

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

January 2011



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Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of January 2011.

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Retrospect: the Second Half of 2010

Maritime Security: Regarding the incidents of attacks by Somali pirates in the second half of 2010, they began to occur frequently in September as the southwest monsoon was continuing to abate. In view of the trend of the hijacking incidents from the Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010) on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship issued by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were five incidents in September (of which two were noted off Somalia, including the Indian Ocean), five incidents in October (which were noted off Somalia, including the Indian Ocean), five incidents in November (of which four were noted off Somalia, including the Indian Ocean), and eight incidents in December (which were noted off Somalia, including the Indian Ocean). (Please refer to 2 Intelligence Assessment in this monthly report.)

One of the features of the recent incidents of attacks in the second half of 2010 is that the maritime area of the attacks covers a vast area which includes off Kenya, off Tanzania, off Seychelles and off Madagascar, expanding further out at sea from the east and south coasts of Somalia. It is because the pirates are regarded to be using the “mother ships” which are able to operate farther into the distant area. Below is information on the recent status of the “mother ships.” According to the NATO Shipping Center, vessels used as “mother ships” are mostly hijacked fishing boats, shipping vessels of smaller types, or dhows. Additionally, even the large types of vessels hijacked are sometimes used as “mother ships.” A Panamanian-flagged cargo ship operated by Japan’s Hinode Yusen KK, MV *Izumi*

(20,170DWT), was hijacked off Kenya on October 10. MV *Izumi* is likely to be used as a “mother ship” also. According to the EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release dated November 8, Spanish navy’s corvette, SPS *Infanta Cristina*, was fired on by pirates aboard MV *Izumi* as it accompanied an aid ship, MV *Petra 1*, destined for Mogadishu on the evening of November 6. SPC *Infanta Christina* had to defend herself and her escort with only minimal force in order not to endanger the lives of the hostages (20 Filipinos) on-board MV *Izumi*. MV *Izumi* then fled the scene. Additionally, according to the EU NAVFOR, a Pirate Action Group (PAG) was said to be confirmed to move from MV *Izumi* to the skiff and attacked the vessels underway in the sea off Somalia on November 5.

On the other hand, under the situation in which the activities by Pirate Action Groups (PAG’s) are strengthened, and the number of the incidents is increasing, two counter-piracy measures are noticeable. One is the capture of the PAG’s before their venturing out to sea by the international navies. These countermeasures have been increasing since around March 2010. Usually, the PAG is usually comprised of one to two skiffs, which are under tow by a fishing vessel which is acting as “mother ship” on the sea. The EU NAVFOR and NATO fleet are taking the following measures: Upon finding the PAG in the coastal area off Somalia, the naval vessels stop the vessels to seize their weapons and equipment aboard. The naval vessels destroy large boats as well as small boats, except the one to be used for sending back the PAG to Somali coast. The EU NAVFOR says attacking the PAG before it begins attacks - deterring these attacking groups from operating at sea, is a very effective anti-piracy measure. However, in usual cases, these pirate suspects who have been seized are transferred to

the boat to be sent back to the coast, if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute them. However, some of the shipping business circles are said to be critical of such a measure, considering such a “catch and release” policy would only be regenerating the piracy.

Another way to be taken when the ship is attacked by pirates is the self-defense measure taken by the vessels attacked. According to the anti-piracy manual of the “Best Management Practice (BMP)” issued by the shipping business circles, crews of the vessels are advised to take evasive maneuvers, as well as to lock themselves inside a safety compartment dubbed “citadel” when they are boarded by pirates. By taking such self-defense measures, the cases, in which the pirates who have boarded the vessel give up hijackings and flee away, are increasing. The cases, in which the crews were saved by the naval vessels of each nation patrolling on an escort mission, are also increasing. Additionally, there are cases, in which the crewmembers were freed by force when the pirates did not flee from the ship.

Additionally, there are cases in which hostages are released from captivity if pirates do not leave the ship. For instance, on September 8, US Marines boarded and seized a German vessel hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. The recovery operation by the marine assault team took about an hour, but there were no injuries among the marines and the crew. It is the first time the US Marines have released a vessels seized by the pirates.

On November 23, the UN Security Council adopted unanimously a UN Security Council’s Resolution 1950 which renews for another 12 months the authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somalia’s transitional government to fight piracy off the

country’s coast.

In September, Thailand sent naval ships for 98-day operation off Somalia. Two Thai navy ships – the offshore patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* and the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* - left Sattahip naval base in the Gulf of Thailand for waters off Somalia. A total of 351 crew members and the unit of 20 navy’s SEALs were involved in the expeditionary force. (The expeditionary force returned home on January 20, 2011. (Refer to 1. 1 Maritime Security in this monthly.)

On September 8, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) released a special report on pirate incidents on the rise off the islands of Anambas, Natuna and Mangkai in the South China Sea titled “ReCAAP ISC, Special Report on Situation off Pulau Anambas and Pulau Mangkai.” Regarding the status of the incidents in the vicinity of the islands of Anambas and Mangkai, compared to the previous three years, there has been a drastic increase in 2010, the report says. By September 5, a total of 16 incidents (including one attempted case) were reported. Particularly, between August 16 and September 5, there were nine incidents, which were more than a half of the total (Apart from these incidents, there was one attempted incident). All incidents occurred while the ships targeted by pirates were steaming. They usually boarded the ship from the rear part of the hull to rob the crew members of their possessions.

In 2010, the number of Contracting Parties to the ReCAAP stands as 17, including three states outside Asia – Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway that became members in July, in November, and in August 2009, respectively, plus 14 states in Asia.

Military Developments: In July, China, Russia,

and two nations of U.S. and South Korea conducted the exercises. On July 3, Chinese 6th naval escort flotilla on an anti-piracy mission arrived in the waters around Natuna Islands, Indonesia in the South China Sea (SCS), where its landing ship “*Kunlan Shan*” conducted her first training exercise of launching the hovercraft in the “distant sea.” Additionally, on the 5th, the flotilla conducted the exercise of launching the hovercraft from the landing ship “*Kunlan Shan*” and simulated escort drills with merchant ships sailing in the exercise area, and others. The report says this is the first training exercise for the hovercraft in the open sea since it was launched in December 2009. On June 30–July 5, the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) organized a large naval and air force formation consisting of dozens of warships and 10-plus warplanes to have a routine naval and air force exercise with actual-troops and live-ammunitions in a sea area of the East China Sea off Zhejiang Province. On July 26, the PLAN conducted a live ammunition training exercise in the South China Sea involving multiple members of naval joint forces organized by the South Sea Fleet. In the exercise major destroyers of the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet participated, and conducted the exercise which included long-range precision attacks toward the sea under the “complicated electro-magnetic environment,” air control operations, anti-air defense of the surface fleet under complicated electro-magnetic environment, and others.

The Russian Navy’s Northern, Black Sea and Pacific fleets participated in the Vostok-2010 large-scale military exercises in Siberia and the country’s Far East, which were held on June 30–July 8. The exercises involved several dozen warships and support ships. The Northern and

Black Sea fleets contributed their largest and most powerful warships - the Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great) and Moskva guided missile cruisers, respectively.

On July 25, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) began a joint military exercise codenamed “Invincible Spirit” in the Sea of Japan. To put on the military fireworks display, the United States and South Korea dispatched about 20 ships including the USS *George Washington*, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, 8,000 sailors and airmen, and 200 aircraft including F-22 fighter planes to participate in the four-day exercise.

On August 8, the U.S. 7th Fleet kicked off naval engagement activities with the Vietnam People’s Navy off Da Nang in central Vietnam to commemorate the 15th anniversary of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. From the U.S. side, Task Force 73 composed of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73), USS *John S. McCain* (DDG 56), USS *Curtis Wilbur* (DDG 54), USS *Chung-Hoon* (DDG 93) and USS *McCampbell* (DDG 85) were involved. After the exercises, the USS *John S. McCain* visited Da Nang on August 10.

On August 16, the US Defense Department released an annual report on the Chinese military trends - Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. The report was issued extremely late this year, compared to other years in the past when it was released in around March. Moreover, the title of the report is different from the “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” in the previous years.

On September 6, the Chinese navy’s hospital ship *Peace Ark* departed Zhou Shan in Zhejiang Province on her first 87-day overseas mission

called the “Harmonious Mission 2010.” Having completed the “Harmonious Mission 2010,” the hospital ship *Peace Ark* returned home on November 26. After providing medical services to the Chinese naval taskforce which was involved in anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, the *Peace Ark* stopped in five African countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Seychelles. She also provided medical services in Bangladesh.

According to the Thai newspaper, *The Bangkok Post* dated October 31, at a press interview after the end of the East Asian summit on October 30, Nyugen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese prime minister, said: “Vietnam will stand ready to service naval ships, including submarines, from foreign countries which need service at the naval base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay. These countries will be required to pay money commensurate with the service.”

On October 12, at the meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus held in Hanoi, U. S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made a speech, in which he said: “The United States has been a Pacific nation for many years and will continue to be a resident power in Asia in the future.” Based on this perspective, Gates encouraged claimant nations in the South China Sea to make initial steps to discuss the development of a full code of conduct, in line with the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Gates also stressed the U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation, unimpeded economic development and commerce, and is in respect for international law.

On October 22, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said the transformation into four unified strategic commands – Command West (CW), Command South (CS), Command Center (CC), and Command East (CE) - to replace

four military districts as part of Russia's military reform has been completed. Russian Information Agency (RIA) Novosti dated the 2nd carried an article by a military reporter, which comments that Russia's naval ship-building program is gradually gaining momentum. Moreover, as the feature of the program, it is seeking standardization in warship and submarine designs to a maximum degree, which is completely different from the trend 30-35 years ago. The article comments on the status in which there are a few base platforms of combatants and submarines, and standard equipment to be added depending on the function of the warship.

On November 2, the Chinese South Sea Fleet (SSF) staged a yearly actual-troop live-shell exercise dubbed the “Dragon 2010” in an area of the South China Sea (SCS). About 1,800 officers and men of a marine brigade of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy participated in the exercise. A hundred-plus armed platforms as well as various weapons appeared in the drill site. The drill went through the whole procedures of a landing combat in four subjects, i.e., mobile assembly, loading and ferrying, assault landing and seizing and holding firmly the landing field.

On December 14, the U. S. Institute for National Strategic Studies issued a report which carried out an analysis of China's out of area naval operations titled “*China's Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions.*” While mentioning that, for the navy of any nation, if it conducts its out of area operations far away from its homeland, it is essential to have accesses to overseas facilities and bases, the report points out that: (1) Presently, China has no networks of facilities and bases; and (2) China's possession or absence of such a network may ultimately be the best indication of judging its future intentions.

On December 24, Russia opted to purchase *Mistral*-class helicopter carriers from France. At the initial stage, two *Mistral*-class helicopter carriers will be built jointly by France and Russia at the French shipyard. Another two will be constructed later at the Russian shipyard. The first *Mistral*-class ship is expected to be built within 36 months after Russia makes an advance payment scheduled for January 2011. RIA Novosti dated December 15 carries an article of a military analyst, in which he mentioned the background of purchasing the *Mistral* class amphibious landing ships as follows: (1) At present, Russian shipbuilding industry does not have the capacity to design and build such amphibious landing ships. By building the ships under license, the Russian shipbuilding industry will get the big benefits. (2) It looks likely that the first ships of the *Mistral* class amphibious landing ships (LHA) will be deployed to the Pacific fleet. Stationed near the Kurils, a *Mistral* and similar ships (LHA) could serve as a mobile base, providing effective support for troops stationed on remote islands.

Maritime Boundaries: On December 13, the Japanese government decided at a cabinet meeting the basic plan which is based on a “law of preserving the low-tide lines and maintaining the key-point facilities” to manage and control specific remote islands in an effort to maintain and preserve its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) wide with them. The law requires to secure strategic base points by maintaining the port facilities on the Okinotori Islands in the southernmost Japanese territory and on the Minamitori Island in the easternmost Japanese territory which are designated as the “specific remote islands,” and to revitalize resource development of rare metals and others as well as

fishery.

On August 29, Singapore and Indonesia ratified the treaty relating to the delimitation of the territorial seas in the western part of the Strait of Singapore. They signed the exchange of the instruments of ratification at the Singaporean foreign ministry. The territorial sea boundary line agreed in this treaty is the continuation of the territorial sea boundary line as previously agreed upon in the treaty signed by both sides on May 25, 1973. Indonesia and Singapore still need to settle their borders on the eastern parts in the Singapore Strait. On the other hand, Malaysia too has not settled its territorial sea boundary line with Indonesia on the eastern part of the Singapore Strait.

On August 26, China said it had used a small, manned submarine to plant the national flag deep beneath the South China Sea, where Beijing claims domain.

On October 11, Li Lixin, director of South China Sea Branch of State Oceanic Administration of China, said China plans to build 30 patrol vessels in the next five years in order to improve the capacity of marine law enforcement and safeguard marine rights. By the end of 2010 to early 2011, six vessels will be added to the China Marine Surveillance. The patrol boat “China Marine Surveillance 75,” which was launched at the end of this July, joined the South China Sea Branch on 26 October. On November 16, China's first fishery patrol vessel *Yuzheng 310* began its 20-day maiden voyage from Guangzhou to patrol in the East China Sea. The two Chinese vessels, the *Yuzheng 310* and *Yuzheng 201*, were spotted navigating through a contiguous zone about 44 km northwest of Taisho Island, one of the islets in Senkaku chain on the morning of November 28. Two vessels sailed around and outside of Japan's territorial waters

of the Senkaku Islands.

On November 23, Zhao Xingwu, Director of Fisheries Administration under the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture told regular patrols to safeguard fishing around the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu islands in China) in the East China Sea would be organized in 2011.

On December 13, Malaysia and Brunei signed an agreement to jointly explore and produce oil and gas in deepwater blocks offshore the Brunei-Sarawak border in northern Borneo. The national petroleum companies of Malaysia and Brunei will partake in joint exploration and production for oil and gas over the next 40 years. Malaysia and Brunei had amicably resolved the land and maritime boundary issues in March 2010. The recent agreement was all the more remarkable because both Governments concluded these deals without resorting to any third-party arbitration or seeking decision from the International Court of Justice.

Diplomacy and International Relations: On December 23, at the annual U.S.-ASEAN post-ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed, “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” China has reacted angrily to an announcement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, “What will be consequences if this issue is turned into an international or multinational one? It will only make matters worse and the resolution more difficult.”

Andrew Krepinevich, President of the U.S. think tank, The Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, contributed an article titled “China’s ‘Finlandization’ Strategy in the Pacific” to the U.S. newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated September 11. In the article, mentioning that the threat of ‘Finlandization’ has revived in the western Pacific, Krepinevich discusses that Washington’s longstanding allies and friends in the Western Pacific are expecting the United States to take a leadership role in keeping a stable military balance in the region. For, in his words, if the military balance between the U.S. and China continues to deteriorate, they may have no choice but to follow Finland’s Cold War example.

According to the U. S. newspaper, *The Washington Times* dated October 20, the foreign policy against China of the Obama Administration is divided into camps of the “kowtow” group and “sad and disappointed” group, and a heated policy debate between these camps is underway over how to deal with China. One faction that favors past policy of conciliation and concessions in relations with China is described as the “kowtow” group. On the contrary, the other faction is described as the “sad and disappointed” group which is against China’s across-the-board refusal to work cooperatively with the United States for the past two years. According to the report, the policy debate is almost totally hidden from public view and only occasionally surfaces in public through statements or public speeches by faction members. On the other hand, China’s diplomats and intelligence officers are said to be aware of the debate. The U.S. officials said the Chinese are actively trying to influence it behind the scenes through their supporters in and out of government.

In the article contributed to the *Eurasia Daily Monitor* dated November 4, a Moscow-based

defense analyst mentions the strategic values on the Northern Islands, as follows: The Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN's) and surface ships to defend the deployment of the newest *Borey* class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) in the open Pacific. The only safe option seems to be deployment to the semi-closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Island chain. Based on it, the author mentions, to keep the Kuriles, Moscow needs massive investment to develop the local economy and Japanese participation in exchange for handing over Habomai and Shikotan.

Regarding the "Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines after the FY 2011" approved at a Cabinet meeting on December 17, Michael Auslin, director of Japan studies at the U. S. think tank, The American Enterprise Institute, commented in his article contributed to *The Wall Street Journal* dated December 22: "Japan has recognized that the most likely threats to its national interests now come from China, and has shifted its strategic focus accordingly."

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: On July 27, President Barack Obama signed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. The law is aimed in response to incidents of passengers falling overboard and shipboard assaults. The new law will apply to any cruise ship that calls in a US port with at least one US passenger aboard. Within 18 months of Obama's signature, cruise lines will be required to ensure that all ship rails are at least 42 inches (102 cm) high from the deck and that all stateroom and crew cabin doors are equipped with peepholes. Cruise lines found in violation face a penalty of \$25,000/day and could be barred from entry into US ports.

According to Xinhua dated July 13, COSCO

Pacific, a port operator subsidiary of China's State-owned shipping giant China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co (COSCO), has signed a \$4.2 billion deal to take over management of an Athens container port, the Piraeus port, and lease it for 35 years. According to the contract signed in June, COSCO will spend \$707 million to upgrade port facilities, build a new pier and almost triple the volume of cargo the port can handle. COSCO aims to make the container port a hub to rival Rotterdam-Europe's largest port.

According to the Indian newspaper, *The Times of India* dated September 17, the Sri Lankan government recently made a contract to build a new deep-water container terminal in Colombo port with a consortium consisting of China Merchant Holdings International and Aitken Spence. The terminal will be built by the same company that built the Hambantota port complex -- China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) and Sino Hydro Corporation.

Furthermore, on October 17, China's English newspaper *Global Times* reports, as information from the Myanmar's local *Weekly Eleven News* dated October 16, that Myanmar has planned to construct a railroad that will link a deep-sea port, Kyaukphyu, in western Rakhine state with Kunming in Yunnan Province, China. According to the report, the Kyaukphyu-Kunming railroad, which is part of the national railroad network, is targeted to be completed in 2015. On the other hand, according to the *Stock Analyst* dated December 2, the framework agreement to build the Dawei deep seaport in Myanmar and its related infrastructure signed between the Myanmar Port Authority and the Italian-Thai Development Public Company (OOTC:ITHVF) is targeted to complete in 10 years in three phases. The project stands as a strategic one which lies within the east-west corridor of Asia. On

completion, the deep-sea port will play role in removing trade barrier in some regions in Asia.

According to the *Marine Log* dated December 6, Norway's Classification Society, Stiftelsen Det Norske Verita (DNV) has unveiled an LNG-fueled very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) *Triality* concept design that obviates the need for ballast water. *Triality*, as its name indicates, fulfils three main goals: it is environmentally superior to a conventional crude oil tanker; its new solutions are feasible and based on well known technology, and it is financially attractive compared to conventional crude oil tankers.

On December 27, a newly constructed VLCC-size oil terminal in Zhanjiang port in Guangdong Province was put into operation. Zhanjiang port now boasts two VLCC-size oil terminals, one 250,000 DWT iron ore terminal and a 150,000 DWT coal terminal, with annual capacity of some 16.8m tons.

According to *The Journal of Commerce Online* dated December 29, a record 61 container ships of more than 7,500 TEUs capacity (Very/Ultra Large Container Ships [VLCS/ULCS]) were delivered in 2010. In 2011, 76 V/ULCS are scheduled for delivery, of which 49 exceed 10,000 TEUs.

Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others: According to the *Shiptalk* dated July 26, the cargo ships of Denmark-based Maersk, the world's largest shipping line, with more than 600 ships, are traveling at lower speeds today than sailing clippers such as the *Cutty Sark* did more than 130 years ago. Since two years ago many ship owners have been adopting "slow steaming" which lowered speeds from the standard between 25 knots and 20 knots to speeds of 12 knots. This policy reduces fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions by 30%. It is believed that the company has saved more than £65m on fuel since

it began its go-slow. According to Maersk, when speed is reduced by 20%, fuel consumption is reduced by 40% per nautical mile. Introduction of slow steaming has been the most important factor in reducing our CO2 emissions in recent years.

According to the U.S. newspaper, *The New York Times* dated October 4, carried an article reporting that, with insurgents increasingly attacking the American fuel supply convoys, the U.S. military is pushing to develop, test and deploy renewable energy to decrease its need to transport fossil fuels. On the other hand, on September 22, the U.S. Navy conducted a full power demonstration of a Riverine Command Boat (experimental) (RCB-X) powered by alternative fuel aboard Naval Station Norfolk, Va. The fuel, a drop in replacement to standard shipboard fuel, is 50 percent algae-based and 50 percent NATO F-76 fuel, which forms a 50/50 blend of hydro-processed renewable diesel. The fuel, a drop in replacement to standard shipboard fuel, is 50 percent algae-based and 50 percent NATO F-76 fuel, which forms a 50/50 blend of hydro-processed renewable diesel, which is also known in industry as HR-D. These exhibitions will culminate in 2012 with a "Green Strike Group" of U.S. Navy ships operating locally and by 2016 deploying a "Great Green Fleet" powered entirely by alternative fuels.

According to the "*MHI News (Mitsubishi Juko News)*" dated October 14, Japanese shipbuilder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) has announced it completed the conceptual design of a 14,000 TEU containership with an air-lubricated hull, "Mitsubishi Air Lubrication Systems (MALS)-14000CS". The MALS-14000CS is a New Panamax size vessel, adopting the proprietary MALS, which reduces frictional resistance between the vessel hull and seawater using air bubbles at the vessel bottom. By

incorporating the MALS, along with an advanced high-efficiency hull and propulsion system, the vessel will be capable of reducing emissions of CO₂ by 35 percent compared with container carriers of conventional design.

According to the UPI dated August 20, recent research shows a rise in the surface temperature of the Andaman Sea area, northwest of Indonesia, has devastated local coral populations. Marine biologists with the Wildlife Conservation Society, in an initial survey of the waters in May 2010, found that more than 60 percent of the coral had “bleached.” By August, survey by researchers from Australia’s James Cook University and Indonesia’s Syiah Kuala University showed 80 percent of those bleached corals had since died.

On the other hand, according to the *Financial* dated December 22, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS) are helping five Pacific countries manage their marine resources in the Coral Triangle. Often referred to as “the Amazon of the Seas,” the Coral Triangle contains vast marine resources critical for the economic and food security of an estimated 120 million people. These resources are at immediate risk from a range of factors, including the impacts of climate change, over-fishing, and unsustainable fishing methods.

Major Events in January 2011

Maritime Security: In January, there were 7 hijacking incidents caused by Somali pirates. And there were three unusual cases. Among them was an incident, in which the hijacked vessel was abandoned, but only the crew members were kidnapped. On the 13th, a cargo ship operated by the Danish shipping company, MV *Leopard* (2,000DWT), was attacked by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden off Oman. But in an unusual departure from normal practice, the pirates took the six crew members to a seized Taiwanese fishing vessel being operated as a mother-ship, abandoning the cargo ship.

As the second incident, on the afternoon of the 22nd, a German owned, general cargo vessel, the MV *Beluga Nomination* (9,775DWT), was boarded by pirates 390 nautical miles north of the Seychelles. Although the 12 crew members went into the safety section called “citadel” to take shelter over two days, they were eventually subdued by the pirates. German shipping company, Beluga Shipping GmbH, said in a statement, “Why, within 2-1/2 days during which the crew had hidden from the pirates in the citadel, could no external help be offered?” According to Beluga, a distress call was sent to the European Union's anti-piracy naval mission, but no help arrived. On the other hand, according to the EU NAVFOR, it should be stressed that the use of a citadel by crew members does not guarantee a military response.

As the third incident, there is an armed rescue of the hijacked vessel. On the morning of January 15, Somali pirates seized a Maltese flagged and South Korean owned vessel, the MV *Samho Jewelry* approximately 350 nautical miles South East of the port of Muscat, Oman. The product tanker has a crew of 21 (Myanmar, Korean and Indonesian). Chasing the MV *Samho Jewelry*, the South Korean navy commandos of the anti-piracy force stormed MT *Samho Jewelry* on the early morning of the 21st. All 21 crew members of the South Korean-owned *Samho Jewelry* were rescued, while eight of the pirates had been killed and five captured. Captain of the cargo vessel was injured.

Military Developments: Contributing an article titled “A One-Sided Arms Race: China’s military ambitions are boundless” to *The Weekly Standard* (Net edition) dated January 24 (Vol. 16, No. 18), Dan Blumenthal and Mike Mazza, researchers of the U.S. think tank - the American Enterprise Institute, mentioned in it that, against the Chinese expansion of the military power the United States should take the measures of strengthening the forward deployment fighting force instead of adopting the offshore strategy of pulling the bulk of U.S. forces back to Hawaii and Guam.

On the 25th, in Mumbai the Indian Navy held the commissioning ceremony for the INS *Deepak*, the first fleet tanker of the Indian navy. The *Deepak* is the first of two fleet tankers India ordered to be built in Italy. With a displacement at full load of 27,500 tons, the 175 meter long fleet tanker, with a beam of 25 meters and a height of 19, has two 10,000 kW diesel engines for propulsion and can reach a maximum speed of 20 knots. Further features include a propulsion

system with an adjustable propeller and a flight deck for medium-heavy helicopters up to 10 tons. Also, the vessel can supply four ships at the same time. The ship can accommodate 250 crew and personnel.

Maritime Boundaries: On 9th, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dip Moni said Bangladesh will submit its document to claim 400 nautical miles of territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal to the UN over its maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal disputed by neighboring India and Myanmar in February. The maritime dispute has, at times, led to the nations' navies conducting sometime provocative warship maneuvers in the contested area in the Bay of Bengali. There have also been flare-ups between Myanmar and Bangladesh over access to the region for oil and gas exploration.

Diplomacy and International Relations: John Hemmings, the coordinator and a research analyst for the International Security Studies department at the Royal United Services Institute in London, has contributed an article titled "China's Rise = Remilitarizing Japan?" to *The Diplomat* (a Tokyo-based Web journal). In the article the author is pointing out: (1) In the past ten years there have been the three trends that have dominated the region over the last decade: the growth of Chinese power, the relative decline of US power and the resulting remilitarization of Japanese power. These trends have the capacity of driving a cycle of mistrust and spiraling arms spending. And, since Japan's defense posture automatically includes the United States (which is obliged by treaty to come to Japan's defense), any potential conflict has all the ingredients for a 'great power war.' (2) Therefore, the future of Asia depends on Chinese leaders making sensible choices. At the same time, it will also depend on Japanese and American leaders offering China sensible options.

Harsh V. Pant, a professor of military research at London-based King's College, contributed an article titled "The India-Indonesia Alignment" to the U.S. daily newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated January 25. Regarding the promotion of cooperative relations between India and Indonesia, Pant is pointing out that, while China's rise is increasingly viewed in the region as a reason for suspicion and alarms, India's democratic government leads to greater transparency in its foreign-policy motives, which in turn makes it easier for partners to feel comfortable working with New Delhi.

Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors: According to a South Korean expert, the South Korean government has been looking to reform the country's defense industry in a more export-oriented fashion to nurture it into one of the largest in the world by 2020. Four South Korean government-designated naval shipbuilders composed of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC) and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding are expected to shoulder great responsibility.

Intelligence Assessment: In this monthly report, the OPRF has taken up the two annual reports on piracy and armed robbery issued respectively by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in

Asia (ReCAAP). On the 17th, the IMB released the annual report on the incidents of piracy and armed robberies against ships noted in the world in 2010. According to the report, the number of the incidents reported in the year 2010 was 445. Of them, 249 were actual attacks, which included 53 hijackings, and 196 boarding incidents. Of 196 attempted attacks, 107 were firing incidents and 89 were boarding incidents. The number of attacks in 2010 marked a high record following 469 attacks in 2000 which marked the highest record in the past ten years. It equals 445 attacks in 2003. The number of attacks has continued to rise in the recent four years.

On the other hand, the ReCAAP issued a report on the incidents of piracy and armed robberies against ship noted in Asia in the year 2010. According to the report, the number of the incidents reported in the year 2010 was 164 (101 in 2009). Of them, 133 (82 in 2009) were actual attacks and 31 (20 in 2009) were attempted cases. The incidents drastically increased in 2010 by 60 percent, compared to 2009. In particular, the incidents increased in the Arabian Sea, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the South China Sea, and Vietnam. The incidents in the Arabian Sea were carried out by Somali pirates, indicating that Somalia pirates have proceeded into the areas targeted by the ReCAAP.

1. Information Digest

1.1 Maritime Security

January 1 “Somali pirates seize Algerian owned-vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 1, 2011)

On the 1st, an Algerian-flagged and owned bulk carrier, the MV *Blida* (20,586DWT), was pirated by Somali pirates approximately 150 nautical miles South East of the port of Salalah, Oman. The vessel was seized on her way to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from Salalah in Oman. MV *Blida* has a crew of 27 - Algerian, Ukrainian and Filipino.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, an Algerian-flagged and owned bulk carrier, the MV *Blida* (20,586DWT), was pirated by Somali pirates approximately 150 nautical miles South East of the port of Salalah, Oman. The vessel was on her way to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from Salalah in Oman, carrying a cargo of Clinker. MV *Blida* has a crew of 27 - Algerian, Ukrainian and Filipino.

Refer to the article: MV BLIDA pirated in the Indian Ocean

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-blida-pirated-in-the-indian-ocean/>



MV *Blida*

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 1, 2011

January 2 “Malaysia steps up patrol off southern coast” (Winnipeg Free Press, January 4, 2011)

According to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Malaysia has stepped up patrols off southern coast, responding to the incidents in which a group of up to 10 men armed with knives and pistols have robbed crew aboard four ships off Johor state in the past week.

An outline of the article: According to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Malaysia has stepped up patrols off southern coast. This is a measure taken in response to the incidents in which a group of up to 10 men armed with knives and pistols have robbed crew aboard four ships off Johor state in the past week. Last year there were only seven cases of sea robbery between January and November in this maritime area. Therefore, the agency has increased its patrols and will send helicopters to monitor the area. According to the agency, the pirates are suspected to be Indonesians.

Refer to the article: Malaysia steps up patrols after increase of piracy off southern coast
<http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/world/breakingnews/malaysia-steps-up-patrols-after-increase-of-piracy-off-southern-coast-112916244.html>

January 6 “Maldives, India begin joint surveillance operations” (Haveeru Online, January 8, 2011)

According to Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF), Maldives has been conducting a joint surveillance operation with the Indian navy in the Maldivian Economic Zone since the 6th. Maldivian Coastguard vessels and an Indian Navy Dornier aircraft are participating in the operation.

An outline of the article: According to Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF), Maldives has been conducting a joint surveillance operation with the Indian navy in the Maldivian Economic Zone since the 6th. Maldivian Coastguard vessels and an Indian Navy Dornier aircraft are participating in the operation. According to MNDF, actions will be taken against those who commit illegal activities within the Maldivian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Maldivian Coastguard is also planning a joint surveillance operation with Sri Lankan Navy to eradicate piracy, drug trafficking and human smuggling.

Refer to the article: Maldives and India begin joint surveillance operation
<http://www.haveeru.com.mv/english/details/34149>

January 9 “Indian dhow hijacked by Somali pirates” (The Economic Times, January 12, 2011)

On the 9th, *Al Musa*, the dhow registered in Gujarat, was hijacked by Somali pirates, while sailing in the waters near Mangalore, India, about 800 nautical miles away from the Somali coast. The 14 Indian crew members on board were taken hostage.

An outline of the article: On the 9th, *Al Musa*, the dhow registered in Gujarat, was hijacked by Somali pirates, while sailing in the waters near Mangalore, India, about 800 nautical miles away from the Somali coast, with a cargo of vegetables. The 14 Indian crew members on board were taken hostage. As the hijacked dhows had been used as mother-ships by pirates, Directorate General of Shipping issued an advisory to the shipping companies in Gujarat not to take up contract work in the Gulf of Aden region in 2010.

Refer to the article: Indian cargo ship hijacked by Somali pirates off Oman
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/7268406.cms>

January 12-13 “Somali pirates hijack 2 vessels” (Shiptalk, January 16, 2011)

On the 12th - 13th, two chemical tankers were hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean. An outline of the article: On the 12th, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek-owned chemical tanker, MT *Nipayia* (9,000DWT), was seized by Somali pirates 450 nautical miles off Somalia. MT *Nipayia* has 19 crew members.

On the other hand, another Bahamian-flagged, Norwegian-owned chemical tanker, MT *Bow*

Asir (23,000DWT), was captured by Somali pirates 250 nautical miles off the Somali coast on the 13th. MT *Bow Asir* has 19 crew members including Norwegian captain. According to the Norwegian shipping company, it received a security alert from the ship on the morning of the 13th saying it was being chased by two small boats with suspected pirates. Sixteen minutes later, the ship's captain reported that pirates had boarded the vessel. Three hours later, the shipping company received an e-mail from the *Bow Asir* confirming that 16 to 18 pirates carrying machine guns had gained control. No reports of any injuries to the crews have been reported.

Refer to the article: Busy Week

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=7378>



MT *Bow Asir*

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=862537>



MT *Nipayia*

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=56347>

January 13 “Somali pirates kidnap crew but leave vessel” (AFP, January 13, 2011)

On the 13th, a cargo ship operated by the Danish shipping company, MV *Leopard* (2,000DWT), was attacked by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden off Oman. But in an unusual departure from normal practice, the pirates took the six crew members to a seized Taiwanese fishing vessel being operated as a mother-ship, abandoning the cargo ship. The *Leopard* was carrying cargo, believed to include weapons.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, a cargo ship operated by the Danish shipping company, MV *Leopard* (2,000DWT), was attacked by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden off Oman. But in an unusual departure from normal practice, the pirates took the six crew members -- two Danes including the captain, and four Filipinos -- to a seized Taiwanese fishing vessel being operated as a mother-ship, abandoning the cargo ship. The *Leopard* was carrying cargo, believed to include weapons. According to the *Leopard's* Danish operator, the vessel routinely carried nuclear items,

although none were believed to have been on board this vessel during the attack. The cargo ship had meanwhile been located and searched by the Turkish navy, but no trace of pirate skiffs had been found.

Refer to the article: Pirates kidnap Danish ship crew but leave vessel: report

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i6czPw0veYaRHXrrm4xB68q4WnKA?docId=CNG.2ae8d10289d05e80ecb077f1af8fa46d.cf1>



MV Leopard

Source: http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_E-QOnTGFX_o/TS_WxUad_NI/AAAAAAAAAKtc/Xzrh_oJNn5z4/s1600/Leopard.jpg

January 15 “Somali pirates hijack Maltese-flagged vessel (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 15, 2011)

On the morning of January 15, a Maltese flagged and South Korean owned vessel, the MV *Samho Jewelry* (19,6009DWT), was pirated approximately 350 nautical miles South East of the port of Muscat, Oman. The product tanker has a crew of 21 (Myanmar, Korean and Indonesian).

An outline of the article: On the morning of January 15, a Maltese flagged and South Korean owned vessel, the MV *Samho Jewelry* (19,6009DWT), was pirated approximately 350 nautical miles South East of the port of Muscat, Oman. Carrying chemicals, the product tanker has a crew of 21 (Myanmar, Korean and Indonesian).

Refer to the article: MV SAMHO JEWELRY pirated in the Indian Ocean

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-samho-jewelry-pirated-in-the-indian-ocean/>



MT Samho Jewelry

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 15, 2011

【Related Story 1】**“South Korean navy’ s anti-piracy commando rescues vessel hijacked by pirates”
(BBC News, January 21, 2011)**

According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, South Korean navy commandos of the anti-piracy force stormed MT *Samho Jewelry* on the early morning of the 21st. All 21 crew members of the South Korean-owned *Samho Jewelry* were rescued, while eight of the pirates had been killed and five captured. Captain of the cargo vessel was injured.

An outline of the article: According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, South Korean navy commandos of the anti-piracy force stormed MT *Samho Jewelry* on the early morning of the 21st. All 21 crew members of the South Korean-owned *Samho Jewelry* were rescued, while eight of the pirates had been killed and five captured. Captain of the cargo vessel was injured. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the *Samho Jewelry* was hijacked, the destroyer *Choi Young* (4,500 tons) of the anti-piracy force had been pursuing the ship for nearly a week. Before the rescue operation South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken advice from the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, and that the raid was carried out with support from a US destroyer and P3C aircraft. The Joint Chief of Staff stressed, “This operation demonstrated our government's strong will to never negotiate with pirates.”

Refer to the article: South Korea rescues *Samho Jewelry* crew from pirates

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12248096>



Navy commandos approached the 11,500-tonne *Samho Jewelry* in the early hours of the morning nearly a week after it was captured - there were fears the pirates were about to be joined by a mothership.

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12248735>



With back-up from a US warship in the area, South Korean commandos stormed the ship, rescuing all 21 crew members - the ship's captain was shot in the stomach but his injury was not life-threatening, said officials.

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12248735>

【Related Story 2】

“Somali pirates threaten to kill South Korean crews” (Chosun Ilbo, January 24, 2011)

On the 23rd, Somali pirates threatened to kill any South Korean sailors they take hostage in the future in revenge against the Korean Navy's rescue operation for Korean crews.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, Somali pirates threatened to kill any South Korean sailors they take hostage in the future in revenge against the Korean Navy's rescue operation for Korean crews. The pirate from Garad, one of the two pirate havens in Somalia, is reported to have told Reuter by phone: “We never planned to kill shipping crew. From now on, we shall never negotiate to take a ransom from Korean ships. We shall burn them and kill their crew.”

Refer to the article: Somali Pirates Threaten to Kill Korean Hostages

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/01/24/2011012400431.html

【Related Story 3】

“Captured Somali pirates to be prosecuted in South Korea” (The Chosun Ilbo, January 26, 2011)

Five Somali pirates captured by the Korean Navy are likely to be prosecuted in South Korea. On the 25th, Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan said, “I think it's only natural that we ourselves deal with the pirates who inflicted harm on our people and attacked our forces.” Article 6 of the Constitution of Korea allows foreigners who committed crimes against Koreans on foreign soil to be prosecuted in Korea.

An outline of the article: Five Somali pirates captured by the Korean Navy are likely to be prosecuted in South Korea. On the 25th, Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan said, “I think it's only

natural that we ourselves deal with the pirates who inflicted harm on our people and attacked our forces.” Asked whether the government is considering swapping the pirates for Korean hostages still held by Somali pirates, Kim said, “Our basic position is that we do not negotiate directly with pirates.” The government had considered transferring the pirates to a third country like Kenya or Oman for trial, but apparently neither wanted them. On the 25th, the South Korean Justice Ministry and the Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office have begun reviewing laws that could be used to charge the pirates. Prosecutors say there are no problems investigating them in Korea and prosecuting them according to Korean laws. Article 6 of the Constitution of Korea allows foreigners who committed crimes against Koreans on foreign soil to be prosecuted in Korea.

Refer to the article: Somali Pirates to Face Trial in Korea

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/01/26/2011012601207.html

January 16 “Somali pirates release Marshall Islands-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 20, 2011)

On the 16th, Somali pirates released a Marshall Islands flagged product tanker, MT *Motivator* approximately 160 nautical miles southwest of the island of Socotra. The vessel was pirated in the Southern Red Sea on July 4.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, Somali pirates released a Marshall Islands flagged product tanker, MT *Motivator* approximately 160 nautical miles southwest of the island of Socotra. The vessel, with a crew of 18 Filipino nationals, was pirated in the Southern Red Sea on July 4. (Note: The vessel had been used as the pirates' mother boat. Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, December 2010, 1.1 Maritime Security.)

Refer to the article: MV *Motivator* released from Pirate Control photos

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-motivator-released-from-pirate-control-photos/>

January 17 “Somali pirates hijack Greek vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 17, 2011)

In the early hours of the 17th, the Cypriot-flagged and Greek-owned bulk carrier MV *Eagle* (52,163DWT) was attacked and pirated by a single skiff, with Somali pirates onboard, in waters, approximately 490 nautical miles South of Salalah, Oman. The bulk carrier has a crew of 24 Filipinos.

An outline of the article: In the early hours of the 17th, the Cypriot-flagged and Greek-owned bulk carrier MV *Eagle* (52,163DWT) was attacked and pirated by a single skiff, with Somali pirates onboard, in waters, approximately 490 nautical miles South of Salalah, Oman. The pirates fired small arms and a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) before boarding the vessel. The MV *Eagle*, with a crew of 24 Filipinos, was on passage from Aqaba (Jordan) to Paradip (India).

Refer to the article: MV EAGLE pirated in the Somali Basin

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-eagle-pirated-in-the-somali-basin/>



MV Eagle

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 17, 2011

January 18 “Somali pirates hijack Mongol-flagged vessel” (Monster and Critics, January 21, 2011)

On the 18th, a Mongol-flagged and Vietnamese-owned bulk carrier, MV *Hoang Son Sun* (22,835DWT), was seized by Somali pirates about 520 nautical miles south-east of Oman's capital, Muscat. MV *Hoang Son Sun* has 24 crew members.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, a Mongol-flagged and Vietnamese-owned bulk carrier, MV *Hoang Son Sun* (22,835DWT), was seized by Somali pirates about 520 nautical miles south-east of Oman's capital, Muscat. The cargo ship, which was nearly 30 years old, was transporting feed for cattle for a Chinese company and was en route from Iran to China. MV *Hoang Son Sun* has 24 crew members.

Refer to the article: Vietnamese bulk carrier seized by Somali pirates

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1613458.php/Vietnamese-bulk-carrier-seized-by-Somali-pirates



MV Hoang Son Sun

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 20, 2011

January 20 “Thai navy’s ships home from anti-piracy mission” (The Bangkok Post, January 20, 2011)

Having completed the anti-piracy mission off Somalia, two Thai navy ships assigned to the international anti-piracy task force – the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* and the offshore

patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* arrived back home at the Sattahip naval base on the 20th.

An outline of the article: Having departed from the Gulf of Aden on the 4th after completing the anti-piracy mission off Somalia, two Thai navy ships assigned to the international anti-piracy task force – the logistics support vessel HTMS *Similan* and the offshore patrol vessel HTMS *Pattani* arrived back home at the Sattahip naval base on the 20th. The two ships left the home base on September 10, 2010 and ended their mission on Dec 31. In the ceremony for welcoming the crew the Thai navy chief said the navy is ready to send ships to the Gulf of Aden again if the government and private firms so wish.

Refer to the article: Thai ships home from piracy mission

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/217341/thai-ships-home-from-anti-piracy-mission>

January 20 “Somali pirates seize Togo-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 20, 2011)

On the 20th, Somali pirates hijacked a Togo-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Syrian shipping company, MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* (24,022DWT), in the North Arabian Sea approximately 330 nautical miles South East of the Omani coastal port of Salalah.

An outline of the article: On the 20th, Somali pirates hijacked a Togo-flagged bulk carrier owned by the Syrian shipping company, MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* (24,022DWT), in the North Arabian Sea approximately 330 nautical miles South East of the Omani coastal port of Salalah. The MV *Khaled Muhieddine K* has a crew of 25, comprising 22 Syrians and three Egyptians. The vessel was on passage from Singapore to Hudaydah, in Yemen.

Refer to the article: MV KHALED MUHIEDDINE K Pirated in the Arabian Sea

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-khaled-muhieddine-k-pirated-in-the-arabian-sea/>



MV Khaled Muhieddine K

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 20, 2011

January 20 “Malaysian navy commandoes subdue Somali pirates” (The Star, January 21, 2011)

On the 20th, Malaysian navy commandoes subdued seven Somali pirates that tried to board a Panamanian-flagged, Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) tanker, MT *Bunga Laurel* (1,9992DWT).

An outline of the article: On the 20th, Malaysian navy commandoes subdued seven Somali pirates that tried to board a Panamanian-flagged, Malaysian International Shipping Corporation

(MISC) tanker, MT *Bunga Laurel* (1,9992DWT). The Royal Malaysian Navy's frigate KD *Bunga Mas 5* was on a routine escort mission of MT *Bunga Laurel* out of the dangerous gulf waters en route to Singapore. But hours out of the danger zone, when the RMN would cease their escort, the Somali pirates armed with assault rifles and machine guns struck MT *Bunga Laurel*. At this time, KD *Bunga Mas 5*, which was about 30km away, reacted immediately by dispatching a helicopter with commandoes on board to the scene. The commandoes boarded the tanker and subdued the pirates. The 23 Malaysian crew members were safe. At least three pirates were injured in the shoot out with the commandoes.

Refer to the article: Malaysian navy thwarts Somali pirate attack on MISC tanker

<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/1/21/nation/20110121190603&sec=nation>



This picture taken on January 21 and released courtesy of the Royal Malaysian Navy shows Somalian pirates being guarded by Malaysian naval commandos following a firefight to free a hijacked oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. Malaysian naval commandos rescued 23 crew and captured seven pirates.

Source: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_E-QOnTGFX_o/TTr7GonuBBI/AAAAAAAAKvc/JfL8yVoIPa0/s1600/more+Somalis+on+deck.jpg

January 22 “Somali pirates seize German vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 25, and iol, January 26, 2011)


On the afternoon of the 22nd, an Antigua and Barbuda-flagged, German owned, general cargo vessel, the MV *Beluga Nomination* (9,775DWT), was attacked by a skiff, with an unknown number of suspected pirates on board while being on passage to Port Victoria in the Seychelles 390 nautical miles north of the Seychelles. When the pirates boarded the vessel, the 12 crew members (one Polish, seven Filipinos, two Russians and two Ukrainians) went into a citadel. Although the crew took shelter in the citadel over two days, they were eventually subdued by the pirates. German shipping company, Beluga Shipping GmbH, said in a statement, “Why, within 2-1/2 days during which the crew had hidden from the pirates in the citadel, could no external

help be offered?” According to Beluga, a distress call was sent to the European Union's anti-piracy naval mission, but no help arrived.

An outline of the article: On the afternoon of the 22nd, an Antigua and Barbuda-flagged, German owned, general cargo vessel, the MV *Beluga Nomination* (9,775DWT), was attacked by a skiff, with an unknown number of suspected pirates on board while being on passage to Port Victoria in the Seychelles 390 nautical miles north of the Seychelles. When the pirates boarded the vessel, the 12 crew members (one Polish, seven Filipinos, two Russians and two Ukrainians) went into a citadel. As to the situation of the ship thereafter, the Ukrainian foreign ministry confirmed on the 24th that the vessel had been hijacked by Somali pirates. Although the crew took shelter in the citadel over two days, they were eventually subdued by the pirates. German shipping company, Beluga Shipping GmbH, said in a statement, “Why, within 2-1/2 days during which the crew had hidden from the pirates in the citadel, could no external help be offered?” According to Beluga, a distress call was sent to the European Union's anti-piracy naval mission, but no help arrived. When the *Beluga Nomination* was attacked, the nearest EU NAVFOR warship at the time of the attack was over 1000 nm away from the scene. In addition, the arrival of Seychelles coast guard at the scene was hindered by bad weather. According to the EU NAVFOR, it should be stressed that the use of a citadel by crew members does not guarantee a military response.

Refer to the article: MV BELUGA NOMINATION pirated in the Indian Ocean

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/mv-beluga-nomination-pirated-in-the-indian-ocean/>



MV *Beluga Nomination*'s wake

Source: Spiegel Online, February 1, 2011



MV Beluga Nomination

Source: BBC News, February 1, 2011

January 24 “South Korean Samsung Heavy Industries develops remote-controlled anti-piracy water cannon” (Marine Log, January 24, 2011)

South Korean Samsung Heavy Industries has recently developed an integrated anti-piracy system. It includes a surveillance system to analyze the speed and movement of suspected pirate craft, track them and raise an alarm as well as an apparatus capable of handling remotely controlled and operated water cannons if the suspect vessel does not divert.

An outline of the article: South Korea’s Samsung Heavy Industries has recently developed an integrated anti-piracy system. It includes a surveillance system to analyze the speed and movement of suspected pirate craft, track them and raise an alarm as well as an apparatus capable of handling remotely controlled and operated water cannons if the suspect vessel does not divert. The water cannon have a range of 70 m and a water pressure of 10 bars. They are controlled via CCTV, so that crews are not on deck exposed to pirate gun fire. The system has been developed in conjunction with Hanjin Shipping and Korea's Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs.

Refer to the article: Samsung Heavy Industries develops antipiracy system

http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=403:2011jan002401&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=107



Source: Marin log, January 24, 2011

January 28 “Indian Navy fires to sink Thai fishing boat used as Somali pirate mother-ship” (Mumbai Monitor, January 30, 2011)

According to an announcement of the Indian Navy, having exchanged fire with Somali pirates who were on board the Thai fishing boat FV *Prantalay* which the pirates had hijacked 300 nautical miles off Lakshadweep islands in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard put the boat engulfed in flames, apprehended 15 pirates, and rescued 20 Thai and Burmese fishermen on the 28th. FV *Prantalay* is one of three Thai fishing boats -- FV *Prantalay 11*, FV *Prantalay 12*, and FV *Prantalay 14*, which had been hijacked on April 18, 2010 and used as the “mother -ship” of the Somali pirates.

An outline of the article: According to an announcement of the Indian Navy, on the 28th, having exchanged fire with Somali pirates who were on board the Thai fishing boat FV *Prantalay* which the pirates had hijacked 300 nautical miles off Lakshadweep islands in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard put the boat engulfed in flames, apprehended 15 pirates, and rescued 20 Thai and Burmese fishermen. According the announcement, upon receipt of a rescue signal form a Bahamian-flagged vessel, a coast guard patrol airplane found two skiffs were trying to attack the fishing boat. Seeing the patrol aircraft, the pirates aborted their attempt and dashed toward the mother-ship (*Prantalay*). Hurriedly hoisting the two skiffs onboard, the mother-ship attempted to escape from the area. The Navy’s high speed boat, INS *Cankarso*, first fired a warning shot to compel the mother-ship stop. However, pirates onboard the FV *Prantalay* opened fire at INS *Cankarso*. INS *Cankarso* returned limited fire in self-defense. As a result, FV *Prantalay* was put into flames and pirates and fishermen were seen jumping overboard. FV *Prantalay* is one of three Thai fishing boats -- FV *Prantalay 11*, FV *Prantalay 12*, and FV *Prantalay 14*, which had been hijacked on April 18, 2010 and used as the “mother-ship” of the Somali pirates.

Refer to the article: Indian Navy rescues 20 fishermen abducted by Somali pirates

<http://www.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx?page=article§id=3&contentid=2011013020110130040925530c10454ad>



Prantalay, the mother ship the pirates, towing the skiffs prior to hoisting them onboard

Source: Mumbai Monitor, January 30, 2011

January 28 “Somali pirates release Taiwanese fishing boat” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 28, 2011)

There are indications that the Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel *Tai Juan 227* has been released from Somali pirate control on the 28th. The vessel was attacked and hijacked by Somali pirates on May 6, 2010 while operating 700 nautical miles northeast of The Seychelles. Since then, the FV *Tai Juan 227* had been used as a pirate mother-ship.

An outline of the article: According to an announcement of the EU NAVFOR, there are indications that the Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel *Tai Juan 227* has been released from Somali pirate control. The vessel was attacked and hijacked by Somali pirates on May 6, 2010 while operating 700 nautical miles northeast of The Seychelles. The fishing vessel has 28 crew-members. Exact details of the release are unknown. But until 3 days ago, the FV *Tai Juan 227* had been used as a pirate mother-ship.

Refer to the article: FV TAI YUAN 227 Released from Pirate Control

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/01/fv-tai-yuan-227-released-from-pirate-control/>



FV Tai Yuan 227

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, January 28, 2011

1.2 Military Developments

1.2 January 7 “Brunei accepts 2 offshore patrol vessels” (Free Republic.com, January 8, 2011)

According to the Brunei’s defense ministry, the Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) accepted two new Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) bearing the names KDB *Darussalam* and KDB *Darulehsan* on the 7th. Built at the Lurssen Shipyard in Germany, the two OPVs were delivered to the RBN. Two OPVs are expected to arrive in Brunei in May, after leaving Germany in March.

An outline of the article: According to the Brunei’s defense ministry, the Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) accepted two new Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) bearing the names KDB *Darussalam* and KDB *Darulehsan* on the 7th. Built at the Lurssen Shipyard in Germany, the two OPSs were delivered to the RBN. Additionally, the third Darussalam class OPV - KDB *Darulaman* - was launched in the same shipyard on the 6th, which is planned delivery in August this year. Measuring 80 meters in length and 13 meters wide, the OPVs are diesel-powered and were designed and built for a 21-day patrolling endurance. The ship also comes equipped with Exocet MM40 anti-ship missiles and a Bofors 57mm gun. Two OPVs are expected to arrive in Brunei in May, after leaving Germany in March.

Refer to the article: MinDef accepts 2 Darussalam-class offshore patrol vessels

<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2653421/posts>



Darussalam class OPV

Source: Free Republic.com, January 8, 2011

January 23 “Philippine Navy eyeing to purchase US coast guard” (The China Post, January 24, 2011)

On the 23rd, the Philippine Navy chief Rear Admiral Alexander Pama said the Philippine Navy was in talks with the United States government to buy a secondhand coast guard cutter of the *Hamilton* class to upgrade its ageing fleet. The *Hamilton* class cutters are the biggest vessels used by the U.S. coast guard, with the exception of heavy ice breakers. The vessel is expected to arrive in Manila in the first half of 2011, replacing the navy’s current flagship.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, the Philippine Navy chief Rear Admiral Alexander

Pama said the Philippine Navy was in talks with the United States government to buy a secondhand coast guard cutter of the *Hamilton* class to upgrade its ageing fleet. The 115-meter *Hamilton* class cutters are the biggest vessels used by the U.S. coast guard, with the exception of heavy ice breakers. The vessel is expected to arrive in Manila in the first half of 2011, replacing the navy's flagship BPR *Paja Humabon*, a *Cannor*-class destroyer escort, which is regarded as probably the world's oldest warship. Although Pama described the cutter as the first of several being planned, he did not disclose exact figures for the purchase.

Refer to the article: Philippine Navy eyeing coast guard boat purchase from US

<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/philippines/2011/01/24/288870/Philippine-Navy.htm>

【Related Story】

“U.S. government pledges to help strengthen Philippine navy” (Defense News, AFP, January 27, 2011)

On the 27th, the U.S. government said it would help boost the Philippines' capacity to patrol its waters as part of a larger strategic goal of keeping vital Asian sea lanes open as well as opposing the rise of China.

An outline of the article: On the 27th, the U.S. government said it would help boost the Philippines' capacity to patrol its waters as part of a larger strategic goal of keeping vital Asian sea lanes open as well as opposing the rise of China.

In a security dialogue with the Philippines held in Manila, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said, “One of the objectives in this dialogue is to discuss the bilateral steps that we can take to increase the Philippines' maritime capacity. We think this is a critical component of our partnership. Much of this work is already underway and we seek to intensify it in the months and years ahead. The South China Sea is an important area, and its importance will be growing further in the future.”

Refer to the article: US pledges help for Philippine navy

<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=AME&s=TOP&i=5555729>

January 24 “U.S. experts: U.S. should oppose China’s one-sided military expansion” (The Weekly Standard, January 24, 2011)

Contributing an article titled “A One-Sided Arms Race: China’s military ambitions are boundless” to *The Weekly Standard* (Net edition) dated January 24 (Vol. 16, No. 18), Dan Blumenthal and Mike Mazza, researchers of the U.S. think tank - the American Enterprise Institute, mentioned in it that, against the Chinese expansion of the military power the United States should take the measures of strengthening the forward deployment fighting force instead of adopting the offshore strategy of pulling the bulk of U.S. forces back to Hawaii and Guam.

An outline of the article: Contributing an article titled “A One-Sided Arms Race: China’s military ambitions are boundless” to *The Weekly Standard* (Net Edition) dated January 24 (Vol. 16, No. 18), Dan Blumenthal and Mike Mazza, researchers of the U.S. think tank - the American Enterprise Institute, mentioned in it that, against the Chinese expansion of the military power

the United States should take the measures of strengthening the forward deployment fighting force instead of adopting the offshore strategy of pulling the bulk of U.S. forces back to Hawaii and Guam. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) The contours of the strategy driving China's military buildup are clear enough to allow for a serious U.S. response. First, China is pursuing the ability to coerce and intimidate countries along what it calls the "first island chain." This geographic area includes such stalwart U.S. allies and friends as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Second, China is seeking more control over what it calls the "near seas," which include the waters closest to its coasts—the Yellow, East China, and South China seas. Third, it is looking to project power into the Indian Ocean to protect the large volume of maritime trade that flows from the Persian Gulf to Shanghai. Therefore, China is developing a layered military capability, the core of which is the missile force.
- (2) Many U.S. analysts use the confusing term "anti-access" to describe China's strategy, which makes it sound purely defensive. Yes, China wants to deny U.S. access to Asian airspace and waters. But in doing so the Chinese military will itself gain the maneuver space to control the sea and air closer to the mainland and begin to project power farther from its shores.
- (3) While China's strategy is beginning to take shape, a serious U.S. response is not on the horizon. Instead we are hollowing out our air, naval, and marine forces at a time when we should be reinforcing and modernizing them, so as to reassure allies that we will maintain the capability to deter Chinese aggression and defeat Chinese forces should they attack. Washington needs to resist the temptation, made stronger by the Chinese ability to attack our forward deployed forces, to adopt an offshore defense strategy. Pulling the bulk of our forces back to Hawaii, Guam, or other Pacific islands would be a mistake. Such an approach would encourage a nuclear arms race in Asia and weaken our alliances. We need forward bases and the forward-deployed force around China.
- (4) With these principles in mind, the Pentagon could take the following steps to redress a balance of power now tilting toward Beijing:
 - (a) Hardening, dispersal, and diversification of bases are necessary to negate China's missile threat. The secretaries of state and defense should also launch efforts to find more nations to host bases and naval facilities.
 - (b) We should revive the F-22 line to export to Japan, South Korea, and Australia and deploy its fleet to hardened, forward bases. Also, the short-takeoff and vertical landing variant of the F-35 and F-35B are exactly the aircraft most needed as a response to China's missile force.
 - (c) The next-generation bomber program should be accelerated and be deployed as early as possible.
 - (d) More attack submarines and renewed emphases on anti-submarine warfare and offensive mining are needed.
 - (e) We need to establish a regional security headquarters that can coordinate coalition operations. Many of our allies have very capable militaries, but they lack collective training, collective planning, and an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system. By

connecting a network of allies with U.S. ISR platforms through a regional headquarters, the ability to watch China at all times and from all angles will be promoted, which will immeasurably enhance deterrence.

- (f) As for commitment to the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps is essential for maintaining a military edge over China as well as playing an integral role in most Asian-Pacific conflict scenario.
- (5) China's military modernization program is destabilizing the region. It's time we woke up to that fact.

Refer to the article: A One-Sided Arms Race: China's military ambitions are boundless.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/one-sided-arms-race_533699.html

January 25 "Indian navy commissions fleet tanker" (Defence Talk, January 25, 2011)

On the 25th, in Mumbai there was the commissioning ceremony for the INS *Deepak*, the first fleet tanker of the Indian navy. The *Deepak* is the first of two fleet tankers India ordered to be built in Italy. With a displacement at full load of 27,500 tons, the 175 meter long fleet tanker, with a beam of 25 meters and a height of 19, has two 10,00 kW diesel engines for propulsion and can reach a maximum speed of 20 knots. Further features include a propulsion system with an adjustable propeller and a flight deck for medium-heavy helicopters up to 10 tons. Also, the vessel can supply four ships at the same time. The ship can accommodate 250 crew and personnel.

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Refer to the article: First Fleet Tanker for the Indian Navy Delivered In Mumbai

<http://www.defencetalk.com/first-fleet-tanker-for-the-indian-navy-delivered-in-mumbai-31551/>



INS *Deepak*

Source: Defence Talk, January 25, 2011

1.3 Maritime Boundaries

January 9 “Bangladesh to submit its claim over maritime boundary in Bay of Bengal” (Shiptalk, January 10, 2011)

Bangladesh will submit its document to claim 400 nautical miles of territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal to the UN over its maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal disputed by neighboring India and Myanmar in February, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said on the 9th.

An outline of the article: Bangladesh will submit its document to claim 400 nautical miles of territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal to the UN over its maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal disputed by neighboring India and Myanmar in February, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said on the 9th. New Delhi and Yangon already submitted their claims to the UN last year. Regarding the submission of its document, Bangladesh is arguing its claim based on its population, economic status and needs, while India and Myanmar are relying on arguments based on geometric calculations. The maritime dispute has, at times, led to the nations’ navies conducting sometime provocative warship maneuvers in the contested area in the Bay of Bengali. There have also been flare-ups between Myanmar and Bangladesh over access to the region for oil and gas exploration.

Refer to the article: Sea Grab

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=7290>

1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

January 7 “Two ports display Chinese-Indian rivalry” (YaleGlobal, January 7, 2011)

Christophe Jaffrelot, a senior research fellow with the French Center for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po/CNRS, has contributed an article titled ‘Gwadar and Chabahar display

Chinese-Indian rivalry in the Arabian Sea' to the YaleGlobal (Net edition) dated January 7. In the article, Jaffrelot mentions that a geo-strategic contest between China and India has been building in the Arabian Sea over two ports of Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran.

An outline of the article: Christophe Jaffrelot, a senior research fellow with the French Center for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po/CNRS, has contributed an article titled 'Gwadar and Chabahar display Chinese-Indian rivalry in the Arabian Sea' to the YaleGlobal (Net edition) dated January 7. In the article, Jaffrelot mentions that a geo-strategic contest between China and India has been building in the Arabian Sea over two ports of Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) Quietly, out of sight, a contest has been building in the Arabian Sea centered between two ports, one based in Pakistan and the other in Iran. The first is backed by China, the second by India.
- (2) India feels encircled by the trends over Gwadar. In his recent book on the Indian Ocean (Note: *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and The Future of American Power* issued in October 2020), journalist Robert Kaplan writes that "the Indians' answer to Sino-Pakistani cooperation at Gwadar was a giant new \$8 billion naval base at Karwar, south of Goa on India's Arabian coast, the first phase of which opened in 2005." In addition, in 2002 India helped Iran to develop the port of Chabahar, located 72 kilometers west of Gwadar, soon after China began work at Gwadar. Chabahar should provide India with access to Afghanistan via the Indian Ocean. Iran, India and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan, preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar.
- (3) Gwadar is located on the Gulf of Oman, close to the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Until 1958 it belonged to Oman. At first, Pakistan sought US help to construct a new port at Gwadar, and reportedly offered the US Navy use of the facility in vain. Consequently, Pakistan turned to China for help. Work started in 2002, and China has invested \$200 million, dispatching 450 personnel for the first phase of the job completed in 2006. The Port of Singapore Authority was selected to manage Gwadar in 2007. But it did not invest much money, and Pakistan decided to transfer port management to another institution, not yet selected but which will probably be Chinese.
- (4) Pakistan and China contemplate developing the Karakorum Highway to connect China's Xinjiang and Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan. But the Karakorum Highway, the highest point of which passes at 4,693 meters, can open between May and December. It's also vulnerable to landslides, so large trucks may not use it easily. Pakistan and China also discussed building a 3,000-kilometer rail line between Kashgar and Gwadar, during Pakistani President's July 2010 visit with Chinese President in Beijing. The cost would be enormous, but China persists.
- (5) Gwadar, at least, will provide Beijing with, first, a listening post from where the Chinese may exert surveillance on hyper-strategic sea links as well as military activities of the Indian and American navies in the region, and second, dual-use civilian-military facilities providing a base for Chinese ships and submarines. For the Indians, this is a direct threat.

- (6) India responded by helping Iran with the port of Chabahar. Work on the Chabahar-Milak-Zaranj-Dilaram route from Iran to Afghanistan is in progress. India has already built the 213-kilometer Zaranj-Dilaram road in Afghanistan’s Nimroz province and helps Iran to upgrade the Chabahar-Milak railroad.
- (7) However, this Indo-Iranian project is bound to suffer from two problems: First, politically, Afghanistan is unstable and may not oblige Iran and India if the Taliban or any Pakistan-supported government is restored. Chabahar is also part of one of Iran’s most volatile regions where anti-regime Sunni insurgents have launched repeated attacks. Secondly, the work is far behind schedule. In July 2010, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister said the port was functional, but has a capacity of only 2.5 million tons per year, whereas the target was 12 million tons. Additionally, in providing assistance to developing this port, New Delhi must factor in US policy toward Iran. How far the Indo-Iranian rapprochement is compatible with the growing Indo-American alliance remains to be seen. The US and India may agree on the need to counter growing Chinese influence in Gwadar, but may also disagree on the policy India wants to pursue by joining hands with Iran. Iran itself may not want to take any risk at alienating China, a country which has supported Tehran, including its nuclear policy, until recently.

Refer to the article: Gwadar and Chabahar display Chinese-Indian rivalry in the Arabian Sea
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports>



Gwadar



Chabahar

Source: <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/sites/default/files/images/2011/01/gwadarMapBIG.jpg>

January 21 “British specialist: Will China’s rise bring about remilitarization of Japan?” (The Diplomat, January 21, 2010)

John Hemmings, the coordinator and a research analyst for the International Security Studies department at the Royal United Services Institute in London, has contributed an article titled “China’s Rise = Remilitarizing Japan?” to *The Diplomat* (a Tokyo-based Web journal). In the article the author is pointing out: (1) In the past ten years there have been the three trends that have dominated the region over the last decade: the growth of Chinese power, the relative decline of US power and the resulting remilitarization of Japanese power. These trends have the capacity of driving a cycle of mistrust and spiraling arms spending. And, since Japan’s defense posture automatically includes the United States (which is obliged by treaty to come to Japan’s defense), any potential conflict has all the ingredients for a ‘great power war.’ (2) Therefore, the future of Asia depends on Chinese leaders making sensible choices. At the same time, it will also depend on Japanese and American leaders offering China sensible options.

An outline of the article: John Hemmings, the coordinator and a research analyst for the International Security Studies department at the Royal United Services Institute in London, has contributed an article titled “China’s Rise = Remilitarizing Japan?” to *The Diplomat* (a Tokyo-based Web journal). In the article the author says: In the past ten years there have been the three trends that have dominated the region over the last decade: the growth of Chinese power, the relative decline of US power and the resulting remilitarization of Japanese power. These trends have the capacity of driving a cycle of mistrust and spiraling arms spending. And, since Japan’s defense posture automatically includes the United States (which is obliged by treaty to come to Japan’s defense), any potential conflict has all the ingredients for a ‘great power war.’ The gist of his article is as follows:

- (1) Back in 1985, there was a significant shift in Chinese naval strategy, from one of defending Chinese coastlines to one of meeting threats at sea, called Offshore Defense. It’s arguably this policy that has had the biggest influence on strategic thinking in the region, both as an expression of growing Chinese power and as a cause of friction with the United States and other Asian states. In addition, coming three years after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea had internationalized sea resource and maritime territorial issues, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) doctrine of ‘Offshore Defense’ conceived of two island chains forming geographic defense barriers to any attacking opponent. These are called the first and second island chains.
- (2) So how will traditional rival Japan respond? For nearly two decades, Japan’s remilitarization has piggy-backed on North Korean bellicosity and the desire to be a more ‘normal’ country — an equal partner to the United States. But as the ‘unipolar moment’ of dominant US power has receded, Japan has begun to realize that it must be able to defend its interests in the same way that other normal states do, namely with economic and military hard power. While the new defense guidelines don’t alter Japan’s pacifist constitution, there are signs that some of the walls are coming down. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan came very close to giving in to Japanese Ministry of Defense pressure to overturn the Three Principles Ban on

Weapons Export.

- (3) China is, above all, responsible for developing a power-projection capability and for using it for short-term gain. While China's point of view that this is no more, no less than previous rising powers have sought is understandable, such thinking, planning and acting is more characteristic of 19th century powers than of those in the 21st century. And the results of all this are already clear. Further Chinese militarization will be met with further Japanese militarization — and thus begins a dangerous cycle. By focusing on Japan's past rather than a mutually beneficial future, and by embracing the worst elements of nationalism, Chinese leaders have sought to displace questions over legitimacy and internal political reform.
- (4) Japan and the United States, for their part, view China as a potential partner and as a major player at the table of nations, and so must act on this positive side of the relationship. But there are questions the US will have to answer as well. After all, it has dominated Asia for nearly 60 years, and will seek to maintain its role in the region for the foreseeable future. The question, then, is how much is the United States willing to let China carve out a role for itself in the region, and how much is China willing to allow the US to share? The future of Asia depends on Chinese leaders making sensible choices. At the same time, it will also depend on Japanese and American leaders offering China sensible options.

Refer to the article: China's Rise = Remilitarizing Japan?

<http://the-diplomat.com/2011/01/21/chinas-rise-remilitarizing-japan/>

January 25 “Indonesia, India agree to promote ties” (The Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2011)

Harsh V. Pant, a professor of military research at London-based King's College, contributed an article titled “The India-Indonesia Alignment” to the U.S. daily newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated January 25. Regarding the promotion of cooperative relations between India and Indonesia, Pant is pointing out that, while China's rise is increasingly viewed in the region as a reason for suspicion and alarms, India's democratic government leads to greater transparency in its foreign-policy motives, which in turn makes it easier for partners to feel comfortable working with New Delhi.

An outline of the article: Harsh V. Pant, a professor of military research at London-based King's College, contributed an article titled “The India-Indonesia Alignment” to the U.S. daily newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* dated January 25. In the article Pant says that the promotion of cooperative relations between India and Indonesia, which is symbolized by a visit of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to India on January 26, not only marks a new step in “Look East” policy of the Indian government but also signals two large democracies growing closer as authoritarian China grows more menacing. Based on this assumption, Pant is pointing several implications of cooperative relations between the two nations. The gist of his report is as follows:

- (1) Promotion of such cooperative relations between the two nations is a natural result of geography. Indonesia's location, combined with its naval forces, allow it to work effectively

with India to ensure security in the sea lanes of communication between Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Together they control the entry point from the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean to the Straits of Malacca.

- (2) Similarities in democratic governing systems and broad foreign-policy outlooks have helped dramatically: Viewing India's maritime presence as benign, Indonesia has openly invited India to help littoral states in the region maintain the Straits' security.
- (3) All of this is significant, because it stands in stark contrast to China's approach to its waters, which has more often than not deteriorated to outright aggression. Unlike China's rise, which is increasingly viewed in the region as a reason for suspicion and alarm, India's poses no such threats. While it is large, its democratic governance leads to greater transparency in its foreign-policy motives, which in turn makes it easier for partners to feel comfortable working with New Delhi. Cooperative relations with Indonesia offer a clear example of what a greater role for India in Southeast Asia would look like, and as such gives other countries in the region little cause for concern.
- (4) New Delhi's ambitious policy in East and Southeast Asia is aimed at significantly increasing its regional profile. Smaller states in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China's growing influence, while larger states also see it as an attractive engine for regional growth. It remains to be seen if India can indeed live up to its full potential, as well as to the region's expectations. But with the wooing of Indonesia, India is signaling that it is indeed serious about its presence in Southeast Asia.

Refer to the article: The India-Indonesia Alignment

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703398504576101024293509588.html>

1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

January 4 "ACP: Panama Canal expects traffic to rise in 2011" (Dredging Today, January 4, 2011)

The Panama Canal Authority (ACP) estimates that 305 million tons of cargo will transit the canal during the 2011 fiscal year, an estimated four million ton increase from last year. In addition, when the Panama Canal expansion project is completed in 2014, the canal will be able to carry vessels with a capacity of 12,600TEU.

An outline of the article: The Panama Canal Authority (ACP) says it expects vessel traffic to rise in 2011. The Panama Canal expansion project will be completed in 2014. Currently, the canal is able to carry vessels of up to 5,000TEU and once new locks are fitted, the canal will be able to carry vessels with a capacity of 12,600TEU. ACP estimates that 305 million tons of cargo will transit the canal during the 2011 fiscal year, an estimated four million ton increase from last year. The Panama Canal moved approximately 4.4 million TEU per year on average and is expected to handle eight million containers by 2015.

Refer to the article: Panama Canal Expects Traffic to Rise in 2011

<http://www.dredgingtoday.com/2011/01/04/panama-canal-expects-traffic-to-rise-in-2011/>

January 5 “SK expert: SK naval shipbuilders oriented to exports” (World Politics Review, January 5, 2011)

According to a South Korean expert, the South Korean government has been looking to reform the country's defense industry in a more export-oriented fashion to nurture it into one of the largest in the world by 2020. Four South Korean government-designated naval shipbuilders are composed of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC) and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding. Having constructed some of the world's most sophisticated naval vessels, these builders are expected to shoulder great responsibility.

An outline of the article: In an e-mail interview with the World Politics Review (an online information service), Mingi Hyun, research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), discussed South Korea's naval shipbuilding sector has a stronger orientation to exporting the vessels. The gist of the fellow's opinions is as follows:

- (1) South Korean naval vessels are being constructed by four South Korean government-designated naval shipbuilders which are composed of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC), and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding. These ship builders have constructed some of the most sophisticated vessels, such as the KDX-3 Aegis destroyers, Type 214 submarines, and the LPX amphibious vessels among others. These shipbuilders possess great potential to become the strong export industry, largely due to the financial value of individual ships which can range from \$100 million to over \$1 billion per ship. The Korean government has been looking to reform the country's defense industry in a more export-oriented fashion to nurture it into one of the largest in the world by 2020. Therefore, great responsibility rests on the shoulders of the naval shipbuilders.
- (2) Korean shipbuilders have worked extensively with a number of American and European system houses that supply missiles, radar systems and combat-management systems. While these relationships have been oriented to the domestic market, some of them have already been shifting their focus toward the export market. A few years ago, HHI formed a partnership with Lockheed Martin to export HHI destroyer hulls equipped with a scaled-down Lockheed Martin Aegis weapon system, a ship type that may appeal to aspiring medium-power navies in Asia and South America. Korea's greatest competition in the naval export market is mostly in Europe. European shipbuilders also possess the world's most advanced naval-ship-design capabilities.

Refer to the article: Global Insider: South Korea Naval Shipbuilding

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/7472/global-insider-south-korea-naval-shipbuilding>

January 7 “China to build oil wharf in western Burma (Irrawaddy, January 12, 2011)

On the 7th, China's Qingdao Port (Group) Co. Ltd. signed an agreement with the Southeast Asia Pipeline Co., Ltd. under China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to build and operate a wharf in the Arakan coastal town of Kyaukphyu on Burma's western coastline.

An outline of the article: On the 7th, China's Qingdao Port (Group) Co. Ltd. signed an agreement with the Southeast Asia Pipeline Co., Ltd. under China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to build and operate a wharf in the Arakan coastal town of Kyaukphyu on Burma's western coastline. China will send its crude oil brought from Africa and the Middle East from this wharf to Yunnan Province via an inland pipeline. An industry analyst at China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) said, “This agreement is very important for Qingdao Port because this is the first time the port will extend its management expertise overseas.” Within Burma, the CNPC has been building a 793 km-long gas pipeline and a 771 km-long crude pipeline since March 2010. China has already invested heavily in Kyauk Phyu deep seaport project in Arakan State.

Refer to the article: China to Operate Oil Wharf in Burma

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20512

January 9 “Suez Canal’s revenues in 2010 increase 109% compared to 2009” (Shiptalk, January 9, 2011)

According to the Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal’s revenues amounted during 2010 to US\$ 4.773 billion, say an increase of 10.09% compared to 2009.

An outline of the article: According to the Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal’s revenues amounted during 2010 to US\$ 4.773 billion, say an increase of 10.09% compared to 2009. The rise is attributed for the recovery in the global economy which led to the improvement in the trade traffic through the channel. In addition, the 30% decline in the number of piracy attempts in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast during 2010 helped the higher revenues of the Canal.

Refer to the article: Canal Cash

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=7284>

2. Intelligence Assessment

2.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the year 2010 (1 January – 31 December 2010): From IMB Annual Report

On January 18, 2011, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) published a report through the Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) based in Kuala Lumpur on the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships noted in the world in year 2010 (January 1–December 31, 2010). Below is a summary of the characteristics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships viewed from the IMB report (hereinafter referred to as the Report) noted in the year 2010.

Regarding the definition of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, the IMB accepts the “definition of piracy” in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As for the armed robbery, the IMB accepts the definition of the “Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its Assembly session in November 2001.

(In view of circumstances for the descriptions, related Tables and Charts were carried en bloc at the end of the report.)

1. Characteristics viewed from numbers and locations of the incidents (including attempted attacks)

The number of the incidents reported in the year 2010 was 445. Of them, 249 were actual attacks. Of them, 53 were hijackings, and 196 incidents were boarding. There were 196 attempted attacks. Of them, 107 cases were firing and 89 incidents were attempted boarding. However, the IMB is regarding there are a great number of the unreported cases apart from the reported cases, advising the shipping owners and masters of the ships to report all piratical attacks and suspicious movements of the crafts to the bureau.

The number of attacks in 2010 marked a high record following 469 attacks in 2000 which marked the highest record in the past ten years. It equals 445 attacks in 2003. Compared with 293 attacks in 2008, it marked a drastic increase. Even if the number in 2010 is compared with 410 attacks in 2009, it marked an increase by nearly 10 percent. The number of attacks has continued to rise in the recent four years.

Looking at 445 attacks in 2010 from the areas where the attacks were noted, 330 attacks, which equal nearly 75 percent of a total of attacks, have occurred in the seven areas as follows: 25 attacks in the Red Sea, 53 attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 139 attacks off Somalia, 19 attacks in Nigeria, 23 attacks in Bangladesh, 40 attacks in Indonesia, and 31 attacks in the South China Sea.

As shown in Table 1, the number of attacks by Somali pirates marked 219 cases, occupying

nearly half of the total. Also, in 2009, there were 217 attacks, occupying over one half of the total. Abnormality of attacks by Somali pirates continues to be conspicuous. Furthermore, the attack area by Somali pirate continues to expand, and it covers, according to the Report, an entire area from a southern part of the Red Sea in the west to 72 degrees East longitude in the east, and, moreover, from off Oman and the Arabian Sea in the north to 22 degrees South latitude in the Mozambique Channel in the south. As the Report is pointing out, particularly, the characteristics of attacks in 2010 was that the Somali pirates were using the hijacked merchant vessels and fishing boats as their “mother-ships.”(Regarding this information, refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, November 2010, 1. 1 Maritime Security ‘Topic’ and Hijacking Incidents in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia in the Information Digest (2011-1).)

On the other hand, the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped from 116 cases in 2009 to 53 cases in 2010, decreasing by more than 50 percent. According to the Report, it was the results of the deployment of naval vessels from the respective nations as well as ships’ application of self-protection measures in Best Management Practices 3 (BMP3). Four cases, in which the vessels hijacked or those boarded by pirates were rescued by military forces, were noted in 2010. Meanwhile, attack areas are expanding into the immense Indian Ocean where patrols by the navies of the respective countries are unable to cover. There were 49 hijacking incidents in 2010 (47 hijackings in 2009) and 1,062 incidents in which the crew were taken hostage in 2010 (826 incidents in which the crew were taken hostage in 2009). According to the Report, as of the end of December 2010, 28 vessels were detained and 633 crew-members were taken hostage. The Report is pointing out that in order to prevent the activities of the pirates on the high seas it is necessary to develop particularly workable administrative infrastructure in central and southern parts of Somalia where the bases of pirates are located.

On the other hand, in South East Asia, the number of incidents in Indonesia marked 40 cases (of which, one case was hijacking), which drastically increased from 15 cases in 2009, and a decreasing trend over the past three years stopped. The incidents are most frequently noted in Anambus, Natuna, Mangkai, and Subi Besar islands area. In the South China Sea, there were 31 attacks on the vessels while they were underway, which drastically increased from 13 attacks in 2009. It was the highest number of cases noted in the past five years. There were two attacks in the Malacca Strait, which remained constant in the past three years. There were three incidents in the Singapore Strait, which decreased to one-third in 2009.

The Table 2 estimates actual rates of hijackings based on the assessments of monthly incidents (including actual and attempted cases) and their details in the Gulf of Aden (including the Red Sea) and off Somalia (including the Indian Ocean off Somalia’s east coast) which are explained in the incidents in the Report. According to the study, more attacks were noted during the respective periods from March to June and October to December. In particular, it was peculiar that the attacks increased in the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Somalia extending to the area off Kenya, and far away from the coast where no naval vessels of respective nations were deployed. Almost no attack was noted during the southwest monsoon season between June and September. In October attacks in the Indian Ocean remarkably increased again. On the other

hand, the attacks in the Gulf of Aden decreased after July, and no hijacking was noted in August, October or December. Looking at the rate of success in hijackings in 2010, in the Gulf of Aden, 16 out of 78 incidents were hijackings, which are equal to 20.51 percent of all incidents in 2010. (In 2009, 20 out of 131 incidents were hijackings, which are equal to 15.27 percent of all incidents in 2009.) On the other hand, regarding the incidents off Somalia, 33 out of 139 incidents were hijackings, which were equal to 23.74 percent of all incidents in 2010. (In 2009, 27 out of 80 incidents were hijackings, which were equal to 33.75% in 2009.) While the number of attacks drastically increased, the rate of success in hijackings decreased. Out of 217 incidents (exempting two incidents in the Arabian Sea) by Somali pirates, 49 were hijackings, which were equal to 22.58 percent at a rate of success. It is nearly the same as 47 hijackings, which are equal to 22.27 percent at a rate of success in 2009.

2. Characteristics viewed from Activities

The **Table 3** shows the status of attacks by location noted frequently in the areas in Asia and others in the year 2010. The **Table 4** shows the status of ships attacked, including the attempted cases, by location in 2010. According to the latter table, regarding the status of the vessels when they were attacked, of 249 actual attacks (a/a) in 2010 (202 a/a in 2009), 15 attacks (16 a/a in 2009) were noted while the vessels were berthed in port, 115 attacks (101 a/a in 2009) were noted while the vessels were anchored, and 119 attacks (101 a/a in 2009) were noted while the vessels were steaming. (There was one case of 'not stated' in 2009.) Additionally, of 196 attempted attacks in 2010 (196 cases in 2009), three cases (one cases in 2009) were noted while they were berthed, 16 cases (18 cases in 2009) were noted while they were anchored, and 177 cases (185 cases in 2009) were noted while the ships were steaming.

According to the **Table 3** and **Table 4**, all attacks by Somali pirates were made while the vessels were steaming, and all attempted attacks are "fired upon" and/or "boarding" cases, which indicate the features of Somali pirates that are armed with their automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and attack the steaming vessels with their "mother-ships" and skiffs. On the other hand, the features of pirate attacks in Asia are that the attacks were mostly the boarding cases while the vessels were steaming, which were noted in the South China Sea including the waters around Indonesia. Additionally, in Vietnam, Bangladesh and India all attacks were boarding cases in ports and anchorages.

Also, in 16 locations (14 locations in 2009), more than three attacks were reported respectively while the ships were berthed or anchored in 2010. In particular, incidents more frequently occurred in the following places: 16 cases (14 cases in 2009) in Chittagong in Bangladesh, 11 cases (15 cases in 2009) in Lagos in Nigeria, nine cases (12 cases in 2009) in Callao in Peru; and status of these top three ports are constant. Besides, in Asia, there were seven cases (three cases in 2009) in Vung Tau in Vietnam, which was a big increase. In India, there were three cases (none listed in 2009) in Vusakhapatnam on the east coast, and none were listed in Kochi (three cases in 2009) on the west coast or in Kakinada (three cases in 2009) on the east coast. In Indonesia, there were four cases in Dumai in Sumatra and Jakarta/Tanjung Priok, respectively and three cases in

Tanjung Pemancingan in Kalimantan, although none were listed in 2009. Also, there were three cases at anchorages in Manila in the Philippines and Singapore Strait, respectively, although none were listed in 2009.

3. Characteristics of vessels attacked

What types of vessels were attacked as the targets of the pirates/robbers? As shown in the Table 5, the number of types of ships attacked (including those involved in attempted attacks) is totaled 30 (22 in 2009), and the number of ships by type involved in attacks (including attempted attacks) in 2010 was noted as follows: First is the highest number of 96 attacks (cases) (69 in 2009) for the chemical /product tankers, and the second are 89 cases (109 in 2009) for bulk carriers. Following are 74 cases (64 in 2009) for containers, 63 cases (54 in 2009) for general cargo vessels, 43 cases (41 in 2009) for crude oil tankers, 20 cases (17 in 2009) for tugs, and 19 cases (16 in 2009) for fishing trawlers. In the past five years seven types of these vessels occupied a greater part of the vessels targeted, even though there were, more or less, up and down in the numbers of the vessels attacked by pirates.

The Table 6 shows data on major vessels by type that were hijacked in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia in 2010. Here are shown, in order from the top in numbers of attacks, the data of typical vessels by types of chemical / product tanker, bulk carrier, general cargo, container, and others taken from the data in the List of Ships Seajacked in the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Horn of Africa Piracy.

As shown in the Table 6, on average, the vessels which were vulnerable to hijacking in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia have relatively low dry decks with a full load of oil (the Table above indicates the data when unloaded), slow speed (below 15 knots), and a small crew of more or less 20 - 25 persons on average.

In view of the types of the vessels, what is noteworthy in the hijackings in 2010 was the very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) *Samho Dream* (319,000DWT) operated by Korean shipping company. MT *Samho Dream* was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean 970 nautical miles east from Somali coast on April 4. The tanker was carrying as much as \$170 million worth of Iraqi crude oil. It was the third time that the VLCC was hijacked by Somali pirates. In addition, on the afternoon of October 10, the Panama-flagged MV *Izumi* (20,170DWT) operated by NYK-Hinode Line Ltd. was hijacked by Somali pirates. The *Izumi* departed from the port of Kimitsu in Chiba prefecture on September 12, carrying a cargo steel. The ship was heading for Mombasa in Kenya via Singapore. MV *Izumi* has been used as the “mother-ship” of pirates.

Looking at the vessels attacked by registration, of 443 ships, the highest number of 82 (69 in 2009) was given to Panamanian-registered vessels. The following were, according to the ranking by registration, in which more than 12 vessels were attacked, 57 (38 in 2009) Liberian-registered vessels, 40 (32 in 2009) Singaporean-registered vessels, 36 (29 in 2009) Marshall Islands-registered vessels, 24 (24 in 2009) Antigua Barbuda-registered vessels, 19 (21 in 2009) Malta-registered vessels, 18 (21 in 2009) Hong Kong (SAR)-registered vessels, 14 (three in 2009) Malaysia-registered vessels, 13 (14 in 2009) Cyprus-registered vessels, and 10 (3 in 2009)

Italian-registered vessels. No Japanese-registered vessel was attacked during recent two years. (Throughout the past five years, two attacks in 2008, and one attack in 2007 were noted.)

On the other hand, looking at the operational status of the vessels attacked by Flag State (Countries where victim ships are controlled / managed), the highest number of 69 (64 in 2009) were given to German vessels. Following are 54 (45 in 2009) Singaporean vessels, 46 (59 in 2009) Greek vessels, 23 (16 in 2009) Japanese vessels, 17 (nine in 2009) UAE vessels, 16 (14 in 2009) British vessels, 16 (20 in 2009) Hong Kong vessels, 14 (11 in 2009) Indian vessels, 14 (two in 2009) Malaysian vessels, 11 (six in 2009) Cyprus vessels, 10 (seven in 2009) Netherlands vessels, 10 (10 in 2009) Norwegian vessels, 10 (eight in 2009) USA vessels, and others.

4. Types of violence to crews and peculiarities of weapons used

Looking at the status violence (or damage) to crews, as the Table 7 shows, the incidents in which crews were taken hostage dramatically increased, occupying a greater part of violence. In 2010, 1,181 persons (1,052 persons in 2009) were taken hostage. In view of the trends in the past five years, compared with 188 persons in 2006 and 292 persons in 2007, there were 889 persons in 2008, which almost tripled. Since then, the number has been increasing by more than 100 every year. On the other hand, looking at the violence by locations, of 1,181 hostage incidents in 2010 (1,052 hostage incidents in 2009), 275 cases (351 cases in 2009) in the Gulf of Aden and 732 cases (506 cases in 2009) in Somalia, 18 cases (none in 2009) in the Red Sea, all by Somali pirates, were noted, occupying less than 90 percent of the hostage incidents. Additionally, of eight incidents (eight cases in 2009) in which persons were killed by Somali pirates, seven incidents (three cases in 2009) in the Gulf of Aden and one incident (one case in 2009) in Somalia were noted. From the point of violence to crews, there are many cases in which the crews were taken hostage, which is the feature of attacks by Somali pirates.

The Table 8 shows types of arms used by pirates in all incidents in 2010 by location. There are few changes in the trends that guns and knives are major arms of pirates for the past five years. On the other hand, looking at the types of arms to be used by pirates by location, of a total of 264 attacks (240 cases in 2009) in which guns were used, 48 cases (105 case in 2009) in the Gulf of Aden, 13 cases (eight cases in 2009) in the Red Sea, 130 cases (76 cases in 2009) in Somalia, which occupied nearly 80 percent of the accidents, were noted. This will make us find how dangerous the Somali pirates armed with AK-47 rifles and RPG-7 rocket weapons are. It is also peculiar that guns have been frequently used in the attacks in Nigeria.

Table 1: Trends of incidents (including the attempted attacks) that occurred frequently in Asia and other areas in the recent five respective years

Locations	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Indonesia	40	15	28	43	50
Malacca Straits	2	2	2	7	11
Malaysia	18	16	10	9	10
Philippines	5	1	7	6	6
Singapore Straits	3	9	6	3	5
Thailand	2	1		2	1
South China Sea	31	13		3	1
Vietnam	12	9	11	5	3
Bangladesh	23	17	12	15	47
India	5	12	10	11	5
Gulf of Aden*	53	116	92	13	10
Red Sea**	25	15			
Somalia	139	80	19	31	10
Arabian Sea***	2	1		4	2
Indian Ocean****		1			
Oman*****		4			
Seychelles			1		
Tanzania	1	5	14	11	9
Nigeria	19	29	40	42	12
Total at year end	445	410	293	263	239

Source: Made from Table 1 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), pp. 5-6. The total of the incidents covers all area in the report.

Note: *: Gulf of Aden; **: Red Sea; ***: Arabian Sea; ****: Indian Ocean; *****: Oman. All of the above attacks are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 2: Monthly attacks and successful rate (%) of hijackings in the Gulf of Aden (including the Red Sea) and off Somalia (including the Indian Ocean) in 2010

Month	Locations*	H + B**	Attempted	Total	SR (%) ***
1	A	1 + 0	2	3	33.33
	S	1 + 0	0	1	10.00
2	A	1 + 1	1	3	33.33
	S	0 + 0	0	0	0
3	A	3 + 0	7	10	30.00
	S	6 + 0	16	22	27.27
4	A	1 + 0	9	10	10.00
	S	5 + 2	11	18	27.78
5	A	3 + 0	5	8	66.67
	S	2 + 1	7	10	20.00
6	A	2 + 0	12	14	14.29
	S	0 + 0	1	1	0
7	A	1 + 0	4	5	20.00
	S	0 + 0	0	0	0
8	A	0 + 0	10	10	0
	S	0 + 0	0	0	0
9	A	3 + 1	2	6	50.00
	S	2 + 1	4	7	28.57
10	A	0 + 0	4	4	0
	S	5 + 5	10	20	25.00
11	A	1 + 0	2	3	33.33
	S	4 + 5	30	39	10.26
12	A	0 + 0	2	2	0
	S	8 + 0	13	21	38.10
Sub	A	16 + 2	60	78	20.51
Total	S	33 + 14	92	139	23.74
Total		49 + 16	152	217	22.58

Source: Made from Table 1 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), Narrations of Attacks, pp. 57-65, and pp. 76-97.

Remarks*: A = Gulf of Aden (including Red Sea); S = Off Somalia (including Indian Ocean).

** : H = Hijacked; B = Boarded.

*** : Indicates successful rate (%) of hijackings. (Boarded incidents are not included.)

Table 3: Status of attacks frequently noted in Asia and other areas in 2010

Locations	Actual		Attempted	
	Boarded	Hijacked	Fired Upon	Attempted Boarding
Indonesia	30	1		9
Malacca Straits				2
Malaysia	13	2		3
Philippines	4			1
Singapore Straits	3			
Thailand	2			
South China Sea	21	1	2	7
Vietnam	12			
Bangladesh	20			3
India	4			1
Gulf of Aden*	2	15	22	14
Red Sea**		1	4	20
Somalia	14	33	74	18
Arabian Sea***				2
Tanzania	1			
Nigeria	13		4	2
Sub Total	196	53	107	89
Total	445			

Source: Made from Table 2 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), p. 8. The total of the incidents covers all areas targeted in the report.

Note: *: Gulf of Aden; **: Red Sea; ***: Arabian Sea. All areas are attributed to Somali pirates.

Remarks: "Boarded" covers an incident, in which pirates gave up hijacking and fled the ship they have successfully boarded. In this case, most of crew-members took self-protection measures by sheltering themselves in a security compartment called "citadel," locking it from inside. Afterwards, the ship was eventually rescued by the foreign naval vessel patrolling in the vicinity. On the other hand, if pirates did not flee from the ship, the situation sometimes led to a case of rescuing the crew-members by military force.

Table 4: Status of ships attacked (including the attempted cases) by location in 2010

Locations	Actual			Attempted		
	B	A	S	B	A	S
Indonesia	5	17	9	1	2	6
Malaysia		11	4		2	1
Malacca Straits						2
Philippines		4				1
Singapore Straits			3			
Thai / Gulf of Thailand	1		1			
South China Sea			22			9
Vietnam	1	10	1			
Bangladesh	3	14	3		3	
India		4			1	
Gulf of Aden*			17			36
Red Sea**			1			24
Somalia			47			92
Arabian Sea***						2
Tanzania		1				
Nigeria				1	1	4
Sub Total	15	115	119	3	16	177
Total	249			196		

Source: Made from Table 4 and Table 5 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), pp. 9-10. The total of the incidents covers all areas targeted in the report.

Remarks: B = Berthed, A = Anchored, S = Steaming.

Note: *: Gulf of Aden; **: Red Sea; *** : Arabian Sea. All areas are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 5: Types of ships (3 or more) and trends in the past 5 years

Type	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Chemical / Product Tanker	96	68	55	52	35
Bulk Carrier	80	109	48	32	57
Container	74	63	49	53	49
General Cargo	63	53	38	36	30
Tanker Crude Oil	43	41	30	25	9
Tug	20	16	16	7	9
Trawler / Fishing Vessel	19	16	9	16	18
LPG Tanker	7	5	6	5	4
Ro-Ro	6	8	1	3	2
Vehicle Carrier	5	4	3	1	1
Refrigerated cargo	4	4	8	7	3
Dhow	4	3	1	3	2

Source: Made from Table 11 and Chart D in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), p. 13 & p. 14.

Table 6: Data on major types of vessels hijacked by Somali pirates in 2010

Name	Type	GRT	DWT	Freeboard (ft)	Speed(k)	Crew
<i>UTB Ocean</i>	Chemical / Product Tanker	6,149	9,224	8	13	21
<i>Marida Marguerite</i>	ditto	8,505	13,168	14	13	22
<i>Golden Blessing</i>	ditto	9,127	14,445	9	13	19
<i>Hannibal II</i>	ditto	16,284	23,404	12	17	31
<i>Frigia</i>	Bulk Carrier	20,352	35,246	2	13	21
<i>Voc Daisy</i>	ditto	25,807	47,183	15	14	21
<i>Eleni P</i>	ditto	37,707	72,119	16	14.5	24
<i>Suez</i>	General Cargo	13,277	17,300	11	15.5	23
<i>Izumi</i>	ditto	14,162	20,170	15	N/A	20
<i>Albedo</i>	Container	10,837	15,562	9	17	23
<i>MSC Panama</i>	ditto	18,000	26,288	12	18	23
<i>Samho Dream</i>	VLCC	161,135	319,430	26	16	24
<i>Asian Glory</i>	Vehicle Carrier	44,818	13,363	16	18.6	25
<i>Iceberg 1</i>	Ro-Ro Vessel	5,402	3,960	1	14	24
<i>Polar</i>	LPG Tanker	4,807	5,076	6	16	18

Source: Made from U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Horn of Africa Piracy, List of Ships Seajacked. (The List has been irregularly revised.)

Chart 7: Types of violence noted frequently in Asia and other areas in 2010

Locations	Hostage	Threatened	Assault	Injured	Killed	Missing	Kidnap
Indonesia	33	3	1				
Malaysia	35	1					
Singapore Straits	10						
South China Sea	42			3			
Vietnam				1			
Bangladesh		5		2			
Gulf of Aden*	275				7		
Red Sea**	18						
Somalia	723			13	1		
Tanzania		1					
Nigeria	26			15			17
Sub Total	1,181	18	6	37	8		20
Total	1,270						

Source: Made from Table 9 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), pp. 11-12. The total of the incidents covers all areas targeted in the report.

Note: *: Gulf of Aden; **: Red Sea. All areas are attributed to Somali pirates.

Table 8: Types of arms used frequently by pirates in Asia and other areas

Locations	Guns	Knives	Other Weapons	Not Stated
Indonesia	3	16	2	19
Malacca Straits				2
Malaysia	3	7		8
Philippines		2		3
Singapore Straits	2			1
Thailand				2
South China Sea	8	16	1	6
Vietnam	2	4	1	5
Bangladesh	1	20		2
India				5
Gulf of Aden*	48			5
Red Sea**	13			12
Somalia	130			9
Arabian Sea***				2
Tanzania		1		
Nigeria	16	2		1
Sub Total	243	88	6	108
Total	445			

Source: Made from Table 10 in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship, Annual Report (January 1 – December 31, 2010), p. 12. The total of the incidents covers all areas targeted in the report.

Note: *: Gulf of Aden; **: Red Sea; ***: Arabian Sea. All areas are attributed to Somali pirates.

(By Hideshi UENO, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

2.2 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia in the Year 2009 (From ReCAAP Annual Report)

On January 20, 2010, the Information Sharing Center (ISC) of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) which was established, based on ReCAAP, issued a report which deals with incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the year 2010 (January 1–December 31, 2010) (hereinafter, the Report). (ReCAAP is an abbreviation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy.)

While the similar report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) covers world-wide areas, the ReCAAP's report covers the regional areas stretching from the Arabian Sea to northeast Asia via southern rim of the Eurasian continent. In addition, while the IMB makes use of reports from non-government vessels and shipping owners as its main sources of information, the ReCAAP's information sources are connecting the member-nations with Focal Point in Hong Kong and Singapore-based Information Sharing Center (ISC), which is an Information Sharing Web composed of mutual connections with Focal Point. The focal points of the respective nations are located in the coast guard, maritime police, ministry of agency in charge of marine transportation and maritime affairs, and/or navy. (In case of Japan, the focal point is located in Japan Coast Guard.) Also, the focal points of the respective nations are coordinating with the law enforcement agencies, navy, port authorities, custom authorities, and shipping circles among others of the nations concerned. Moreover, the ReCAAP is using data from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), IMB, and others.

At present, 17-member ReCAAP consists of 14 regional nations of India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Brunei, Philippines, China, Republic of Korea and Japan plus three non-regional nations of Norway (joined in August 2009), Denmark (joined in July 2010), and the Netherlands (joined in November 2010). Although Malaysia and Indonesia are non-members, they are conducting exchanges of information with the ISC.

The following are the patterns and trends of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against the ships viewed from the Report noted in the Asian region during the third quarter of 2010 (1 January–30 September 2010).

1. Definition of Piracy and Armed Robbery

Regarding the definition of Piracy and Armed Robbery, the ISC in ReCAAP accepts the “definition of piracy” in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As for the armed robbery against the vessels, the ISC accepts the definition of the “Code of practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its Assembly session in November 2001. Piracy and Armed Robbery are stipulated in Article 1 Definitions in the ReCAAP Agreement respectively.

2. Characteristics viewed from numbers and locations of incidents (including attempted cases)

According to the Report, the number of the incidents in the year 2010 was 164 (101 in 2009), of which 133 (97 in 2009) were actual incidents and 31 (20 in 2009) were attempted cases. The incidents drastically increased by 60 percent, compared to 2009. As shown in the **Table 1**, in particular, the incidents increased in the Arabian Sea, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the South China Sea, and Vietnam. The incidents in the Arabian Sea were carried out by Somali pirates. The Report describes them as East African Attack Group (PAG). According to the report, ten incidents occurred between October and December, and during this period the weather was good in the waters from the Arabian Sea to west coast of India due to the exit of the monsoon. The U.S. newspaper, *The New York Times* dated November 9, 2010, reports: “The monsoon season has ended. The Indian Ocean is calm again. For Somalia’s pirates, that means one thing: it is a busy time of year.” In fact, as *The New York Times* reports, in the Indian Ocean, the attacks by Somali pirates increased from October to December 2010. As the Report says, an expansion of the attacking area by Somali pirates from the Arabian Sea to near the west coast of India is attributed to their use of mother ships. The Report mentions that the MV *Izumi* and MV *Polar* were used for the attacks by PAG in this area. (Refer to the remarks.) This means that Somalia pirates have proceeded into the areas targeted by the ReCAAP.

3. Evaluation of Significance of Incidents viewed in ReCAAP Report

The most distinctive characteristic of the ReCAAP report is that the ISO evaluates significance of each incident in terms of two factors – violence factor and economic factor, and classifies each case into three categories.

In evaluation of the violent factor the report uses as criteria: (1) types of weapons used (violence is the most forceful when more highly efficient weapons than knives and others are used); (2) treatment of the crew (violence is the most intensive if the crew are killed or kidnapped); and (3) numbers of the pirates /robbers who engaged in an attack (in this case, the more the numbers increase, the more the violence develops, and the organized crime will possibly increase.)

In assessment of the economic factors the report uses a criterion of evaluating financial values of damaged vessels. In this case, the seriousness is the utmost when the ship was hijacked with the cargoes.

Based on the above criteria, the Report classifies each category as follows:

Category	Significance of Incident
CAT-1	Very Significant
CAT-2	Moderately Significant
CAT-3	Less Significant

The **Table 2** shows the actual attacks noted in the past five years by categories, and classifies all attacks into those in berthed, anchored, and underway situations, regarding the status of incidents of each category.

According to the Table 2, looking at the status of ships at the time of the actual incidents in the past five years, Category 3 incidents occupied 40-50 percent of all incidents, which involved most of the incidents while the vessels were berthed, and anchored. According to the Report, these cases were spontaneous offences, in which a group of usually one to six persons armed with knives, steel pipe and others stole/robbed ship's store/engine parts and crew's possessions. At this point, they reflect the general features of piracy/robbery in the maritime area which is targeted by the ReCAAP.

Looking at the trends in the past five years, there were many Category 1 and Category 2 incidents in the attacks noted while the ships were underway. Of 17 actual incidents in the South China Sea in 2010, one was Category 1 incidents, 14 were Category 2 incidents, and two were Category 3 incidents. According to the Report, of 59 Category 2 incidents, a total of 27 incidents were noted in the South China Sea and Anambas, Natuna, Mangkai, and Subi Besar in Indonesia, which occupy 46 percent of all incidents. It indicates that the sea east of the Malacca-Singapore Strait is the place where the incidents have been noted most frequently among all areas targeted by the ReCAAP.

Of four Category 1 incidents, one was noted in the South China, and two were noted off Tioman on the east coast of Malaysia and off Pulau Bintan, Indonesia getting out to the South China Sea, The remaining one was the incident in which a Bangladeshi-flagged cargo ship, MV *Jahan Moni* (44,377DWT), was hijacked by Somali pirates in the area around the Lakshadweep group of islands, some 275 nautical miles west of Kochi, India on 5 December. This hijacking incident was carried out by Somali pirates in the area so close to the coast of India. This case proves an example that Somali pirates are advancing toward the area targeted by the ReCAAP. The attack took place at the 'eight-degree channel' between Minicoy Island and Maldives, which witnesses a traffic of about 40 cargo ships on an average every day. (Regarding this hijacking incident, refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, December 2010, 1. 1 Maritime Security.)

4. Types of ships attacked

Looking at the ships involved in actual incidents in 2010 by type, of a total of 164 incidents, the highest number of 55 (45 actual cases and 10 attempted cases) incidents involved various tankers (chemical, product, LPG/LNG, oil). The tankers were followed by 37 (31 actual cases and six attempted cases) bulk carriers, 26 (24 actual cases and two attempted cases) container ships, 26 (16 actual cases and 10 attempted cases) general cargo vessels, and 17 (16 actual cases and one attempted case) tugs and barges.

Table 1: Numbers of Incidents by Location in the past five years

Locations	2010		2009		2008		2007		2006	
	Act	Att	Act	Att	Act	Att	Act	Att	Act	Att
East Asia										
China	1		1						1	
Sub Total	1		1						1	
South Asia										
Arabian Sea	5	5					1	3		1
Bangladesh	21	3	15	4	10	2	12	1	30	14
Bay of Bengal	3						1			
India	5	2	8	2	10	1	8		3	
Sri Lanka								1	1	
Sub Total	34	10	23	6	20	3	22	5	34	15
Southeast Asia										
Gulf of Thailand	1									
Indonesia	35	10	14	5	22	1	33	7	39	10
Malaysia	20		12	3	13		7	1	10	1
Myanmar			1							
Philippines	5		4	1	6	2	5	1	3	2
Singapore	2									
South China Sea	17	8	11	2	5	2	1	5	3	
Straits of Malacca & Singapore	4	3	6	3	6	4	3	4	6	7
Thailand	1		2				1		1	
Vietnam	13		8		11	1	5		3	
Sub Total	98	21	58	14	63	10	55	18	65	20
Total	133	31	82	20	83	13	77	23	100	35
Overall Total	164		102		96		100		135	

Source: ReCAAP Annual Report (January 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010), p.12, Table 1.

Remarks: MV *Izumi* (20,170DWT) is the Panamanian-flagged cargo ship operated by NYK-Hinode Line Ltd (Tokyo). The MV *Izumi* has a crew of 20, all Filipinos. Carrying a cargo of steel, The *Izumi* was heading for Mombasa after departing from the port of Kimitsu, Chiba, on September 12, 2010. The cargo ship was hijacked in the waters south of Mogadishu on October 10, 2010. On the other hand, MT *Polar* (78,825DWT) is the Panamanian-flagged tanker owned by the Liberian shipping company. The tanker was hijacked by Somali pirates approximately 580 nautical miles east of the Socotra Island on October 30, 2010. The MT *Polar* has a crew of 24.

MV *Izumi*

Source: MV *Izumi*: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, October 11, 2010

MT *Polar*

Source: MT *Polar*: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/MVPolar>

Table 2: Numbers of actual incidents by categories in the past five years (As for figures in parenthesis, the first figure shows number of incidents while the ship were at anchor/berth, and the second figure shows number of incidents while the ships were underway.)

	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
CAT-1	4 (0,4)	4 (1, 3)	4 (0, 4)	5 (0, 5)	3 (1, 2)
CAT-2	59 (19,40)	31 (9, 22)	22 (6, 16)	15 (9, 6)	38 (18, 20)
CAT-3	70 (61,9)	46 (44, 2)	57 (53, 4)	57 (53, 4)	59 (52, 9)

Source: Made from ReCAAP Annual Report (January 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010), p.9, Chart 1, pp. 54 – 114 (Details of incidents for January to December 2010: Actual Incidents)

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