

# OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

## May 2008



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This monthly report is edited/ summarized by publisher and staff writers based on published news resources.

Each resource is referenced with bracket below each title and is displayed as link URL on the last page of this report.

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## Major Events in May 2008

**Security:** In Somali waters, following the previous month, several piracy incidents occurred in May. On May 4, Somali pirates opened fire on a chemical tanker. On the 17th, pirates hijacked a Jordanian-flagged cargo ship MV *Victoria* about 40 nautical miles off the capital Mogadishu. The cargo ship was released on the 23rd. On 25th, MV *Amiya Scan* (2,546 GT) of the Dutch cargo vessel was hijacked by the pirates as it was traveling in international waters in the Gulf of Aden. On the 28th, two more cargo ships, German MV *Lehmann Timber* and Turkish MV *Arean*, were hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, roughly, in the same area where the Dutch vessel had been hijacked. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there have been 24 attacks on ships near the Somali coast since this January. Of those 24, seven have been successful hijackings.

On May 19, a new organization dedicated to Indian Ocean regional port and maritime security called the South Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO) was launched. The SARPSCO brings together stakeholders from Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

On May 27, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the three littoral states, officially implemented the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Cooperative Mechanism is an initiative mooted under Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which aims to serve as a formal platform to promote voluntary cooperation between the littoral states and users of the Straits in enhancing safety of navigation and environmental protection of the Straits. Under the Cooperative Mechanism, the littoral states and user states of the Straits also agreed to set up the Aids to Navigation Fund, which will be headed by Malaysia for the next three years.

**Military:** The South Korean defense industry's global ambitions for overseas export have been surfacing in recent years. Mingi Hyun, a South Korean defense expert with U.S. citizenship, said about the topics of exporting naval vessels on a web-site on maritime Asia.

According to a Canadian report, since (the then) Russian president Vladimir Putin resumed long-range air patrols by strategic bombers in August 2007, the TU-95 Bear H bombers have been flying about twice a month into the buffer zone just outside Canadian and U.S. airspace in the Arctic.

On May 12, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) has released the 2008 White Paper. The Taiwan's MND has published the White Paper every two years since 1992. According to the Taipei Times dated May 13, the Taiwanese 2008 Defense White Paper says China is increasing military activities around Taiwan Strait.

In the analysis of this monthly report, we have taken up anew the topics of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy for an evaluation, based on the several articles issued thereafter.

**Diplomacy and International relations:** The Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) held a week long workshop from May 12 in Suva, the capital of Fiji, to prepare for the country's submission on Extended Continental Shelf (ECS). Fiji along with Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga and Papua New Guinea have a credible claim to extend their continental shelf beyond their current 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

On the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the delegates from 88 states attended a Senior Political Level Meeting held in Washington, D.C. on May 28. The first PSO meeting was held in Cracow in Poland on May 31, 2003. In the Meeting the "Washington Declaration" was adopted.

The meeting of the Cabinet ministers from the five coastal States to the Arctic Ocean was held in Ilulissat, Greenland for two days from May 28 to 29. Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Premier of Greenland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, the Minister of Natural Resources of Canada, and the United States Deputy Secretary of State attended the conference. Regarding any possible overlapping claims over sovereignty under the legal framework of the UNCLOS, the "Ilurissat Declaration" signed at the meeting will remain committed to the orderly settlement.

On May 23, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave a Judgment on the sovereignty over the three rocks including Pedra Branca and others which have been in dispute between Malaysia and Singapore, which are located some 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore. The Court finds that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca; that Malaysia has sovereignty over Middle Rocks; and that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located.

**Shipping, Resources, Environment and Miscellaneous:** Russian state nuclear agency (Rosatom) will take over the management of the country's fleet of eight nuclear-powered icebreakers under the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSCO) from August this year. The transfer to Rosatom will mean a strengthening of Russia state interests in the Northern Shipping Route. The icebreakers will for many years ahead play a vital role for shipping along the 13,000km long Russian arctic coast.

On May 6, the United States and Russia signed a long-sought agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. The framework agreement could open the way for Russia to import, store and reprocess thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel that had been supplied by the United States for reactors around the world.

According to a recent report of the United Press International (UPI), China is facing a potential shortage of tankers. A prominent Chinese shipping executive commented that by 2015 China will need nearly 150 Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tankers to meet its rising energy needs. For Beijing, the news is bad, as the country's top five shipping companies currently have a combined fleet of 27 VLCCs. VLCC, displacing 200,000-320,000 tons, are capable of carrying two million barrels of oil.

According to Upstream Oil and Gas Regulator (BPMigas), a large oil company in Indonesia, a gas field, which is believed to contain the Indonesia's second biggest reserves, was found in the gas development field in the Masela Timor Sea (MTS) in East Nusa Tenggara. Inpex, the Japanese firm, has rights to the MTS gas block as an operator. Data based on a first drilling trial showed it holds a potential reserves of 10 trillion cubic feet, the country's second's biggest after the Tangguh block in Papua with a proven gas reserve of 14.4 trillion cubic feet.

On May 19, two Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the development of a deep seaport in Tavoy. Construction of the port is projected to take up to six years; management of the port will be contracted to a Thai firm yet to be named.

On May 22, Chinese science vessel the *Dayang Yihao* (Ocean No.1) (5,600 tons) with 145 scientists aboard set sailed from Guangdong for the Pacific, starting a 250-day oceanographic research expedition. The expedition, 20th of its kind, has the largest yet complement of scientists, drawn from 24 domestic scientific and educational institutions, according to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The *Dayang Yihao* is scheduled to return to Qingdao late January 2009.

# 1. Information Digest

## 1.1 Security

### **May 4 “Somali pirates opened fire on chemical tanker” (Khaleej Times Online, May 6, 2008)**

On May 4, Somali pirates opened fire on a chemical tanker, Andrew Mwangura of the Seafarers Assistance Program said on May 6. According to Mwangura, while most of a series of the attacks by pirates in the area of “Horn of Africa” have occurred within about 200 miles of the coast, this attack was noted nearly 350 miles out at sea. The ship attacked was Marshall Islands-registered vessel, which was on its way from Durban, South Africa, to Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Pirates in two speedboats apparently fired machineguns and “some form of projectiles” at the chemical tanker, which changed course and sped away. No one was hurt.

### **May 10 “Attempted pirate attack in Malacca Strait” (Maritime Global Net, May 13, 2008)**

On May 10, pirates using a bamboo pole attached to a hook attempted to board a chemical tanker underway in the Malacca Strait area, off North Sumatra, according to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The master raised the alarm and alerted ships in vicinity. The pirates aborted the attempt and escaped in their speedboat.

### **May 14 “USN CNO: Civilian and military cooperation against piracy needed” (Ship Talk, May 15, 2008)**

In an interview with AFP, Admiral (ADM) Gary Roughead, the chief of US navy operations, told that the navies and maritime law enforcement organizations should unite with insurance and shipping companies to make it so hard, so difficult, and high risk for pirates to undertake their business that they stop doing it. ADM Roughead called for the joint cooperation after attending the two-day international meeting held in Copenhagen from May 14, which was cosponsored by the United States and Denmark. “Cooperation is the key. One country can't do it alone,” ADM Roughead stressed, citing the example of efforts made by three littoral countries bordering the Strait of Malacca. Grouping more than 200 representatives from 60 countries, including navies, non-governmental organizations and NATO, the conference in Copenhagen discussed ways of combating a rise in incidents of sea piracy.

### **May 17 “Somali pirates hijack Jordanian ship” (AFP, May 17, Sify News, May 20, and Hindustan Times, May 20, 2008)**

On May 17, pirates hijacked a Jordanian-flagged cargo ship MV *Victoria* about 40 nautical miles off the capital Mogadishu, said Andrew Mwangura of the Kenyan branch of the Seafarers' Assistance Program to AFP. Jordanian Transport Minister Alaa Batayneh said the vessel, owned

by Dubai-based Marwan Shipping Company, was carrying 4,200 tons of sugar donated by Denmark to the people of war-torn Somalia. Pirates on three small boats boarded the Jordanian-flagged vessel, Mwangura said on 20 May. MV *Victoria* is now believed to be moving north toward Hobyo some 500 kilometers north of Mogadishu. “We are trying to establish contact with the pirates. So far they have not demanded any ransom. We suspect that a pirate group called ‘Somali Marine’ is behind the hijacking,” Mwangura said.

The ship was carrying 21 crew members of whom 10 are Indians while the others are from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya and Tanzania. On May 20, the Marwan Shipping said they were still awaiting some communication from the hijackers. The US Naval Forces-Central Command, Bahrain, has told to offer all possible help to free the vessel and the crew members held hostage. The Indian Coast Guard's Maritime Rescue Coordination Center, Mumbai, is also coordinating with the search and rescue agencies in Yemen, Seychelles and Norway to initiate necessary action against the piracy.

### **【Related Story】**

#### **“Somali pirates release hijacked vessel” (AP, May 23, 2008)**

The owners of the MV *Victoria* told Andrew Mwangura, a Kenyan coordinator of the Seafarers Assistance Program, that MV *Victoria* was released on May 23 and was traveling with a handful of Somali soldiers on board to ensure its safe passage. Mwangura said he was not informed under what terms the pirates released the ship. There have been no reports of injury to the crew or damage to the ship. The vessel will travel to the Somali capital, Mogadishu, its destination before it was hijacked, to offload its cargo, Mwangura said.

In addition, South Africa's U.N. Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo said that U.N. experts monitoring a 1992 arms embargo in Somalia are currently investigating the links between piracy and arms trafficking. The experts are also investigating allegations that pirates received support from government officials in charge of the ports.

#### **May 19 “Indian Ocean regional port and maritime security organization starts” (VOA news.com, May 19, and US Coast Guard Press Release, May 19, 2008)**

On May 19, a new organization dedicated to Indian Ocean regional port and maritime security called the South Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO) was launched. Being hosted by the Maldives Ministry of Transport and Communication, the four-day inaugural meeting of SARPSCO, titled “Partnering for a Safer Sea Conference,” was held from May 19 through 22. The SARPSCO brings together stakeholders from Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In the opening address the President of the Republic of Maldives, His Excellency Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, said the nine countries' vigilance is crucial to combat the maritime threats they jointly face. He stressed, “This conference is an excellent opportunity to chart a new framework for regional cooperation in this vital area.”

Delivering a keynote speech, U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral (RADM) Craig E. Bone said the United States is pledging to support the new multinational initiative, although it will not be a

member. RADM Bone said: (1) It is important for the region to work together on port and maritime security to save lives and prevent economic damage by thwarting criminal and terrorist acts before they occur; (2) If crimes such as illegal fishing, human smuggling and the transportation of illegal cargoes and drugs can not be collectively combated, then neither can terrorism and piracy; (3) Half of the world's international maritime traffic is in the Indian Ocean region. Any disruption of the maritime flow of oil supplies in the Indian Ocean region would have disastrous economic consequences; and (4) The inauguration of SARPSCO sends a clear message and a warning to terrorists and criminals in the South Asia and Indian Ocean region. In addition, U.S. Coast Guard Activities Far East, headquartered at Tokyo, is one of only two overseas Coast Guard commands and responsible for international port security, maritime safety and engagement throughout a 41-nation Asia-Pacific region.

### **May 25 “Somali pirates hold Dutch firm's crew hostage in the Gulf of Aden”(CNN, May 27, and Marine Global Net, May 27, 2008)**

On May 25, a cargo vessel MV *Amiya Scan* (2,546 GT) of the Dutch Reider Shipping BV was hijacked by the pirates as it was traveling in international waters in the Gulf of Aden. According to the shipping company, MV *Amiya Scan* had nine crew members of four Russians and five Filipinos. None of them were harmed. Carrying parts of an old oil rig, the ship was traveling from Kenya to Romania, flying under the Antigua and Barbuda flag. The ship is presently anchored within Somali territorial waters. According to the company, the vessel was not navigating within Somalia's territorial waters when it was hijacked.

According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there have been 24 attacks on ships near the Somali coast this year. Of those 24, seven have been successful hijackings. IMB says Somali pirates seem to take ships “purely for financial gain.” In the seven cases this year, most were resolved with a ransom payment, adding that the pirates in Somalia typically treat the crews on the hijacked ships well. There are at least four distinct pirate groups in the country, but it is difficult to tell which group is responsible for which hijacking.

### **【Related Story 1】**

#### **“Somali authorities: Ready to use force if necessary” (Reuters, May 28, 2008)**

On May 28, Adde Muse, president of the Puntland autonomous government of Somalia, told Reuter they had sent troops on two ships toward Ras Bina, 470 miles east of Bosasso, where MV *Amiya Scan* was being held, and they were ready to use force to release the ship if necessary. Muse told they placed troops at the coast near Ras Bina from where the pirates might get support from their fellows on the ground or where they might get the chance to escape. Moreover, Muse asked the international community and, in particular, the country of the ship's origin not to pay ransom to the pirates. He also asked the world to help their military forces.



**【Related Story 2】****“Dutch Ship hijackers threaten to ‘kill the crew’” (Garoweonline.com, June 1, 2008)**

According to Puntland-based Radio Garowe, Men who hijacked the Dutch-owned ship MV *Amiya Scan* have contacted Radio Garowe about the Puntland government's threat to storm the ship by force. The hijackers threatened to take steps that may endanger lives of the ship crew if Puntland security forces attempt to release the ship and its crew by force from them. The hijacker who contacted Radio Garowe said: "The Dutch ship entered Somali territorial waters illegally for illegal fishing purposes. We have complained to the Puntland administration about boats and ships illegally fishing in our waters but the administration has done nothing to address this issue." He said hijackers demand ransom although he did not specify the amount of ransom money. On the other hand, the Puntland administration suggested to foreign ship owners not to negotiate with or give hijackers a ransom payment.

**May 27 “Three littoral nations start mechanism for the Malacca Singapore Straits” (Bernama, May 27, 2008)**

On May 27, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the three littoral states, officially implemented the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (hereafter referred to as Cooperative Mechanism). Malaysian Transport Minister Datuk Ong Tee Keat said, “We are now taking the lead in ensuring navigational security and environmental protection of the Straits.” Cooperative Mechanism is an initiative mooted under Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which aims to serve as a formal platform to promote voluntary cooperation between the littoral states and users of the Straits in enhancing safety of navigation and environmental protection of the Straits. Under the Cooperative Mechanism, the littoral states and user states of the Straits also agreed to set up the Aids to Navigation Fund, which will be headed by Malaysia for the next three years. Ong said, “We want to get the commitment of the user states whose vessels ply the Straits,” adding that, as of now, the fund had 3.6 million US dollars contributed by the littoral states and various user states including Japan, Korea, Greece and the Gulf countries. Moreover, under the Cooperative Mechanism, a Projects Coordination Committee (PCC) was also set up to oversee the implementation of projects in the Straits which include the removal of wrecks in the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, cooperation and capacity-building on hazardous and noxious substance preparedness and response in the Straits, and demonstration project of class B Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on small ships. The PCC also identified the setting up of tide, current and wind measurement systems for the Straits in order to enhance navigational safety and marine environment protection, replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits and replacement of aids to navigation damaged by the tsunami in December 2004.

Note: Regarding the Aids to Navigation Fund, at the forum of the “Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection” held in Singapore from May 4 to 6, 2007, Mr. Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman of The

Nippon Foundation, stated that he was prepared to contribute to the “Aids to Navigation Fund” up to a third of the costs associated with the funding of the maintenance and repair of the navigational aid facilities in the Straits during the initial five-year period, until the necessary funds have been collected from voluntary contributions from the users of the waterway.

### **May 28 “Somali pirates hijack two more ships” (AP, May 29, 2008)**

Andrew Mwangura of the Kenyan Seafarers Association told AP two more cargo ships were hijacked by pirates on May 28 in the Gulf of Aden, roughly, in the same area where the Dutch-owned vessel had been s hijacked. The vessels hijacked are a German owned vessel registered in Gibraltar, MV *Lehmann Timber* and a Turkey-flagged MV *Arean* – owned by Arkia Company of Malta. No details are available.

## **1.2 Military**

### **May 2 “S. Korea’s growing naval ship export ambitions” (‘Manoeuvre’ in Maritime Asia, May 2, 2008)**

The South Korean defense industry's global ambitions for overseas export have been surfacing in recent years. Mingi Hyun, a South Korean defense expert with U.S. citizenship, said about the topics of exporting naval vessels on a web-site on maritime Asia as follows.

- (1) With regards to naval vessels, rumors have emerged of overseas interest in South Korea's 4,500-ton *Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin* class (KDX-II) and 7,500-ton AEGIS-equipped *King Sejong the Great* class (KDX-III) destroyers, and the 14,000-ton *Dokdo* class (LPX) landing platform dock vessels among others. Countries rumored to be interested in these platforms have been Malaysia, Australia and Turkey. As evident in the Republic of Korea Navy's (ROKN) activities during certain overseas port visits, the ROKN has also been advertising its vessels to several governments and navies, including those of Vietnam, India and Egypt.
- (2) Currently, South Korea’s shipbuilding industry has played a central role in building ROK naval vessels. As for surface vessels, every single one in service today was manufactured by a South Korean shipbuilder. With the exception of the first *Chang Bogo* class submarine constructed in Germany, since then, South Korean shipyards have so far manufactured *Chang Bogo* class and *Dolgorae* class (U-214) submarines under license from Germany. Over the next decade, as the ROKN pushes ahead with procurement programs for over 20 frigates and even larger number of next generation coastal vessels, their orders to shipbuilders will in all likelihood grow further.
- (3) On the other hand, South Korea has sold off second-hand ROKN vessels to some countries for prices of around 1,000 US dollars. While practically a give-away, the purpose for doing so has been interpreted as establishing and strengthening military relations with countries or opening

up potential channels for the future export of first-hand military hardware manufactured by South Korea's growing defense industry. So far, countries which have received second-hand ROKN vessels in recent years have been Bangladesh, Kazakhstan and the Philippines, while negotiations have been ongoing for the transfer of vessels to Cambodia. All vessels involve mostly coastal patrol vessels. South Korea has so far churned out a frigate for Bangladesh in 2001.

- (4) The aforementioned sophisticated vessels are already attracting the attention of aspiring naval powers, many of whom share a common concern in China. This development could provide for a bright future for South Korea's naval ship exports. Also, in February 2008, BAE Systems and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) announced that its bidding for an upcoming Royal Navy tanker program will include DSME as a key member of its consortium.\* DSME's role will be to construct the vessels at its shipyard on Geoje Island. If awarded, DSME will most likely become the first-ever non-British contractor in history to manufacture vessels for the storied Royal Navy.

Note\*: As to this report, please refer to a following web-page: "BAE Systems and DSME join forces for tanker bid" (Lloyd's List, February 15, 2008).

<http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017505757&src=rss>

#### **May 4 "Canada reports: Russian bombers made patrol flights over the Polar Circle" (globeandmail.com, May 2, 2008)**

Since (the then) Russian president Vladimir Putin resumed long-range air patrols by strategic bombers in August 2007, the TU-95 Bear H bombers have been flying about twice a month into the buffer zone just outside Canadian and U.S. airspace in the Arctic. "The Russians are just telling all the Arctic nations, 'We're back,' " says Rob Huebert of the Center for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, regarding their intention. USAF Col. John Zentner, chief of NORAD current operations says it's a section of airspace for interception emanating from both of their countries. According to the Canadian Air Force (CAF), they had five intercept missions in 2008. (Incidentally, CAF had one intercept mission in 2006 and two in 2007—one in September and November respectively.) On the other hand, the U. S. Air Force had 12 such missions in 2008.

#### **May 8 "Indo-French Naval exercises start" (Thaindian, May 8, 2008)**

On May 8, Navies from India and France kicked off "Varuna 2008," a large-scale amphibious landing exercise held in the Bay of Bengal. French vessels involved in the exercise are the *Mistral*, the 32,300-tonne Landing Platform Dock, frigates and stealth ships among others. On the other hand, from the Indian Navy (IN), INS *Jalashwa*, the landing ship the IN acquired from the US, and other naval vessels are participating in the drills. The Varuna series of joint exercises commenced in 2001 and have grown in scope and complexity over the years.

**May 9 “India to acquire more submarines” (The Times of India, May 9, 2008)**

On May 9, closing a two-day naval command conference in Mumbai which had started on the 8th, Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta told media that India intends to acquire six more diesel-electric submarines in addition to the six Scorpene-class already under construction. Furthermore, Mehta confirmed that the Indian Navy plans to develop its own nuclear submarine, code-named the 'Advanced Technology Vessel,' which could either be equipped with conventional or nuclear weapons. India currently maintains a fleet of 16 submarines. New Delhi is considering leasing two *Akula*-class nuclear submarines from Russia.

**May 12 “China is increasing activities in Taiwan Strait: Taiwan Defense White Paper” (Taipei Times, May 13, 2008)**

On May 12, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has released the 2008 White Paper. The Taiwan’s MND has published the White Paper every two years since 1992. According to the Taipei Times dated 13, the Taiwanese 2008 Defense White Paper (hereafter report) says China is increasing military activities around Taiwan Strait. Below is the gist of the report.

- (1) China has been stepping up fighter plane patrols in the Taiwan Strait. While Chinese fighters patrolling the Strait made a little over 400 sorties per year before 1998, there were 1,500 sorties in 2001 and 1,700 in 2005. The figures have averaged between 1,300 and 1,700 since 2005, indicating a more aggressive posture.
- (2) Chinese research vessels have intruded into Taiwan’s waters more than 20 times in the past three years. The research vessels are believed to be mapping the undersea geography of Taiwan’s and Japan’s territorial waters for use by China’s submarine force.
- (3) The latest figures show that China has around 1,300 ballistic and cruise missiles targeted at Taiwan, and is adding 75 to 100 missiles per year. China’s ballistic missiles posed the biggest threat to national security. China has about 700 fighter jets of various types, with its most advanced Su-series fighter jets deployed in bases in southeast China. These jets would form the main force should there be a conflict between China and Taiwan.
- (4) The deployments of Russian Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers pose a serious threat to stability in the strait.

**May 21 “Indian Navy plans building large landing docks” (New Kerala, May 21, 2008)**

Having cleared the hurdles for manufacture of large aircraft carriers indigenously, the Indian Navy is now proposing to venture into building huge ship landing docks to give it the capability to carry heavily armed troops and armaments over oceans. The naval design bureau has now finalized plans to go ahead to manufacture over 20,000 ton displacement landing ship docks on the pattern of the INS *Jalashva*, which it recently acquired from the US Navy. Incidentally, alongside trying its hand on manufacturing such large warships, the Navy has also proposed to the government to set up another public-sector shipyard located on the east and west coast respectively, as its order book for vessels grows. India, at present, only has the know-how to

manufacture smaller amphibious warships of 4,000 to 6,000 thousand ton displacement. However, lacking the design expertise to build larger ships, Indian Navy asked an Italian firm Fincantieri to help them with the design of its indigenous aircraft carriers.

**May 26 “Flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet starts firing drills” (RIA Novosti, May 26, 2008)**

On May 26, the *Varyag*, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, started a series of live-firing exercises for the first time following a major refit that lasted almost a year. The *Varyag* is one of the three Russian *Slava*-class missile cruisers in commission, which is equipped with SS-N-12 Sandbox nuclear-capable supersonic anti-ship missiles mounted in eight pairs on either side of the superstructure, and is dubbed “the killer of aircraft carriers.” The exercise was aimed at checking the performance of all on-board weapons systems.

**May 27 “USS *George Washington* arrives in San Diego” (Navy Compass, May 28, 2008)**

The aircraft carrier USS *George Washington* arrived in San Diego on May 27. While the vessel is in port, investigation into the cause of its fire is ongoing.

### **1.3 Diplomacy and International Relations**

**May 12 “Pacific island nations hold workshop before submission on ECS” (SOPAC HP, May 12)**

The Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) held a week long workshop from May 12 in Suva, the capital of Fiji, to prepare for the country’s submission on Extended Continental Shelf (ECS). The workshop was coordinated by SOPAC, Geoscience Australia (GA) and the UNEP Shelf Program. Fiji along with Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga and Papua New Guinea have a credible claim to extend their continental shelf beyond their current 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The SOPAC, GA and UNEP will provide these countries with technical and financial support to complete the activities toward their submission on ECS.

**May 28 “Washington Declaration for PSI 5th Anniversary Meeting adopted” (U.S. Department of State HP, May 28, 2008)**

On the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the delegates from 88 states attended a Senior Political Level Meeting held in Washington, D.C. The first PSI meeting was held in Cracow in Poland on May 31, 2003. In the Meeting the “Washington Declaration” was adopted. Endorsing the declaration, the PSI participating states, now reaching 91, will continue their efforts to strengthen interdiction capabilities needed to prevent and stop

WMD proliferation effectively, including through participation in PSI-related exercises and other activities.

Note: Regarding to Washington Declaration for PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level, please refer to:  
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105268.htm>

**May 28 “Five Arctic Ocean littoral state hold meeting” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark HP, May 28, 2008)**

The meeting of the Cabinet ministers from the five coastal States to the Arctic Ocean was held in Ilulissat, Greenland for two days from May 28 through 29. Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Premier of Greenland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, the Minister of Natural Resources of Canada, and the United States Deputy Secretary of State attended the conference. Regarding any possible overlapping claims over sovereignty under the legal framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the “Ilulissat Declaration” signed at the meeting will remain committed to the orderly settlement. “With the ‘Ilulissat Declaration’ we have created a solid political framework for a peaceful development in the Arctic Ocean in the years ahead. We have committed ourselves politically to solve any disagreements through negotiation. Thus, hopefully, we have eradicated all the myths about a ‘race for the North Pole.’ The legal framework is in place and the five States have now declared that they will abide by it,” Foreign Mminister of Demark Muller said.

Note: As for the Ilulissat Declaration Arctic conference, please refer to:

<http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BE00B850-D278-4489-A6BE-6AE230415546/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf>

**Hot topic****Judgment on sovereignty over rocks in dispute between Malaysia and Singapore: ICJ**

On May 23, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave a Judgment on the sovereignty over the three rocks including Pedra Branca and others which have been in dispute between Malaysia and Singapore. Located some 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore, Pedra Branca (which is called Pulau Batsu Puteh by Malaysians) houses the Horsburgh Lighthouse built by the British between 1847 and 1851. The island also comprises Middle Rocks which are two clusters of rocks situated 0.6 nautical miles south of Pedra Branca, and South Ledge, a rock formation which can be seen only at low-tide, that sits 2.1 nautical miles to the south. (Refer to Photo 1)

**Photo1: Pedra Branca /Pulau Batu Puteh and Middle Rocks**

Source: The Malaysian Bar, May 23, 2008

[http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=cat\\_view&gid=384&Itemid=332](http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=384&Itemid=332)

Regarding the historical process over the sovereignty of the three rocks, the details are available in the ICJ press release and the whole text of its decision. The direct trigger which led to a suit for the issue between Malaysia and Singapore was a map published by Malaysia in December 1972. It is shown in Photo 2. In this map Malaysia claimed the sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh for the first time. In response, Singapore lodged a formal protest with Malaysia on February 14 in 1980. Finally, the issue of sovereignty over the Pedra Branca/Pulau

Batu Puteh came to the surface. After repeated bilateral negotiations, the two countries, both Singapore and Malaysia decided to put the issue on the sovereignty over Pedra Branca /Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge before the ICJ. Having agreed on a Special Agreement in February 1995, the two countries submitted to the ICJ the formal documents on their case for sovereignty in July 2007. (Channel NewsAsia, November 6, 2007)

**Photo 2: Map released by Malaysia in December 1979**

Source: The Malaysian Bar, May 23, 2008

[http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=cat\\_view&gid=384&Itemid=332](http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=384&Itemid=332)

On May 23, the ICJ gave a Judgment as follows: The Court finds that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh; that Malaysia has sovereignty over Middle Rocks; and that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located.

Below is a summary of an outline of the Judgment and internal reactions of Singapore and Malaysia which were reported in the media of two countries.

**1. Outline of ICJ Judgment**

Press Release of ICJ dated May 23 says on an outline of its Judgment as follows. The Judgment of the Court is final, binding and without appeal.

- (1) In the case concerning the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, of 16 judges, the ICJ finds by twelve votes to four that sovereignty over it belongs the Republic of Singapore. In this Judgment, the Court notes: (a) In a letter of the Sultan of Johor dated 21 September 1953 is written that the “Johore Government [did] not claim ownership” of the island; and (b) The conduct of the Parties after 1953, particularly, the investigation of shipwrecks related to



the rock by Singapore within the island's territorial waters and the permission granted or not granted by Singapore to Malaysian officials to survey the waters surrounding the island, may be seen as conduct *à titre de souverain*. Based on this, the court considers that by 1980 when the dispute surfaced the sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh had passed to Singapore. The Horsburgh lighthouse on the rock has been administered and operated by Singapore.

- (2) Regarding Middle Rocks, the Court finds by fifteen votes to one that sovereignty over Middle Rocks belonged to Malaysia. With respect to Middle Rocks, the Court observes that the particular circumstances which led to finding that sovereignty rests with Singapore in the above-mentioned (1) clearly do not apply to Middle Rocks. It therefore finds that original title to Middle Rocks should remain with Malaysia as the successor to the Sultanate of Johor.
- (3) As for South Ledge, the Court finds by fifteen votes to one that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located. Regarding South Ledge, (a) ICJ notes that this low-tide elevation falls within the apparently overlapping territorial waters generated by Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh and by Middle Rocks; and (b) Recalling that it has not been mandated by the Parties to draw the line of delimitation with respect to their territorial waters in the area, the Court reached to the above-mentioned conclusion. Therefore, final belonging of South Ledge has to wait until the demarcation of the territorial waters between the two nations.

Note: As to information on the Press Release, refer to the following web-site:

<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14490.pdf>

For details of the positions of two nations, refer to the following texts on ICJ's judgment on the web:

<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf?PHPSESSID=51b96e51dc89c081db981736eb3d576d>

## 2. Internal reactions between Malaysia and Singapore

On May 23, while pointing out that ICJ's decision is a balanced one, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said, "This decision is partly successful but partly failed in the other for Malaysia. The government understands how important, symbolically, is Pulau Batu Puteh to Malaysians, especially Johoreans. However, even though we are disappointed with the decision, we have earlier stated to accept whatever decision made by the ICJ." He expressed his dissatisfaction to the decision on Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh. (Bernama, May 23) On May 23, regarding that the judgment will bring about a "win-win" outcome, Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim stated, "ICJ decided to award sovereignty over Pulau Batu Puteh to Singapore, but at the same time awarded sovereignty over Middle Rocks to Malaysia. This is a victory for Malaysia as well." (Bernama, May 23)

Chairman of the Pengerang Fishermen's Association, which has utilized this area as the fishing ground, expressed his dissatisfaction with the decision. While obeying the decision, and respecting the Singaporean sovereignty over the territory, Abu Baker said the fishermen could no

longer fish in the area, as Singapore would not permit their fishing in the area around Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh since the territorial dispute came to the fore. Based on this, he was glad that Middle Rocks still belong to Malaysia, and expressed his expectation to the next move to the South ledge ownership issue. (Bernama, May 24)

On May 23, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said he was pleased with the judgment made by the ICJ and Singapore would fully accept the decision. Mr. Lee said this is a good way to resolve disagreements or problems while maintaining good relations with each other. He expressed his expectation that from now on two nations can go on to develop their cooperation in many areas. (Channel NewsAsia, May 23)

On the other hand, Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said it was pleased with the judgment of the ICJ, which led to solution to a longstanding territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore. However, from a standpoint that Singapore had regarded Middle Rocks and South Ledge as part of Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, the ministry hinted dissatisfaction with the decision over the two rocks, expressing that the judgment was not totally in Singapore's favor. (Channel NewsAsia, May 23)

As viewed from the words of the top government leaders of the two nations, the recent decision by the ICJ did not give satisfaction to both of the nations as in all other cases of the court. Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said in the aforementioned interview, "At the point when the nations have entrusted the conflict issues to the international criteria, it means that, if an assertion of one Party is approved, the assertion of another Party is not approved." However, anticipating fully that such a decision be made beforehand, both Parties have filed a suit for a solution to the Court, and have expressed to accept the verdict. Researcher Barry Desker who works for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore has evaluated an expression of a willingness of two nations to entrust dispute settlement to the norms of international law by filing a suit to the ICJ as an indication of regional maturity. Desker is expecting it will be a precedent for solving other issues or disputes in the region. (Channel NewsAsia, May 23)

### **3. Remaining Issues**

As both Malaysia and Singapore have accepted the verdict, it is not anticipated that the bilateral relations will get intense and they will confront each other over these issues. However, difficult issues related to the verdict remain unresolved. A Singapore-Malaysia joint technical committee co-chaired by the Vice-Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two nations will be held to implement the court's decision. For one thing, both sides have: (1) to discuss how to delimit the 0.6-mile territorial waters in the Pedra Branca (Malysian appellation of this island is abbreviated here) and Middle Rocks area; and (2) to decide to whom South Ledge belongs. Additionally, the procedures on fishing operations and navigations for small boats among others will become necessary. For this, as its precondition, two nations have to set their territorial demarcation lines including this area.

On May 23, Singapore's Foreign Ministry said the precise coordinates of Singapore's territorial

sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) will be announced at an appropriate time. Should the limits of its territorial sea or EEZ overlap with claims of neighboring countries, Singapore will negotiate with those countries with a view to arrive at agreed delimitations, in accordance with international law. (Channel NewsAsia, May 23)

On May 24, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, said Malaysia must determine quickly the boundary line to include South Ledge in the Malaysian waters. (Bermana, May 24) Dr. Abu Bakar Jaafar, a Malaysian expert on law of the sea, told that Pedra Branca is not an island, according to Article 121 (3) in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), as it cannot sustain human habitation or economical life of their own, and (as such) it shall have no EEZ or continental shelf (CS). (The Malaysian Bar, May 27)

According to aforementioned Dr. Abu Bakar, regarding Middle Rocks, it can be a base point for 12-nautical mile (nm) territorial waters, in which South Ledge is included. Dr. Abu Bakar pointed out that South Ledge itself can be another base point for territorial waters, introducing Article 13 (1) of the UNCLOS: "It further provides that where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland and or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea."(The Malaysian Bar, May 27)

Regarding the sovereignty of South Ledge, demarcation in the territorial waters between the two nations will be a precondition, in which Indonesia is expected to get involved. Associate Professor Robert Beckman from the NUS Faculty of Law said: "Indonesia may have to intervene in this case because the islands are actually quite close to the Indonesian island of Bintan, which affects their territorial waters." However, Professor Beckman believes an amicable agreement is within reach, given the 'very good' relations between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. (Channel NewsAsia, May 24)

## **1.4 Shipping, Resources, Environment, and Miscellaneous**

### **May 2 “Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers become under state control” (Barents Observer, May 2, 2008)**

Russian state nuclear agency (RosAtom) will take over the management of the country's fleet of eight nuclear-powered icebreakers under the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSCO) from August this year. Since 1994, the state-owned fleet of eight nuclear-powered icebreakers has been managed and run by the MSCO. The transfer to Rosatom will mean a strengthening of Russia state interests in the Northern Shipping Route. The icebreakers will for many years ahead play a vital role for shipping along the 13,000 km long Russian arctic coast.

### **May 6 “Philippines to develop self-claimed island of the Spratly for eco-tourism survey” (International Herald Tribune, May 5, 2008)**

During a week starting on May 6, the Philippine team of marine and eco-tourism experts is to assess the Philippine-occupied Pag-asa Island (PI). The PI is the largest of nine islands and reefs in the Spratly Island claimed by the Philippines. In 1978, proclaiming PI, which lies in the South China Sea about 480 kilometers west of the western Philippine province of Palawan (refer to map) as Kalayaan Township, the Philippine government attached this island to Palawan Province. The island is home to not only soldiers but also a modest community of civilians. The aim of assessment is to find out the possibilities for further development as a diving and eco-tourism location.

Notes: In this island is located a 1,260-meter runway constructed 33 years ago. As to repairing the runway, a Philippine newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, dated 6, reports as follows. Following a visit to the island, the PAF commander, Lieutenant General Pedrito Cadungog, said Air Force is planning to repair the runway, but the problem is how to transport the materials. The current 1,260-meter Rancudo runway built 33 years ago is used for supply, survey, and transport missions for the C-130 Hercules, N22-C Nomad and Navy Islander. However, the runway is slowly washing away into the South China Sea. Both ends and sides of the runway are damaged. Part of the southwest portion is perennially flooded. Cadungog, however, said the runway could still withstand takeoffs and landings even in its present state. But he said they hope to set aside funds for asphaltting. He estimated the total restoration of the runway would cost 200 million pesos (about 4 million US dollar), which would have to come from the military's budget. China, Taiwan, Malaysia and Viet Nam have also staked claims to the resource-rich island group, but they have agreed to respect patrol and overflight rights of claimant countries that maintain military and civilian installations on the parts of the Spratlys they are claiming. Under an existing code of conduct, repairs on the island have been allowed but new construction was prohibited.

Map: The Spratly Islands

Source: Global Security.org

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/spratmap.gif>

**May 6 “U.S., Russia sign pact on civilian nuclear cooperation” (The Washington Post, May 7, 2008)**

On May 6, the United States and Russia signed a long-sought agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. The framework agreement could open the way for Russia to import, store and reprocess thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel that had been supplied by the United States for reactors around the world. This could be a business potentially worth billions of dollars. And it would facilitate joint ventures between the U.S. and Russian nuclear industries. The agreement would also reduce the risk of countries developing their own nuclear fuel facilities that could divert material into weapons programs.

**May 6 “Myanmar invites Thais to help build deep-sea port” (The Bangkok Post, May 6, 2008)**

During his official visit to Thailand, Myanmar’s Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein asked Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to help develop a deep-sea port in Tavoy facing the Andaman Sea. According to Thai Transport Minister Santi Promat, Myanmar is planning to develop Tavoy deep-sea port and an industrial zone in its vicinity to accommodate energy-related industries such as petrochemicals and refineries. Construction of the deep-sea port would cost about 40-50 billion baht (about 1.2 to 1.5 billion US dollar), whereas at least another 100 billion baht (about 3 billion US dollar) would be needed for developing the industrial zone. The PTT Plc, Thailand’s oil giant,

has shown an interest in setting up an oil refinery in Burma. If the refinery was built there, PTT could supply refined oil products to Thailand through pipelines.

### **【Related Story】**

#### **“Thailand, Myanmar sign MOU on deep seaport development” (The Nation, May 21, 2008)**

On May 19, two Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the development of a deep seaport in Tavoy. Construction of the port is projected to take up to six years; management of the port will be contracted to a Thai firm yet to be named.

#### **May 9 “China faces large tanker shortage” (UPI, May 9, 2008)**

China is facing a potential shortage of tankers. According to a recent report of the United Press International (UPI), a prominent Chinese shipping executive commented that by 2015 China will need nearly 150 Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tankers to meet its rising energy needs. For Beijing, the news is bad, as the country's top five shipping companies currently have a combined fleet of 27 VLCCs. VLCC is the second-largest class of tankers, displacing 200,000-320,000 tons, and are capable of carrying two million barrels of oil.

The reality is that, in the short term, China relies on ever-increasing oil imports delivered by sea. The Middle East was responsible for nearly 45 percent of China's oil imports in 2006, while African imports totaled 31.5 percent of China's total crude imports. On the other hand, China's imports from Russia rose by 24.9 percent compared with the previous year. Russian exports move exclusively by rail and pipeline on interior lines. However, in the interim, China will be forced to rely on the Middle East and African nations for more than three-fourths of its energy imports, whose pattern will not shift in the foreseeable future.

According to the aforementioned Chinese shipping executive's observation, China's tanker fleet by 2011 is estimated to increase to only 63 vessels, which will only be able to transport approximately 58 percent of China's crude imports. Over the past decade the costs of constructing a regular VLCC have varied from 70 million US dollar (USD) to 100 million USD. Accordingly, not even accounting for inflation, the cost of constructing 123 new VLCCs could reach 8.6 billion USD to 12.3 billion USD.

Nor would this be all. Maritime transport of oil is not 100 percent safe for Beijing. As the majority of new tankers being built for China will fly China's flag, Chinese navy would be forced to deploy beyond the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea to provide force protection for its merchant marine. Moreover, the Chinese imports must traverse some of the maritime choke points, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca. Even worse is the fact the U.S. Navy is active in both areas.

China has already negotiated pipeline agreements with both Russia and Kazakhstan. In such an environment, it seems that the future will see Beijing seek every conceivable and possible pipeline agreement with its energy-rich neighbors in an attempt to secure its energy imports

while minimizing their vulnerability to the maritime transport.

#### **May 14 “Indonesian press reports : Timor Sea has huge potential gas block” (The Jakarta Post, 14 May 2008)**

According to Upstream Oil and Gas Regulator (BPMigas), a large oil company in Indonesia, a gas field, which is believed to contain the Indonesia's second biggest reserves, was found in the gas development field in the Masela Timor Sea (MTS) in East Nusa Tenggara. Inpex, the Japanese firm, has rights to the MTS gas block as an operator. Data based on a first drilling trial showed it holds a potential reserves of 10 trillion cubic feet, the country's second's biggest after the Tangguh block in Papua with a proven gas reserve of 14.4 trillion cubic feet. This block, operated by British oil giant, BP, is scheduled for production start-up by the end of 2008. Inpex is to submit its development project of the MTS gas block which is estimated to cost seven billion US dollars. The Masela project is expected to involve the construction of a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing terminal with a total capacity expected to reach four million tons a year.

#### **May 19 “Piling work begins on oil bunker hub” (Portworld, May 19, 2008)**

Piling work has begun for the Asia Petroleum Hub (APH) bunker complex on Tanjung Bin Island off the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) in Malaysia. The work would be completed by end-2009, and the complex would be operational in 2010. The APH terminal is expected to handle over 30 million metric tons of petroleum products a year. The project calls for some one million cubic meters (m<sup>3</sup>) of onshore storage capacity and 330,000 m<sup>3</sup> of offshore capacity.

#### **May 22 “China starts biggest ocean research expedition” (China Daily, May 22, 2008)**

On May 22, Chinese science vessel, The *Dayang Yihao* (Ocean No.1) (5,600 tons) with 145 scientists aboard set sail from Guangdong Province for the Pacific, starting a 250-day oceanographic research expedition. The expedition, 20th of its kind, has the largest yet complement of scientists, drawn from 24 domestic scientific and educational institutions, according to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). Chief scientist for the expedition said the current mission would focus on subjects ranging from deep-sea environment, sulfide in seabed hydrothermal activity in the Pacific, bio-genes and biodiversity in the Indian Ocean. In the research operations they will employ the most recent high-tech and new devices developed by the country itself, including an unmanned, remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV) that could observe the sea and collect samples as deep as 3,500 meters. China has accomplished a number of feats since 1995 when the country began its first ocean-going scientific expedition, including circumnavigating the globe between April 2005 and January 2006, and finding a new seabed hydrothermal activity area from the depth of 2,800 meters in Mid-Indian Ocean Ridge on its 19th expedition among others. During the round-the-globe voyage, Chinese scientists brought back more than 1,000 kilograms of hydrothermal sulfide samples containing copper, zinc and precious metals such as gold and silver. The *Dayang Yihao* is scheduled to return to Qingdao late next

January.

In addition the Dayang Yihao, which was remodeled from a Russian vessel in 1994, is the most sophisticated science vessel in China. Beijing currently has a fleet of more than 100 scientific survey vessels excepting her.

The *Dayang Yihao*

Source: CHINA.ORG.CN, January 10, 2007

<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/cw/195615.htm>



## 2. Intelligence Assessment

### **The new U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Revolutionary Innovation or a Lost Opportunity?**

Soon after its release, a number of articles, blogs and emails began to offer interpretations and criticisms of the U.S. new maritime strategy, or “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”<sup>1</sup> The November 2007 issue of this Report offered an initial introduction of the strategy. The spring issue of the U.S. Naval War College Review<sup>2</sup> offers a useful assessment of the strategy. The basic assessment of the strategy is that it provides an accurate and realistic analysis of the current and future global security environment and restores the primacy of seapower in U.S. security policy while failing to prioritize specific threats and to prescribe force structure. Below is an attempt to summarize the accomplishments and challenges of the strategy.

#### 1. Accomplishments

A military strategy must provide an accurate analysis of global security environment for which it is designed and implemented. The new maritime strategy recognizes the complex nature of the globalized world. Improvements in speed, consistency of service, and enormous reductions in the cost of seaborne shipping have changed the global manufacturing system greatly.<sup>3</sup> The maritime domain supports 90 % of world’s trade. Sea commerce supports the growing global economy.

On the other hand, new threats—from conflicts over the marine resources to proliferations of weapons of mass-destructions, massive natural disasters, and maritime crimes—are emerging in the maritime domain. The strategy avoids any reference to a unipolar world but envisions a multipolar or, more precisely, nonpolar international system instead.<sup>4</sup> The strategy fosters “a peaceful global network system comprising interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance” and makes the case that “United States seapower is a force for good, protecting [U.S.] vital interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe.”

The framers of the strategy found that each state, even “rogue” state such as Iran or North Korea, had an “intrinsic” interest in the effective functioning of the global system, of trade, while al-Qaida and its associated groups had “endemic hostility” to the system. Then the concept of protecting the existing global system of trade provided the context for the new strategy.<sup>5</sup> The concept of global commerce system security also provided a basis for a strategy aimed not against a particular enemy but at tying together all the regions of the world. In that sense, the strategy is

<sup>1</sup> Available at [www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Naval War College Review, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Steve Carmel, “Commercial Shipping and the Maritime Strategy,” in Naval War College Review, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2., p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> William T. Pendley, “The New Maritime Strategy: A Lost Opportunity,” in Naval War College Review, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2., pp. 61-2.

<sup>5</sup> Robert C. Rubel, “The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story,” in Naval War College Review, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2., p. 71.

“positive” and “revolutionary.”<sup>6</sup>

The new maritime strategy emphasizes the advantage of seapower to “influence actions and activities at sea and ashore,” thereby restoring the primacy of seapower in U.S. security policy. “...From the Sea” of 1992 had shifted from power at sea to power from the sea. The strategy clearly says goodbye to the two-major-regional-conflict force-shaping strategy of the 1990s which focused on fighting wars on the ground overseas.<sup>7</sup>

The strategy has several other new and postmodern elements. The stress on cooperation and mutual dependence among the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines—to be precise, the partnership between the Navy and Coast Guard, on one hand, and between the Navy and the Marine Corps, on the other hand—is something new. It endorses the thinking behind the concept of Navy-Coast Guard “National Fleet”<sup>8</sup> policy. It is also new that the specific importance was attached to humanitarian aid/disaster relief, not as a “bonus” but as one of the six strategic imperatives. It is noteworthy that the ability for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief is listed equally with traditional core capabilities of forward presence and sea control.<sup>9</sup>

The most striking feature is the Global Maritime Partnership initiative listed as one of the six strategic imperatives. This initiative is also important for two of the six core capabilities—maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. This suggests a move away from traditional and modern thinking of security.<sup>10</sup> The Global Maritime Partnership can also be a “major source of wisdom.” The U.S. Navy can learn from the experiences of Japanese, South Korean, Australian and other Asian navies as it did from Australian High Speed Vehicles. Also The U.S. Navy can learn littoral operations from small navies of Israel, Denmark, Germany and so on.<sup>11</sup>

## 2. Criticism

There are a lot of criticisms about the new maritime strategy. To some extent, this is “inevitable,” for the ten-page document attempts to cover a wide range of issues. It is also a result of compromise among the world-largest navy, marines and coast guard.<sup>12</sup> Many critics offer misinterpretations or at least fails to understand the document, but there are some worth listening.

A military strategy must identify and prioritize threats and provide force structure to deal with those threats. Many argue that the strategy failed to do so, while it provides an accurate and realistic analysis of the new security environment. Some argue that the new maritime strategy is not a “strategy” at all but simply a “vision,” for it does not provide force planners of the three sea services with guidance to relate ways and means to achieve the strategic goals.<sup>13</sup>

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6 Ibid., pp. 71-2.

7 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), “Implementing the Seapower Strategy,” in *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2., p. 49.

8 To read the National Fleet joint Navy/Coast Guard policy statement go to [www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/2006\\_national\\_fleet\\_policy.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/2006_national_fleet_policy.pdf).

9 Geoffrey Till, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: A View from Outside,” in *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2., p. 28.

10 Ibid.

11 Huges, p. 56.

12 Till, p. 29.

13 Till, p. 32.

The strategy catalogues every potential threat but lacks an essential focus. A typical example is that it lists terrorism and WMD proliferation which are the “most dangerous and imminent” threats to the United States in the same breath as piracy and drug/human trafficking. It also pays little attention to the potential conflicts in Korea or the Taiwan Strait where deterrent strategies have maintained the peace.<sup>14</sup>

There is no reference to force planning in the strategy. Some say that this document is an attempt to justify the 2006 Navy Strategic Plan<sup>15</sup> to increase the current 278-ship fleet to 313 during the next three decade.<sup>16</sup> Others argue, however, that although the strategy looks at war-fighting and constabulary roles with much emphasis on the latter, there is no guidance on the relative weight of resources to devote to each end.<sup>17</sup> The strategy calls for global reach for operations from major-power conflict to homeland security and humanitarian assistance, although it admits the U.S. sea services “cannot be everywhere.” A seapower with global reach is not cheap. The strategy fails once again to provide any real priority or focus in force structure to reallocate scarce resources.<sup>18</sup> Thus the Navy missed a “golden opportunity” to convince lawmakers by linking the strategy and equipment needs in a single voice.<sup>19</sup>

The strategy also fails to grasp an “opportunity to reduce America’s military footprint.” Given the economic and political progress in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, redeployment of U.S. forces from these two areas is possible. The United States should be an Atlantic and Pacific power, not a European or an Asian power and pursue an “offshore strategy” that avoids major basing or deployment inside Islamic nations.<sup>20</sup>

The strategy is not a war-fighting strategy but a peacekeeping/peacemaking strategy. However, the current U.S. Navy is not designed to respond effectively to peacemaking/peacekeeping missions.<sup>21</sup> Also, the Global Maritime Partnership is not convincing. Few nations have maritime forces to contribute to such an initiative, and the (temporary) withdrawal of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force from the operation in the Indian Ocean indicates how fragile such an initiative is.<sup>22</sup> International maritime cooperation in piracy, trafficking and interdiction of nuclear materials is “marginal at best” for U.S. military strategy. Instead, such constabulary missions should be and in fact is conducted by the Coast Guard. The Navy’s proposal of a “1,000 ship-navy” or the Global Maritime Partnership is ill suited to building “global constabulary power.”<sup>23</sup> Navy warships, designed for high-intensity war against a major opponent, are too “menacing in regions sensitive to sovereignty and not politically acceptable for duty against maritime crimes and terrorism, while the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum offers

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14 Pendley, pp. 62-3.

15 [http://www.jhuapl.edu/MaritimeRegistry/Documents/nsp\\_2006.pdf](http://www.jhuapl.edu/MaritimeRegistry/Documents/nsp_2006.pdf).

16 Till, p. 31.

17 Hughes, p. 52.

18 Pendley, p. 65.

19 Till, p.32.

20 Pendley, pp. 63-4 and 67.

21 Hughes, p. 51.

22 Pendley, p. 65.

23 Mackenzie M. Eaglen, James Dolbow, Martin Edwin Andersen, and James Jay Carafano, ed., “Securing the High Seas: America’s Global Maritime Constabulary Power,” Heritage Special Report SR-20, March 12, 2008, p. 7. <[http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/sr\\_20.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/sr_20.pdf)>

the best model for future cooperative international regime.<sup>24</sup> The Navy should focus on vitally important mission of sea control to defeat any area-denial strategy of China and to ensure the survival of a credible strategic seaborne nuclear deterrent, while the Coast Guard should be modernized to assume the lead role in constabulary maritime missions, with Navy's support.<sup>25</sup>

Security at sea cannot be accomplished without effective partnerships with the private sector. The private sector operates much more ships than the total number of warships in the world and they do not want to be simple objective of the maritime strategy. International shipping industries does not necessarily share threat perception with navies. Piracy is troublesome but the issue of stowaways is actually more worrisome for them.<sup>26</sup> The private sector views transparency in the maritime domain as problematic as well.<sup>27</sup> However, the private industries are willing and also able to help navies and coast guards build maritime domain awareness (MDA) by participating in trials of MDA technologies or by providing training venues for Coast Guard, Navy and law enforcement personnel. Also, since the U.S. military depends on the commercial transport system for its support of military operations overseas,<sup>28</sup> the private sector's role should not be underestimated in a military strategy.

### 3. A "Revolution" or a "Lost Opportunity?"

In short, the new maritime strategy provides a timely vision for collaborative action. It reaffirms the long-neglected value of seapower and speaks of global reach, the power to influence from the sea and the appropriateness of worldwide partnerships. However, or therefore, the critics argue that there was a lost opportunity to develop a military strategy that would prioritize threats and options and provide the basis for force planning and alliance transformation.

How do the framers of the strategy respond to those critics? The framers identified "potential aggressors" like China, Russia and North Korea but did not regard them as "existential threats." Therefore they gave up "threat-based" planning but instead took "opportunity-based" planning to position maritime forces to "prevent war, protect the global system and create a better peace" without treating some nations as enemies.<sup>29</sup> This might be a reason why the strategy has received some positive reviews from the Chinese.<sup>30</sup>

As for force structure, they gave it up since it was impossible to find a solution to controversy over force structure. Some called for capabilities for new missions such as homeland defense, the Long War and humanitarian assistance, while others demanded high-end combat capabilities for "kinetic" missions. Instead of taking sides, they provided a basis from which future force structure could be deduced.<sup>31</sup> The exact numbers and types of forces required are not self-evident and subject to analysis and gaming.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>26</sup> Carmerl., P. 43-4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>29</sup> Rubel, p. 72.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 72-3.

The new maritime strategy is obviously a departure from the old thinking of strategy, reflecting the reality of the new era. It is a “necessary foundation, but not sufficient.”<sup>32</sup> This strategy is not a “national” strategy, but a strategy of the three U.S. sea services. The problem is the lack of coherent U.S. national military strategy for this new era.<sup>33</sup> In formulating grand strategy, it is necessary to reconsider the new relationships with the Army and Air Force. Since the maritime infrastructure—from ships to ports—depends on space and cyberspace, the Air Force’s roles in space and cyberspace have important implications to maritime strategy.<sup>34</sup>

The world is 70 percent water and the maritime strategy should be the center of U.S. grand strategy. The development process of the maritime strategy was not a “lost opportunity,” but provides an opportunity to facilitate a new dialogue on national grand strategy.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Hughes, p. 58.

<sup>33</sup> Pendley, p. 68.

<sup>34</sup> “Securing the High Seas: America’s Global Maritime Constabulary Power,” p. 4.

<sup>35</sup> Rubel, p. 76.

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