


# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## February 2010



### CONTENTS

#### Major Events in February 2010

1. Information Digest
  - 1.1 Maritime Security
  - 1.2 Military Development
  - 1.3 Maritime Boundaries
  - 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations
  - 1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors
  - 1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others
2. Intelligence Assessment
  - 2.1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
  - 2.2 The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

This monthly report is edited/ summarized by publisher and staff writers based on published news resources.

Each resource is referenced with bracket below each title and is displayed as link URL on the last page of this report.

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## Major Events in February 2010

**Maritime Security:** In February five vessels which had been captured by Somali pirates were released. Of them, there was a Taiwanese fishing boat, FV *Win Far 161* which was freed on February 11 after 10 months since it was captured. On the other hand, two ships were hijacked. From March after the end of monsoon the piracy is expected to become active.

In Southeast Asia, on the 6th contact was lost with a Singaporean-flagged tug with a barge in tow in the vicinity of Pulau Tioman. Later, crew was saved. The tug and barge were found in the area in the vicinity of the northern end of the Mindanao Island. However, ship's name had been changed. The Philippine police are keeping the Chief Engineer who has been missing and seven pirates for investigation.

On the 20th, the Turkish Navy's frigate TCG *Gemlik* belonging to CTF-151 swooped on a skiff which was acting suspiciously in the vicinity of Panamanian-flagged MV *APL Finland* (8,100TEU) inside IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, and the naval Special Forces arrested seven pirates. With this latest arrest, the total of captured pirates by Turkish Navy increased to 42.

On the 2nd, Turkish parliament approved extending the period of deploying naval vessels to the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) to fight piracy off Somalia for another year. Already Turkey has been deploying a frigate - TCG *Gemlik* since February 1. The deployment period is authorized to be extended for another year, starting from February 10, when the current mandate expires.

On the 24th, European Union (EU) defense ministers agreed to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta, with which they can watch over Somali ports where pirate ships are based, and neutralize the mother ships that allow the pirates to operate more than 1,000 km from the Somali coast. Furthermore, the EU ministers also agreed to improve the application of the agreements that exist with Kenya and the Seychelles for taking legal action against pirates that are detained and to increase efforts to achieve similar agreements with other countries in the region, such as Tanzania, Mauritius and South Africa.

**Military Development:** On the 1st, the South Korean Navy has mobilized its first fast-response combat unit. It is composed of the country's first Aegis combat destroyer, *King Sejong the Great* and six *KDX-II* class destroyers (4,500 displacement tons). The unit will be made up with two squadrons based at naval bases in Busan and Jinhae. When the second Aegis-class destroyer, *Yulgok Yi Yi* is put into operation in August 2010, each squadron will be composed of one Aegis destroyer and three *KDX-II* class destroyers.

On the 5th, Indian navy sponsored a 13-nation naval exercise, "Exercise Milan 2010" off its Andaman archipelago. It lasted until February 8. The nine warships from the navies of Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore (two warships), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand and Vietnam took part in the exercise, in addition to senior naval officials from Brunei, the Philippines, New Zealand and Vietnam.

On the 8th, an official of the French defense ministry said France had already agreed in

principal to sell the Russians one *Mistral*-class warship. Russia's navy intends to buy four command ships. However he added that at the moment it was a "technical inquiry" and needed to be vetted at a political level. On the other hand, Secretary of Russia's Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said on the 9th Russia is still studying whether or not to purchase a *Mistral*-class vessel.

On the 8th, a spokesman of the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk said Russia has already started the construction of the fourth unit of a new *Borey*-class strategic nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN). Russia is planning to build eight of these subs by 2015. Fourth-generation *Borey*-class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to constitute the core of Russia's modern strategic submarine fleet.

On the 12th, at Fincantieri shipyard in La Spezia, Italy there was the launch of the first of two fleet tankers ordered by the Indian Navy, with delivery scheduled by the end of the year 2010. The order is the first surface vessel India has ever made to a European company.

On the 16th, the US Navy's first littoral combat ship, USS *Freedom* (LCS 1), left Mayport in Florida for her maiden operational deployment to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) areas of focus. *Freedom* will participate in counter-illicit trafficking (CIT) operations in the areas under the two Commands.

On the 17th, Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps of the Pacific, said during a speech in Tokyo that the U.S. bases in Okinawa are strategically necessary. He pointed out, "In order to fulfill our alliance responsibilities to defend Japan, the Marine Corps, the expeditionary, rapidly deployable branch of the U.S. military and the only forward-deployed and available U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India, must be based on Okinawa and must have its helicopters near its ground forces."

On the 17th, having completed five-month operations in the Arabian Sea, the US aircraft carrier USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68), along with other warships, arrived in Hong Kong. They will stay there for five days.

Director of the PLA Navy's Arms Research Institute, Rear Admiral (RADM) Zhao Yongfu said in an interview with the *PLA Daily* that for China the amphibious ships have an important feature of being "conveniently used, but not expensive."

On the 1st, the U.S. Department of Defense released the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR2010) for the first time since an inauguration of President Barack Obama. The QDR2010 lists in order of priority (a) victory against war on terror, (b) the prevention and deterrence of conflicts, (c) defeat of adversaries and readiness for various measures against emergencies, and (d) management and strengthening of the All-volunteer Force. The OPRF has summarized its main points in the QDR2010 in Chapter 2 "Intelligence Assessment" in this monthly report.

On the 5th, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (hereafter text) by presidential decree, and released its content on the 6th. The text revised the previous "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" signed on 21 April 2000 over a span of ten years. The OPRF has summarized an outline and features of the text, adding as a supplement the main points briefly translated from the text at the end of this

article in Chapter 2 “Intelligence Assessment” in this monthly report.

**Maritime Boundaries:** According to the reports from the *PLA Daily* and others, on January 4 2010, a naval survey team of the China’s East Sea Fleet (ESF) constructed at Waikiejiao in the East China Sea (ECS), 33 00.9' N and 121 38.4' E,13, permanent facilities - stone tablets and lighthouses to clarify its territorial waters' baseline in the oil-rich area. The Xinhua reported China has not reached an agreement with neighboring countries over territorial waters, and China and Japan hold territorial disputes on overlapping claims of their extended continental shelf in the ECS.

**Diplomacy and International Relations:** Argentina’s president Cristina Kirchner has recently issued a new decree compelling all ships calling at Argentine ports to get previous approval before sailing to or from British-controlled waters. Any boat that wants to travel between ports on the Argentine mainland to the Islas Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands must first ask for permission from the Argentine government. Tensions between the UK and Argentina are becoming increasingly strained for the Falklands, a territory over which Argentina and Britain fought in 1982

The two US media - the *New York Times* dated February 15 and *UPI* dated February 17 – carried articles reporting India is worried that China is building ports in South Asia.

**Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors:** On the 6th, Japan and Gujarat government of India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to upgrade existing Alang shipyard in Bhavnagar. Based on the MOU, Japan will provide technology transfer and financial assistance to upgrade the yard at Alang to the international standards.

Spain, which currently holds the European Union (EU) Presidency, has recently become the first EU member state to ratify the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Maritime Labor Convention, 2006 (MLC2006). As all EU members are expected to ratify the Convention before 31 December 2010, Spain’s leadership in early 2010, the International Year of the Seafarer, is especially significant, ILO informed.

On the 12th, Vietnamese SP-PSA International Port successfully handled a trial call by the MV *Albert Maersk* of the Maersk Line. MV *Albert Maersk* is 352m-long and has a capacity of 109,000 DWT (8,272TEU). It is the largest ship ever to call at a Vietnamese port, whether by length, deadweight tonnage or container capacity.

**Ocean Resources, Energy, Sea Environment and Others:** Number of major oil spills from tankers has dropped dramatically over recent years. According to latest statistics from the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), there was no major oil spill recorded from tankers during 2009, although bunker spills continued to occur. This is the first time since the organization began collating tanker spill statistics that there were no reports of a 700 ton or greater spill.

According to the website of the Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK), the NYK and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) are to begin experiments on an “air-lubrication system” to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during marine transport. The jointly developed system effectively reduces the frictional resistance between a vessel’s bottom and the seawater by means of bubbles generated by supplying air to the vessel’s bottom. According to the website, the world's first permanent installation of the system using an air-blower is expected to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by approximately 10 percent.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Maritime Security

### February 1 “Somali pirates free Greek ship” (Trade Winds, February 2, 2010)

On the 1st, Somali pirates released the Greek bulk carrier MV *Filitsa* (Marshall Islands-flagged). A ransom of \$3m was reportedly paid. MV *Filitsa* (23,700DWT) was seized in the Indian Ocean on November 11, 2009 while it was en route from Kuwait to South Africa. The 22 crew of the vessel comprising three Greeks and 19 Filipinos are on board.



MV *Filitsa* seen anchored off the coast of the town of Hobyo in northeastern Somalia on January 5, 2010.

Source: CNN, February 2, 2010

### February 1 “Somali pirates free Indian Dhow” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, February 2, and Ecottera International, February 4, 2010)

On the 1st, Somali pirates released the Indian Dhow, MV *Faize Osamani*. According to the report to the shipping owner from master of the Dhow, the vessel and its 14 Indian crew-members were captured off Kismayo in the southern part of Somalia on January 6. The pirates are believed to have used the vessels as the pirate “mother-ship.” On the 30th, the vessel rendezvoused with MV *Asian Glory* which had left Somali coast on January 29 in the water some 150 nautical miles northeast of Socotra Island in the stormy weather. Five pirates that had seized the Dhow embarked the MV *Asian Glory* before abandoning the Dhow. Having continued to shadow the Dhow, the Danish frigate HDMS *Absalon* of the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) provided some assistance to the crew after the pirates abandoned the vessel.

### February 2 “Turkish Parliament extends anti-piracy mission of Somalia for a year” (Today’s Zaman, February 4, 2010)

On the 2nd, Turkish parliament approved extending the period of deploying naval vessels to the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) to fight piracy off Somalia for another year. Already Turkey has been deploying a frigate - TCG *Gemlik* since February 1. The deployment period is authorized to be extended for another year, starting from February 10, when the current mandate expires.

**February 3 “Somali pirates capture North Korean-flagged vessel” (Ecoterra International, February 4, 2010)**

On the 3rd, Somali pirates captured the North-Korean-flagged general cargo vessel MV *Rim* (4,800DWT) to the north of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. MV *Rim* is owned by owned by Libyan White Sea Shipping. Its crew is regarded to normally comprise 17 sailors holding Romanian and Libyan nationalities. The vessels are not registered with Maritime Security Center, Horn of Africa (MSC HOA). The US Navy ship USS *Porter* and a helicopter from USS *Farragut*, both of CMF CTF 151, confirmed that the *Rim* had been hijacked.



*MV Rim*

Source: Fairplay Daily News, February 3, 2010

**February 3 “UK Royal Navy sends frigate to the Gulf” (Naval Technology, February 3, 2010)**

The UK Royal Navy has recently deployed a Type 23 frigate, HMS *St Albans*, to the Arabian (Persian) Gulf to tackle piracy, illegal trafficking and smuggling in the region. During the six-month deployment, HMS *St Albans* will also sail into Iraqi waters to help the government protect its oil platforms and provide security to ensure regional stability. HMS *St Albans* commanding officer said the seas east of the Suez Canal are being increasingly used for unlawful purposes, including piracy, illegal trafficking and smuggling in support of terrorist organizations.

**February 5 “NATO fleet rescues merchant ship in Gulf of Aden” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, February 5, and Trade Winds, February 5, 2010)**

The bulk carrier M/V *Ariella* (Antigua & Barbuda-flagged) owned by Slovenian shipping company was boarded by Somali pirates. The ship was sailing for Indonesia in a “Group Transit” within the International Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) under the protection of Coalition navies. Sending out a rescue message, the crew informed naval forces that they had secured themselves in a compartment onboard paving the way for a release by force. Having received the message, Indian navy destroyer INS *Tabar* passed it to the naval vessels and patrol aircraft of other countries. Within 15 minutes, French naval aircraft observed pirates on the deck of the vessel and passed its information to the Danish navy HDMS *Absalon* of the NATO fleet. The



HDMS *Absalon* launched a helicopter and the Special Forces unit embarked the ship to rescue the crew. At the same time another Special Forces unit from the Russian frigate, *Neustrashimy* in the vicinity got on board the pirate boat and seized a skiff of the pirates. However, some of the pirates are believed to have fled from the scene. M/V *Ariella* has a crew of 25 and the nationalities are one Bulgarian, 15 Filipino, one Slovenian, one Indian, and seven Ukrainian and they are all safe. Registered with the Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa (MSC HOA), the ship was in contact with the UK Royal Navy's Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) in Dubai.



MV *Ariella*

Source: <http://www.shipspotting.com/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=923582#comments>

### **February 6 “Tug and barge hijacked near Tioman east of Malaysia” (ReCAAP ISC, February 6, 2010)**

According to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), the Singapore-registered tug *Asta* towing barge *Callista* departed Singapore for Cambodia on the 5th. In the middle of the night of the 6th, the ship agent lost communications with tug boat sailing around Pulau Tioman off the east coast of Malaysia. There were 12 Indonesian crew onboard *Asta*, and there was no cargo onboard the barge. The *Asta* was scheduled to arrive at Cambodia on the 12th. The ship owner suspected that *Asta* had been hijacked and reported incident to the Singapore Port Operations Control Centre (POCC).



Tug *Asta*

Source: ReCAAP ISC, February 6, 2010

### **【Related Story】**

According to the Special Report on the Hijacking of the *Asta* issued by the ReCAAP ISC on the 18th, the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) reported to ReCAAP ISC that the Malaysian navy spotted a life raft around the Adraiser Reef off Kota Kinabalu in Sabah State in Malaysia, and rescued 11 crew who are believed to be the crew of the tug *Asta*. According to the

rescued crew, the barge was boarded by eight robbers dressed in dark clothes and armed with rifles and knives when their vessels were about three nautical miles south of Pulau Tioman in the middle of night on the 6th. Blindfolded, the crew was locked in the cabins of the Master and Chief Engineer. On the evening of the 10th, the crew was set adrift in a life raft. The Chief Engineer was missing.

Later, according to an update the ReCAAP ISC received from the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) (who is also the Philippines Focal Point of the ReCAAP), the PCG found the vessel believed to be tug *Asta* in the area of Dinagat Island, Surigao City at the northern end of the Mindanao Island, Philippines on the 25th. The *Asta* had been renamed *Roxy-1*. The PCG reported that she received information from the Philippine National Police (PNP) that a tug boat named *Roxy-1* with the same IMO number as *Asta* was found. The PCG dispatched a patrol craft to the area to take custody of the tug boat. The Chief Engineer who has been missing and seven pirates are under the custody of the PNP for investigation.

### **February 9 “Somali pirates free Indian vessel” (Trade Winds, February 9, 2010)**

On the 9th, Somali pirates freed an Indian-owned bulk carrier (Panamanian-flagged), MV *Al Khaiq* (36,700DWT). There are no reports of any injuries to the ship’s crew of 26 comprising 24 Indians and two Burmese. The ransom is believed to have been 3.1 million US dollars, and the marine tug (Sierra Leone-flagged) owned by the Tanzanian shipping company was used to deliver the ransom. The MV *Al Khaiq* was hijacked on October 22, 2009, 180 nautical miles west of the Seychelles. The vessel has been held in the pirate stronghold of Haradhere in Puntland.



*MV Al Khaiq*

Source: Fairplay Daily News, February 10, 2010

### **February 11 “Somali pirates free Taiwanese fishing vessel” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, February 11, and BBC News, February 11, 2010)**

On the 11th, Somali pirates released a Taiwanese fishing vessel, FV *Win Far 161*. The *Win Far 161* has been anchored off the Somali coast in the vicinity of Harardheere since it was hijacked by Somali pirates in the waters approximately 160 nautical miles north of the Seychelles on April 6, 2009. Three of the boat's original crew of 30 had died of malnutrition, disease and stress during their captivity. The other crew of 17 Filipinos, four Indonesians, four Chinese and two Taiwanese returned home safely. FV *Win Far 161* had been used as a “mother ship.” The ransom is said to

have been relatively small. (BBC News, February 11, 2010)



*FV Win Far 161*

Source: Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, February 11, 2010

### **【Related Story】**

#### **“China’s naval escort flotilla off Somalia supports Taiwan’s fishing vessel” (Xinhua News Agency, February 12, 2010)**

According to a report of the Xinhua News Agency, the ship-owner of the fishing vessel *FV Win Far 161* belonging to the Far Win fishery company in Kaohsiung, Taiwan requested the mainland ship-owner association to escort the fishing vessel. *FV Win Far 161* has four crew members registered in Chinese mainland. China’s naval escort flotilla is said to have escorted the fishing vessel as far as the safety waters after supplying them with living commodities and fuel. Having supplied necessities and fuel oils, the mainland naval escort ships off Somali are said to have escorted the ship to a safe sea area.

#### **February 18 “China’s naval escort flotilla off Somalia visits S Korea's flotilla” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, The Gulf of Aden, February 20, 2010)**

On the 18th, Qiu Yanpeng, commander of the Chinese naval escort flotilla in the Gulf of Aden, visited the South Korea's destroyer, *ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sunshin* which is on an escort mission in the Gulf of Aden to meet with Captain Kim Myung Sung, commander of the South Korean naval escort flotilla. Expressing thanks for an invitation from Captain Kim Myung Sung, Qiu Yanpeng said, under the framework of the United Nations’ resolutions, Chinese navy will continue joint efforts, and military exchanges, and wish to accomplish escort missions on a level of high quality. Responding to him, Captain Kim Myung Sung said the South Korean navy will cooperate with the Chinese naval escort flotilla and wish for the health and safety of the ships and crew that jointly pass through the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters.

#### **Turkish navy prevents attack on Panama-flagged ship” (Bosphorus Naval News, February 21, and Trade Winds, February 22, 2010)**

On the 20th, the Turkish Navy’s frigate *TCG Gemlik* belonging to CTF-151 swooped on a skiff which was acting suspiciously in the vicinity of Panamanian-flagged *MV APL Finland* (8,100TEU) inside IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, and the naval Special Forces arrested seven pirates. With this latest arrest, the total of captured pirates by Turkish Navy increased to 42. *MV APL Finland* is owned and operated by the Japan’s Shoei Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (OPRF editor’s comment:

Although the original source of the Trade Wind mentions “The *APL Finland* is owned by Shoei Kisen Kaisha of Japan and management by Schulte Ship-management’s China office,” there is no name of this vessel in the container fleet list of the Shoei Kisen Kaisha of Japan on its Website.) Below is a scene at the time.

On the other hand, also on the 20th, the US Navy’s destroyer USS *Farragut* foiled the hijacking of the Tanzanian-flagged product tanker *Barakaale 1* in the Gulf of Aden, and the boarding team arrested eight pirate suspects.



MV *APL Finland*

Source: Left: <http://www.tradewinds.no/vessel?id=6B491E8DBC6934F5&aid=554030>

Right: Bosphorus Naval News, February 21, 2010

### **February 22 “Somali pirates hijack Indian-flagged vessel” (Deccan Herald, February 25, 2010)**

On the 22nd, Somali pirates hijacked the Indian-flagged vessel MV *Abdul Razak* in the Gulf of Aden. The vessel, with a crew of nine Indians, was on its way from Kandala, India, to Dubai.

### **February 24 “EU to step up anti-piracy operations” (The Sofia Echo, February 25, 2010)**

On the 24th, European Union (EU) defense ministers agreed to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta, with which they can watch over Somali ports where pirate ships are based, and neutralize the mother ships that allow the pirates to operate more than 1,000 km from the Somali coast. These two new functions will be launched at the end of March when the winter monsoon draws to an end, and could involve an increase in the number of personnel and resources assigned to the operation. The ministers also agreed to increase the level of co-operation and collaboration with NATO and other countries that are carrying out surveillance operations in this part of the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the EU ministers also agreed to improve the application of the agreements that exist with Kenya and the Seychelles for taking legal action against pirates that are detained and to increase efforts to achieve similar agreements with other countries in the region, such as Tanzania, Mauritius and South Africa.

**February 25 “Somali pirates free Singaporean-flagged vessel” (Trade Winds, February 26, 2010)**

On the 25th, Somali pirates released the Singaporean-flagged chemical tanker MT *Pramoni* (20,000DWT). The tanker was seized in the Gulf of Aden on January 1. A total of 24 crewmembers composed of 17 Indonesians, five Chinese and one each from Nigeria and Vietnam are all understood to be well. Before they were freed, a ransom was dropped on board.

**February 28 “Somali pirates released Greek ship” (Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Press Release, February 28, 2010)**

On the 28th, Somali pirates released the Panama-flagged bulk carrier MV *Navios Apollon* (52,073DWT) which has a crew of 19 - 1 Greek and 18 Philippine. Before the crew was freed, a ransom was dropped on board the carrier on the 27th. MV *Navios Apollon* was hijacked in the waters approximately 200 nautical miles east of Seychelles on December 28, 2009.

## **1.2 Military Development**

**February 1 “South Korean navy launches high-mobility combat unit” (Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 2010)**

On the 1st, the South Korean Navy has mobilized its first fast-response combat unit. It is composed of the country's first Aegis destroyer, *ROKS King Sejong the Great* and six *KDX-II* class destroyers (4,500 displacement tons). On the occasion of an inauguration of the fast-response combat unit, Navy Chief of Staff Jung Ok-Keun said, “A dream has come true. We believe the unit can effectively protect sea lanes and counteract possible threats from North Korea.” The unit will be made up with two squadrons based at naval bases in Busan and Jinhae. When the second Aegis-class destroyer, *ROKS Yulgok Yi Yi* is put into operation in August 2010, each squadron will be composed of one Aegis destroyer and three 4,500-ton destroyers. Moreover, the third Aegis destroyer as well as six *KDX-II* mini Aegis destroyers, measuring 5,600-tons in capacity, will be put into operation in 2012. When a new naval base is completed on Jeju Island in 2014, the high-mobility units will be based there.

**February 4 “China’s Naval Command College conducts exercise for ‘Joint operations under information conditions’ ” (The PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 1, and February 4, 2010)**

According to the *PLA Daily*, flag officers who had graduated from the Naval Command College (NCC) conducted the exercise of the ‘joint operations under information conditions’ in the ‘naval warfare experimental room’ for the first time in the PLA. Based upon the understanding that bringing up officers who have the high qualities of commanding the joint operations have the key to deciding the whole course of a war, the NCC attaches greater importance to improving the

commanding capability of the medium and high-level ranking leaders in the joint operations under the near-war situation. According to the report, in the year 2015 the exercise proceeded under the assumption that the surface, air, submarine and coastal defense forces of the 'Red Force' cooperate closely to help submarines break through the barrier-lines of the 'Blue Forces.' In the exercise, when the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) of the 'Red Force' was lost, the course of the battle changed completely, and the 'Red Force' lost contact with surface targets it had been monitoring. The 'Blue Force' tried to divulge the locations of the submarines by concentrating on the attacks by the helicopter units. On the contrary, these helicopters were caught by the fighter aircraft of the 'Red Force' and were annihilated. On the other hand, the surface vessels of the 'Red Force' conducted the electronic countermeasures (ECM), which elicited the missile attacks by the 'Blue Force.' Through the exercise, the commander of the 'Red Force' is said to have learned the lesson that "the situation would become worse unless effective protection of the AWACS were highly considered." On the other hand, the commander of the 'Blue Force' learned that "it would be the cause of an eventual defeat that they lost air supremacy by having lost all fighter aircraft."

### **【Related Story 1】**

#### **“China’s Air Command College Assistant Professor stresses importance of AWACS in air defense” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 22, 2010)**

In a special article on the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) in the PLA Daily dated February 22, Li Shihua, the Assistant Professor (Senior Colonel of Air Force Technical Specialty) of China’s Air Force Command College, pointed out the significance of the AWACS in the homeland air defense as follows: China has a land territory of 9.6 million square meters and a maritime domain of 3.0 million square meters which are impossible to be covered by land-based radars only. In order to maintain the nation’s sovereignty and perform the mission of homeland air defense, the PLA must have a definite number of AWACS. Without such unified and effective command and control operational capabilities, we cannot exert fully the various kinds of operational capabilities of air defense equipment.

### **【Related Story 2】**

#### **“China’s SSF Aviation innovates training model” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 9, 2010)**

According to the PLA Daily dated February 9, the aviation troop unit of the China’s South Sea Fleet (SSF) conducted the training of a number of highly-difficult subjects in the near-actual combat environment including ultra low-altitude penetration on sea and remote navigation under complicated meteorological conditions at the beginning of the year 2010. According to the report, in order to steel the ability of the unit to take off under complicated meteorological conditions, it tested the long-range maneuver ability by expanding the flight space from coastal waters to remote waters. It broke up the attack model of flying distance, air space, and shooting range which had been previously fixed, and strengthened the training of night flying, and changing the

flight route and the target for attacking temporarily, and improved the attack and defense capabilities in the air.

**February 5-8 “India conducts naval multinational exercise off Andamans” (AFP, February 5, and Sunday Island Online, February 7, 2010)**

On the 5th, Indian navy sponsored a 13-nation naval exercise, “Exercise Milan 2010” off its Andaman archipelago. It lasted until February 8. The nine warships from the navies of Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore (two warships), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand and Vietnam took part in the exercise, in addition to senior naval officials from Brunei, the Philippines, New Zealand and Vietnam. The exercises are the biggest naval event since 2007 when a smaller exercise involving Australia, Japan, Singapore and the United States was held. The exercise is aimed at humanitarian relief and disaster management. On the 6th, when asked if the exercise can raise Beijing’s suspicion, India’s navy chief ADM Nirmal Verma stressed that their coming together was not an attempt to form a security bloc, but the drill to improve coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster management.

**February 7 “India strengthens fortification in Andaman” (Hindustan Times, February 7, 2010)**

China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region appears to have injected new momentum in India’s efforts to fortify its farthest military outpost, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Myanmar’s Coco Islands, where the Chinese navy has reportedly set up a surveillance post, are barely 40 km from the Andamans’ northernmost tip Landfall. Although New Delhi may not openly flag concerns about China’s strategic moves to squeeze India with its presence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, there is a growing realization the Andamans hold the key to dominating a vital maritime zone. Vice-Admiral D.K. Joshi, Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), said airstrips at Campbell Bay and Shibpur were being extended from 3,200 feet to 12,000 feet to support all types of aircraft, including fighters. The airstrips are being upgraded for night-flying operations too. ANC sources said the army was planning to beef up its brigade-level deployment (around 3,000 soldiers) with three more battalions and support units. Additionally, there are plans to induct a mechanized infantry battalion, an artillery regiment and an infantry unit. The navy, too, is deploying more warships and patrol vessels in the region. The Andamans are more than 1,200 km away from mainland India. A significant volume of China’s oil imports passes through Malacca Strait, about 350 km from these islands.

**February 8 “France, Russia agree in principle over sales of landing ships” (Radio France International, February 8, 2010)**

France had already agreed in principal to sell the Russians one *Mistral*-class warship, an official of the French defense ministry said on the 8th. Russia’s navy intends to buy four command ships. However he added that at the moment it was a “technical inquiry” and needed to be vetted

at a political level.

Discussions about the purchase of a *Mistral*-class vessel first began in November last year, when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited France. Russia does not have an equivalent to the 21,000-ton amphibious assault ship.



FS *Mistral* docked in Brest

Source: Radio France International, February 8, 2010

### **【Related Story】**

#### **“Russia still considering warship options” (RIA Novosti, February 9, 2010)**

On the 8th, France said it had agreed to sell Russia a *Mistral*-class warship, (worth 400-500 million euros (around \$600-\$750 million). However, on the 9th, Secretary of Russia's Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said Russian is still considering whether to buy a *Mistral*-class amphibious assault ship from France. “We could build a ship of this class on our own, but this will take time, or we could buy it abroad, but it will cost a lot of money,” Secretary of Russia's Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said at a news conference in *RIA Novosti*. A source close to the Kremlin said the decision on *Mistral* would be taken on the highest political level in the near future.

A *Mistral*-class ship is capable of transporting and deploying 16 helicopters, four landing barges, up to 70 vehicles including 13 battle tanks, and 450 soldiers. The vessel is equipped with a 69-bed hospital and can be used as an amphibious command ship. Despite strong opposition in the Russian defense industry, the military has insisted Russia needed *Mistral*-class warships to modernize its aging fleet of combat surface ships. “If a positive decision is taken, the first vessels of this class will be deployed in Russia Far East to strengthen the Pacific Fleet which has suffered the most in the 1990s due to the lack of funds for ship repairs,” a Russian military source said. However, some military experts say Russia has no need for such a vessel, and many believe that Russia simply wants to gain access to advanced naval technology.

#### **February 8 “Russia starts building 4th new SSBN” (RIA Novosti, February 8, 2010)**

Russia has already started the construction of the fourth unit of a new *Borey*-class strategic



nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN), a spokesman of the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk said on the 8th. It was previously reported that construction of the *Borey*-class SSBN was delayed. The first unit of SSBN designed to carry the new type of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) - Bulava missiles - is currently undergoing sea trials. Two second unit, the *Alexander Nevsky*, and the third unit, *Vladimir Monomakh*, are in different stages of completion respectively. The fourth generation *Borey* Class SSBN is 170 meters long, and has a hull diameter of 13 meters, a crew of 107, including 55 officers, a maximum depth of 450 meters and a submerged speed of about 29 knots. It can carry up to 16 Bulava SLBMs. Russia is planning to build eight of these subs by 2015. Fourth-generation *Borey*-class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to constitute the core of Russia's modern strategic submarine fleet.

### **February 8 “PLAN’s East Sea Fleet conducts operational test of new equipment” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 8, 2010)**

According to the report in the *PLA Daily* dated February 8, the fleet training center of the China’s East Sea Fleet conducted the underway replenishment exercises in the East China Sea. It is said that the success of connecting replenishment nozzles to three receiving warships positioning alongside and behind the delivery ship indicates that the supply vessel has obtained a “passport” of performing the mission in the distant waters. The fleet training center of the China’s East Sea Fleet is a training organization specializing in the surface vessels of the PLA Navy, which is in charge of important missions of making the exercise procedures and standard models of the training, as well as establishing and developing the combat capabilities of the vessels.



Scenes of vertical replenishment (left) and replenishment between the delivery ship (center in front) and three receiving ships positioning alongside and behind the delivery ship (OPRF editor’s comment: Although the photographs above are placed in the reported article, the content of the article and the photographs may not be directly related.)

### **February 11 “China some years away from aircraft carrier capability: former Indian Navy Chief” (The Hindu, February 12, 2010)**

On the 11th, the former Chief of the Staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral Arun Prakash (retired) said PLA Navy would be some years away from attaining aircraft carrier capability. As to the reason for a delay, Admiral Prakash said the lack of an integral aviation capability is considered to be a major handicap, indicating several points as follows. (a) Acquiring or even building a carrier is not China’s real problem; their dilemma is the type of aircraft that is going to be

operated from the ship. (b) In the current scenario China was unlikely to have access to a steam catapult to launch an aircraft from the deck and its option is confined to two Russian aircraft that use short take-off and arrested recovery. (c) So, either Russia will have to give sufficient numbers of either MiG29 K which India has procured for its aircraft carrier or Su-33 fighter to equip its carriers or China design carrier aircraft in a hurry. The Indian Navy has traveled this route and knows that aircraft acquisition, training of air and ship crew and gathering operational expertise in carrier operations are factors that take a lot of time and effort. (d) Therefore, the PLA Navy is some years away from attaining carrier capability.

### **February 12 “First Indian navy’s fleet tanker launched in Italy” (Defence Professional, February 12, 2010)**

On the 12th, at Fincantieri’ shipyard in La Spezia, Italy there was the launch of the first of two fleet tankers ordered by the Indian Navy, with delivery scheduled by the end of the year 2010. The order is the first surface vessel India has ever made to a European company. The fleet tanker is a supply and logistic support vessel with a displacement at full load of 27,500 tons and a maximum speed of 20 knots. Maximum passenger capacity is 250 including crew and additional forces.



The fleet tanker ordered by the Indian Navy

Source: Defence Professional, February 12, 2010

### **February 16 “US Navy commissions 1st littoral combat ship” (Navy News Stand, February 17, 2010)**

On the 16th, the US Navy's first littoral combat ship, USS *Freedom* (LCS 1), left Mayport in Florida for her maiden operational deployment to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) areas of focus. *Freedom* will participate in counter-illicit trafficking (CIT) operations in the areas under the two Commands. A U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) is embarked aboard USS *Freedom*. In addition, USS *Freedom* is scheduled to make goodwill port visits in Colombia, Mexico and Panama.



On February 16, the littoral combat ship USS *Freedom* (LCS 1) departs Naval Station Mayport for its first operational deployment.

Source: Navy News Stand, February 17, 2010

**USS Freedom vs. USS Independence**  
 The two competing designs for littoral combat ship are different from tip to stern. Here is a look at some of the key specs:

	USS Freedom	USS Independence
Hull	steel semi-planing monohull	aluminum trimaran
Length	378 ft (115.3 m)	419 ft (127.6 m)
Beam	57.4 ft (17.5 m)	104 ft (31.6 m)
Draft	13.5 ft (4.1 m)	15 ft (4.5 m)
Displacement (fully loaded)	3,089 tons	2,841 tons
Speed Sprint	45+ knots	45+ knots
Range	3,500+ nautical miles at cruise speed	4,500 nautical miles
Flight deck Height above water	5,200 ft <sup>2</sup> (483 m <sup>2</sup> ) 19.7 feet (6 m)	7,300 ft <sup>2</sup> (678 m <sup>2</sup> ) 36 feet (10.9 m)
Hangar	4,680 ft <sup>2</sup> (435 m <sup>2</sup> )	3,500 ft <sup>2</sup> (325.2 m <sup>2</sup> )
Mission bay Height above water	6,400 ft <sup>2</sup> (594.2 m <sup>2</sup> ) 3 feet	15,200 ft <sup>2</sup> (1,412 m <sup>2</sup> ) 15 feet

Source: National Defense, March 2010

<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/LittoralCombatShip.aspx>

**April 17 “US Pacific Marines Corps Commander: Okinawa base is strategically necessary” (The Japan Times, February 18, 2010)**

On the 17th, Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps of the Pacific, said during a speech in Tokyo that the U.S. bases in Okinawa are strategically necessary and marines are prepared to die to protect Japan. The commander said that the U.S. fully

understands that the alliance is not symmetrical, as Japan bears no responsibility to protect the United States, but it does shoulder the obligation of providing bases to U. S. forces. He stressed that Japan must provide the bases and training that U.S. forces need. General also said, “Foreign governments are watching to see whether the United States-Japan alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the current issues again and ensure that the awesome deterring power of the U.S. Marine Corps remains based on Okinawa for decades to come.” He pointed out, “In order to fulfill our alliance responsibilities to defend Japan, the Marine Corps, the expeditionary, rapidly deployable branch of the U.S. military and the only forward-deployed and available U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India, must be based on Okinawa and must have its helicopters near its ground forces.”

### **February 17 “US aircraft carrier arrives in Hong Kong” (Navy News Stand, February 17, 2010)**

On the 17th, having completed five-month operations in the Arabian Sea, the US Navy aircraft carrier ,USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68), along with the guided missile cruiser USS *Chosin* (CG 65), the guided missile destroyers USS *Pinckney* (DDG 91) and USS *Sampson* (DDG 102), and the guided missile frigate USS *Rentz* (FFG 46) arrived in Hong Kong. They will stay there for five days. Then, USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68) Carrier Strike Group continues its routine deployment in the Western Pacific.

### **February 19 “Iran deploys new indigenously designed destroyer” (Press TV, February19, 2010)**

On the 19th, Iran's Navy took the delivery of the first indigenously designed and developed guided missile destroyer *Jamaran*. The vessel has a displacement of around 1,420 tons, a top speed of up to 30 knots, and can carry 120-140 personnel on board. *Jamaran* is equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare capabilities, including highly advanced anti-aircraft, anti-surface and anti-subsurface systems, and a helipad. It is armed with anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles. The destroyer's launch marks a major technological leap for Iran's naval industries. More ships in its class are under construction.



Guided missile destroyer, *Jamaran*

Source: Press TV, February 19, 2010

### **February 25 “PLA stresses the need for its international image” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 25, 2010)**

Carrying an article signed by Meng Yan in the *PLA Daily* dated February 25, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasized that it has been attaching importance to introducing its image to international community. According to Yan, the PLA has won praises from the international community for its performances in earthquake rescue and relief, international peacekeeping and joint military exercises and the misunderstanding and bias of the foreign countries upon the PLA have been rectified to certain degree. But the international opinion will not change in a short period of time and Western media’s opinion-attack on the Chinese military will not disappear. Therefore, Meng Yan says, “to better introduce the Chinese military to the outside world is still an arduous task for a long run.” In addition, responding to the opinion that, although China’s national defense policy is defense-oriented, “some people in the West questioned the buildup and growth of the PLA with this policy as an excuse,” Meng Yan stressed, “We have adequate reasons to make positive response on this point: China is one of the countries with the longest land borderline, most neighboring countries and most nationalities. In the face of a multiple of threats from the traditional and non-traditional fields, it’s well justified to build a national defense and a strong military commensurate with national security and development.”

### **February 25 “China’s Rear Admiral stresses importance of amphibious ships for PLA navy” (PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 25, 2010)**

Director of the PLA Navy’s Arms Research Institute, Rear Admiral (RADM) Zhao Yongfu, said in an interview with the *PLA Daily* that for China the amphibious ships have an important feature of being “conveniently used, but not expensive (好用不貴).” Below are the points RADM Zhao mentioned:

- (a) After the Cold War, the US and western nations are regarding the regional conflicts as their major targets, and implementing the strategy of “From the sea to land.” Therefore, the amphibious ships are the important fighting force for the naval powers to settle the regional conflicts. The amphibious ships are the third core of naval equipment next to the aircraft carriers and submarines.
- (b) The French Navy’s *Mistral* class amphibious ships are regarded with attention. The ship can perform part of the missions of an aircraft carrier, and its construction cost is approximately ten percent of that of the aircraft carrier. It can depart anytime, and respond to any contingencies.
- (c) In order to maintain China’s maritime interests, we must learn seriously about success on the development of the amphibious ships and the practical experience. Concrete development of the equipment must be implemented rationally in accordance with the situation of every nation and the military forces. The amphibious ships can perform various missions of not only the fire-attacks and projection of power ashore but also landing, sea-control operations, medical and rescue assistance and transport support. The amphibious ships have important features of “being used for multiple purposes with a single unit and connecting peacetime with wartime” and “being easy to be used, but not expensive.”

### 1.3 Maritime Boundaries

#### **February 8 “Chinese media: China’s ESF Survey Ship Team builds lighthouse in ECS” (Xinhua News Agency, February 5, PLA Daily, Net Edition, February 9, 10, 2010)**

According to the reports from the *PLA Daily* and others, on January 4, 2010, a naval survey team of the China’s East Sea Fleet (ESF) constructed at Waikejiao in the East China Sea (ECS), 33 00.9' N and 121 38.4' E, 13 permanent facilities - stone tablets and lighthouses to clarify its territorial waters' baseline in the oil-rich area. The Xinhua reported as follows: China has settled land boundary disputes with 12 neighboring countries through negotiation. However, disagreements with neighboring countries over territorial waters remain unresolved. Regarding the oil development in the area around China's Diaoyu Islands (Japanese name: Senkakushoto), China and Japan hold territorial disputes on overlapping claims of their extended continental shelf in the ECS.

#### **February 18 “Malaysia, Indonesia agree on rules of engagement at sea” (Bernama, February 18, 2010)**

On the 18th, Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed on the rules of engagement at sea (ROE) to prevent clashes between the navies of both countries at the 38th session of the Malaysia-Indonesia General Border Committee (Malindo CBO). This ROE also covers patrols in disputed area of Ambalat in the Celebes Sea. (Regarding the issues over disputed area of Ambalat, refer to the OPRF MARINT Monthly report, June 2009, 1. 3.)

### 1.4 Diplomacy and International Relations

#### **February 15 “India worries China builds ports in South Asia” (The New York Times, February 15, and UPI, February 17, 2010)**

The two US media - the *New York Times* dated February 15 and *UPI* dated February 17 - reported India is worried that China is building ports in South Asia. The outline of the articles is as follows.

- (a) India worries China's efforts to expand its regional clout through its “string of pearls” strategy - ringing India with naval bases and electronic Listening posts – as an attempt to muscle into waters New Delhi has long considered its own.
- (b) As recently as the 1990s, China’s and India’s trade with four South Asian nations — Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan — was roughly equal. But over the last decade, China has outpaced India in deepening ties. In addition, China has been developing port facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and it is planning to build railroad lines in

Nepal. For China, these countries provide both new markets and alternative routes to the Indian Ocean, which its ships now reach through the Strait of Malacca.

- (c) The construction of the \$1 billion container port at Hambantota, until recently a fishing hamlet on Sri Lanka's southeastern coast, illustrates how the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean is becoming more pronounced. China is financing 85 percent of the cost of the \$1 billion project. The deep-water port will include a development zone and an oil refinery.
- (d) Over the last few years, China has built a similar port at Gwadar on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast, which will eventually be the terminal for pipelines carrying Gulf crude and natural gas to western China. Another oil refinery terminal is planned at Chittagong in Bangladesh. These could become bases for China's growing submarine fleet, a potential threat to the arterial shipping lanes running east from the Persian Gulf. The Chinese are reported to have established a naval base in Myanmar and intelligence surveillance bases on islands across the Bay of Bengal. Another is reportedly being built on Marao Island in the Maldives chain that runs south toward the British base of Diego Garcia, currently manned by U.S. forces.
- (e) Beijing says it has no interest in establishing major foreign bases so far from home. But as its economy mushrooms and its naval forces swell, it will inevitably require bases to project its growing power.

China's port construction project





Left: Ships will dock along this long wall and other similar structures nearby once the port in Hambantota is complete.

Right: As trade in South Asia grows, China has been developing port facilities like this one in Gwadar in the southwest of Pakistan.

Source: The New York Times, February 15, 2010

**February 18 “Argentina compels all ships at ports to get previous approval before sailing British-controlled waters” (Trade Winds, February 18, 2010)**

Argentina’s president Cristina Kirchner has recently issued a new decree compelling all ships calling at Argentine ports to get previous approval before sailing to or from British-controlled waters. Any boat that wants to travel between ports on the Argentine mainland to the Islas Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands must first ask for permission from the Argentine government. However, Fernandez did not stipulate what measure, if any, would be taken against ships which failed to comply with the new decree. The rig of Diamond Offshore Company, Ocean Guardian, is expected to arrive at the islands soon. A UK-based company, Desire Petroleum, has been granted drilling rights. Therefore, tensions between the UK and Argentina are becoming increasingly strained for the Falklands, a territory over which Argentina and Britain fought in 1982. It is reported that there could be up to 60 billion barrels of oil under the islands.



Source: The Economist, February 17, 2010



## **1.5 Shipping, Shipbuilding and Harbors**

### **February 6 “Japan assists upgrading India’s Gujarat shipyard” (Indian Express, February 6, 2010)**

On the 6th, Japan and Gujarat government of India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to upgrade existing Alang shipyard in Bhavnagar. Based on the MOU, Japan will provide technology transfer and financial assistance to upgrade the yard at Alang to the international standards. The MOU includes construction and operation of a common hazardous waste removal pre-treatment facility, modernization of recyclable goods market and development of human resources. Japan will also address environmental aspects of Alang. This is the second project after Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) where Japan is partnering Gujarat. The Gujarat government plans to make Alang the largest International Maritime Organization (IMO) complied ship recycling yard.

### **February 9 “Spain ratifies MLC2006” (Financial, February 9, 2010)**

Spain, which currently holds the European Union (EU) Presidency, has recently become the first EU member state to ratify the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Maritime Labor Convention, 2006 (MLC2006). As all EU members are expected to ratify the Convention before 31 December 2010, Spain’s leadership in early 2010, the International Year of the Seafarer, is especially significant, ILO informed. Spain becomes the seventh country to ratify the MLC2006 and joins a group that includes the world’s four largest flag States. The Bahamas, Liberia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, and most recently, in January 2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with an emerging maritime interest, have all ratified the MLC2006. One of the two requirements for MLC2006 entering into force is that the shipping of the ratifying countries should cover 33 percent of the world gross tonnage a year before the Convention takes effect. The ratification of Spain and Bosnia and Herzegovina now increased the shipping to nearly 45 percent of the world fleet by gross tonnage. The second requirement for the Convention coming into force is that the number of ratifying countries must reach 30. Therefore, as ratifications by EU countries are expected, the Convention is believed to enter into force by early 2011.

Aimed at protecting the world's 1.2 million or more seafarers, the MLC, 2006 sets out a seafarers' “bill of rights,” which is called the “fourth pillar” in the international shipping regulation complementing the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers (STCW), and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ship (MARRPOL).

### **February 11 “Norwegian company orders offshore wind turbine planters” (Marine Log, February 11, 2010)**

Fred. Olsen Windcarrier AS has recently placed an order with the Lamprell Energy Ltd.

shipyard in Dubai for two self elevating vessels for installation of offshore wind turbines (US\$ 320.4M in total). They are set for delivery in May and September 2012. The contract with the yard includes options for two additional vessels. The vessels have an overall length of 130.8 m and breadth of 39 m and can carry a payload of 5,300DWT. The vessel is equipped with four jack-up legs and a large crane designed to install turbines (with capacity of 800 t at 24 m). The helicopter deck is approved for operating a large, general-purpose helicopter such as Sikorsky S92A and Super Puma AS 332 L2 (CAP437). Accommodations are provided for a total compliment of 80 persons.

Below is an image of the offshore wind turbine planters carried on the website of the Fred. Olsen Windcarrier AS.



Source: Fred. Olsen Windcarrier HP; <http://www.windcarrier.com/?did=9083392>

### **February 12 “VN’ deep port welcomes largest container vessel yet” (Vietnam News, February 13, 2010)**

On the 12th, Vietnamese SP-PSA International Port successfully handled a trial call by the MV *Albert Maersk* of the Maersk Line. MV *Albert Maersk* is 352m-long and has a capacity of 109,000DWT (8,272TEU). It is the largest ship ever to call at a Vietnamese port, whether by length, deadweight tonnage or container capacity. SP-PSA is a joint venture between Sai Gon Port, Vinalines and PSA Viet Nam Pte Ltd, the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PSA International Pte Ltd. SP-PSA commenced operations in May of last year and is Viet Nam's first deep-sea container terminal. Strategically located near the mouth of the Cai Mep-Thi Vai River, SP-PSA will be developed in two phases, with the first phase of 600m of berths with 14.5m water depth now operational. When both phases (1,200m of berths) are completed, SP-PSA will have a projected annual capacity of over two million TEU of containers. Prior to MN *Albert Maersk*, on February 10, SP-PSA also received the *Queen Mary II* cruise ship from Cunard Line, with 2,600 passengers on board.

### **February 25 “China’s Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian aim to be international maritime centers” (Global Times, February 25, 2010)**

Following China's Ministry of Transport and Shanghai government signing of a Memorandum

of Understanding to develop Shanghai as an international maritime center, Tianjin and Dalian announced that they are also building international maritime centers. According to the government timetable, Shanghai becomes most important hub port in the Asia-Pacific region by 2015 and an international maritime center by 2020. The maritime center planned for Tianjin's Binhai New District will serve Northeast Asia, China's northern borders as well as Central and West Asia. The Dalian maritime center will also serve Northeast Asia. "In the next 10 to 20 years, London will lose its dominant position as an international maritime center and the high-end services of the shipping industry will inevitably transfer to Asia where will undoubtedly be the destination," predicted Zhang Jieshu, researcher from the Shanghai International Shipping Institute. The latest rankings of the world's Top 20 container throughput ports in the first half of 2009 include seven Chinese mainland ports. Shanghai has the leading position for a maritime center in China. In 2009, the cargo handling capacity in Shanghai reached 6.91 billion tons, topping the world's ports for the fifth consecutive year. The container throughput was put in second place for three consecutive years.

### **February 26 "Myanmar plans to privatize two ports" (The Irrawaddy, February 26, 2010)**

The state-run Myanmar Port Authority (MPA) is planning to privatize two state-operated ports in Yangon, which are Sule and Bo Aung Kyaw. According to a Ministry of Transport official, the MPA plans to sell its existing ports to the private sector and invite investors to build new ports. Hong Kong-based company which owns the Myanmar International Terminal Thilawa (MITT) situated 25 km south of Yangon has already reached agreements with the MPA to build new ports together with other companies.

## **1.6 Ocean Resources, Energy, Marine Environment and Others**

### **February 8 "Tanker spills over recent years decreasing dramatically" (Sustainable Shipping, February 8, 2010)**

Number of major oil spills from tankers has dropped dramatically over recent years. According to latest statistics from the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), there was no major oil spill recorded from tankers during 2009, although bunker spills continued to occur. This is the first time since the organization began collating tanker spill statistics that there were no reports of a 700 ton or greater spill. According the ITOPF, the average number of major spills for the decade is about three. Moreover, medium sized spills from tankers, considered to be 7 to 700 tons, have also seen a dramatic reduction. The average number of medium spills in the last ten years amounted to 14, half the number experienced during the previous decade. On the other hand, most spills from tankers were shown to be the result of routine operations such as loading, discharging and bunkering which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals. The

majority of these operational spills were small, with some 90% involving quantities of less than 7 tons. However, the ITOPT issued warning that even minor incidents can generate significant environmental damage and economic loss. Additionally, ITOPF commented that 2010 will not maintain the 2009 record due to the recent collision between a tanker and a vessel towing barges in Texas, USA (LINK).

For further details, refer to website below:

<http://www.itopf.com/information%2Dservices/data%2Dand%2Dstatistics/statistics/#major>

### **February 9 “China issues rules on maritime wind energy projects” (China daily, February 10, 2010)**

On the 9th, China’s National Energy Administration and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) jointly issued regulations on the development and construction of offshore wind power projects. The regulations include 38 articles in ten chapters. The rules specify procedures and requirements for the planning of offshore wind energy developments, the authorization of such projects, the application and approval of the use of sea space, and construction verification, among others. According to the regulations, energy departments at provincial level will be responsible for drawing up plans for local offshore wind energy development, while oceanic departments at the same level should provide initial opinions on the plans regarding the projects' impact on the ocean environment. Projects may only be started after being verified by authorities and the obtaining of rights for the use of the sea space.

### **February 24 “Nippon Yusen KK, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. begin experiments on ‘Air-Lubrication System’ ” (Nippon Yusen Website, 24 February 2010)**

According to the website of the Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK), the NYK and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) are to begin experiments on an air-lubrication system to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during marine transport. Jointly developed by the two companies, the system effectively reduces the frictional resistance between a vessel’s bottom and the seawater by means of bubbles generated by supplying air to the vessel’s bottom. According to the website, the world's first permanent installation of the system using an air-blower is expected to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by approximately 10 percent. The experiments will be conducted using module carriers\* operated by an NYK Group company, NYK-Hinode Line, Ltd. Construction of the two vessels – *YAMATAI* and *YAMATO* - will be completed on March 31 and in late November 2010 respectively.

Note\*: Special heavy load carrier with roll-on, roll-off rampway to transport thousand-ton prefabricated structures of plant facilities to be installed on oil/gas development sites, or industrial locations.





Image from the bottom of a module carrier equipped with an air lubrication system

Source: NYK Website; [http://www.nyk.com/release/787/NE\\_1002224.html](http://www.nyk.com/release/787/NE_1002224.html)

## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### 2.1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

On February 1, 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense released the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (hereafter QDR2010) for the first time since President Barack Obama's inauguration. Following the previous Quadrennial Defense Review Report (hereafter QDR2006) which the former President George W. Bush published in February 2006 during the wartime when the United States was fighting a war against terrorism, the current QDR2010 has also been issued during the wartime. In order of priority the QDR2010 is listing (a) victory against war on terror, (b) the prevention and deterrence of conflicts, (c) defeat of adversaries and readiness for various measures against emergencies, and (d) management and strengthening of the All-Volunteer Force. Below is a summary of the features in the QDR2010.

#### 1. War on terror

##### (1) Additional troops to Afghanistan and exit strategy

On December 1, 2009, President Obama made an address on the future policies on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and pointed out the several issues as follows.

- (a) Regarding Iraq, we will remove its combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011.
- (b) On the other hand, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. As it is more serious than we have expected, I have decided to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. The 30,000 additional troops will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace. These additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.

Similar to previous Bush Administration, QDR2010 regards that the United States is under the wartime situation, takes the war on terror as its task of the highest priority, and stipulates the strategic objectives in Afghanistan as follows.

- (a) Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action;
- (b) Denying the Taliban access to key areas and facilities;
- (c) Disrupting the Taliban and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan; and
- (d) Increasing the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and building the capacity of the Afghan government. (QDR2010-11-12)

In order to achieve these objectives, with additional troops of 30,000, approximately 100, 000 US troops will be deployed in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban with the NATO and other allied nations.

##### (2) Tight U.S. manpower resources and management of "All Volunteer Force"

On the other hand, the eight-year war on terror has already been a big burden on the manpower resources of the U. S. military forces since the days of the administration of the former President George W. Bush. On April 22, 2009, the Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli told the Senate Armed Services Committee's subcommittee that unless "tough decisions" are made, the Army cannot continue to meet current demands for deployed forces while maintaining the amount of time troops need to re-train and rest at their home station.

The same situation applies to Marine Corps ground forces, Assistant Commandant Gen. James Amos told the panel. Deployed Marine units in Iraq and Afghanistan are equipped with the best manpower, equipment and training available, Amos said. But those Marine units preparing to deploy or standing by for strategic responses, such as to a new war or conflict, aren't so fortunate. "This degraded state of readiness within our non-deployed forces presents risks to our ability to rapidly respond to other unexpected contingencies around the globe. It would be very difficult and challenging, in the case of the Marine Corps, if something happened in Iran or North Korea," Amos said.

Therefore, QDR2010 is regarding a long term of maintenance of "All-Volunteer Force" as one of the strategic priorities to reduce personal burdens to win the present war and to prepare for the future. In this respect, based on the understanding that years of conflict requiring long and numerous deployments abroad have imposed significant strain on our uniformed men and women—physically and psychologically, Recruiting and Retention are considered particularly important, in addition to management of deployment period abroad.

- (a) Regarding the management of oversea deployment period, the near-term planning objective for the Active Component is to maintain the rotation of two years at home station for every one year oversea deployment. In case of Guard and Reserve units, a policy of one year mobilization period every five-year demobilization period is maintained. On the other hand, from the present demands of capabilities, frequency of mobilizing a number of Reserves of specialties and Guards is likely to surpass this standard. Therefore, the plan is emphasizing that the burden must be shared by the Reserves as much as the Active Components to meet the demand. In addition, the status of U. S. Forces in Korea (USFK) is changing from being forward-deployed to being forward-stationed with family members. When fully implemented, this change will enable forces to deploy from Korea, helping to expand the pool of available forces for global contingencies.
- (b) As for recruiting and retention, the Department succeeded in meeting their objectives in 2009. However, in order to strengthen retention of personnel, a further policy is required. The programs of increasing various allowances and implementing transfer from Active service to Reserve Component service for a certain period of time are introduced. (QDR2010-49~56)

Additionally, the war on terror gives the government a big financial burden. In the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act signed by President Obama in October 2009 is included a sum of 130 billion US dollars, which is the budget for measures against overseas contingencies mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the budget request from the U. S. Defense Department in

2011 submitted to the Congress on 1 February 2010 is included 159.3 billion US dollars for measures against overseas contingencies, which covers the additional estimated costs of implementing the president's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

War on terror is not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. The establishment of exit-strategy from Afghanistan to withdraw from Afghanistan in which the United States invests a scale of fighter power and its realization will be without doubt a big task for the administration of President Obama in the first term.

## 2. Buildup of Conventional Forces

### (1) Importance of fighting capability under environment of “Denial of Accesses”

The QDR2010 stresses strengthening capabilities in the six mission areas in building up the military force. Namely, they are to: (a) Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home; (b) Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations; (c) Build the security capacity of partner states; (d) Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; (e) Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and (f) Operate effectively in cyberspace. (QDR2010-17~39)

Here, in particular, the mission to “deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments” is notable. As a force plan to “deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments,” the QDR2010 aims to: (a) Develop a joint air-sea battle concept; (b) Expand future long-range strike capabilities; (c) Exploit advantages in subsurface operations; (d) Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure, and readiness; (e) Assure access to space and the use of space assets; (f) Enhance the robustness of key C4ISR capabilities; (g) Destroy hostile sensors and combat command systems and others. Regarding developments of a new “joint air-sea battle concept,” in order to defeat the adversaries across the range of military operations, equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities, the DoD is aiming to check operations of air and sea forces which will integrate capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action. The QDR 2010 is pointing out that the concept, as it matures, will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. (QDR2010-32-34)

In the background where the concept to “deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments” is emphasized there is a worry about facing the “anti-access strategies” which is aimed at impeding the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and blunting the operations of those forces that deploy forward by the countries which have a wide range of sophisticated weapons when U.S. forces conduct power projection operations abroad. Although the QDR2010 does not particularly specify the name, in the background where strengthening of the capabilities in this area is emphasized there is a situation in which the direction of Chinese military modernization is moving toward the ocean and challenging the superiority of the United States. As seen in the incidents of an obstruction from China against a U.S. Navy’s surveillance ship in the South China Sea from March to May 2009, an expansion of the range of “access denial” strategy is clarifying the structure of a confrontation between the U. S. Navy with aircraft



carriers as a pillar of strength and Chinese naval and air forces.

Regarding China, the QDR2010 is showing worry about China's buildup and deployment of large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems, as part of the comprehensive military modernization by Beijing. The QDR2010 is pointing out that China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions. (QDR2010-31)

Although QDR2010 does not say clearly about the need of "hedge strategy" against China which was reported in the QDR2006, there is no doubt that an emphasis on "deterrence and defeating of aggression in anti-access environments" and the aim of reorganization and redeployment of the U. S. forces in the Pacific region, which is to be mentioned later, is a kind of "hedge strategy" against China.

## (2) Direction of force buildup of the Department

According to QDR2010, the Department is taking the directions as follows.

- (a) U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.
- (b) U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.
- (c) U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility and multi-mission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities.
- (d) The United States will continue to enhance the capabilities of its special operations forces.
- (f) The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber defenses. (QDR2010-39~40)

Based on this direction, the QDR2010 mentions it is checking the force-sizing construct from the three standpoints of the short, midterm (5-7 years) and long term (7-20 years).

- (a) For the near-term and midterm future, the U. S. will win the present war, which means war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq will substantially influence upon the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces for several years.
- (b) While the U. S. continues the present war efforts, for the mid-term and long terms, the U. S. will deter the appearance of the threats of terrorism and attach greater importance to

construction of multi-phased defense systems to deter the potential and large-scale hostile force.

- (c) In order to prepare for the appearance of serious and new challenges, for medium term and long terms, it is necessary to prepare for the fighting force which is able to accomplish various kinds of operations simultaneously as follows. (1) A major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating a highly capable regional aggressor, and extending support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in the United States. (2) Deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened alert posture for U.S. forces in and around the United States. (3) A major stabilization operation, a long-duration deterrence operation in a separate theater, a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission, and extended support to civil authorities in the United States. (QDR2010-42-45)

When evaluating the force structure and combat capabilities of the U. S. forces, the QDR2010 regards it is no longer appropriate to speak of “major regional conflicts,” because America’s adversaries have been adopting a wide range of strategies and capabilities. Rather, the document considers U.S. forces must be prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances. (QDR2010-42) At this point, QDR2010 is succeeding the same idea with “capability base” of former Bush administration which denies the deterrence posture of “one size fits all.” (QDR2006-4)

### **3. Reorganization and Redeployment of U. S armed forces in Asia-Pacific region**

#### (1) Policy of Obama administration

As a “Pacific power,” Obama administration is attaching importance to the forward-stationed and forward-deployed U. S. forces because of the vast distance of the Pacific and the low density of U. S. basing and infrastructures in the area. Based on this understanding, QDR2010 mentions that the United States will work with allies and partners to continue to adapt its defense presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). At the same time, the United States will encourage its allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular multilateral security cooperation within the region. (QDR2010-65-66)

Regarding the reorganization and redeployment of the U. S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama administration is following the policy of the former Bush administration. In the reorganization and redeployment plan of the naval force, the plan of deploying 60 percent of the SSNs of the US Navy to the Pacific by 2010 which was shown in the QDR2006 is being implemented by deployment of the SSNs to the West Coast of the U. S. main land, Hawaii, and Guam as well as redeployment from the East Coast.

According to the report on the U.S. Navy website, in the year 2009, *Los Angeles* class SSN, USS *Jacksonville*, arrived at Pearl Harbor in April, and in July the US Navy’s newest SSN, USS *Hawaii*, arrived at the same port. The USS *Hawaii* is the first *Virginia* class SSN deployed in the Pacific. Afterwards, the second unit of the *Virginia* class SSN, USS *Texas*, was deployed in Pearl Harbor. In the summer of 2010 the third unit of the *Virginia* class SSN, USS *North Carolina*, and

follow-on units are scheduled to be deployed in Pearl Harbor right after construction. Additionally, another *Los Angeles* class SSN, USS *Albuquerque*, was redeployed to San Diego on the West Coast in August 2009. Eventually, of 53 SSNs, 31 units were deployed to the Pacific, of which 18 units are based in Pearl Harbor by the end of the year 2009. Additionally, aircraft carrier, USS *George Washington* was deployed in Yokosuka in August 2008. Having completed the ship's midlife refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH), aircraft carrier, USS *Carl Vinson* returned to an active duty in July 2009. In October of the same year the Carrier Strike Group 1 (CSG-1) with USS *Carl Vinson* as flagship was born anew in San Diego. (As for these activities, OPRF have carried them each time in the OPRF MARINT monthly ports.)

(2) Reorganization and redeployment of the U. S. military forces in Japan and the ROK

On the other hand, regarding reorganization and redeployment of the U. S. military forces in Japan and the ROK, the QDR2010 mentions that DoD is working closely with key allies Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to implement our agreed-on plans and shared visions to build a comprehensive alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope; realign our force postures; restructure allied security roles and capabilities; and strengthen our collective deterrent and defense capabilities. According to the QDR2010, these changes will firmly position these alliances for the 21st century security landscape and ensure their enduring strength, readiness, and resilience for the future. (QDR2010-59)

As to reorganization and redeployment of the U. S. military forces in Japan, expressing the expectation of continued implementation of the "Realignment Roadmap," the QDR2010 says, "With Japan, the United States will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam, the westernmost sovereign territory of the United States, into a hub for security activities in the region." (QDR2010-66)

On the other hand, concerning reorganization plan of the US forces in the ROK, the QDR2010 mentions that the United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. and combined force posture on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance's deterrent and defense capabilities and long-term capacity for regional and global defense cooperation. Doing so includes continuing to advance the ROK's lead role in the combined defense of its territory, together with the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK military in April 2012. (QDR2010-66)

According to the U.S. Army News dated January 12, 2010, based on the reorganization and redeployment program of U.S. military forces in the ROK, the majority of USFK will be relocated to two enduring hubs: the Northwest or Pyeongtaek hub, comprised mainly of U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Osan Air Force Base; and the Southeast or Daegu hub, comprised mainly of U.S. Army Garrison Daegu and Chinhae Naval Base. According to this program, in 2002 there were approximately 104 U.S. military installations and sites in Korea. As of 2009, there were approximately 70 U.S. military installations and sites in Korea. When the USFK transformation is complete, which is currently projected for 2016, 47 U.S. military installations and sites will remain. In addition, tour normalization is all about making Korea more like Europe and Japan, where unaccompanied Soldiers serve a two-year tour and accompanied Soldiers serve a

three-year tour, which will be implemented over a period of years in three phases.

In the program of reorganization and redeployment of USFK, it is worthy of notice that the status of USFK is changing from being forward-deployed to being forward-stationed with family members. As the QDR2010 mentioned previously, this change will enable forces to deploy from Korea, helping to expand the pool of available forces for global contingencies. If it be so, USFK after reorganization and redeployment has also in sight the contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula, which is worthy of notice.

(By Hideshi UENO, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

## 2.2 The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (hereafter the document) by Russian Federation (hereafter RF) edict on 5 February 2010 and released the content of the document on the Web site on the 6th.<sup>1</sup> The document was issued after ten years as a revised version of the “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (hereafter the old document)<sup>2</sup> which was decided by the then President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin on April 21, 2000.

According to a spokesman of the Russian Security Council, in addition to the document, President Medvedev also signed “The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020” (hereafter secret document) on the 5th. While the former is unclassified, the latter remains classified.

Below is a summary of an outline and features of the document. In addition, the major contents selected from the abridged translation of the document are listed in an enclosure attached to the end of this article.

### 1. Structure of the document and its outline

- (1) Structure of the document (Number in parenthesis indicates the number of items described in the document.)
  1. General situation (No.1~6)
    - (1) Military doctrine
      - Fundamental concepts
  2. Military dangers and military threats for Russia (No.7~16)
    - (1) External military dangers
      - a. Internal military dangers
      - b. Military threats
      - c. Military conflicts
      - d. Military actions
      - e. Nuclear weapons
    - (2) Territorial claims
  3. Russian military policy (No.17~37)
    - (1) Fundamental tasks of military policy
    - (2) Deterrence and prevention of military conflicts
      - a. Use of Armed Forces
      - b. Use of nuclear weapons
      - c. Collective Security
      - d. Peacekeeping operations

<sup>1</sup> Refer to: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html>

<sup>2</sup> Refer to: [http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/Russia/r\\_mil\\_doctrine\\_2000.html](http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/Russia/r_mil_doctrine_2000.html)

- e. Protection of Russian citizens
  - f. Tasks of Russian Armed Forces in peacetime, period of direct threats and wartime
  - g. Organizational building and development
  - h. Military planning
4. Tasks of Military-economic support for defense (No. 38~53)
- (1) Tasks
  - (2) Main task of equipping the Armed Forces
  - (3) Distribution of resources
  - (4) Development of Military industries
  - (5) Mobilization
  - (6) Military-political, Military-technological cooperation

(2) Outline of the document

Regarding the current security environment of the world, the document shows an understanding that it does not guarantee equal safety to all nations including the area of mechanism and international laws and the military dangers that Russia is confronting from every direction are in the trend of increasing. As the major military dangers (Field Comment: The document makes a distinction between “threats” and “dangers.” See an enclosure.), the document points out eleven items in all including: (a) Eastward expansion of NATO; (b) Deployment and increase of foreign troops near the borders of Russian and its allies; (c) Development and deployment of anti-missile defense systems; (d) Territorial claims to Russia and allies; (e) Use of military forces to neighboring territories of Russia that is against the international law; (f) International terrorism; and others.

As a pillar of Russian military policy, the document points out: (a) Prevention of conflicts by nuclear weapons; (b) Reservation of the rights of using nuclear weapons against aggressions by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or conventional arms; (c) Use of high-precision guided missiles for deterrence; (d) Dispatching military forces abroad to protect national interests; and (e) Defeating the aggressions is the mission of the Russian military forces in wartime.

In addition, as the partners and regional organizations with which Russia aims to strengthen military cooperation, the document points out: (a) Belarus; (b) Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); (c) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); (d) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and (e) The United Nations, and other international and regional organizations. In particular, the CSTO is frequently mentioned in the document.

Regarding the understanding of situation which comes first of all to the relations with NATO, the document is following the contents of the “The National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020” (hereafter the Security strategy)<sup>3</sup> which was issued in March 2009. As for the description on nuclear weapons, particularly, the word on nuclear deterrence has content which is toned down, compared with the old document in 2001. Although the document is placing

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<sup>3</sup> Refer to: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/436.html>

more emphasis on the need of conventional arms than the nuclear weapons, it is considered that the different content may be described in the secret document which was already mentioned at the beginning of this article. In addition, as items on the ocean policy, the document mentions two items of (a) Anti-piracy and securing safety of the vessels; and (b) Securing the safety of economic activities on the high sea among 18 major tasks of the military forces in peace time.

## 2. Features of the document

- (1) Regarding the military doctrine which Russia revised after nine years, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council, who was in charge of drafting the document, expressed his view in October 2009 that the target for using nuclear weapons would be extended not only to the global war of using the conventional weapons but also to regional and local wars. (*Izvestiya*, October 14, 2009) However, there is no direct description [of using nuclear weapons in the regional and local wars] in the document released this time.

The old document in 2001 made it possible to use nuclear weapons when Russia had “a large scale of attack by conventional weapons.” Previously, Patrushev explained as a reason for review that, facing the ceaseless movement of an enlargement of NATO, intensifying military exercises by the United States including operations of strategic nuclear weapons, and instability caused by the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, international terrorism, and increasing conflicts over energy resources, among others, Russia “needs more flexible, timely response.”

However, in the chapter of the national defense in the “Security Strategy” issued in May 2009 the “use of nuclear weapons” was deleted and in the document this time it was written “The Russian Federation (hereafter RF) reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the RF involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.” (No. 22 in an enclosure), and its content was toned down, compared with the old document. As to this description, it might be described in a different expression in the secret document related with the nuclear weapons which was approved on the same day with the military doctrine, and it is necessary to make efforts to analyze “what was not mentioned in the document” apart from “what was revealed in the document.”

- (2) General Yuri Baluyevskiy, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council (DSSC), who is regarded to have been involved in drafting the document, is said to be one of hard-liners to European nations and the United States. (*The Mainichi Shimbun*, Japan, 3 June 2009) While serving as Chief of General Staff (CGS) of the Russian Military Force (between 2004 and 2008), Baluyevskiy used to say there was no need of military reform as the situation remains unchanged, ” before submitting the draft to the Security Council. In due course, he was relieved of his post of CGF by then President Putin (now Prime Minister) and was assigned to the post of DSSC. On the other hand, General Nikolai Egorovich Makarov who was appointed to CGF as a successor to Baluyevskiy is an advocate of the military reform. (*Eurasia Daily*

*Monitor*, Volume: 7, Issue: 26, the Jamestown Foundation, February 8, 2010)

- (3) The document was compiled and checked under the delicate human relations among these people concerned, and was finally approved by President Medvedev. Therefore, there is no denying the fact that there are some differences in expressions between this document and its related previous documents. The document has been discussed since at least three years ago. However, looking from the timing, it was eventually issued during the timeframe from right after the U. S. Quadrennial Defense Review to right before Munich Security Conference (beginning February 5, 2010) as well as before the conclusion of the new nuclear arms reduction treaty on behalf of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty One (START-1) which expired on 5 December 2009 as well as the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (May 5 ~ 28, 2010).

### 3. Comments

- (1) In Russia the military doctrine is in itself regarded to have legal binding force. It is “a system officially accepted to bind the most important defense matters” and “a declaration of the nation in the area of national defense.” Furthermore, the military doctrine is an official document in both domestic and external sides, and “a declaration of the country on national defense matters” officially announced to the world. However, it is important to bear in mind that a declared policy and action plan are always separate.
- (2) The document is developed from the previously related documents. In its content, however, regarding the definition of key words, the document separates “threat” used by the “Security Strategy” issued in May 2009 into “military danger” and “military threat.” While the old document stressed the cooperative policy with the United States and European nations as its basis, the new document describes “the desire of moving the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of Russia is dangerous (No. 8a), making the confrontational posture with the United States and NATO member countries more visible.

On the contrary, rebuffing the Russian words, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary-General, said, “I have to say that this doctrine does not reflect the real world...NATO is not an enemy of Russia.” (Reuters, February 6, 2010)

- (3) The document reconfirms the “use of the nuclear weapons” (No. 22) which was not mentioned in the “Security Strategy” and emphasizes the importance of conventional weapons, in particular, precision, communications, and command and controlled systems, in which Russia is behind the United States and NATO. (No. 15, 22) The relations between the two parties seem to indicate that Russia is demonstrating the existence of nuclear forces to supplement the strategic instability brought by the weakness of the conventional forces rather than strengthening the nuclear forces. (No. 15, 16, 19, 22, 41c, 41f, 49) However, it is true that the present Russian military needs modernization of both nuclear forces and conventional forces.
- (4) Regarding the standard of using nuclear weapons, it was changed from the expression of “under the critical situation for the national security of Russia” in the old document to “when existence of its nation itself is threatened,” Russia reserves the rights to use nuclear



weapons. (No. 22) In addition, the words in old document: “RF will not use nuclear weapons to NPT member countries, However, if such countries that have no nuclear weapons attack Russian military forces or Russian allies in cooperation with the countries that have nuclear weapons, Russia reserves the rights to attack...” were deleted. Moreover, other nuclear powers countries such as the United States, Britain and France have not rejected the rights of nuclear attack against the attacks from other countries. The unilateral declaration by Russia is a political gesture which is accompanied by its own degradation of nuclear weapons. In fact, Russian military personnel are expressing “preemptive strikes” in the articles and speeches, and it should be kept in mind that the “preemptive strike or no-use” is unrelated with the action.

- (5) Regarding the “territorial claims,” although the old document mentioned at the top of 13 external threats, the document lists at the fifth of 11 items of external military dangers. (No. 8e) Although the document does not specify the countries, one of Russian experts says, “There are countries that say a part of Russian territories is their own territory, for example, Japan,” mentioning directly the name of the country. (Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies, and Technologies (CAST), *Russia Today*, February 5, 2009)
- (6) As a standard of using the military force in peace time, the document mentions that, in addition to dispatching military forces into the countries and allied nations and peacekeeping activities under the resolution the UN Security council out of Russia (No. 25), RF will use military forces, assuming wide scope of military intervention into the regions of the former Soviet Union among others “to defend the interests of Russia and its citizens as well as the international peace and security.” (No. 26) In particular, concerning the standard of the latter, the chapter 2, section 1, item 10 in “Law on Defense” was revised to enable the armed force to: (a) repel the attack on Russian forces stationed abroad; (b) give military assistance to nations requesting Russian assistance; (c) protect Russian nationals living abroad from armed attacks; (d) fight piracy and protect commercial trade. Regarding these cases, Russia can now “use military forces.” (Federal Law N252FZ, “Law on Defense” <Revised on November 9, 2009>) Prior to this revised law, the use of military forces abroad was authorized only for the anti-terrorist activities under the anti-terrorism law enacted in 2006. (Japan’s *Gunji Kenkyu* <*The Military Review*>, February 2010, pp. 206-207)

What is noteworthy here is that the document designates that Russia can send armed forces abroad to protect their citizens by presidential order. It will protect the Russian population living in the countries that became independent from the former republics of the ex-Soviet Union including Georgia and Ukraine. Additionally, it is also intended to help the Russian intelligence agents (part of other military forces) to conduct “covert active measures” against the Russian individuals living abroad who are critical of present political regime of Russia. This is closely related with the “international terrorism” (No. 8j, k), one of external dangers in the document.

In Russia, on July 9, 2006, the bill which enables the government to assassinate the

“enemies of the Russian regime” under the leadership of President Putin (now Prime Minister)) passed into law at Russian Duma unanimously. The content is classified top secret but the law permits the agents to assassinate the “enemies of state”- terrorists and anti-Russian elements. Under this law, the authority of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and anti-terrorism and anti-Russia measures were strengthened. (Hiromi TERATANI, “*Ansatsukokka Roshia (Assassinating State, Russia)*,” Gakken, 2007, p. 38)

- (7) Regarding the military cooperation in the military security area, RF is strengthening the collective security systems with Belarus and CIC nations, which is the same with the old documents. On the other hand, the document is also targeting as part of collective security system the SCO which was established in 2001. Although the names of the country are not specified individually, it suggests RF is emphasizing the relations with China, one of the members of the group. (No. 51 d) In particular, the CSTO which became effective on 20 April 1994 is frequently mentioned, which is worthy of note. (No. 18e, 21, 51 b) Russia is intending to organize joint coalition forces under the CSTO to send them abroad on the peacekeeping mission. The Russian aim is regarded to form the Collective Rapid-Response Forces (KSOR) (born in 2001) in the CSTO to have it developed as an organization which can compete with NATO. Russia has great expectations to CIC (born with RF, Ukraine and Belarus). (No. 51c) Based on the relation with Belarus with which Russia concluded “The Union of Russia and Belarus,” a super-national confederation, on 9 December 1999, Russia will try to annex Ukraine which has a large Russian population in the country as a pillar of a greater federation. (No. 51a)
- (8) The document mentions to develop special weapons for the foreign military forces under the government control (No. 42), and develop defense industry to produce high-tech assets for export. (No. 45) There is no word on an introduction of high-tech weapons from foreign countries. If the Russian military wishes to recover its capabilities, it needs to solve the problems in this area which are “not mentioned” in the documents.
- (9) Regarding the ocean policy, the document lists up anti-piracy and protection of the vessels as one of missions in peace time. (No.27-1) The old document only mentioned that (in case of need) Russian political activities are supported by implementation of appropriate measures of military nature and maritime military presence. (Old document, No.I-10)
- (10) There is no description on the Arctic Ocean (Arctic region) in the document. As details on it were already mentioned in the related-documents listed in an enclosure below - “The Security Strategy” (No.IV-11) and “The Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine for the Period through 2020” (Arctic region: No.III- 2), the document is believed to have avoided duplication.

(By Takehisa TOMOMORI, editorial staff of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report)

## Enclosure

Below is a list of the major contents selected from the abridged translation of the original Russian document composed of a total of 53 items, which are arranged in sequence (No.1 - No. 53), but some of them are skipped.

### 1. General Situation (No. 1 ~ 6)

- (1) The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (hereinafter the document) is a fundamental strategic planning document and a system of the views officially adopted on preparations for national defense and on the defense of the Russian Federation (hereafter RF). (No. 1)
- (2) The document considers: (a) the fundamental provisions of the 2000 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation; (b) the Concept for the Long-Term Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation for the Period through 2020; (c) the Russian Federation National Security Strategy through 2020: (The Security Strategy); (d) 2008 Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept; and (e) the Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine for the Period through 2020. (No. 2)
- (3) Fundamental concepts (No. 6a ~ j)
  - (a) military security of the RF - a state of protection of the vitally important interests of the individual, society, and the state against external and internal military threats related to the use or threat of military force that is characterized by the absence of a military threat or by the ability to counter such a threat;
  - (b) military danger - a state of interstate or intrastate relations characterized by a total of factors capable of leading to the emergence of a military threat in certain conditions;
  - (c) military threat - a state of interstate or intrastate relations characterized by the real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict;
  - (d) military conflict - a form of interstate or intrastate contradictions involving the use of military force, including large-scale, regional, and local wars and armed conflicts; (1) armed conflict - an armed clash on a limited scale between states (an international armed conflict) or between opposing sides within the confines of the territory of a single state; (No.6e) (2) local war - a war between two or more states pursuing limited military-political objectives; (No. 6g) (3) regional war – a war involving two or more states in the same region fought by national or coalition armed forces; (No. 6e) (4) large-scale war – a war between coalitions of states or world community states in which both sides would pursue radical military-political objectives; (No. 6h)
  - (e) military policy - the activities of the state to defend and safeguard the security and interests of the RF; (No. 6i)
  - (f) military planning – the determination of the procedures and methods for achieving objectives and tasks relating to the development of the military organizations, the organizational development, and the development of the Armed Forces. (No. 6k)

## 2. Military dangers and military threats for Russia (No.7-16)

### (1) External military dangers

- (a) While the likelihood of a large-scale war using conventional means of attack and nuclear weapons against the RF declines, military dangers to the RF are intensifying in a number of areas. (No. 7)
- (b) Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The existing international security system, including its international-legal mechanisms, does not ensure equal security for all states. (No. 7)
- (c) Having global functions of settling international conflicts in violation of the norms of international law, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is moving its military infrastructure closer to the borders of the RF, the desire of which is a danger. (No. 8a)
- (d) the deployment of troop contingents of foreign states on the territories of states contiguous with the RF and its allies; (No. 8c)
- (e) the deployment of strategic missile defense systems, the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems; (No. 8e)
- (f) the territorial claims against the RF; (No. 8e)
- (g) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and missile technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons; (No. 8f)
- (h) the use of military force on the territories of states contiguous with the RF in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law; (No. 8h)
- (i) the military presence leading to seats of the armed conflict and the escalation of such conflicts on the territories of states contiguous with the RF and its allies; (No. 8i)
- (j) the spread of international terrorism; (No. 9j)
- (k) the emergence of seats of interethnic tension, the activity of international armed radical groupings in areas adjacent to the state border of the RF and the borders of its allies; (NO 8k)

(2) The main internal military dangers are: attempts to change the constitutional structure of the RF by force; the undermining of the sovereignty and violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the RF; the disruption of the functioning of organs of state power, important state and military facilities, and the informational infrastructure of the RF. (No.9a ~ c)

(3) The main military threats are: (No.10a ~d)

- (a) a drastic deterioration in the military-political situation and the creation of the conditions for the use of military force;
- (b) the impeding of the operation of systems of state and military command and control of the RF, the disruption of the functioning of its strategic nuclear forces, missile early warning systems, systems for monitoring outer space, nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy facilities, atomic and chemical industry facilities, and other potentially dangerous facilities;
- (c) the creation and training of illegal armed formations and their activity, a show of

military force with provocative objectives during the exercises, and intensification of the activity of the armed groups:

- (4) Features of military conflicts are:
  - (a) Military actions will be featured by the increasing significance of precision, electromagnetic, laser, and infrasound weaponry, computer-controlled systems, drones and autonomous maritime craft, and guided robotized models of arms and military equipment. (No. 15)
  - (b) Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war). In the event of the outbreak of a military conflict involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war) and imperiling the very existence of the state, the possession of nuclear weapons may lead to such a military conflict developing into a nuclear military conflict. (No. 16)

### 3. Russian military policy (No.17 ~ 37)

- (1) The fundamental tasks of the military policy of RF are determined by the RF president in accordance with federal legislation, the RF National Security Strategy through 2020, and the current Military Doctrine. (No. 17)
- (2) The military policy of the RF is aimed at preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing military conflicts, and improving military organization, the forms and methods of operating the Armed Forces and other troops, and also means of attack for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the RF and also the interests of its allies. (No. 17)
- (3) Prior to utilizing military force, in order to neutralize possible military dangers and military threats the RF use political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means. (No. 19b)
- (4) As a means of deterring and preventing conflicts RF will strengthen the CSTO, which will have a fundamental role to deter and prevent military conflicts as well as to promote cooperation with NATO. (No. 18e)
- (5) The RF regards an armed attack on a Union State member as an act of aggression against the Union State and will carry out retaliatory measures. (No. 21)
- (6) Forcible strategic deterrence of RF is implemented by the utilization of precision weapons. (No. 22)
- (7) The RF reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat. The decision to utilize nuclear weapons is made by the Russian Federation president. (No. 22)
- (8) The RF assigns troop contingents to the CSTO Collective Rapid-Response forces and CSTO peacekeeping forces. (No. 24)
- (9) Under a UN mandate or under a CIS mandate the RF provides troop contingents peacekeeping operations in accordance with RF legislation and international treaties. (No. 25)

- (10) With a view to protecting the interests of the RF and its citizens and maintaining international peace and security, the Russian Federation Armed Forces may be used outside the Russian Federation in accordance with the international law, the international treaties of the RF, and federal legislation. (No. 26)
- (11) The operations in the foreign countries for eliminating the threats and suppressing aggression are authorized on the basis of requests from the UN Security Council and other bodies in accordance with international law. (No. 27k)
- (12) The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime are: to defend the sovereignty of the RF and the integrity and inviolability of its territory; to ensure strategic deterrence; to maintain the composition and state of combat and mobilization readiness and training of the strategic nuclear forces; to provide timely warning to the supreme commander in chief of the RF Armed Forces; to maintain the capability of the Armed Forces and other troops for the timely deployment of groupings of troops (forces); to ensure the air and space defense; to deploy space weapons; to protect communication, and infrastructure; Russian civil defense; to participate in international peacekeeping activities; to combat piracy and to protect shipping; to ensure the security of the economic activities on the high seas; to combat terrorism; to prepare for carrying out territorial defense and civil defense measures; to participate in the protection of public order and maintaining public security; to participate in the elimination of emergencies and the restoration of special-purpose facilities; and to participate in securing a state of emergency. (No. 27a ~ r)
- (13) The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops during a period of direct threat of aggression are: to participate in maintaining a martial law regime; to fulfill the commitments with regard to collective defense (No. 28a ~ d); to develop the military organization (No. 30); to decide the priority for developing military organization (No. 31); to plan military policy and its implementation (No, 34a); to plan military plan, to build military organization, and to make short-, medium-, and long-term planning documents. (No. 36d)

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