

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## November 2010



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This monthly report was summarized and produced by OPRF staff writers based on their analyses and assessments of open source information.

Each source of information is described as an internet link in a bracket, which is available as URL online as of the end of November 2010.

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## Intelligence Summary in November 2010

**Maritime Security:** Since this October the incidents of attacks by Somali pirates have been increasing. In accordance with this trend, the number of the vessels hijacked reached five in October, and seven in November, respectively. At present, the naval vessels and maritime patrol aircraft of the nations, including the EU Naval Force, NATO Fleet, Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and Russia, are deployed to conduct anti-piracy operations and escorting missions for the merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. There are no endings to incidents of attacks and hijackings. While discussing the incidents of pirate attacks in November, we have summarized the features of the recent incidents of pirate attacks as a “topic” in this monthly report.

On the 2nd, the 7th escort taskforce, with more than 780 crew members, consisting of missile frigates “*Zhoushan*” and “*Xuzhou*” and the supplying ship “*Qiandaohu*” of the East Sea Fleet left Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province for the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters on an escort mission. On the 22nd, the 6th escort taskforce, having completed its mission, turned over its mission to the 7th escort taskforce. The PLA Daily dated November 28 carried an article summarizing the escort mission of the 6th escort taskforce, in which the daily stressed that the taskforce had accomplished the “responsibilities that the great naval power should accept.”

According to a spokesman of the Russian Pacific Fleet, a Pacific Fleet's destroyer, the *Admiral Vinogradov*, left Vladivostok for the waters off Somalia on the 17th on an international anti-piracy mission. The mission period of the fleet lasts until December. On the 25th, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would continue anti-piracy patrols in waters off the Somali coast for two reasons – protection of Russian ships and foreign-flagged ships and maintaining combat readiness of the navy.

From November 20, 2010, Denmark will become a member of ReCAAP. Of member-nations from outside Asia, Denmark is the third participant, following Norway and the Netherlands. The Danish Maritime Authority will be the daily point of contact.

On the 23rd, the UN Security Council adopted unanimously a UN Security Council's Resolution 1950 which renews for another 12 months the authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somalia's transitional government to fight piracy off the country's coast.

**Military Developments:** On the 1st, Russia's United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) and France's shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) signed an agreement to form a consortium. The agreement is an important step toward purchasing the Mistral-class helicopter carriers of the French Navy which has been pending. Russia and France are currently in talks on a 2+2 scheme, whereby Russia will buy one or two French-built Mistrals and build another two at home. The contract is expected to be inked before the end of the year 2010.

Russian Information Agency (RIA) Novosti dated the 2nd carried an article by a military

reporter, which comments that Russia's naval ship-building program is gradually gaining momentum. Moreover, as the feature of the program, it is seeking standardization in warship and submarine designs to a maximum degree, which is completely different from the trend 30-35 years ago. The article comments on the status in which there are a few base platforms of combatants and submarines, and standard equipment to be added depending on the function of the warship.

On the 2nd, the Chinese South Sea Fleet (SSF) staged a yearly actual-troop live-shell exercise dubbed the "Dragon 2010" in an area of the South China Sea (SCS). About 1,800 officers and men of a marine brigade of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy participated in the exercise. A hundred-plus armed helicopters, mine-sweeping vessels, submarine chasers, landing ships, amphibious armored vehicles, assault boats and various direct-aiming weapons also appeared in the drill site. The drill went through the whole procedures of a landing combat in four subjects, i.e., mobile assembly, loading and ferrying, assault landing and seizing and holding firmly the landing field.

At a press interview after the end of the East Asian summit on October 30, Nguyen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese prime minister, said: "Vietnam will stand ready to service ships and submarines from all countries at the naval base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay." The British newspaper, *The Telegraph* dated October 8, reports that, if the foreign naval vessels are to be given access to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, an outpost would be emerging as a vital base to counter China in the SCS.

On the 10th, ADM Roughead, Chief of the U. S. Naval Operations, said in his briefing on an expansion of the Chinese Navy that it is changing its operating patterns. It is more active in areas that are important to them as determined by sea lanes, by resources, and so that's going to continue. Admiral Roughed also mentioned: "As we do the work of anti-piracy in the Somali Basin, in my opinion, the same level of cooperation should be made in the SCS and in other places."

According to Western analysts, China's first aircraft carrier, the *Shi Lang* (ex-Russian aircraft carrier *Varyag*), which has been undergoing conversion in the shipyard in Dalian, seems to be nearing completion. The media, including *The Australian* dated the 20th, report the *Shi Lang* is expected to make its maiden voyage next year or 2012.

In the way of responding to the North Korean artillery fire, both U.S. and South Korean military forces conducted a joint military exercise in the southern part of sea areas in the Yellow Sea from November 28 to December 1. While this exercise is defensive in nature, and has been planned for some time, it underscores the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and their collective commitment to regional security and stability. The ships involved in the exercise include the *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and others, and several ships from the ROK.

**Maritime Boundaries:** On the 5th, Vietnam asked China to remove a "U-shaped" line showing its claims to over 80 percent of the East Sea (South China Sea) from its map on a newly launched

online mapping service. On the 16th, China's first fishery patrol vessel “*Yuzheng 310*” began its 20-day maiden voyage from Guangzhou to patrol in the East China Sea. The two Chinese vessels, the *Yuzheng 310* and *Yuzheng 201*, were spotted navigating through a contiguous zone about 44 km northwest of Taisho Island, one of the islets in Senkaku chain on the morning of the 28th. The two vessels sailed around and outside of Japan's territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** Dr. Pavel E. Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based defense analyst, has contributed an article titled “The Kurile Islands: a Key to Russia’s Maritime Nuclear Strategy” to the *Eurasia Daly Monitor* dated the 4th, in which Felgenhauer mentions the strategic values on the Northern Islands, as follows: The Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN’s) and surface ships to defend the deployment of the newest *Borey* class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s) in the open Pacific. The only safe option seems to be deployment to the semi-closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Island chain. However, to keep the Kuriles, Moscow needs massive investment to develop the local economy and Japanese participation in exchange for Habomai and Shikotan. Moscow seems to be actively pressing for a deal, while handing over control of Kunashir and Iturup is out of the question.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** London’s position as the world’s top shipping hub is being challenged by emerging Asian contenders such as Singapore and possibly Shanghai. In Singapore new maritime set-ups have been made in recent months. Singapore has got both the physical shipping business alongside the maritime services. But, on the other hand, many players say the sheer strength of London, built up over centuries, as a maritime capital is unlikely to be matched. Additionally, Singapore faces challenges itself especially from Shanghai. The Shiptalks dated 5th reported.

**Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others:** Offshore wind farms capable of producing the same amount of 2,500-megawatt of electricity as two nuclear plants will be built on the southwest coast by 2019, the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy announced on the 2nd. The government wants South Korea to become one of the top three countries in terms of offshore wind power generation.

On the 4th, Burma announced the setting-up of its first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) around a deep sea port in Dawei, covering up to 64,000 hectares. near the southern border with Thailand.

In Taiwan, sixty-six of 141 vessels equipped to fish bigeye tuna have ceased their operations due to the threat of Somali piracy. Therefore, to compensate for the lost business, Taiwan is seeking permission to “transfer” 15 of the mothballed fishing vessels from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, which would be limited to 2010 and 2011, by a document submitted by Taiwan to the 17th special session (annual meeting) of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (ICCAT).

**Intelligence Assessment:** From perspective overseas, the exertion of pressure on Japan at the incident of collisions between Japan's Coast Guard's patrol vessels and Chinese trawler (fishing boat) off Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao in Chinese name) (hereafter, incident) is taken as a phenomenon of showing an escalation of China's postures against foreign countries, together with a theory of "core interests" in the South China Sea (SCS) and a demonstration of military power by the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the maritime area in East Asia. Now, what kinds of discussions are underway about this incident in China? How are the overseas comments regarding that the Chinese foreign postures are being intensified taken in China? Additionally, what kind of response has appeared in China? As the analysis in this monthly report, the OPRF has taken up this matter in the article titled "Incident of collisions between Japan's Coast Guard's patrol vessels and Chinese trawler off Senkaku Islands: From perspective on China's diplomacy and internal affairs" by Assistant Professor Aki Mori at the Doshisha University.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### November 2 “China’s 7th escort task force sets sail for Somali waters” (PLA Daily, November 2, 2010)

On the 2nd, China’s 7th flotilla left Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province for the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters on an escort mission. The flotilla, with more than 780 crew members, is composed of missile frigates “*Zhoushan*” and “*Xuzhou*” and the supplying ship “*Qiandaohu*” of the East Sea Fleet.

An outline of the article: On the 2nd, China’s 7th flotilla left Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province for the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters on an escort mission. The flotilla is composed of missile frigates “*Zhoushan*” and “*Xuzhou*” and the supplying ship “*Qiandaohu*” The flotilla has two ship-borne helicopters, more than 780 crew members, including dozens of special weapons and tactics team (SWAT) sailors and 25 female crew members responsible for medical care, psychological counseling and telecommunications on board. It has been the second time for the three vessels to perform the escort mission.

On the 5th, the Chinese escort taskforce sent a message expressing respects to the PLA’s officers and men that station in the Spratly Islands while transiting waters around the islands. On the 17th, the Chinese taskforce arrived in the Gulf of Aden, and rendezvoused with the sixth escort taskforce to relieve the duty of escort missions on the 22nd.

Refer to the article: Three Chinese escort ships sail for Gulf of Aden, Somali waters

[http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/03/content\\_4205123.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/03/content_4205123.htm)

Seventh Chinese naval escort taskforce arrives in Gulf of Aden

[http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/18/content\\_4208811.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/18/content_4208811.htm)

6th and 7th Chinese naval escort taskforces hold mission hand-over ceremony

[http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/24/content\\_4210039.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/24/content_4210039.htm)



Underway replenishment drill in the South China Sea

Source: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2010-11/07/c\\_13595509\\_6.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2010-11/07/c_13595509_6.htm)

**【Related Story】****“Chinese 6th escort taskforce completes responsibilities of Big Navy: Summary by PLA Daily” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, November 28, 30, 2010)**

Completing its mission on the 22nd, the Chinese sixth escort taskforce relieved the seventh escort taskforce of its mission. The PLA Daily dated November 28 carried an article summarizing the escort mission of the sixth escort taskforce, in which the daily stressed that “the taskforce accomplished the responsibilities to be accepted by the great naval power.”

An outline of the article: Completing its mission on the 22nd, the Chinese sixth escort taskforce relieved the seventh escort taskforce of its mission. The PLA Daily dated November 28 carried an article summarizing the escort mission of the sixth escort taskforce, in which the daily stressed that “the taskforce accomplished the responsibilities to be accepted by the great naval power.” The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) The sixth escort taskforce secured a hundred percent of safety of the 615 merchant vessels inside and out of China, drove the vessels of the suspected pirates away 190 times, conducted inspections, rescued four vessels which were boarded by pirates, and conducted medical rescued nine times. During the escort mission, more than half of the vessels escorted by the sixth escort taskforce were said to be foreign-registered merchantmen.
- (2) The sixth escort taskforce consisted of a destroyer, a supply ship and a dock landing ship as well as shipboard air cushion landing craft, high-speed patrol craft and helicopters. The PLA Daily stressed this formation “not only became a new model of the Chinese Navy for deploying escort forces to distant seas, but also became the first case among international navies deployed for escort missions in the Gulf of Aden.” When the merchant vessels of the countries that wish for an escort by the six escort taskforce gathered, one merchant vessel was sailing separately at sea several kilometers ahead of the group. As the vessel’s speed was slow, and navigation in disordered formation is apt to elicit pirate attacks, the taskforce commenced patrols by air cushion craft, thereby expanding the warning area, and threatening the suspected pirate boats which attempt to approach the merchant vessels.
- (3) The air cushion landing craft and high-speed patrol craft covered the weakness of the helicopters which are short of flying hours and costly for operations, expanding area to be controlled by the naval units and securing the ample warning time. Additionally, after departing from the Gulf of Aden, on the 27th, the six escort taskforce arrived in Jeddah port, Saudi Arabia (SA). This was the first visit to SA by Chinese naval ships. It commenced five-day goodwill visit.

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/28/content\\_44347.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/28/content_44347.htm)

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/28/content\\_44351.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/28/content_44351.htm)

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/30/content\\_44534.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/30/content_44534.htm)



### November 2, 3 “Spanish warship intercepts 2 pirate groups” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 4, 2010)

On the two days of the 2nd and 3rd, the EU NAVFOR Spanish naval frigate SPS *Galcia* captured 11 pirate suspects and two skiffs. But, without sufficient evidence of piracy, after having 11 pirate suspects board a skiff, the SPS *Galcia* released them, and confiscated another skiff.

An outline of the article: On November 2, while the EU NAVFOR Spanish naval frigate SPS *Galcia* was patrolling along the Kenyan coastline, a merchant vessel reported it had been attacked twice. Although the merchant vessel was successful in avoiding the attacks, the SPS *Galcia*, positioned 75 nautical miles from the scene of attack, was immediately tasked to relocate the skiffs involved in this attack. The coordination between the SPS *Galcia*'s helicopter and the French Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) made it possible to relocate a pirate group. The pirate group was seen throwing quantities of weaponry and one orange tarpaulin overboard from the helicopter. Inspecting the skiff, the SPS *Galcia*'s boarding team found one fuel drum, several jerry cans, ladders, and captured seven people onboard the skiff. Additionally, on the early morning of the following third day, the helicopter of SPS *Galcia* was able to sight two more suspicious skiffs, sailing with ladders, jerry cans and powerful overboard motors. One of the two skiffs was quickly intercepted by the SPS *Galcia*'s boarding team, but the second skiff fled the scene. Consequently, 11 suspected pirates and two skiffs were intercepted by the SPS *Galcia* in two days. Without sufficient evidence of piracy, after having 11 pirate suspects board a skiff, the SPS *Galcia* released them, and confiscated another skiff.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR warship SPS GALICIA disrupts two Pirate Action Groups

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-navfor-warship-sps-galicia-disrupts-two-pirate-action-groups/>



The EU NAVFOR warship SPS *Galcia*, with her helicopter, her boarding team, and with the support of an EU NAVFOR Aircraft, located and disrupted two Pirate Action Groups comprising of 2 skiffs with 11 suspected pirates onboard.

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 4, 2010

**November 3 “Somali pirates hijack small passenger ship” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 3, 2010)**

On the morning of the 3rd, a Comorian-flagged small-type of vessel, the MV *Aly Zulfecar*, was pirated on route between the Comores and Dar Es Salam (Tanzania). The MV *Aly Zulfecar* is 43 meters long. When hijacked, she had 29 people onboard. On the 16th, NATO Shipping Centre issued a warning that the vessel MV *Zulfecar* remains underway and will probably be used by pirates as a mother ship for attacks at sea.

An outline of the article: On the morning of the 3rd, a Comorian-flagged small-type of vessel, the MV *Aly Zulfecar*, was pirated on route between the Comores and Dar Es Salam (Tanzania). The MV *Aly Zulfecar* is 43 meters long. When hijacked, she had 29 people onboard. Of them, nine were crewmembers consisting of one Tanzanian, four Comorian and four Madagascar. On the other hand, there were a total of 20 passengers consisting of 12 Tanzanian and eight Comorian.

Moreover, on the 16th, NATO Shipping Centre issued a warning that the vessel MV *Zulfecar* remains underway and will probably be used by pirates as a mother ship for attacks at sea. According to the warning, this vessel has previously been used by pirates as a mother boat. It is likely that she will operate within a triangular area between the Kenyan/ Tanzanian coast and north point of Madagascar. NATO Shipping Centre calls on sailors that all small boats in the area should be perceived as suspicious. (NATO Shipping Centre, November 16, 2010)

Refer to the article: MV ALY ZULFECAR pirated in the Somali Basin

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/mv-aly-zoulfecar-pirated-in-the-somali-basin/>

**November 3 “Seychelles gives 11 Somali pirate suspects prison sentences”(EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 4, 2010)**

On the 3rd, the judge delivered the verdict at the Seychelles Courts, sentencing the 11 Somali pirate suspects who had been transferred by EU NAVFOR to the Seychelles to prison sentences of six years each. EU NAVFOR has to date arrested 93 individuals, of which 43, including 11 individuals this time, have now already stood trial and been found guilty, serving in prison.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, the judge delivered the verdict at the Seychelles Courts, sentencing the 11 Somali pirate suspects who had been transferred by EU NAVFOR [to the Seychelles] to prison sentences of six years each. Major General Buster Howes, Operation Commander of EU NAVFOR Somalia, comments: “This first conviction of pirates transferred by EU NAVFOR to the Seychelles marks an important step in the co-operation between European Union and the Republic of Seychelles in the suppression of acts of piracy.” Eleven pirates were arrested when they attacked on the Spanish fishing vessel on March 5, 2010. EU NAVFOR has to date arrested 93 individuals, of which 43, including 11 individuals this time, have now already stood trial and been found guilty, serving in prison.

Refer to the article: Verdict for the first EU NAVFOR case in Seychelles

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/verdict-for-the-first-eu-navfor-case-in-seychelles/>

**November 3 “Denmark joins ReCAAP” (Denmark Maritime Authority, November 3, 2010)**

From November 20, 2010, Denmark will become a member of ReCAAP. Of member-nations from outside Asia, Denmark is the third participant, following Norway and the Netherlands. The Danish Maritime Authority will be the daily point of contact.

An outline of the article: From November 20, 2010, Denmark will become a member of ReCAAP. ReCAAP is short for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Since many Danish ships navigate this area, it is natural for Denmark to join the work. Of member-nations from outside Asia, Denmark is the third participant, following Norway and the Netherlands. The Danish Maritime Authority will be the daily point of contact.

Refer to the article: Denmark joins international network against pirates

<http://www.dma.dk/news/Sider/Denmarkjoinsinternationalnetworkagainstpirates.aspx>

**November 4 “Thai Navy rescues Thai trawler’s crew” (The Bangkok Post, November 5, 2010)**

On the 4th, the Thai navy’s patrol ship HTMS *Pattani* taking part in an anti-piracy mission off the Somalia coast rescued 23 crewmen from a Thai trawler which was robbed by pirates and then sunk by gunfire, the navy said on the 5th.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, the Thai navy’s patrol ship HTMS *Pattani* taking part in an anti-piracy mission off the Somalia coast rescued 23 crewmen from a Thai trawler which was robbed by pirates and then sunk by gunfire, the navy said on the 5th. The source said the Yemen-registered Thai fishing vessel FV *Sirichai Nava II* had been attacked and seized by Somali pirates about 15 nautical miles from the coast of Yemen on the evening of the 2nd. This was 360 nautical miles from where the HTMS *Pattani* received a report of the attack. HTMS *Pattani* arrived in the attack area on November 3, but did not see the Thai vessel. A helicopter search was then launched. On the next day of the 4th, the helicopter crew spotted an oil slick, flotsam and survivors. They plucked from the sea seven Thai and 15 Cambodia crew and one Yemeni policeman. Still missing were one Thai crewman and four Yemeni policemen. According to an account given by the rescued crewmen, the Thai fishing vessel was attacked and seized by 10 armed Somali pirates who arrived on a speed boat on November 2. After the seizure, two of the pirates left on the speed boat while eight others took control of the Thai boat and forced it to sail toward the Somali coast. On its way, the trawler was hit by gun shots from another boat of an unknown nationality and sunk. They did not know what happened to the eight pirates.

Refer to the article: Navy saves Thai trawler Somali pirate castaways

<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/204981/thai-fishing-boat-robbed-off-somalia>

**November 5 “Kenyan court declares pirate suspects innocent” (Gulf Times, November 6, 2010)**

On the 5th, a Kenyan court declared 17 Somali pirate suspects innocent. Magistrate said as a

reason for freedom that the prosecution has not proved its case against the accused persons.

An outline of the article: On the 5th, a Kenyan court declared 17 Somali pirate suspects innocent. The 17 suspects were arrested in the Gulf of Aden in a joint operation by US and South Korean navies on May 13, 2009 as they tried to attack an Egyptian bulk carrier, MV *Amira*, and were transferred to Kenya. Magistrate said as a reason for freedom that the prosecution has not proved its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. They walked free from a Kenyan court after becoming the first defendants to be acquitted since Nairobi signed a deal with Western states to try suspected pirates. Some 136 suspected Somali pirates, brought mainly by international navies deployed off Somalia since 2008, are being held in Kenyan prisons.

Refer to the article: Kenya court acquits 17 piracy suspects

[http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu\\_no=2&item\\_no=396712&version=1&template\\_id=39](http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=396712&version=1&template_id=39)

### **November 6 “Double ships released by Somali pirates” (Shiptalk, November 6, 2010)**

On the 6th, Somali pirates released two hijacked vessels - the Singapore-flagged chemical tanker MV *Golden Blessing* and the South Korean very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) MT *Samho Dream*. A ransom of \$9 million and \$9 million was reportedly paid, respectively.

An outline of the article: On the 6th, Somali pirates released two chemical tanker ships. According to China’s Transport Ministry (CTM), the Singapore-flagged tanker MV *Golden Blessing* was released on the 6th and is now sailing to safe waters under escorted of Chinese naval forces dispatched to waters off Somalia. The ship was seized in the Gulf of Aden on June 28 while sailing to India from Saudi Arabia. The tanker’s 19 crewmembers are all Chinese. Although the CTM gave no details of the ship’s release, media reports say the pirates were paid a ransom of \$9 million.

The Marshall Islands-flagged very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) MT *Samho Dream* operated by the South Korean shipping company was also released on the 6th. Pirates seized the vessel on April 4. The *Samho Dream* was seized in the Indian Ocean while en route to the United States from Iraq carrying \$170 million worth of oil. It is reported that a ransom of \$9.5 million was paid in cash.

Refer to the article: Double Release

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=6405>

### **November 6 “Dutch Navy’s support ship disrupts 2 pirate skiffs” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 8, 2010)**

On the morning of the 6th, a helicopter launched from the EUNAVFOR Dutch support ship HNLMS *Amsterdam* detected two suspicious skiffs with nine men and a large quantity of fuel and several ladders on board. Firing the warning shots, the helicopter ordered the skiffs to stop, but the nine pirate suspects jumped overboard and fled away, and reached the shore safely. The

warship destroyed both skiffs at the scene, together with associated paraphernalia.

An outline of the article: According to an announcement of the EUNAVFOR, on the 5th, a helicopter launched from the EUNAVFOR Dutch supply ship HNLMS *Amsterdam* detected two suspicious skiffs with nine men and a large quantity of fuel and several ladders on board, while it was on a patrol mission. After the helicopter urged the skiffs to stop, firing the warning shots, the boarding team of the Dutch warship chased the two skiffs, which fled way toward the Somali coast. On the morning of the 6th, the warship's helicopter found the pirate group, and fired warning shots after ordering the vessels to stop. The skiffs eventually stopped and the pirates jumped overboard. They reached the shore safely. Both skiffs were destroyed by the warship at the scene, together with associated paraphernalia (ladders and weapons).

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR HNLMS AMSTERDAM disrupts nine pirates

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-navfor-hnlms-amsterdam-disrupts-nine-pirates/>



Two skiffs were destroyed by the warship at the scene, together with associated paraphernalia (ladders and weapons) insuring these pirates will not be able to engage in piracy for the coming period of time.

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 8, 2010

### **November 10 “French AWACS begins anti-piracy surveillance mission from Djibouti” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 11, 2010)**

On the 10th, an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the E-3F SDCA (French Air Force – Base of Avord) aircraft, commenced the first counter-piracy surveillance mission from Djibouti. The mission lasts for the next three weeks.

An outline of the article: On the 10th, an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the E-3F SDCA (French Air Force – Base of Avord) aircraft, commenced the first counter-piracy surveillance mission from Djibouti. The mission lasts for the next three weeks. With a detection system scanning capability of up to 360° and 250 Nm, this radar-aircraft will be able to monitor main sea areas in the coordination of EU NAVFOR's maritime and aerial units deployed in Indian

Ocean and Gulf of Aden. The E-3F SDCA is operated by a detachment of 60 persons.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR welcomes a French E-3F SDCA into the Force

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-navfor-welcomes-a-french-e-3f-sdca-into-the-force/>



E3-F SDCA (French Air Force)

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 11, 2010

### **November 11 “Somali pirates hijack Panamanian-flagged vessel” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 11, 2010)**

On the 11th, Somali pirates hijacked a Panamanian-flagged chemical tanker, the MT *Hannibal II* (24,105DWT), in an area some 860 nautical miles east of “The Horn of Africa” which is closer to India [than it is to Somalia]. The MT *Hannibal II* has a total of 31 crewmembers on board.

An outline of the article: On the 11th, Somali pirates hijacked a Panamanian-flagged chemical tanker, the MT *Hannibal II* (24,105DWT), in an area some 860 nautical miles east of “The Horn of Africa” which is closer to India [than it is to Somalia]. The chemical tanker was carrying vegetable oils from Malaysia to Suez at the time. The MT *Hannibal II* has a total of 31 crewmembers on board, consisting of 23 Tunisians, 4 Filipinos, 1 Croatian, 1 Georgian, 1 Russian and 1 Moroccan.

Refer to the article: MV HANNIBAL II pirated in the Somali Basin

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/mv-hannibal-ii-pirated-in-the-somali-basin/>



MT *Hannibal II*

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 8, 2010

**November 12 “Somali pirates hijack Chinese vessel” (Global Times, November 15, 2010)**

In the middle of night of the 12th, a Panamanian-registered cargo ship owned by Chinese shipping company, the *Yuan Xiang* (22,356DWT), was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea, closer to India. The ship has 29 Chinese sailors onboard.

An outline of the article: In the middle of night of the 12th, a Panamanian-registered cargo ship owned by Chinese shipping company, the *Yuan Xiang* (22,356DWT), was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea, closer to India. The ship has 29 Chinese sailors onboard. According to the Chinese shipping company - The Ningbo Hongyuan Ship Management Co, they were informed by the pirates that the ship had changed course to sail toward Somalia. But they hadn't received a request for ransom money from the pirates. The company has launched its efforts to rescue the crew through the assistance of related ministries of China and anti-piracy international organizations,

Refer to the article: Pirates nab 29 Chinese

<http://world.globaltimes.cn/africa/2010-11/591989.html>



MV Yuan Xiang

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=1174677>

**November 13 “EUNAVFOR Spanish warship intercepts pirate group”(EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 15, 2010)**

On the 13th, the EU NAVFOR Spanish naval corvette SPS *Infanta Cristina* intercepted a whaler with four suspected pirates on board for inspection. There was insufficient evidence to pursue a prosecution. Therefore, the four suspected pirates were returned to Somalia, and the whaler was destroyed.

An outline of the article: On the 13th, the EU NAVFOR Spanish naval corvette SPS *Infanta Cristina* intercepted a whaler with four suspected pirates on board for inspection. The whaler, which had been initially spotted by an EU NAVFOR Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA), was found to be operating with a skiff. Upon receipt of information, the Spanish warship launched its Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB) with a specialist boarding team to intercept both vessels. The skiff fled the scene. There was insufficient evidence to pursue a prosecution. Therefore, four suspected pirates were returned to Somalia, and the whaler was destroyed.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR warship disrupts Pirate Action Group  
<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-navfor-warship-disrupts-pirate-action-group/>



The whaler was successfully intercepted and four suspected pirates found to be onboard.

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 15, 2010

### **November 17 “Russia dispatches Pacific Fleet warships off Somalia” (RIA Novosti, November 17, 2010)**

According to a spokesman of the Russian Pacific Fleet, a Pacific Fleet's destroyer, the *Admiral Vinogradov*, left Vladivostok for the waters off Somalia on the 17th to join the international anti-piracy mission.

An outline of the article: According to a spokesman of the Russian Pacific Fleet, a Pacific Fleet's destroyer, the *Admiral Vinogradov*, left Vladivostok for the waters off Somalia on the 17th to join the international anti-piracy mission. The *Admiral Vinogradov* is accompanied by a salvage tug and the *Pechenga* tanker. The *Admiral Vinogradov* is to replace the current task force including the guided-missile destroyer of the Northern Fleet, *Admiral Levchenko*, as the flagship, which has been operational since July 3.

Refer to the article: Russian naval task force heads to Gulf of Aden  
<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101117/161371155.html>



The *Admiral Vinogradov*

Source: RIA Novosti, November 17, 2010



**【Related Story】****“President Medvedev: Russia to continue anti-piracy mission” (RIA Novosti, November 25, 2010)**

On the 25th, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would continue anti-piracy patrols in waters off the Somali coast for two reasons – protection of Russian ships and ships sailing under foreign flags, and maintaining combat readiness of the navy.

An outline of the article: Russia has been conducting anti-piracy activities in the area off Somalia since October 2008. On the 25th, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would continue anti-piracy activities in waters off the Somali coast. Medvedev mentioned as follows: “I believe that we will continue to fulfill our international obligations in the Gulf of Aden for two reasons. Primarily, we must protect our commercial ships and, under agreements with other countries, the ships sailing under foreign flags. Secondly, it helps [our naval personnel] to maintain combat readiness” At present, a task force dispatched from the Pacific Fleet has successfully escorted 13 commercial convoys with a total of 57 vessels through pirate-infested waters off the Somali coast since its arrival in the area.

Refer to the article: Russia to continue anti-piracy missions in Gulf of Aden - Medvedev

[http://en.beta.rian.ru/military\\_news/20101125/161498820.html](http://en.beta.rian.ru/military_news/20101125/161498820.html)

**November 17 “Bulgaria to send military personnel to NATO fleet” (The Sofia Echo, November 17, 2010)**

On the 17th, Bulgarian Cabinet decided to deploy military personnel to the NATO fleet which is engaged in fighting Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden – Operation Ocean Shield. But, according to the ruling, no more than five Bulgarian military personnel can be deployed at any one time.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, Bulgarian Cabinet decided to deploy military personnel to the NATO fleet which is engaged in fighting Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden – Operation Ocean Shield. But, according to the ruling, no more than five Bulgarian military personnel can be deployed at any one time. Expenses for deployment will be covered by the budget of the Defense Ministry. Bulgarian Military forces are already participating in European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atlanta.

Refer to the article: Cabinet: Bulgarian forces will be deployed against Somali pirates

[http://sofiaecho.com/2010/11/17/994991\\_cabinet-bulgarian-forces-will-be-deployed-against-somali-pirates](http://sofiaecho.com/2010/11/17/994991_cabinet-bulgarian-forces-will-be-deployed-against-somali-pirates)

**November 17 “French warship intercepts pirate group” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 17, 2010)**

On the 17th, the French Navy’s destroyer FS *De Grasse* (Flagship of EU NAVFOR) intercepted a Pirate Action Group comprising of one skiff with seven suspected pirates onboard. The boarding team confiscated weapons and ammunitions on board the skiff. As there was insufficient evidence to pursue a prosecution, the seven suspected pirates were returned to Somalia in their skiff.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, the French Navy's destroyer FS *De Grasse* (Flagship of EU NAVFOR) intercepted a Pirate Action Group comprising of one skiff with seven suspected pirates onboard. On the morning of the 17th, a helicopter from the EU NAVFOR French warship FS *Meuse* detected a suspicious skiff in the Gulf of Aden and informed FS *De Grasse* in the vicinity. A helicopter from FS *De Grasse* found the group and fired warning shots to stop the skiff. Before the boarding team from FS *De Grasse* arrived at the skiff, ladders were seen to be thrown overboard from the helicopter, but the boarding team found weapons and ammunitions onboard the skiff, including two RPG's, one AK47 assault rifle and 7.62 ammunitions, and confiscated them. As there was insufficient evidence to pursue a prosecution, the seven suspected pirates were returned to Somalia in their skiff.

Refer to the article: EU NAVFOR Flagship FS DE GRASSE disrupts a Pirate Action Group

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-navfor-flagship-fs-de-grasse-disrupts-a-pirate-action-group-2/>



The EU NAVFOR Flagship FS *De Grasse* intercepted and disrupted a Pirate Action Group comprising of 1 skiff with 7 suspected pirates onboard

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 17, 2010

### **November 18 “US Navy ship conducts training with Maldives Coast Guard” (U.S. Navy 7th Fleet News, November 19, 2010)**

On the 18th, the U. S. guided missile-destroyer USS *Momsen* (DDG 92) arrived in Male, Republic of Maldives, to conduct bilateral maritime domain awareness training within the country's vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with the Maldivian Coast Guard.

An outline of the article: On the 18th, the U. S. guided missile-destroyer USS *Momsen* (DDG 92) arrived in Male, Republic of Maldives, to conduct bilateral maritime domain awareness training within the country's vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with the Maldivian Coast Guard. Commanding officer of the ship of Destroyer Squadron 15, Cmdr. Jay D. Wylie, said: “The government of the Maldives asked for our support in improving their ability to conduct maritime domain awareness. As a remote Indian Ocean nation, the Maldives face a variety of maritime threats to include piracy, illegal trafficking and illegal fishing. We're working with the Maldives Coast Guard on maritime surveillance and information sharing, which will enhance security in the Indian Ocean region.” Maldives is a small country consisting of group of island atolls that stretches for hundreds of miles in the Indian Ocean with a population of 400,000 people. With a

land area roughly twice the size of Washington, D.C., it has more than 400 miles of shoreline and a vast EEZ. USS Momsen is the first U.S. Navy to make a port visit Maldives since USS Decatur (DDG 73) visited in 2008.

Refer to the article: USS Momsen Promotes Maritime Domain Awareness with Maldives Coast Guard

<http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2010/11-november/013.htm>

### **November 18 “China’ s 6th naval taskforce rescues Chinese merchant vessel from piracy” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, Gulf of Aden, November 21, 28, 2010)**

On the 18th, the Chinese sixth escort taskforce led a cargo vessel owned by the Chinese Ocean Transport Company (COSCO), *Le Zong* (樂縱), to safety from a chase by Somali pirates over the satellite-telephone. The missile-destroyer “*Xuzhou*” of the Chinese seventh escort taskforce arrived at the scene, and conducted an emergency measure to the persons injured by the attack.

An outline of the article: Around 16:00 hour on the 18th, during an escort mission, the Chinese 6th naval escort taskforce received a rescue message from a cargo vessel owned by the Chinese Ocean Transport Company (COSCO), *Le Zong* (樂縱) (29,108DWT), informing the ship was being chased by two armed skiffs approximately 704 nautical miles east of the Socotra Island. However, the maritime area was about 2,300 kilometers away from the 6th naval escort taskforce - a distance taking two days to get there. Therefore, the commander of the 6th naval escort taskforce called the master of the vessels by telephone to stay calm, advised him to take measures by using high-pressured water spray, and prevented the pirates from boarding the ship. Around 1630 hour, *Le Zong* (樂縱) shook off the attack of the pirates, but some of its crew were injured by shooting of the pirates. At six o'clock on the 20th, the missile-destroyer “*Xuzhou*” arrived at the scene, and conducted an emergency measure to the injured. Under escort of “*Xuzhou*,” the “*Le Zong*” sailed for the port of Salalah, Oman.

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/21/content\\_43806.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/21/content_43806.htm)

### **November 18 “Australia donates maritime comm. system to Indonesia” (Security Access.com, November 18, 2010)**

Under the support of Australia, Indonesia will establish four Maritime Regional Coordination Centers equipped with a new maritime radio communication system - the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). The first Maritime Regional Coordination Center will be established and put into action on the 18th at Karangasem in Bali. It will soon be followed by other three new centers in West Timor, Maluku and Papua (New Guinea Is).

An outline of the article: As part of the partnership plan with Indonesia, Australia has donated \$2 million for establishing a new maritime radio communication system - the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). According to the Australian Ministry for Home Affairs, the new network will be put into action on the 18th with the opening of the first of four Indonesian Maritime Regional Coordination Centers at Karangasem in Bali. The VHF radio network

provides more comprehensive reception of radio transmissions and can monitor maritime radio messages from anywhere within the archipelago. With better monitoring, Indonesian authorities can deploy resources more swiftly and efficiently, potentially stopping crimes, including people smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal foreign fishing, as well as saving lives. Maritime security information gathered through using the new network will be disseminated to 12 Indonesian government agencies and Australian authorities, to help in the fight against maritime transnational crime and other threats to safety and security. In addition to the standard radiotelephony function that allows verbal communication between mariners and authorities, vessels fitted with the new GMDSS equipment can send their unique registration number, name and precise location to the nearest Regional Coordination Center. The opening of the first communication centre in Bali will soon be followed by other new centers in West Timor, Maluku and Papua (New Guinea Is).

Refer to the article: Aust donates to Indonesian maritime security

<http://www.securityaccess.com.au/932E8A1C-F2D9-11DF-898A005056B05D57>

### **November 18 “Kenya sets up security corridor for ships entering Mombasa” (Daily Nation, Kenya, November 18, 2010)**

Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) has created a security corridor for ships entering the Port of Mombasa to counter piracy attacks on Kenya’s territorial waters. Vessels will be required to wait at the four identified co-ordinates, which, according to the KMA, is a corridor of 10 by 20 nautical miles from the Port of Mombasa.

An outline of the article: Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) has created a security corridor for ships entering the Port of Mombasa to counter piracy attacks on Kenya’s territorial waters. Vessels entering the port will be required to wait at the four identified co-ordinates. According to the KMA, this is a corridor of 10 by 20 nautical miles from the Port of Mombasa. KMA director Ms Nancy Karigithu said: “The area is a security zone within which patrols by the Kenyan Navy have been enhanced to provide security for vessels waiting berthing at the port.” Fishing boats, skiffs and leisure boats will be required to keep off the corridor, which will help identify any pirate skiff that approaches the corridor. Recently, Kenya has recorded an unprecedented number of attacks in waters off the coast. According to the East Africa Seafarers Assistance Program coordinator, Mr Andrew Mwangura, between September 28 and November 16, 17 ships have been attacked on the East African coast. Therefore, fears are emerging that there could be a cell of pirate groups operating from Mombasa.

Refer to the article: Security zone set up in fight against piracy

<http://www.nation.co.ke/News/regional/Security%20zone%20set%20up%20in%20fight%20against%20piracy%20%20/-/1070/1056324/-/95phg3z/-/index.html>

### **November 18 “Ukraine dispatches officer to EU NAVFOR” (EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 18, 2010)**

Recently, Ukraine has dispatched an officer to EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters based

in Northwood – UK, which is the first case in the EU NAVFOR operation. Ukraine is the third non EU Member State participating in the operation after Norway and Croatia. The number of countries participating in EU NAVFOR has increased to 24.

An outline of the article: Recently, Ukraine has dispatched an officer to EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters based in Northwood – UK, which is the first case in the EU NAVFOR operation. During the coming months, liaison officer (Commander in rank) from the Ukrainian Navy will be working in the “External Training and Lessons” Branch of the Operational Headquarters. Ukraine is the third non EU Member State participating in the operation after Norway and Croatia. A Norwegian warship deployed regularly in the area of operation. As a result, the number of countries participating in EU NAVFOR has increased from five from its beginning to 24.

Refer to the article: Ukraine offers a first contribution to EU NAVFOR

<http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/ukraine-offers-a-first-contribution-to-eu-navfor/>

### **November 20 “Somali pirates board Chinese-flagged vessel” (Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report: Oct 26 – Nov 24, November 24, and Mritime Bulletin, November 21, 2010)**

On the 20th, a Chinese-flagged multi-function large load carrier of semi-submergible type, the MV *Tai An Kou* (20,247DWT), was attacked by a pirate group of 10-15 men and boarded by four men. Further details are unknown. But there is a report that the carrier was hijacked.

An outline of the article: According to the Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report issued every two weeks by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of the U. S. Defense Department, it is reported as information of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) that a Chinese-flagged multi-function large load carrier of semi-submergible type, the MV *Tai An Kou* (20,247DWT), was attacked by a pirate group of 10-15 men in three speed boats with RPG and AK-47, and boarded by four men while underway approximately 438 nautical miles northeast of Salalah, Oman. Taking evasive maneuvers, the MV *Tai An Kou* fired rocket flares, and activated water spray. The crew took refuge in the citadel.

On the other hand, the Russian Maritime Bureau reports as information from Lloyds that Somali pirates hijacked the Chinese-flagged multi-function large load carrier of semi-submergible type, the MV *Tai An Kou*, in waters off Oman in the Arabian Sea. But further details are unknown. For reference, ship’s designation in Chinese letters is “泰安口 (Tai An Kou in the international phonetic alphabet)” which means the vessel is owned by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO).

Refer to the article: Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report: Oct 26 – Nov 24

[http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts\\_20101124100000.txt](http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20101124100000.txt)

Somali pirates highjack Chinese semi-sub in Arabian Sea

<http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/883-Somali-pirates-highjack-Chinese-semi-sub-in-Arabian-sea.asp>



MV *Tai An Kou*

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=1066408>

### **November 20 “Somali pirates hijack Seychelles fishing vessel” (Maritime Bulletin, November 20, 2010)**

On the 20th, Somali pirates seized a Seychelles fishing vessel with seven crew members, FV *Faith*, in waters approximately 240 nautical miles north of Mahe, Seychelles.

An outline of the article: According to the Seychelles Minister for Home Affairs, Environment, Transport and Energy, Somali pirates seized a Seychelles fishing vessel, FV *Faith*, in waters approximately 240 nautical miles north of Mahe, Seychelles on the 20th. Seven crew members were on board the vessel.

Refer to the article: Somali pirates seize 7 fishermen off Seychelles

<http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/880-Somali-pirates-seize-7-fishermen-off-Seychelles.asp>

### **November 23 “UN Security Council renews action against piracy off Somalia” (UN News Centre, November 23, 2010)**

On the 23rd, the UN Security Council adopted unanimously a UN Security Council’s Resolution 1950 which renews for another 12 months the authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somalia’s transitional government to fight piracy off the country’s coast.

An outline of the article: On the 23rd, the UN Security Council adopted unanimously a resolution of fighting piracy off Somali coast. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1950 renews for another 12 months the authorizations granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somalia’s transitional government to fight piracy off the country’s coast. As set out in the previous resolution 1897 in November 2009, this includes the authorization for States and regional organizations to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means”—such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy.

Refer to the article: Security Council re-authorizes action against piracy off Somali coast

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36851&Cr=piracy&Cr1>

UN Security Council's Resolution 1950 ;

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/649/02/PDF/N1064902.pdf?OpenElement>

**November 26 “Somali pirates hijacks Malaysian-flagged vessel” (The Star, November 30, 2010)**

On the 26th, Somali pirates have hijacked the Malaysian-flagged cargo ship *MV Albedo* (15,562DWT) in the Indian Ocean about 900 nautical miles east of Somali coast.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, Somali pirates have hijacked the Malaysian-flagged cargo ship *MV Albedo* (15,562DWT) in the Indian Ocean about 900 nautical miles east of Somali coast. Departing from the United Arab Emirates' port town of Jebel Ali, the ship was bound for Mombasa, Kenya. Her 23 crewmembers hailed from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran.

Refer to the article: Malaysian ship hijacked

<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/11/30/nation/7526701&sec=nation>



*MV Albedo*

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, November 29, 2010

 **Topic** 

Mother ships, Attacks on Pirate groups before their departure, and BMP:  
Recent Features of Incidents of attacks by Somali pirates

“The monsoon season has ended. The Indian Ocean is calm again. For Somalia’s pirates, that means one thing: it is a busy time of year”. (The New York Times, November 9, 2010)

In reality, as *The New York Times* points out, since this October the incidents of attacks by Somali pirates have been increasing. In accordance with this trend, the number of the vessels hijacked reached five in October, and seven in November, respectively. At present, the naval vessels and maritime patrol aircraft of the respective nations, including the EU Naval Force, NATO Fleet, Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and Russia, are deployed to conduct anti-piracy operations and escort missions for the merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. However, there are no endings to incidents of attacks and hijackings. Below is a summary of the features of the recent incidents of pirate attacks. (As for the details of the incident per se, please refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Reports, October and November (this edition) 2010, 1. 1 Maritime Security.)

#### 1. Recent information on “Mother ships”

One of the features of the recent incidents of attacks is that the maritime area of the attacks covers a vast area which includes off Kenya, off Tanzania, off Seychelles and off Madagascar, expanding further out at sea from the east and south coasts of Somalia. It is because the pirates are regarded to be using the “mother ships” which are able to operate farther into the distant area. Below is information on the recent status of the “mother ships.”

According to the NATO Shipping Center, vessels used as “mother ships” are mostly hijacked fishing boats, shipping vessels of smaller types, or dhows (motorized dhow). According to the NATO Shipping Center, pirates frequently use the mother ships, including dhows and others, to expand their attack-areas, as well as to extend the activity-period. These vessels represent an active threat to merchant shipping. The NATO Shipping Center warns that any small vessel observed in the open ocean more than 300Nm from Somali coast should be considered to be a potential pirate vessel.

For instance, on October 15, the NATO Shipping Center estimates there is at least one mother ship operating in the northeast Somali Basin east of 65 degrees east. According to information, the vessel is the *FV Tai Yuan 227* which was hijacked off Seychelles on May 6, 2010. It is estimated that this ship continues to operate in this area.





*FV Tai Yuan 227*

Source: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/TaiYuan227>

According to a warning from NATO Shipping Center dated November 16, a Comorian-flagged small-sized passenger ship, MV *My Aly Zoulfecar*, was hijacked by Somali pirates on route between the Comores and Dar Es Salam, Tanzania, on the morning of November 3. The MV *My Aly Zoulfecar* is believed to have been used by pirates as the mother ship for attacks at sea. According to the report, it is likely that she is operating within a triangular area between the Kenyan / Tanzanian coast and north point of Madagascar. The NATO Shipping Center is advising all merchant vessels to be careful about all small boats in the area.



*MV Zoulfecar*

Source: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/Zoulfecar>

On October 9, a Kenyan-flagged fishing vessel operated by the South Korean fishery company, FV *Golden Wave* (ex-name: *Keummi 305*), was hijacked off Kenya by Somali pirates. The fishing vessel is believed to be used as the “mother boat” of the pirates. On the 23rd, a Singapore-flagged liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier, MV *York*, was attacked by two skiffs in waters approximately 50 nautical miles east from Mombasa while it was on route to the Seychelles. On the morning of October 24, the LNG carrier was confirmed to be pirated. In the vicinity, the South Korean fishing vessel *Golden Wave*, which is believed to have been involved in hijacking, was observed. According to the warning from NATO Shipping Center dated November 16, as of the 12th, it is said that the fishing vessel was noted at 04°01S - 041°12E, sailing south.

FV *Golden Wave*Source: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/GoldenWave>

According to the warning of the NATO Shipping Center, a hijacked dhow, with its name is unknown, is sailing as the “mother ship” either in the area of 0065E – 11-16N or in the vicinity southwest of Seychelles.



Unnamed Dhow

Source: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/UnnamedDho>

In addition, large vessels hijacked are sometimes used as “mother ships.” A Panamanian-flagged cargo ship operated by Japan’s Hinode Yusen KK, MV *Izumi* (20,170DWT), was hijacked off Kenya on October 10. When MV *Izumi* was hijacked, a previously unknown trawler was confirmed in its vicinity. This trawler is believed to have been hijacked in waters in the vicinity and may have been used in the attack on the MV *Izuumi*. (NATO Shipping Center, October 15, 2010). MV *Izumi* is likely to be used as a “mother ship” also. According to the EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release dated November 8, Spanish navy’s corvette, SPS *Infanta Cristina*, was fired on by pirates aboard MV *Izumu* as it accompanied an aid ship, MV *Petra 1*, destined for Mogadishu on the evening of the 6th. MV *Petra 1* was contracted by the African Union peace keeping mission in Somalia to deliver food to Mogadishu. SPC *Infanta Christina* had to defend herself and her escort with only minimal force in order not to endanger the lives of the hostages (20 Filipinos) on-board MV *Izumi*. MV *Izumi* then fled the scene. Additionally, according to the EU NAVFOR, an attacking group of pirates was said to be

confirmed to move from MV *Izumi* to the skiff and attacked the vessels underway in the sea off Somalia on the 5th.



The *MV Izumi*

Source: EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, Press Release, October 11, 2010

## 2. Prior attacks on PAG's before attacks


On the other hand, under the situation in which the activities by Pirate Action Groups (PAG's) are strengthened, and the number of the incidents is increasing, two counter-piracy measures are noticeable. One is the capture of the pirate action groups before their venturing out to sea by the international navies. These countermeasures have been increasing since around March 2010. Usually, the PAG is comprised of one to two skiffs, which are under tow by a fishing vessel which is acting as "mother ship" on the sea. Recently, the EU NAVFOR and NATO fleet are taking the following measures: Upon finding the PAG in the coastal area off Somalia, the naval vessels stop the vessels to seize their weapons and equipment aboard. (In most cases, the PAG abandons these weapons, equipment and others overboard when found by the helicopters launched from the ships of the fleets, including EU NAVFOR.) The naval vessels destroy large boats as well as small boats, except the one to be used for sending back the PAG to Somali coast. According to NATO Shipping Center, a whaler (large boat) is 10-12m open boat which is capable of operating at a speed of 6-8 knots. A skiff is a high-speed boat, with an outboard engine (mostly Japan-made).

The EU NAVFOR says attacking the PAG before it begins attacks - deterring these attacking groups from operating at sea, is a very effective anti-piracy measure. In usual cases, these pirate suspects who have been seized are transferred to the boat to be sent back to the coast, if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute them. However, some of the shipping business circles are said to be critical of such a measure, considering such a "catch and release" policy would only be regenerating the piracy. (The examples of most attacks on PAG's before they might carry out the attacks have been carried each time in the OPRF MARINT Monthly report.)

## 3. Best Management Practice (BMP)

Another way to be taken when the ship is attacked by pirates is the self-defense measure taken by the vessels attacked. According to the anti-piracy manual of the "Best Management Practice (BMP)" issued by the shipping business circles, crews of the vessels are advised to take evasive maneuvers, as well as to lock themselves inside a safety compartment dubbed "citadel"


when they are boarded by pirates. By taking such self-defense measures, the cases, in which the pirates who have boarded the vessel give up hijackings and flee away, are increasing. The cases, in which the crews were saved by the naval vessels of each nation patrolling on an escort mission, are also increasing. Additionally, there are cases, in which the crewmembers were freed by force when the pirates did not flee from the ship. (For example, please refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, May 2010, Maritime Security, 1. 1.)



The BMP is available from:

[http://www.mschoa.org/bmp3/Documents/BMP3%20Final\\_low.pdf](http://www.mschoa.org/bmp3/Documents/BMP3%20Final_low.pdf)

Reference: Status of Incidents of Attacks by Somali pirates and BNP for Shipping



Source: Spiegel Online, November 23, 2010

(By Hideshi UENO, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

## 1.2 Military Developments

### November 1 “Russian, French shipbuilders form consortium” (RIA Novosti, November 1, 2010)

On the 1st, Russia's United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) and France's shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) signed an agreement to form a consortium. The agreement is an important step toward purchasing the *Mistral*-class helicopter carriers of the French Navy which has been pending. Russia and France are currently in talks on a 2+2 scheme, whereby Russia will buy one or two French-built *Mistrals* and build another two at home. The contract is expected to be inked before the end of the year 2010.

An outline of the article: On the 1st, Russia's United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) and France's shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) signed an agreement to form a consortium. According to the USC president, the agreement is an important step toward purchasing the *Mistral*-class helicopter carriers of the French Navy which has been pending. Russia and France are currently in talks on a 2+2 scheme, whereby Russia will buy one or two French-built *Mistrals* and build another two at home. The contract is expected to be inked before the end of the year 2010. “We have signed a long-term agreement; it includes a transfer of technologies,” said the USC president, expressing that the consortium is interested in building supply ships and icebreakers for the Arctic. On the other hand, DCNS Chairman added that it is also ready to compete in all military tenders.

Refer to the article: Russian, French shipbuilders form consortium

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20101101/161170512.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20101101/161170512.html)



*Mistral* class helicopter carrier (amphibious assault ship)

Source: RIA Novosti, November 1, 2010

### November 2 “Russian Navy pushing for modernization by standardization in warship and submarine designs” (RIA Novosti, November 2, 2010)

Russian Information Agency (RIA) Novosti dated the 2nd carried an article by a military reporter, which comments that Russia's naval ship-building program is gradually gaining momentum. Moreover, as the feature of the program, it is seeking standardization in warship and submarine designs to a maximum degree, which is completely different from the trend 30-35

years ago. The article comments on the status in which there are a few base platforms of combatants and submarines, and standard equipment to be added depending on the function of the warship.

An outline of the article: Russian Information Agency (RIA) Novosti dated the 2nd carried an article by a military reporter, which comments that Russia's naval ship-building program is gradually gaining momentum. Moreover, as the feature of the program, it is seeking standardization in warship and submarine designs to a maximum degree, which is completely different from the trend 30-35 years ago. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) In the Russian Navy there are a few base platforms of combatants and submarines, and standard equipment to be added depending on the function of the warship. In case of submarines, they have standard propulsion units, as well as sonars and radio-electronic equipment. Essentially, they differ only in terms of their main armament. Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) are equipped with silos which will house RSM-56 SS-NX-32 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while attack submarines will feature multi-purpose launchers for various types of cruise missiles. The warships currently being developed also use standardized propulsion units, sonars, and radio-electronic equipment.
- (2) Analysts and high-ranking Defense Ministry officials believe that the submarine fleet is still the backbone of the Russian Navy, and that it will continue to play this role in the future. The Russian Navy will continue to receive two types of nuclear-powered submarines and two types of diesel-electric submarines in the next few years. Eight Project 955 *Borei* class SSBN's will form the foundation of the navy's strategic nuclear forces. The first submarine is currently being tested, three more are under construction, and the keels of four other submarines are to be laid in the next five to six years. The success of this project depends on the prompt completion of Bulava SLBM tests and the missile's subsequent adoption. This is a priority of the government.
- (3) In the next few decades, the navy will operate Project 885 *Yasen* (*Graney* class) attack submarines. The lead submarine, the *Severodvinsk*, was launched in the summer of 2010. These heavily armed and extremely costly submarines are expected to replace 15 Project 671 *Victor* class, Project 945 *Sierra* I class and Project 949-A *Oscar II* submarines dating back to the Soviet period in the course of the next 15 years. They are to replace the 12 aging Project 971 *Akula* class submarines after 2025. One Project 885 submarine is currently being built. The keels of another six submarines are to be laid in the next six to seven years. In all, 10 to 12 *Yasen* submarines are to be constructed by 2025.
- (4) On the other hand, the Russian Navy had problems developing the new Project 677 *Lada* diesel-electric submarines, whereas Project 877 *Paltus* (*Kilo* class) submarines continued to age rapidly. As a result, the Navy had to order upgraded Project 636-M (*Kilo* class) submarines once again. In August 2010, the keel of a lead Project 636-M submarine was laid for the Black Sea Fleet. Over the next decade, the Navy will replace obsolete *Paltus* submarines with improved models, while continuing to upgrade the *Lada* submarine. The Navy is to operate

four to five *Ladas*, as well as 9-12 upgraded and 5-6 obsolete *Paltus* submarines.

- (5) The Russian warship fleet has become obsolete and needs to be completely replaced because it did not receive even the meager replacements and allocations given to the submarine fleet in the past 20 years. A Project 20380 *Steregushchy* class corvette is the first production warship to enter service with an overhauled Navy. The lead ship has already been commissioned. One more has been launched, and three more are under construction. Moreover, construction has begun on ocean-going warships, namely, Project 22350 *Admiral Sergei Gorshkov* frigates. These are the first post-Soviet capital warships. Once this ship-building program got underway, it became obvious that these sophisticated and expensive ships would delay the fleet's renovation. Consequently, it was decided to expedite the process and to begin construction on the Project 11356 *Talwar* class frigates, which are on a par with the new warships. Russia has already built several such ships for the Indian Navy. These frigates should have the same interchangeable components - including equipment and main weapons systems - as next-generation warships. Eight next-generation frigates, as well as the same number of Project 11356 warships, are to be commissioned in the next ten years. The Russian Navy is to receive 30 frigates and 30 corvettes in the next 20 years. Additionally, Russia has almost finished designing a next-generation destroyer, with a displacement of 10,000 metric tons. The new warship is to be equipped with standard launchers, a standard information-and-control system and other interchangeable equipment. (Regarding the launch of the first unit of the *Admiral Sergei Gorshkov* class frigates, refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, October in 2010, 1. 2 Military Developments.)
- (6) Corvettes, frigates and next-generation destroyers will form the backbone of the Navy's warship fleet in the next 20-30 years. Without these new ships, it would be pointless to buy French-made *Mistral* class amphibious assault ships, to build them in Russia, to overhaul and refit the *Admiral Kuznetsov* aircraft carrier and to build other aircraft carriers. Refer to the article: Russian Navy to standardize its warships and submarines <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101102/161183586.html>

### **November 2 “Chinese SSF kicks off live-shell drill in SCS” (PLA Daily, November 4, 2010)**

On the 2nd, the Chinese South Sea Fleet (SSF) staged a yearly actual-troop live-shell exercise dubbed the “Dragon 2010” in an area of the South China Sea (SCS). About 1,800 officers and men of a marine brigade of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy participated in the exercise. A hundred-plus armed helicopters, mine-sweeping vessels, submarine chasers, landing ships, amphibious armored vehicles, assault boats and various direct-aiming weapons also appeared in the drill site. The drill went through the whole procedures of a landing combat in four subjects, i.e., mobile assembly, loading and ferrying, assault landing and seizing and holding firmly the landing field.

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Refer to the article: Chinese Marine Corps kicks off "Dragon 2010" live-shell drill

[http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/04/content\\_4205595.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-11/04/content_4205595.htm)



Exercise scene

Source: [http://japanese.china.org.cn/photos/2010-11/03/content\\_21265937.htm](http://japanese.china.org.cn/photos/2010-11/03/content_21265937.htm)

### **November 3 "U. S. Cyber Command achieves full operational capability" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, November 03, 2010)**

On the 3rd, U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) announced that U.S. Cyber Command has achieved full operational capability (FOC). U.S. Cyber Command is responsible for directing activities to operate and defend DoD networks.

An outline of the article: On the 3rd, U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) announced that U.S. Cyber Command has achieved full operational capability (FOC). U.S. Cyber Command is responsible for directing activities to operate and defend DoD networks. Some of the critical FOC tasks included establishing a Joint Operations Center and transitioning personnel and functions from two existing organizations, the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. U.S. Cyber Command's development will not end at FOC, and the department will continue to grow the capacity and capability essential to operate and defend our networks effectively. U.S. Cyber Command is a sub-unified command under the U.S. Strategic Command. It reached its "initial operational

capability” on May 21, 2010.

Refer to the article: Cyber Command Achieves Full Operational Capability

<http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=14030>

### **【Related Story】**

#### **“Cyber Command seeks authority to attack worldwide network” (The Washington Post, November 6, 2010)**

The Cyber Command is seeking authority to carry out computer network attacks around the globe to protect U.S. interests.

An outline of the article: The Cyber Command is seeking authority to carry out computer network attacks around the globe to protect U.S. interests. Cyber Command's chief, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, who also heads the National Security Agency, wants sufficient maneuvering room for his new command to respond to the full spectrum of operations in cyberspace.

Refer to the article: Pentagon's Cyber Command seeks authority to expand its battlefield

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507304.html?wpisrc=nl\\_headline](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507304.html?wpisrc=nl_headline)

#### **November 8 “Vietnam’s Cam Rahn Bay base to become vital outpost in SCS” (The Telegraph, November 8, 2010)**

At a press interview after the end of the East Asian summit on October 30, Nguyen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese prime minister, said: “Vietnam will stand ready to service ships and submarines from all countries at the naval base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.” The British newspaper, The Telegraph dated October 8, reports that, if the foreign naval vessels are to be given access to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, an outpost would be emerging as a vital base to counter China in the South China Sea (SCS).

An outline of the article: At a press interview after the end of the East Asian summit on October 30, Nguyen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese prime minister, said: “Vietnam will stand ready to service ships and submarines from all countries at the naval base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay. Countries concerned will pay commensurate with the services provided.” The British newspaper, The Telegraph dated October 8, reports that, if the foreign naval vessels are to be given access to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, an outpost would be emerging as a vital base to counter China in the South China Sea (SCS). Russia is to help rebuild the port facilities in Cam Rahn Bay as part of an £1.3 billion defense deal signed earlier this year. The move is one of a series of interlocking regional arrangements that are being put in place to counter China’s growing might. In October, Vietnam also signed an agreement giving Indian naval ships base facilities at its ports. India, in turn, agreed to help Hanoi expand its naval logistics capabilities. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, October 2010, 1. 2.)

Refer to the article: Vietnam offers navy base to foil China

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/vietnam/8116192/Vietnam-offers-navy-base-to-foil-China.html>



Cam Ranh Bay, 180 miles northwest of Ho Chi Minh City, would stand ready to service ships and submarines 'from all countries'.

Source: The Telegraph, November 8, 2010

### **November 10 “USN CNO calls on China’s Navy to cooperate in SCS” (GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE MAGAZINE, November 11, 2010)**

On the 10th, ADM Roughead, Chief of the U. S. Naval Operations, said in his briefing on an expansion of the Chinese Navy that it is changing its operating patterns. It is more active in areas that are important to them as determined by sea lanes, by resources, and so that’s going to continue. Admiral Roughed mentioned that, as we do the work of anti-piracy in the Somali Basin, in my opinion, the same level of cooperation should be made in the South China Sea (SCS) and in other places.

An outline of the article: On the 10th, ADM Roughead, Chief of the U. S. Naval Operations, was asked his comments on an expansion of the Chinese Navy from the floor after leadership briefing in Washington D. C. The gist of his answers is as follows:

- (1) As history shows, as the country’s economy – and as that economy is driven by trade – grows, then their navy grows with it. The Portuguese did it; the Dutch did it; the British did it; the United States did it. China is now in that process of building up. The navy is changing its operating patterns. It is more active in areas that are important to them as determined by sea lanes, by resources, and so that’s going to continue.
- (2) Although China has to be transparent, it’s important for us to work toward a cooperative relationship with the PLA Navy. As we do the work of anti-piracy in the Somali Basin, in my opinion, the same level of cooperation should be made in the South China Sea (SCS) and in other places.

Refer to the article: (Leadership briefing by Admiral Roughhead, CNO US Navy)

<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/101111-govexec-roughead.pdf>

**November 16 “Vietnam, Philippines sign defense agreement” (NewsBalita.com, November 18, 2010)**

On October 25, Philippines Defense Secretary and Vietnamese Defense Minister signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on defense cooperation in Hanoi, the Department of National Defense (DND) of the Philippines announced on the 16th.

An outline of the article: On October 25, Philippines Defense Secretary and Vietnamese Defense Minister signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on defense cooperation in Hanoi, the Department of National Defense (DND) of the Philippines announced on the 16th. According to the DND of the Philippines, the MOA aims to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the Department of National Defense of the Philippines and the Ministry of National Defense of Vietnam. The two parties agreed to convene a Technical Working Group to implement the MOA.

Refer to the article: Vietnam and Philippines Sign Defence Agreement

<http://www.newsbalita.com/vietnam-and-philippines-sign-defense-agreement/>

**November 17 “US Navy’s amphibious ship visits Hong Kong” (BBC News, November 17, 2010)**

On the 17th, a US navy amphibious ship, USS *Essex*, visited Hong Kong. The USS *Essex* with 2,200 sailors is making a four-day port call there.

An outline of the article: On the 17th, a US navy amphibious ship, USS *Essex*, visited Hong Kong. Beijing suspended military ties with the US in February 2010 in protest over US arms sales to Taiwan. In October a visit by the USS *George Washington* to Hong Kong was reportedly cancelled. The USS *Essex* which carries 2,200 sailors and serves as the flagship of the Essex Amphibious Ready Group is making a four-day port call in Hong Kong. The US navy usually invites on board local Hong Kong government leaders and representatives of China's military but that did not happen this time.

Refer to the article: US navy Hong Kong visit hints at warmer China ties

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11772127>

**November 20 “China’s aircraft carrier ‘Shi Lang’ (ex-Varyag) possibly nearing completion” (The Australian, November 20, and Daily Mail Post, November 24, 2010)**

According to Western analysts, China’s first aircraft carrier, the *Shi Lang* (ex-Russian aircraft carrier *Varyag*), which has been undergoing conversion in the shipyard in Dalian, seems to be nearing completion. The *Shi Lang* is expected to make its maiden voyage next year or 2012.

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a new Chinese radar system has been installed. We know little about its engine but it appears work has been proceeding on that as well.” It is likely the *Varyag* will be used as a training platform. Officially, the Chinese say nothing. But the dockyard workers keep at it, and it’s possible to take photos from a distance. (Refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report, May 2009, 1. 2 Hot Topics.)

Refer to the article: First Chinese aircraft carrier nears completion

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/first-chinese-aircraft-carrier-nears-completion/story-e6frg6so-1225956776506>

First Chinese Aircraft Carrier almost Complete

<http://www.dailymailpost.com/?p=677>



Recent photographs of “*Shi Lang*”

Source: [http://www.varyagworld.com/portfolio.php?cat\\_id=6](http://www.varyagworld.com/portfolio.php?cat_id=6)

### **November 27 “Chinese navy’s hospital ship ‘Peace Ark’ returns home after accomplishing ‘Mission Harmony-2010’ mission” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, November 3, 27, 2010)**

On the 26th, the “Peace Ark” hospital ship which had departed Zhou shan in Zhejiang Province on August 31 returned home after accomplishing medical service mission - the “Harmonious Mission 2010.” Having provided medical services to the Chinese naval taskforce which was conducting anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, the “Peace Ark” stopped in five African countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Seychelles, and also provided medical services in Bangladesh.

An outline of the article: On the 26th, the “Peace Ark” hospital ship which had departed Zhou shan in Zhejiang Province on August 31 returned home after accomplishing medical service mission - the “Harmonious Mission 2010.” Having provided medical services to the Chinese naval taskforce which was conducting anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, the “Peace Ark” stopped in five African countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Seychelles, and also provided medical services in Bangladesh. On the occasion of the Peace Ark’s arrival in China, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy: Admiral Wu Shengli and Political Commissar of the Navy: Admiral Liu Xiaohe, and Deputy Political Commissar of the Navy: Xu Jian welcomed the hospital

ship. Xu said: "The mission this time was the first humanitarian support duty in foreign countries conducted by the hospital ship of the PLA Navy, which is an accomplishment of 'various military duties' of the navy, and a verification of the logistic capabilities of the maritime logistics. Moreover, it showed an image of the responsible Power which accomplishes the international obligations positively."

Refer to the article: Original text in Chinese;

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/03/content\\_42186.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/03/content_42186.htm)

[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/27/content\\_44263.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-11/27/content_44263.htm)

**November 28 "US, South Korean Forces hold joint military Exercise in Southern Area in Yellow Sea"(STRATFOR Global Intelligence, November 23, U.S. Pacific Command News, November 29, and American Forces Press Service, December 1, 2010)**

In the way of responding to the North Korean artillery fire, both U. S. and South Korean military forces conducted a joint military exercise in the southern part of sea areas in the Yellow Sea from November 28 to December 1. While this exercise is defensive in nature, and has been planned for some time, it underscores the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and their collective commitment to regional security and stability. The ships involved in the exercise include the *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and others, and several ships from the ROK.

An outline of the article: On the afternoon of the 23rd, North Korea fired artillery shells, which landed at Yeonpyeongd and in the surrounding waters off the west of the South Korea lying adjacent to the Northern Limited Line (NLL) which South Korea designates as the maritime border between South and North Korea. Some 50 rounds struck the island, putting private houses burst into flames, and injuring South Korean soldiers and inhabitants. South Korea responded by firing some 80 shells of its own toward North Korea, dispatching F-16 fighter jets to the area and raising the military alert to its highest level. In the way of responding to the situation, both U. S. and South Korean military forces conducted a joint military exercise in the southern part of sea areas in the Yellow Sea from November 28 to December 1. According to the reports of the U. S. Pacific Command News dated November 28 and the American Forces Press Service dated December 1, while this exercise is defensive in nature, and has been planned for some time, it underscores the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and their collective commitment to regional security and stability. The ships involved in the exercise include: the *Nimitz*-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* (CVN 73), with embarked Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5); the guided-missile cruiser USS *Cowpens* (CG 63); the guided-missile destroyers USS *Lassen* (DDG 82), USS *Stethem* (DDG 63), and USS *Fitzgerald* (DDG 62) from the United States; and several ships from the ROK. In addition Air Force elements from two nations also participated in the exercise. The two nations will conduct air defense and surface warfare readiness training, communications and data link drills and subject matter expert exchanges during the course of the exercise. Rear Adm. Dan Cloyd, commander, Task Force

70, said he's extremely confident in our collective capabilities to be able to execute any number of missions we may be asked to do, from higher-end operations such as those practiced during the exercise to humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Refer to the article: North Korean Artillery Attack on a Southern Island

[http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101123\\_north\\_korean\\_artillery\\_attack\\_southern\\_island?utm\\_source=RedAlert&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=101123&utm\\_content=readmore&elq=b86140567ed14ba38e53e24727c2de61](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101123_north_korean_artillery_attack_southern_island?utm_source=RedAlert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=101123&utm_content=readmore&elq=b86140567ed14ba38e53e24727c2de61)

George Washington Strike Group Begins Exercise with Republic of Korea

[http://www.pacom.mil/web/Site\\_Pages/Media/News%20201011/20101129-WG%20Strike%20Group%20Begins%20Exercise%20with%20ROK.shtml](http://www.pacom.mil/web/Site_Pages/Media/News%20201011/20101129-WG%20Strike%20Group%20Begins%20Exercise%20with%20ROK.shtml)

Naval Exercise Wraps Up In South Korea

[http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=57489](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=57489)

North Korean Artillery Attack on a Southern Island

[http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101123\\_north\\_korean\\_artillery\\_attack\\_southern\\_island?utm\\_source=RedAlert&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=101123&utm\\_content=readmore&elq=b86140567ed14ba38e53e24727c2de61](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101123_north_korean_artillery_attack_southern_island?utm_source=RedAlert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=101123&utm_content=readmore&elq=b86140567ed14ba38e53e24727c2de61)



Source: STRATFOR Global Intelligence, November 23, 2010

### 1.3 Maritime Boundaries

#### November 6 “Vietnam demands China to remove ‘U-shaped’ line on online map” (Thanh Nien News, November 6, 2010)

On the 5th, Vietnam asked China to remove a “U-shaped” line showing its claims to over 80 percent of the East Sea (South China Sea) from its map on a newly launched online mapping service.

An outline of the article: On the 5th, Vietnam asked China to remove a “U-shaped” line showing its claims to over 80 percent of the East Sea (South China Sea) from its map on a newly launched online mapping service. The China’s State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping has critically violated Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes by presenting the map with the nine-dotted line on the two websites, said spokeswoman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has also violated Vietnam’s sovereignty rights and jurisdiction in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, she added.

Two websites (in Chinese) are: [www.tianditu.cn](http://www.tianditu.cn) and [www.chinaonmap.cn](http://www.chinaonmap.cn)

Refer to the article: Vietnam demands China removes illegal dotted line on online map

<http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20101106120629.aspx>

#### November 16 “New Chinese fishery patrol vessel sets out for East China Sea” (Xinhua, November 16, 2010)

On the 16th, China's first fishery patrol vessel “*Yuzheng 310*” began its 20-day maiden voyage from Guangzhou to patrol in the East China Sea. The vessel is under the Administration for Fishery and Fishing Harbor Supervision in the South China Sea under the Ministry of Agriculture. The 2,580-ton vessel, with a crew of 60, has a maximum speed of 22 nautical miles per hour and a platform for two Z-9A helicopters. It is equipped with broadband satellite communications and a photoelectric tracking system.

An outline of the article: On the 16th, China's first fishery patrol vessel “*Yuzheng 310*” began its 20-day maiden voyage from Guangzhou to patrol in the East China Sea. The vessel is under the Administration for Fishery and Fishing Harbor Supervision in the South China Sea under the Ministry of Agriculture. The 2,580-ton vessel, with a crew of 60, has a maximum speed of 22 nautical miles per hour and a platform for two Z-9A helicopters. It is equipped with broadband satellite communications and a photoelectric tracking system. “The use of the vessel marks as a milestone for China's marine law enforcement patrol work, as the vessel can combine air and surface surveillance,” said Li Jianhua, director of the ministry's fishery bureau. Li said the Chinese government had planned to build more such fisheries patrol vessels.

Refer to the article: New Chinese fishery patrol vessel sets out for East China Sea

[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/16/c\\_13609300.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/16/c_13609300.htm)





“Yuzheng310”

Source: [http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2010-11/30/content\\_21449761.htm](http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2010-11/30/content_21449761.htm)

**【Related Story】“Chinese fishery patrol vessels sail off Senkaku Islands” (The Japan Times, Kyodo News, November 29, 2010)**

The two Chinese vessels, the *Yuzheng 310* and *Yuzheng 201*, were spotted navigating through a contiguous zone about 44 km northwest of Taisho Island, one of the islets in Senkaku chain on the morning of the 28th. The Chinese vessels were sailing around the islands and outside of Japan's territorial waters.

An outline of the article: Japan Coast Guard officials said, the two Chinese vessels, *the Yuzheng 310* and *Yuzheng 201*, were spotted navigating through a contiguous zone about 44 km northwest of Taisho Island, one of the islets in Senkaku chain on the morning of the 28th. The Chinese vessels were sailing around the islands and outside of Japan's territorial waters. The Japanese ships warned them by radio not to enter Japanese territorial waters. The two vessels were the same ones spotted sailing off the Senkaku islands on November 20.

Refer to the article: Chinese ships return to Senkakus

<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101129a4.html>



“Yuzheng201”

Source: [http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2010-11/30/content\\_21449761.htm](http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2010-11/30/content_21449761.htm)

## 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

### November 4 “Russian expert: No change of strategic value on Northern Islands” (Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 200, The Jamestown Foundation, November 4, 2010)

Dr. Pavel E. Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based defense analyst, has contributed an article titled “The Kurile Islands: a Key to Russia’s Maritime Nuclear Strategy” to the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the U. S. think tank - The Jamestown Foundation, in which he mentions the strategic values on the Northern Islands, as follows: The Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers of nuclear attack submarines (SSN’s) and surface ships to defend the deployment of the newest *Borey* submarines in the open Pacific. The only safe option seems to be deployment to the semi-closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Island chain. However, to keep the Kuriles, Moscow needs massive investment to develop the local economy and Japanese participation in exchange for Habomai and Shikotan. Moscow seems to be actively pressing for a deal, while handing over control of Kunashir and Iturup is out of the question.

An outline of the article: Dr. Pavel E. Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based defense analyst, has contributed an article titled “The Kurile Islands: a Key to Russia’s Maritime Nuclear Strategy” to the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the U. S. think tank - The Jamestown Foundation, in which he mentions the strategic values on the Northern Islands, as well as the possibility of Russian handover of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. The gist of the article is as follows:

- (1) Kunashir (Japanese name—Kunashiri) and Iturup (Japanese name—Etorofu) are situated in the southern tip of the Kurile Island chain that separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. In military-strategic value, the two islands differ from Habomai and Shikotan which form the Lesser Kurile Islands chain to the east. In times of conflict, Russia could mine the straits between the Kurile Islands and effectively isolate the Sea of Okhotsk, allowing strategic nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles to deploy in relative safety.
- (2) After the end of the Cold War the military significance of the Kuriles seemed to diminish, but it should not necessarily be taken that way. The six newer *Delta-4* class strategic submarines (SSBN), which have been modernized in recent years and will be in service until 2020 or 2025, are permanently based in the Barents Sea (the Northern Fleet) together with one older *Delta-3* class SSBN. Although only 4 old *Delta-3* class SSBN’s are today deployed in the Pacific Fleet in the Vilyuchinsk naval base in Kamchatka, they are scheduled to be scrapped before 2015. But it was lately disclosed that the Pacific Fleet will be boosted by the newest *Borey*-class SSBN with the new Bulava SS-NX-30 ballistic missile. Facilities are already prepared in Vilyuchinsk for the first—the *Yury Dolgoruky*. After the Yuri Dolgoruky deploys, it is assessed that other *Borey* class SSBN’s will follow.
- (3) The Russian navy does not have sufficient numbers of nuclear attack submarines (SSN’s) and surface ships to defend the deployment of the newest *Borey* submarines in the open Pacific.

The only safe option seems the semi-closed Sea of Okhotsk, guarded by the Kurile Island chain. To keep the Kuriles, Moscow needs massive investment to develop the local economy and Japanese participation in exchange for Habomai and Shikotan. Moscow seems to be actively pressing for a deal, while handing over control of Kunashir and Iturup is out of the question.

- (4) Handing over to Japan even the Habomai and Shikotan Islets would give away important fisheries and other possible natural riches, which would create a “precedent” for rewriting the post-World War II borders. However, Russia is not a democracy, and Moscow does not seem to hesitate it, if it be necessary.

Refer to the article: The Kurile Islands: a Key to Russia’s Maritime Nuclear Strategy

[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=37127&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no\\_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37127&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no_cache=1)

## 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors

### November 5 “Is world’s shipping crown shifting from London to Singapore?” (Shiptalk, November 5, 2010)

London’s position as the world’s top shipping hub is being challenged by emerging Asian contenders such as Singapore and possibly Shanghai. In Singapore new maritime set-ups have been made in recent months. Singapore has got both the physical shipping business alongside the maritime services. But, on the other hand, many players say the sheer strength of London, built up over centuries, as a maritime capital is unlikely to be matched. Additionally, Singapore faces challenges itself especially from Shanghai.

An outline of the article: London’s position as the world’s top shipping hub is being challenged by emerging Asian contenders such as Singapore and possibly Shanghai. In Singapore new maritime set-ups have been made in recent months. UK-based Ship-owners’ P&I Club has opened its first overseas Asian office in Singapore. Global ship broker Clarksons relocated its Hong Kong dry cargo broking teams to Singapore, while Swiss Re moved its Hong Kong marine reinsurance operations to Singapore. Rolls Royce moved the global headquarters for its marine business to Singapore from London in 2009. In early 2010 ship broker Howe Robinson moved its corporate headquarters to Singapore from London. Jeremy Penn, vice chairman of Maritime UK, which represents the UK’s maritime industries, said: “Right now Singapore has got both the physical shipping business alongside the maritime services.” Singapore is stable politically and has a legal system that is also strong and stable. In shipping, compared with Norway, London and the United States, they provide government incentives for non-Singaporean businesses. Company tax exemption schemes in Singapore have already benefited maritime businesses including groups such as Marco Polo Shipping and Mercator Lines. Some in the shipping sector have argued that the UK government’s moves to raise corporation tax and other fiscal initiatives including higher

personal tax could also push new business away from London.

But, on the other hand, many players say the sheer strength of London, built up over centuries, as a maritime capital is unlikely to be matched. “There is a huge residual body of knowledge and expertise not just in ship broking but in law, insurance, banking, ship registry and that is not going to go away over night,” said Kidwell, whose company has expanded its Asian operations. Jeremy Penn aforementioned said it had started to report some of its Asia route information in the Asian afternoon, the freight market still largely trades in the European day. “For the time being at least the time zone does help,” he said. “The use of English law and therefore the prejudice in favor of London arbitration is a huge advantage. The adjacency of a major financial centre as well is also an advantage.” Additionally, Singapore faces challenges itself especially from Shanghai. “I believe Singapore will become a major shipping hub but I don’t think it will supplant London,” said Harry Theochari, global head of transport with Norton Rose in London. “The biggest problem Singapore faces is the development of Shanghai. If I were a betting man I would put my money on Shanghai.”

Refer to the article: Is Shipping Crown Heading East?

<http://www.shiptalk.com/?p=6381>

## **1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others**

### **November 2 “South Korea to build massive offshore wind farms off SW coast” (The Chosun Ilbo, November 3, 2010)**

Offshore wind farms capable of producing the same amount of electricity as two nuclear plants will be built on the southwest coast by 2019, the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy announced on the 2nd. According to the program, they will be built with a W9.2 trillion (About 670 billion yen) investment from the public and private sectors. The government wants Korea to become one of the top three countries in terms of offshore wind power generation.

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In the first phase, wind farms with 20 turbines each with the capacity of 5 MW will be built near Buan, North Jeolla Province and Yeonggwang, South Jeolla Province to generate 100 MW electricity by 2013. Capacity will steadily increase to 900 MW by 2016, and 2,500 MW by 2019. The electricity produced here will be supplied nationwide through substations in Gochang and Saemangeum in North Jeolla Province.

The ministry plans to accelerate the process through a negotiating body formed by power monopoly KEPCO and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. The ministry is also reviewing plans for

smaller offshore wind farms in Jeju Island and other parts of the country. “Offshore wind power causes less destruction to the environment and generates fewer complaints from nearby residents, and plants are easier to build,” a ministry official said. “If we could integrate it with relevant industries such as shipbuilding, heavy industries, offshore plant construction and information technology, we can compete globally soon.”

Refer to the article: Korea to Build Massive Offshore Wind Farms

[http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2010/11/03/2010110300765.html](http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/11/03/2010110300765.html)

#### **November 4 “Burma to build SEZ in southern border with Thai” (BBC News, November 4, 2010)**

On the 4th, Burma announced the setting-up of its first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Dawei (Tavoy) township near the southern border with Thailand. The zone would be developed around a deep sea port in Dawei, covering up to 64,000 hectares.

An outline of the article: On the 4th, Burma announced the setting-up of its first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Dawei (Tavoy) township near the southern border with Thailand. The zone would be developed around a deep sea port in Dawei, covering up to 64,000 hectares. Infrastructure development contracts were endorsed by the two governments to enable the construction of rail and road links with western Thailand. The Dawei SEZ will also have a hydro-electricity power plant, petrochemical and refinery plants, and upstream steel mills. The framework concession agreement on the project, signed between Italian-Thai Development (ITD) public company and the Burmese Port Authority, is worth \$13.4bn. It is expected to be completed in 10 years. ITD will seek investment partners, and many investors from South Korea, China and India have shown interest. In September, the head of the Burmese military junta, Gen Than Shwe, visited China's SEZ in Shenzhen, and it is estimated that Burma's SEZ may be similar to that of Shenzhen in China.

Refer to the article: Burma to build its first Special Economic Zone

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11692574>

#### **November 26 “Taiwan seeks ‘transferring’ mothballed fishing vessels to Atlantic: Paris special meeting of ICCAT” (AFP, November 26, 2010)**

In Taiwan, sixty-six of 141 vessels equipped to fish bigeye tuna have ceased their operations due to the threat of Somali piracy. Therefore, to compensate for the lost business, Taiwan is seeking permission to “transfer” 15 of the mothballed fishing vessels from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, which would be limited to 2010 and 2011, by a document submitted by Taiwan to the 17th special session (annual meeting) of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (ICCAT).

An outline of the article: More than a third of Taiwan's tuna-fishing fleet in the Indian Ocean has been scared off by the threat of piracy, according to Taiwanese delegates at a fisheries meeting underway in Paris (between November 17 and 27). Sixty-six of 141 vessels equipped to fish bigeye tuna “have ceased their operations due to the escalating situation,” noted a document

submitted by Taiwan to the 17th special session (annual meeting) of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (ICCAT). The escalation of piracy has severely undermined the livelihood of the fishermen concerned and affected the legitimate operation of the industry. Since 2009, three Taiwan-flagged vessels and their crews have been hijacked by pirates from Somalia. On 6 April 2009, FV *Wen Fa No 161* was hijacked, and was released on February 11, 2010. On March 31 and May 6, the *Jih Chun Tsai No. 68* and the *Tai Yuan No. 227* were hijacked, respectively, which, along with their crews, are still held by pirates. To compensate for the lost business, Taiwan is seeking permission to “transfer” 15 of the mothballed fishing vessels from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, which would be limited to 2010 and 2011, the proposal said. “Once the problem of piracy is resolved, or the period is expired, the vessels will return to the Indian Ocean,” it said. The 48-member ICCAT, which is comprised of 47 nations, EU, and Taiwan, is charged with setting the rules and quotas for fisheries in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, including all species of commercially-fished tunas.

Regarding the results of the meeting, refer to the Web site of the Japanese Fishery Agency. However, it is unknown whether or not the request of Taiwan has been approved:

[http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/101128\\_1.html](http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/101128_1.html)

Refer to the article: Piracy sidelines third of Taiwan's Indian Ocean tuna fleet

[http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101126/sc\\_afp/environmentfishtunataiwansomaliapiracy](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101126/sc_afp/environmentfishtunataiwansomaliapiracy)

## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### **Incident of collisions between Japan's Coast Guard's patrol vessels and Chinese trawler off Senkaku Islands: From perspective on China's diplomacy and internal affairs**

From perspective overseas, the exertion of pressure on Japan at the incident of collisions between Japan's Coast Guard's patrol vessels and Chinese trawler (fishing boat) off Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao in Chinese name) (hereafter, incident) is taken as a phenomenon of showing an escalation of China's postures against foreign countries, together with a theory of "core interests" in the South China Sea (SCS) and a demonstration of military power by the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the maritime area in East Asia.

Now, what kinds of discussions are underway about this incident in China? How are the overseas comments regarding that the Chinese foreign postures are being intensified taken in China? Additionally, what kind of response has appeared in China?

#### **1. Incidents of trawler's collisions near Senkaku Islands viewed from China: Factors underlying Japanese internal affairs**

On September 8, 2010, a Chinese trawler (fishing boat) collided with the Japanese coast guard patrol vessels in the waters in the vicinity of the Senkaku Island, and the Ishigaki Coast Guard Office arrested the captain of the fishing boat. When an extension of period for detaining the captain was decided, China's strong posture toward Japan was escalated. On September 23, premier Wen Jiabo made an address in the United Nations, in which he stressed that, regarding the sovereignty, "China will not make any concessions."

Regarding an extension of period for detaining the captain, I received the mail message from a Chinese researcher in Beijing. It says: "In the past it used to be a tacit way to deport the fishermen. Anyway, how will the Kan government deal with China-Japan relations?" In a situation where China's strong posture toward Japan was escalating, this Chinese researcher asked me about the true intention of the response of the of Kan's government while trying to behave calmly.

In the Chinese media, an interpretation was carried that the arrest and extension of detention of the Chinese captain had been caused by the Japanese internal politics. According to Ye Hailin, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, it is said to be an understanding of the China side that "a few political groups in Japan utilized the issue of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao) and tried to obtain the results in the inimical, domestic politic of Japan."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 葉海林「釣魚島風波の拐点効応」『国際先駆導報』2010年11月5日。

## 2. Is it an “initiation of debate-battles”(Xinglunzhan=興論戰) : Chinese researchers were puzzled over the external posture of Chinese government

Eventually, the Kan government released the Chinese captain (Zhan Qixiong) by a suspension of disposition on September 25. Right after the Chinese captain was released, I was attending the conference in Shanghai. At that time the Chinese government was demanding the Japanese government an apology and compensation. Regardless of such circumstances, some Chinese researchers expressed, in an informal way, surprise and anxieties at the rapid deterioration of China-Japan relations. A few of them were at a loss for the responses of the Chinese government, voicing concern. As I have seen many Chinese researchers who used to make the strenuous efforts of supporting the views of the Chinese government, it was an impressive experience for me.

It seems to be not only myself that was impressed by the Chinese researchers who have doubts about the Chinese government. David Zweig at the University of Hong Kong, who has also been active in publishing many articles in the United States, said in the article which he had contributed to the *Wall Street Journal* that Chinese researchers were perplexed by the strong external postures of the Chinese government and the military forces, and some of them were even angered at them.<sup>2</sup>

A look of anxieties of Chinese researchers seems to be directed at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to Zweig, Chinese researchers are said to have agreed to the views that the PLA is serving as an interest group. In China, the military personnel often appear on television, and the PLA is implementing its tasks, and placing itself in the situation of discussing diplomatic policies, which is, as pointed out by Zweig, making Chinese researchers worried. He said: “Chinese researchers are not the military personnel who aim to obtain the budget more, but they believe that their own more balanced voices should be taken up in the media.”<sup>3</sup>

It might be possible to interpret with a cool, realistic eye that such kind of appearances of Chinese researchers would be one of “debate-battles” that will mitigate the tone of strong image created by the Chinese government and the PLA.

Under a certain condition, there might be a scene in which such kind of an interpretation may be necessary. It is because the Chinese government and media have begun to dispatch messages actively that there is a “territorial issue” between Japan and China over the incident of the collisions of the fishing vessel off the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, on November 20, China’s fisheries administration patrol boats of the Agriculture Ministry, *Yuzheng 201* and *Yuzheng 310*, circumnavigated counterclockwise along the territorial line in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.

However, at least, before concluding in that way, we should bear in mind the following points: It is because we should avoid consciously to be entangled in the wrong impression that “all

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<sup>2</sup> DAVID ZWEIG, “Spooked by China's Hawks? So Are the Chinese”, *The Wall Street Journal*, November 11, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703848204575607752838513836.html>

<sup>3</sup> ZWEIG, “Spooked by China's Hawks? So Are the Chinese”.



Chinese actions must be strategic and intentional.” Firstly, the Chinese researchers do not necessarily grasp everything that occurs in the Chinese government. Secondly, there are Chinese researchers that are regarded to have influence on the Chinese government, but, in reality, it would be difficult for them to control the PLA. In China, the difference of opinions between the civilians and the military over the external affairs is getting to be noticeable.

If so, what’s the matter in the world? What will regulate the actions of the Chinese political leadership and the PLA? This issue seems to be an important theme not only for us, the foreign researchers, but also for the Chinese researchers themselves. Before interpreting China’s foreign postures, the coordinate of views of China’s domestic affairs is indispensable.

### 3. “Spilt water cannot be gathered again.”(What is done can’t be undone.) : China-Japan relations cannot go back from “Territorial Issue”

Even so, there is also a limit. Firstly, general “confusion” on the external postures of the Chinese government and the PLA noticeable in the Chinese researchers will not make them turn down an assertion that the “territorial issue” exists between China and Japan. According to the points of the argument of Zweig aforementioned, a Chinese researcher is said to have doubted “why the Chinese government demanded an apology and approved staging anti-Japanese demonstrations in the inland of China,” so long as the release of the Chinese captain of the boat was certainly a victory for China.<sup>4</sup> The reaction of the Chinese government of not solving the affair by the release of the captain is said to have been too excessive.

Secondly, although the U.S. involvement in the defense of the Senkaku Island was confirmed over and over again, the view of taking it as a problem is agreed in China side. In the foreign ministers’ meeting between the United States and China held in Hanoi on October 30, Secretary of State Rodham Clinton is said to have proposed a dialogue among three parties of Japan, the United States and China. On November 2, pointing out that “it is merely an idea of the United States,” Ma Chaoxu at the Chinese foreign ministry refused the U. S. proposal.<sup>5</sup>

The *Xinhua Agency* dated November 3 carried a comment of Professor Shi Yinhong at China People’s University that the proposal is against the “common sense” that the “territorial dispute between the sovereign states shall be settled by the nations concerned.”<sup>6</sup>

Thirdly, the opinions of the Chinese researchers are not monolithic, and sometimes unrefined arguments are noted. Since the incident of the collisions of the fishing boat the descriptions of the Okinawa islands have been observed more frequently. The Chinese journal “*Huan Qiu Bao*” frequently carries articles by Tan Chunfeng, a researcher of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of the Ministry of Commercial Affairs, which include: “The Ryukyu is not a Japanese territory, and Japan has no qualification to talk about the Diaoyu Dao with China.” and “China

<sup>4</sup> ZWEIG, “Spooked by China's Hawks? So Are the Chinese”.

<sup>5</sup> 中国外交部、「外交部發言人馬朝旭 11 月 2 日應記者問」、2010 年 11 月 3 日。  
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxfbh/xwfbh/wjb/201011/t794990.htm>

<sup>6</sup> 「美国插手釣魚島不利于問題的解决」『新華網』、2010 年 11 月 3 日。  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-11/03/c\\_13589573.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-11/03/c_13589573.htm)

has to directly urge a movement of independence on the Ryukyu.”<sup>7</sup>

These limits suggest that they could not pass away the recognition that there is a “territorial issue” between China and Japan in China as if “it had never existed.” While mentioning Chinese and Japanese government should not “sink” the relations between the two countries because of a single incident of the collisions, Ye Hailin at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences pointed out that “there is no longer such vigor as was previously noted in the diplomatic area of two nations ‘in repairing the friction’ or ‘maintaining strategic and mutually beneficial relationship.’”<sup>8</sup> The “territorial issue” can not be solved by any other means except zero-sum game method. It should be called by the name of either the “Senkaku Island” or the “Diaoyu Dao” and there is basically no intermediate point between the two names. This is, so called, a structural inconsistency.

Ye Hailin is regarding the connotation that the collisions of the fishing boat off the Senkaku Islands have brought about to the relations between Japan and China and the Chinese diplomacy pessimistic. The relations between Japan and China will not be recovered by the structural inconsistency called “territorial issue.” Moreover, according to Ye, the method which the China’s diplomacy has long been seeking to mitigate the clash of interests by expanding the common interests did not function practically. “As the China’s real power increases, and under the circumstances where the power balance between China and other nations changes drastically, even if China itself recognizes that it is pursuing to find out common points and leave the different points (qiu tong cun yi (求同存異) in Chinese), Beijing is regarded to “be taking strong measures” by foreign countries.<sup>9</sup> (OPRF comment: qiu tong cun yi (求同存異) in Chinese is to “seek common ground while reserving differences” in English. Source: The Chinese- English Dictionary, 北京外國語學院 (Beijing Foreign Language University), 商務印書館, 香港, 1979, p. 559),

#### 4. Public opinion is a double-edged sword for Chinese diplomacy

In the Chinese media there are arguments which take note of a role of public opinion about the incident off Senkaku Islands. The “*guojixianqudaobao (international leading journal)*” carried an article which mentioned that, although public opinion supports Chinese diplomacy, it is a double-edged sword which will greatly limit space for China’s diplomatic activities.<sup>10</sup> This article has pointed out that public opinion has two effects on China’s diplomacy toward Japan. Firstly, public opinion has supported the Chinese diplomacy. Lu Fengding at China Foreign Affairs University said that the reason why Japan released the Chinese captain was because Japan was afraid of anger of China’s internal public opinion to some extent. He Liang, a commentator at the Hong Kong-based Phoenix television, highly evaluated that the release of Chinese captain by Japan was brought about by the good mutual effects between Chinese government and China’s

<sup>7</sup> 「中国应指示琉球独立運動」『環球時報』、2010年11月8日。

<http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-11/1234470.html> ;

「琉球并非日本領土、日没資格与我對話釣魚島」『環球時報』、2010年11月10日。

<http://history.huanqiu.com/china/2010-11/1243397.html> ;

<sup>8</sup> 葉、「釣魚島風波的拐點效應」。

<sup>9</sup> 葉、「釣魚島風波的拐點效應」。

<sup>10</sup> 「民意助力中国外交出擊」『國際先驅導報』2010年11月9日。

public opinion. Secondly, the article also pointed out: “There are side-effects in public opinion, which is a kind of a double-edged sword.” As an example of side-effects of the public opinion, it was mentioned that part of public opinion on the net sought a settlement of the issues over the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea by means of war. The article warned that “such opinions will not distinctly serve the national interests, but once such a situation arises, it will be a great pressure on the diplomatic sector.”<sup>11</sup>

The article mentioned as an opinion of Gu Qingguo, a professor of the international relations at the Beijing University, that cases in which Chinese diplomatic authorities cut the “public opinion cards” are increasing. Professor Gu mentioned as a case that the Chinese government has refuted a demand from the United States to raise the rate of renminyuan as there is an opposition of public opinion. Gu said, “As the government represents the people, the government cannot do what will harm the interests of the people.”

However, this article is as a whole declining to a tone of admonishing an excessive public opinion, which is known from the part which is mentioned as a comment of an anonymous expert of the international relations. “The duties of diplomats are to build good diplomatic relations with other nations. It is different from the military personnel whose duties are to defend the nation by threat of force. However, some diplomats seem to be influenced by public opinions, his words are extremely strong, and they even have some spirits of the military personnel. This will not serve a settlement of the diplomatic issues. Diplomacy should be an art of mutual concessions.

Well then, how will the Chinese government face with the public opinions? Gu Qingdao is said to have stressed “we have to respect the public opinions fully and we have to clarify our opposition to narrow nationalism.” The article in the “*guojixianqudaobao (international leading journal)*” emphasized that “the best way to erase the narrow-minded and one-sided opinions is not to prohibit them, but to limit the people’s rights of expressions and to have the nation explain faithfully about foreign policy.”<sup>12</sup>

Also in Japan, it is said that the government should explain the nation about its foreign policy. The same opinions are noted in the Chinese media. However, what is more interesting is the method of a solution for limiting the people’s rights of expressions to suppress the narrow-minded nationalism. The Chinese government is going to carry out the diplomacy which is “the art of mutual concessions” while keeping inconsistencies of the political system. Here is the twisted “agony” of the Chinese diplomacy.

(By Aki Mori, Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Law, Department of Political Science, the Doshisha University, and Fellow of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF))

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<sup>11</sup> 「民意助力中国外交出击」。

<sup>12</sup> 「民意助力中国外交出击」。





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