagged general cargo ship owned by the German shipping company, MV *Beluga Nomination* (9,775DWT). The vessel was hijacked on January 22 approximately 390 nautical miles north of the Seychelles.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, Somali pirates released an Antigua & Barbadian-flagged general cargo ship owned by the German shipping company, MV *Beluga Nomination* (9,775DWT). The vessel was hijacked on January 22 approximately 390 nautical miles north of the Seychelles while it was on route to Port Victoria in the Seychelles.

Refer to the article: MV BELUGA NOMINATION Released from Pirate Control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/mv-beluga-nomination-released-from-pirate-control/>

April 15 “Somali pirates release Panamanian-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press release, April 26, 2011)

On the 15th, Somali pirates released the Panamanian-flagged general cargo ship MV *Asphalt Venture* (3,883DWT) which had been under pirate control for 199 days. Of its 15 Indian crew,

eight were released with the vessel, but it is understood that the other seven are still being held.

An outline of the article: On the 15th, Somali pirates released the Panamanian-flagged general cargo ship *MV Asphalt Venture* (3,883DWT) which had been under pirate control for 199 days. *MV Asphalt Venture* had been pirated on September 28, 2010 approximately 100 nautical miles South-East of DAR ES SALAAM in the Somali Basin. The vessel was on route to Durban when it was attacked. Of its 15 Indian crew, eight were released with the vessel, but it is understood that the other seven are still being held.

Refer to the article: MV ASPHALT VENTURE Released from Pirate Control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/mv-asphalt-venture-released-from-pirate-control/>

【Related Story 1】

“Somali pirates hold Indian crews hostage” (Reuters, April 16, 2011)

On the 16th, Somalia pirates said they would keep any Indian nationals from freed ships as hostages until fellow pirates held by India are set free.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Somalia pirates said they would keep any Indian nationals from freed ships as hostages until fellow pirates held by India are set free. “It was a joint understanding among us not to release any Indian citizens,” a pirate told Reuters. “India hasn't only declared war against us, but also it has risked the lives of many hostages.” India is holding more than 100 pirate suspects it has detained mostly in rescue operations.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates say to hold any Indian crews hostage

<http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE73F07T20110416>

【Related Story 2】

“IMO expresses concern over mistreatment of seafarers held hostage by pirates” (IMO Briefing, April 18, 2011)

On the 18th, in the context of the recently-released Indian ship *M/V Asphalt Venture*, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reiterates its condemnation of all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and expresses its concern over the treatment of seafarers being held hostage by pirates. In particular, it condemns their use as “human shields.”

An outline of the article: On the 18th, in the context of the recently-released Indian ship *M/V Asphalt Venture*, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reiterates its condemnation of all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and expresses its concern over the treatment of seafarers being held hostage. In particular, it condemns their use as “human shields” on board or on the Somali coast. Of 15 Indian crew members of *MV Asphalt Venture*, six officers and one rating had been removed from the ship and, at the time of release, were being held at an undisclosed location ashore, where they remain. IMO is concerned for the welfare of all innocent seafarers being held in captivity, and is working towards their timely release. Using seafarers as human shields to continue to engage in piracy - one of the most heinous of crimes against humanity at sea - is totally unacceptable.

Refer to the article: IMO expresses concern over mistreatment of seafarers held hostage by pirates
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/IMO-expresses-concern-over-mistreatment-of-seafarers-held-hostage-by-pirates.aspx>

【Related Story 3】

“Somali pirates pose new challenge to India” (The Economic Times, April 18, 2011)

C Uday Bhaskar, Director of India’s National Maritime Foundation, said in the Indian Newspaper, *The Economic Times*, on the 18th, that, Somali pirates have posed a fresh challenge to the Indian security establishment by retaining seven Indian crew members even after a sizeable ransom (\$3.5 million) was paid for the release of a hijacked ship, the MV *Asphalt Venture*. Bhaskar mentions, apart from the present anti-piracy policies by the navy, a multidisciplinary task force that includes all the principal stakeholders, which can address the piracy iceberg with determination and single-minded attention, is urgently called for.

An outline of the article: C Uday Bhaskar, Director of India’s National Maritime Foundation, said in the Indian Newspaper, *The Economic Times*, on the 18th, that, Somali pirates have posed a fresh challenge to the Indian security establishment by retaining seven Indian crew members even after a sizeable ransom (\$3.5 million) was paid for the release of a hijacked ship, the MV *Asphalt Venture*. The gist of the report is as follows.

- (1) According to reports, a spokesman for the Somali pirates, Hassan Farah, confirmed that the seven Indians were held back because Delhi has apprehended over a 100 Somali pirates and that this was a collective decision taken by the Somali warlords in Haradhere. He added: “We will keep these Indians until the Indian (authorities) release our colleagues.”
- (2) Maritime professionals aver that this is the first time that the Somali pirates have adopted such a stance and that this marks a break from the unwritten protocol that all crew members would be released when the agreed ransom was paid. Experts note that over the last six months there has been a steady increase in the ruthlessness and cruelty index by way of how the Somali pirates have been treating hostages and that Indian nationals have been specifically targeted.
- (3) According to one estimate, the total ransom paid to pirates in 2010 is almost \$250 million. Apart from the human dimension, Indian trade and economic interests are being adversely impacted due to the spread of piracy in the Indian Ocean. Piracy cannot be dealt with effectively from the sea alone and countermeasures on land need to be considered. Apart from the present anti-piracy policies by the navy, a multidisciplinary task force that includes all the principal stakeholders, which can address the piracy iceberg with determination and single-minded attention, is urgently called for.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates pose new challenge to India

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-18/news/29443845_1_somali-pirates-member-all-indian-crew-fresh-challenge

April 16 “Tanzania orders army to guard offshore oil & gas resources” (Reuters, April 17, 2011)

On the 16th, Tanzanian Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda has told parliament that he ordered its army to escort ships searching for oil and gas off its coast to protect them from Somali pirates.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Tanzanian Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda has told parliament that he ordered its army to escort ships searching for oil and gas off its coast to protect them from Somali pirates. The East African country has licensed at least 17 international companies to look for offshore and onshore energy reserves. The Prime Minister (PM) has told parliament that, in order to respond to increased attacks by Somali pirates, they have been compelled to beef up security in their territory. The PM said: “So far, Tanzania has provided escorts to vessels that requested security assistance when they entered our territorial waters. But, from now on, we will provide protection to vessels exploring for gas and oil in our ocean.” The companies of Canada, France, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) among others are exploring oil and gas in Tanzania’s internal waters. Pinda said Tanzanian authorities had so far arrested 11 Somali pirates in its waters and prosecuted all the suspects.

Refer to the article: Tanzania to guard oil, gas ships from pirates

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/17/somalia-piracy-tanzania-idUSLDE73G06520110417>

April 18 “UAE signs Djibouti Code of Conduct” (IMO Briefing, April 18, 2011)

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become the 18th signatory to sign the Djibouti Code of Conduct on the 18th.

An outline of the article: According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become the 18th signatory to sign the Djibouti Code of Conduct on the 18th. The Djibouti Code of Conduct Signatories to the Code has been in effect since 29 January 2009 to develop regional capacity to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean.

Refer to the article: UAE signs IMO anti-piracy Code

<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/UAE-signs-IMO-anti-piracy-Code.aspx>

April 20 “Seychelles Coast Guard rescues fishermen from hijackers” (News 24, April 20, 2011)

On the 20th, the Seychelles coast guard rescued four fishermen whose boat had been captured by hijackers.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the Seychelles coast guard rescued four fishermen whose boat had been captured by hijackers. According to a statement sent by the government, the fishing vessel *Gloria* with four Seychellois fishermen onboard was captured by Somali pirates on the 19th. Receiving a distress signal from the fishing vessel, the coast guard responded by deploying two of its vessels, a surveillance plane, army personnel and members of the special anti-piracy force. On the 20th, the Seychellois forces launched a rescue operations after pirates failed to heed calls to surrender approximately 150 nautical miles northeast of the Indian Ocean

archipelago's main island of Mahe. One Seychellois fisherman was wounded during the operation, together with three Somali suspected pirates.

Refer to the article: Seychelles rescues fishermen from pirates

<http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Seychelles-rescues-fishermen-from-pirates-20110420>

April 21 “Somali pirates hijack Italian-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 21, 2011)

On the early morning on April 21, an Italian-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Italian shipping company, MV *Rosalia D'Amato* (74,500 tons), was pirated approximately 350NM South East of Salalah, Oman, in the Indian Ocean. MV *Rosalia D'Amato* has a crew of 21- six Italians and 15 Filipinos.

An outline of the article: On the early morning on April 21, an Italian-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Italian shipping company, MV *Rosalia D'Amato* (74,500 tons), was pirated approximately 350NM South East of Salalah, Oman, in the Indian Ocean. The bulk carrier was on its way to Iran from Brazil when it was attacked by a single skiff. MV *Rosalia D'Amato* has a crew of 21- six Italians and 15 Filipinos.

Refer to the article: MV ROSALIA D'AMATO pirated in the Indian Ocean

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/mv-rosalia-d%e2%80%99amato-pirated-in-the-indian-ocean/>



MV Rosalia D'Amato

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, April 21, 2011

April 23 “Somali pirates release Panamanian-flagged vessel” (Sea News, April 27, 2011)

On the 23rd, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged and Liberian-owned bulk carrier, *MV Renuar*. The vessel was hijacked on December 11, 2010 in the Indian Ocean.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, Somali pirates released a Panamanian-flagged and Liberian-owned bulk carrier, MV *Renuar* (70,123DWT). The vessel was abducted on December 11, 2010 in the Indian Ocean, approximately 1050 nautical miles east of the Somali coast and a distance of 550 nautical miles from the coast of India. All of her 24 Filipino seafarers on board are in good health.

Refer to the article: Pirates released Greek bulker M/V Renuar

<http://www.seanews.com.tr/article/PIRACY/60440/MV-Renuar-Pirates-Released/>

April 24 “Somali pirates free Greek-flagged vessel” (Reuters, April 24, 2011)

On the 24th, Somali pirates freed a Cyprus-flagged, Greek-owned bulk carrier, MV *Eagle*. The vessel was seized about 500 miles south-west of Oman on January 17. Pirates said they received a \$6 million ransom for the ship’s release.

An outline of the article: On the 24th, Somali pirates freed a Cyprus-flagged, Greek-owned bulk carrier, MV *Eagle* (52,163DWT). The vessel with its crew of 24 Filipinos was seized about 500 miles south-west of Oman on January 17. Pirates said they received a \$6 million ransom for the ship’s release.

Refer to the article: Piracy: ransom paid to Somali pirates for Greek owned ship

<http://www.news-insurances.com/piracy-ransom-paid-to-somali-pirates-for-greek-owned-ship/0167477318>

April 24 “Turkish naval ship arrests pirate mother-ship” (Bosphorus Naval News, April 25, 2011)

On the 24th, Turkish Navy’s frigate of the COMNAVFOR TCG *Giresun* captured a suspicious dhow 300 miles of the coast of Oman. The dhow turned out to be a Yemeni fishing vessel, which had been used as a mother ship of pirates. The seven Yemeni fishermen on board who had been taken hostage were freed with the tow [by the Turkish sailors]. The pirates on board were detained.

An outline of the article: On the 24th, Turkish Navy’s frigate of the COMNAVFOR TCG *Giresun* sighted and stopped a suspicious dhow 300 miles of the coast of Oman. The visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) team consisting of naval Special Forces boarded the vessel, and confiscated weapons, which were dumped to the sea. The dhow turned out to be a Yemeni vessel which had been captured by the Somali pirates on April 11, 2011 to be used as a mother ship. The seven Yemeni fishermen on board who had been taken hostage were freed with the dhow by the Turkish sailors. The number of the arrested pirates was not mentioned in the official statement. Below is the scene at the time.

Refer to the article: TCG Giresun Frees Yemeni Dhow

<http://turkishnavy.net/2011/04/25/tcg-giresun-frees-yemeni-dhow/>



Source: Allied Maritime Command HQ, Northwood, News, Release, April 26, 2011

April 26 “US warships encounter pirate group, destroy skiff” (Allied Maritime Command Headquarters Northwood, News Release, April 26, 2011)

On the 26th, the U.S. Navy’s guided missile frigate USS *Stephen W. Groves*, operating as part of NATO’s counter piracy mission, encountered the fishing vessel *Jih Chun Tsai 68* which had been used as a pirate mother boat, while patrolling approximately 100 miles off the coast of Somalia. The FV *Jih Chun Tsai 68* was towing two unmanned skiffs. The FV *Jih Chun Tsai 68* itself was a Italian –flagged vessel, and was tethered to the MV *Rosalia D’Amato* which had been hijacked on the 21st. Although the U.S. warship ordered the pirates to cut loose the mother ship and skiffs, the pirates did not comply. Therefore, U.S. warship destroyed two skiffs. Later, when the USS *Stephen Groves* moved in closer to the MV *Rosalia D’Amato*, the pirates opened fire on the naval vessel. After returning fire to defend itself, the warship opened to a distance in order not to endanger the innocent hostages on board the pirated ships.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, the U.S. Navy’s guided missile frigate USS *Stephen W. Groves*, operating as part of NATO’s counter piracy mission, encountered the fishing vessel *Jih Chun Tsai 68* which had been hijacked to be used as a pirate mother boat, while patrolling

approximately 100 miles off the coast of Somalia. The FV *Jih Chun Tsai 68* was towing two unmanned skiffs. The FV *Jih Chun Tsai 68* itself was a Italian –flagged vessel, and was tethered to the MV *Rosalia D'Amato* which had been hijacked on the 21st. Also, there was a UAE-flagged tanker, MV *Zirku*, in the vicinity, which had been hijacked on 28 March. Although the U.S. warship ordered the pirates to cut loose the mother ship and skiffs, the pirates did not comply. The U.S. warship fired warning shots. As they too were ignored, the warship destroyed the two skiffs. Later, as the USS *Stephen Groves* moved in closer to the MV *Rosalia D'Amato*, the pirates opened fired on the naval vessel. After returning fire to defend itself, the warship opened to a distance in order not to endanger the innocent hostages on board the pirated ships. The two hijacked merchant vessels moved in to a known pirate anchorage. Then, finding another Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier - MV *Renuar*, which had just been released by pirates on the 23rd and was making preparations to leave the anchorage, the U.S. warship escorted the merchant vessel to the safe waters.

Refer to the article: NATO Warship Destroys Pirate Assets

<http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/26%20Apr%202011%20NATONewsReleaseNATOWarshipDestroysPirateAssetsApr11.pdf>



FV *Jih Chun Tsai 68*

Source: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/CounterPir>

April 30 “Somali pirates seize Singaporean vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, May 1, 2011)

On April 30, the Singaporean-flagged and owned product tanker the MV *Gemini* (20,989 tons) was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean approximately 180 NM East of Malindi, Kenya. The MV *Gnemini* has a crew of 25.

An outline of the article: On April 30, the Singaporean-flagged and owned product tanker the MV *Gemini* (20,989 tons) was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean approximately 180 NM East of Malindi, Kenya. The tanker was on its way to Mombasa in Kenya from Kuala Tanjung in Malaysia when it was attacked. The MV *Gnemini* has a crew of 25, comprising four Korean, 13 Indonesians, three Myanmar, and five Chinese.

Refer to the article: MV GEMINI pirated off the coast of Kenya

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/05/mv-gemini-pirated-off-the-coast-of-kenya/>



MT *Gemini*

Source: The Straits Times, April 30, 2011

1.2 Military Developments

April 3-10 “US, India conduct naval exercise in Western Pacific” (Defence Professional, April 4, 2011)

The Indian Navy and the United States 7th fleet conducted exercise Malabar 2011 in the western Pacific on April 3-10. Malabar, bilateral naval exercise of the two navies, has grown in scope and complexity over the years.

An outline of the article: The Indian Navy and the United States 7th fleet conducted exercise Malabar 2011 in the western Pacific on April 3-10. Malabar is a regularly scheduled bilateral naval field training exercise and has grown in scope and complexity over the years. The Malabar 2011 exercise was conducted in the western Pacific Ocean, east of the Luzon Strait and east of Okinawa. The location coincides with the Indian Navy's western Pacific deployment. U.S. Navy participants included two guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate and a nuclear powered attack submarine. Indian Navy participants included four destroyers among others. Events during the exercise involved liaison officer professional exchanges and embarks; communications exercises; surface action group exercise operations; formation maneuvering; helicopter cross deck evolutions; underway replenishments; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; gunnery exercises; visit, board, search and seizure; maritime strike; air defense; screen exercise; and anti-submarine warfare.

Refer to the article: Seventh Fleet to Conduct Exercise Malabar with Indian Navy

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/23375/?SID=db4aceedefef5891d7a95d50b24f1b7e>

April 4 “Russia to continue military conscription for next 10-15 years (RIA Novosti, April 4, 2011)

The Russian Armed Forces will continue using a mixture of conscripts and contracted recruits for the next 10-15 years, President Dmitry Medvedev said on the 4th. Russia is in the process of reforming its armed forces by shifting the focus away from a largely inefficient body of conscripted

soldiers toward a smaller professional army.

An outline of the article: The Russian Armed Forces will continue using a mixture of conscripts and contracted recruits for the next 10-15 years, President Dmitry Medvedev said on the 4th. The current length of military service for draftees is one year, while the shortest term of a military service contract is three years. Russia is in the process of reforming its armed forces by shifting the focus away from a largely inefficient body of conscripted soldiers toward a smaller professional army. Medvedev said he should do everything possible to make contract service attractive and prestigious. He added the monthly salary for an entry-level military specialist may be doubled to around 30,000 rubles (\$1,000). In line with the reform, the armed forces will be downsized to 1 million personnel by 2016. According to Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vasily Smirnov, the reformed forces would be made up of 220,000 officers, 425,000 contract servicemen and 300,000 conscript soldiers. Medvedev also stressed the importance of pre-conscription training for young draftees. "It is a useful undertaking...because young people should be in good physical shape and realize what they are expected to do while serving in the military," the president said.

Refer to the article: Russia to continue military conscription for next 10-15 years - Medvedev
http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110404/163367728.html

April 6 "Xinhua makes first report on aircraft carrier program" (South China Morning Post, April 7, 2011)

On the 6th, twenty high-resolution pictures of China's first aircraft carrier, the *Varyag*, appeared on the Xinhua website, with captions saying the vessel was almost finished and expected to sail this year. It was the first time official state media reported on the nation's first aircraft carrier project as well as indicating its construction progress at a shipyard in Dalian, Liaoning.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, twenty high-resolution pictures of China's first aircraft carrier, the 67,500-tonne *Varyag*, appeared on the Xinhua website, with captions saying the vessel was almost finished and expected to sail this year. It was the first time official state media reported on the nation's first aircraft carrier project as well as indicating its construction progress at a shipyard in Dalian, Liaoning. The Xinhua picture captions said refitting work on the *Varyag*, a Soviet-designed *Admiral Kuznetsov*-class carrier that China bought from Ukraine in 1998, was almost complete after more than a decade spent on reconstruction. "A 70-year dream of an aircraft carrier that is all-Chinese will come true soon," one caption said, referring to a carrier proposal by the Kuomintang navy in the 1940s. Citing the latest report of Canadian-based Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, the captions confirmed the carrier would start sea trials this year after an active phased array radar system was installed on the vessel.

Andrei Chang, Kanwa's editor-in-chief, who has monitored China's carrier project for 20 years, said all the Xinhua photos of the vessel were the most recent he knew of. "The pictures I used in the latest report of my magazine were shot in late February by our own photographer for an edition whose printing is not yet finished," he said, adding that the Xinhua photos clearly showed

a month's progress since then. "But those pictures carried by Xinhua all come from other mainland military websites, which might be taken by so-called mainland military enthusiasts." It was at least the second time official media had quoted a source from the internet posted by military enthusiasts and overseas media to reconfirm Beijing's new weapon plans. The first test flight of a new generation J-20 stealth fighter jet in January was another well-known example.

Chang estimated the carrier would undergo sea tests - including power system trials, harbor trials, close-range and high-sea trials - for about two years. "After the sea trials are finished, it will also need at least eight years to test its radar and weapons systems such as the J-15, early warning planes and others on board," he said. But China would have its first formal carrier fighting group in 10 years, after all the trials and tests were completed, he said. "Since *Varyag* is a carrier for training purposes, it's possible that it will be equipped with magnetic or steam catapults instead of its originally designed ski-jump ramp take-off system," Chang said.

Refer to the article: 70-year dream of aircraft carrier close to reality

<http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=9f4e37dd77b2f210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News>



Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-04/06/c_121247200.htm

【Related Story 1】

“First Chinese aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang, likely to be deployed to SSF: Taiwan” (The China Post, April 7 and 8, 2011)

On the 7th – 8th, carrying the article on China's aircraft carrier, the *Varyag*, the Taiwanese newspaper, *The China Post*, reports that, as a view of the expert, it is very likely that the carrier will be assigned to China's South Sea Fleet (SSF). In that case, it would allow the *Varyag* to move in areas surrounding southern and eastern Taiwan, which would pose a threat to Taiwan, a Navy

veteran said.

An outline of the article: According to Beijing media reports, China is set to launch its first aircraft carrier on its maiden voyage soon. “The work on aircraft carrier *Varyag* (the Soviet Union name of carrier) has entered its last stage, with its hull being painted in the standard Chinese naval color — light gray-blue,” the report said. The carrier will reportedly be renamed *Shi Lang*, after a Qing Dynasty admiral who surrendered to the Qing Court and helped it conquer Taiwan in 1681.* The carrier is 302 meters long and 70.5 meters wide, with a loaded displacement of 67,000 tons. It can host up to 50 planes of various types and helicopters. International military analysts are of the opinion that the *Varyag* serves as platform for the Chinese navy to acquire carrier-building expertise and technology to pave the way for China's construction of more carriers from start to finish. It is very likely that the carrier will be assigned to China's South China Sea Fleet (SSF) to help secure Beijing's crude oil shipping line and enhance its military deployment in the region amid sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan, according the experts.

On the other hand, on the 7th, Lan Ning-li, a retired vice admiral and a former top naval intelligence officer of the Taiwanese Armed Forces, said it is likely that the carrier will be assigned to China's South Sea Fleet. In that case, it would allow the *Varyag* to move in areas surrounding southern and eastern Taiwan, posing a threat to Taiwan. Taiwan's strategy has always been to keep China's East Sea Fleet from joining its South Sea Fleet in a pincers movement on Taiwan, said Lan. Now, with the *Varyag* likely to join the South Sea Fleet, China's naval capabilities will be boosted, he said. However, Lan pointed out that it is still too early to say when the threat of the *Varyag* will be realized -- when the newly overhauled carrier will be capable of combat.

Refer to the article: China's first aircraft carrier to be completed soon: reports

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2011/04/07/297646/Chinas-first.htm>

China carrier could threaten island: ex-admiral

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2011/04/08/297859/China-carrier.htm>

Notes *: According to the Strategic Page, April 30, 2009, “*Varyag*” is said to have been renamed “*Shi Lang* (施琅)” in 2008, after an admiral who was born in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, and later conquered Taiwan with an order from the Kangxi Emperor (康熙帝), the fourth emperor in Qing Dynasty in 1683. *Shi Lang* is a significant name for the ship. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, May 2009, Hot Topic.)

【Related Story 2】

“Articles by experts: ‘China’s Navy: rising threat’” (New York Post, April 8, 2011)

Rear Adm. (ret.) Joseph Callo, a naval historian, and Daniel Mandel, a fellow in history at Melbourne University, have contributed an article under joint signature entitled “China’s Navy: rising threat” to the U.S. newspaper, the *New York Post*, dated the 8th. The article cautions it is clear that China has been developing aircraft carrier capabilities independently within a few

years ahead, which means that, as a next step, China is shaping a navy for global power projection. Additionally, assuming just one scenario, starting with Taiwan, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the China's aircraft carrier.

An outline of the article: Responding to the latest Xinhua picture captions of the aircraft carrier *Varyag*, Rear Adm. (ret.) Joseph Callo, a naval historian, and Daniel Mandel, a fellow in history at Melbourne University, have contributed an article under joint signature entitled "China's Navy: rising threat" to the U.S. newspaper, the *New York Post*, dated the 10th, in which two authors have cautioned it is clear that China has been developing aircraft carrier capabilities independently within a few years ahead, which means that, as a next step, China is shaping a navy for global power projection. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) The photos released by the Xinhua (state news agency) are of a reconditioned ship originally bought from Ukraine -- but Beijing is quite likely to follow up with its own construction in the years ahead. It has already announced that it's begun training programs for carrier pilots. The time has come to challenge assurances that the Chinese Navy does not represent a threat to US interests.
- (2) Although there is no public knowledge of the actual size of the Chinese defense budget, almost everyone is persuaded that it is growing rapidly. China can more cheaply design, build and maintain its military than can the United States. There is little likelihood that the Chinese regime, which is enjoying exceptional economic growth accelerated by predatory trade policies and a willingness to ignore intellectual-property rights and with deep-seated resentment of past exploitation by foreign powers, is likely to be satisfied with regional parity with US naval power.
- (3) China has spent years building its influence with nations like Fiji, Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu in order to establish economic hegemony in the Western Pacific. Beyond the Pacific, it is aggressively building economic ties in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and even the Caribbean. Those ties contribute to Chinese global power -- and it will seek to protect them. China has become a major importer of oil, gas and raw materials and an exporter of manufactured products. These imports and exports travel over sea routes it is going to protect. In the years since the communists took power in China, the regime's geo-strategic perspective has advanced inexorably from an inward concentration to a coastal emphasis to a "near beyond" focus. The admission that China is going to develop a carrier capability makes the next step clear: China is shaping a navy for global power projection.
- (4) Consider just one scenario, starting with Taiwan. The only real question about unification of Taiwan to China is when -- and with US naval power falling as China's rises, the odds grow that it will be sooner rather than later. The conquest of Taiwan would surely embolden America's enemies and depress its friends. For example, Cuba and Venezuela might threaten US Gulf Coast oil resources. There might be the chance, in which the Chinese company manages the Panama Canal closing that strategic chokepoint to US ships -- something Chinese carrier-based battle groups could enforce. At the same time, China could declare a naval quarantine of the Straits of Malacca. In that case, the effect on the US economy and

military posture would be disastrous. And the implications would be global. Overstretched US naval power in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean could be checkmated by Chinese naval forces operating much the way the US Navy operates today. Other scenarios staged around an expanded Chinese Navy led by as many as seven or eight carrier battle groups are equally disturbing, particularly with the US Navy having shrunk from 15 carrier battle groups to 11, and possibly 10 in the future. In short, there's plenty of reason to worry about Chinese aircraft carriers.

Refer to the article: China's Navy: rising threat: A global challenge to America

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/china_navy_rising_threat_FH18IBreWApKyxIMT29dBK

April 8 “DOD releases Unified Command Plan 2011” (DOD Releases, Unified Command Plan 2011, April 8, 2011)

On the 8th, the U.S. Department of Defense updated the Unified Command Plan, a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commanders. The significant points are change of geographical boundaries of the responsibility in the Arctic region, giving more responsibility to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), as well as designating maintenance of combat capabilities in the Arctic region as the responsibility of the USNORTHCOM.

An outline of the article: On the 8th, the U.S. Department of Defense updated the Unified Command Plan, a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commanders. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2011, signed by President Barack Obama on April 6, assigns several new missions to the respective combatant commands. Every two years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary.

Significant changes made by the UCP 2011 are as follows.

- (1) Considering long-standing relationships of respective joint forces, in order to improve unity of effort for performing missions, areas of responsibilities boundaries in the Arctic region were shifted. As a result of this realignment, responsibility for the Arctic region is now shared between the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) rather than USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), as shown in the chart below. The North Pole and its surrounding area were incorporated into the responsibility of the USNORTHCOM.
- (2) Responsibility to advocate for combat capabilities in the Arctic region is given to the USNORTHCOM.
- (3) The President's approval to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command was codified.
- (4) Responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing Global Missile

- Defense Concept of Operations is given to U.S. Strategic Command.
- (5) Responsibility for synchronizing planning of global distribution operations is given to U.S. Transportation Command.
 - (6) There are other changes. U.S. African Command's maritime border is [shifting] to include all Cape Verde's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It also shifted the maritime boundary between U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command so the South Sandwich Islands fall under Southern Command.


UCP 2011 continues to support U.S. defense security commitments around the world while improving military responsiveness to emerging crises.

Refer to the article: DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 2011

<http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14398>

Unified Command Plan Reflects Arctic's Importance

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63467>



The chart shows an expanded view of the Arctic region taken out from the map above.

Source: <http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110408map.pdf>

Note: According to the chart, the left side of the map comprising the Arctic Pole and its surrounding region is a responsible area of the USNORTCOM while the right side of the map is the responsible area of the USEUCOM. Although the boundaries of the USPACOM and the USNORTCOM are closing in the Northern Pacific region beyond the Bering Strait in the chart, the responsible area of the USPACOM is located out of the Arctic region.

April 13 “China, Vietnam agree to strengthen military ties” (People’s Daily Online, April 14, 2011)

On the 13th, General Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, met in Hanoi with Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh, and the two sides agreed to enhance military cooperation.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, General Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, met in Hanoi with Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh, and the two sides agreed to enhance military cooperation. Guo said China treasures the traditional friendship with Vietnam, attaches great importance to advance comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership between the two countries. Furthermore, military ties are an important part of the China-Vietnam relations. The Chinese military is ready to join hands with the Vietnamese military to strengthen strategic communication, upgrade the level of practical cooperation and further promote the development of military ties between the two countries, he said. For his part, Thanh said that Vietnamese people always bear in mind the Chinese people's generous help in the Vietnamese people's struggle for independence and the national construction over the past years. Thanh added the Vietnam-China bilateral relations have new opportunities to grow further in a new period. He expressed the hope that two sides will promote pragmatic cooperation in extensive areas.

Refer to the article: China, Vietnam pledge to strengthen military ties

<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7349856.html>

April 16 “Cam Ranh Bay to be opened to foreign naval vessels; plays important roles under US-China geopolitical conflict” (The Straits Times, April 16, 2011)

Ian Storey, a fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies based in Singapore, contributed an article entitled “Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay: Geopolitical power in play” to the Singaporean newspaper “*The Straits Times*” dated 16th. In the article, the author mentions that, with the Vietnam’s opening of the Cam Ranh Bay to the foreign naval vessels, keeping China in mind, it is certain that the port-visits by U,S. naval vessels will increase, and the Cam Ranh Bay will play an important role under the geopolitical conflicts between the United States and china in the Asia-Pacific Region.

An outline of the article: Ian Storey, a fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies based in Singapore, contributed an article entitled “Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay: Geopolitical power in play” to the Singaporean newspaper “*The Straits Times*” dated 16th. In the article, the author mentions that, with the Vietnam’s opening of the Cam Ranh Bay to the foreign naval vessels,

keeping China in mind, it is certain that the port-visits by U.S. naval vessels will increase, and the Cam Ranh Bay will play an important role under the geopolitical conflicts between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific Region. The gist of the article is as follows.

- (1) The Cam Ranh Bay is about to undergo a US\$200 million refurbishment, after which the facilities will be made available to foreign warships on a commercial basis. The upgrade is part of a US\$2 billion deal signed with Russia in 2009 to provide the Vietnamese navy with six Kilo-class submarines, the first of which will be delivered in 2013 and based at Cam Ranh Bay. The submarine acquisition is part of Hanoi's military modernization program, which has been accelerated in recent years due to escalating tensions with Beijing over disputed islands in the South China Sea.
- (2) Located in Khanh Hoa province, 400km north of Ho Chi Minh City, Cam Ranh Bay is one of the finest deep-water anchorages in South-east Asia, and provides convenient access to the commercially and strategically vital sea lanes which pass through the South China Sea. In October 2010, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made the announcement that Cam Ranh Bay would once again be open to port calls by foreign navies. Mr Dung did not single out which navies would be welcome to visit Cam Ranh Bay. But opening the base to foreign naval vessels is clearly part of a larger strategy by Vietnam to strengthen defense ties with America and facilitate the US military presence in South-east Asia as a counter to China's rising power.
- (3) The regular presence of US warships at Cam Ranh Bay might make China think twice about using coercive military diplomacy against Vietnam, even though Washington does not take sides in the sovereignty dispute. For its part, the US military has long been interested in regaining access to Cam Ranh Bay as part of its 'place not bases' strategy whereby its warships regularly visit Asian ports for re-supply and repairs without the need for expensive and politically sensitive basing rights.
- (4) Due to Hanoi's sensitive relationship with Beijing, US Navy ship visits to Vietnam have been less frequent. Since 2003, 12 US warships have made port calls in Vietnam, and twice, in 2008 and last year, the hospital ship USNS *Mercy* undertook humanitarian work in Vietnam. Several US navy supply ships have also visited Vietnam, and early last year, one such vessel underwent repairs at the Cam Ranh Shipyard near the naval base. (Incidentally, regarding the visits to Singapore, 149 vessels made port calls in 2010 only.)
- (5) Other foreign navies have also expressed strong interest in visiting Cam Ranh Bay, including Russia and India. But given that Washington plans to beef up its naval presence in Asia's maritime domains, the US Navy will almost certainly become the primary foreign visitor.
- (6) Vietnam has been careful not to overtly offend China. Beijing views the US military presence in Asia as part of a wider strategy of encirclement and has warned Hanoi not to become a 'strategic pawn' of the US. To assuage Chinese concerns, Vietnamese officials repeatedly stress the country's 'three No's' defense policy: No foreign alliances, no foreign bases, and no relationship with another country to be used against a third party. Yet the opening of the Cam Ranh Bay naval base to foreign warships is clearly a symptom of Vietnam's growing

nervousness at Beijing's renewed assertiveness in the South China Sea and changes in Asia's military balance of power which is rapidly moving in China's favor. Vietnam plans to use Cam Ranh Bay to redress that shift.

Refer to the article: Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay: Geopolitical power in play

<http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=3256>



Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay

Source: The Straits Times, April 16, 2011

April 20 “Indonesian Navy successfully tests Russian anti-ship missile for 1st time” (RIA Novosti, April 21, 2011)

On the 20th, the Indonesian Navy has successfully tested a Russian-made Yakhont anti-ship missile for the first time. After flying 250 kilometers, the missile hit to destroy the target. Indonesia bought Russian SS-N-26 Yakhont supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles for \$1.2-million apiece in 2007.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, the Indonesian Navy has successfully tested a Russian-made Yakhont anti-ship missile for the first time. The Yakhont anti-ship missile was launched from the *Van Speijk* class frigate, *Oswald Siahaan*, during naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. According to the navy, after flying 250 kilometers, the missile hit to destroy the target. Indonesia bought Russian SS-N-26 Yakhont supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles for \$1.2-million apiece in 2007 to replace Harpoon missiles on its frigates. The missile has a maximum range of 300 kilometers, and flies at low level during the terminal phase, and between 5 and 15 meters in altitude.

Refer to the article: Indonesian Navy successfully tests Russian anti-ship missile

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110421/163634028.html



Yakhont anti-ship missile

Source: RIA Novosti, April 21, 2011

April 22 “China, Pakistan hold first joint anti-piracy exercise” (PLA Daily, April 25, 2011)

On the 22nd, the warships of the navies of China and Pakistan on escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast held their first joint anti-piracy exercise. The exercise involved such subjects as joint escort, helicopters’ cross landing, joint boarding, special operation members’ slide-landing from helicopter, helicopter air rescue and simulated airborne replenishment.

An outline of the article: On the 22nd, the warships of the navies of China and Pakistan on escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast held their first joint anti-piracy exercise. The Chinese warships of *Wenzhou*, *Ma’anshan* and *Qiandaohu* and the Pakistani guided missile destroyer of *Khaibar*, which is a part of the multilateral anti-piracy task force – CTF 151, took part in the exercise. The exercise involved such subjects as joint escort, helicopters’ cross landing, joint boarding, special operation members’ slide-landing from helicopter, helicopter air rescue and simulated airborne replenishment. The warships of *Wenzhou* and *Khaibar* assumed the role the commander ship in different phases, alternately commanding the joint exercise.

Refer to the article: China and Pakistan hold first joint anti-piracy exercise

<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/>

April 25 “Thailand to buy four second-hand subs from Germany” (The Bangkok Post, April 26, 2011)

On the 25th, the Thai Defense Council approved a navy plan to buy six second-hand submarines from Germany for almost 8 billion baht (¥21.4 billion). The navy’s choice is the *U-206A* German-made submarines. If the procurement plan is approved by the cabinet, the navy is expected to have the submarines by September 2013.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, the Thai Defense Council approved a navy plan to buy six second-hand submarines from Germany for almost 8 billion baht (¥21.4 billion). The navy’s choice is the *U-206A* German-made submarines. If the procurement plan is approved by the

cabinet, the navy is expected to have the submarines by September 2013. The navy stressed three reasons for needing submarines - to protect national and marine interests, to strengthen the capacity of submarines in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to ensure a balance of military power in ASEAN. Malaysia deploys two French-made ones, Singapore has four and Vietnam has three, with a plan to buy six more from Russia. Even Burma has already had its soldiers trained in submarine operations. Although Thailand had earlier floated the idea of buying South Korean U209 submarines, Bangkok is said have abandoned the plan as its limited budget would be able buy only two.

Refer to the article: Navy wins big battle for U-boats: Defence panel gives nod to sub purchase
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/security/233706/navy-wins-big-battle-for-u-boats>



U-206A class submarine

Source: <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/206%E5%9E%8B%E6%BD%9C%E6%B0%B4%E8%89%A6>

Notes: U-206A (General characteristics: Displacement 450t.(surfaced)/500. (submerged); Speed 10 knots (surfaced) / 17 knots (submerged); Range 4,500 nmi (at 6 knots, surfaced); 228 nmi(at 4 knots, submerged); Armament: 8×533 mm torpedo tubes, 8 torpedoes or 16 mines.

April 25 “Indonesian-made missile craft launched” (KOMPAS.com, April 26, 2011)

On the 25th, Indonesia launched the indigenous missile craft KRI *Clurit*-40.

An outline of the article: On the 25th, Indonesia launched the indigenous missile craft KRI *Clurit*-40. KRI *Clurit* is a 40-meter-long swift missile-carrying ship designed and built fully by Indonesians at PT Palindo Marine. The navy had ordered two KCR-40s and would order 20 more of different types. The KRC-40 would operate in Indonesia’s western waters.

Refer to the article: Indonesian-made Warship Launched

<http://english.kompas.com/read/2011/04/26/08581846/Indonesian.made.Warship.Launched>

KRI *Clurit-40*

Source: <http://www.militarium.eu/article.aspx?ID=7023>

April 29 “South Korea launches new type frigate” (The Korea Herald, April 29, 2011)

On the 29th, South Korea launched a new 2,300-ton frigate, ROKS *Inchon*. The frigate is the first unit under the Frigate Experimental program. The Navy is seeking to secure some 20 2,300-ton or 2,500-ton frigates by around 2020.

An outline of the article: On the 29th, South Korea launched a new 2,300-ton frigate, ROKS *Inchon*. The frigate is the first unit under the Frigate Experimental program, and the navy aims at replacing aging frigates and corvettes with more advanced warships. The Navy is seeking to secure some 20 2,300-ton or 2,500-ton frigates by around 2020. The *Incheon*, measuring 114 meters in length, 14 meters in width and 25 meters in height has a maximum speed of 30 knots. It can carry a 140-member crew and one military helicopter.

Refer to the article: Navy gets 2,300-ton frigate

<http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20110429000700>



The new 2,300-ton frigate *Incheon* is launched at a shipyard of its builder, Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., in Ulsan.

Source: The Korea Herald, April 29, 2011

1.3 Maritime Boundaries

April 6 “China’s envoy to Manila expects dialogue between two nations during President Aquino’s visit to Beijing” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2011)

On the 6th, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jianchao said China was open to discussing the conflict over the Spratlys and other bilateral issues during President Benigno Aquino III’s upcoming state visit to Beijing.

An outline of the article: Noting that diplomatic relations between Beijing and Manila were “becoming more and more mature,” Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jianchao said China was open to discussing the conflict over the Spratlys and other bilateral issues during President Benigno Aquino III’s upcoming state visit to Beijing. “We’re open for dialogue, conversation and we’ll be very happy to discuss with the Philippine government and the President issues that both sides are interested in,” Liu said at a diplomatic reception hosted by designated Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario at a Makati City hotel. “Everything can be talked about,” he said. “We can work out ways to maintain peace and stability in the region where we have dispute(s).” The Philippines recently dispatched a military plane to the Spratlys, west of Palawan, after a research ship authorized by the Department of Energy complained that it was “harassed” by Chinese Navy patrols in the area. Liu said, “If we can cooperate in this region in exploring and developing the resources, it’s going to be a wonderful arrangement.” “At the same time, we can reduce the sources of all conflicts,” he also said. Liu reiterated that China would respect the relations between the US and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. China, he claimed, is “also ready to work with ASEAN and the US in preserving peace and stability in the region.”

Refer to the article: China open for Spratlys talks during Aquino’s visit

<http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20110406-329666/China-open-for-Spratlys-talks-during-Aquinos-visit>

April 14 “PH protests China’s ‘9-dash line’ in SCS” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 15, 2011)

On the 14th, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirmed reports that the country had filed a formal protest in the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) over China’s so-called “nine-dash line” territorial claim over the entire South China Sea (SCS).


An outline of the article: On the 14th, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirmed reports that the country had filed a formal protest [in the United Nations] over China’s so-called “nine-dash line” territorial claim over the entire South China Sea (SCS). China has been using the map with nine dashes in asserting its territorial claim over the entire area in the SCS, including the Spratly group of islands (the Kalayaan Islands in Tagalog). According to a DFA spokesperson, the Philippines had filed a note (verbale) dated 5 April with the UN Commission on

the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) expressing its position on the “nine-dotted line” issue. The note said the Philippine-claimed section of the Spratlys is an integral part of the Philippines. “The claim by China and their terms of ‘adjacent waters’ would have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS,” it said. The Philippines’ protest came nearly two years after two of its neighbors, Malaysia and Vietnam, filed similar protests over the same issue in 2009. In 2010, Indonesia registered its protest even if it did not have a claim on the SCS.* Pagasa is the largest of the seven Spratly islands that the Philippines occupies. Moreover, the Philippines claims more than 50 islands in the archipelago. Much of the disputed areas and adjacent waters being exclusively claimed by China is closer to Philippine than Chinese land.

Refer to the article: PH runs to UN to protest China’s ‘9-dash line’ Spratlys claim

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20110415-331204/PH-runs-to-UN-to-protest-Chinas-9-dash-line-Spratlys-claim>

Note*: In countering the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations' Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) dated May 6, 2009, China used in its Verbal Note on May 7, 2009 the U-shaped line officially to defend its maritime territorial claim in the South China Sea.



China’s so-called “nine-dash line” territorial claim over the entire South China Sea

Source: Hasjim Djalal, “Conflicting Territorial and Jurisdictional Claims in South China Sea,” *The Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1979), pp.36~52.

【Related Story】**“Beijing submits note to counter Manila's protest” (AP, April 20, 2011)**

Countering a Philippine diplomatic protest at the United Nations, China sent a diplomatic note to the U.N. Secretary General on the 14th, in which Beijing said it has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly islands, asserting the contents of the Philippines' diplomatic note “are totally unacceptable to the Chinese Government.”

An outline of the article: Countering a Philippine diplomatic protest at the United Nations, China sent a diplomatic note to the U.N. Secretary General on the 14th, saying Beijing has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly islands that Manila started to invade in the 1970s. According to a copy of China's diplomatic note to the U. N. which was obtained by the Associated Press on the 19th, China protested that Philippines' occupation of some islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands infringes upon China's sovereignty. (Nansha Islands are also known as Spratlys.) China asserts the contents of the Philippines' diplomatic note “are totally unacceptable to the Chinese Government.”

Refer to the article: Beijing counters Manila's UN protest, says Philippines 'started to invade' Spratlys in 1970s

http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5jt3CxKId_TtvuT3fIAjTln9W8Bqw?docId=6608248

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

April 5 “Vietnam wishes to boost ties with Philippines” (VOV News, April 5, 2011)

On the 5th, at the meeting with Foreign Minister of the Philippines, Alberto F.del Rosario, during his visit to Hanoi, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung expressed wish that the two sides will boost cooperation between Hanoi and Manila. In addition, both host and guest agreed to affirm that peace, stability, security and maritime safety in the East Sea (South China Sea) are common interests of regional countries and concerned parties should strengthen exchanges and consultations in a peaceful manner, avoiding the use of force.

An outline of the article: On the 5th, at the meeting with Foreign Minister of the Philippines, Alberto F.del Rosario, during his visit to Hanoi, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung affirmed Vietnam's stable rice exports to the Philippines and expressed wish that the two sides will boost cooperation in the fields of security and defense, trade, investment, agriculture, education and training, and maritime. In addition, both host and guest agreed to affirm that peace, stability, security and maritime safety in the East Sea (South China Sea) are common interests of regional countries and concerned parties should strengthen exchanges and consultations in a peaceful manner, avoiding the use of force.

Refer to the article: Vietnam wishes to boost ties with Philippines

<http://english.vovnews.vn/Home/Vietnam-wishes-to-boost-ties-with-Philippines/20114/125473.vov>

April 24 “U.S. should ratify UNCLOS: Ex-Commandant of Coast Guard and others” (The New York Times, April 24, 2011)

Thad W. Allen, the former commandant of the Coast Guard; Richard L. Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state; and John J. Hamre, the former deputy secretary of defense contributed opinions in an article entitled “Odd Man Out at Sea” under joint signature to *The New York Times* on the 24th. In the article they mention that the United States has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, the United States, the world's leading maritime power, is at a military and economic disadvantage. Therefore, they are urging that the United States should ratify the convention immediately.

An outline of the article: Thad W. Allen, the former commandant of the Coast Guard; Richard L. Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state; and John J. Hamre, the former deputy secretary of defense contributed opinions in an article entitled “Odd Man Out at Sea” under joint signature to *The New York Times* on the 24th. In the article they mention that the United States has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, the United States, the world's leading maritime power, is at a military and economic disadvantage. Therefore, they are urging that the United States should ratify the convention immediately. The gist of the article is as follows.

- (1) With nearly 12,500 miles of coastline, 360 major commercial ports and the world's largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the United States has a lot to gain from signing the convention. It is the only legal framework that exists for managing international waters; joining it would allow us to secure international recognition of a claim to the continental shelf in order to explore and conserve the resource-rich Arctic. It would also provide American companies with a fair and stable legal framework to invest in mining projects in the deep seabed.
- (2) Ratification of the UNCLOS makes sense militarily as well. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the convention “codifies navigation and over-flight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our armed forces.” In other words, it enhances national security by giving our Navy additional flexibility to operate on the high seas and in foreign EEZ's and territorial seas. This is particularly important in the Asia Pacific region and the South China Sea, where tensions among China, Japan and Southeast Asian nations have increased because of conflicting interpretations of what constitutes territorial and international waters.
- (3) Perhaps most important of all, ratification would prove to be a diplomatic triumph. American power is defined not simply by economic and military might, but by ideals, leadership, strategic vision and international credibility. In July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gained much respect by reassuring the Southeast Asian nations that the United States strongly supported multilateral efforts to address those territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and denounced China's heavy-handed, unilateral tactics. But strong American positions like that are ultimately undermined by our failure to ratify the UNCLOS; in short, it shows we are not really committed to a clear legal regime for the seas.

(4) For all of these reasons, ratification is more important today than ever before. At a time when America's military and economic strengths are tested, we must lead on the seas as well as on land.

Refer to the article: Odd Man Out at Sea

<http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/04/25/NYT.html>

1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

April 11 “MPA to upgrade water course of Yangon River” (People’s Daily Online, April 12, 2011)

Myanmar Port Authority (MPA) will carry out the maintenance of the water course of the River of Yangon aimed at facilitating safety drive of foreign vessels ranging from 15,000 tons to 35,000 tons from the mouth of the river to the Yangon port and timely completion of freight-handling.

An outline of the article: According to the Yangon port authorities on the 11th, Myanmar Port Authority (MPA) will carry out the maintenance of the water course of the River of Yangon aimed at facilitating safety drive of foreign vessels ranging from 15,000 tons to 35,000 tons from the mouth of the river to the Yangon port and timely completion of freight-handling. Myanmar Ministry for Transport inspected the wharves along the River of Yangon. According to the official figures, there are a total of 41 small and large jetties at the Yangon port, which can yearly handle 6,800 vessels of Inland Water Transport and private-owned vessels on the arrival and 6,885 vessels for their departure. The port tackles over 360,000 tons of incoming commodities and over 280,000 tons of outgoing commodities.

Refer to the article: MPA to improve water course of Yangon river for ocean-liners

<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7347072.html>

Port Klang can achieve 10th place ranking among world's container ports: Malaysian vice transport minister” (Bernama, April 22, 2011)

According to Malaysia’s Deputy Transport Minister on the 22nd, Port Klang is expected to achieve at least a 10th place ranking among world’s container terminal in the near future, surging in the handling of containers, with a 21.4 percent jump to 8.87 million TEU's from the 7.3 million in 2009.

An outline of the article: According to Malaysia’s Deputy Transport Minister on the 22nd, Port Klang is expected to achieve at least a 10th place ranking among world’s container terminal in the near future, surging in the handling of containers, with a 21.4 percent jump to 8.87 million TEU's from the 7.3 million in 2009. This performance left Port Klang in 13th spot amongst the biggest container ports in the world, beating Antwerp and Hamburg into 14th and 15th place respectively, as well as the Port of Los Angeles in 16th spot. This impressive rise is closely

associated with the presence of the United Arab Shipping Corporation Consortium, comprising shipping companies of Arab countries, which have made Port Klang a key “transshipment hub” for the region. The consortium moved 339,000 TEUs in 2010, a drastic increase from the 65,000 TEUs in 2009. In addition, other than Port Klang, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in Johor has become the 17th largest container port in the world, having moved 6.54 million TEUs [in 2010].

Refer to the article: Port Klang Can Achieve 10th Place Ranking Among World's Container Ports, Says Abdul Rahim

<http://www.bernama.com/maritime/news.php?id=581076&lang=en>

April 27 “Turkey to build Istanbul Canal” (gCaptain, April 27, 2011)

On the 27th, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced that Turkey will build a new canal connecting the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea. According to the plan, Kanal Istanbul would create a second channel that ultimately connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As for the plan, a study will take two years to determine the route of the canal, which is expected to be 45 to 50 kilometers long, 150 meters wide, and 25 meters deep.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced that Turkey will build a new canal connecting the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea to reduce traffic in the Bosphorus, one of the world’s busiest and most dangerous shipping lanes. The prime minister is evaluating his plan significant, comparing the project’s importance with the Panama and Suez canals. According to the plan, Kanal Istanbul would cut through mostly undeveloped, state-owned land and forest just west of Istanbul, creating a second channel that ultimately connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The project also would include construction of a new 60 million passenger per year airport for Istanbul and two new mini-cities. As for the plan, a study will take two years to determine the route of the canal, which is expected to be 45 to 50 kilometers long, 150 meters wide, and 25 meters deep. Although the prime minister gave no estimate of the new canal’s construction cost or how it would be financed, he said he would expect to complete the plan by 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

Refer to the article: Turkey To build Its Own ‘Panama Canal’?

<http://gcaptain.com/turkey-build-panama-canal/24706>

April 27 “China, Myanmar sign memorandum of building railway line project” (The Hindu, April 30, 2011)

China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding to complete the railway line, connecting a Myanmar border town to the planned deep-sea port it is building at Kyaukphyu, along with an ongoing pipeline project.

An outline of the article: According to the state-run Xinhua news agency dated the 29th, China has announced it will build a railway line connecting a Myanmar border town to the planned deep-sea port it is building at Kyaukphyu, along with an ongoing pipeline project. The report said the line will run from Kyaukphyu to the border town of Muse, which plans to complete the 126-km first phase of the railway line by 2014. The railway would be built in line with the gas

pipeline China was building from Kyaukphyu to Ruili in Yunnan province.

Refer to the article: China expands presence in Myanmar with railway line

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1978874.ece>

1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others


April 3 “China aims to more than triple its oil, gas production in SCS over next 10 years” (China SignPost, 洞察中国 (Dongcha Zhongguo), April 3, 2011)

According to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China is aiming for oil & gas production of 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day by 2015 and 1 million boe per day by 2020 in deepwater areas of the South China. Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipyard has built the HYSY 981 drilling rig, which can drill in 3,000 m of water to a total well depth of 12,000 meters. The HYSY 981 deepwater rig gives China the physical capacity to drill virtually anywhere in the South China Sea apart from the deepest parts of the abyssal plain,

An outline of the article: According to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China is aiming for oil & gas production of 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day by 2015 and 1 million boe per day by 2020 in deepwater areas of the South China. China's dominant offshore producer had total output of roughly 290,000 boe per day from the South China Sea during 2010. Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipyard has built the HYSY 981 drilling rig, which can drill in 3,000 m of water to a total well depth of 12,000 meters. The HYSY 981 deepwater rig gives China the physical capacity to drill virtually anywhere in the South China Sea apart from the deepest parts of the abyssal plain, which will likely complicate the South China Sea maritime security environment.

Refer to the article: China Aims to More Than Triple Its Oil & Gas Production in the South China Sea over the Next 10 years

<http://www.chinasignpost.com/2011/04/china-aims-to-more-than-triple-its-oil-gas-production-in-the-south-china-sea-over-the-next-10-years/>



Source: <http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/South-China-Sea-drilling-access-with-deepwater-rig-2-March-2011.jpg>

April 12 “Indonesia: Fish theft incurs Rp9 trillion in financial loss every year” (TEMPO Interactive, April 13, 2011)

The Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fishery Ministry claims that Jakarta loses Rp9.4 trillion due to fish theft every year. Areas susceptible to fish thefts include the Natuna Sea, Arafura and northern Sulawesi. Indonesia only has 24 monitoring ships and only 17 are equipped with standard weaponry.

An outline of the article: The Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fishery Ministry claims that Jakarta loses Rp9.4 trillion due to fish theft every year. Areas susceptible to fish thefts include the Natuna Sea, Arafura and northern Sulawesi. The Maritime Affairs and Fishery Resources Supervision (PSDKP) said: “Therefore, we focus our supervision on the three areas, but that doesn’t mean we ignore other waters. We still supervise them according to our capability.” In 2010, the ministry arrested 140 illegal foreign ships in Indonesian waters, most of which were from neighboring countries like Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. From January until April 2011, at least 13 illegal foreign ships have been caught. Although Indonesia has border issues with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Timor Leste, the Indonesia prioritizes the resolution of land border issues as a government policy. Indonesia only has 24 monitoring ships and only 17 are equipped with standard weaponry.

Refer to the article: Fish Theft Incurs Rp9 Trillion in Financial Loss Every Year
<http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2011/04/13/brk,20110413-327137,uk.html>

2. Intelligence Assessment

China's National Defense in 2010 - Review of diversity of modernization of military power

Junichi TAKEDA

Senior Program Inspector, Program Inspection Bureau, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK)

On 31 March, China has released its national defense white paper entitled “China’s National Defense in 2010”-- “2010 年中国的国防” in the original text, which is translated into English as “China’s National Defense in 2010 (hereinafter WP).”

The WP mentions: “Considering the second decade of the 21st century as strategically important opportunities for national development, China will persevere on the path of peaceful development, and pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.” In addition, the WP stresses that China is making efforts to carry out military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as the United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations (PKO), counter-piracy operations off Somalia, emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and the protection of security among others, as well as promoting mutual confidence, arms control and disarmament.

On the other hand, the WP says that it will realize economic development and national defense in a unified manner, the unified goal of building a prosperous country and a strong military. It also emphasizes to modernize the military forces by placing the highest priority on informationization.

Although the WP lacks a concrete explanation, in reality, China continues a continued increase in defense expenditure, active maritime advances, strong postures in the issues which confront the interests of the respective nations, and an expansion of the military exercises with foreign nations. In case of weapons, China is carrying out strengthening of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Information System (C⁴IS), construction of an aircraft carrier, increase of new types of submarines and large types of amphibious ships, developments of carrier-borne aircraft and stealth aircraft, and is testing anti-satellite weapons and anti-ballistic missile defense. A series of events seems to indicate two major goals of “strategic in-depth enlargement” and “strengthening of campaigning capabilities” of denying accesses by other nations. Formal theory is to “seize firmly the build-up of core military capabilities and to arrange scientifically the buildup of core military capabilities.” (General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Hu Jintao directed it at the military delegation group meeting at the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 12.) Its priority is clear. Under the situation in which China has secured the status of the world’s second largest economy, and global national power is increasing, it cannot be denied that China’s military trends have such “diversification” and the

side which is causing worries and anxieties to international community of the surrounding and concerned nations. I would like to analyze whether or not the recent WP is explaining distinctly the consistency of an idea and reality, and enhancing transparency of persuading the international community. In order to be aware of every in the document as faithfully as possible, the text is based on the Chinese edition.

1. Tone of propaganda in defense WP

China's defense WP has been issued biennially since 1998 by China's State Council Information Office, and this WP is the seventh issue. The WP has been issued at the year end or in the beginning of the year, but it was delayed until March 31 this time, the reason of which has not been announced. The State Council Information Office is the governmental window to outside propaganda. According to the military bulletin, The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Daily and China-net.com., publication of the WP was decided by the Foreign Affairs Office, General Staff Headquarters, Ministry of National Defense as a mission given by the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. A working group of War Theory and Strategy Research Department of the Academy of Military Science led by Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, who were members of the drafting team from the first edition, collaborated (rubbed their hands together) with other related sections.

So far as the author has been informed, the offices concerned are: International Liaison Department, Central Office for Taiwan Affairs, Central Office for Overseas Publicity, Central Office for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Commerce, and People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries among others. After a spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense (Director of the Press Office), Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, made a press brief, Major General Qian Lihua briefed to a group of military attaches [of 118 from 81 countries]. Editions in seven languages were prepared. The white papers of the respective nations, including Japan, have the primary purpose of explaining the necessity and reasonableness of maintaining the military (defense) power to the tax payers and the parliaments, congresses or diets. However, in case of China, we should bear in mind that the white paper is propaganda to the outside to image up its own policy.

As shown in Chart 1, the current WP is composed of 10 chapters with approximately 30,000 Chinese letters, as follows.

They were: (1) The Security Situation; (2) National Defense Policy; (3) Modernization of the People's Liberation Army; (4) Deployment of the Armed Forces; (5) National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force Building; (6) Military Legal System; (7) Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; (8) Defense Expenditure; (9) Military Confidence-Building; and (10) Arms Control and Disarmament. As you see in Chart 1 below, this edition has become more compact compared with the last one which was composed of 14 chapters with approximately 40,000 letters.

Of all chapters, Chapter (6) was newly added. Respective chapters of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force in the last edition (2008) were integrated into chapter (3). The chapter of the People's Armed Police Force was included in chapter (4). A list of six items

in the appendixes: (a) Major international exchanges and training of the Chinese military; (b) Joint Exercises and Training with Foreign Armed Forces; (c) China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations; (d) Imports and Exports of Seven Major Types of Conventional Arms of the PRC; (e) Defense Expenditure of the PRC, and (f) Major Military Regulations (1978-2007) was not included this time.

As a whole, the current WP is simplified and lacks in concrete descriptions. The Chinese insistence that “we are enhancing transparency every year” lacks in persuasions. The current WP is a last issue made under the regime of Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CPC who is expected to certainly retire from two-term of ten years party secretary at the 18th National Congress of the CPC on the autumn of 2012. However, it remains uncertain whether or not Hu Jintao will turn over the post of Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission to his successor Xi Jinping.

Chart 1 Transition of Chapters in Each Editions (2006-2010)

2006 Edition	2008 Edition	2010 Edition
1. The Security Environment	1. The Security Situation	1. The Security Situation
2. National Defense Policy	2. National Defense Policy	2. National Defense Policy
3. China's Leadership and Administration System for National Defense 4. The People's Liberation Army	3. Reform and Development of the PLA	3. Modernization of the People's Liberation Army
	4. The Army →3	
	5. The Navy →3	
	6. The Air Force →3	
	7. The Second Artillery Force →3	
5. People's Armed Police Force	8. The People's Armed Police Force →4	4. Deployment of the Armed Forces
6. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force	9. National Defense Reserve Buildup	5. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force Building
7. Border and Coastal Defense	10. The Armed Force and People →4	
		6. Military Legal System (new)
8. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense	11. Science Technology and Industry for National Defense	7. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
9. Defense Expenditure	12. Defense Expenditure	8. Defense Expenditure
10. International Security Cooperation	13. International Security Cooperation	9. Military Confidence-Building
	14. Arms Control and Disarmament	10. Arms Control and Disarmament
	Appendixes (1-6)	

Sources : Made by author from annual editions. Extent of descriptions of respective chapters varies, depending on respective annual editions.

2. 'Self-confidence' in rise to power and recognition of situation

First of all, I will discuss the recognition of national security situation a on which the strategy is based on. The WP says, "On the whole, the world remains peaceful and stable." This assessment is derived from the recognition of a situation which has been developing since the then supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, declared in 1980s that the main stream of the age is peace and development, and world war does not occur, and shifted China's viewpoints of military

strategy from the preparations for the total war in the era of Mao Zedong to a settlement of limited wars. Nevertheless, the WP mentions that the progress toward economic globalization and a multi-polar world is irreversible, as is the advance toward informationization of society. The current trend toward peace, development and cooperation is irresistible. At the same time, the WP says that “international strategic competition and contradictions are intensifying, global challenges are becoming more prominent, and security threats are becoming increasingly integrated, complex and volatile on a daily basis.”

What is worthy of note is that the WP appears to indicate self-confidence as an emerging great power. The WP writes “The international balance of power is changing, most notably through the economic strength and growing international status and influence of emerging powers and developing countries. Prospects for world’s multi-polarization are becoming clearer. “The prevailing trend is towards reform in international systems. Steady progress is being made in the establishment of mechanisms for management of the global economy and finance. G20 is playing a more outstanding role. The international spotlight has turned to the reform of the United Nations (UN) and other international political and security systems.” This is an expression written with an expectation to transition to international orders. For reference, what China call as reform in international systems means strengthening the status and roles of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, India, China and South Africa), not of Japan. Incidentally, I may add that Chinese authorities use the “nations with golden bricks” for the BRICS in translation with an expectation of world’s multi-polarization.

On the other hand, contradictions continue to surface between developed and developing countries and between traditional and emerging powers. Local conflicts and regional flashpoints are a recurrent theme. In a number of countries, outbreaks of unrest are frequently triggered off by political, economic, ethnic, or religious disputes. In general, world peace remains elusive.” “Deep-seated contradictions and structural problems behind the international financial crisis have not been resolved. World economic recovery remains fragile and imbalanced. Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters, public health concerns, and transnational crime are on the rise. Traditional security concerns blend with non-traditional ones.” Regardless of status of newly developed countries, they commonly share the recognition of other threats with the world.

Concerning the traditional military situation, the WP is pointing out, “International military competition remains fierce. Some powers have worked out strategies for outer space, cyber space and the polar (Arctic) regions, developed means for prompt global strikes (PGS), accelerated development of missile defense systems, enhanced cyber operations capabilities to occupy new strategic commanding heights. It is of note that China has in its sights the polar (Arctic) regions where melting of sea ice is proceeding. PGS is a concept advocated by some people in the United States as a system that can deliver a precision conventional weapons strike anywhere in the world within one hour just as an ICBM can do with a nuclear warhead to counter the Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy. Although this part is not mentioned by name, it is

clear to be a criticism against the United States. In other parts of the WP expressions against hegemony and power politics which might suggest the United States continue to be used. Alertness is not slackened.

Regarding the Asia-Pacific security situation, the WP writes that it is generally stable with progress in cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with three nations of Japan, China and South Korea. Nevertheless, settlement in the regional hot points takes long time. There is intermittent tension on the Korean Peninsula. The security situation in Afghanistan remains serious, while conflicts over territorial and maritime interests sometime raise the temperature. The descriptions on the Korean peninsula reflects the tension of the situation caused by the incident in which the South Korean corvette Cheonan was reportedly sunk by the North Korean torpedo attack and the incident of North Korea's artillery attack on South Korean-held Yeonpyeong Island. Notable portion of territorial and maritime interests was delicately changed from "disputes continue to be prominent." However, there is no further allusion in the WP. Although China is a member concerned on one hand regarding the issues in the South and East China Sea, their descriptions seem to indicate as if they were none of its business.

Additionally, calling only the United States by name, the WP says, "The United States single-handedly, saying "Profound changes are taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. Relevant major powers are increasing their strategic investment. The United States is reinforcing its regional military alliances, and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs." China is getting distinctly nervous about strengthening of security alliance between the United States and Japan after the incidents of collisions of a Chinese trawler with the Japanese patrol boats off the Senkaku Islands, "return to Asia" of the United States over the situation in the South China Sea, and the U.S.–South Korean joint military exercises in response to an intensification of the situation in the Korean peninsula.

Regarding the situation of China itself, the WP writes: "In addition to independence movements of Taiwan, East Turkistan, and Tibet, China faces pressure builds up in preserving China's territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests. Non-traditional security concerns, such as existing terrorism threats, energy, resources, finance, information and natural disasters, are on the rise. Suspicion about China, interference and countering moves against China from the outside are on the increase."

Concerning the Taiwan issue, China continues to blame the United States that Washington, in the defiance of the three Sino-US joint communiqués, continues to sell weapons to Taiwan, severely impeding Sino-US relations and impairing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. On the other hand, the WP carried for the first time that the two sides of the Straits can hold contacts and exchanges on military issues at an appropriate time and talk about a military security mechanism of mutual trust. It may be a "slow-ball" for cutting off the ties between the United and Taiwan in the background of an expansion of economic relations as well as dialogues between China and Taiwan.

3. Defensive national defense policy and “Consistency” of securing national interests

The WP stresses “China pursues a national defense policy which is defensive in nature.” The national defense policy which is defensive in nature is determined by China's development path, its fundamental aims, its foreign policy, and its historical and cultural traditions. Well then, what is the road to the development? The WP insists that China takes the road of peaceful development, strives to build a “harmonious socialist society” internally, and promotes the building of a “harmonious world” enjoying lasting peace and common prosperity externally. (The word “和諧 (hexie)” in Chinese means “harmonious.”) Moreover, the fundamental mission for China is “to advance its reform in order to promote socialist modernization, as well as to pursue an independent foreign policy of peace.” Although China's historical and cultural traditions do not come to the point, the WP mentions that it is a reason that advocates the settlement of disputes through peaceful means and insistence on “attacking only after being attacked strategically,” adding that “China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops.”

Regarding a story on the theory of military strategy in detail, in fact, a paragraph of “後發制人 (hou fa zhi ren)” was mentioned in the 2008 edition, citing that “Carrying out a military strategy of positive defense, China will maintain the principle of defense, self-defense, and “後發制人 (hou fa zhi ren)”-- attack after the enemy has struck, strategically. However, the description in current WP is simple. The theory of “active defense” is difficult, and it is a strategic theory maintained since Mao Zedong. It involves two inconsistent sides which have both the so-called strategic defense and offense in the campaigning area. However, at the new stage in the new century, in order to stand against the strong enemies by deterring Taiwan's independence and defending the expanding national interests including maritime interests, there are some views noted in the military publications which say that having strategic defense and gaining mastery by sticking only after the enemy has struck is not sufficient, particularly, in information war in which finding enemy first will promptly lead to the destruction of the enemies. But, if such internal opinions are reflected in the white paper, China's peaceful and defensive images are apt to be damaged. There is a possibility that China is consciously toning down the expression in the defense white paper whose purpose is to make propaganda to outside. To say on the contrary, there is the side in which we cannot take the words in the WP as they are.

An idea of ‘road to peaceful development’ or being ‘harmonious’ in the WP has a side which cannot be taken as it is, to say on the contrary. An idea of ‘road to peaceful development’ or being ‘harmonious’ was announced, in fact, in the speech by General Secretary Hu Jintao at the summit in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations [in September 2007] and was adopted at China's 17th Party Congress in October 2007. These terms are also repeated in the WP. From these repeated emphases, their purposes of wiping away “China's Threat Theory,” “China's Uncompromising Theory,” and “China's Arrogance Theory” (Gen. Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff) in the respective editions are clearly visible. Nevertheless, what the international community is paying attention to is a gap lying between an idea of propaganda and real action, which means whether or not there is a consistency in speech and action.

The WP mentions the four goals and tasks of China's national defense as follows: They are: (1) Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; (2) Maintaining social harmony and stability; (3) Accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; (4) Maintaining world peace and stability. In fact, these are the adaptations of the tasks which Hu Jintao, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, showed at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 2004. They were also the adaptations of what Hu had demanded of the military --"three provisions and one implementation" which are wrapped in a wafer for the overseas users. The "three provisions and one implementation" includes giving power to strengthen the administrative position of the communist party, giving security to guard strategic chance for national developments, providing strategic support to defending national interests, and implementing the role of keeping peace of the world as well as urging joint developments on the military.

The WP mentions as follows:

In (1), "China implements the military strategy of active defense of the new era, safe-guards its maritime rights and interests, and maintain its security interests in space, electromagnetic space and cyber space. It is also tasked to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence," crack down on separatist forces for "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence." China upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. They pass on without explaining the military strategy of active defense of the new era.

In (3), the WP mentions to realize basically mechanization and infomationization in 2020. It clarifies maintaining a "3 walk-run" strategy: 1st step, basic in 2010; 2nd step, Big developments in 2020; and 3rd step, Being equaled to big powers in 2050) There is no change in the goal of implementing mechanization and informationization side by side at the same time. Informationization includes strengthening of capabilities of C⁴ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), smart sensor technology and digitalization of weapons, and IT technology for security and administration among others, in which China is pursuing to catch up with the U.S. Military Forces as a whole.

Also, in (2), the WP mentions that, taking the maintenance of overall social stability as a critical task, the armed forces resolutely subdue all subversive and sabotage activities by hostile forces, as well as violent and terrorist activities. It is because of the fact that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the "Armed Forces" of the CPC, and the expression suggests that the CPC leadership is alert to the possibility that a "Jasmine Revolution" continuing in the Maghreb region in Northern Africa might spread to China.

4. Limit to "transparency" of military power

Regarding the modernization of the military power, what and how is the WP explaining? I have translated all pages on the PLA Navy (PLAN) in the WP which may be interesting to the readers of this monthly report as follows:

The description is extremely abstract and brusque.

- In line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the PLAN endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its integrated combat forces, enhances its capabilities in strategic deterrence and counterattack, and develops its capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters and in countering non-traditional security threats. It seeks to further improve its combat capabilities through regularized and systematic basic training and actual combat training in complex electromagnetic environments. By organizing naval vessels for drills in distant waters, it develops training models for MOOTW missions.
- New types of submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels have been deployed as planned. The PLAN enhances the construction of composite support bases so as to build a shore-based support system which matches the deployment of forces and the development of weaponry and equipment. The Navy has accelerated the building of surface logistical platforms by deploying ambulance boats and helicopters, and a standard 10,000 DWT hospital ship, and is working to further improve its surface support capabilities. The Navy explores new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime missions. There are three fleets under the Navy, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet, each of which has under its command fleet aviation, support bases, flotillas, maritime garrison commands, aviation divisions and marine brigades. (Note: 支隊 (flotilla) and 水警区 (maritime garrison) are units of division level.

Thus, the WP gives no concrete explanations of distant area training of formation or maritime security capabilities which are note worth. In addition, the WP does not mention that a helicopter of the China's East Sea Fleet (ESF) flew near the Japanese maritime self-defense force (JMSDF) vessels on a surveillance mission repeatedly, against which Japan protested through the diplomatic channel. (This is particularly described in the Japan's Defense White Paper 2010.) The helicopter was assigned to a formation of 10 naval vessels of the ESF, which had been deployed west of the Okinotori Island in the Pacific Ocean, after passing through the Miyako channel in the spring of 2010. There is also no explanation of the incident of [Chinese] harassment (in 2009) by hindering the U.S. Navy acoustic observation vessel. How will China coordinate such maritime deployment with its "defensive national policy"-- China's national policy? China's powers of persuasion to mitigate worries and anxieties of the neighboring maritime nations may not be said sufficient. It is the same with equipment and organizations. In the chapter of this area, especially in the part of explaining the matters under General Assessment Department, there is a short sentence as follows: The PLAN has built for its maritime operations a weaponry system with new types of submarines, surface vessels and surface attack aircraft as the spine.

There is no concrete explanation at all about the performance, aims of procurement, or deployment status, among others, of naval vessels, aircraft and others. Strange to say, they pick up a hospital ship only, while there is no description of resurging works of the aircraft carrier *Varyag* which is a matter of the highest interest of the surrounding nations, or the developments of the carrier-based fighter aircraft J-15, and Z-8 AEW helicopter among others. Nor are mentioned the development of the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) which the U.S. military is

worried about, destruction of a satellite (in 2007), testing of missile defense (in 2010), reconnaissance surveillance and data-link satellites, and data link satellites.

Some points, which are worthy of note as modernization of the Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force, are taken out from the WP as follows: Nevertheless, it is also difficult to read the real image of the concrete capabilities of the PLA from these descriptions after all.

PLAA: In line with the strategic requirements of mobile operations and tri-dimensional offense and defense, the PLA Army (PLAA) has advanced the transformation of the service and significantly boosted its capabilities in long-distance maneuvers and integrated assaults. The armored component has strengthened the development of digitized units, and the motorized units accelerated its reorganization to mechanization units. The PLAA aviation wing has worked to move from being a support force to being a main-battle assault force. The last part means an expansion of armed helicopters units.

PLAAF: To satisfy the strategic requirements of conducting both 'offensive and defensive operations,' the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is strengthening the development of a combat force structure that focuses on air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection. The PLAAF strengthens routine combat readiness of air defenses, taking the defense of the capital as the center and the defense of coastal and border areas as the key. It has carried out MOOTWs, such as air security for major national events, emergency rescue and disaster relief, international rescue, and emergency airlift (in Beijing Olympia 2008 and Expo 2010 Shanghai China). It has deployed airborne early warning and control aircraft, third-generation combat aircraft, and others.

PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF): The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) strives to push forward its modernization and improves its capabilities in rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations. The PLASAF has grown into a strategic force equipped with both nuclear and conventional missiles. It has continued to maintain good safety records in nuclear weapon management. There is no concrete explanation of surface to surface ballistic missiles.

Additionally, in the area of the **General Staff Headquarters**, the WP mentions: The total length of the national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber communication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistance. Promulgation of command regulations which build Joint operational systems, compilation of training manuals, and transformation of military training in conditions of informationization which includes strengthening electronic counteraction trainings and others are being implemented.

In the area of the **General Political Department**, the WP stresses that the Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was revised in August 2010, which clarified that the PLA must secure its army under the absolute leadership of the Party from the political, ideological and organizational points. It is only a hopeful observation of the limited sources that view the PLA is transforming itself from the "Army of the Party" to the "Army of the

Nation.” Notably, it also rules that within five years there must be at least one professional psychotherapist for each brigade- (regiment-) level unit. It also attracts attention that the PLA has implemented the “Measures for High-Level Personnel Project” (newly built) which educates every two years 200 high-level talents who will be in charge of innovations of joint operations and informationization.

In the “China’s National Defense in 2008” brief historical accounts and types of weapons of each military service of the PLA were reported in order of respective chapters. However, their descriptions were at the level of, for example, as follows: “Submarine Force is composed of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and diesel-electric attack submarines. There are bases and sub-bases. They have anti-ship, anti-submarine, mine-laying, and a set of nuclear counterattack capabilities.” Consequently, no concrete data had been released.

5. International cooperation and expansion of campaigning capabilities

The chapter of deployment of military power (The title in the English edition: Deployment of the Armed Forces) in the WP is mentioned in order of the items as follows: (1) Safeguarding Border, Coastal and Territorial Air Security; (2) Maintaining Social Stability; (3) Participating in National Construction, Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief; (4) Participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations; (5) Conducting Escort Operations in the Gulf of Aden and Waters off Somalia; (6) Holding Joint Military Exercises and Training with Other Countries; (7) Participating in International Disaster Relief Operations

Of them, (1) Safeguarding Border, Coastal and Territorial Air Security reports on maritime defense system as follows: (a) The armed forces safeguard the border, coastal and maritime security, and guard against, stop and subdue such activities as foreign intrusions, encroachments, and provocations; (b) The border public security force is responsible for border, coastal and maritime public security administration, entry-exit frontier inspection, prevention of illegal border crossing, and smuggling among others.; (c) Organs of maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs, inspection and quarantine, and customs are responsible for ensuring legitimate rights, law enforcement, and administration; (d) The militia, the reserve forces and the people in the border and coastal areas will participate in the system.

The State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense, under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC), coordinate China's border and coastal defenses. While the WP says the military border units maintain effectively the security and stability of the coastal area and maritime area under their control, it does not mention the strategy of possessing the islands and developing the marine resources. Like border units, maritime border units are divisional or regimental level Army, not Navy, and belong to the military districts in the coastal Provinces.

(2) People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is the paramilitary force which undertakes tasks against domestic contingencies and others. (3) The data on the achievements by the armed forces and the PAP are propagated in detail. (3), (5), (7) Here, the overseas missions in the MOOTWs

which China is eager to propagate are mentioned. (4) Here, the WP mentions that the PLA had 1,955 officers and men serving in nine UN PKO mission areas, which marked more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. In 2009, it established the Peacekeeping Center of the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China to commonly share experiences with other nations. (7) Here, the WP mentions that the PLA sent an international a rescue team after the Haiti earthquake and flood disaster in Pakistan respectively. It also participated positively in the multinational forum for regional disaster relief.

(5) As for conducting escort operations off Somalia, in line with relevant UN resolution which requested respective nations to respond to a drastic increase of piracy, China dispatched the naval vessels since December 2008. At present, two frigates and a supply ship of the 8th fleet are being deployed. The WP mentions that information sharing with navies of respective nations has been normalized. It has exchanged boarding visits of commanders with fleets from the EU, the multinational naval force (CTF with US Navy at the center), NATO, Russia, the ROK, the Netherlands and Japan. It has conducted joint escort operations with Russian fleets and joint maritime exercises with ROK escort ships. Thus, the report emphasized its international cooperation.

Although the WP does not mention directly, except the first escort fleet which made the direct outbound and inbound course to the gulf and homeport, the other escort fleets made port calls to African nations, the Gulf states along the coast of the Indian Ocean, Asian countries along the navigation routes, and countries along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The significance of preserving the interests in the remote seas and the expansion of presence should be regarded with attention.

In fact, China used armed forces to protect the withdrawals of 35,860 Chinese construction workers and others during the intense Libyan situation in last spring. The PLA Navy sent frigate *Xuzhou*, which had been deployed in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy mission with the 7th escort fleet, off Libya as an escort to the chartered passenger ship (Greek-flagged). In addition to a large number of chartered civil air transports, the Chinese Air Force sent four IL-76 transport aircraft to Sudan, a China's friendly nation, and they made shuttle-flights between Sudan and Sabha, an inland city in Libya. Even though they were non-combatant evacuation operations, they showed high-intensity expeditionary capabilities of "show-the-flag." There is a side view that that China no longer hesitates to project military power to defend the interests which are expanding worldwide. The PLA Daily (dated March 15) carried an article which says: "The military must defend not only territorial borders but also the borders of interests."

(6) Regarding the maritime joint exercises with foreign countries, the WP says, since 2003, alongside with mutual port calls and other activities, the PLAN has run bilateral or multilateral joint maritime exercises with the navies of 11 nations, including Japan. Since 2007 the PLAN has participated in multilateral joint maritime exercises AMAN organized by the Pakistani navy every two years. In 2010, China held a joint marine training with Thailand.

Meanwhile, the WP does not mention that, in addition to tank units of the Beijing Military Region which had been transported by railroad during the Shanghais Cooperation Organization's

(SCO) anti-terrorist joint exercise “Peace Mission 2010” held in neighboring Kazakhstan last autumn, PLA Air Force had sent H-6 bombers and J-10 escorting fighters, under the support of AWACS and an air tanker. It also does not mention that Su-27s of the PLA Air Force, being refueled en route in Pakistan and Iran, had participated in the exercise—“Anatolian Eagle” sponsored by Turkish Air Force. At that time, they the events had been reported to some extent in China. Were they not reported in the WP so as not to get alerted by foreign countries as strengthening of presence and campaigning capabilities?

6. Difference between principle and real intention and future

Because of limited description space, five points should be briefly pointed

(1) Defense mobilization and logistics capabilities

This time the terms of “people’s war” have disappeared in the WP for the first time. However, we should not regard that they took farewell to the traditional concept. The WP mentions that in 2010 the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed National Defense Mobilization Law of the People's Republic of China, which specifies the peacetime preparations for and wartime implementation of national defense mobilization, stipulating the obligations and rights of each citizen and organization. Defense mobilization includes four elements of “people’s armed forces mobilization” of reserve force and militia, “national economic mobilization,” “civil air defense (CAD)” of civil defense, and “transportation mobilization for national defense.”

Reserve Force is a nucleus of 1-2 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions, but their names and locations are not released. The WP says China now has 8 million primary militia members. Calculating from the figures in Table 1, the reserve force expenditure in peacetime is one percent less than defense expenditure which was announced publicly, while the militia expenditure is less than three percent.

(2) Military Legal System

The WP has made the item of “Persisting in Governing the Forces in Accordance with the Law” in the Chapter III Reform and Development of the PLA in “China’s National Defense in 2008” into an independent new chapter. As a review of military legal system in the past two years, in addition to defense mobilization law mentioned above, the WP is listing a review and others of laws, regulations and platforms, including the Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Armed Police Force, the newly revised Regulations on the Political Work of the People's Liberation Army, the newly revised Regulations on Routine Service of the People's Liberation Army, the Regulations on Discipline of the People's Liberation Army, the Regulations on Formation of the People's Liberation Army, and a new generation of regulations on the work of headquarters. There are altogether 1,342 military lawyers and 25,000 legal advisors in the armed forces.

The WP writes that units participating in emergency rescue and disaster relief operations strictly abide by such laws and regulations as the Emergency Response Law of the People's Republic of China, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters, and the Regulations on the PLA's Participation in Disaster

Rescue. Even if there is a reason of new laws, why does the WP emphasize such matter of course? We can read that it is a reflection of danger to intentional activities and anxieties to corruptions and others as well as criticism. The WP also writes that Naval ships performing escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and in waters off Somalia, as well as those carrying out maritime trainings in the high seas, strictly observe international treaties like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and act in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of China. After all, China seems to bear in mind the “eyes” of foreign nations.

(3) Defense expenditure

Tone of presentation is the same as before. As for the reasons of the increase of defense expenditure, the WP explains it is not only for improving working conditions, including salaries and others, rising procurement costs of weapons, and the introduction high-tech equipment but also for a diversification of the missions, including the MOOTW. As explained in the Table 2, the pattern of the classification is the same as the previous one.

Table 2: Defense Expenditure in 2009 (unit: RBN billion)

	Active Force	Reserve Force	Militia	Total	
				Amount	Percentage
Personnel	1,670.63	14.65	—	1,685.28	34.04%
Training & Maintenance	1,521.71	19.65	128.59	1,669.95	33.73%
Equipment	1,574.26	14.31	7.30	1,595.87	32.23%
Total	4,766.60	48.61	135.89	4,951.10	100.00%
(Percentage)	96.27%	0.98%	2.75%	100.00%	* *

Source: “China’s National Defense in 2010”, Colored part is added by author.

The costs are almost equally divided as follows: (a) Personnel expenses which mainly cover salaries, allowances, housing, insurance, food, bedding and clothing, among others; (b) Training and maintenance expenses which mainly cover troop training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenses on routine consumables; and (c) Equipment expenses which mainly cover research and development (R&D), experimentation, procurement, maintenance, transportation and storage of weaponry and equipment. It would be hard to say that transparency has been upgraded.

According to the WP, in recent years, the share of China's annual defense expenditure in its gross national product (GNP) has remained relatively steady, while that in overall state financial expenditure has been moderately decreased. China’s Defense Ministry’s spokesman Geng Yansheng briefed: Although the increase rate of the defense expenditure (in budget volume) was reduced by 7.5% in 2010, a one-digit since 22 years ago because of a financial crisis, it was recovered by 12.7% in 2011 owing to economic recovery. (China’s Broadcasting Net) China announced the defense expenditure in 2011 (in budget volume) is 601.1 billion yuan (\$91.5 billion)

in 2011. It is approximately six percent of national financial expenditure and approximately 1.4% in gross national product GNP ratio.

(4) Military confidence-building measures

The WP says China has established mechanisms for defense and security consultation and dialogue with 22 countries. Regarding the dialogue and cooperation on international maritime security, the WP said: China began to conduct consultations on military maritime security issues with the United States, which is based on the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) concluded in 1998. The two navies of China and Vietnam have begun to conduct Joint Patrols in the Beibu Gulf since 2005. In 2009, direct telephone links (hot lines) were established between the Chinese and ROK naval and air force troops [stationed in adjacent areas]. The WP briefly said China and Japan have held several consultations over establishment of a maritime liaison mechanism since 2008. The second consultation was held in the summer 2010 between the Japanese Self Defense Force and Chinese Armed Force with the aim of preventing the “unexpected incidents,” but the next meeting remains undetermined after the collision incidents between the Chinese fishing boat and Japanese patrol boats. The WP also says Chinese Navy has taken an active part in the multinational forums, including the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)

(5) Arms control and disarmament

Regarding the nuclear arms control, the WP repeatedly maintains that countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals, so as to create the necessary conditions. When conditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states- China and others- should also join in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. China maintains that the global missile defense program (of the United States) will be detrimental to international strategic balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament.

* * *

Thus, the WP maintains the content of propagating the defense policy of peaceful development policy and defensive orientation. While stressing international contributions and others as the MOOTW by low-intensity capabilities, China will never reveal the parts such as mid- and high-intensity military modernization and others that are disadvantageous or inconvenient to its own cause. The WP is a through propaganda, which makes it hard for us to follow China’s real image and intentions. As such is the case, there is no other way than continuing to pay our attention to their real activities in future.

Ocean Policy Research Foundation

3F, Kaiyo Senpaku Bldg., 15-16 Toranomom 1-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan
TEL.81-3-3502-1828 FAX.81-3-3502-2033

The "Ship & Ocean Foundation" is operating under the name of "Ocean Policy Research Foundation"